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Contents

Defining the Phenomenon of Radicalization in Pakistan

Introduction

The commonly accepted definitions of radicalism and radicalization are borrowed from Western scholars and are generally believed to be not as relevant in the Pakistani context. These definitions reflect the Western authors' respective environments and perspectives. In view of this, PIPS started a series of sessions in September 2008, besides conducting interviews with scholars from various disciplines. The sessions are still in progress. The objective is to appropriately draw an outline of the phenomenon of radicalization in Pakistan's context.

While exploring the subject through holding sessions and interviews, it was noted that the speakers generally proceeded directly to explaining the causes and factors that contribute to radicalization, instead of discussing definitional issues to any considerable extent. A serious effort to address the definitional aspects of the phenomenon continues to lack in the presentations made by the speakers as well as in interviewees' responses. The presentations have helped to broaden the scope of the discourse but definitional aspects have not been focused on to the extent desired. To expand the debate, two Western scholars were also invited who addressed the subject in the global context with an emphasis on Western states and societies. Summarized versions of the sessions and interviews held so far are being furnished in the following pages.[1]

Definition

Almost all speakers alluded to the difficulty in achieving consensus definitions for social phenomena and said that radicalization was no exception. It was agreed that radicalization is not necessarily a religious phenomenon. Rais opined that the definitions by Prince and the like serve the purpose.[2] On the other hand, Iqbal and Akhlaq were of the view that Western definitions of the phenomenon do not help. Almost all of the speakers agreed that radicalization is a neutral term, without negative or positive connotations. It was also agreed that radicals want to bring change in society.

Mumtaz emphasized that identifying a person as a moderate or a radical depended on the political context or on one's ideological perspective. He differed with Roy's definition of Muslim radicalism. Islam and Dolnik identified it as a group phenomenon. Islam described terrorism and radicalization as one. Sufi shed light on the legal aspects of the phenomenon with a focus on international law and treaties. He called radicalization a mindset of deviation from law.

Factors

Most of the speakers observed that the major causes of the phenomenon are political. Some others, however, were of the view that political and religious causes and motives are interconnected. Sham asserted that there are no religious factors involved at all. Rais and Islam talked about Muslim states while elaborating the factors of radicalization in the Muslim world. Rais pointed out that Muslim States had failed to perform their fundamental functions in the post-colonial period. Islam alluded to the powerlessness of Muslim States as a source of increased frustration among certain groups in the Muslim world. Such groups are not content with the prevailing world order under which none of the Muslim States is among the major international powers.

Hoodbhoy also identified *mullas* as a factor. Other factors mentioned by more than one scholar included deprivation (Rahman, Javed, Akhlaq and Islam), lack of justice (Rahman, Javed and Hoodbhoy), inequality (Rais and Sham), ignorance (Sham and Yad), and poverty (Hoodbhoy and Yad). Factors mentioned by only one speaker included absence of constitutional means and human freedom, a biased social structure and weak law and order (Rais); globalization, society's vengeful attitudes, unjust policies of the government, unjust use of power (Rahman); oppression (Javed); xenophobia, suffocation and confusion (Akhlaq); feelings of hatred, helplessness and hopelessness (Islam); cultural problems and financial issues (Sham); illiteracy (Yad); and indoctrination in schools (Hoodbhoy).

Rahman elaborated radicalization in the historical perspective, focusing on the Indian Subcontinent.

A. Sessions

Rasul Bakhsh Rais
Professor of Political Science at School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Lahore University of Management Sciences

Absence of constitutional means, human freedom, unequal distribution of wealth, a biased social structure and a fragile law and order situation produce radical movements in the developing or developed societies. The following points seem to be important:

1. Radicalism primarily rejects the existing means of political participation and finds the prevailing social, economic and political institutions inadequate to address the grievances of the society.

2. Radicals and radicalism are about fundamental structural change in all spheres of societal life, including political and economic relations and social hierarchies.

3. Radicalism popularizes new ideologies, questions the legitimacy and relevance of the old ones and believes that existing ideologies have no answer to contemporary problems.

4. Radicalism creates a myth about change as a constructive and progressive term.

Communism or Marxism is considered a radical ideology because it questions the legitimacy and advocacy of existing institutions. Marxism and anarchism justify violent means to topple the existing system. Islamic religious movements should be examined very closely as we cannot lump all of them together. Radical groups always have a radical ideology or agenda.

The post-colonial Muslim States failed to perform their fundamental functions i.e. ensuring justice, social development, rule of law, security and safety of the individuals, human freedoms and constitutional values and institutions.

In addition, social and economic forces play a vital role in the spread of radicalization in Muslim countries. When people are not treated in the same way at the social level and lack the opportunities available to the elite, they are either forced to accept their deprivation as their fate or hold the system responsible for it. When they revolt against the system they are declared radicals by the elite.

Radicalization is a neutral term. Conservatives do not accept radicalism because it challenges the existing institutions. Although the era of radical or revolutionary change is history now, such a change can take place when all other avenues of political participation are closed. The only solution to the existing chaos is a non-violent democratic struggle.

Tariq Rahman
Distinguished National Professor & Director National Institute of Pakistan Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad

Radicalism is not necessarily a religious phenomenon. It can occur in any ideological or secular leaning. It is secular. In fact, when Israel was created there was a group which was similarly indulging in terrorism, placing bombs, threatening the British and other forces to accept their demands. They practiced terrorism which culminated in the creation of Israel.

The native population responded in three ways to the British colonization of India.

a) Confrontation

b) Resignation and withdrawal

c) Cooperation

The first native response to colonialism was confrontation with the British colonial power starting in 1831. It was a precursor to any future action by the native population, even against the military.

The second response was resignation and withdrawal. Some people went to madrassas in a bid to preserve the past. In a way, madrassas were and are seen as a source of preservation of the past and of a distinct identity. That is why one sees that the madrassa has strong emotional attachment with the Dars-e-Nizami, the basic syllabus followed by the vast majority of madrassas in South Asia. Some of the Dars-e-Nazami texts date back to the thirteenth century. Urdu translation of the original texts, in Arabic, is now available but the old texts are still recommended for the sake of continuity and preservation of the past. The Dars-e-Nizami itself is not radical as some writers would have us believe.

The third response was cooperation with and subordination to the colonial rulers. It also meant becoming part of the modern state's large bureaucracy.

Those waging *jihad* were a small group. A group of young people was ready to use force in order to achieve political aims. They were committed enough to use force against the dignitaries of the empire. The planned to destroy the empire but failed.

If we go further back, both Shias and Sunnis considered Kharijites as extremists, who were seen as people who would fight till the end. Such commitment was also there in the late seventh century. But when we see the same phenomenon in the modern era, we find things like forced motivation, etc. That is why people call it a new phenomenon. It has different manifestations due to modernity. The phenomenon is challenging the status quo and this challenge leads to conflict. The anarchist challenge in the late 19th century was a similar example. The anarchists thought that by creating enough disruption and terrorism, they could destroy the State and make human beings happy. It was a secular phenomenon.

The Marxists in Latin American and many other countries formed groups to fight against the State. Several of these groups thought that they could establish a better world and claimed to have a roadmap for that purpose.

Why do extremists groups succeed? Because they have a strong sense of grievance, which easily transforms into the response referred to here as radicalization. For example, the Chechen people took on the Russians out of the same strong sense of grievance against them.

The historical context motivates people to react or take on the system. The following factors are instrumental in the emergence of the phenomenon.

1. Role of the ruling elite (corruption)

2. Frustration among the deprived

3. Framework of the society

In Pakistan's context those who are armed, trained and have anti-US sentiments have the ability to create an environment where such phenomenon may emerge –where people stand up against the system or the State. The same thing happened in Indian-held Kashmir, leading to radicalization of the people.

Deregulation and globalization etc. are also factors that cause radicalization in a society. Other factors include lack of justice, vengeful attitudes in a society, unjust policies of the government/State, unjust use of power, and a sense of deprivation and its psychological impact. Class discrimination in a society also contributes to the phenomenon of radicalization.

The radicals' mindset is to bring 'change' in society because they are not satisfied with the existing order. In order to overcome the impact of radicalization on our system we must first recognize our weaknesses and mistakes and remove all the sources that fuel anger and grievances in society.

Mumtaz Ahmed
Executive Director Iqbal International Institute for Research and Dialogue, International Islamic University, Islamabad

The definitions of moderates and radicals keep on changing. They are determined by the political context or one's ideological perspective. An individual or a group is radical in one context and moderate in another. For example, the last generation of Taliban was considered moderate when they were fighting against the Soviets. In a famous quote, Brezezinski said, "We have to make a distinction between good fundamentalists and bad fundamentalists. The good fundamentalists are the Afghan *Mujahideen* who are fighting against the Soviets and the bad fundamentalists are the Iranians who are opposing us."

An individual may be extremely radical with regard to religion but moderate politically. Those belonging to the *Tablighi Jamaat*, the non-political *salafis,* may be called radicals but politically they probably are not. I do not agree with the first element of Olivier Roy's definition of Muslim radical movements,[3] in which he says that Muslim radicals 'call for a return of Muslims to the true tenets of Islam' because the *Tablighi Jamaat* also calls for a return to the Quran and *Sunnah* but they are not radicals.

Javed Iqbal
Professor, Department of Psychology, International Islamic University, Islamabad

When people's psyches are different, just like fingerprints and irises, how can we have one psychological definition of radicalization.

I believe that the creators of abstract ideas are western scholars and think-tanks. We (the Easterners) are at the second level, i.e. of utilization of experiences and ideas. Definitions of radicalization are also coined by Western scholars. After going through a huge volume of research, particularly that available on the internet, I have concluded that we accept any definition or idea from the West as the last word. We have not come up with a definition of radicalization reflecting our own perspective.

The major causes of radicalization are:

1. Sociopolitical:

    a) *Oppression:* The more oppression is there, the more radicalized people will become.

    b) *Lack of justice:* Human rights violations and injustices lead to radicalization among the masses.

2. Economic:

    When the gap between haves and have-nots increases, people become radicals.

3. Psychological

    Three types of 'genocides' can also cause radicalization:

    a) of one's beliefs

    b) of one's lifestyle

    c) of one's values and ideology

Qazi Javed
Resident Director, Pakistan Academy of Letters, Lahore

In this part of the world, the use of weapons and resort to aggression has become more frequent over time. Though the people here already had a religious background, religion has been brought into the political spectrum for the first time. Recent interpretations of religion have pushed some people towards activism. This has led them to violence and blatant use of weapons.

Ahmer Bilal Sufi
Director Research Society of International Law

Radicalism or radicalization is a mindset, which may be called religious aggression or violation of religion. In fact, it is a mindset of deviation from law. In my view, when someone deviates from law, he behaves as a radical. Law is not a metaphor but a symbol of the expression of state's authority. Deviation from that authority takes place due to two reasons; firstly, when someone does not regard the law of the land as law; and secondly, when someone thinks that *Shariah* is what he perceives it to be and if the country's law is a hurdle in the implementation of his version of *Shariah* he will disregard it. This approach provides the basis for radicalization.

Furthermore, because of ignorance about the law people do not actually realize when they have crossed the line. Pakistan has signed over 50,000 agreements and treaties with other states. But people are not aware of them and of their implications. Sometimes they also violate these international agreements without even realizing that they have done so.

Zafarullah Khan
Director Centre for Civic Education, Islamabad

The discourse of defining the phenomena is very strange. Terms of radicalization, extremism and terrorism are viewed as interchangeable. The phenomenon of radicalization is about bringing reform or change, which can be categorized further. Defining radicalization is tricky. Primarily, it seems that these are two competing worldviews. In fact, there are so many functional elements in these definitions. These elements demarcate the instrumentality of a term as well as identify its parameters. Another difficulty is that the term radicalization has to be used with reference to something or someone. One has to specify the context.

Akhlaq Ahmed
Associate Professor, Department of Sociology, International Islamic University, Islamabad

Religious elements in our society, whom we call radicals, are very vulnerable to manipulation by others. They have no motive of their own. They have been sacrificing for the state or for private interests of others. They have never played any role for societal rights or any broader social change.

The kinds of radicalization we experience presently, like bomb explosions, should be seen as a response to social deprivation. These are manifestations of xenophobia and these people are committing such acts out of frustration. It clearly means that the people we call Pakistani Taliban are neither radicals nor extremists. They are struggling for their defence and survival. I call them 'alienated' rather than 'radicals'. The reason is that they are cut off from the whole process. Following are the causes of prevailing chaos in Pakistani society:

i)   Deprivation and alienation

ii) Xenophobia

iii) Suffocation

iv) Confusion

We have to see whether the Western discourse on radicalism is relevant in the Pakistan's context. Secondly, it needs to be determined whether those identified as radicals in Pakistan are really that. And, if the answer is in the affirmative, what are the motives that have attracted them, or the forces that have pushed them towards radicalism?

It seems that the definitions we see in the discourse do not conform to the situation prevalent in Pakistan. In fact, origins of various radical movements in other parts of the world can be found in denial of certain rights and privileges. When we try to see the available definitions in the Pakistan's context we find that none of the radical movements in Pakistan, whether political or religious, was based on a demand for certain rights. Though the issues are there in some pockets, we do not observe any clash between haves and have-nots in Pakistan. We have never observed a phenomenon of overall social change. That means the definitions of radicalization borrowed from the West do not help.

The questions that need to be stressed are: who do we identify as religious extremists? Is someone using them? Are these people instruments for others?

Are they self-motivated or motivated by others? All of that needs to be analyzed.

Keeping the Western definitions of radicalization in mind, when we look at these people we learn that they have been playing in to others' hands, sometimes against the Soviets, and at other times against someone else. Iran used Pakistan's Shia community and some parties used the Sunni community against the Shias. These are among the couple of examples of radicalism we have in the entire history of Pakistan. There is such suffocation in our society that the people are afraid of disclosing their religious identities. The society does not provide them with a room to express their views. Dissent is not tolerated.

Muhammad Islam
Professor of Political Science, Bahria University, Islamabad

Radicalization is a group phenomenon where views and actions become violent in a comparative perspective. Radicalization is generally described as a situation in which groups, or society as a whole, resort to violent tactics. But that would be an incomplete definition. Radicalization actually occurs at the level of perceptions/ideas – or ideology – before the action or strategy level. And all this happens in a 'comparative perspective' where a group compares its values, notions and perspectives with that of another group. And members of the former group conclude that the two views are not compatible and that they need to achieve their goals in a different manner. They do not resort to negotiations. Consequently, they are of the firm belief that the best way to achieve their objectives is through violence.

There are a number of reasons for emergence of radical ideologies. Different religious sectors become radical against each other because of the feelings of hatred. These feelings are born when the leaders of rival sectors fail to cultivate arguments against each other's concepts and beliefs and become radical in their approach. Secondly, deprivation is undermining the basic rights of the common people. Helplessness and hopelessness are also among major contributing factors to radicalization. When gaps between values, expectations and achievements widen, particular groups of a society become segmented. Their approach becomes cohesive. And, they indulge in violence for achieving their aims.

Psychological reasons also lead to breeding of radical ideologies at times. When people cannot realize their dreams, they rapidly become radical against the existing system and try for a 'revolution' in all spheres of society.

A sense of deprivation is at its highest in Muslim societies that are more fragmented than the Western ones. Radicals and terrorists are both the same as they use violence as a major tactic to pursue their aims.

Stephan Tankel
Associate Fellow at the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence, King's College, London

Desire for revenge is also a factor behind radical (violent) behavior. Resorting to violent means points to the belief that non-violent means have failed and something must be done.

People also become radicalized when they share oversimplified view of the world and when everything is viewed in terms of black and white. Radicals see the world in terms of us versus them. 'Them' is the enemy. Mahatma Gandhi and Anwar Sadaat were assassinated by people of their own faith and nation.

While seeking to understand what can lead people to embrace such extreme worldview, a possible perspective is 'relative poverty' that is more important than absolute poverty. A sense of humiliation, political grievances and breakdown of existing culture or political structure are behind radicalization in developed countries. Rapid modernization is a vital factor in developing countries. These conditions make people radical or more vulnerable to radical ideologies and groups.

Richard agrees and suggests three ingredients of radicalization: a disaffected individual; a complicit community – a person who is unhappy and a community that is willing to support them in their unhappiness; and, an ideology that legitimizes violence.

In the US and the UK, some of these factors exist and have led to the radicalization of a number of groups. During the 1970s, the businesses and farms of a number of white Christians in the US, particularly in the Western part, closed and they faced widespread unemployment. The US was entering a post-civil rights era at the time. A movement that called itself Christian Identity was growing. It espoused radical religious anti-government sentiments and the people were driven by the belief that the government had betrayed white Christian America in favor of multiculturalism and of people following other religions.

Christian Identity propagated that the government was out to get 'white Christians'. It painted blacks, Jews and other racial and religious groups as the enemy. Christian Identity argued that the government had betrayed them and, therefore, true white Christians of America needed to wage war both

against the government and against the people who were being favored by the government.

In the UK, injustice and humiliation were among the causes of radicalization. The term 'Muslim Penalty' refers to many British Muslims of Pakistani descent who suffer from relative poverty and are effectively excluded from the British society. They feel that they are suffering because of their ancestral background. Muslims in the UK are susceptible to a widespread perception that frames all of these issues as a war against Islam and victimization of followers of the religion.

Muslims see themselves as belonging more to the *Ummah* than to the British society. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have had a strong radicalizing impact. In the UK, radicalization spreads through the internet, books and talking to likeminded friends. The message is disseminated through personal mentors and private locations. In the US, recruits are enlisted through more broad and public networks and over time shifted to violent wings of the movement. Recruitments take place through family ties, business and professional relationships, social gatherings, places of worship, meetings, rallies and protests. Prisons have also been effective avenues for recruitment. The internet has been seen as a problem, attracting potential recruits on its own. This has been reported more in the case of Muslims in the UK than Christians in the US.

Activists and facilitators motivate themselves to find new recruits. In the UK, self-recruited people remain in touch with people in Pakistan. In USA, self-recruited people seek support locally, not necessarily through the internet. Timothy McVeigh, perpetrator of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, and those behind the 7/7 bombings in the UK were alienated people.

Supporting a movement is not the same as joining it. Joining is not the same as acting to support violence, which, in turn, is not the same as committing violence. It is a multi-stage process. Most of the people join the movement to support it rather than commit violence themselves. Religion is used to rationalize violence. Eric Robert Rudolph, architect of the 1996 Centennial Olympic Park bombing in the US, used the language of the Bible to justify his action. In the UK, the 7/7 bombers, also justified their action in religious terms.

Adam Dolnik
Director Research Programs and Senior Research Fellow at Center for Transnational Crime Prevention, University of Wollongong, Australia

There is something more than mere psychological forces, which motivates people to become radical. Radicalism and terrorism are strategic choices by

radicals and terrorists to correct their perceived or stated sense of deprivation, grievances or injustice.

Researchers use different definitions of radicalism and terrorism, which makes it essentially very difficult to build on other peoples' conclusions, and also confuses the concepts and causative factors. Secondly, most of the studies in this regard are very descriptive and event-driven. The 'firefighter approach' to studying the subject and the western bias are also hurdles in the analysis of how and why people become radicals and terrorists. At the same time, enclosed circular research systems, difference in statistics and limits of retrospective account of events create hurdles in researching the subject.

Psychological, physiological, organizational/group study approaches, root-cause narratives, and social network analyses are used to study the factors of radicalism and terrorism.

There are four stages to homegrown radicalism in some Western countries: pre-radicalization, cognitive openings, self-radicalization, and the concept of jihadization. Cognitive opening is a situation where one is ready to take another look at what s/he believes and that completely changes one's perspective. It is frequently triggered by thematic events, even television reports or divorce of one's parents and so on. A cognitive opening is really the key to people becoming radicalized. Self-radicalization mostly happens at home when people access websites, videos, profiles etc., on the internet. Self-radicalization leads to jihadization.

B. Interviews

Hussein Naqi[4]
National Coordinator for HRCP Core Groups

Western thinkers deem that radicalism is a synonym for being irrational. But that is not true. 'Being irrational' may be called extremism or fanaticism. So many words can be used to describe that, but not radicalism or radicalization. In many articles, radicalization has been taken as something negative. But, radicalization is required to bring about urgently-needed change in many fields of human activity in underdeveloped and developing countries. In Pakistan, we need radicalization in agriculture through drastic land reforms, transferring ownership to actual tillers. At the same time, Pakistan needs to guard against radicalization under the garb of religion and against subverting national political philosophy to promote terrorism. Basically, radicalization means willingness to change one's way of thinking. That would require openness to new ideas and to drastically changing one's opinion and views. Such a change would generally be dictated by objective conditions and their

appreciation by the sections of society enjoying influence over the attitudes and behavior of the public at large.

Radicalization would generate extremism in the assertion of the righteousness and finality of one's beliefs and their supremacy. In Pakistan, the motives behind radicalization are patently political. Radicalization, extremism and terrorism are dissimilar terms. Radicalization means a drastic change accepted willingly about a particular issue. Extremism is the acceptance or adoption of an irrational position about any issue. Terrorism means forcible imposition of ideas, agendas or views, etc. on the unwilling. To differentiate *jihad* from terrorism, we can say that today *jihad* would be a painstaking exercise conducted to improve the conditions of life for those subjected to deprivation on various counts, whereas terrorism is to impose one's diktats through lethal tools or instruments.

Ayesha Siddiqa[5]
Writer and independent defense and political analyst

Radicalization signifies lack of communication in a society and end of dialogue. Radicalization is linked with poverty which not only means lack of resources but absence of opportunities and political culture to improve an individual's social existence. Political and religious motives of radicalization are interlinked. Radicalization, extremism and terrorism are also connected. Radicalization is a state of mind. Terrorism is a tool to achieve objectives that a radical mind creates. *Jihad* is a defensive war as opposed to terrorism.

Kishwar Naheed[6]
Distinguished poet, writer and human rights activist

Radicalization in Pakistan was and has been a state-sponsored movement since the regime of military ruler Ziaul Haq under the supervision and funding of the US. That movement – in the form of Saudi- and Iranian-funded madrassas – spread all over FATA, in Turbat, interior Sindh and Southern Punjab. A spirit of *jihad* was provoked among the children of large and chronically poor families through the teachings of the Quran and *Hadith*, through rustic interpretations by Imams and madrassa teachers. The radical ideology's basic elements are keeping women confined in domestic courtyards and rejecting all electronic and print media that portrays an enlightened social structure.

Religion never propagates or promotes radicalism. It teaches tolerance and human respect irrespective of gender. But radicalization negatively affects the overall perception about religion. In Pakistan, radicalization has been

promoted and continues to be promoted by religious clerics with the knowledge and tacit approval of the state.

Both religious and political motives are blended together by the colonial-minded superpower that engages and takes into confidence the local and national politicians in combination with tribal leaders.

Radicals may not be terrorists but they do not reject terrorism as un-Islamic.

Pervez Hoodbhoy[7]
Professor of Nuclear Physics, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad

Mullas' propaganda in mosques and madrassas, indoctrination in schools, and poverty, and societal injustice are the basic factors leading to radicalization in Pakistan. Radicalization leads to terrorism.

Fateh Muhammad Burfat[8]
Chairman and Professor Department of Sociology, Criminology and Population Sciences, University of Karachi

Radicalization means intolerance, an inflexible attitude and considering oneself as perfectly right. Insufficient information is also a characteristic of radicalization. Radicals wrongly interpret religion, which has nothing to do with radicalization. Factors and objectives of radicalization are political in nature. Religion is being used to achieve political goals. The common people in Pakistan are not radicals. A culture of radicalization has been promoted by design to achieve certain objectives.

Sajid-ur-Rehman[9]
Editor Fikr-o-Nazr, Seerat Section, Islamic Research Institute, International Islamic University, Islamabad

Radicalization means imposing one's opinion on others. A faulty education system is the strongest factor in radicalization in Pakistan. Social and economic injustices are also among its causes. Economic deprivations also play a role in the spread of radicalism. Those trying to implement the Islamic system through radical means, i.e. by using force, are creating a wrong impression of Islam. Islam is spreading because of the study of the Quran and Sunnah, not because of *jihadi* organizations.

Political factors of radicalization are more important than religious ones. At national and international levels, many powers are involved in it, which are leading people towards radicalization in the name of religious and economic issues.

There is a clear-cut distinction between *jihad* and terrorism. *Jihad* is waged when a country's geographical boundaries are under attack or someone conspires against it. But to announce *jihad* is the government's prerogative. Individuals and groups are not authorized to do that. How can you characterize killing your Muslim brethren as *jihad*?

Mavara Inayat[10]
Associate professor, Department of International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad

Radicalization is an attitude of mind where violence is not used. Basic factors of radicalization include individuals' interaction with radical groups; role of madrassas preaching radicalization; and the actions of US forces in Afghanistan, damaging lives and property. Radicalization has no room in Islam, a religion of peace and moderation. Politics has played a large part in the advent of radicalization in the region. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in the 1980s, post-9/11 US and NATO occupation of Afghanistan and the so-called war on terror have played a significant role in the spread of radicalization.

Shahzad Iqbal Sham[11]
Assistant Professor, Sharia Academy, International Islamic University, Islamabad

Radicalization means trying to impose one's opinion upon others. It is being rigid in one's views. Considering the 'imported' definitions of radicalization, America's War of Independence can also be categorized as radical.

Radicalization is not confined to religion. It can be in any form. A minister, a senior or junior officer, a driver, a cleric or anyone else can be a radical. Ignorance is one of the basic factors of radicalization. Unless the components of culture and civilization - particularly in the case of Pakistan - are corrected, the problem cannot be solved. Cultural institutions have fallen apart. For example, mothers do not look after their children properly. There are no religious factors involved at all. The real factors of radicalization are political forces, political powers and political figures. In Pakistan's context, radicalization is caused by economic inequality and financial issues.

Mansha Yad[12]
Prominent Fiction Writer and Playwright of Pakistan

Radicalization is an extreme point of view pertaining to religion, politics or any other sphere of life. Illiteracy, poverty and ignorance are basic elements of radicalization. In Pakistan, we see radical elements carrying out suicide bombings and killing innocent people, destroying schools and places of learning for females, delivering lectures only on *jihad* in Friday prayer

sermons, burning and destroying CD shops. The radicals do not let people speak their minds.

Ashfaq Saleem Mirza[13]
Director Media, South Asia Free Media Association (SAFMA), Islamabad

Radicalization is a complete and comprehensive change in existing socioeconomic and political situation in the context of progressive ideas. Political motives of radicalization are more important than religious ones. Ideology, political will, mass appeal and commitment are basic elements of radicalization. The concept of radicalization is different from the concepts of jihad, extremism and terrorism.

Notes and References

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[1] Findings of the subsequent sessions will be published in the next issue.

[2] Two definitions were presented in the session before his address. One by David Prince that characterized radicalization as "The process by which an individual becomes open to the prospect of committing … terrorist acts." (Opening statement of Congressman David Price, chairman House Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security, March 12, 2008, http://appropriations.house.gov/pdf/PriceDHSScienceTechnology03-12-08.pdf, retrieved on Feb 28, 2008.) The other definition is by Gregory Saathoff that radicalization is "the process by which (people) adopt extreme views, including beliefs that violent measures need to be taken for political or religious purposes …." (Testimony for the US Commission on Civil Rights, http://www.religionandsocialpolicy. org/docs/legal/cases/rl_dscrm_prsn_cs/GregorySaathoffCvlRghtsComm.pdf, retrieved on Feb 28, 2009.)

[3] According to Olivier Roy, Islamic radicalism is a combination of two elements: a call for the return of all Muslims to the true tenets of Islam or what is perceived as such; and, a political militancy against the foes of Islam who could include existing Muslim rulers. Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1994).

[4] Interview with Noureen, M.A. 3rd semester, Department of Defence and Strategic Studies (DSS), Quaid-i-Azam University (QAU), Fall 2008, Islamabad, Nov 2008.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Interview with Umaira Qaisar, M.A. 3rd semester, DSS, QAU, Fall 2008, Islamabad, Nov 2008.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Interview with Asif Ali, M.A. 3rd semester, DSS, QAU, Fall 2008, Islamabad, Nov 2008.

[9] Interview with Mujtaba Rathore, Islamabad, Nov. 2008.

[10] Interview with Abdul Karim Liaqat, M.A. 4th semester, Department of International Relations, QAU, Fall 2008, Islamabad, Nov 2008.

[11] An interview with Mujtaba Rathore, Islamabad, Nov. 2008.

[12] Interview with M. Ajmal Shabbir M.A. 3rd semester, DSS, QAU, Fall 2008, Islamabad, Nov 2008.

[13] Interview with Moazam Bashir Tarar, M.A. 3rd semester, DSS, QAU, Fall 2008, Islamabad, Nov 2008.

Abstracts

Mapping the Madrassa Mindset: Political Attitudes of Pakistani Seminaries

Muhammad Amir Rana

Pakistani madrassas are seen as a catalyst promoting extreme views. Their role in shaping the views of their students and the masses and their affiliation with political, sectarian and militant organizations is viewed as a serious concern.

Based on a survey and interviews with madrassa teachers, this study is aimed at determining the political attitudes of the clergy that controls madrassas. It finds political affiliations among the majority of the madrassas surveyed. It was found that seminaries were reluctant to disclose their sectarian and militant association. There is an overwhelming opposition to the military operations in the tribal areas as well as to the role being played by Pakistan in the international campaign against terrorism. The majority of the madrassas blame the presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan for suicide bombings in Pakistan. The majority also backs the democratic process in the country and a peaceful solution of the Kashmir dispute. It considers the departure of foreign troops from Afghanistan would resolve the conflict in the war-ravaged country.

Radicalization in Pakistan: Sociocultural Realities

Muhammad Azam

Radicalization in Pakistan has occupied the center stage in debates and has become a major concern for governments in the region and beyond. This study is an effort to explore sociocultural factors of radicalization in Pakistan. The paper's theme revolves around the idea that Pakistan's sociocultural structure is changing and complex processes of social transformation are underway. However, the primary concern is direction of change, which is negative in general, and positive only partly. It alludes to the point that the change tends to be more in favor of the radical forces than peaceful sociocultural agents. Increase in the levels of radicalization over the decades shows that the overall social change has been in favor of radicalism.

The paper addresses the process of socialization, sociocultural change, political culture, economic culture, folk culture, culture of education, local culture and monoculture to bring various aspects of the topic to the fore. It is argued that Pakistan's sociocultural realities are a factor, albeit an indirect one, behind radicalization. Direct causes of radicalization in Pakistan are other than sociocultural. Government policies, political expediencies and international actors draw attention more immediately when it comes to defining the factors of the phenomenon of radicalization in Pakistan. Sociocultural factors revolve around the Pakistani culture of education, which is extremely skewed; religious culture, which is polarized and sectarian; and economic culture, which is widely unequal.

Post 9/11 Peace Narrative in Pakistan

Shabana Fayyaz

The article highlights the critical need to formulate a consensus-based counter-terrorism policy in Pakistan. The absence of a holistic vision of peace acceptable to all stakeholders in Pakistan is the biggest challenge to this. The article argues that the post-9/11 peace narrative lacks unity that needs building of trust and harmony based on mutual respect and tolerance. Three competing peace narratives are identified: (a) the view of the government or the establishment, (b) religious perspective and (c) political argument to foster peace at the micro and macro levels in Pakistan. The article concludes that all stakeholders need to work toward a consensus-based sustainable peace that should be indigenous in its outlook and character.

Radicalization in Sri Lanka

Ranga Kalansooriya

If radicalization is defined as "affecting the basic nature or most important features of something"—basically societal in nature in this context—"or holding extreme political or revolutionary views", Sri Lanka provides ample evidence of how things can go out of spiral after being affected by a protracted civil war.

The country has been a victim of ethnically motivated extremist nationalistic movements, which resulted in the emergence of brutal terrorism. However, religious fundamentalism and ethnic nationalism have fuelled the situation to a point where a negotiated political settlement seems far from reality given the present context of the conflict. Radicalization is rampant in all segments of

religious and political systems in the country. The paper presents arguments about radicalization in Sri Lanka in two main categories – political radicalization and religious radicalization.

Human Rights Reporting in Pakistani Media

Safdar Sial

The print and electronic media journalists in Pakistan do not have the expertise, finances or training to investigate and report on human rights issues. Journalists have to report amid a range of threats, pressures and curbs, including censorship from within their media organizations, as well as external constraints. These capacity gaps and reporting constraints restrict media organizations to keep on pursuing small event-based packages in the electronic media and narrative stories in the print media, which lack thoroughness. There is also a lack of conviction and commitment among most of the journalists covering human rights. However, in some cases, the level of conviction and commitment is remarkable.

There is a considerable indifference among journalists regarding human rights issues and violations, more so in the Urdu media. Many journalists are also skeptical of human rights organizations and view human rights as western agenda. The electronic media's coverage of rights issues is somewhat more investigative, presenting viewpoints of the victims and/or their families. Human rights activists and experts are invited to electronic media programs to talk about human rights issues. The Urdu media relies much on sensationalization and personal bias, and its reporting of human rights issues generally lacks investigation.

Mapping the Madrassa Mindset: Political Attitudes of Pakistani Seminaries

Muhammad Amir Rana

Introduction

The role of Pakistani madrassas features prominently in the debate on terrorism. They are perceived as a crucial medium for promoting extreme religious, sectarian, social and political views. They are projected as no longer focused on producing the next generation of religious scholars but dominating the education system as a whole.[1] Many analysts view that although not all madrassas have direct links with terrorism,[2] approximately 10-15 percent do.[3] At the same time, madrassas' role in shaping radical views among the masses, and specifically among their students is a serious concern for many analysts and policymakers.[4] Their affiliations with political, sectarian and militant organizations are a cause of concern. Such affiliations may drive their administrations and students toward an increased political role of these madrassas.

It is important to look at the political attitudes of madrassa teachers – who are instrumental in shaping students' views – and to explore whether it is similar to or differs from that of the general political attitudes in Pakistan. The study is an attempt in that direction.

The study also addresses a range of other issues related to the efforts aimed at curbing extremism in the post 9/11 scenario. Based on a survey of 251 madrassas across the country belonging to five madrassa education boards – the Wafaqul Madaris Al-Arabia of the Deobandi school of thought, the Tanzeemul Madaris Pakistan of the Barelvi school of thought, the Wafaqul Madaris Al-Shia of the Shia school of thought, the Wafaqul Madaris Al-Salfia of the Ahle Hadith school of thought, and the Rabitatul Madaris Al-Islamia run by the Jamaat-e-Islami. The study attempts to document the opinion of representatives of a sector which houses and imparts religious education to more than a million girls and boys. The main objective of this study is to highlight and incorporate the opinion of the madrassa sector in the ongoing debate on how to rein in the growing religious intolerance and violence in Pakistan and abroad.

The questions put to seminary teachers were designed to elicit their response on a variety of issues that affect public perceptions directly or indirectly. Primarily, the purpose of the survey was to determine the political attitudes of the clergy that controls madrassas. Do they agree with the general

understanding of terrorism and extremism? How do they view Pakistan's policies on the war on terror and military operations in the tribal region bordering Afghanistan? What changes would they like to see in the way the country's foreign relations are being conducted? Has the democratic change in the country paid any dividends? What is the clergy's understanding of international relations, especially with regard to American and European Union policies vis-à-vis the Muslim world? Do they link the disputes in Palestine, Kashmir and Afghanistan with the war on terror? Most of the respondents were quite forthcoming and vocal in giving their opinion. The responses to these questions varied from sect to sect, area to area and with respect to the respondents' political affiliations. A near unanimity of views was noted in responses by respondents from the same sect.

The significance of this study, therefore, lies in the fact that it helps understand the viewpoint of the madrassa sector on Pakistan's domestic politics as well as on the country's international relations. It shows how these viewpoints and opinions relate to the outside world. The trends gauged from the findings are likely to help determine whether madrassas' political attitudes are aligned with the mainstream political behavior and also how and whom do such attitudes influence.

Survey Design and Methodology

The data were collected in three phases – over a period of 13 months, between September 2007 and October 2008. The survey originally planned to cover 700 madrassas but after a pilot survey carried out in Lahore, Rawalpindi and Peshawar encountered reluctance among the madrassas' administration to respond. Of the 70 madrassas visited for the pilot survey, only 30 agreed to participate in the survey. Most of the madrassas initially viewed the survey as an attempt by 'the West' or the government to collect 'sensitive' information about madrassas, although, most of them did not explain what they meant by 'sensitive'. However, many changed their minds and agreed to participate after going through the questionnaire. The survey was subsequently restricted to 251 madrassas, on account of field constrains, without disturbing the initially planned sectarian or geographical proportion.

The 251 madrassas spread across the four provinces, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Northern Areas, Kashmir, and the capital territory of Islamabad. The sample also took into account the relative numerical strength of madrassas of these sects. The sample included madrassas associated with each of the five major seminary boards. Deobandi and Barelvi madrassas had a heavy representation – 46 and 27 percent respectively – whereas the Ahle Hadith and Shia madrassas made up 12 and 9 percent of the sample group respectively. The Jamaat-e-Islami, which has a

few madrassas in Pakistan, accounted only for six percent. The survey did not include madrassas run by the government.

The survey included both structured and unstructured interviews. A questionnaire was designed based on the pilot survey done by the field researchers[5]. The purpose of the pilot survey was to determine the issues of concern for madrassa administrators and formulate a questionnaire accordingly. The pilot survey helped identify the political and cultural trends in madrassas and informed the survey design as well as its methodology.

On the basis of the pilot survey, a 21-point questionnaire was prepared. Some of the questions were open-ended to allow the respondents maximum space to express their opinion. Most of the questions, however, were specific and required direct responses. After the pilot survey, queries that might have dissuaded the respondents from cooperating with the survey team were excluded. No questions were asked about the financial state or sources of madrassas. Supplementary questions were also not asked, though observations by the team members during their field visits were taken into consideration while finalizing the survey findings.

To collect the data, a 10-member research team was formed from different areas with a view that local researchers could access the selected madrassas relatively easily because of their understanding of local traditions and circumstances. Most of the questionnaires were delivered and collected by the field researchers themselves.

Table 1: Sample Distribution

Board	No.	Percentage
Wafaqul Madaris Al-Arabia	115	46%
Tanzeemul Madaris Pakistan	69	27%
Wafaqul Madaris Al-Shia	23	9%
Wafaqul Madaris Al-Salfia	30	12%
Rabitaul Madaris Al-Islamia	14	6%
Total	251	

Field researchers' impressions, snippets of information gathered during meetings with the administrators and discussions with the students and teachers in many madrassas were also used to supplement and corroborate the responses obtained through the questionnaire. The responses were tabulated and analyzed.

Respondents' Characteristics

Pakistan's educational system reflects a deeply divided society. There are six forms of education in Pakistan based essentially on class divisions. Madrassas are the lowest rung among the categories[6] and provide education to children who are mainly neglected by the national educational system.[7] Along with the economic and social classes, Ahmed Sheikh also considers disparity in access, area of residence (rural and urban) and gender as factors in this regard.[8] Seminary teachers represent a different segment of the society. They are typically graduates from madrassas of their own schools of thought and spend their whole life in madrassas. However, there are a few exceptions among the teaching staff at JI madrassas which includes graduates – mostly in Islamic, Arabic and oriental studies – from formal educational institutions.

Madrassa teachers are typically native males. It is very uncommon to find foreign teachers in madrassas. There are, of course, some teachers who have received their education/training in Egypt or Saudi Arabia, usually through scholarships offered by the host countries. Female teachers are hired in girls' seminaries but the number is far lower compared to males. It is very common for teachers to be are graduates from the same madrassa they teach in, as is the case in Jamia Binori in Karachi. For some madrassas, graduation is the minimum qualification for teachers. Others require a Master's degree. Teachers, who are aged between 24 and 60, earn a meager monthly salary of around (Pak) Rs 5,000 (approximately 600 US dollars). Like the students, teachers are provided free board and lodge by the madrassa. Generally, a madrassa has between 30 and 50 teachers. Larger ones have more, for instance, Jamia Binori has 145 teachers.

Relationship between Madrassa and Society

Despite the fact that madrassas are politically sensitized, the interaction of their teachers, students and administrators with the society is nominal. The teacher, in particular, faces many implicit restrictions from the society. His participation in social activities is limited to certain ceremonies related to birth, marriage and death. His daily interaction with the people is confined to the mosque during prayer times. People expect a madrassa teacher to behave as a scholar who must keep some distance from society. His participation in sports and festivals is not appreciated. All these checks effectively confine him to the small social sphere of madrassa, mosque and house. Participation in religious congregations becomes the main outlet for madrassa teachers, as there they associate with religious parties whose leanings range from political to sectarian, missionary and militant. The teachers study literature and publications reflecting the beliefs and opinions of their own schools of

thought.[9] All these factors contribute to the formation of the thinking style and the general mentality of the madrassa teacher.

Findings

a. Affiliation

Contrary to common perception, the survey found that 172 (62%) of the 251 madrassas surveyed have political affiliations – 59 percent are affiliated with religio-political parties, three percent with other mainstream parties and 18 percent with sectarian or jihadi parties. Eighteen percent did not express such association.

Table 2: Affiliation

Responses	No.[10]	Percentage
Religious political parties	163	59%
Sectarian/Jihadi groups	50	18%
Mainstream political parties	9	3%
Other groups	4	1%
Not affiliated	48	18%

The majority's political affiliation indicates that madrassas are eager to play a prominent political role. The administration of 60 percent of these madrassas believes that playing their role in politics is a religious obligation. Some nine percent prefer to be affiliated with a political party to protect their interests. Most of these interests revolve around administrative issues concerning government departments. However, 21 percent cite their desire to be a part of their community as the reason for their association with a political party. Ten percent did not give any reason for the affiliation.

The survey shows that Deobandi and JI madrassas are more inclined towards politics as 82 percent of Deobandi and 100 percent of JI madrassas have political affiliations. It is easy to understand the reason in case of JI madrassas – they are under the patronage of a political party – but for the Deobandi madrassas it can be a matter of their tradition, as political struggle was the main objective behind the formation of Darul Uloom Deoband, whose founders had taken part in the freedom movement of 1857. After their movement was defeated they concluded that they could not overcome the British Raj in India with military might and that the biggest challenges facing the Muslims of the Indian Subcontinent was a lack of education and social reform.[11] The focus of the Darul Uloom was on education but it also concentrated on religious reformation, Muslim's civil rights and politics.[12] Deobandi religious scholars played their role in the Subcontinent's politics during the British Raj. Madrassas remained the custodians of the political

trends of their respective schools of thought and carried on the same tradition after the creation of Pakistan. The Jamait Ulema-e-Islam, whose leadership mainly consists of madrassa teachers, is the continuity of the same legacy.

Like the Deobandis, the Barelvis also have a tradition of political activism – they had supported Muhammad Ali Jinnah's pro-Pakistan movement, much to the chagrin of the Deobandis. But they have apparently not maintained their focus on the political tradition. The survey found that 27 percent of the Barelvi madrassas have political affiliations, not only with religio-political parties but also with the mainstream ones. All three percent of the madrassas affiliated with mainstream political parties belong to the Barelvi school of thought. Seventy percent of Ahle Hadith and 48 percent of Shia madrassas have political affiliations, mostly to safeguard the interests of their schools of thought. Only 20 percent said they deemed association with politics as a religious obligation.

Field researchers found that the madrassas' administration was reluctant to disclose their sectarian and militant affiliations. Even though some of the madrassas are well-known for such affiliation, their administration denied links with sectarian and militant groups. Eighteen percent, however, acknowledged affiliations with sectarian outfits and only a few acknowledged their links with militant jihadi groups.

b. War on Terror

Most of the responding madrassas condemned terrorism as an evil. But the condemnations came with qualifications. Fifty-seven percent of the madrassas view the war on terrorism as directed exclusively against Islam and Muslims. They see the global campaign against terror as a ploy to kill Muslims and undermine Islam. Some 31 percent of the respondents expressed this view unequivocally. Only 13 percent of the respondents agreed that Pakistan should be a part of the international campaign against terrorism while 77 percent disagreed with such a role for the country. But all of them disagreed with the conventional notion of terrorism. They held that Pakistan should support the anti-terror campaign only when it is not directed against Muslims or Islamic countries. Some described the United States as the "biggest terrorist" itself. Only seven percent supported the military operations in Pakistan's tribal areas, while 81 percent opposed them. Twelve percent talked about the definition of terrorism, but did not give a clear opinion.

Chart 1: Is the war on terror an issue?

Respondents from 16 of the 23 Shia madrassas thought that killing of Muslims by Muslims – sectarianism – is the real terrorism. At the same time, 70 percent of Shia madrassas said that Pakistan should not be a part of the global campaign against terrorism.

Table 3: Should Pakistan be a part of global campaign against terrorism?

Responses	No.	Percentage
Yes	32	13%
No	195	77%
No Response	24	10%
Total	252	

Chart 2: Should Pakistan be a part of global campaign against terrorism?

Almost half the 69 Barelvi madrassas hold that terrorism is a product of the United States' Cold War policies against the Soviet Union. However, 35 Barelvi madrassas say that terrorism has become a serious issue now and 17 say that Pakistan should cooperate with the international community in the war on terror.

Eleven of the 14 JI madrassas think that the war on terror is not an issue and hold that it is aimed at targeting Islam and Muslims in general. All of the JI madrassas hold that Pakistan should not join the global campaign against terrorism and oppose the military operations in the tribal areas against Taliban. Similar views were expressed by Ahle Hadith madrassas – only five out of the 30 surveyed consider the war on terror a serious issue.

Among Deobandi madrassas, nearly 20 percent believe the war on terror is an issue but most of them suggest that Pakistan should deal with the issue on its own, and not take 'dictation' from the West. As many as 103 out of the 115 Deobandi madrassas opposed the military operations in the tribal areas. Three Deobandi madrassas, from Sindh, supported the military operations.

Table 4: Favor for military operations against Taliban in tribal areas

Responses	No.	Percentage
Yes	18	7%
No	204	81%
No Response	29	12%
Total	251	

c. Support for Taliban

None of the madrassas said that they offered practical support to the Taliban movement, but 43 percent expressed moral support for Afghan Taliban, who they said were fighting against occupation forces. Only 19 percent agreed with the Taliban ideology. Support for Pakistani Taliban and militant groups was as high as 29 percent. Forty-nine percent of the respondents said that they did not support any militant organization, whereas 25 percent did not offer an opinion. Support for militant groups was higher among Deobandi madrassas as 57 percent admitted moral and ideological support for them but most of them were reluctant to admit any direct link with or practical support for them. None of the Shia madrassas said they supported militant groups and only seven of the 30 Ahle Hadith madrassas admitted their support for militant groups.

Table 5: Support for Afghan Taliban

Responses	No.[13]	Percentage
Agree with ideology	53	19%
Moral support for armed movement	121	43%
Practical support	--	--
No response	109	39%

d. Suicide Attacks and Violent Protests

More than 90 percent of the respondents said there was no justification for committing suicide attacks inside Pakistan. Only two percent supported such attacks, but only in a scenario where the state denounced Islam and killed its own citizens. Most of them stated that suicide attacks in Iraq, Palestine and Afghanistan were justified. The result is similar to *fatwas* (religious decrees) issued by clerics during the last three years in which they declared suicide attacks *haram* (forbidden) in a Muslim society but justified in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan and Kashmir. However, they were not certain if the presence of foreign jihadists in the tribal areas and their use of the territory of their host country, Pakistan, for waging 'jihad' in a neighboring country was justified.[14]

Table 6: Are suicide attacks justified inside Pakistan?

Responses	No.	Percentage
Yes	6	2%
No	226	90%
No response	19	8%
Total	251	

The survey shows that 52 percent of the madrassas believe that the presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan is the main reason for suicide attacks in Pakistan and 20 percent think it is because of Pakistan's role in the war against terrorism. Twelve percent of the respondents see poverty, unemployment and social injustice behind the phenomenon and eight percent think religion is a motivating force for suicide attacks.

Table 7: Factors behind suicide attacks in Pakistan

Responses	No.	Percentage
Pakistan's role in war against terrorism	51	20%
Foreign troops' presence in Afghanistan	131	52%
Religious motivation	20	8%
Poverty and social injustice	29	12%
Reaction to military operation	20	8%
Total	251	

Ninety-two percent of the madrassas oppose violent protests in the country over any issue, including the blasphemous caricatures of Prophet Muhammad published in western countries. Similar views were expressed in a PIPS public opinion poll on the issues of the blasphemous caricatures. It showed that 97 percent of the respondents were in favor of peaceful demonstrations and 95 percent opposed violent protests.[15]

e. Madrassas' Role in Promoting Extremism

Madrassas deem themselves to be protectors of Islam, or at least their own brand of Islam. They disagree with the notion that they are encouraging extremism in any form. Asked whether madrassas are a source of extremism, more than 79 percent replied in negative. They emphasized making a distinction between militant seminaries and 'normal' madrassas. Eight percent of the respondents believe that some madrassas play a role in promoting extremism but also point out that such seminaries were close to the government of Pakistan and even received support from the West. Even those madrassas that identified extremism as a real problem refused to acknowledge that madrassas play a role in promoting it. On the contrary, they accused the United States, Israel and other western countries of terrorism and promoting extremist ideologies. Shia madrassas see terrorism at two levels, intra-sect militancy and global terrorism.

Table 8: Madrassas' role in promoting extremism

Responses	No.	Percentage
Yes	21	8%
No	198	79%
No response	32	13%
Total	251	

Chart 3: Madrassas' role in promoting extremism

The survey's findings show two facets of the madrassa mindset. One, they consider themselves and their profession as superior to worldly pursuits and, two, they suffer from a siege mentality and think of themselves as targets of conspiracies by the West and its allies in Pakistan.

f. Support for Democracy

The majority of the madrassas surveyed favors a democratic process in the country, with 73 percent respondents agreeing that democracy is the solution to many issues in the country. But this support for democracy comes with caveats. Most of the madrassas think that they can bring Islamic reform in the country through democracy. Some also cited achievements of religio-political parties in terms of Shariah legislation in the country. They did not support the secular values of the system and stressed the need of its Islamization. Not even a single madrassa supports a 2006 law introduced by the Musharraf government to protect women's rights. Most of them – 72 percent – considered the law as an attempt to westernize Pakistani society. The rest saw other reasons, such as foreign pressure, behind the introduction of the 2006 Women's Protection Act.

Table 9: Support for democracy

Responses	No.	Percentage
Yes	183	73%
No	35	14%
No response	33	13%
Total	251	

However, 14 percent madrassas do not support democracy. Six percent support military rule and eight percent disagree with both and want the Muslim Caliphate revived.

g. Foreign Policy of Pakistan and Worldview

Nearly 73 percent of madrassas call Pakistan's foreign policy an utter failure. They blame the US and other western countries' influence and lack of independent policies for that. Some of the respondents held that since Pakistan was a nuclear power, it should formulate a policy along the same lines as the United States and other nuclear powers. Most of them saw Islamabad as a pawn of the West, adding that it cannot devise its policies without a go-ahead from western powers.

Those who called Pakistan's foreign policy a success – a mere 11 percent – thought so because of Pakistan's good relations with countries like Saudi Arabia, Iran and Bangladesh. Seventy-five percent of the respondents

emphasized the unity of the Muslim *Ummah* and said that that was the only solution of the problems facing the Muslim world and Pakistan. Fifty-seven percent respondents believe that western policies towards the Muslim world are based on taking over its resources. Twenty-nine percent respondents said that western policies were against Islam and intended to westernize the *Ummah*.

h. Solution for Conflicts

The survey also sought the opinion of the madrassas on the solution of the two major regional conflicts, Afghanistan and Kashmir. PIPS teams found that the madrassas were keen to express their views on the subjects and suggested more than one solution. Nearly 90 percent favored a peaceful solution of the Kashmir dispute. Out of them, 69 percent supported a solution according to United Nations' resolutions and 23 percent favored a resolution through bilateral talks between India and Pakistan, or trilateral negotiation, also including Kashmiris. Every respondent condemned the Indian forces' atrocities in held Kashmir and criticized the role played by the international community, but only nine percent believed that jihad is a solution to the dispute.

Table 10: How should Kashmir issue be resolved?

Responses	No.	Percentage
According to UN resolutions	172	69%
Through jihad	22	9%
Through talks with India and/or Kashmiris	57	23%
Total	251	

Chart 4: How should Kashmir issue be resolved?

Similarly, only six percent supported a solution to the situation in Afghanistan through jihad but a majority (82%) linked it with foreign troops leaving Afghanistan. Around 12 percent emphasized evolving traditional resolution mechanisms – jirgas and talks with Taliban.

Conclusion

Madrassas and the general public hold common views on many issues including violent protests, suicide attacks and democracy in Pakistan. Like madrassa teachers, many people condone suicide attacks carried out by the jihadis. Similarly, Taliban fighting in Afghanistan is mainly viewed in the same perspective by the general public as by the madrassa teachers. But the survey noted a major difference of opinion on the issue of extremism. According to a December 2008 Gallup poll, 60 percent of Pakistanis believe that religious extremism is a serious problem in the country,[16] but only 31 percent madrassas hold that view. The December poll suggested that 60 percent of the people support government's crackdown on Pakistan-based extremists but the madrassas' majority suggests looking for political solutions. Considerable differences were noted between the stance of madrassa students and teachers regarding the conflicts in Kashmir and Afghanistan. The students supported a militant policy towards India regarding Kashmir,[17] but 90 percent of the teachers favored a peaceful resolution.

Most importantly, political views of madrassas are not confined to religious issues alone. On certain issues, their views are in line with public perceptions. Madrassas should not be treated as equivalents of schools or merely as educational institutions for religious studies. They essentially serve as places of political and cultural indoctrination and therefore deserve to be dealt with politically. Given their proclivity to indulge in political discourse and foreign policy issues, the government can arrange training and lectures for orientation on Pakistan's foreign policy and international relations in general.

Notes and References

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[1] P.W Singer, "Pakistan's Madrassahs: Ensuring a system of Education not jihad," Analysis paper 41, Washington DC, Brookings Institution, November 2001.

[2] Peter Bergen & Swati Pandey, "The Madrassa Scapegoat", The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2006, Center for Strategic and International Studies and Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The study examined 79 terrorists responsible for five of the worst anti-Western terrorist attacks and found that only in rare cases were madrassa graduates involved.

[3] P.W Singer, op. cit.

[4] "Unfulfilled Promises: Pakistan's Failure to Tackle Extremism," International Crisis Group, Asia Report No 73, January, 16, 2004. The report emphasizes madrassas' role in promoting extremist views.

[5] The author is thankful to Najam Mushtaq and PIPS survey teams led by Shahzada Saleem and Mujtaba Rathore. The teams included Muhammad Fareed (Rawalpindi/Islamabad), Mufti Sanaullah (Balochistan), Moeen Noori (Sindh), Aminullah Swati (Swat), Bakhtiar Ahmed and Shehryar Ahmed (Hazara region).

[6] Tariq Rahman, "Worlds Apart: An opinion survey," *The News,* May 12, 2000.

[7] There are a few exceptions: some madrassas have upgraded their system – Darul Uloom Bhera Sharif, Sargodha, Jamiatul Rasheed and Darul Uloom Korangi, Karachi have the all facilities available at modern educational institutions. At the same time, madrassas and religious parties have set up their English-medium schools to attract middle and lower-middle class children. In general, however, madrassas are the major source of education for the poor.

[8] Amneh Shaikh, "Warring ideologies: The use of education policy to control religious fundamentalism in Pakistan," Crawford School of Economics and Government, The Australian National University, Policy and Governance Discussion Paper 06-10.

[9] A range of religious publications, by religious parties and radical and militant groups, is available in the market. These groups publish their own daily and weekly newspapers. Madrassa teachers are cut off from mainstream media. For a detailed discussion *see* Muhammad Amir Rana, "Radical Print Media in Pakistan, An Overview," *PIPS Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies*, Islamabad, Issue 1, Number 1, 2008.

[10] The total exceeds from the number of surveyed madrassas because some of the madrassas are affiliated with political parties as well as sectarian/jihadi organizations.

[11] Qari Muhammad Tayyab, Darul Uloom Deoband, Monthly *Al-Jamia*, Rawalpindi, April 2001.

[12] Abu Atta, Mufti, "Darul Uloom Deoband Kay Anasar-e-Tarkeebi," Monthly *Al-Jamia,* Rawalpindi, April 2001.

[13] The total exceeds from the number of surveyed madrassas because some of the madrassas agree with the ideology of Afghan Taliban as well as morally support their armed movement.

[14] "Ideology: Clergy holds War on Terror Responsible for Terrorism," http://www.san-pips.com/new/index.php?action=ra&id=ido_list_1, retrieved on Feb 28, 2008.

[15] Opinion poll on blasphemous caricatures of Prophet Muhammad, http://www.san-pips.com/new/index.php?action=survey&id=02, retrieved on Feb 28, 2008.

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Radicalization in Pakistan: Sociocultural Realities

Muhammad Azam

Radicalization in Pakistan has occupied the center stage in debates and has become a big concern for governments at national and international levels. This study is an effort to explore sociocultural determining factors of radicalization in Pakistan. This is a qualitative study. Primary and secondary sources were utilized during the research. Experts on the subject, from different professions, were interviewed.

The phenomenon of radicalization in the country and actors, factors, causes and processes involved have not been studied and explored to any considerable extent. Only a few systematic studies on the subject have been conducted so far. Those who have carried out such studies include Tariq Rahman, Ayesha Jalal, Sohail Abbas, Sohail Mahmood, Amir Rana, Shabana Fayyaz and Christine Fair. This qualitative study may be taken as a step further. Though, the writers have addressed the sociocultural factors but only as a part of their studies. This paper exclusively addresses the sociocultural factors of radicalization in Pakistan. For theoretical and sociological concepts in the context of Pakistani society and culture, a few of the pioneering works on sociology were relied upon. They include works by Sabeeha Hafeez, Abdul Qadeer, Siddique Qureshi and the like.

Tahir Abbas has shed light on Islamic radicalism from European perspective. His book, *Islamic Political Radicalism,* contains excellent articles which deal with radicalization's roots and growth in Eurasia. He has elaborated at length the international political factors behind Muslim radicalism.[1] *The Changing Pakistan Society*[2] by Sabeeha is a classical work on Pakistani society and culture. The questions addressed in the book include the possibility of using folklore as a mechanism of social control, and the concepts needed for the analysis of changing realities of Pakistan's social structure and organizational system. Ayesha Jalal has dealt with the subject in South Asian context in *Partisans of Allah: Jihad in South Asia,*[3] and, *Self and Sovereignty: Individual and Community in South Asian Islam since 1850.*[4]

Mahmood's PhD dissertation, *Islamic Fundamentalism in Pakistan, Egypt and Iran* is a scholarly work on radical movements in Pakistan.[5] Rana has produced a number of works on the subject, including *The Seeds of Terrorism*[6] and *Gateway to Terrorism.*[7] The former is helpful in understanding the spread and pervasiveness of radicalism in Pakistan. The latter is full of information on radical groups and movements in the country. But Rana's most recent study on the subject is his article, "Jihadi Print Media in Pakistan".[8]

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Haqqani has discussed the ideologies of radical Jihadi groups in South Asia.[9] Hassan Abbas, in his book, *Pakistan's Drift into Extremism,* has endeavored to tackle a number of themes related to radicalization in Pakistan, like Pakistani radical groups and 9/11.[10] Christine Fair – in her paper, "Who are Pakistan's Militants and Their Families?"[11] – has discussed some important aspects regarding sociocultural factors of radicalization in Pakistan. In another study, "Militant Recruitment in Pakistan: Implications for Al Qaeda and Other Organizations,"[12] she has dealt with radicalization and its manifestations in Pakistan and their international connections.

Kaul has dealt with the impact of Islamic radicalization on the civil and military society in Pakistan in "Role of religion in politics: Impact on the civil and military society of Pakistan".[13] In his book, *The Failure of Political Islam,* Roy deals with radicalism and radical groups and movements in the Middle East. He also refers to the phenomenon in Pakistan.[14] Stern's book, *Why Religious Militants Kill, Terror in the Name of God,* is among the major works on the subject.[15] She has been visiting religious schools in Pakistan for the sake of research on the subject. Davis points out the role of educational systems and curricula in contributing towards radicalization in Pakistan and Afghanistan.[16]

Chitkara has discussed the phenomenon of radicalization and its causes in Pakistan in *Combating Terrorism*.[17] He also deals with different radical organizations. Benazir Bhutto has discussed a number of issues regarding radicalization in Pakistan including its link to Jihad.[18] Jamaat-e-Islami of India and radicalization has been addressed by Ahmed in his article, "Between moderation and radicalization".[19] Dyer and others, in their well-written article, "Countering Violent Islamic Extremism: A Community Responsibility," elaborate four stages of the radicalization process: preradicalization, identification, indoctrination, and action.[20] Safia Aftab has examined the link between poverty and radicalization in the country.[21] This review of the works, however, is not comprehensive because of the constraints, mainly temporal.

Although, cultural anthropologists, Clofford Geertz and David Schneider, argue that "cultural systems must be distinguished from social systems and analyzed, in the first instance, as internally coherent wholes".[22] But, drawing a clear-cut line of distinction between social and cultural factors seems to be almost impossible. So, no subheadings are provided to separate the two.

Sociocultural realities involve two categories: (a) domestic society and domestic culture, and (b) global society and global culture. Though, the latter is more relevant vis-à-vis the determinants of radicalization in Pakistan, this paper deals with the former category i.e. Pakistani culture and society. This

paper, too, does not intend to discuss at length what does a culture or a society mean.

Sociocultural factors are extrinsic in nature, which means that intrinsic factors are excluded from the study. Moreover, sociocultural factors are only a part of extrinsic factors. Although other factors – such as political, economic, religious, psychological, educational, and ideological – are excluded but discussing their cultural and social dimensions was necessary. That is because all of these types are highly integrated with one another. Society and culture have their political, economic and religious dimensions. One's personality is affected by sociocultural processes. Education also directs and moulds one's socialization process. In fact, personality, society and culture cannot be seen or comprehended in isolation from the above-mentioned components.

Since radical activities do take place within the society, these activities, in turn, become a part of sociocultural factors of radicalization in their own right, e.g. radical newspapers and magazines; and radicals' religious and political gatherings. Such factors, however, are beyond the scope of this paper.

Calhoun has given a suitable definition of radicalism. According to him, it designates "basic or extreme political challenges to established order".[23] The terms of 'radicalism' and 'radicalization' are neutral. They are neither negative nor positive. However, some of the writers use them negatively. Some of them may use radicalism and terrorism interchangeably. Similarly, some may equate radicalism with extremism. But this writer does not think that equating radicalism with terrorism or extremism is appropriate. Some define radicalism as 'political extremism.' That is not an accurate description. Extremism carries its specific connotations. Anthony Judge alludes to the point saying, "'Radical' is somewhat a less negatively-connoted label" than extremist, and is "sometimes used by people or groups to label themselves".[24] Defining radicalism as 'political extremism' means applying those connotations to radicalism without any qualification. Doing so disregards the qualitative difference between the two terms. A conscious effort is made to treat radicalism and radicalization as distinct from terrorism and extremism. Mentions of terrorism and extremism, however, do occur from time to time because these terms are too deeply related to be avoided here. Dealing with radicalization as distinct from terrorism and extremism, however, does not imply that radicals cannot be extremists or terrorists.

Extremists do not label themselves as extremists. But radicals, sometimes, call themselves radicals. It implies that the term radicalization is not always frowned on, but is used positively as well. Flaherty has given the following characteristics and beliefs of radical groups and movements:[25]

a. There is a sense of futility that anything other than extreme measures will not work.
b. Destruction of the existing world order is seen as necessary.
c. Compromise and power sharing are rejected.
d. A new world order is envisioned.
e. The end justifies the means.
f. Impatience and a sense of urgency.
g. The prospect of violent change has its own appeal.

Culture has very broad meanings. For some, the concept of culture "provides a set of principles for explaining and understanding human behavior".[26] In Hatch's words, culture consists of "conventional patterns of thought and behaviour, including values, beliefs, rules of conduct, political organization, economic activity, and the like, which are passed on from one generation to the next by learning – and not by biological inheritance".[27] Culture also means the customs and beliefs, art, way of life and social organization of particular country or group.[28] Khaled defines culture as the ability of a people to have fun. Much of what we call culture is the creative ways in which a society entertains itself.[29] Culture is also defined as 'a system of symbols'.[30] Society is defined as a particular community of people who share the same customs, laws, etc.[31] 'Social' refers to anything connected with society and the way it is organized.[32] That culture is a learnt tradition and the main determinant of behavior is a fundamental concept in the filed of cultural anthropology.[33] An individual's behaviour "is influenced more by the values, norms, and rituals prevalent in the society than by laws".[34] It implies that it is agreed upon that society and culture do influence attitudes and behaviors. The point to be debated is whether these factors lead toward radicalism? If the answer is positive, then, to what extent? Are they among the primary factors behind radicalization or secondary ones?

When the entire society is on one side, the radicals are on the other. It follows that mainstream sociocultural attitudes, norms, behaviors, and values are not direct causes of radicalizing someone. Fundamental determining factors of radicalization in Pakistan lie somewhere else. However, the country's domestic society and culture may not be seen as totally irrelevant. Sociocultural factors cannot be taken as the best explanation of such phenomenon. Same is the case with Pakistani society and culture. They are not the most important factors behind the phenomenon. The extent to which they are responsible is discussed in the following pages.

Some have argued that structural limitations – marginalization, social exclusion, (self-) segregation and inadequate educational provision – make "the fertile ground within which … radicalism flourishes".[35] One can agree with Richardson that "social, economic, and cultural factors are the

underlying risk factors that make a society more or less susceptible to the appeal" of such phenomena. But his assertion that the best explanations are at the level of "the societies that produce them (i.e. terrorists),"[36] is questionable. He may be asked whether all of the societies and cultures have become conducive to radicalism and terrorism. It is a well-established fact that individuals and groups from the developed modern societies, including the US and the UK, have adopted and promoted radical ideologies and practices. In Kuper's observation, many of the authors believe that culture is the main determinant of behavior.[37] It seems to be true generally, but not in case of radical behavior. If culture was indeed the main determinant of radical behavior, then the majority would have gone radical.

Pakistan's sociocultural structure is changing. Complex processes of social transformation are underway. But the problem is the direction of change which is positive only partly, and negative in general. Something has gone wrong with the process of change. The change tends to be more in favor of the radical forces than peaceful sociocultural agents. Increase in the levels of radicalization over the decades shows that social change overall has been in favour of radicalism. Our society is changing very rapidly; changes caused by globalization are among reasons behind radicalization, remarks Rahman.[38]

Javed is of the view that historically, the climate of this part of the world has been very moderate. The books written in the last millennium by Muslim authors – such as 11th century saint Syed Ali Hajveri and the like – are replete with moderate thoughts and ideas, and messages of peace and love for humanity, he underlines. "After the decades of 1960s and 70s, however, circumstances took a U-turn and extremism and radicalism came to the fore,"[39] regrets Javed. Commenting on the ongoing process of sociocultural change, Khaled writes: [40]

> The Seminary won over the shrine around which Pakistani culture had accreted. What came later was a wholesale removal of culture. A high water mark was achieved in the 1990s when the population actually began to feel the duress behind the change. The change was called Talibanization.

Dynamics of social change in Pakistan reflect a mix of four types of conflicts: (a) between culture and ideology[41] (b) between subcultures and national culture (c) between economic development and cultural preservation, and (d) between Islamization and moderation. These conflicts are elaborated further in the following pages.

It is irresistible to disagree with Kemp's assertion that "the rise of radicalism in Afghanistan and Pakhtun tribal areas of Pakistan is rooted in the disintegration of tribal and state structures; and the increased influence of

religiously orthodox foreign elements…."[42] Disintegration of tribal structure is not a cause of increase in radicalism in the said areas of Pakistan. In fact, the opposite is true. The radical groups have weakened and partly damaged the tribal structure in these areas.

It is assumed that "human beings … exhibit a wide variety of behavioral forms as a result of the process of socialization or enculturation".[43] In a study, majority of the radicals is found to be less sociable people, "keeping mostly to themselves".[44] Individuals with poor cultural attainments are more vulnerable than others to be attracted by radical ideas. Radicals may be regarded as unsociable individuals who have not gone through a proper socialization process. They do not enjoy socializing with other people. Their concepts of enjoyment and happiness seem to be entirely different from those of the remaining society. They practically deny social engineering on part of the state by attempting to destroy existing sociopolitical order. Constitutional provisions have not been promulgated in their true spirit in Pakistan. Thus, the social contract has been violated. Sanaullah Baloch, a former senator, is among the leading Baloch leaders who have made frequent demands for a new social contract.

Increase in the number of radical groups and their activities, alludes to the fact that our socialization process is flawed. It is, at least partly, responsible for that increase. Weaknesses in our socialization process are a contributing factor to radicalism and violence in our society. The family has an important role in the function of socializing children. Parents are becoming increasingly negligent with regard to their responsibility of their children's proper socialization. Proper socialization of the children cannot take place unless their psychological needs are fulfilled. Parents send their children to nurseries when they are too young. They do not get parents' due attention and love.[45] It causes anxiety among them from the very beginning. Shortcomings of this type are a factor contributing to violent attitudes and behaviors. Our socialization structure and process have failed in training the potential radicals in a desirable direction. Home chaos affects the process of socialization negatively. A family is like a small society and home environment has a basic role in the process of socialization.

Some may tend to assume that all radicals have a poor social conscience, or totally lack one.[46] However, that is not the case. Most of them have acquired a very well-refined social conscience, but they disregard or suppress it against their higher commitment to a 'superior' cause.

According to Parsons, for their persistence, social structure must perform four functions: (a) adaptation, (b) goal-attainment, (c) integration, and (d) pattern-maintenance or tension management. He further explains: [47]

> For the evolution of more differentiated structure to be successful there must be adaptive upgrading, inclusion and value generalization…. Inclusion refers to processes (such as extension of the franchise) that produce commitment by people to the new more specialized structures. … Values must be generalized or stated more abstractly in order to legitimize a wider range of activities.

But, the process of inclusion has suffered problems throughout Pakistan's history. Exclusion or 'perceived exclusion' has caused antagonism among the excluded towards existing social, political and economic structures. Definitions of a 'patriotic Pakistani' are too narrow to accommodate any kind of value-generalization. Pakistani society lacks in institutions "necessary for ensuring an individual's basic rights and security".[48] Some of the social and political structures and institutions are, at least partly, supportive of radical activities and ideologies. Pakistani media, for example, in some cases consciously and in others unconsciously, has been propagating and advertising things which promote radicalism.[49]

Media is one of the powerful tools used for directing the socialization process. It is imparting such things which lead readers and viewers to think about radicals sympathetically.[50] It glorifies the radicals, probably inadvertently. With the passage of time, some of the readers and viewers may tend to become radicals themselves. Pakistani media has always been there as a factor in the increase and spread of radicalization.[51] The role of the media is one of the five determining factors of spread of violence after 9/11, enumerated by Farhana.[52] Some elements in the media succeed in suppressing reports and news covering social and cultural activities.[53] Abdul Qadeer observes that the cultural changes

> induced by the spread of radio, television, videos, and telephone follow a dualistic path, reinforcing and reinventing some beliefs and practices while displacing others. It may be said right away that Pakistani society's response to the new 'mediums' is demonstrably affected by the 'messages' they bear.[54]

Our society is paternalistic. Beating or killing someone is taken as a symbol of courage. Such acts are presented by the media in a manner that encourages people to commit similar acts.[55] "I believe the media has played a major role in promoting violence in Pakistan, the Urdu media in particular, and the English media to a lesser extent," asserts I.A. Rahman.

To de Tocqueville, a true democracy requires a culture where ideas and values support liberty of association, press, and religion etc.[56] But the press in Pakistan does not enjoy freedom as compared to the media in developed democracies. That also adds to the existing suffocation in society.

Pakistan's education system has not been able to play its due role in inculcating desirable sociocultural values among the people. The syllabi rarely incorporate lessons on such subjects. Our traditional culture and historical social values, attitudes and behaviors are getting lost in the shadows of the past. One example is our folklore.[57] It is known "little to the Pakistan's general public and even to many of our academics".[58]

Pakistan's folk culture may be taken as the opposite of radicalism. There seems to be no room for radicalism in it. A visit to Cultural Heritage Museum, Islamabad may suffice to prove that. The museum is a magnificent effort to display maximum possible aspects of the sociocultural realities of Pakistan. A part of the museum consists of a library where an invaluable collection of cultural writings is preserved. These writings contain almost all types of folk literature which are full of love and peace. It is suggested that study of folklore can be used as a mechanism of social control. And, social control, Sabeeha says, is "one of the available mechanisms for coping with change".[59] It may be derived from this point that studying and teaching folklore can help the de-radicalization effort.

Folklore mirrors values and fantasies of a society. It is an "aesthetic product" of the society.[60] Sabeeha has urged the need to introduce folklore as an independent subject of study in educational institutions. She assumes that the study of folklore will bridge the gap between generations and "improve the identification of the younger people with their indigenous roots…."[61] The study of folklore involves interaction between the old and the young. The old know folklore and recite proverbs, riddles, magical episodes, legends, the sagas, superstitions and the like. She further explains: [62]

> The young…will be in a position to acquire deeper insights into the ways older people think, feel and act. This would help initiate a dialogue between the younger and the older people, which would be an important step towards bridging the gap between generations.

Dyer explains that "those with weak social ties may benefit from the solidarity that extremist [and radical] groups provide".[63] "Accepting the cause leads people to become increasingly isolated from their former lives" i.e. society, Dyer writes. Radicals are not entirely isolated from society. They have social ties and use these ties "to spot, assess, and encourage potential recruits to follow the same path".[64] Moreover, "Converts' social connections with other like-minded individuals can strengthen this dedication".[65]

Although, material norms are important in Pakistani society in their own right, but in some cases they are overwhelmed by reflexive norms.[66] The individuals with a strong tendency towards reflexive norms and a dislike for

material norms are more prone to adopting radical ideas. It is not implied here that reflexive norms are something negative. Though negative norms are dangerous and push individuals towards ideologies like radicalism, positive norms may also function in the same direction.

Social insecurity is also a factor, because of which many individuals see no future for themselves. That makes it easier for them to be radicalized. Injustice is an important determinant of radicalism.[67] Social injustice also refers to status-centric values. Some of our social values are status-centric which do not fit into the framework of a harmonious society. Propertied and wealthy classes receive a highly privileged treatment. The rich and influential show disrespect with impunity to the poor and the lowly. Such values have caused frustration among those who are deemed to have a lower social status. And, frustrated individuals or groups are always vulnerable to be caught up in radical ideologies and groups. Nobody feels comfortable with a lower social status and, consciously or unconsciously, keeps looking for some avenue to an improved status in society. Radical groups and organizations provide a window of opportunity to such individuals. The fewer the opportunities to improve one's status, the more the vulnerability for such people to be radicalized.

A culture of corruption is another factor. Prevalence of corruption in every sphere of life may lead an individual to a stage where s/he starts abhorring society and thinking of teaching a lesson through radical means to at least some of the people he thinks responsible. Widespread corruption in law and order systems and establishments in Pakistan and frequent violent attacks against the police – police stations, check posts and mobiles – may be interlinked.

Fighting against the government is seen as an act of courage and bravery in our society. In other words, carrying out radical activities against government forces has a social value. Radicals also carry out suicide attacks. Certain cultural and social norms justify suicide and equate it with martyrdom, points out Saif.[68]

In Pakhtun culture, aggressive attitudes and behaviors are prominently visible as compared to Punjabi culture, comments Chaudhry.[69] These aggressive attitudes and behaviors fan radicalism, he explains. Upbringing is very tough here, tells Mehsud, who is a Pakhtun himself and belongs to the tribal area. In some pockets of the tribal regions, some children's games involve violence. Boys go for playing and come back home in the evening with injuries, sometimes with broken skulls, because of stoning one another as a part of their game, informs Mehsud.[70] Javed comments:[71]

> About Pashto culture it is stated that it is generally radical. But if you look at their legends like Rehman Baba and Khushhal Khan Khattak, it seems as if they were from Punjab. They were all peace-loving and moderate people. However, there is no doubt that their lifestyles and culture have played a role in the increase of radicalization to the levels we experience these days.

A recent study conducted at University of the Punjab, Lahore, finds that social anxiety plays a fundamental role in extremism.[72] "Extremist recruiters can identify a population disaffected with society" and use it to serve their cause, writes Dyer.[73] "In … universities, they (extremists) can find curious individuals who question society…," he notes.[74] "Our society has isolated the religious community," for example, "how can a Hafiz-e-Quran settle himself? What kind of economic opportunities does the society offer him? In fact, most of the religious community is not integrated into the economic system," comments Saif. This fact helps them embrace radicalism, he explains.[75] In his opinion, an individual becomes radicalized when his/her rights are not protected, when s/he is deprived of his/her fundamental rights. A deprived person spends the whole of his/her energy to get his/her rights.[76]

A question may arise that if political, economic and social deprivations constitute any cause of radicalization why do they not result into a widespread mass revolutionary movement. The answer is that the above-mentioned and other deprivations have not inspired huge number of individuals for such a movement. And, in the absence of any mass revolutionary movement, individuals radicalized on these bases join the ranks of whatever radical groups they find operating around.

Radicalism – use of force for political ends – is a way to compensate for powerlessness, deprivation and despair. It improves the status of the radicals. The ingredients[77] of such a status are power,[78] privilege[79] and prestige.[80] An assumption by Sabeeha is worth noticing: [81]

> In the process of comparison, one consciously weighs one's deprivations against one's material possessions, and attempts to compensate them either by asserting one's possession of certain aspects of social status (power, privilege or prestige) or by acquiring the material possessions.

But, what would one's response be if such attempts to compensate do not succeed. Logically, one may be allured towards radical means to compensate for deprivations.

Conspiracy theories are widely believed in the society. Stereotypes persist in different social circles and have generated a culture of stereotypes in Pakistan regarding certain national and international issues. Superstitions and magical

thinking are also widespread in our society. The radicals exploit these weaknesses to serve their cause.

Perceptions and misperceptions sometimes lead to blame-others syndrome. The syndrome is deeply entrenched in Pakistani society.[82] "Cultural patterns structure both thought and perception," says Hatch.[83] In Pakistan, perceptions of politics and the world, particularly the West, are so structured by cultural patterns that many of the Pakistanis possess a negative image of the West and domestic and international politics. These perceptions, domestic and international, sometimes unconsciously and sometimes consciously, have pushed many individuals towards radical circles.

Opportunities and facilities for recreation are extremely insufficient. Most of the population lives in villages where there is no concept of recreation. Recreational activities are insufficient even in urban areas. An overwhelming majority cannot afford to travel to the available recreational cites. Furthermore, spending money on recreational and cultural activities is generally frowned upon as it is seen as a luxury and profligacy. Many people view sports as a negative activity in FATA[84] and other parts of the country. A society where there is no room for cultural activities like singing, dancing etc., will become nothing other than radical, comments Javed.[85] "Our (Pakistanis) concept of a 'human being' is wrong; we do not realize that cultural activities are as important for a human being as other aspects of human life," he adds.

Becoming a member of a radical group also affords opportunities which are no less than alternatives to recreation. The young tired of monotony in their lives, while working with their farmer and artisan parents or at factories and shops, feel almost excited while travelling from city to city and country to country for organizational, training and operational purposes. Many of them go outside their home district or province for the very first time after being recruited by such groups.

Human beings are impressionable; they can be influenced easily. Cultural adaptability leads individuals both ways, constructive and destructive. The former strive to make contribution or to achieve certain goals through peaceful means. The latter pursue their cause through use of force. If the relationship between culture and personality remains positive, the individual becomes a peaceful citizen, otherwise a violent one. The level of violence varies. In Pakistan, in many cases, the relationship between culture and personality suffers from serious deficiencies in a way which drives individuals into radicals' folds.

Radicals in Pakistan are inspired more by the foreign societies and cultures than by their own. In other words, they have acculturated radical attitudes

and behaviors. Because of the acculturation process, Pakistani culture, particularly in FATA and NWFP, has changed to a large extent. It has acquired characteristics of foreign cultures where people have been fighting protracted civil or international wars, Afghanistan being the most immediate example. Other Central Asian and Middle Eastern states may also be named.

Cultural anomalies are normally frowned upon. But, there are some exceptions. Silverman describes an interesting example.[86] Mary Douglas worked, Silverman writes, on a central African tribe, the Lele, in 1975. Douglas observed that pangolin was very important for the tribe. The animal possessed both animal and human characteristics. Unlike other animals, for example, it tended to have one offspring at a time. It spent some of its time on land and some in water. Putting it into the classification of land water creatures was problematic. Because of these and other reasons, the Lele treated it as something special. Despite being an anomaly, it became more important than other creatures for the tribe. Radicalism in Pakistan is an anomaly. It is frowned upon in major segments of the society. But, exceptions are also there. There have been reports of some tribesmen and neighbors seeing off suicide bombers off with beating drums.

Pakistan consists of areas historically dominated by foreign culture, which came here with the invaders. The invaders in general used raw power ruthlessly against the local populations. Over the centuries, these populations, barring a few exceptions, and their generations have gotten used to looking at themselves as powerless and helpless. In fact, their powerlessness was major reason that emboldened foreign invaders. Now these populations have tasted power and its awful effectiveness in bringing about events and influencing the course of politics and other aspects of state and society. Some of the individuals and groups are attracted so much to the use of this newly-acquired power that they have adopted it as a method of directing the sociopolitical and economic changes in a 'desirable' direction. The point may be made that domination of foreign cultures for centuries has affected the thinking of some of the individuals in a way which causes spread of radicalism.

The assertion that a 'monoculture' is emerging out of globalization – which "attacks local cultures and thus deprives societies of their ability to remain tied to traditional roots"[87] – seems to be true in Pakistan's case. The radicals do proclaim their commitment to resist the monoculture, which they hold is 'highly influenced' by western cultural values. That is why the process of radicalization in Pakistan has strong international linkages. The radicals believe that their religious and cultural values are under attack.

Like political culture, Pakistan's economic culture is also a factor in radicalization. The economic classes in the country can be categorized as poor, lower-middle, middle, upper-middle, rich and ultra-rich. The poor suffer from a sense of deprivation and the middle class from relative deprivation. This sense of deprivation further intensifies for those who are unemployed or underemployed. Unemployment leads to radicalism, too. In a study Fair interviewed 141 Pakistani families of Shaheeds who served and died in Kashmir or Afghanistan. She focused upon households of the Shaheeds who died from 1990 onward. She made efforts to exclude the Shaheeds from the Soviet-era. About three-quarter of the *Shaheeds* were either unemployed or underemployed.[88] In FATA, where radicalization is at its peak, no employment opportunities exist and sometimes the entire family depends on a single breadwinner.[89] In this situation, "the temptation for young people to get involved in…religious extremism is strong".[90]

Rapid modernization and changing economic conditions are "conducive to instability and traditional means of making sense of the world…."[91] Richardson elucidates further that "if the structures are not in place to absorb … young men into the work force, they are likely to have time to contemplate the disadvantages of their position and to be available to be mobilized behind a cause that promises to change it".[92]

Many of the rich and ultra-rich have thrived on exploitation of the weak. Middle and poor classes resent the wealth of the rich which is mainly perceived to be ill-gotten. This resentment potentially may lead an individual to think about revenge on part of the week and unprivileged. In this way, our economic culture is contributing towards the process of radicalization as it incorporates deprivations and lack of opportunities for the young. Talking about the pre-9/11 scenario, Farhana describes "frustration in different socio-economic groups" as a factor for spread of violence.[93]

Education as a social process is also another factor of radicalization. Our education system and society as a whole are responsible for not inculcating fundamental social attitudes in the young to give a positive direction to their energies. Through proper education and training they can be turned into desirable social beings, possibly social workers.

There are three types of education systems – private English-medium institutions, public institutions and *madrassas* (seminaries) – in Pakistan. Rahman has classified Pakistani schools into four major categories i.e. *madrassas,* Urdu-medium, elitist English-medium and cadet colleges.[94] These different systems actually represent and are meant for different social and economic classes. In fact, there is a world of difference among their curricula, infrastructures, and fee and salary structures. Rahman reported an average

cost of 5,714 rupees (including boarding and lodging) per student per year in madrassas, 5,500 rupees (only tuition) in Urdu-medium schools/colleges, 96,000 rupees for 'A' Level and 36,000 (only tuition) for other levels in English-medium and 90,061 (all facilities) in cadet schools/colleges.[95]

Same is the case with treatment of the students by faculty and staff. Corporal punishment for students in public schools and seminaries is a common practice. The staff also frequently insults them. Students of these two types of institutions suffer from a sense of relative deprivation. They leave or complete their education with their self-esteem and self-respect seriously damaged, if not completely destroyed. As they mature, their sense of relative deprivation gets intensified when they find themselves unable to compete with the graduates of English-medium institutions and cadet schools and colleges for employment and other opportunities. In some cases, that forces them to commit suicide. When such deprivation can lead someone to end his own life why can it not lead him/her to radicalization?

Social sciences play a significant role in spreading moderate values and practices and strengthening moderate attitudes and behaviors. But, in Pakistan, social sciences have not gained any considerable attention of the state and society. Though, departments of social sciences exist in a number of universities, they are extremely ignored. It seems that the powerbrokers ignore social sciences purposefully, probably because they see social scientists as a potential 'evil' who can question the status quo and malpractices of the ruling elites.

Pakistan's political culture,[96] an undemocratic one, is essentially a factor of radicalization in the society. Although, constitutionally and legally, all of the inhabitants enjoy equal political opportunities, practically that is not the case. Some of the social strata are deprived of their political rights. The sense of political deprivation is so entrenched in some of the groups and regions that it has led people to resort to use of force. They want to alleviate or eliminate their political deprivation through violent means. In this way, our asymmetric political culture is a direct cause of radicalization among the deprived. Tribal areas may be taken as an immediate example.

Siddique Qureshi opines that various factors have promoted a political culture of conflict and dissension. As a consequence, "our political culture is in a state of flux where violence, intolerance and authoritarianism prevail".[97] Pakistan's political culture believes in "buy, cheat or muscle your way into public office and then simply relax".[98]

The country has been facing political crises throughout its history. Before a crisis settles down, another is in the making. This crises-ridden political

culture has played havoc with the maintainability of peace and harmony among communities. The people largely lack trust in the political leadership and institutions. In this situation, any call for resorting to radical means carries greater attraction. Such a scenario provides fertile ground for radicalism to flourish.

The political leadership has always made lofty claims regarding national progress. Political parties have been frequently making promises to take the nation to unparalleled heights if and when they are voted into power. But each time the actual outcome has been the exact opposite of the lofty claims. It is the same story with the military army rulers who missed no opportunity to make promises and win sympathies of the people in order to strengthen and prolong their rule. The people expected a better outcome every time and were always let down by the ruling elite. This led to 'perceived deprivation' among certain groups. The 'perceived deprivation' caused anxiety and frustration. Apparently, that too has contributed towards radicalization in the country.

Radicalism spread alarmingly after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian Revolution. *Mujahideen* from all over the world came to fight against the Soviets, most of them passed through and/or stayed in Pakistan. Many of them settled here permanently. They played a significant role in radicalizing local groups. Tribesmen in FATA have been influenced throughout history by the effects of events in Afghanistan.[99]

The state is committed to promoting a national culture in Pakistan. Some perceive that as an onslaught against their respective subcultures. Thus, at a lower level, subcultures or provincial cultures are in competition with the national culture. As Abdul Qadeer observes, "national culture has been the most controversial dimension of the notions of Pakistan".[100] Khaled has rightly observed that "culture is affected by what the state wants to do with the identity of the people who live in it. The state may change popular culture to set the population apart from the population of a neighboring 'enemy' state".[101]

Pakistan is a Muslim-majority country. Islam is an indispensable characteristic of Pakistani society and culture. Although people take pride in being Muslims and tend to observe Islamic festivals and rituals, a true Islamic spirit is largely missing. An overwhelming majority is unaware of the true meanings of Quranic injunctions and commandments. It is oblivious to what kind of human beings does Islam wish them to be. The reasons of this obliviousness are many, including:

a) *Language problem:* Despite the fact that they can recite Quran fluently, the masses do not understand Arabic.

b) *Sectarian approach:* Muslim preachers are mainly concerned first with their respective sects and vested interests and only after that with Islam, if at all. Driven by the primary concerns for their sects and personal benefits they tend to preach a very selective set of Quranic verses. The phenomenon is decades old, at least. This sectarian approach towards "religion of peace" has resulted in the emergence of the exact opposite of what the religion ordains. This approach has caused countless bloody conflicts and abject disharmony among the social strata.

c) *Political use of religion:* Religion has frequently been used for political ends. Politicians and rulers have seldom missed an opportunity to exploit religion and the religious-minded communities in order to serve their political interests. "Politically motivated interpretations of Islam" are made for "opportunistic reasons".[102] Every sixth in 517 Pakistanis interviewed, who went for *jihad* in Afghanistan, responded positively to the question: "Had some people used you in the name of religion?"[103] Hasan observes that sectarian intolerance and extremism were "the direct result of indoctrination pursued according to political agendas".[104] Religious groups have been armed time and again for political reasons. Arming non-state actors is the worst way of radicalizing them. In other words, the state itself is among those who are responsible for radicalization. The clergy has played a 'decisive role' in radicalization in FATA.[105]

While I was working on this paper, a boy – no older than 10 – passed through the street, singing one of the most famous verses by Iqbal:[106]

> *Shaheed ki jo maut hey wo qaum ki hayat hey* (The death of a martyr is a nation's life).

The child may be inspired by the idea of dying a martyr's death. But the question is, how closely or remotely the child's concept of martyrdom is related to that of Iqbal's. Apparently, the child's concept of a martyr is influenced by the militants. These inculcations are a result of the efforts made by the state to promote a *jihadi* culture for certain purposes, e.g. fighting against the Soviets to liberate Afghanistan in the 1980s. Out of context *Jihadi* speeches, sermons and songs have become a part of the religious culture. In a survey study, Fair finds that 44 percent of the *jihadis'* recruitment was motivated by religious gatherings and 42 percent through friends or family.[107]

In many cases, the concept of religion is extremely distorted. Pakistan's religious culture, though labeled as 'Islamic' is widely un-Islamic. Islamic teachings are frequently misinterpreted which in turn lead to the spread of un-Islamic, and sometimes anti-Islamic, values and practices.

In the name of Islamization of society and culture, certain cultural and social values, activities and norms have been discouraged or suppressed. Islamization has been a 'national cause' pursued by the state as well as some of the groups and organizations. In the process, some of the sociocultural values, norms and activities, which promoted and supported peace and harmony in society, were also targeted. In a way, the efforts towards Islamization on part of the state and non-state actors distorted the culture in such a way that it became somewhat accommodative towards radical ideologies and practices. That resulted in many people condoning radical violent activities. The reason behind why efforts of Islamization led to such consequences is best explained by Sabeeha:[108]

> Islamization presupposes certain operating realities, e.g., the exisiting [sic] laws, norms, customs and rituals are not functioning in accordance with the Quranic prescriptions. If these are repugnant to Islam, they would need to be corrected in order to bring them in conformity with it. This would necessitate raising and investigating research questions such as "Which of the ingredients of the Pakistani norms, values, rituals and customs are un-Islamic?" Though often raised, this question does not seem to have been investigated so far.

Islamic teachings which promote modernity and moderation are widely neglected and understated. Very selective of Islamic values and norms are being preached by different quarters. As a result, the Islamic discourse[109]

> … has not only grown to be puritanical, but also restrictive of individual liberty. It has recast the folk order in a conservative mold, shedding its tolerant spiritualism and investing it with literalism. It is decidedly antimodern in the sociocultural sphere although willing to tap into the economic benefits of technology.

Religious culture has tilted towards intolerance and violence. In this culture, petty politics, motivated partly by economic factors, continues to take place. Occupying mosques forcibly is a common practice. People from one sect seize mosques held by people belonging to other sects. Generally, very selective portions of Islamic teachings are preached to create a certain type of religious social environment which in turn supports the preachers and safeguards their economic and other personal interests. A large part of the religious community is responsible for creating and intensifying such a culture. Religion as a factor in the socialization process is frequently used to emotionalize and sentimentalize people.

Religion is not a factor in radicalization. Rather, it is being used as a tool by the radicals for recruitment and to indoctrinate the recruits. The religious elite "has increased the price tag of what he wants people to do and all other aspects are conveniently ignored".[110] "Illiterate *mullas* and masses" are one of

five major determinants of violence," observes Farhana.[111] Another study reveals that most of the people use religion for personal interests.[112] Religious circles, directly or indirectly, support "maintenance of unjust socioeconomic structures, social attitude and behavior".[113] Moreover, radicalism is not promoted only in the name of religion, secular communities, parties and organizations are also engaged in radical practices.[114]

Conclusion

The study suggests that Pakistan's sociocultural realities are a factor behind radicalization, but remain an indirect cause than a direct contributing factor. Direct causes of radicalization in Pakistan could be identified as Government policies, political expediencies and international actors. Sociocultural factors revolve around our culture of education, which is extremely skewed; religious culture, which is polarized and sectarian; and economic culture, which is widely unequal. Authoritarian and undemocratic attitudes and institutions are also among the factors. Religion, media and education have been used as tools of radicalization by the state and non-state actors.

The questions which need to be addressed further include (a) what is the social psychology of Pakistani radicals? (b) how are home chaos and radicals' socialization linked? (c) what is the role of foreign media as a factor of radicalization in Pakistan? (d) how have global society and global culture contributed towards radicalization in Pakistan? In addition, a new subject, of 'Sociology of Radicalization', has to be explored and established in order to comprehend the phenomenon in an efficient manner.

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Post-9/11 Peace Narrative in Pakistan

Shabana Fayyaz

The biggest contemporary challenge facing the people and government of Pakistan is the restoration of peace in the country. This paper argues for the cultivation of inclusive, broad-based, objective, and sustainable 'strategic peace' in Pakistan. That can be achieved through a combination of force, dialogue and social and economic development. However, beyond rhetoric, the question remains how to move towards this goal practically? The key element of cultivating and restoring trust within communities both at the state and non-state level needs to be harnessed. Only when trust is restored can the ultimate goal of achieving a national consensus-based counterterrorism policy be realized. The central argument here is that strategic peace requires constructive thinking and the institution of a consensus-based policy at the national and sub-national levels. The critical challenge, thus, is to foster harmony among the various stakeholders within and beyond the country.

To discuss the multifaceted dimensions of peace discourse within Pakistan – a frontline state in the US-led war on terror – it is pertinent to look into the competing arguments for stability and peace at the micro and macro levels across Pakistan. Every new threat brings in new challenges and that, in turn, call for re-examination of the old ways of thinking both at the state and/or non-state levels.

The very occurrence of 9/11 attacks put states like Pakistan and neighboring Afghanistan in the spotlight. After Pakistan committed to join as a frontline state the US-led international campaign against terrorism that began with an assault on Afghanistan in November 2001, the gap between the public's perception and Islamabad's interpretation of terrorism widened to the utmost. The result has been an erosion of stability and security at all levels – including political, social, economic, ethnic and individual – across the country. The prospects of a consensus-based peace remain elusive in Pakistan.

Three divergent perspectives have remained key elements of the peace discourse in post 9/11 Pakistan. The first is the government's perspective, reflected in its policies and initiatives regarding the war on terror; then there are the religious and sociopolitical perspectives. Before looking in detail at the three groupings one must understand that there is no watertight compartmentalization among the three. However, for the purpose of analysis, all three are discussed separately.

(a) Government's perspective

The government in Islamabad, whether led by General (r) Pervez Musharraf or by the present Pakistan People's Party-led coalition, has remained committed to ensuring success in the war on terror. A variety of policies and initiatives have been adopted to foster peace at home and beyond. Musharraf was the main architect of Pakistan's post-9/11 foreign and internal policies, and narrated this change in these words:

> The tragedy of 9/11 transformed security policies and changed geopolitical calculations. Pakistan took a strategic decision, based on the principles of humanity and our national interest, to support the war on terror…. Pakistan will remain in the forefront…. It is a decisive moment in history. We must decide whether to flow with the currents that threaten confrontation and the collapse of our civilization, or muster the collective will to chart the course of history towards a peaceful and cooperative global society.[1]

Since 2001, Pakistan has been pursuing a policy of eliminating the extremist elements either by use of force or political dialogue. It has made peace deals with the militants and has also launched security operations against them. In 2008 alone, Pakistan arrested 4,113 militants[2] and killed many others, launched 12 major military operations against the Taliban in its territory, killing over 3,000 and arresting more than 2,000 militants including Afghan Taliban.[3] In the same year, 3,182 people were killed and another 2,267 injured in operations launched by Pakistani security forces.[4] Pakistan's security forces have suffered 1,750 casualties[5] in the course of the war on terror – twice the number of total casualties suffered by coalition forces of 41 nations in Afghanistan. But peace has not yet been restored in the country, particularly in the tribal region bordering Afghanistan and the NWFP. Deep rifts have always been present within the political, religious and even government circles on the issue of the war on terror and the government's policies in this regard. A severe skepticism on part of the people has also emerged parallel to these rifts. The official policy has neither brought peace nor evolved a consensus on the issue. The political/religious leaders and the public have never been taken into confidence either on Pakistan's commitments and obligations in the anti-terror war.

Resultantly, in an environment devoid of trust and consensus, ambiguity has constantly shrouded government initiatives for fighting terrorism and restoring peace in the country. One comes across a multitude of statements – by military chiefs, the diplomatic community, and political leaders – which are not only contradictory but also lack the commitment to resolve the issue.

This gap has grown from the Musharraf era to the current PPP regime as Pakistan has traversed the trajectory of the war on terror. The only difference the PPP government has made is its effort to own the war on terror, perhaps to win support of the people who see the campaign as America's war.

After repeated statements by President Aif Zaradri and Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani expressing commitment to the war on terror and to initiating a three-pronged strategy to win it, army chief General Kayani has also supported the wider matrix of the war on terror including political engagement, use of force and economic development. To quote Kayani:

> The multi-prong approach, fully supported by the people of Pakistan will help us defeat the threat of internal terrorism… Military action alone cannot solve the problem. Political reconciliatory effort is required to go along with the military prong to win hearts and minds of the people… There are no quick fixes in this war.[6]

Reflecting on the Pak-US counter-terror equation, Kayani has repeatedly aired his apprehensions against the coalition forces' cross-border actions inside Pakistan's tribal regions:

> Such reckless actions only help the militants and further fuel the militancy in the area. Pakistan Army has given huge sacrifices in this war and it is the presence of the army which has denied the freedom of movement and operation to Al Qaeda and the affiliates. Trust-deficit and misunderstandings can lead to more complications and increase the difficulties for all… To succeed, the coalition would be required to display strategic patience and help the other side the way they want it rather than adopting a unilateral approach which may be counterproductive.[7]

To some extent, these statements also reflect the assessment of intellectuals, media persons, and Pakistani diaspora. However, what is lacking is how to nurture peace and stability in the long run. Unless issues in Afghanistan are settled, that is, the Pashtun majority is given representation, governance is improved and the Afghan economy revived, lasting peace in Pakistan cannot materialize. The way out is to iron out the perception gap between Kabul and Islamabad regarding the challenge terrorism poses. There has to be continued intensive bilateral cooperation, and an engagement based on mutual recognition that terrorism affects both countries. It is pointless to continue trading allegations against one another despite understanding the complexity of terrorism that threatens national cohesion in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. The need to have an integrated notion of peace within and beyond Pakistan was reiterated in the very first official statement of newly-elected president Asif Zardari:

> Pakistan intends to work not only with Afghanistan but also for the entire region including other neighbouring countries. We look to the region and shall stand with neighbours. … Pakistan and Afghanistan have been friends for a long time and they will stand with each other and not in the way of each other for the betterment of the peoples of the two countries. This is a message for not just Afghanistan but for all the neighboring countries.[8]

The need to understand and address the root causes of extremism is also highlighted in the official perspective. The strategy of using force is justified as means to restore the weakened writ of the government in the Tribal Areas.[9] These areas have long been neglected in all aspects – including economic, social, educational, political and legal – of development and progress.

Despite official arguments in support of an integrated vision of peace at home and abroad, national consensus on the so-called war on terror and Pakistan's role in it has not evolved. In this context, it would be beneficial to look at the two other broad clusters of discourse, the religious and political perspectives on peace and the war on terror.

(b) Religious perspective

The religious spectrum ranges from mild to extreme. The proponents of this discourse can be found at all levels of state and society. The insurgents and hardliners siding with the Afghan Taliban are not in majority. Their groupings are neither centralized in character nor directly controlled by Al Qaeda. A number of groups with sectarian,[10] ethnic,[11] and Islamist[12] agendas come together under the banner of *jihad* against the presence of Western forces in Afghanistan and the Pakistani government that is an ally in the war on terror.

Militants facilitating the Taliban, both of Afghan and non-Afghan origin, envision peace in Afghanistan and Pakistan only after the defeat and withdrawal of Western/NATO troops presently fighting along side the Afghan government forces. They also call for pulling back Pakistan's forces currently engaged in counter-insurgency in the Tribal Areas. Militants believe ultimate peace is only possible through an Islamic rule across the region.[13]

However, moderate religious organizations[14] – including charities, madrassas and the civil society – believe that extremists are misusing Islam for their petty agendas. But the fallout is being felt by the people all over the world. Such moderate elements have not been able to come to the forefront and ordinary people continue to fall prey to the extremist version of Islam. This brings us to political perspective on peace in the post-9/11 era.

(c) Political perspective (peace through democracy)

To quote former prime minister of Pakistan, late Benazir Bhutto, "Democracy is necessary to peace and to undermining the forces of terrorism."[15] She asserts that:

> The forces of moderation and democracy must, and will, prevail against extremism and dictatorship. I will not be intimidated. I will step out on the tarmac in Karachi not to complete a journey, but to begin one.

The majority of political actors, whether belonging to the left, right or center political parties in Pakistan advocate this line of thinking. Intellectuals and community leaders also echo the same perception of peace. There exists an understanding that the war on terror has pushed Pakistan towards more trouble. The challenge faced by Pakistani leadership is how to steer the country out of the quagmire of terrorism and extremism. To quote Nawaz Sharif, another former premier and leader of the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N):

> Now the situation has changed. A truly representative parliament has come into being.... Every decision will be presented before parliament, they will review Musharraf's policy in the last six years…. The US and Pakistan want to see the world free of terrorism and for innocent people not to suffer. We want to see peace in every corner of the world and we want to see peace in Pakistan also. We do not want that in order to give peace to others we turn our own country into a murder house.[16]

Conclusion

From a discussion of these multiple strands of peace one can conclude that there exist 'pieces of peace' within Pakistan. There is an urgent need to build bridges among these pieces through sustained dialogue. The idea of "strategic peace" put forth in this paper needs to be explored at all levels. There is a need to understand the gaps within the system and rectify past mistakes.

In a nutshell, strategic peace based on dialogue, understanding and patience should be the ultimate goal of all policymakers within and beyond Pakistan. That is, the concept that peace means more than the absence of overt violent conflict. Strategic peace implies interaction and engagement based on mutual understanding at the micro and macro level. The ultimate goal is to foster sustainable peace across the society based on the broader vision of security. Here, the aim is to institute mechanisms and undertake policies that aim to provide physical and mental security to the people at large. To quote Tibetan leader Dalia Lama:

> Peace, in the sense of the absence of war, is of little value to someone who is dying of hunger or cold…. Peace can only last where human rights are respected, where people are fed, and where individuals and nations are free.[17]

In short, strategic peace should not be seen as a distant goal but as a means through which sustainable peace is possible.

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5 http: //www.san-pips.com/new/index.

6 Pakistan Army chief, General Ashfaq Kayani, made these comments following his meeting with senior United States officers on USS Abraham Lincoln on 27th August 2008. Details are available at http: //en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ashfaq_Parvez_Kayani.

7 Ibid.

8 President of Pakistan Asif Zardari made these remarks while addressing a joint press conference with Afghan President Hamid Karzai at the President House in Islamabad on September 10, 2008, after taking oath as the 12th president of Pakistan.

9 The Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) is divided into seven agencies and six frontier regions. The agencies are: Khyber, Kurram, Orakzai, Mohmand, Bajaur, North Waziristan and South Waziristan. Frontier regions (FR): FR Peshawar, FR Kohat, FR Tank, FR Banuu, FR Lakki and FR Dera Ismail Khan. Under the Constitution, FATA is included among the "territories" of Pakistan (Article 1). It is represented in the National Assembly and the Senate but remains under the president's direct executive authority (Articles 51, 59 and 247). Laws framed by the National Assembly do not apply here unless specifically directed by the president, who is also empowered to issue regulations for the "peace and good government" of the tribal areas. For details visit: http://www.fata.gov.pk.

10 The prominent sectarian groups banned in Pakistan in 2002 are the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) – a radical group from the majority Sunni sect – and the Tehreek-e-Jafria Pakistan (TJP) – a movement of followers of the Shia sect. The SSP was founded by Sunni cleric Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi in the 1980s and wants Pakistan to be officially declared a Sunni Muslim state. The TJP was founded in 1979. Its leader, Allama Arif Hussain al-Hussaini was a student of the leader of Iran's Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini. Another banned group is the Tanzeem-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi – a radical Sunni Muslims outfit – founded by Maulana Sufi Mohammad.

11 The main ethnic groups in Pakistan include Punjabis, Pashtuns, Sindhis, Seraikis, Muhajirs, Balochis, Hindkowans, Memon, Chitralis.

[12] The Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), an alliance of six religious political parties, won around 11 percent of the vote in the 2002 general elections.

[13] The most prominent militant group in Pakistan is the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). It has its presence in all seven agencies of FATA as well as settled areas of NWFP, including Swat, Bannu, Tank, Lakki Marwat, Dera Ismail Khan, Kohistan, Buner and Malakand. One of the publicly aired key objectives of the TTP is 'Enforce Shariah, unite against NATO in Afghanistan, and perform defensive Jihad against Pakistan Army." For a detailed account of the TTP *see* Hassan Abbas, "Profile of Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan", *CTC Sentinel,* Jan. 2008, Vol 1, Issue 2.

[14] The *Barelvi* school of thought is a branch of Sunni Muslims. What makes them distinct is their extraordinary love and devotion for Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). This group was founded by Ahmed Raza Khan Barelvi who wrote many books. In his teachings he has exhorted Muslims that the path to eternal success is to follow the Shariah and the love of God and of the Prophet. *Barelvis* consider Prophet Muhammad as the best human being and the source through which they can achieve the love of God.

[15] Quoted at http://www/quotes and poem.com/quotes/listquotes/author/Benazir-bhutto.

[16] *Dawn*, March 25, 2008.

[17] http://www.dalailama.com/page.2.htm

Radicalization in Sri Lanka

Ranga Kalansooriya

Introduction

Though the present context of radicalization is being discussed primarily in the religious perspective, it has its own explanations in different perceptions. Sri Lanka is a classic example to make this argument. With a prolonged ethnic conflict Sri Lanka has experienced, and continues to experience, religious and political radicalization in all its manifestations since the country's independence.

The issue of radicalization in Sri Lanka goes back over a millennium and a half to the initial days of the ethnic conflict. The Sinhala and Tamil ethnic groups have engaged in political rivalry probably for over fifteen centuries.

Even though both ethnic communities originally derived from neighbouring India, those originating from northern and southern India locked themselves in a prolonged conflict on the issue of autonomy – mainly with regard to the northern region of the country, with the eastern region also joining in later. After continuous neglect by successive governments of various political issues of ethnic minority Tamils in the north and east of the country, the struggle has degenerated into terrorism.

Largely dominated by Sinhala Buddhists, Sri Lanka is home to four major ethnic communities: Sinhalese, Tamils, Muslims[1] and Burghers of Dutch descent. Radicalization, whether as an effect of the protracted conflict or not, could be seen on the political, religious and ethnic fronts with its symptoms visible in every socio-political sphere.

Political Radicalization

Ethnicity, not religion, is the defining characteristic of radicalization in Sri Lanka. The issues facing ethnic minority Tamils have been on the political platform since the island nation's independence from British rule in February 1948, but have not been addressed. These issues remained mere electioneering tools for the major political forces in the south while peaceful Tamil agitations were generally met with riots or violence. Thus, the moderate Tamil political leadership found itself being isolated by the Tamil youth by the early 1980s, and later being systematically eliminated.

The radical Tamil movement emerged during the early '70s with a small group of youth with locally made weapons engaged in random killings, robberies and destructive activities. They held radical political views, in stark

contrast to the Tamil polity of the day, which was aligned to non-violent Gandhian-style campaigns. The militant youth argued that the peaceful Tamil political movements had not brought any tangible results for their issues, rather ended up as mere political pledges on election platforms. This argument and the prevailing political situation of the country attracted many youth to resort to militancy for gaining a separate homeland for ethnic Tamils in Sri Lanka's northern and eastern parts.

Fired by radical political ideologies and backed by a gradually growing militant capacity, the number of armed Tamil youth groups gradually grew along with their combat power. Though the initial phase of the militancy inclined towards Marxist ideologies that leaning disappeared at a later stage.

Most significantly, external support towards Tamil militancy fuelled the situation to a greater extent. Radical views of political leaders in both Sri Lanka and India at the time (J.R. Jayewardene and Indira Gandhi respectively) paved the way for New Delhi to provide logistic, training and other support to Tamil militant organizations in the early '80s.

Emergence of the LTTE

The radicalization of Tamil youth not only rewrote the history of Sri Lanka, it also added a crucial chapter to the global history book of terrorism. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a terrorist organization that has been banned in 32 countries including the United States, UK, India and the European Union eliminated almost all other Tamil militant groups and also the moderate Tamil political leadership in a bid to present itself as the sole representative of the Tamil people in Sri Lanka.[2] The three-decade-long conflict has claimed the lives of over 75,000 people.[3]

The key significance in the Tiger radicalization is their initiation of the present-day suicide bombing culture. Unlike other radicalized suicide cadres, the Tigers are not driven by religious beliefs or expectations of rewards in the hereafter, but by their total commitment to a political cause. The group could boast of the most dedicated group of suicide cadres compared to any terrorist group in the world.

Identified as Black Tigers, the Tiger suicide cadres operate directly under the command of Tiger leader Velupillai Prabhakaran and its intelligence wing chief Pottu Amman, and are the most sophisticated and ruthless unit of the LTTE. Though there seem to be a great deal of eagerness to join the unit, according to LTTE claims, Black Tigers are hand-picked by Prabhakaran. Most of these cadres are from the families of those who have been severely affected by military operations of the government or by other opposition groups. Dhanu --

the garland-carrying woman suicide bomber that killed former Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi -- is the prime example. Her family was subjected to severe harassments by the Indian peacekeeping forces in Sri Lanka.

Once assigned to an operation, there have been extremely few cases of defection among the highly motivated, disciplined and covert Black Tiger cadres. Tiger suicide operations have also provided operational examples to other groups including Al Qaeda.[4] Black Tigers would provide a classic case study for a comprehensive research on radicalization for suicide terrorism.

Marxist Leftists in the South – JVP

Radicalization of the Sri Lankan youth in the early '70s was not limited to the northern Tamils. The majority southern Sinhalese youth, too, were radicalized by Marxist ideologies and took up arms against the government at the time in an unsuccessful countrywide armed resistance. The Peoples Liberation Front (Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, popularly known as the JVP), led by a Marxist ideologist, Rohana Wijeweera, locally identified as a leader in Che Guerra's mould, rebelled against three elected regimes of Sri Lanka over a period of 18 years.[5]

Flourishing among the underprivileged and marginalized youth, the JVP managed to establish a strong support base at the grassroots level and in universities. The insurgencies it launched[6] faced a ruthless response by the governments of the day. Killings took place in large numbers and dead bodies were a frequent sight even at public places.

The movement highly benefited from the socio-political and economic issues of the country at the time. Rural underprivileged youth were attracted to its radical political ideologies and the party had an organized structure for radicalizing them through systematic lectures and then arming and training them in guerrilla operations. As Prof. Ralph Buultjens[7] explains, measured by the impact it has had on society and the threat it has presented to three elected governments in Sri Lanka, the JVP has been highly effective in its disruptive capacity.[8]

However, the captured and killing of its leader Rohana Wijeweera by security forces in November 1989 and subsequent elimination of all its main leaders prompted the movement to carve a political path and adopt new strategies in politics. All except one of the 11-member PVP politburo were killed and its military and operational structure and capacity completely destroyed.

As in the case of any underground military organization, the JVP was also shattered by the loss of its chief and main leadership. The only way it could

survive was to rejoin the democratic political mainstream in the country. After opting for the political path, the JVP eventually emerged as the third largest political party in Sri Lanka in successive polls.

The JVP has been described as the Sinhala twin of the LTTE.[9] However, its re-entry into mainstream politics could also be viewed as a bold transformation of its ideology and activism at large. Gunaratna in the preface to his book 'Sri Lanka – A Lost Revolution?' writes:

> … the post-Wijeweera JVP has today re-merged as the third largest political party in Sri Lanka. It remains one of the few success stories of a highly successful underground movement that radically transformed its character to embrace mainstream democratic politics. The Sri Lankan security forces and intelligence community's success in destroying the JVP core and penultimate leadership permanently crippled its capacity to re-emerge as a military force.

Religious Radicalization in Sri Lanka

Though the protracted conflict in Sri Lanka has generally had an ethnic countenance, religion plays a significant role in all its spheres. The prolonged ethnic strife has added a religious dimension to the conflict – especially with regard to majority Sinhalese who are predominantly Buddhists.

The phenomenon of minority complex of a majority[10] could largely be seen among the Sinhala Buddhist majority in Sri Lanka which – in some cases – is justifiable. With the escalation of war in the last two years, the nationalistic sentiments coupled with pro-war campaigns were common in all spheres of the country's social fabric. This situation was further fuelled by some recent comments by senior authorities, proclaiming Sinhala Buddhists' sole 'ownership' of Sri Lanka. Other ethnicities were asked to look for alternatives.

A significant player in the current governing coalition in Sri Lanka is the hard-line Sinhala Buddhist political party Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) – a political grouping predominantly of Buddhist monks. Mobilizing a Sinhala Buddhist hard-line audience that was created by another popular Buddhist monk, Ven Gangodawila Soma Thera,[11] the JHU came into power with a considerable number of seats (11) in parliament. It thus became a decisive factor in the ruling coalition, most significantly influencing key policies of the government.

The radical ideology of the JHU led to many controversies within the Sri Lankan polity and also the society at large. A recent comment by a cabinet minister from the JHU against Muslim girls wearing veils in the country's non-Muslim schools sparked a heated debate among the concerned parties.[12]

Sri Lanka's constitution guarantees Buddhism the foremost position among all other religions in the country.

Anti-conversion and anti-blasphemy laws have already been enacted in India, Pakistan, and Indonesia.[13] Sri Lanka attempted to follow suit, but the parliament never debated a draft anti-conversion bill tabled in 2004. However, in August 2004, the Supreme Court declared the draft bill, conceived by the JHU, was constitutional. Some argue the decision not only ignores the country's basic law -- which declares that "every person is entitled to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, including the freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice"[14] --but it also violates the international norms and obligations that Sri Lanka has committed itself to through United Nations protocols and conventions.[15] However, the draft did not become a law.

Nevertheless, moderate Buddhists and other religious communities also view forcible or 'unethical' conversions as a social menace. Several hardcore fundamental religious groups conduct 'unethical' conversions of underprivileged and marginalized segments among the rural poor mainly through financial influence. A national commission established by the country's leading Buddhist gathering, the All Ceylon Buddhist Congress (ACBC), conducted comprehensive investigations and held public hearings for over a year and made 121 proposals for the protection and strengthening of Buddhism in Sri Lanka. These proposals are expected to be implemented by Buddhist temples.[16]

'Unethical' conversions have further damaged inter-religious harmony in Sri Lanka, as is the case in many countries in the region, including India. In the past three years, more than 100 churches have been attacked around Sri Lanka, for which hard-line Buddhists have been mainly blamed. In most of these cases, religious influence trumped the implementation of the rule of law. However, more systematic and professional approaches like establishing the ACBC commission has helped control the situation to a great extent.

A grenade attack on a concert featuring Indian movie star Shah Rukh Khan and his Bollywood troupe in Colombo in December 2004 was a significant event with regard to Buddhist radicalism in Sri Lanka. The event coincided with the first death anniversary of Gangodawila Soma Thera, a popular Buddhist monk. Protestors had been demanding the event's postponement, saying it was a day for mourning, not for enjoyment. Military and police were deployed to disperse the agitating crowd. The grenade explosion in the premises during the show killed two people and injured another 18. Buddhist activists were blamed for the attack, but the charge was never proved.

Muslims in Sri Lanka

With Sunnis the majority Muslim population in Sri Lanka, the country has witnessed a relatively low level of religious radicalism among the Islamic believers in the country compared to other countries in the region.

Radicalization of Muslims, especially in the face of LTTE violence against the eastern Muslims, was seen in the late '80s and also in the '90s, but did not endure as a movement. Moreover, with the resumption of peace talks between the government and the LTTE in 2001, eastern Muslims demanded to be part of the negotiations to decide the future of the Eastern Province. Most of these protests centered around the South Eastern University. This prompted a convention in January 2003 in the southeastern coastal city of Oluwil, which demanded through a declaration self-determination for Muslims in the Eastern Province.

Lack of unity, and political and sectarian issues are common within the Sri Lankan Muslim community. Among four main religious gatherings, Tablig Jamaat is widely seen by non-Muslims as a grouping with radical approach–which has not been an issue since its political passiveness–something that has been continuously denied by the Sri Lankan Muslims. Muslim preachers in Sri Lanka generally promote Islam in a non-violent and non-radical context.

Though precise figures cannot be ascertained, conversion to Islam is increasing in the country. Monitoring of Tamil newspapers[17] reveales the publication of at least 10 paid notices per month announcing conversions of Tamils to Islam. Such conversions predominantly follow inter-ethnic marriages in the east and in the central hills region of the country.

The conversion of a senior Buddhist monk to Islam, not only as a general practitioner, but also as a preacher, shows the trend. Matale Gnanodaya Thera was ordained at the age of 12, educated at leading Buddhist training centers for clergy and spent 33 years as a Buddhist monk preaching Buddhism across the country. He then converted to Islam and now functions as a Muslim preacher in rural Sri Lanka.

He does not attribute his conversion to any individual or group's influence. "I find many parallels between Islam and Buddhism. The basis of both religions is the same. So I opted to convert to Islam which provides more practical aspects of the truth," he says.[18]

The emergence of Sri Lanka Muslim Congress in the late 1980s can also be considered a significant event that transformed radical Muslim political activism into a democratic process. The party that mainly focused on the

Eastern Provinc`e Muslims during its early days now plays a vital role in the political theatre at the national level. It has emerged as a main political force in Sri Lanka's polity within a considerably short period of operation.

The Eastern Province with all its multi-ethnic features continues to remain one of the most volatile regions in the country. Muslims, one-third of the province's population, continue to be sandwiched between Sinhalese and Tamils who are divided in equal proportion on ethnic lines. A decisive part of the violent conflict in Eastern Province was the major attraction for all the major players, but mainly for the LTTE. The Muslims in the east were subjected to continuous harassment, intimidation and ruthless violence. However, they seldom reacted to that intimidation and violence. Though there have been unconfirmed reports of armed Muslim youth operating in the east in the name of Jihad, but that is mostly ad hoc and lacks an established central command.

However, the responses by the Muslims to the Tamil militant aggression in the Eastern Province have been far below the expected level, displaying a high degree of tolerance. These Muslims continue to repose their faith in the democratic political system amidst severe hardships and challenges.

There have been isolated instances of sudden emergence of fundamental Islamic groups in the eastern Muslim-populated areas. However, these groups have not managed to make a significant impact within the socio-ethnic system of the region. Nevertheless, the situation remains vulnerable with external interest groups looking for opportunities in the region.

The country has 251 madrassas[19], but according to Muslim leaders, none of them has bred extremism, radicalism or fundamentalism. The government, Muslim philanthropists and well-wishers continue to support these madrassas in various capacities.

Conclusion

Devastated by over three decades of violent conflict, Sri Lanka continues to experience many forms of radicalization in its entire social fabric. As discussed above, such radicalization mainly assumes political and religious forms, with both aspects largely inter-linked.

Levels of radicalization among different religious groups in Sri Lanka vary from those in other countries in the region. Political maturity, fair play, adhering to basic principles of human dignity and mutual respect are the best tools for tackling these forms of radicalism, especially in the multi-ethnic and multi-religious Sri Lankan society.

Notes and References

1 Followers of Islam are being identified as a special ethnic community in Sri Lanka.

2 The LTTE has killed almost all Tamil political / militant leadership whose ideology differed to theirs. Some Tamil political leaders who oppose LTTE's viewpoint continue to operate from the capital Colombo with heavy security provided by the State.

3 The first killing by the LTTE took place in July 1975. The exact number of killings remains unknown. The figure quoted by international media until 2007 was 60,000. The military subsequently claimed killing more than 10,000 Tigers. Officials claim security forces suffered around 5,000 fatalities in the past two years.

4 Several research studies have compared the modus operandi of Al Qaeda and the LTTE in some attacks. The most significant has been by Shanaka Jayasekera of Macquarie University of Sydney on the method of attack on USS Cole by Al Qaeda and LTTE's targeting of Sri Lankan navy ship Abheetha in the country's northern waters.

5 Gunaratna, Rohan, *A Lost Revolution,* IFS; Kandy; 2001, p. iii.

6 The major armed insurrections were launched in 1971 and subsequently in 1988-89. The JVP went underground in 1983 after being declared a banned organization along with two other political parties.

7 Prof. Buultjens is a former senior fellow at the Institute of Fundamental Studies in Sri Lanka, a senior professor at New York University and the New School for Social Research in New York.

8 Gunaratna, Rohan, *A Lost Revolution,* IFS 2001, p vi.

9 Ibid

10 Dixit, J N, *Assignment Colombo*, Vijitha Yapa Publication; Colombo; 2004, p. 13.

11 Venerable Gangodawila Soma Thera was an extremely popular Buddhist preacher until his unexpected demise in 2004. He openly admitted his intention of joining active politics by contesting presidential elections. His death paved the way for the JHU to muster the support of his followers.

12 Ravaya newspaper, Dec. 21, 2008.

13 http://www.becketfund.org/, Jan 12, 2009

14 Constitution of Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, Chapter III, Paragraph 10.

15 Roman P. Storzer, *Asian Tribune,* Sep. 14, 2004.

16 The commission's report was released at a ceremony held in Colombo on Jan 07, 2009.

17 Muslim community in Sri Lanka use Tamil as their main language.

18 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sgSaWUlgsxk, accessed on Jan. 12, 2009.

19 All madra`ssas are required to register with the government.

Human Rights Reporting in Pakistani Media

Safdar Sial

Introduction

Pakistan's Urdu and English print and electronic media understand and present human rights issues in a variety of ways. The manner in which newspapers, magazines and television channels portray human rights issues and defenders, and victims of violations and abuse shapes people's opinion. It also affects policymaking and legislation. This study intends to determine how journalists and media organizations view and report human rights issues in Pakistan. Conversely, an effort has also been made to investigate how the people, human rights organizations and activists see the role of the media's coverage of human rights issues.

The study also aims to explore journalists' capacity for well-informed, investigative and rights-based journalism. Meanwhile, public perceptions of human rights issues have been studied with a special reference to the impact of contemporary media reporting approaches. These approaches have been documented and analyzed, especially journalists' attitude towards victims, treatment of human rights issues as well as the patterns and quality of reporting. An analysis of the opinions and content has also been included with excerpts from news items, reports, editorials and debates to better comprehend the media coverage. The environment for reporting on human rights issues was also studied to comprehend the threats and pressures which limit journalists' capacity for investigation and reporting. Another objective was to evaluate the role of the media and the mindset of journalists to improve and fill the gaps in human rights reporting.

There is no dearth of literature and reports on human rights issues in Pakistan. A great deal of statistical and narrative data is also available on the subject. Human rights violations in Pakistan, including violations of rights of women and children, arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, harassment of families of the disappeared, excessive use of force by state agents and unlawful killings are regularly monitored, highlighted and protested against by a number of human rights organizations in the country and abroad – the prominent ones include Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Asian Human Rights Commission, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, Defense of Human Rights and *Aurat* Foundation. These and other human rights organizations are engaged in raising awareness about human rights and lobby whenever any important case arises. They also produce and

disseminate reports on human rights issues, which are reproduced and discussed in Pakistani print and electronic media.

Media organizations are another source of information, analysis and reports on human rights in Pakistan. Rights issues have become a regular feature of the electronic media as well. Be they cases of enforced disappearances and illegal detentions or curbs on rights after promulgation of the state of emergency, Pakistani media has played a key role in keeping human rights in the limelight.

Rights' violations and abuse is the focus of a substantial volume of reports, books, literature and data on human rights issues in Pakistan. However, how these issues are investigated, reported and analyzed in the media largely remains an unexplored area. This study is an attempt to remedy that. The study also explores how the reporting on human rights issues is being influenced by the environment within and outside media organizations.

Methodology and Approach

The study was conducted over a period of four months, starting July 1, 2008. A representative cross-section of 35 Urdu and English daily newspapers, and weekly and monthly magazines, was selected for monitoring and analysis. Nine television news channels were also monitored from July to October 2008. The coverage of the issues and the opinions expressed in the print and electronic media was also examined.

Besides researching newspaper archives and media monitoring, interviews and surveys of journalists and rights activists were also conducted.[1] A sample of 108 print and electronic media journalists from Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar, Quetta and Islamabad was selected for the survey. The questionnaire contained both open- and close-ended questions. A similar survey was conducted with a representative sample of 221 people in these cities to learn about the public perception regarding human rights issues and reporting. As many as 15 interviews were also conducted with senior journalists, experts and rights activists to have an in-depth analysis of the subject. During the final month of the study, data collected from archives, interviews and surveys was analyzed.

Enhanced and extensive media monitoring over at least a six-month period and inclusion of regional media (Urdu, Pashto, Sindhi and Baloch media) could have provided a better insight into the patterns of human rights reporting. Moreover, electronic media monitoring was limited to programs, talk shows and one hour of main news bulletins daily. Similarly, surveys and interviews could also be extended to local journalists/correspondents and the general public. However, the shortage of time was the major constraint in this regard.

Public Perceptions of Media Reporting on Human Rights

As far as people's understanding of human rights is concerned, 21 percent of the respondents to the public survey said they get information on human rights from media reports. Fifty percent of the 221 people surveyed in five cities attributed their knowledge of human rights issues to all sources of information including the print and electronic media, home, mosques and textbooks, etc. Ten percent of the respondents acquired their knowledge about human rights issues from home, 3 percent from mosque, and 9 percent from syllabus, while 7 percent denied receiving knowledge about human rights from any of these sources (Table 1). The majority of the respondents (53 percent) preferred the electronic media to get information on human rights issues, 35 percent relied on the print media and 12 percent mainly on the internet (Chart 1). While the majority of the respondents (85 percent) was generally satisfied with the media's reporting on human rights issues, 11 percent were not (Chart 2).

Table 1: Sources of public knowledge on Human Rights issues

Sources	Responses (%)
Home	10%
Mosque	3%
Media	21%
Syllabus	9%
All sources	50%
None of these	7%

Chart 1: Which is your preferred media for information on human rights issues?

Chart 2: How do you rate the effectiveness of media in reporting human rights issues?


Journalists' Perceptions of Human Rights

Journalists' understanding of human rights issues was almost similar to that of the general public, gauged through the PIPS public survey.[2] Almost half of the journalists (48 percent) perceived human rights as provision of basic needs, improvement in living standards and equal opportunities. As many as 17 percent respondents equated human rights with social freedom.

Sixteen percent linked human rights to human dignity and 19 percent saw them as rights advocated by Islam. The perceptions of 108 journalists from across the country regarding human rights – collected through a questionnaire form – are documented in Table 2.

Table 2: Journalists' Perceptions of Human Rights

Perceptions	Responses (%)
a. Improvement in living standards	24%
b. Fulfilment of basic necessities of life	18%
c. Equal opportunities	6%
d. Protection of human dignity	16%
e. Social freedom	17%
f. Rights provided by Islam	19%

While reporting issues and incidents, journalists do bear in mind the ethical obligations to ensure victims' self-respect and dignity are not undermined. The media survey also found that the majority (90 percent) of journalists questioned thought they took great care in reporting human rights cases (Chart 3).

Chart 3: Do you feel yourself sensitized regarding HR issues?

Journalists' Training for HR Reporting

Journalists were also asked in the survey about their training background regarding human rights reporting. As many as 52 percent of the respondents said they had attended at least one training workshop on human rights in their career, and 75 percent said that they had also benefited from these workshops and improved their understanding of human rights (Table 3 and Chart 4). On the contrary, observations made by these journalists during the PIPS media survey showed that a large number of the journalists lacked formal training and academic background in their respective reporting spheres.

Chart 4: Have you attended any HR training workshop?

Table 3: Did you benefit from the training workshop?

Responses	Percentage
Yes	75%
No	25%

The concept of training for human rights reporting is very complex, says *Zafarullah*, who has extensive experience of media reporting. Journalists mainly attend workshops to file a story for that day. It is rare that they use the tools, shared in the workshops, in their reporting. Secondly, the concept of specialization has not yet taken root in media organizations, especially in the Urdu media, and the media keeps transferring journalists from one reporting field to another. The situation is comparatively better in the English media where journalists are not forced to cover an array of multiple beats. Human rights reporting in the electronic media also lacks investigation and research.[3]

Limitations in Human Rights Reporting

Investigative and research-based reporting needs resources. Such expense is neither a priority for the media organizations nor for the journalists. The salary journalists command is mostly determined by their image and is not necessarily commensurate to the amount of work they do for the organization.[4] Lack of resources or absence of allocation for investigative reporting compels media organizations to pursue small event-based packages in the electronic media and narrative stories in the print media, which lack thoroughness.

Incidents of human rights violations, particularly against women and children in the name of cultural and tribal traditions, mostly occur in rural areas far from big cities. The burial alive of five Baloch women in a far-flung Balochistan village, 80 kilometers from Osta Muhammad town in district Jaffarabad is an example. Journalists find it difficult to travel to such remote areas. Local journalists and correspondents who cover such events generally lack the ability and knowledge to appropriately investigate and report on human rights violations. Even the electronic media uses local correspondents to get reports and details on the events.

Sometimes even the knowledge of local journalists and correspondents is limited to superficial information due to socio-cultural and traditional constraints. Tribal elders and feudal lords also create hurdles in the way of victims of human rights abuses communicating with journalists. Some examples of such limitation cited by journalists in their reports during the monitoring period include:

a) It is believed that using the influence of the PPP minister and his brother the incident was kept away from the media.[5]

b) The names of those girls could not be ascertained due to tribal traditions and restrictions.[6]

c) However, he (the divisional inspector-general of police) said the tribal system is in place here. People are very much frightened. No one has so far come forward as a witness of the incident. Even the heirs of the victims are not coming to collect the dead bodies.[7]

d) No one is ready to be a witness (in the case of women's burial alive in Balochistan): Rehman Malik[8]

e) Because some influential people of the area were involved in this incident, the local journalists (in Naseerabad) did not provide much detail. Therefore, the incident could not be appropriately covered by the newspapers published from Quetta.[9]

The journalists investigate and report amid a range of threats, pressures and curbs, including curbs and censorships from within their media organization, and external constraints. Those areas of Pakistan which are notorious for human rights violations have a strong historical background of rituals and norms which the local people do not deem as human rights violations. Secondly, the feudal system and illiteracy are so dominant in such areas, particularly in rural Sindh, southern Punjab and Balochistan that any voice raised against human rights abuses and violations can easily be suppressed.

Sometimes journalists also face threats from state institutions while reporting about human rights issues. Seventy-five percent of the respondents in the PIPS media survey said that they had received verbal, telephonic or written threats at state and societal levels while investigating and reporting about human rights issues. As far as internal curbs and censorship are concerned, 54 percent journalists said their editors/general managers gave priority to their reports on human rights issues, 41 percent accused their editors of expediency, whereas 5 percent stated that their reports on human rights issues were completely ignored.

The threats journalists face in big cities such as Peshawar, Lahore, Karachi, Quetta and Islamabad seem to be lower compared to small towns and far-flung areas of the country where a journalist may even be killed for highlighting human rights violations. Journalists associated with the Urdu media are more vulnerable than their colleagues in the English media. The former have to bear in mind the mental and educational level of their

readers/viewers, most of whom have no or very little education. On the other hand, journalists from the English media do not have to worry much about these things. The journalists stated that that was why the English media provided more coverage to human rights issues. Seventy-two percent of the respondents were of the view that they were restricted to minimal reporting without any investigation. Only 28 percent said they were able to brush aside these pressures.

Some analysts also see political factors interfering with journalists' performance in human rights reporting. According to Naureen Tawakkal, "Pakistani media is still working under the influence of political parties, which makes unbiased reporting impossible. In democratic societies, journalists work as think-tanks and directly affect government policies. The quality of our human rights reporting does not compare with the international standards. This is due to unprofessional attitude of our journalists, media organizations and our political elite."[10] According to another expert, Peter Jacob, the lack of resources and the absence of unbiased organizations have contributed immensely to the fragile situation of Pakistani media.[11]

Attitude of the Journalists

Lack of Conviction and Commitment

A number of factors – dearth of training and professional education, skepticism about rights issues and rights organizations, structural, organizational or financial constraints – are responsible for lack of conviction and commitment among journalists covering human rights. It was observed during the media monitoring as well as in conducting the survey, that around 75 percent of the journalists reporting on rights issues, were not convinced of the significance of their area of reporting and that they were not interested in investigation. They were not committed to exploring and highlighting the issues in the human rights context. The following abstract from a three-column detailed report demonstrates how the journalist's interest results in a comprehensive report.[12]

> (Lahore) Police have liberated two sisters and their father from a 15-year-long-bondage imposed by none other than the man's son... The victims were identified as Babu Nazir Ahmed, a retired WAPDA employee, and his two daughters – Riffat, 35, and Nighat, 27 – who were present in the house which was reportedly locked from outside by their brother Qaisar Mehmood... A Rescue 1122 official said they broke the lock of a room and recovered Riffat, adding the door was [also] locked from inside and terrified, she was not ready to come out of the room... One of the CMIT members and political secretary to the Punjab chief minister, Tanveer Alam Butt, talking to the newsmen, claimed that some locals had told the team that the three victims had been confined to the

house for the last 15 years by accused Qaisar… Some local residents alleged that Qaisar, who was also an ex-employee of WAPDA, had confined his father and sisters and used to torture them mentally besides disallowing them to leave the house… However an elderly woman, Sharifaan Bibi, who introduced herself as paternal aunt of the girls, told Dawn that Qaisar had not confined them. His only sin, according to her, was that he neither married himself nor managed the marriages of his sisters… Dressed in stinking clothes, they (victims) were unable to speak to the media and paramedical staff apparently owing to their poor state of mind… Kiran Dar, an MPA, who was included among the rescuers, told Dawn that some locals had planned in a meeting to inform the government and media about the alleged confinement of the girls and their father… Saddar division SP Faisal Ali Raja told Dawn that the medical report of the three victims would determine the offense, if any.

But at the same time, in some cases, the level of conviction and commitment is remarkable. Rauf Klasra's name, for example, is among the journalists who wrote – amid heightened threats and pressure – a number of reports and follow-ups on the issue of burial of five women alive in Balochistan. The following extract from one of his articles describes the pressure in which he was investigating and reporting the incident: [13]

The tone of IG (police inspector general) Nawaz, who made a phone call from Quetta to this reporter, was not only threatening but he also used strong language to express his own views and even made a taunt at one stage, saying: 'I have come to know that you, Mr Klasra, are the new champion of women's rights in Pakistan'.

Indifference

Considerable indifference was noted among journalists regarding human rights violations and issues, more so in the Urdu media. Around 50 percent of the news and reports monitored lacked any investigation. The news items were little more than narration of basic details of incidents. Reports in the Urdu media were mostly based on reports prepared by human rights organizations or translations from the English media and lacked personal investigation and interest.

Even some full-page reports on rights issues in the Urdu media lacked investigation and analysis. A report in an Urdu newspaper on September 8 on violation of women's rights in Balochistan opened with a rhetorical 150-word introduction. While narrating the burial alive of five women, it relied on about 1,000 words from a report by the Asian Human Rights Commission -- a 300-word statement of the Balochistan police chief, around 500 words narrating a press conference by the divisional inspector-general (DIG) police, and another 250 words describing the press conference of a Balochistan Assembly member from Naseerabad, Sadiq Umrani, and a statement by the Senate deputy chairman.[14] Many such reports on rights issues were

monitored, in both the Urdu and English media, which were mere compilations of related events and developments, or reproduction of press statements or reports by NGOs.

Skepticism

It is not uncommon for journalists to get confused while reporting on human rights issues, on account of conflicting accounts of events. Zafarullah, an experienced journalist himself, observes that the journalists covering human rights issues often have many contradictory versions to reconcile and report. There is a fusion of culture, traditions and religion in Pakistan.[15] On top of this confusion, many journalists were skeptical of human rights organizations, and termed human rights as anti-Islam western agenda. Requested to comment on the training workshops organized by human rights organizations, many of were wary of the human rights organizations' agenda for such workshops. "Every NGO has its own agenda…. I just get networking opportunities in such workshops," says a journalist.[16] Such skepticism was quite explicit in some reports and a little less so in others. A few extracts from such reports are given below.

    i)   Pakistan is a developing country where more than 70 percent people are forced to live below the poverty line.... Due to rising crimes in the country sexual abuse of children is also on the rise…. Protecting the children and providing them a safe environment for growth has become a real challenge…. According to a report, more than 3.3 million children in Pakistan are victims of child labor. It was revealed in a workshop organized by a working group the other day that more than 2 million children have become victim of sexual abuse…. In the NWFP, people have a religious mindset and often do not report such cases…. After president Pervez Musharraf came into power and raised the slogan of enlightened moderation many NGOs were established in the country, especially in the NWFP, and vowed to protect the rights of children. These NGOs got millions of rupees in the name of so-called rights of children and women from local and international donors…. The government should take action against such NGOs and recover those charity funds after a proper audit.[17]

    ii)   Last month, the Human Rights Watch (HRW) had sent a letter to Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani stressing the need to abolish the death penalty…. Most of the NGOs in Pakistan argue that the death penalty is an inhuman punishment but they should also be asked if murdering somebody is a human act.[18]

This decision (to commute the death penalty to life imprisonment) will encourage the terrorists…. The decision is meant to benefit foreign and local terrorists.[19]

Reporting Patterns: Sources and Content

The media survey revealed that 33 percent of the journalists asked learn about incidents of human rights violations through media reports themselves, 13 percent through the Human Rights Commissioner of Pakistan (HRCP), 20 percent through other human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 14 percent through the victims and 19 percent from other sources (Chart 5).

Chart 5: How are journalists informed of HR violation incidents?

During the process of preparing follow-up reports, 41 percent journalists said they contacted victims, 23 percent claimed using sources in the police, 20 percent relied on NGOs' reports and 16 percent consulted media reports (Table 4).

Table 4: Journalists' sources for investigating and reporting HR cases

Source of information	Percentage
Contact with victims	41%
Police reports and press releases	23%
NGO reports	20%
Media reports	16%

Considerable disparity was noted during the survey and the media monitoring, regarding the sources journalists access while reporting about human rights issues. The media monitoring found that no more than 10 percent journalists, mostly from the English media, actually contacted the victims and/or their relatives to investigate an issue. During the survey, however, 41 percent said that they did so. The survey also found that the print media relies to a considerable extent on the electronic media and human rights organizations for retrieving news and reports on human rights issues.

The media monitoring found that even some exclusive stories in the print media were based on 'tips', typically from an anonymous source, and were easily expanded into reports after inserting a few comments from government officials and NGOs.

The following report, a two-column news item based on such a 'tip', is reproduced in its entirety to highlight the lack of basic information about the incident and the crude narration of such reports.

> Asian Human Rights representative Baseer Naveed has said that three more women have been 'buried alive' in Naseerabad. According to the representative, the names of these women are being kept secret. The reason for their 'burying alive' was said to be their protest against the burial alive of three women in Naseerabad.[20]

The electronic media seems in a rush to break the news even before the basic information has been ascertained. Details are added later after media organizations approach their regional correspondents, police and other sources. Reporting of human rights issues is generally confined to describing the event's nature, place and time and is devoid of investigation. This pattern of reporting, and even analysis, is very common in the print media as well as in special programs, such as talk shows, on the electronic media.

Treatment of Human Rights Issues

News Items and Reports

The electronic media in Pakistan is event-based. While reporting human rights violations, it sensationalizes, rather than highlighting the human rights significance of the case. Headlines in the Urdu media are more sensational compared to the English media. Their emphasis is not on human rights, but on police brutality, criticism of government laxity, journalist's opinion in the religious, political or social context, or some statement or viewpoint of a person even if it undermines the basic concepts of human rights and state Constitution.

Sometimes, the media publishes or telecasts statements that might cause incitement and provoke rights violations. Such a statement broadcast by a leading television network against *Qadiyanis* in 2008, became the reported reason for the killing of three people from the *Qadiyani* community.[21]

The media monitoring also found that at times journalists' own views blur the facts, to varying extent. Though that perception usually surfaced in the text of the news, sometimes personal bias appeared in the headlines as well.

Articles and Editorials in Print Media

From July to October 2008, 21 articles and seven editorials were written on human rights issues in the monitored English and Urdu media publications.

Most of these articles were focused on a single issue of human rights violation. Very few articles treated theses issues in the appropriate human rights context. Most of them merely used human rights issues to criticize the government and politics, feudalism and tribal traditions, religion and the socio-cultural setup in Pakistan.

At times, the media – mainly English newspapers and magazines – presented an unbiased analysis, based on domestic outlook of socio-political, cultural, religious and constitutional perspectives. Only a handful of articles discussed human rights issues in a global perspective, like Nauman's *Human rights violations in historical perspective,*[22] Rizwana's *Children of conflict*[23] and Irfanullah's *Saza-e-Maut* (capital punishment).[24]

The following extract from an editorial published in *Dawn* on September 3, analyzed the issue of burying five women alive in Balochistan. It discussed customary laws as a parallel justice system challenging the writ of the state, the role of the state, political and legal perspectives, women rights, and the role of the civil society and the media. During the period under discussion, this was perhaps the only analysis highlighting violations of women's rights and attacking the state and its legal system.[25]

> It is ironic that the official emphasis remains on the 'idea' of the victims being buried 'alive' rather than the fact that the acts were gruesome crimes against the state where reports of the murders were concealed, FIRs denied, the allegations against the women not verified and the slain women never granted a chance to present their side of story. Other than being a venue for outright murders that demonstrate how worthless are women in tribal cultures, Pakistan is perhaps one of the few places on the globe where government officials can publicly defend the slaying in the name of 'customary laws and traditions' with impunity or openly accuse the media of giving the matter 'out of proportion' coverage. It is shocking that even in this pandemonium the concept of women's rights which have been

recognized by the courts – in this case the right of women to marry a man of their choice – has escaped the understandings of the powers that be. The only positive outcome of this episode, if one may describe it so, is that it has brought civil society, hundreds of rights activists and the media together to highlight the brutality and violation of the rights of the women.

However, more than half of the editorials and articles lacked an unbiased and realistic analysis of the rights issues based on logic and rationality. It was more visible in the Urdu media. The following extract discussed the abolition of the death penalty in Pakistan.[26]

> It is bizarre that the newly-elected Pakistani government quickly responded to 'suggestion' of the Human Rights Watch (HRW)…while there are many important national issues which have been placed on the backburner…. According to the 1973 Constitution, no law could be enacted which is repugnant to the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and *Sunnah.* If we look at the legal system of Islam, it presents the concept of *Qisas* (retribution) and the right to pardon the murderers is granted only to heirs of the victim…. If our government holds the view that criminals after spending 14 years of imprisonment, especially in Pakistani jails, would become saints and preach some virtues after returning to society, then I must say that our decision-makers are either 'innocent' or unaware of the true conditions in our society.

There were very few examples of a reasoned debate on human rights issues in the Urdu media. In the following extract from an Urdu article, the writer has argued against the abolition of the death penalty in the religious, legal and social contexts. [27]

> The debate on the death penalty should be in three perspectives (*Shariah*, legal and social) …. It will be debated in the *Shariah* perspective when it is related to those guilty of murder. In this case, the Quran has a clear verdict about *Qisas*. *Qisas* means the death penalty for murderers (al-Baqra: 871, 971). However, the Quran has given the victims' heirs the right to forgive the culprit of their own free will. The discretion of state in this regard can be seen in two ways. First, can the state reduce the punishment if a court imposes the death penalty on a person found guilty of murder? Secondly, can the state still insist on punishing a convict if the victim's heirs forgive him? Experts of Islamic jurisprudence unanimously hold that the state cannot forgive or change the punishment to other than *Qisas* against the will of heirs of the victim. Most of them also agree that the state cannot punish a convict if the victim's heirs forgive him/her. Renowned Islamic scholar Javed Ghamedi, however, has a different opinion in the latter case. He says murder is a crime against an individual as well as the state and society. Sometimes, the victim does not have heirs or his heirs seem disinterested in pursuing his/her case. As we see in cases of honour killing that the father or brother of the girl are involved in her murder and are also pursuing the case as the family of the deceased. In such cases, Ghamedi thinks, the state has the right to punish the convict even if the heirs forgive him…. If we see the situation in its

legal perspective, the government again does not have any such right. According to…the Constitution, the president has the right to abolish a sentence declared by an authority or the court, but the Supreme Court has given a verdict in *Sakina Bibi case* that in *Hudood* and *Qisas* cases the president cannot abolish the penalty… If we see this in the social perspective, we understand that hatred against crime is in human instinct. There is no society in the world that does not have laws against crimes. Every law has termed the offenses against life, property and dignity of humans as crime and suggested strictest punishments in this regard. There are two opinions on the death penalty in secular countries. However, human experience tells us that the death penalty's abolition is tantamount to encouraging crime.

Electronic Media Reports and Programs

The electronic media has a relatively more regular focus on human rights issues than the print media. During the media monitoring, it was learned at least two regular programs/talk shows on human rights issues were being regularly telecast by two private TV channels; *Aurat Kahani* (The story of woman) on ARY One TV and *Sach ka Safar* (The journey of truth) on TV One. No special pages covered human rights issues in the print media. Some other programs on various TV channels intermittently addressed human rights issues.

The electronic media's coverage was somewhat more investigative, presenting viewpoints of the victims and/or their families. Human rights activists and experts were invited to these programs to talk about human rights issues.

Rhetoric, instead of in-depth analyses, was visible in some electronic media programs mainly due to lack of research work by the anchorpersons and their teams.

Language, Style and Tone

The English and Urdu media have distinct groups of readers and viewers with different backgrounds, understanding and concerns. The difference in audience does influence reporting patterns. A relatively small segment of Pakistani society, including human rights and civil society organizations, is concerned about rights violations. The English media mostly caters to their information needs. The Urdu media has to take into account the sensitivities and concerns of a large portion of population. In its view, it requires simplistic treatment of the issues in order to make the reports and news items consumable.

Due to its educated and enlightened audience, the English media has considerable space to report the human rights issues in the appropriate context. The Urdu media faces language-related pressure from society, depending on the nature of the issue being reported. It cannot treat the issue in a manner which may irritate its audience. A clear difference in the reporting patterns is visible in the use of terms, analysis framework and communication perspective.[28]

During the media monitoring it was noted that unlike reports in English media, Urdu reports consisted of a mere narration. There were very few original investigative reports in the Urdu print media. Mostly it carried reports translated from English newspapers or magazines.

The same division was visible in the electronic media. Narration without any investigative input, sensationalization and event coverage were prominent common features of the Urdu electronic media. But the talk shows/programs on human rights issues gave an edge to electronic media in general. Although human rights is not a distinct reporting area, English media reporters were found more aware regarding human rights issues.

Quality of Human Rights Reporting

Lack of trainings and threat management, internal and external pressures and curbs on journalists have affected the quality of human rights reporting in the print media. Although, the journalists questioned say they have diverse sources of information to investigate human rights issues, the utility of these sources remains debatable in the given reporting environment of journalists' vulnerability. Consequently, the news items and reports lack in quality.

The public survey found that 65 percent of the respondents or their close relatives experienced human rights violations but only 29 percent of them were reported and the remaining 71 percent were not discussed by the media. Asked about the reasons for lack of reporting, 38 percent of the responding journalists cited their inability to access the victims or their relatives in far-flung areas; 36 percent said the victims do not pay attention to highlighting their issues in the media; while 26 percent stated reasons other than these two for the lack of reporting. (Chart 6).

Chart 6: Why did media not report?

In Pakistan, media persons ignore human rights issues at times, however, sometimes people themselves hide incidents of rights violation to save their "honor" or social status. Moreover, the people are skeptical of journalists' role and 29 percent of the respondents to the public survey complained that journalists did not report their cases accurately, while 26 percent thought that their cases were reported appropriately. Around one-third (29 percent) of the respondents believed that the media did not think that cases of violation of their rights were important. (Chart 7).

Chart 7: If reported, What was the quality of the coverage?

Senior journalists and experts on human rights reporting argue that there is a visible difference between the quality of reporting in Pakistan and abroad because in Pakistan, journalists collect their information on human rights violation issues from secondary sources and the issues are generally reported incorrectly.

Urdu newspapers, in particular, continue to lack investigative reporting and objectivity. But the limited freedom the media has received in recent years is leading to a gradual change in the situation.[29] According to Shaista, Pakistani media only highlighting negative aspects of the issues distinguishes it from human rights reporting abroad.[30] Moreover, the media in the developed countries enjoys a fair degree of independence whereas Pakistani media is not as independent.[31] This factor is also, at least partially, responsible for mediocre reporting.

Range and Authenticity of Sources

During the media monitoring, it was noted that most of the news and reports on human rights issues in the print media ascribed the information to sources who

requested anonymity. Many byline reports[32] also appeared with such unidentified sources. In the electronic media, regional correspondents were the main source of news and reports on human rights issues. The sources journalists rely upon while investigating and reporting on human rights issues include:

a) Police

b) Statements and press conferences

c) Reports issued by human rights organizations

d) Comments mostly from non-victims and non-offenders, including rights activists, political leaders, police, local authorities in the area where the incident occurred, and even journalists/analysts

e) Anonymous sources

Police are a major source of news and reports on incidents of human rights violations. Almost a quarter of the news items and reports were based on statements and press conferences. The electronic media was found to be more efficient in contacting the victims and their families and even broadcasting their interviews. The English media was deemed to be more responsible regarding its sources of information and investigation.

Conclusion

Media reports on human rights influence people, but there is a lack of investigative reporting on human rights issues in Pakistan. The journalists do not have the required expertise and training to investigate and report on rights issues. Only a few journalists are committed to human rights reporting whereas most of them are either indifferent to or skeptical of rights issues. The environment is comparatively better for human rights reporting in the English media where journalists are not forced to work in multiple areas and have an educated audience. The Urdu media relies much on sensationalization, a narrative devoid of investigation and personal bias. A balanced and impartial analysis of the issues is largely missing.

Investigative and research-based reporting needs substantial resources, which are not being made available to the journalists.

There are many sociocultural, political and religious constraints in human rights reporting. Journalists from main cities face difficulties in traveling to remote areas where rights are violated most often. Local journalists and correspondents that cover those events have a one-dimensional approach to reporting rights violations. In order to get their reports and details on the events, even the electronic media uses local correspondents – who lack the training to properly investigate the issue.

Notes and References

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[1] The writer wishes to thank the interviewees, interviewers and those who conducted the surveys. The survey team and interviewers included Yousuf Ali, who conducted surveys and interviews in Peshawar, Malik Siraj Akbar in Quetta, Zahid Hasan in Lahore, Masroor Hussain in Karachi, and Sajjad Azhar and Shahzada Saleem in Islamabad and Rawalpindi. Shagufta Hayat, Saba Noor, Abdul Mateen and Mansur Mahsud also helped immensely to make this study possible.

[2] The survey was conducted in Lahore, Peshawar, Quetta, Islamabad and Karachi, and the term 'PIPS media survey' will be used to allude to this survey throughout the study.

[3] Zafarullah Khan, interview with Sajjad Azhar, Islamabad, September 2008.

[4] Nadeem Iqbal, associated with Urdu journalism, interview with Sajjad Azhar, Islamabad, September 2008.

[5] Rauf Klasra, *Jang*, Islamabad, August 27, 2008.

[6] Rauf Klasra, *Jang*, Islamabad, August 23, 2008.

[7] *Intekhab*, Quetta, September 3, 2008.

[8] *Intekhab*, Quetta, September 6, 2008.

[9] *Express*, Islamabad, September 8, 2008.

[10] Naureen Tawakkal, member Shirkat Gah's Rapid Assessment Team, interview with Zahid Hasan, Lahore, October 2008.

[11] Peter Jacob, Executive Secretary, National Commission for Justice and Peace Pakistan, interview with Zahid Hasan, Lahore, October 2008.

[12] *Dawn*, August 3, 2008.

[13] *The News*, Karachi, September 11, 2008.

[14] *Express*, September 8, 2008.

[15] Zafarullah Khan. Interview, *op. cit.*

[16] Daniyal, a Karachi-based electronic media journalist, an interview with Masroor Hussain, Karachi, August 2008.

[17] A special report by M Fayaz, *Mashriq*, Peshawar, August 31, 2008. The report is based on another report prepared by an NGO and has extensive data on child abuse. This full report – more than 2,500 words and 3 columns – contains nothing

else than the NGO's compiled data. The writer has only added his views critical of the role of NGOs.

[18]'*The Post*, July 9, 2008.

[19] *Ummat*, Karachi, July 7, 2008.

[20] *Jang*, Islamabad, September 27, 2008.

[21] 'HRCP slams Ahmedi killings', *Daily Times*, Islamabad, September 11, 2008.

[22] *The Post*, Islamabad, September 8, 2008.

[23] *Dawn*, Islamabad, September 21, 2008.

[24] *Jinnah*, Islamabad, July 13, 2008.

[25] *Dawn*, September 3, 2008.

[26] *The Post*, July 9, 2008.

[27] *Jang*, Islamabad, July 7, 2008.

[28] Mubasher Bukhari, associated with Geo TV, based at Lahore, interview with the writer, Lahore, Nov. 2008.

[29] Tanveer Afzaal, editor monthly *Nawa-e-Insaan,* interview with Zahid Hasan, Lahore, October 2008.

[30] Shaista Jan, former director CSC, interview with Zahid Hasan, Lahore, October 2008.

[31] Naureen Tawakkal. Interview, *op. cit.*

[32] News item bearing the name of the reporter.

Radicalization among Educated Pakistani Youth

Saba Noor

Radicalization has a long history in Pakistan and its spread among various segments of society has long been debated. The Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies and the Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, jointly conducted an empirical quantitative research study to identify the trends and gauge the extent of radicalization among educated Pakistani youth. A survey was conducted to determine the nature of radicalization and identify root causes, trends and scale of the phenomenon among Pakistani youth. Quaid-i-Azam University students, both from natural and social sciences departments, were chosen as the survey sampling population.[1] The survey was based on responses from 70 students, aged between 20 and 35, to closed-ended questions.[2]

The respondents included 35 male students and an identical number of females. However, as Table 1 shows, respondents from the rural and urban backgrounds were not represented in equal numbers.

Table 1: Population sample

Rural areas	Urban areas
29%	71%
Male	Female
50%	50%

The survey's findings can be compared in further studies with similar surveys in other education institutions in Pakistan and abroad for a better understanding of the subject. It may be noted that at some points percentages do not add up to 100 percent for the reason that the categories deemed not adding much to the information are not included in the narration.

The survey results show the urban youth to be liberal compared to their counterparts from rural areas. The former also seem to have moved away from the traditional perception of women's role in society. They support equal rights for both genders.

The survey reveals that compared to those hailing from rural areas, respondents belonging to cities are keener to bring a change in society. Religious and cultural radicalization was more noticeable among the rural youth. The respondents attached priority to fulfilling *huqooq-ul-ibad* (religiously-ordained human rights) over *huqooq-ul-Allah* (rights owed to God). Most of the respondents, 60 percent, stated that the conflict in

Afghanistan was purely political and had nothing to do with Islam, whereas 23 percent saw it as a tribal conflict.

Table 2: Nature of Conflict in Afghanistan

Responses	Percentage
Political conflict	60%
Tribal fight	23%
Jihad	11%
Geo-political issue	1%
Reaction to US attacks	1%
Ideological issue	1%
Others	3%

Chart 1: Nature of Conflict in Afghanistan

The survey's findings show that 20 percent of the respondents prefer to don western clothes, 44 percent Pakistani clothes, whereas 36 percent say they wear both.

Of those who favored Pakistani dress, 23 percent cited cultural and traditional reasons for their preference. Twenty-nine percent said they preferred the local dress because they felt comfortable wearing it. Only 13 percent mentioned religion as the reason for their dress choice, whereas 10 percent cited both religious and cultural reasons. Twenty-five percent said that their choice for the local dress did not have any special reason.

The majority of the respondents, 59 percent, denied that their dress preferences were related to religion, whereas 29 percent said it was. However, 1 percent held that the choice of dress was linked to religion for girls but not for boys.

Sixty-three percent of the respondents did not agree that wearing western clothes diverted individuals from religion, 24 percent thought it does. Eleven percent chose not to express an opinion.

An overwhelming majority of those surveyed – 90 percent – said they like listening to music for entertainment, relaxation and fun. Ten percent avoided music due to religious reasons and 59 percent stated that quitting singing for religious reasons was appreciable.

The respondents overwhelmingly subscribed to gender equality. Eighty-seven percent of those questioned said that women's education was extremely important while 10 percent said it was not. To a question about women working outside their houses, 63 percent of the respondents said that women should have the freedom to pursue such work. Sixty percent said that women should have the right to divorce, whereas 30 percent opposed such a right.

Twenty percent of the respondents received their basic religious education only from their parents; 27 percent from all means listed in Table 3; 17 percent both from parents and schools; 7 percent from schools; 6 percent from mosques; 6 percent from parents, schools and mosques; and 3 percent received religious education from *madrassas*. Most of the respondents stated that clerics and *madrassas* used religion to pursue sectarian agendas. They held that that was why the education *madrassas* impart was limited in scope and promoted their respective sects.

A minority of the respondents, 23 percent, said they favored rule by religious parties in the country, compared to 58 percent who opposed it. When asked who was serving Islam and the people in the real sense in the Pakistani society, 66 percent of the students mentioned intellectuals and scholars. Only 6 percent thought clerics were serving Islam. (See Table 3)

Table 3: Who is best serving Islam in Pakistani society?

Responses	Percentage
Scholars and intellectuals	66%
No one	11%
Military rulers	7%
Clerics	6%
Political leaders	4%
Social workers	4%
Youth and media	1%
Media	1%

Chart 2: Who is best serving Islam in Pakistani society?

Forty-six percent of the respondents deemed *pardah* (veil) for women to be a religious obligation, 33 percent said the observance of *pardah* depended upon the situation, 16 percent believed it was a matter of personal choice, whereas 4 percent considered it unnecessary.

Thirty percent cited deviation from the Quran and *Sunnah* (practice) of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) as the reason for the Muslim world's deficient progress, 11 percent said it was a lack of scientific and technological knowledge, 6 percent blamed Western control over Muslim countries' economies, 2 percent mentioned absence of jihad, whereas 10 percent believed that a combination of lagging in science and technology and deviation from the Quran and *Sunnah* were the reasons for Muslims' lack of progress. Three percent pointed to wrong religious concepts, while 31 percent said that all of these were among the reasons.

Forty-one percent of the students questioned thought that a person could be a better Muslim even if s/he did not offer prayers five times a day but took care of others' rights. Seventy-nine percent held that marriage should take place between followers of the same religion, whereas 17 percent did not deem a common religion to be that important.

Commenting on differences among various Islamic school of thought, or *fiqah* (religious jurisprudence) – such as the *Deobandi, Barelvi, Shia* or *Ahl-e-Hadith fiqah* – 33 percent of the respondents stated that the difference was that of interpretation; 17 percent believed that it was a basic religious difference; 9 percent saw it as a political conflict. According to 30 percent, it was a difference of opinion.

Twenty-seven percent saw differences among various religious sects as natural, 24 percent believed that the differences were harmful and 26 percent thought they were based on ignorance.

Twenty-nine percent of the respondents described *jihad* as a battle against personal desires, 20 percent explained it as fight against cruelty, 19 percent understood it as taking on the enemies of Islam, and to 7 percent it meant battling against cruelty and personal desires. Commenting on the nature of *jihad*, 51 percent respondents (including 51 percent females and 49 percent males) stated that it should be defensive in nature, 14 percent youth believed it should be offensive, and 31 percent were indecisive. Sixty-four percent of the respondents believed the struggle for the implementation of *Shariah* to be *jihad* as well, whereas 16 percent disagreed with that interpretation. Twenty percent were indecisive. Sixty-four percent identified the struggle against Indian rule in Held Kashmir as *jihad*, 14 percent did not see it as such, whereas 22 percent were indecisive. The majority (89 percent) did not identify the insurgency in Afghanistan as *jihad*.

Sixty-nine percent of the respondents believed that Taliban were not fighting for Islam, while 17 percent held that they were. Seventeen percent of those who believed that Taliban were fighting for Islam condemned attacks on cinemas, video and CD shops, barber shops, and girl schools and colleges. Sixty percent of the respondents remarked that Pakistan's decision to assist the United States in the war against terrorism was not right, whereas 26 percent held that it was the correct decision.

The respondents were also asked questions to assess radical tendencies in their political beliefs and practices. Fifty-eight percent said that they considered their candidate's capability and education while casting their votes, 23 percent based their decision on party affiliation and 7 percent on the candidate's caste. Only 6 percent stated that they vote on the basis of religion.

Responses were also collected to explore the level of awareness regarding Hudood laws[3] among the educated youth. Around 53 percent responded that they were aware of the laws, while 33 percent said they were not. Sixty percent of those who knew about the Hudood laws said they should be amended, while 28 percent said they should remain unchanged.

Forty-nine percent of the respondents said they were affiliated with or supported a political party. Only 29 percent were associated with religious political parties. Male respondents were more politically active compared to the females as 54 percent of the former were affiliated with or supported a political party. The figure was 11 percent lower for females at 43 percent. The ratio of male respondents' association with religio-political parties was 17 percent. It was 11 percent for female respondents.

Asked to pick the most influential incident in the country's recent history that directly affected the youth, 32 percent referred to the 2007 Lal Masjid operation in Islamabad, 20 percent to former prime minister Benazir Bhutto's assassination, 19 percent to the judicial crisis, and 15 percent to the military operations in the Tribal Areas. Forty-five percent mentioned the Lal Masjid operation and the judicial crisis both.

Conclusion

The sampling population's opinions prima facie reflect that educated Pakistani youth is generally not radical in its outlook. They overwhelmingly support equal rights for both women and men, and believe that the Taliban are not fighting for Islam. However, they disapprove of Pakistan's decision to assist the US in the war against terrorism.

A substantial majority of the youth does not deem that wearing western clothes threatens an individual's religion in any manner. They oppose rule by religious parties in the country and believe that intellectuals and scholars – and not clerics – serve the interests of Islam. The majority of those aware about the subject matter of the Hudood laws call for amending them. Only a small minority says that a candidate's religion is a consideration when they vote.

However, a sizable minority sees a substantial role of religion in the progress of Muslims worldwide and cites departure from the Quran and *Sunnah* as the reason for the Muslim world's lack of progress. They hold that marriage should take place between followers of the same religion. Though they say that *jihad* should only be defensive in nature, the majority believes the struggle for the implementation of *Shariah* law is also *jihad*.

Over two-third of the respondents citing the Lal Masjid operation as the most influential recent incident affecting the youth in Pakistan is also noteworthy.

Notes

1 The university admits around 600 students in its master's degree programs every six months; and 200 in its M. Phil and 100 in Ph.D. programs annually. The university draws students from all segments of the society, as reserved seats are allocated for each province and for the rural and urban areas. Three hundred students are admitted to various M.Sc programs of natural and social sciences on self-finance basis (evening programs) in the fall semester (September-January).

2 The survey team comprised Sana Aslam, Rabia Aftab, Attia Younis, and Sajida Hina from Department of Defence and Strategic Studies (DSS), Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.

3 The Hudood laws were a group of laws enacted in 1979 as part of then military ruler General Ziaul Haq's Islamization process. The laws aimed at implementing *Shariah* law by enforcing religiously-ordained punishments for *Zina* (extramarital sex), *Qazf* (false accusation of zina), theft, and consumption of alcohol. Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979, has been criticized as leading to situations where a woman subjected to rape was accused of extramarital sex and incarcerated. Two of the Hudood laws – relating to the offences of *Zina* and *Qazf* – were amended by the Women's Protection Act of 2006.

Note on Contributors

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Muhammad Azam is a research analyst at PIPS and Associate Editor *Conflict and Peace Studies.* He is pursuing his PhD in international relations. He also teaches "World Politics" and "Western Political Thought" to MA classes at Department of Politics and International Relations, International Islamic University, Islamabad. His areas of interest include democracy, democratization, radicalization and conflicts in South Asia and the Middle East. His article "Radicalization and Media: Who influences whom and how in Pakistan?" appeared in the previous issue. He has also contributed a chapter to Baharudin Ahmad's *Islamic Science and the Contemporary World* (2008).

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Safdar Sial is a research analyst at the PIPS. After completing his education in marketing research from Lawrence Institute of Management Sciences, Lahore, in 1995, he joined English journalism as an investigative reporter. He has worked with English dailies *The News,* and *The Nation* in Lahore. He joined

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Saba Noor completed her masters in Defense and Strategic Studies from Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad in January 2008. Her areas of interest include de-radicalization, terrorism, counter-terrorism strategies, and security complexes in Asia. Her paper "Evolution of Counter-Terrorism Legislation in Pakistan" appeared in the previous issue.

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Conflict and Peace Studies is a quarterly journal published by the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies. The journal is aimed at dissemination of research by the Institute in its key mandated areas. It also provides a forum for those around the world undertaking research in the areas of:

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- Security and development
- Radicalization
- Media for peace and democracy
- Political violence and terrorism
- Counter-terrorism
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- International relations and foreign policy

Only previously unpublished submissions will be accepted and copyright will be assigned to the publisher. Permission to use copyright material submitted to the journal will be the responsibility of the author.

Submissions must be typed, single-spaced, should not exceed 6,000 words including references, and should be accompanied by an abstract (200-300 words) and a brief introduction of the author (100-150 words). Contact details should also be provided. Before publication, proofs will be sent to authors for correction and must be returned to the editor by the given deadline.

Guidelines regarding endnotes/footnotes, headings, subheadings etc. may be followed as given in the *Chicago Manual of Style.*

The title of the submission may be center-aligned and all headings and sub-headings left-aligned. All headings and sub-headings, as well as the title, may be in lower case but first letter of the first word and of all other words except prepositions, articles, and coordinating conjunctions may be capitalized. Titles and subheads may not be underlined or italicized.

Citations for books may include full name of the book, city of its publication, publishing company or organization, year of publication, and the page number/s referred to. Citations for articles may include full name of the article, name of the journal it was published in along with its volume and issue numbers, and, the page number/s referred to. Names of the books and journals cited may be italicized but may not be in quotation marks. Names of the articles cited may be in quotation marks but may not be italicized.

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Last Issue

Abstracts from Last Issue

Radicalization and Media

Muhammad Azam

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Radicalism is one of the major issues faced by the state and society in Pakistan. Pakistani media, which has recently acquired a certain level of vibrancy, has always been there as a factor in radicalizing the individuals, groups and organizations. The phenomenon of radicalization and media in Pakistan have been influencing each other. But, little is known about the interaction and mutual relationship between the two. This study finds out how they have been impacting upon each other, to what extent media is under pressure from the radical groups, and, to what extent our media has played its role in the process of radicalization.

The overall image that emerges from the research is that media has played a role – in some cases consciously and in others unconsciously – in the spread of radicalism in Pakistan. Through qualitative and quantitative interviews, this study recovers that the media is inadvertently glorifying the militants. An element of sympathy for the radicals exists in the media. The radicals use all types of tactics, to pressurize the media.

The survey shows that an overwhelming majority of Pakistani journalists notice that the phenomenon of radicalization is making some impact on Pakistani media. An analysis of the quantitative interviews yields that a majority (57%) also believes that the media is concealing the facts regarding the phenomenon of radicalization. Sixty-nine percent say that the phenomenon is hindering freedom of expression in the country. Seventy-seven percent responded positively to the question that is there any pressure on the media from radical groups.

Jihadi Print Media in Pakistan: An Overview

Muhammad Amir Rana

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Jihadi print media is an important component of jihadi movements in Pakistan. The daily and weekly newspapers, magazines and pamphlets of militant groups, religious organizations and madrassas cover operational, ideological, and preaching aspects of jihadi movements. They also carry fund-raising appeals. Research by individuals and institutions, analysts and journalists has not yet paid due attention to this limb of jihad.
This paper undertakes to have an overview of contemporary jihadi media, which started to flourish in the 1980s, with around 100 jihadi monthly and 12 weekly publications from Peshawar, Quetta and

Islamabad in 1990. This media has now developed distinct dynamics of its own. A media department has become an essential organ of jihadi outfits and religious organizations. They have the most modern printing facilities and claim extensive distribution and circulation of their publications. Some basic characteristics of these publications include an emphasis on Islam and global jihad, pro-jihad and anti-western rhetoric, glorification of Mujahideen and their activities, training and preaching sermons, coverage of organizational activities and advertisements carrying appeals for donations. Jihadi media has also been playing a key role in indoctrinating and recruiting youth for jihad. In absence of a stringent control mechanism by the State, these publications reappear under the same or a new name after being banned for some time.

Poverty and Militancy

Safiya Aftab

The paper examines the possible links between incidence of poverty, and radicalization, or the growth of militancy. It examines the limited available literature on the causes of radicalization, with particularly emphasis on the linkages between income and likelihood of joining a militant organization. It goes on to look at the spatial distribution of poverty in Pakistan, and concludes that the data on spatial distribution of poverty does not suggest that poverty is confined to, or is even more intense than the norm, in areas now characterized by intense militant activity. There is little evidence to support the contention that poverty, in and of itself, fuels extremism. Studies on the socio-economic profiles of militants would suggest, however, that poverty is a contributing factor pushing people towards militancy, provided an enabling environment already exists.

Evolution of Counter-Terrorism Legislation in Pakistan

Saba Noor

Anti-terrorism laws are the mechanism adopted by the State to curb violent acts or acts meant to terrorize the population. In Pakistan, changes in anti-terrorism laws were mostly made in the absence of parliament. The aim of this paper is to systematically explore the prominent features of laws implemented in the country by various regimes since the creation of Pakistan to suppress violent and terrorist acts. Legislation in the country against violent activities began in 1949 with the promulgation of the Public and Representative Offices (Disqualification) Act, 1949, which the government used to curb political violence. As circumstances

changed, political violence transformed into sectarianism and ethnic clashes and finally led to the creation of several militant organizations whose radical ideology manifested itself through a range of violent tactics. As the nature of violence changed, successive governments established or amended the law accordingly to deter terrorists with the fear of punishment. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto introduced the words 'terrorist activities' in legislation for the first time and established special courts to try such offences. But Nawaz Sharif was the first policymaker who created a specific Anti-Terrorism Act in 1997 which extended to the entire country and was amended by subsequent governments according to their needs. Pakistan introduced severe penalties through a 2007 law to curb cyber-terrorism in the age of Information Technology (IT). The law was meant to dissuade people from any part of the world from accessing or harming any data or network with illegitimate designs. Pakistan's anti-terrorism laws cover every aspect of terrorist activities in detail but a lack of implementation has raised questions about their effectiveness.

Exploring the Mindset of the British-Pakistani Community: The Socio-cultural and Religious Context

Safdar Sial

This study has endeavored to explore the mindset of the British-Pakistani community settled in Great Britain and its interaction with the host community. The scope of the study is limited to the migrants and their families from Mirpur district of Azad Kashmir. The study finds that British-Pakistanis are almost all Muslims and have a mainly rural background. Their first generation in Britain was very conservative and did not let the next generation assimilate and become part of British society. There is lack of political, social and economic awareness among British-Pakistanis, many of whom are still confused and divided, not only physically but mentally as well, between their adopted and native countries. Moreover, there are some radical elements amongst this population also. The socio-cultural and religious identities of the British-Pakistani community may become more crucial in their potential to evolve parallel closed societies within the mainstream host society if not brought into the mainstream immediately.

Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) is an independent think-tank committed to provide an in-depth understanding and objective analyses of regional and global issues. PIPS provides international strategic thinkers a forum to play an active role in understanding and researching real and perceived threats to regional and global peace and security. The objective is to engage leading regional and international strategic thinkers, academicians and media persons in pursuance and production of knowledge of national, regional and global security issues and to promote awareness about the importance of peace and democracy. The goal will be achieved through independent policy analysis, and collection, processing, interpretation and dissemination of information and skills/training.

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PIPS has also developed a vast regional and global network for information sharing and research on some of the key security issues facing Pakistan, which also have a profound impact on regional and global security.