

**TRENDLINES OF
PAKISTAN'S
SECURITY
CHALLENGES**

MANZAR ZAIDI

Copyright © PIPS 2024. All rights reserved.

No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means without any prior permission in writing from the publisher of this book.

All enquiries regarding reproduction should be sent to PIPS at its address given below.



P.O. Box 2110, Islamabad, Pakistan
Tel. +92-51-8359475-6
Fax: +92-51-8359475
Email: pips@pakpips.com
Web: www.pakpips.com

Contents

Abstract	4
Trend matrix	5
Introduction	12
Geography	14
Power and perception of Statehood	15
Law and order	19
Public perception of law enforcement	21
Economy, power and security.....	24
Terrorism and Pakistan.....	29
Pakistan's security response to terrorism.....	31
Peace deals with militants	38
Terrorism rising.....	40
India centrism	42
Afghanistan	48
China & the region	51
USA.....	53
Nuclear doctrine.....	55
Extremism and radicalization.....	57
Politics and national security	67
Conclusions.....	70
Notes and references.....	74

Abstract

This paper aims to contextualize the narratives underpinning Pakistan's national security challenges, examining the clarity or ambiguity in its strategic worldview regarding internal security. National security doctrines evolve gradually, shaped by institutionalization and sudden drastic changes. States with broader global aspirations face expansive challenges, whereas those focused on domestic protection adopt a narrower focus. Geographic location significantly impacts security strategies, with landlocked states facing direct territorial disputes and insular states like Pakistan considering regional neighbors in their security calculus. Power dynamics and state perception are critical in international politics, where power projection influences both external and internal perceptions. Public perception of law enforcement and the military plays a crucial role in shaping national security. Economic conditions further complicate national security, with economic instability limiting rational security decisions. This paper delves into these intricacies, exploring the interplay of geography, power, ideology, public perception, international relations and economic capacity in shaping Pakistan's national security policy, ultimately seeking to discern the coherence and effectiveness of its strategic worldview.

Trend matrix

The matrix below charts ambiguity or clarity in Pakistan's national security doctrine. This trend analysis does not make geopolitical, moral or other value judgments, but is meant only to show whether ambiguity has existed or not previously in Pakistan's national security doctrines, and whether such trajectories are expected to continue in the future or not. Arrows merely indicate deterioration of conditions or increasing ambiguity when sloping downwards, clarity of perception or improvement of conditions when the arrows slope upwards, and arrows point horizontally when the situation seems to be in status quo or state of flux. 2013 is taken as an arbitrary reference point as the state of things a decade ago, but there were a few indicators of change apparent at that time as well; terrorism seemed to be declining after robust military operations, there seemed to be (perceived) political change afoot, and Pakistan was forging regional alliances notably with China while global changes were getting more pronounced etc.

Variable	TRENDS			Ambiguity or Clarity in Security Doctrine	Comments
	Trend till 2013	Trend from 2013-23	Projected Trend		
Ideational hegemony	→	→	→	AMBIGUITY	As an ideational hegemon in context of occupying a pivotal position in Muslim countries, Pakistan still retains this pride but with a weakening economy and beset by problems, it is hard to conceive of the country assuming tangible leadership roles in this context.
Geography	→	→	→	CLARITY	Landlocked and insular, Pakistan still feels threatened by its neighbours to the east and west, and foreseeably will continue to do so.
Perception of power	→	→	→	AMBIGUITY	Ambiguity is created when its army is one of the strongest in the world, and Pakistan is ostensibly a leader of the ummah or at least a prominent actor, but still claims to be a perpetual victim of terrorism and is beset by various problems.
Law & order	→	→	↘	AMBIGUITY	Deteriorating law and order situation and concomitant negative perception globally regarding its law & order milieu makes it hard to reconcile its perceived leadership position in the world, and also portrays a feeling of insecurity.

TRENDLINES OF PAKISTAN'S SECURITY CHALLENGES

Variable	TRENDS			Ambiguity or Clarity in Security Doctrine	Comments
	Trend till 2013	Trend from 2013-23	Projected Trend		
Public perception of civilian LEAs	→	→	↘	AMBIGUITY	Police and civilian LEAs have constantly been perceived to be ineffective and corrupt, a perception which has lingered or even worsened over the years. This casts doubts on their capability to handle security on their own, without the assistance of military.
Economy & security	→	→	↘	AMBIGUITY	A weakened economy is not conducive to expansive civilian measures to implement security, no matter how well conceived, which they are not.
Radicalization	↘	↘	↘	AMBIGUITY	Radicalization, especially of the young is increasing, but there is little informed policy making regarding this.
De-radicalization Initiatives	↘	↘	↘	AMBIGUITY	The drivers of radicalization are not even understood properly in Pakistan, due to almost negligible efforts to comprehend them. Most initiatives are based on sketchy anecdotal evidence, and besides a few army-driven ventures, there is not much to speak of regarding de-radicalization initiatives in Pakistan.
Extremism	↘	↘	↘	AMBIGUITY	Extremism is increasing in Pakistan. This persists in the face of external pressures, limited resources and poor knowledge base, law & order situation, absence of state-wide multisystem PCVE interventions and ineffective regulatory processes.
PCVE policy	↘	↘	↘	AMBIGUITY	The guidelines and policy published are too expansive to be feasible within Pakistan's shrinking resource base. Like others before it, Pakistan's PCVE policy is aspirational rather than realistic in nature, and merely rests on the laurels of military operations. Policy is informed by data almost negligibly. This makes such policies irrelevant to the situation at hand, in pragmatic terms.
Terrorism-magnitude	↘	↘	↘	AMBIGUITY	Though terrorism decreased from previous period under review, it is increasing again. Terrorism is still a big challenge as it will change dimensions in context of TTP now posing an entirely new dimensional threat; TTP is now based on foreign(afghan) soil over which Pakistan only has tenuous access through the Afghan Taliban.

TRENDLINES OF PAKISTAN'S SECURITY CHALLENGES

Variable	TRENDS			Ambiguity or Clarity in Security Doctrine	Comments
	Trend till 2013	Trend from 2013-23	Projected Trend		
Comprehension of Extremism	↘	↘	↘	AMBIGUITY	A centrist position against which determinants of an extremist state of mind has yet to be defined in Pakistan. As extremism is an internalization of ideals in most people, steps to understand what this entails have not been taken at a national level, though varying levels of scholarly debate goes on in the country; most is anecdotal and not data driven.
Comprehension of radicalization	↘	↘	↘	AMBIGUITY	High level of underemployment for the young from lower socio-economic classes, class inequality, poverty, lack of social justice etc. have all been projected to be the cause of radicalization, but there is no coherent data-driven national narrative of radicalization.
Tackling terrorism through military operations	↘	→	↗	CLARITY	As terrorists have clearly demonstrated anti-state tendency, the military seems to have started comprehending tactics more clearly in terms of engaging them, rather than negotiating with them. Ambiguity on this seems to have cleared substantially.
Fluidity of terrorist structures	↘	↘	↗	CLARITY	Constantly morphing, franchise and cell-based nature and extremely fluid command and control structures made these entities hard to comprehend, but the groups like TTP are now clearly comprehensible to the state machinery through experience in tackling them head on.
Intent of terrorists	↘	↗	↗	CLARITY	The intentions of terrorists in terms of having articulated their intentions, resiling from compromises and engaging the state by force is by now quite clear, so the ambiguity in understanding their intentions has cleared in context of their anti-state stance.
Capability of terrorists	↘	↘	↗	CLARITY	Due to the asymmetrical nature of terrorism itself, and the difficulty of controlling tactics like suicide bombing or IEDs which have a higher benefit to cost ratio skewed in favour of terrorists, it was difficult to assess their capability initially, but the Pakistani military especially has a clearer grip on their intent and capabilities.

TRENDLINES OF PAKISTAN'S SECURITY CHALLENGES

Variable	TRENDS			Ambiguity or Clarity in Security Doctrine	Comments
	Trend till 2013	Trend from 2013-23	Projected Trend		
COIN doctrines	↘	→	↗	CLARITY	COIN doctrines have seen a lot of evolution, and seem to be evolving, with the army even taking civilian functions like de-radicalization campaign in areas like Swat and erstwhile FATA, which it cleared out.
Rule of law & access to justice	↘	↘	↘	AMBIGUITY	Rule of law is poor. The police and lower judiciary are often captured by local elites and are amongst the most corrupt state institutions. As demonstrated by COIN doctrines above, the army undertakes functions which should have been in the ambit of civilian structures.
Role of PCNS is evolving a national security doctrine	↘	→	→	AMBIGUITY	Even though the PCNS is unanimous on security issues, its importance as a political body overseeing the security doctrines is at best tenuous. The environment is dominated by the military, with the PCNS giving minimal policy direction to national security policy. National security sphere is dominated almost fully by army.
Legislation on security and Counter Terrorism	↘	→	↘	AMBIGUITY	There are many laws, but they still contain many flaws.
Regulatory quality	↘	↘	↘	AMBIGUITY	Vested interests can prevent rigorous implementation of legislation and policy. General regulatory quality is consistently poor.
Governance	↘	↘	↘	AMBIGUITY	Governance indicators are consistently poor.
Insularity	→	→	→	CLARITY	Landlocked and sandwiched by hostile neighbours, Pakistan clearly cannot evolve a security doctrine without factoring in regional relationships.

TRENDLINES OF PAKISTAN'S SECURITY CHALLENGES

Variable	TRENDS			Ambiguity or Clarity in Security Doctrine	Comments
	Trend till 2013	Trend from 2013-23	Projected Trend		
India centrim	→	→	→	CLARITY	Whatever the international community might think and however the world would like to see things shape out in bilateral relations between Indian and Pakistan, India-centrism is more or less an embedded feature of Pakistan's security policy and is robust to change. Dialogues and soft measures might help deescalate tensions after incidents, but they have not even scratched the surface regarding core issues.
Afghanista n	→	→	→	CLARITY	Afghanistan will continue to be a problem for Pakistan, and there are no real prospects of this going away soon. TTP, border fencing, refugees, currency smuggling etc., will continue to be thorny issues between Pakistan and the afghan Taliban led state, and with escalating terrorism, relations might further deteriorate, especially if pressure exerted on TTP through afghan Taliban steers them in the direction of IS-K.
USA	→	→	→	CLARITY	Relations with USA will continue to be 'transactional' in nature, based on bilateral convenience and self-interests; Pakistan needs American military support and help with IMF bailouts particularly, while America needs Pakistan as an ally in South Asia, especially after the ascendance of Taliban in Afghanistan. Rather than being based on any shared common interests, this might be called a continuing relationship based on 'some-common-perceived-threats-many-self-interests', which manifest differently for both countries.
Geography as being conducive to terrorism	→	→	→	CLARITY	The terrain and porous borders have not been highly amenable to simple 'fool proof' measures like sealing, especially the Durand Line.
Geopolitical pressures shaping National security doctrines	→	→	→	CLARITY	The traditional rivalries have proved resistant to geopolitics, as these rivalries are in themselves products of geopolitics, to a large extent.

TRENDLINES OF PAKISTAN'S SECURITY CHALLENGES

Variable	TRENDS			Ambiguity or Clarity in Security Doctrine	Comments
	Trend till 2013	Trend from 2013-23	Projected Trend		
Politics as a steer for national security	↘	↘	↘	AMBIGUITY	Politics is self-sustaining and patronage based, and has so far been parochial and has not really provided robust steer to National security doctrine
Popularity of the army with power elites	↘	↗	↗	CLARITY	Previously ascribed with intervening in democracy, the Army is nevertheless decidedly popular as a partner by power elites, despite taking hits on its popularity through its ascendancy in national politics. This becomes especially relevant in time of national security challenges like terrorism; escalating threats prompt a response from the only institution deemed effective, the army. Even though the recent fallout from PTI's ouster seemingly tarnishes its image, the army has consistently tended to emerge triumphant in public eyes by handling national emergencies, because no other institution seems capable of doing so.
Pakistan as an ideological Muslim state	→	→	→	CLARITY	This is quite clear, with even the army reiterating its stance of Pakistan as being formed as an ideological Muslim state. Though there is a lively debate among intelligentsia about Pakistan being a secular state, so far this has not emanated from Policy making echelons.
Pakistan as the victim of terrorism	↘	↘	↘	AMBIGUITY	Pakistan is most certainly one of the biggest victims of terrorism in the world, but this does not sit well with Pakistan's perception of itself as ideational hegemon in the Muslim world and a nuclear state with one of the stronger armies in the world.
Leadership role	↘	↘	↘	AMBIGUITY	Pakistan was conceived as a leader of the Muslim world after partition as the major state in 1947 to be formed on Islamic ideology and looked towards a prominent role in the Muslim world. Echoes of this persist, but a weakening economic position and multiple security issues makes this hard to envisage.
Support of Pakistani publics against terrorism	↘	↗	↗	CLARITY	Initially ambiguous, the Pakistani public seem to have been fatigued by incessant terrorism and have rejected it.

TRENDLINES OF PAKISTAN'S SECURITY CHALLENGES

Variable	TRENDS			Ambiguity or Clarity in Security Doctrine	Comments
	Trend till 2013	Trend from 2013-23	Projected Trend		
Strategic mobilization of publics against terrorism	↘	↘	↘	AMBIGUITY	The state has not been able to mobilize a strategic communication campaign based on the variable above, though some half-hearted measures have been attempted.
Army as professional body	↘	→	→	AMBIGUITY	Army consistently seems to be professionalizing in context of institutional strengthening, but it remains to be seen whether this will keep affecting civilian-military relations.
Public distrust of India	→	→	→	CLARITY	Publics have tended to distrust India and will continue to do so in the short to medium term.
Public distrust of Afghanistan	→	→	→	CLARITY	Same as above.
Anti-Americanism	↘	→	→	CLARITY	Relations are consistently in a state of flux, with anti-Americanism running rampant within the publics, political actors utilizing this for political leverage, and the power elites continuously in the midst of re-aligning traditional relationships.
Nuclear doctrine	→	→	→	CLARITY	As unambiguous as India centrism, and also decidedly popular with the publics.

Introduction

This paper attempts to contextualize the narratives behind the national internal security policy paradigm of Pakistan, in an attempt to discern ambiguity or clarity of Pakistan's strategic worldview towards its internal security.¹ As the core national interests of a state due to stimuli from external and internal threats, national security is a product of many factors, amongst which robustness of state against terrorism figures prominently.² States do not just perceive security in terms of their own physical boundaries, but sometimes as extension of their political ideologies beyond their borders, especially in reference to contested areas or ideologies. For instance, when Pakistan mentions national interest or sovereignty, it usually includes Kashmir as an integral part of this context; Pakistan's influence in Afghanistan also has a tremendous bearing on Pakistan's security worldview.³

National security doctrines don't just change overnight since they are shaped by institutionalization of national security through all means available to a country. Only sudden, drastic changes can disrupt and reshape national security for a country, such as must be happening in Ukraine because of its war with Russia.⁴ Only a threat that suddenly appears on the horizon or abruptly disappears can alter national security paradigms significantly; for other threats changes are gradual. For most states, national security environments are incremental and almost as gradually pervasive processes as ideologies, since state parties, lobbies, interest groups, perceptions and institutions adapt and evolve to support a certain established national security environment. Once embedded in the national structure or national ethos, this generally proves robust to change, unless of course there is a drastic change in events as above.

If a state has broader aspirations leaning towards a global presence, then its focus will be expansive, while protecting a domestic territory or homeland against a specified enemy requires a more limited focus. A state with global aspirations will also have bigger challenges, since its interests are necessarily wider than those of regional powers⁵. This pertains to a state's enemies as well; if the enemy is a neighbor, the focus of the state will be regional, while a more distant enemy requires a multi-regional or even global focus. As Nicholas Spykman wrote, 'it is the geographic location of a country and its relation to centers of military power that define its problem of security'.⁶ Arnold Wolters added an

important nuance. To say that insularity leads countries to neglect their military defenses can mean only that decision-makers are more likely to consider their country safe if it enjoys an insular position and that they will tend, as a result, to become more complacent in matters of military preparedness.⁷

Geography

Geography is an important determinant of state security; insularity gives more of a strategic rational choice leverage to states, since expansive distance and broader oceanic distances provide a bigger challenge for hostile states to overcome.⁸ Conversely, intensively landlocked states have less choice in strategy, since closely situated territorial disputes will almost inevitably end up in opponents engaging each other eyeball to eyeball. Resultantly, such conflicts are much more vulnerable to exacerbate into military conflicts. This applies to insular states like Pakistan, who have to necessarily think in terms of their neighbors where regional security is concerned. Stephen P. Cohen states, “While history has been unkind with Pakistan, its geography has been its greatest benefit.”⁹

Straddling a position between the India and China, and bordering Afghanistan, Pakistan has had various ups and downs in the great power struggles involving USA and Russia. Pakistan now occupies an axial position between China –India- US power struggles. China’s rise as a global player has greatly shifted the balance of power; in 2015, China surpassed the US in terms of crude oil import, making it a top destination of exports for various countries, including both Saudi Arabia and Iran, both countries with which Pakistan shares long relationships.¹⁰ This makes out China to be at the center of confluence of interests for Pakistan, especially since the China Pakistan economic corridor (CPEC) initiative, which straddles the path towards central Asia and beyond. The oil rich Central Asian republics have since long been expected to become global powerhouses in terms of oil; however, that requires a stable Afghanistan to allow transit of this oil and Pakistan to materialize this access by providing transportation through its port and roads. For Pakistan its regional relationship with its neighbors becomes a necessity, which is much more urgent than its international linkages further away. This influences Pakistan’s national security policy heavily by a south Asian regional paradigm that is resistant to change by outside pressures. That particular outlook partly explains Pakistan’s quest for power as a major regional player.

Power and perception of Statehood

Power is the core attribute of a state that defines its position in international politics, by giving it the leverage that it can use to influence other states, or to seek parity with other states that can influence international decision making. As Morgenthau wrote, "The prestige of a nation is its reputation for power. That reputation, the reflection of the reality of power in the mind of the observers, can be as important as the reality of power itself. What others think about us is as important as what we actually are"¹¹. However, mere power may not be enough as the American experience after WWI showed; it's almost complete superiority did not result in a robust national security strategy by default.¹² Competition may fuel the quest for power; states tend to 'emulate successful innovations of others out of fear of the disadvantages that arise from being less competitively organized and equipped. These disadvantages are particularly dangerous where military capabilities are concerned, and so improvements in military organizations and technology are quickly imitated'.¹³ An exacerbated state of militarization occurs when states have enemies in its surroundings, which also explains militarization of Pakistan to some extent.

As society is always evolving, security doctrine also changes with how the society in a state views its relationship with the world, as well as societal roles within the society itself. These ideas shape how the society views itself viz-a-viz the rest of the world which shapes beliefs and ideals, which in turn shape threat perceptions.¹⁴ Put simply, the way you view yourself is the also the way you will view the others around you, and thus react accordingly. For instance, Kal Holsti has clarified roles for nations' perceptions of the others and has come up with 17 of these preconceptions.¹⁵ These role definitions classify the state as thinking of itself in the role of an ally, imperialist, protector etc. All of these roles are oriented towards a nation's conception of itself through connectivity to other states. Herrmann and Fischerkeller have also elucidated such roles, these being of an enemy, ally, degenerate, imperialist, and colony, which are also externally oriented.¹⁶ These roles change overtime with changes in the external and internal environment. For instance, with the collapse of Soviet Union, US had to radically re-align its roles in the world, which reduced its orientation of a helper to more of an imperialist.

Pakistan started with a 'defender of faith' orientation according to Holsti's classifications, which implies that such a state views its foreign policy objectives and commitments in terms of defending its projected value systems.¹⁷ Pakistan was created as an Islamic republic and espoused to undertake special responsibilities to guarantee ideological purity for the Muslim world, or ummah. Despite the shift in geopolitical postures over the decades, the defence of this value system remains a primary goal for the state. In fact, Pakistan has from the outset projected itself as playing a pivotal role in the unity of 'ummah'.¹⁸ This lends an aspect of ideational hegemony to a state like Pakistan, whereby upholding its value systems becomes a matter of national pride. Threats also arise more numerous because the state has to defend itself not just physical enemies, but also from pervasion of ideologies considered to be 'threatening'.¹⁹

Hegemonic postures will tend to not only give a global orientation but will also intentionally diffuse the context of the enemy. Thus, instead of a clearly identifiable enemy, esoteric threat typologies such as chaos, 'terror', instability etc. will become dominant themes. As President George Bush articulated US strategy even before the Persian Gulf War, "As the world's most powerful democracy, we are inescapably the leader, the connecting link in a global alliance of democracies. The pivotal responsibility for ensuring stability of the international balance remains ours".²⁰ Since a hegemonic state has usually more than one distinct and 'indistinct' enemies, so it will also try to keep its options open by entering into alliances of convenience, which are easily retractable. Hegemons and ideational states share the ideational orientation, which concentrates on the values that a nation cultivates, and perceives threats to these values from enemies who are opposed to such ideals.²¹

In terms of ideology, Pakistan is clearly an ideational Islamic state, and Islam is stated to be the driving force behind its civil and military machinery.²² By implication, Pakistan from its very inception aimed at a kind of ideational hegemony in the Muslim world, by virtue of being a Muslim state formed in the name of Islam. Thus, initial foreign policy directions of Pakistan were clearly aimed at achieving this leadership role as a champion of the Muslim world.²³ Of course, Pakistan swung in many different directions since then, particularly in regard to its alliance with the US, but the core ideal of Pakistan as a champion of Islam and

being formed in the name of Islam remains germane to its security worldview.²⁴

However, there is some ambiguity in this ideational leadership role; Pakistan is a champion of the Islamic world but allies with the West, supported the Afghan jihad but still was targeted by Islamist jihadism, has one of the stronger armies in the world which is popular and supports this ideational hegemony implicitly (or at least a leadership role), but has also forcibly taken over the reign of the country from democratic regimes numerous times. The guide, leader, or champion of the Muslim ummah narrative is too diffuse to lend substantive content to the ideational direction, and merely expressions of friendship with the Gulf and middle eastern Islamic countries is not enough to offset the cognitive dissonance produced in minds of the common Pakistani, especially after the alliance with US in GWOT. This ambiguity is perhaps what produces a clash of ideational value systems within the country and has been a dominant theme of indoctrinations for the extremist project in Pakistan. Pakistan's main terrorist threat, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), for instance, clearly identifies with this theme when targeting the army, police and paramilitary entities while appealing to the Pakistani publics to 'rise up' for defending ideological purity.

Being perceived as a power influences the morale of Pakistan as a whole but creates problems when beset by economic and security problems; projected by its leadership as a beacon for the Muslim world and a global geopolitical power, why does it need economic bailout time and again? Similarly, ambiguity was projected during the time period between 2007-14, when the Pakistani narrative often cantered around Pakistan being a victim of terrorism.²⁵ Another narrative is Pakistan being "perhaps the world's greatest victim of terrorism," and the loss of thousands of lives in terrorist attacks over the years backs up this assertion.²⁶ Adding to this narrative is the Pakistani citizenry's resentment over US drone strikes (though Pakistani leadership covertly supported them), the problem of coping with about 1.7 million Afghan refugees as a legacy of the Afghan jihad which is perceived widely to have been foisted on Pakistan, and a sense that the U.S. has not shown sufficient gratitude for Islamabad's help in nabbing hundreds of al Qaeda leaders. US alignment with India in Afghanistan has rubbed further salt in the Pakistani wounds. There is no doubt that there have been far reaching implications for Pakistan in the wake of Afghan jihad in making

it a jihadist magnet, many of which have joined the anti-state terrorists. The loss of thousands of Pakistani lives fortifies this narrative.²⁷

Cognitive dissonance is created within Pakistani minds about two varying realities, as Pakistan has a peculiar problematic of perceiving itself viz a viz the outside world. A fragile economy and infrastructure does not sit well with being a nuclear military power of the region, even the world. Pakistanis perceive themselves to be victims of terrorism and the state tends to resonate this, but at the same time possessing one of the strangest militaries in the world makes Pakistanis hang on to a sense of pride. The worldview that even though Pakistan is a stable country with a strong army, but is still beset by problems of security, leads to a state of externalization of the problems, whereby powers external to the problem are to be blamed for all of Pakistan's problems.

Even in open source one cannot deny the assertion that hostile forces are bent on destroying Pakistan's stability; the geopolitical axis of Pakistan does make it vulnerable to 'great games' in the region. However, the widespread ideal in Pakistan that it's always something or someone 'else' to blame for all or many of Pakistan's security problems makes this an exclusivist variable for trying to find solutions for many of the country's indigenously arising problems.²⁸

Law and order

There also needs to be coherence of political and military postures, as incoherence between component parts can lead to disjointed doctrines.²⁹ Typically, such coherence stems from a long-standing discord between civil and military apparatus of the state, whereby politics of the state presents a number of varying trajectories for security doctrine of the state. This intensifies in states such as Pakistan, where civilian law enforcement agencies are no match for the capabilities for the military organs. Pakistan's criminal justice system has been defined as an "anarchic" system which empowers the elite "while victimising the underprivileged"³⁰. During the years when terrorism was at its highest in Pakistan, the judicial system was said to be overstretched, with a conviction rate of between 5 and 10%,³¹ while even the apex court, the Supreme Court of Pakistan, seemingly faced an annual backlog of 1.4 million cases.³² Since then, the state of affairs has declined further.

The world justice project variable of order and security in a state measures how well a society ensures the security of persons and property. The state of affairs in Pakistan is examined with the help of the table 1 below: -

Table 1: Order & security matrix

Table 1: Order and Security Matrix	
Rule of law index ³³	Pakistan ranking (out of a total of 140 countries reviewed)
2020	120 ³⁴
2021	130 ³⁵
2022	129 ³⁶

Table 1 shows that Pakistan is ranked almost at the lowest of all the 140 countries reviewed. Further insight is provided by the order and security matrix of the World Justice Project Rule of Law index.³⁷

Table 2: World Justice Project Rule of Law Index

Table 2: World Justice Project Rule of Law Index		
Year	Pakistan ranking for order and security	Total number of countries reviewed
2015	101	102
2016	112	113
2017-18	113	113
2019	124	126
2020	126	128
2021	137	139
2022	139	140

The only country in the world that has performed consistently lower than Pakistan on the order and security matrix is Afghanistan; this implies that the situation in Pakistan with context to rule of law has deteriorated substantially during the period under review. With an overstretched criminal justice system which does not provide the necessary support to political decisions to steer national security on popular, nonpartisan, democratic lines, framing a national security doctrine free from parochial agendas will be a challenge for Pakistan.

Public perception of law enforcement

One consequence of patronage politics is that people's direct experience of the state is extremely limited. The public education system, land revenue administration, courts and police remain the primary interfaces. Yet incorporation of the law-and-order system into local patronage networks has created a market for dispute resolution. Inequality has shrunk in urban areas, contributing to poverty reduction, while in rural areas inequality has increased. This trend occurred while growth was still robust indicating that inequality is widening for the unskilled rural poor and closing for the more educated and skilled urban population. Growth levels are currently not sufficiently high to reverse this trend, and the 2022 floods have pushed more rural people below the poverty line.

Although there have been reform interventions to protect gender and minority rights, this remains an area where progress is constrained by deep-set structural inequalities and the rise of conservative values. The gulf between the political elite and the majority is mirrored by civil society, and indirect rule has opened up an unregulated chasm in state-society relations which civil society in one form or the other has tried to fill. At one level, Pakistan has an impressive history of activism to protect gender, minority and democratic rights and advocacy for social improvement, yet at another Pakistan has a history of fostering violent community-based political and sectarian organizations and violently targeting minorities.

Despite the fact that terrorism has declined substantially, the law-and-order matrix remain consistently poor. This implies that the implementing agencies, especially the police, have been performing below par. A plausible explanation is that the decrease in terrorism is mainly due to the military operations; any corresponding efficacy of the civilian law and order structures to disrupt terrorism is basically by 'piggybacking' on the successes of military authorities, rather than as standalone mechanisms to take on the might of terrorist enemies like TTP.

These tendencies have eroded citizens' trust in civilian governments. Even though Pakistanis tend to place importance of democratic values, many believe they still don't have enough.³⁸ However, faith in the army has been consistently higher. A World Values Survey in 2020 estimated that 93.2% of Pakistanis tended to have a high level of confidence in the

armed forces, compared to just 43.6% who had confidence in political parties.³⁹ In 2014, citizens wanted active participation of military in government, even when criticism of 'political engineering' were spreading.⁴⁰ 41.2% of Pakistani respondents in a World Values Survey in 2020 stated that the military taking power from an incompetent government was an "essential" characteristic of democracy, with a further 34.7% expressing some agreement with this sentiment.⁴¹ More recently, even though there was backlash against the army in the wake of removal of PTI's government and Imran Khan from power, the army still remains sacrosanct. While many commentators say that the civilian-military relations will be major challenges in the wake of PTI's removal from office, the army's reputation has stood robustly against such schism earlier, especially when challenges such as national disasters and threats from terrorism emanate on the horizon. When national disasters occur, the army steps in to take over humanitarian assistance from the incompetent executive and seems to regain its marred reputation. Similarly, when terrorism rears its head, as it's doing right now, only the army is seen as an effective counterweight to the threat, and subsequently, public opinion swings back again to supporting its only effective institution.

It remains to be seen what fruit the recent strains in civil military relations will bear, but Pakistanis have a general worldview that the military in Pakistan is perhaps the only truly efficient institution left in Pakistan. This has been borne out by Army's handling of the pandemic response,⁴² its effectiveness in dealing with recent floods in Pakistan,⁴³ when the civilian machinery seemed ineffective,⁴⁴ and of course the counter terrorism successes which can be mainly attributed to Pakistan military.⁴⁵ The National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) and the NCOC have been both managed by the military and have played a focal role in coordinating Pakistan's response to the pandemic.⁴⁶ Pakistanis tend to have little faith in their public sector institutions, and the army seems to have filled this vacuum by effectively taking over some of these functions. This Pakistani lack of trust extends particularly to rule of law and the criminal justice sector.⁴⁷

In terms of military might, Pakistan's army does not lag behind many armies of the developed world. As the sixth largest army in the world, the Pakistani army is surprisingly popular in Pakistan despite being credited for derailing the democratic process in Pakistan more than once.

Leaving value judgments aside, it seems at least unambiguous that the military in Pakistan is perceived as a powerful and functional institution which has not only led the initiative of shaping Pakistan's foreign policy, quite clearly in context of India centrism and Pak-US relations, but in preparedness to terrorism and natural disasters as well. Many in Pakistan are still nostalgic for spurts of progress during military dictatorship eras.⁴⁸ Thus, at least in terms of clarity, military is perceived as the most functional institution in Pakistan, and India centrism is not just perceived by the ruling elite as a main driver of foreign policy but is also widely prevalent in the masses.

Economy, power and security

Economic capacity of statehood as variable of power affects upon the exercise of power by actors which are used as instruments of power in a state.⁴⁹ In other words, a state uses its armed forces, intelligence agencies, and other organs in exercising state power, while the magnitude of power exercised depends to a large extent upon economic conditions of that state.⁵⁰ Rational choice decisions regarding national security become limited when there are challenges facing the state, such as economic problems commonly faced by developing and under developed countries. A viable option for a financially secure state may not be feasible for one facing economic challenges. While Socio cultural factors such as the religious, ethnic and nationalist environments of the state play a part in national security uncertainty, they all become exacerbated in times of economic recessions, ethnic and nationalist violence etc.

Robert Gilpin states that, "a more wealthy and a more powerful state . . . will select a larger bundle of security and welfare goals than a less wealthy and less powerful state."⁵¹ Whatever the aspirations of a state, unless it has the resources available to operationalize them, these goals will remain out of reach till the state has overcome its resource challenges.⁵² In this context, government effectiveness has direct bearing on the national security environment.

According to the World Bank government index matrix, government effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. Estimate gives the reviewed country's score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e. ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5.⁵³

Regulatory Quality captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. Percentile rank indicates the country's rank among all countries covered by the aggregate indicator, with 0 corresponding to lowest rank, and 100 to highest rank.⁵⁴ In table below, both indicators are reproduced for Pakistan.

Table 3: Pakistan's Government effectiveness

Table 3: Pakistan's Government effectiveness								
	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Government Effectiveness: Estimate	-0.8	-0.7	-0.7	-0.6	-0.6	-0.7	-0.5	-0.4
Government Effectiveness: Percentile Rank	22.6	26.9	28.4	30.8	28.4	27.4	32.2	37.5
Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism: Estimate	-2.4	-2.5	-2.5	-2.4	-2.3	-2.3	-1.8	-1.7
Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism: Percentile Rank	3.3	1.4	1.4	1.9	2.8	3.3	5.2	6.6
Regulatory Quality: Percentile Rank	27.9	28.8	27.4	29.8	28.8	27.9	26.0	26.0
Rule of Law: Estimate	-0.8	-0.8	-0.8	-0.7	-0.7	-0.7	-0.7	-0.6

As can be seen from table 3 above, effectiveness of the Pakistani government to deliver governance has been consistently poor. Regulatory quality and governance's effectiveness indices have both been falling since 2014; this has a tremendous bearing on how effectively problems could be tackled through state apparatus. Indicators of market economy and state of democracy have also not improved. For instance, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) of 'stateness',⁵⁵ which measures transformation processes toward democracy and a market economy in international comparison, also consistently ranks Pakistan poorly.⁵⁶ Out of a total of 137 states under review, Pakistan ranked at 101st position on the Political Transformation scale, 106th on the Economic Transformation scale, and 111th on the Governance Index.⁵⁷ Pakistan's regulatory systems are weak, primarily because regulations are often poorly specified, regulatory agencies lack capacity, policy is inconsistent and there is a lack of transparency. Legislation is sometimes passed, but then not fully rolled out or implemented.

Pakistan's lags behind its neighbors in service delivery in almost all social sectors;⁵⁸ the Pakistan Economic Survey relates that the country's literacy rate in 2018/19 was at 60%,⁵⁹ up from 58% in 2015/16, while data from UNICEF shows the mortality rate of children under five declined slightly from 69.4 per thousand live births in 2018, to 67.2 in 2019.⁶⁰ Water Aid has reported that as much as 17.7 million people in

Pakistan lack access to clean drinking water, while 79 million people cannot access decent toilet facilities.⁶¹ There are areas of the country which lack a cohesive communication and transport infrastructure, which implies that citizens in poorly developed areas might travel far to seek access to basic facilities such as education and health. Pakistan has been struggling with a power shortfall with regular and unscheduled 'load shedding' periods in attempts to alleviate power shortage, with devastating effects on industry and commerce. Recently, the government has announced a decision to regulate power consumption by state mandated market closures.⁶²

Devolution to grassroots has not succeeded; with general elections held recently and hailed as being grossly unfair and 'rigged,' local government elections that were meant to be held in 2018 nationally have not yet taken place in Pakistan. This implies lack of capability or willingness to devolve power, even though the legislation to do so is in place.⁶³ As a reflection of centralization of power, the PTI government in power preferred to use ordinances in place of legislation, which implies that power is concentrated and exercised through the executive/military axis.⁶⁴ This trend seems to continue with the incumbent government.

Challenges to established authority preventing governments from completing their mandated tenures are common; a loosely allied political coalition of opposition groups came together in 2020 to form the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM), utilizing street power and protests for political leverage, as has happened many times with elected governments. This parliamentary challenge ultimately affected the stepping down of the PTI government through a no confidence motion. Moreover, this change was attributed to the Pakistani establishment, a tag frequently given to the military /executive axis. The military establishment has been perceived to be playing the principal role in shaping Pakistan's foreign policy as well as issues related to internal security.⁶⁵

In recent years Pakistan has had to deal with a worsening economic situation and widening current account and fiscal deficits. This forced Pakistan's PTI government to request assistance from the IMF for an Extended Fund Facility bailout worth \$6 billion, while also requesting aid from China, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. These bailouts were contingent on several promised economic reforms

including the devaluation of the Pakistani rupee. However, since the industry base is not significant and Pakistan relies mostly on import of raw materials even for its assembly sector, a decline in imports coupled with decreased productive capability has ushered in high levels of inflation. The World Bank has estimated that poverty in Pakistan has increased from 4.4 per cent to 5.4 per cent in 2020, as over two million people have fallen below the poverty line.⁶⁶ 38.3 percent of the population in Pakistan (87,089 thousand people in 2020) are multi-dimensionally poor, while an additional 12.9 percent is classified as vulnerable to multidimensional poverty (29,353 thousand people in 2020).⁶⁷

The pandemic has left indelible scars on Pakistan's education landscape. It has been indicated in a World Bank report that learning poverty, defined as inability to read and understand a simple text by age, was estimated to go up to 79% as a result of school closures during the Covid-19 periods.⁶⁸ It already stood at 75% when the pandemic started.⁶⁹ All these factors have had serious effects on Pakistan's ability to compete in the international market; In 2019, the World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Report ranked Pakistan 110 out of 141 countries, a decline of three spots since 2018.⁷⁰

Pakistan has a burgeoning youth bulge; 64 percent of the nation is younger than 30 and 29 percent of Pakistanis are between ages 15 and 29. Pakistan has more young people now than at any stage in its life as country, a trend which is forecasted to continue to increase until at least 2050.⁷¹ However, the state has not been able to capitalize on this demographic as evidenced by an extremely low Human development index(HDI), which has been in steady decline(see table 4 below).

Table 4: Pakistan HDI

Table 4: Pakistan HDI	
Year	Pakistan HDI ranking
2019-20	152 out of 189 countries ⁷²
2020	154 ⁷³ out of 189 countries
2021	161 out of 192 countries ⁷⁴

Pakistan's current state of economy encourages its enemies such as the TTP to taunt the state as well. The TTP has been regularly issuing posts on its website Umar media, about how Pakistan has been experiencing high levels of socioeconomic and political instability.⁷⁵ TTP have utilized this window to highlight that Pakistan has been suffering from these issues because of "the [Pakistani] government's cruel policies"; this presumably is directed towards lack of Sharia implementation as one of TTP's demands.⁷⁶

Thus, limitations of economy have serious impact on rational national security choices, a fact that is being recognized in Pakistan.⁷⁷ In this context the Chinese model is relevant for Pakistan whereby China has been advancing its security on the back of economic reform; economic competitiveness and political resilience ultimately boosts a state's military capability as well. The opposite is true as well.⁷⁸

Strategically, security can be achieved not only by the military but by the whole progression of the economy. A robust economy is an inject into security, while its paucity is a barrier, and no amount of bailouts can help a state achieve security indefinitely. In this current economic context, Pakistan's choices to make and improvise, create and expand its rational choice security doctrines will remain limited; this particularly has bearing on expansive CVE programs which tend to be large scale and need to be sustainable in the longer run. This limitation imposed by a shrinking economy will particularly affect the latest national internal security policy 2022-26 and national counter extremism guidelines 2018, which are expansive in scope, and given Pakistan's current economic condition, probably cannot be implemented in entirety. Even partial implementation might be a challenge.

Terrorism and Pakistan

Ambiguous threats to national security add to the national security uncertainty environment. Such threats tend to operate outside the paradigms of a conventional national security strategy, since any such strategy would have to be against an identifiable opponent.⁷⁹ In framing strategy, one needs to have an opponent, a conflict, a competition, or a situation where an individual or a group is trying to achieve a goal against somebody else.⁸⁰ Uncertainty arises when the threat is so diffusely interspersed that it can no longer be recognized by a clearly identifiable opponent, but by myriad actors with confusing agendas. Historically, in political literature, such uncertainties usually arise after major wars such as the World War II, implosion of a rival such as the disintegration of Soviet Union, or reconciliation transforming the enemy into a friend or at least a neutral.⁸¹ Any tensions that arise after such major shifts may not be immediately recognizable. For many observers of the Pakistani scenario, 9/11 was a paradigm shaper for the state because of Pakistan's alliance with USA in the GWOT, and the subsequent transformation of some of its citizenry into hostiles, incrementally increasing terrorism.

Terrorism is a national uncertainty producer because of its asymmetric nature. Terrorist entities vie against a national strategy by adopting tactics that can offset the larger resource base of the states. Terrorism as a political philosophy does not need to defeat the national security strategy of the state in outright battle, but to fatigue it by the 'war of a thousand cuts.' Thus, terrorism seeks to invoke a state of national security uncertainty by exposing the vulnerability of the conventionally based national security strategy paradigms, thereby causing the state to make adaptations. These changes are what the terrorists will also try to manipulate.

For instance, terrorists will sometimes try to encourage a heavy backlash by the state in the form of military reprisals, which seems illogical as this would wipe out more terrorists. However, at the same time, uncoordinated and hasty operations may also sometimes cause more collateral civilian casualties, thereby turning the opinion of the citizenry against a state and vindicating the terrorists' stance that the state is tyrannical. This may increase the indoctrination base for terrorists, which offsets the losses accrued due to enhancement of military operations.

Many factors can create national security uncertainty, but terrorism is the most troubling in the twenty first century. Its inherent asymmetry implies that it is not easy for a state to be always ready to roll out a preconceived plan; the options of negotiation, long or short war, counterinsurgency, engagement, or any other strategy are always tricky ground for a state to maneuver. In other words, since terrorism is not predictable in any given scenario, the responses cannot be just programmed into a national security strategy but have to be modulated for every terrorist stimulus in its own right. As elaborated below, terrorism has been particularly troublesome for Pakistan in producing a national security uncertainty environment, since Pakistan has been facing terrorism for a while now.

National security uncertainty does not usually result from a single ambiguous variable but is often multivariate, with an overlay of socio cultural and socio-economic factors which can increase or decrease security uncertainty. Even a state which has made no enemies within and without may still face a rational choice decision about national security. A classic example is the traditionally neutral state of Norway, which has joined the NATO alliance in the most dramatic shift away from its venerated neutrality as possible. The fact that porous borders allow insecurity in Europe to permeate its physical and ideological borders, as well as a burgeoning immigrant population, are just two of the many factors that have promoted this shift. This has arisen from rising national security uncertainty more than anything else, since Norway does not have a clearly defined enemy. Asymmetric attacks like the one perpetrated by a far-right extremist exacerbates the uncertainty environment.⁸² Just those two extremist attacks in 2011 by neo-Nazi Anders Behring Breivik, killing 77 people, has left Norway's security environment scarred even now.⁸³ Thus, paradigm shifts can radically alter the security doctrinal scenario of a country even in the absence of a clearly defined enemy, with the situation escalating exponentially with the presence of one or more.

Pakistan's security response to terrorism

Historically, Pakistani COIN apparatus has focused on pushing the militants out of their territorial sanctuaries, and holding these areas, consequent to periods where there were sometimes protracted negotiations between the state and militants.⁸⁴ Previously the state has held negotiations with a number of groups; Lashkar e Islam, TTP Swat, TTP Waziristan, TNSM etc. none yielded tangible results beyond short periods of cease fire. At one time or the other, negotiations were attempted with Baitullah Mehsud, Faqir Muhammad, Fazlullah, Sufi Muhammad, Mangal Bagh, and many medium- to top-level militant commanders, with none giving the desired results.⁸⁵ This illuminated some kind of ambiguity within the state about the terrorists in Pakistan, either regarding organization, intent or capability. However, it seems that the ambiguity has vanished now in context of displacing militancy from areas such as Swat and the twin Waziristan tribal districts.⁸⁶ Trend lines now show that the Pakistani military is much more successful in tackling the militants head on, and the enemy is clearly identifiable now as anti-state terrorist entities.

Escalating situations have been exacerbating Pakistan's security environments for a long time. What began as tribal uprisings in FATA soon escalated into a full-blown insurgency in Swat and Waziristan in ex-FATA (now merged districts) and saw the rise to notoriety of entities such as Terek e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which are now household names. Even more worryingly, extremism and radicalization has been on rise on Pakistan at an exponential level. These phenomena become confusing in the sense that they are widely diffused but sufficiently ambiguous in Pakistan inasmuch as they were not immediately identifiable as an enemy per-se. The early discourse in Pakistan was around 'good' and 'bad' Taliban⁸⁷ and 'discontented tribals' which were mishandled by the state and turned to militancy.⁸⁸ This discourse has ultimately died down, which has lent clarity to who the enemy is and how to engage them.

Conservative values are cherished in Pakistani society, and a stream of reports in the Western media about "extremism," "fundamentalism," and the conservative mind-set of the Pakistani public as a monolithic entity does nothing to reveal the nuances of the problem. Most Pakistanis

continue to live peaceful, mundane existences marked by a mixture of progressiveness, conservatism, and traditional Islamic values.⁸⁹ Since the factors which give rise to this 'extremism' is not even properly understood by the Pakistani publics and policy makers alike, it is not surprising that they continue to remain ambiguous for the world at large.

The problem is compounded by the constantly morphing nature of terrorist entities.⁹⁰ Thus, even when the entity is identifiable as an enemy, the structure of the entity may be not, since it is so fluid. Many militant entities have transformed into more ambiguously demarcated organizations, such as the LJ which expanded its ambit of sectarian terrorism significantly. Even more confusingly, TTP, the biggest enemy of the state, is also not a monolithic entity but has been a constantly morphing conglomerate of loosely held 'militant franchises' which could constitute anything from a few militants to organized bands of thousands.⁹¹ From small tribal bands in Pakistan's northwest to an organization based on Afghanistan's soil and having a symbiotic relationship with afghan Taliban who are in government, TTP has morphed many times. Thus, even on superficial scrutiny, such kind of fluidity clearly presents a dilemma of comprehension to the state.

Whatever the rationale and causes, a state of national security uncertainty is always dangerous, and finding the balance continues to be one of the biggest challenges for national security in the twenty first century. One of the major problems is that if you are unsure about the intent of your opponent, you will not be adequately prepared to meet the challenges presented by your opponents' goals, interests, and capabilities. The parameters of setting out a national doctrine thus need to be comprehended in their intensity, which can be defined in terms of how much preparation may be needed to cater to the scale of activities by the enemy which constitutes a certain quantum of threat.⁹²

A state facing a dilemma of comprehension of what it's opponents will be (in terms of structure, intent, capability etc.) will not be able to make a rational choice decision as to when and how to prepare for a full out war, counterinsurgency, engagement or any other measure to counter the enemy. For instance, if you are able to define a certain quantum of activity as insurgency, you will need to prepare more intensively for a counterinsurgency campaign, and vice versa. Preparing for a small war and neglecting the proper COIN doctrine will be counterproductive.

Considering the Pakistani case in question, the Pakistani COIN has been for long focused on pushing the militants out of their territorial sanctuaries and holding these areas. This is the result of a long-drawn-out process consisting of lots of talking and little fighting till 2009, when the Pakistani army decided to engage in full blown offensives that re took Swat, and cleared large swathes of territory which the state has held successfully. The militants in Pakistan do not seem amenable to negotiation, or the political side of COIN, and have in fact used the negotiating table as a tactic to interrupt trend lines of operations underway at the time. The state initially tried to reason with the militants as a logical enemy, but did not gain any useful advantage from it.⁹³ In all operations before “Rah-e-Haq” and “Rah-e-Nijat” (see table 5), the Pakistani government’s counterinsurgency policy was consistently skewed toward negotiating with one warlord or the other. Ineffective military operations overly emphasized destroying infrastructure and captured few important militants. They were followed by negotiations, which were then usually succeeded by a cease-fire. The intermittent cease-fires were violated at whim by the warlords to either strengthen their positions or violating terms of the peace agreements by capturing security personnel and imposing their radical laws on the local populace.

At one time or the other, negotiations were attempted with Baitullah Mehsud, Faqir Muhammad, Fazlullah, Sufi Muhammad, and many medium- to top-level militant commanders, with none giving the desired results⁹⁴. This reveals that there was ambiguity about the terrorists in Pakistan, either regarding organization, intent or capability. If this was not so, the responses to challenges faced would have been more coherent. However, by mid-2009, military operations became intense, and military doctrines of engaging the enemy head on seems to have been more successful in terms of displacing militancy from areas such as Swat and Waziristan.⁹⁵

Trend lines now show that the Pakistani military is much more successful in tackling the militants head on. The state has been learning about its enemies gradually, but the learning curve has been and may continue to be painful till such time when ambiguity about the enemy remains, as the TTP in Afghanistan is a different creature altogether. This remains a major challenge for the state.

Table 5: Pakistan's peace deals with the militants and the resulting measures.⁹⁶

No	Peace deal	Result	Counter-insurgency measures	Coin military intensity	Coin-impact
1	Pakistan entered into the Shakai agreement with the militant commander Nek Muhammad Wazir ⁹⁷ , in South Waziristan. ⁹⁸	The agreement broke down within a month due to Wazir's death in consequence of a missile hitting him on June, 2004 ⁹⁹ . This targeted assassination was ostensibly carried out due to Wazir's unrelenting pro-Taliban and Al Qaeda activities.	Low level Al Qaeda arrests, but no operation. Negotiations ensued.	Minimal.	Minimal.
2	Between March and July 2004, the government imposed a blockade of the Mehsud area of South Waziristan with extreme difficulty, concluding the 'Sarasrogha Accord' ¹⁰⁰ .	After negotiations, the military at that time vacated these areas with a specific undertaking not to carry out similar operations in future.	Though there was peace for a while in South Waziristan, the insurgency continued unabated in North Waziristan.	Minimal.	Minimal.
3	Attacks on security forces resumed in South Waziristan in July 2005, which led to talks, resulting in a peace deal ¹⁰¹ .	Peace deal soon violated by the militants.	State resumed negotiations with the tribes.	Minimal.	Minimal.
4	A peace deal was signed in North Waziristan in September, 2006 with Baitullah Mehsud, for avoiding tribal militant attacks on Army convoys and checkpoints.	Peace deal soon violated by the militants. ¹⁰² After the agreement, there seemed to be persistent reports of increase in Taliban attacks on coalition forces in Afghanistan near the border with Waziristan.	State resumed negotiations with Mehsud.	Minimal.	Minimal.
5	A peace treaty was signed in March, 2007 ¹⁰³ between the state and Maulvi Faqir Muhammad, a close associate of Maulana Sufi Muhammad, head of Tanzeem-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM), who later allied himself with Mehsud	The peace deal turned sour when 80 students and Maulana Liaquat ¹⁰⁴ , heading a religious seminary at Chenagai, lost their lives in an aerial attack, supposedly carried out by a US unmanned drone, with the subsequent responsibility being accepted by the Pakistani Government.	Negotiations by the state, which broke down.	Mild.	Mild.

TRENDLINES OF PAKISTAN'S SECURITY CHALLENGES

No	Peace deal	Result	Counter-insurgency measures	Coin military intensity	Coin-impact
	as his Taliban deputy in Bajaur.				
6	Pakistani Government also signed a deal in Khyber Agency after the tribal operation "Sirat-e-Mustaqqim" ¹⁰⁵ ,	Despite troops being withdrawn and militants being released, the targeted warlord <i>Mangal Bagh</i> , heading the <i>Lashkar-e-Islam</i> in Khyber Agency, though initially routed, reappeared in September 2008, and re-established himself. ¹⁰⁶	Mangal Bagh and Lashkar e Islam largely left undisturbed.	Moderate.	Moderate.
7	Consistent flouting of terrorist power by Fazlullah in Swat forced the state to launch a military offensive against Fazlullah in November 2007, code named 'Operation Rah-e-Haq' ¹⁰⁷ .	Resultantly, negotiations were initiated with top ranking militant leadership. In April-May 2008, the influential Taliban ideologue, Maulana Sufi Muhammad, head of the outlawed Tehreek-e-Nifaze-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM- The Movement for the Implementation of Mohammad's Sharia Law) was released, and Shariah was introduced in the Provincially Administrated Tribal Areas (PATA). Fazlullah finally forced the state's hands when he abducted 38 Frontier Corps soldiers and killed three ISI personnel in July 2008, causing the NWFP Government to request the army to come to its aid.	The Pakistani Army launched Operation Rah-e-Haq II in July 2008 ¹⁰⁸ , relying on air power and artillery, again without much success against the guerrilla tactics of the Taliban. Negotiations ensued after a half-hearted operation.	Moderate.	Moderate.
8	The Taliban in Bajaur led by Mullah Faqir Ahmed opened another front; the Army was forced to withdraw substantial number of troops from Swat to concentrate on the area contiguous to Durand Line (Operation Sherdill ¹⁰⁹).	Negotiations.	Peace deal, later violated by the militants.	Moderate.	Moderate.
9	Fazlullah continued his militant activities unabated.	As negotiations again involving Sufi Muhammad made no headway,	Negotiations broke down again, with Sufi Muhammad being	Moderate.	Moderate.

TRENDLINES OF PAKISTAN'S SECURITY CHALLENGES

No	Peace deal	Result	Counter-insurgency measures	Coin military intensity	Coin-impact
		Operation 'Rah -e-Haq III' was launched in January 2009 to secure the main supply lines to the district capital Mingora in Swat.	involved in another round of talks as a mediator between the state and the Taliban.		
10	Peace negotiations with Maulvi-Faqir-Mohammad-led tribal militants seemed to be making no headway.	A full-scale military operation in Bajaur was launched on Aug 6, 2008. The Bajaur operation was pursued much more vigorously than previous ones.	A military operation initiated in earnest, which caused displacement of hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons.	Severe.	Significant.
11	Negotiations involving Sufi Muhammad regarding the implementation of 'Nizam e Adal' in Swat and Malakand areas initiated.	Taliban seemed to be spreading beyond Swat to adjacent areas like Buner, consistently flouting the terms of the peace accord.	Operation 'Rah e Haq-4' launched in earnest in May 2009, generating up to two million IDPs.	Severe.	Significant.
12	Short hiatus after the first battle of Swat as it came to known broke down.	April 2009 government troops and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan began to clash once again, and in May the government launched military operations throughout the district and elsewhere to oppose the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan	Rah-e-Rast, began in May 2009 and involved the Pakistani Army and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan militants in a fight for control of the Swat district of Pakistan.	Severe	Drastic-Swat valley almost cleared of militants
	Another round of talks reportedly took place in late 2011, confirmed by the TTP's deputy commander, Maulvi Faqir Mohammad. ¹¹⁰	TTP declared the Pakistani government had released 145 members of the militant group as a gesture of goodwill, while the TTP had pledged a ceasefire.	This round of talks was not confirmed by government officials and the Taliban also later denied that discussions were taking place, insisting that it would only happen if Islamabad agreed to impose Sharia.	Minimal	Minimal
	In 2013 the TTP again expressed willingness to talk.	Later that year Maulana Samiul Haq, chief of his own faction of Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam and then-chairman of the Pakistan Defence Council, was tasked to create a feasible environment to initiate a dialogue with the TTP.	The group dismissed the idea of peace talks completely in December 2013, claiming they had information that plans for military action against them were already under way.	Minimal	Minimal

TRENDLINES OF PAKISTAN'S SECURITY CHALLENGES

No	Peace deal	Result	Counter-insurgency measures	Coin military intensity	Coin-impact
	Military Operation Zarb-e Azb began in the tribal regions of Pakistan on June 15 th , 2014.	The operation was launched in North Waziristan along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border as a renewed effort against militancy.	The operation established the writ of the government within the Tribal Regions and received widespread support from the Pakistani political, defence and civilian sectors. Zarb-e-Azb was followed by Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad that began in February 2017.	Severe	Marked improvement in overall security situation. ¹¹¹ As a result of the operation the military estimated that over 3,500 TTP members were killed. ¹¹²
	Radd ul Fasad operation was conducted by the army countrywide ¹¹³ .	The steps were taken due to a sudden upsurge in suicide attacks, primarily by the terrorist cell Jamat ul Ahrar (Operation Ghazi). The operation was announced as 'the refocusing of efforts in accordance with the NAP.	The operation in 2020 is said to have thwarted more than 400 terrorist plots across the country since 2017. ¹¹⁴ During the campaign, the Pakistan military carried out more than 49,000 intelligence-based operations against terrorism. Writ of state in tribal areas was said to be fully restored. According to official figures, the Pakistan Army launched a total of 1,200 operations out of which 350 were large scale. The military was also able to seal the porous 1,450 km of 2,611 km Afghanistan border with fences, reinforcing it with 843 security forts. ¹¹⁵	Severe	Drastic- the operation seemed to improve the domestic security situation tremendously.

Peace deals with militants

Conventionally, COIN regimes are said to be 80% political and 20% military in nature.¹¹⁶ However, the first thing which becomes obvious is that when the military aspect of the COIN in Pakistan is insignificant, the impact seems to be on the minimal side. This is arguably a vindication of the proponents of the 'hard line' stance towards militants such as the Taliban; they do not seem too amenable to the political aspect of COIN utilizing negotiations. In fact, they have apparently used the negotiation table as a tactic to gain time, interrupting trend lines of operations which were underway at the time. The state always tried to reason with the militants as a logical enemy but have not gained any useful advantage from it; if they had, the COIN impact column in the matrix would have responded with a significant reading in response to deals offered by the state.

The militants, on the other hand have used the time between intervening peace deals to entrench themselves, which is obvious from their gradual pervasion of the tribal areas and Swat. It is only when the state's patience had been exhausted that full scale military operations have begun, which have resulted in significant results in the form of re-capture of territory from the militants, and a marked decrease in intensity of suicide attacks in the country.

There has been a consistent trend line about negotiating with the terrorists as a viable conflict resolution mechanism. Talks were initiated and invariably broke down. There has hardly been any interruption in this trend line; TTP enters negotiations with the state then finds pretexts to break off these negotiations. The latest talks have been failures as well; shrouded in secrecy, rumors emerged in late 2021 of amnesty being offered to TTP in return for laying down arms.¹¹⁷ The subsequent temporary ceasefire suffered a blow when a key member of TTP, Umar Khalid Khorasan, died in an unclaimed attack in Afghanistan on August 7, 2022.¹¹⁸ Just prior, in June 2022, Pakistani army had sought parliamentary approval for continued engagement with the country's deadliest terrorist organization.¹¹⁹ TTP had demanded the reversal of the 2018 merger of the Federally Administered Tribal Agencies (FATA) into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (KPK).¹²⁰ In November 2022, TTP announced an end to the June ceasefire agreement and directed its cadres to carry out attacks across the country.¹²¹ Thus, there are clear trend lines

that TTP tends to use negotiations as a strategy tool rather than a sincerely meant dispute resolution policy.

A typical pattern of radicalization and its subsequent COIN response by the state has occurred; militancy would take root in a village or a small region, and little would be done in response by the local government or police forces to resist the same. When the problem escalated, either there would be a military operation which caused a blowback, or negotiations would ensue.¹²² In any case, there would be a tendency to negotiate with the militants at some point in time. However, the political side of the COIN regime would be inconsistent; the Pakistani tendency has been to allow partial, incremental, or deliberately staggered concessions that have tended to drag out over a substantial period of time. They have thus added to the malady instead of relieving it.

As is obvious from the COIN matrix,¹²³ this incrementalism provided time and opportunities to the terrorists for intentionally provoking the Pakistani state in hopes of derailing the smooth progress of negotiated compromise in the short term, so that they could re-radicalize their own community and actually escalate their efforts toward even greater gains in the long term. This is borne out by the COIN impact column of the matrix, which has shown dismal response to the peace deals offered by the state. It can also be seen that even when a settlement projected as really effective was negotiated with the Taliban, they have tended to remain motivated to continue attacks;¹²⁴ this is because the concessions tended to create an 'expectation threshold.'¹²⁵

It's obvious that military operations have had a significant effect in reducing the militancy and terrorism in Pakistan during the period between 2014-21, while talks with militants have not had much effect. This leads to the obvious conclusion that military operations have been at the heart of the effective security policy, with the overwhelming majority of these carried out by the military. By implication, Pakistani military remains the most potent counter insurgency and counter terrorism tool against terrorism. Whatever role the law enforcement has had is open to debate but judging by the Rule of law indices and the tendency of the military authorities to be the main players in counter terrorism operations, one could assume that the role of LEAs is secondary to military operations, and LEAs are probably incapable of disrupting terrorism on their own. They might have some efficacy in investigating individual terrorism cases, but probably cannot disrupt entire terrorist networks on their own, in the absence of military operations.

Terrorism rising

In 2019, Pakistan had recorded its lowest number of terror-related deaths since 2006, with fatalities declining by 45% from 543 in 2018 to 300 in 2019.¹²⁶ This downward trend began after terrorist attacks reached their peak in 2013. TTP emerged as the deadliest terror group in 2019, responsible for 73 deaths. Other notable groups included Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and Hizb-ul-Ahrar (HuA), which accounted for 21 and 20 deaths respectively. This significant reduction in terrorism can be attributed to comprehensive counter-terrorism operations led by Pakistani military and security forces against various militant groups, including TTP and the Khorasan Chapter. The most impacted regions in 2019 were Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, accounting for 77% of terrorist attacks and 85% of deaths.¹²⁷

In 2020, Pakistan experienced a significant further decline in terrorist activities, with 146 incidents, including three suicide bombings, marking a 38% decrease from the previous year. This decrease also led to a substantial drop in casualties, with 220 lives lost (a 38% decrease from 2019) and 547 injuries. Security forces and law enforcement personnel faced significant losses, with 97 personnel killed and 113 injured. Civilians suffered 94 fatalities and 372 injuries.

In 2021, the downward trend abruptly reversed with a 42% increase in terrorist attacks, totalling 207 incidents, including five suicide bombings. This surge resulted in 335 deaths, a 52% increase from the previous year, and 555 injuries. TTP, local Taliban factions, and Islamic State Khorasan (ISK) carried out 128 attacks, up from 95 in 2020, resulting in 236 deaths and 278 injuries.¹²⁸ Baloch insurgents intensified their activities, causing substantial casualties. One of the significant shifts of this surge was that the security forces casualties had increased more than civilian deaths, implying that security forces were being increasingly targeted.

In 2023, Pakistan experienced the highest number of terrorist attacks between 2019-23, with 306 incidents, marking a further 17% increase from the previous year. Major terrorist groups, including the TTP, ISK and Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), were responsible for 78% of the attacks and 82% of the fatalities. Again, the security forces were the target of such attacks. There was a marked escalation in brazen attacks on security forces in Pakistan. For instance, in August 2022, militants attacked a police station in Turbat, southern Balochistan, using suicide

bombers and gunmen to breach the security perimeter. The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) claimed responsibility for the attack, indicating its intention to target state security apparatus. In February 2024, militants stormed a police station in Zhob, northern Balochistan, using explosives to breach the station's defences and engage in a fierce gun battle with police officers inside. The attacks were attributed to the BLA's intention to escalate its campaign against state institutions.

Thus, terrorism is not only on the rise through the reorganization of TTP, but nationalist groups have also found a window to challenge the state. The problem is compounded by the fact that TTP and many other groups are now operating primarily from command-and-control centres outside Pakistan. TTP and BLA amongst other groups, now have sanctuary in Afghanistan, which makes the situation even more complicated. The terrorism scenario is thus even more tied into the international power-politics than previously.

India centrism

The most constant theme on security which runs throughout the entire thread of Pakistan's security doctrine is India centrism and distrust of Afghanistan. Another thread is the distrust and paradoxically, reliance on America. John West in his book on the importance of Asia says, "*today, Asia is sitting on a knife edge,*"¹²⁹ which pertains particularly to South Asia where Pakistan occupies a pivotal position. Certainly, Pakistan's geographic situation has its peculiar problems. Situated at the crossroads of an area with geostrategic importance to multiple competing players with hegemonic aspirations, Pakistan could have been a warm water gateway for oil rich Central Asia and land-locked Afghanistan, for mutually advantageous global trade.¹³⁰ It has yet to achieve this aspiration.

One of the reasons for this is that Pakistan has been always preoccupied with its strategic internal security outlook; deeply rooted mistrust toward both Afghanistan and India in the wake of partition of India has been the cornerstone of Pakistan's foreign as well as internal security policy (see timeline). During partition Afghanistan rebutted the Durand Line between Afghanistan and the newly formed state of Pakistan, while Indian and Pakistan were embroiled in the Kashmir issue and division of assets and the Indus basin water dispute. This historical legacy survives and drives Pakistan's security policy till now.

Table 6: India-Pakistan relationship trends

Year	Scenario	Situation- Dark Grey denotes deterioration, Light Grey improvement
	Partition of the Indian subcontinent.	
1947/48	The first India-Pakistan war over Kashmir is fought. Fighting continues through the second half of 1948, with the war officially ending on January 1, 1949.	
1954	The accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India is ratified by the state's constituent assembly.	
1957	The Jammu and Kashmir constituent assembly approves a constitution.	
1963	Foreign ministers of India and Pakistan hold talks regarding the Kashmir dispute.	
1964	Following the failure of the 1963 talks, Pakistan refers the Kashmir case to the UN Security Council.	
1965	India and Pakistan fight their second war.	
1966	Indian Prime Minister and Pakistani President Ayyub Khan sign an agreement at Tashkent, agreeing to withdraw to pre-August lines; they also agree on restoring economic and diplomatic relations.	
1971	India and Pakistan go to war a third time, this time over East Pakistan. East Pakistan becomes the independent country of Bangladesh on December 6, 1971.	
1972	Shimla agreement is signed by which the two countries put an end to the conflict and agree to settle any disputes "by peaceful means". The Shimla Agreement designates the ceasefire line of December 17, 1971, as the new "Line-of-Control (LoC)" between the two countries.	
1974	The Kashmiri state government affirms that the state "is a constituent unit of the Union of India".	
1988	The two countries sign an agreement that neither side will attack the other's nuclear installations or facilities.	
1989	Armed resistance to Indian rule in the Kashmir valley begins.	
1991	The two countries sign agreements on providing advance notification of military exercises and troop movements, as well as on preventing airspace violations and establishing overflight rules.	
1992	A joint declaration prohibiting the use of chemical weapons is signed in New Delhi.	
1996	Following a series of clashes, military officers from both countries meet at the LoC in order to ease tensions.	

TRENDLINES OF PAKISTAN'S SECURITY CHALLENGES

Year	Scenario	Situation- Dark Grey denotes deterioration, Light Grey improvement
	Partition of the Indian subcontinent.	
1998	India detonates five nuclear devices at Pokhran while Pakistan responds by detonating six nuclear devices of its own in the Chaghai. The tests result in international sanctions being placed on both countries. In the same year, both countries carry out tests of long-range missiles.	
1999	Pakistani and Indian premieres sign the Lahore Declaration, reaffirming their commitment to the Shimla Accord, and agree to undertake a number of 'Confidence Building Measures' (CBMs).	
1999	Kargil conflict breaks out in May, the fourth war between India and Pakistan.	
2001	Tensions along the Line of Control remain high, with 38 people killed in an attack on the Kashmiri assembly in Srinagar.	
2001	On December 13, an armed attack on the Indian parliament in New Delhi leaves 14 people dead. India blames Lashkar-e-Taiga and Jadish-e-Muhammad for the attacks. The attacks lead to a massing of India's and Pakistan's militaries along the LoC. The standoff ends in October 2002, after international mediation.	
2004	Vajpayee and Musharraf hold direct talks at the 12th SAARC summit in Islamabad in January, and the two countries' foreign secretaries meet later in the year. The Composite Dialogue Process starts, in which bilateral meetings are held between officials at various levels of government.	
2006	India redeploys 5,000 troops from Jammu and Kashmir, citing an "improvement" in the situation there, but the two countries are unable to reach an agreement on withdrawing forces from the Sachem glacier.	
2007	On February 18, the train service between India and Pakistan (the Samjhauta Express) is bombed near Panipat, north of New Delhi. Sixty-eight people are killed, and dozens injured.	
2008	India joins a framework agreement between Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan on a \$7.6bn gas pipeline project. A series of Kashmir-specific CBMs is also agreed.	
2008	In July, India blames Pakistan for a bomb attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul, which kills 58 and injures another 141. In October, cross-LoC trade commences, though it is limited to 21 items and can take place on only two days a week.	
2008	On November 26, armed gunmen open fire on civilians at several sites in Mumbai, India. The attacks on the Taj Mahal Palace & Tower, the Oberoi Trident Hotel, the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus, Leopold Cafe, Cama Hospital, Nariman House Jewish community Centre, Metro Cinema, St Xavier's College and in a lane near the Times of India office, prompt an almost three-day siege of the Taj, where gunmen remain holed up until all but one of them are killed	

TRENDLINES OF PAKISTAN'S SECURITY CHALLENGES

Year	Scenario	Situation- Dark Grey denotes deterioration, Light Grey improvement
	Partition of the Indian subcontinent.	
	in an Indian security forces operation. More than 160 people are killed in the attacks. In the wake of the attacks, India breaks off talks with Pakistan.	
2010	In January, Pakistani and Indian forces exchange fire across the LoC in Kashmir in a string of such incidents.	
2011	In January, Indian Home Secretary says India will share information with Pakistan regarding the 2001 Samjhauta Express bombing. The two countries' foreign secretaries meet in Thimpu, Bhutan, in February, and agree to resume peace talks "on all issues".	
2013	In January, India and Pakistan trade accusations of violating the ceasefire in Kashmir.	
2016	India claims to have launched what it calls "surgical strikes" on "terrorist units" in Pakistan-administered Kashmir in September, less than two weeks after an attack on an Indian army base leaves 19 soldiers dead. Pakistan denies the attacks on its soil took place.	
2019	In the early hours of February 26, India conducts air attacks against what it calls Pakistan-based rebel group Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM)'s "biggest training camp", killing "a very large number of terrorists". ¹³¹ Subsequently, India breaches Pakistan airspace; an Indian MiG-21 aircraft was shot down and its pilot captured. The pilot was subsequently handed over to India by Pakistan	
2020	Hafiz Saeed is sentenced for a collective imprisonment of 21 years on terror financing charges in four cases. ¹³²	
2021	India- Pakistan sign a cease-fire agreement in Feb 2021. ¹³³	
2022	Only three minor incidents of cross-border skirmishes were recorded by the end of the year along the Line of Control (LoC). ¹³⁴	
2023	In 2022 and 2023, Indian central government cracked down on independent media in Jammu & Kashmir, redrew the electoral map to privilege Hindu-majority areas in Kashmir, and held a G20 tourism meeting in Srinagar. In May 2023, at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in India, the foreign ministers of India and Pakistan exchanged hot words over Kashmir. A month after the Shanghai summit, U.S. President Joe Biden and Modi made a joint statement at the White House calling for Pakistan to "take immediate action" against extremist groups operating in its territories and to bring the perpetrators of the 2008 attacks in Mumbai to justice.	

TRENDLINES OF PAKISTAN'S SECURITY CHALLENGES

Year	Scenario	Situation- Dark Grey denotes deterioration, Light Grey improvement
	Partition of the Indian subcontinent.	
	<p>Pakistan Foreign Ministry responded by summoning the U.S. deputy chief of mission to reprimand the United States for encouraging "India's baseless and politically motivated narrative against Pakistan," reminding US about Pakistan's continued cooperation and support for America against terrorism in the region.</p> <p>In December 2023, India formally requested the extradition of Hafiz Saeed, which was rejected by Pakistan, citing the lack of a bilateral extradition treaty between the two countries.</p> <p>Cross border skirmishes between the countries resumed.¹³⁵</p>	

The Uri and especially Pulwama attacks in 2019 in Indian occupied Kashmir were alleged by India to be masterminded by Pakistan through Kashmiri fighters. Military tensions between the two nuclear neighbors touched new heights as JeM claimed responsibility. Ostensibly as revenge, on February 26, 2019, Indian Air Force crossed the Line of Control and launched airstrikes against Pakistan 's territory at Balakot. In the ensuing air skirmish between Indian and Pakistani air forces, an Indian MiG-21 aircraft was shot down and its pilot captured; the pilot was subsequently handed over to India by Pakistan. In August the same year, India repealed Articles 370 and altered Kashmir's constitutional status, which Pakistan considers to be a violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions and the Shimla Agreement.¹³⁶

In turn, as evidence of Indian sponsored state terrorism, Pakistan paraded Kulbushan Yadhav on media; Yadav was arrested in 2016 in Baluchistan over allegations of being an Indian intelligence operative who had been tasked with orchestrating terrorism and subversive activities in Pakistan.¹³⁷ The pendulum of accusations has swung in both directions, with both states calling each other the biggest terrorist and violator of human rights.

Pakistan has taken some action against militant outfits like the Lashkar-e-Taiba (Let), sentencing Hafiz Saeed, the leader of the Let, to 11 years in prison for terrorism financing, and another senior leader, Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, sentenced to five years for similar charges. As much as in response to international pressures, this was viewed as a move to facilitate the exit of Pakistan from the FATF grey list, which had become a hanging economic sword for Pakistan. Pakistan has now exited the grey

list, and even though its monetary institutions have a much greater amount of due diligence built in than previously, much yet remains to be done.¹³⁸

Pakistan's punitive actions against Jaish-e-Mohammad were also stepped up; Jem was held responsible by India for the Pulwama attack in 2019. Again, this was less to do with appeasing India in some way but is more of an attempt by Pakistan to reintegrate itself within the global economic system, by being taken out of the FATF grey list.¹³⁹

As the timeline shows, there has been no significant headway on core issues like Kashmir, Siachen glacier or Sir Creek. Trade¹⁴⁰ and cultural exchanges have done little so far to counter hardline constituencies in India and Pakistan, which argue that the other state is resolutely antagonistic to core interests of the other. The Pakistani publics have also been disdainful regarding Pakistan's relationship with India in trade etc.¹⁴¹ Thus, there seems to be little chance that there would be a political breakthrough on core issues, and mutual suspicion of each other would tend to remain the state of affairs.¹⁴² India centrism, therefore, is going to continue being the dominant theme in Pakistan's foreign policy and national security outlook.

Afghanistan

Afghanistan as usual remains a problem for Pakistan. All Afghan Governments since Pakistan's independence have refused to recognize the Durand Line drawn up during the colonial era, which delineates borders between the two countries. Afghanistan has tended to assert territorial claims over parts of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan in the spirit of Pashtun nationalism, and even fostered a separatist movement calling for 'Pakhtoonistan' in the 1950s. Thus, strictly in terms of national security doctrines, it seems logical that Afghanistan would be viewed with suspicion by Pakistan, and the Afghan jihad and its ensuing fallout has done nothing to improve relations between the two countries, notwithstanding the fact that Pakistan is host to many Afghan refugees.

The close ties of Afghanistan with India further exacerbate Pakistan's distrust of the former; India's strategic partnership agreement with Afghanistan in 2011 was the precursor of huge amounts of Indian aid flowing to Afghanistan, estimated at \$2 billion over the last decade. India was heavily involved in training and equipping Afghan security forces.¹⁴³ This 'India leaning' of Afghanistan's government promoted Pakistan to favor the IPI natural gas pipeline bypassing Afghanistan, over the TAPI pipeline.¹⁴⁴

On August 15, 2021, the Taliban victory and control of Kabul therefore seemed to many Pakistanis a triumph inasmuch as Afghanistan had been secured by the Taliban, that had ties with Pakistan, and India seemed defeated in Afghanistan.¹⁴⁵ Even though Pakistan played a central part, other players were involved too; Taliban were brought to the negotiating table by regional powers including Russia, China, and Qatar. However, it did not transpire that Afghanistan had been secured by a compliant regime; there were signs that Taliban wanted to have a more expansive foreign policy, rather than just relying on Pakistan.¹⁴⁶

Another sore issue is the TTP, which has become emboldened since they are now based in Afghanistan and are firmly allied with the Afghan Taliban. TTP have stepped up attacks in Pakistan, accounting for a 50% upward spike in terrorist attacks since the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan.¹⁴⁷

Taliban view Pakistan's border facing with Afghanistan as "one-sided" and "illegitimate," and have been trying to dismantle it at many places along the Durand Line.¹⁴⁸ In Pakistani areas bordering Afghanistan, this has had repercussions for law and order, with a systemic increase in demand for extortions, kidnappings for ransom, and other forms of racketeering that is associated with terrorism financing.¹⁴⁹

India had been inching closer to Afghanistan after its Agreement of Strategic Partnership (ASP) with Afghanistan in 2011¹⁵⁰, which rankled with Pakistan. This Indo-afghan rapprochement was seen to be in coordination with the United States, since USA had acknowledged Indian support to not just train but also equip the afghan security forces.¹⁵¹ It was therefore not surprising that many in Pakistan saw the Taliban's takeover of Afghanistan in 2021 as a strategic victory for Pakistan. Many Pakistanis celebrated the Taliban takeover, including the Pakistani premier who declared that Afghans had broken the "shackles of slavery."¹⁵² Ascendance of Taliban was perceived as a blow to archrival India, which seemed to lose all traction with the ousting of the US-backed Afghan government. As the Taliban presumably would never seek an alliance with 'infidel' India, Pakistani elation over this victory was rampant. This turned into consternation in 2022 as the TTP stepped up attacks against Pakistan from Afghani soil, with the Taliban seemingly reluctant to rein in their allies, the anti-Pakistan TTP. This is indeed a lengthy debate worthy of separate research but suffice it to say that there has not been much headway made through the Taliban government, to rein in the TTP.

Frustrated by lack of headway, Pakistan made a decision to conduct cross-border airstrikes in Afghanistan, targeting TTP bases. Presumably, these cross-border strikes were driven by the urgent need to address the threat posed by the TTP. The TTP's ability to operate from Afghan territory, particularly in provinces like Paktika and Khost, poses a direct challenge to Pakistan's security. Despite the Afghan government's assurances and the Taliban's promises to prevent Afghan soil from being used for attacks against Pakistan, the TTP has continued to launch cross-border attacks, undermining Pakistan's efforts to maintain peace and stability.

In response to these threats, Pakistan launched airstrikes aimed at eliminating TTP leadership and disrupting their operations. These strikes by Pakistan were described as "retaliatory," in response to some attack carried out TTP against the Pakistani state.¹⁵³ Consequently, the

airstrikes have exacerbated tensions between Islamabad and Kabul. The Afghan government, led by the Taliban, has condemned these strikes as violations of Afghanistan's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Kabul's response, including claims of retaliatory fire across the border into Pakistan, indicates a further deterioration in bilateral relations. The ongoing conflict between Pakistan and the TTP, and the cross-border nature of this conflict, contributes to the broader instability in the region. Afghanistan, still grappling with its internal security challenges following the Taliban's return to power, could become further destabilized if cross-border violence escalates. Thus, even though one regime (Taliban) has replaced another (Karzai), the challenges have not disappeared; Afghanistan continues to be a major security pre-occupation for Pakistan.

China & the region

Pakistan's alliance with China and CPEC add another layer of complexity to the issues, with both India and Pakistan vying for regional dominance. Pakistan's Gwadar Port occupies a strategic position because of its proximity to the Strait of Hormuz, which is the conduit for a large volume of global oil and maritime trade,¹⁵⁴ with the potential for opening up the oil rich central Asian republics.

Indian agreement with Iran in 2016 to sign the Chabahar Port agreement was seen by many in Pakistan as the quest for strategic balance, against Pakistan's strategic axis with China through the Gwadar port.¹⁵⁵ Pakistan has been a key player in the Chinese Belt & Road initiative. The Chinese 'belt' part has six proposed corridors, including i) Bangladesh-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BIMEC), ii) The China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor (CICPEC), iii) The China-Central & West Asia Economic Corridor (CCWAEC), iv) The New Eurasian Land Bridge (NELB), v) the China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor (CMREC) and vi) the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).¹⁵⁶

Besides the obvious economic incentives to Pakistan, many Pakistani observers opine that the CPEC has a vital strategic depth. The Geopolitical axis is changing because of the China-US shift in global and regional geopolitical and geo-economics, while Indo-US strategic alliances deepen Pakistan's insecurity to rely even more on China to reduce Pakistan's insularity in the south Asian region.¹⁵⁷ Maleeha Lodhi says: "Pakistan's greatest security challenges will continue to emanate from its neighborhood — from the unsettled situation on its border with an unstable Afghanistan and from troubled relations with India. An imposing foreign policy challenge will be to navigate the growing confrontation between the United States and China, two global powers with which Pakistan has its most important bilateral relationships. Ties with China will remain an overriding priority for Islamabad.....Pakistan seeks a reset of ties with the United States, but relations will inevitably be affected by Washington's standoff with Beijing. Aspects of America's Indo-Pacific strategy also have security implications for Pakistan, not least because it injects Cold War dynamics into the Indian Ocean, which Islamabad has long sought to prevent becoming India's Ocean".¹⁵⁸

Pakistan's relationship with China has been described as an 'all weather relationship.' Despite challenges such as the COVID-19 pandemic and political shifts in Pakistan, the CPEC continues to expand, encompassing agriculture, industry, and technology. The CPEC and BRI initiatives have attracted scrutiny from the US, which perceives them as challenges to its geopolitical influence. This rivalry has colored global perceptions of the CPEC, with allegations of debt diplomacy emerging. Nonetheless, Pakistan views the CPEC as integral to its economic strategy and a symbol of its strong partnership with China.

In the context of US-China competition, South Asia has become a focal point of geopolitical tension. Both Pakistan and China seek stability with India, despite ongoing conflicts and recent border disputes. The situation in Afghanistan adds further complexity, with both countries advocating for a stable and inclusive Afghan government and exploring ways to incorporate Afghanistan into the CPEC for regional development.¹⁵⁹

USA

Pakistan has a mutual love-hate relationship with the US. General Joseph Vote, the US CENTCOM [Central Command] head rightly saying: “As a state possessing nuclear weapons that sits at the nexus of Russian, Chinese, Indian, Iranian, and US geopolitical interests, Pakistan will always be a country of importance to the United States.”¹⁶⁰ On the other hand, with changes in Pakistan’s scenario, Pakistan has had varying relationships with US. Flexibility of diplomatic postures implies whether a state is able to keep its strategic position more fluid according to changing alliances and geo postural or geo postural shifts or prefers to keep short term alliances and postures which may not be so fluid but reflect a state's long term worldview towards its place in the world.¹⁶¹ Fluidity of such strategic posture is most apparent in Pakistan's recent relations with the US.

Notwithstanding that Pakistan remains the recipient of highest amount in aid form the US, the relations between the two countries remains ambivalent. The US complains about Pakistan failing to take on militancy head on, while Pakistan retorts by saying that no other country in the word has sacrificed so many lives to terrorism than Pakistan, which rings true on many accounts.

Relations between the two countries have been described as transactional, whereby USA seemingly purchased Pakistan’s support by military and economic aid in exchange for ensuring security in the region, especially in context to Afghanistan.¹⁶² Once threats disappear or decrease, Pakistan US relations start souring. Recently, after Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan, relations between the US and Pakistan became strained because of Pakistan’s long history of support for the Taliban.¹⁶³ Subsequently, Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan's visit to Moscow on the day Russia kicked off its invasion of Ukraine exacerbated the tensions between US and Pakistan.

When Imran Khan was removed from power, he flouted a letter which according to him proved an American conspiracy to oust him from premiership. The US and Pakistani army both denied this letter’s existence, but Imran Khan continued to utilize a sense of rampant anti-Americanism present in the Pakistani society.¹⁶⁴ This perception of anti-Americanism is rife in Pakistani society, as shown consistently by trends over two decades. Even though only one-third of Pakistanis (36 percent)

believed in Imran Khan's American conspiracy theory in a recent Gallup poll, more than two-thirds (72 percent) perceived United States to be an enemy rather than a friend of Pakistan.¹⁶⁵ Anatol Lieven says: "In the West, politicians and the media have attacked the Pakistani government and military for not doing enough to help us against the Afghan Taliban. The great majority of Pakistanis by contrast think that Islamabad is doing far too much."¹⁶⁶

Pakistan's youth bulge of predominantly 30-year-olds have lived almost all their lives with this perception, whether it is the waves of anti-Americanism sparked by the Pressler sanctions (1990-2001) or the War on Terror (2001).¹⁶⁷ Since the US- Pakistan strategic axis is military-centric, it often overlooks the perceptions of common Pakistanis, many of who attribute the horrendous losses of Pakistan, almost 80,000 people killed, to American duplicitous alliance during the GWOT.¹⁶⁸ This anti-American sentiment has been consistent over the years.¹⁶⁹ As Pakistan's alliance with China gets deeper, American popularity within Pakistani masses have tended to get weaker.

Even then, many analysts point out that both states would not want to completely sour their relations. IISS writes that "recent tensions between the US and Pakistan can be seen as the drawing of lines in the sand – a process of defining the limits to which Pakistani and US interests do and do not intersect in relation to Afghanistan. Both sides have many reasons to avoid a complete rupture in relations. For the US, Pakistan is a key factor in the struggle against extremist terrorism and nuclear proliferation. For Pakistan, the US remains both an important source of international legitimation and funding, as well as being the only major power able to exercise strategic leverage on India in the event that Indo-Pakistani relations undergo another major deterioration."¹⁷⁰ Many say that this status quo will persist as both states would not want their relations to collapse or even deteriorate drastically.¹⁷¹

Thus, two of the three most important rubrics of foreign policy of Pakistan, namely India centrism and distrust of Afghanistan have remained fairly constant and unambiguous, while the third, Pak-US relations, continues to ebb and flow in what can now be termed as an ambivalent relationship based on 'give and take.'

Nuclear doctrine

The hue and cry about rogue weapons emanating from stolen stockpiles from Pakistan seems to be subsiding, as recent commentaries have stated Pakistan's nuclear weapons to be well secured against terrorist attack.¹⁷² The Pakistani army seems to have a coherent command and control structure in place to protect its nuclear assets, but still alarm bells seem to go off in western government periodically.¹⁷³ This is due to the fact that Pakistan has exponentially expanded its nuclear programme, making it one of the largest in the world¹⁷⁴, with simultaneous expansion of its ballistic missile programme.¹⁷⁵

Pakistan perceives insecurity due to developments like the Indo-US civilian nuclear deal, exemption for India by the Nuclear Supplier's Group, India's conventional military and strategic build-up, enunciation of offensive doctrines involving 'Proactive Operations' and efforts to develop a missile defense capability.¹⁷⁶ The strategic balance is perceived widely by Pakistan as a strategic equalizer to India's conventional military preponderance, which is projected to have deterred conflicts such as in the wake of the attack on Indian parliament. However, both countries engaged in raising the threshold of balance higher, with notions of fighting conventional wars beneath nuclear umbrellas surfacing at times.¹⁷⁷ As Army Chief General Asha Pervez Kaylan later warned, proponents of the "use of conventional force in a nuclear overhang" were charting a dangerous course whose consequences could be both "unintended and uncontrollable".

It is possible that Pakistan's search for parity in nuclear stockpiles could result in a more robust deterrence against conventional war, which it may not be able to win in purely conventional strategic terms. Thus, the contending drive to stockpile may be a quest for parity. In Kenneth Waltz's words, "The possibility that conflict will be conducted by force leads to competition in the arts and instruments of force. ...¹⁷⁸". Another way that state aspire for parity is explained by the Offense-defense theory, which suggests that states must offensively try to offset an opponent's investment in defense."¹⁷⁹ When offensive technologies progress so much as to be able overcome the growth of the defensive systems, states which have invested more in offensive capabilities should benefit more, and vice versa."¹⁸⁰ Defense dominance allows states to

react more slowly and with greater restraint to the capabilities-enhancing efforts and gains of their neighbor.¹⁸¹

Arguably, Pakistan is investing in an offensive defence strategy. Maleeha Lodhi writes: "India's proactive doctrine aimed at a rapid deployment war-fighting strategy impelled Pakistan to look for a response. Seeking space for limited conventional military engagement on the assumption that India's vast conventional asymmetry would prevent Pakistan from threatening to use its strategic capability obliged Pakistan to seek an appropriate solution to fill the perceived gaps in the nuclear domain... the emerging Indian military posture constrained Pakistan to take the decision to develop delivery systems for Full Spectrum Deterrence. By trying to call Pakistan's nuclear bluff and evolving 'proactive' doctrines, India's moves pushed Pakistan to develop Tactical Nuclear Weapons to deter Cold Start and re-establish nuclear stability."¹⁸²

Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme has solid public support behind it, since it carries an aura of empowerment with it; nuclear weapons give Pakistan a perception of parity with India, which is quite popular with publics and establishment alike, especially in the context that US wants to roll back Pakistan's nuclear programme.¹⁸³ Thus, leaving the geopolitical implications of the nuclear arms race in South Asia aside, there seems to be more clarity in terms of national nuclear security doctrine of Pakistan than would warrant on superficial scrutiny. Besides the fact that the program seems secure till date from reach of terrorists,¹⁸⁴ it also does seem to add a layer of deterrent to the trend of conventional wars in the region between the two rivals. It is also decidedly popular with the Pakistani publics, which is a determinant of the direction of the program. Thus, it seems quite unambiguous that Pakistan will continue expanding its nuclear program.

Extremism and radicalization

The rise of extremism in Pakistan is almost to be taken as fait-accompli, with dozens of publications and a plethora of research to support the pervasion of this phenomenon in Pakistani society.¹⁸⁵ Pakistan has experienced a complex and evolving landscape of extremism and intolerance over the past few decades. These trends are deeply intertwined with the country's socio-political and economic fabric, reflecting a broad spectrum of ideological, religious, and ethnic tensions. Commenting on this phenomenon, there have been dozens of publications and opinions, blaming emergence of extremist ideologies in Pakistan on a combination of factors including religious radicalization, political instability, and socio-economic disparities, which have ostensibly been utilized by radical groups to exploit religious sentiments in order to advance their agendas.¹⁸⁶ Many other observers have pointed to economic disparities and unemployment, especially among the youth, creating fertile ground for radicalization.¹⁸⁷ It is reasonable, therefore, to state that extremism in Pakistan has been rising over the years, and the trend shows no signs of abating.

Similarly, many have commented that the state's approach to managing extremism has been inconsistent, and sometimes exacerbates the situation.¹⁸⁸ Effectiveness of counter terrorism and counter extremism initiatives is often hampered by the lack of a comprehensive strategy and the need for greater coordination between different agencies and levels of government.¹⁸⁹ This is even more concerning; the trajectories of rising extremism are difficult enough, but unless there is robust policy making utilizing all possible intellectual faculties and material resources, extremism is a difficult phenomenon to thwart. Informed Policy making is essential for tackling the polycentric hydra of extremism.

Policymaking in Pakistan is sometimes based upon misconceptions, innuendos, and terms and clichés borrowed from the general terrorism literature, rather than on real research. Since Pakistan has not concentrated much on literacy, its literacy and research base on extremism and radicalization is not very broad, though opinions abound in plenty. Much of what we call now research on Pakistan comes from abroad, or from Pakistani bureaucrats or policy makers educated in western universities and institutions trying to comprehend Pakistan from their 'western education' perspective. Then, there is the 'local policy

maker' who does understand nuances of some problem locally but is unaware of the larger picture.

Thus, the disconnect arises from either trying to import a 'western' focused knowledge base or trying to juxtapose locally generated perceptions into a macro level policy framework, which may not work until all component parts are pieced together. Either way, both types of policy making in Pakistan is generally not informed by credible research. This dis-connect causes biases which are not very receptive to the socio-cultural nuances of Pakistan, since works in Pakistan are sometimes, many times, not methodologically sound.

As an outsider, if only the west was confused about Pakistan, it would have made life easier if Pakistanis at least were able to understand their own problems. Unfortunately, conspiracy theories abound as substitutes for critical understanding of issues. Much of the murkiness in Pakistan springs from the fact that Pakistanis tend to generalize the phenomenon in context of what they have read in media reports or seen on television; media in turn tends to rationalize things according to what they have perceived. It is common to see commentators on Pakistani media ascribing extremism to poverty, illiteracy, alienation from the state, mal-governance, ethnic and tribal undercurrents etc. What is not so common is to find people basing such assumptions on meticulously researched facts, on credible evidence.

Admittedly, there is a dearth of literature on the subject. However, that is not reason enough to sometimes hear seemingly authoritative explanations of the phenomena through accounts based on not much more than personal experiences and perceptions. Of course, many practitioners and analysts in Pakistani society have first-hand experience of insecurity in Pakistan, but this may not necessarily present more than a particular facet of the phenomenon under debate. The whole truth may be much more than its individual component observable to the practitioner or analyst and may require enquiry across a variety of fields to uncover.

Generalizations in Pakistan bear scrutiny; it's not that they are all or partly untrue. The dilemma is that purely empirical observations, without extensive cross-sectional studies, 'sit' in the main stream as 'authoritative works.' A common theme is that terrorism and/or extremism in Pakistan was an 'aftermath of the afghan war,' or the 'discontented or poor joined the extremists' which has been done to death by analysts. What are noticeably missing are large scale studies in

Pakistani sub-national theatres which validate or rebut these arguments, robustly; simply put, making policy based on assumptions is a risky road.¹⁹⁰

Simplistic assertions like militants are 'illiterates' or 'the impoverished' have been refuted in many theatres by sophisticated analysis, and thus any empirical assertions should be avoided which cannot be backed up by credible data. This holistic enquiry in Pakistan has sadly been lacking.

Commentators in Pakistani media, print or broadcast, often make assertions like 'good governance or politics will control militancy, that 'good governance will reduce terrorism, or 'political stability, once here, will reduce terrorism.'¹⁹¹ Strengthening of democracy is thought to discourage terrorism'¹⁹² there is a prevalent perception that strong democratic institutions resist authoritarianism and thus, by implication, resist autocratic attitudes which encourage terrorism.¹⁹³ Undoubtedly, these are all lofty ideals to aspire for, and should be aspired for by all means. However, to get the desired outcomes, policy making centred on these approaches has to comprehend the nuances within these paradigms; it is debatable that policy making in Pakistan takes cognizance of this.

This ties into the themes of confluence of governance or lack of it with security, terrorism and politics. Co-relating terrorism with politics may even seem like gross slander; after all, politicians ostensibly vie for noble cases and liberation of the society, while terrorist organizations have been considered 'bands of lunatics' or 'psychopaths' who stand for destruction of order in a society with violent means.¹⁹⁴ However, there is a commonality; both strive to achieve political gains. Of course, the terrorists attempt it through violence, but this should not obscure comprehension of the fact that their ultimate goals are political, no matter how fantastic, and thus something can be done about addressing the perceived grievances. Even liberal politics and terrorism can share the same space; terrorist entities can survive better in democratic societies, and are usually unable to resist authoritarian regimes, as regime changes in Turkey, Argentina, and Uruguay have shown.¹⁹⁵

Similarly, there have been populist terrorist movements like the Hezbollah and Tamil tigers which have attracted many thousands of ardent followers much like a political party¹⁹⁶. Indeed, the birth of modern terrorism ascribed to anarchism in late 19th century Russia is ascribed to the evolution of a terrorist movement which thought of itself

primarily in terms of a political party, the Narodnaya Volya.¹⁹⁷ A similar set of circumstances may also cause two entities to choose different paths, depending on their ideological commitment and impatience to resist the status quo. A case study is the leftist Lotta Continua (Struggle Continues) movement in 1970s Italy, whereby supporters of the Democratic Proletarians chose to contest elections, while other more impatient supporters became the Prima Linea (Front Line) terrorist entity.¹⁹⁸

Leonard Weinberg undertook a seminal work to study environments in which a conjunction of terrorism with politics occurred, that is, countries where most political parties linked to terrorist movements had sprung up. He concluded that regime instability was a cause of this growth of terrorist movements. Taking this further, in some instances of impending instability when authoritarian regimes or dictatorships appear to be under pressure of democracy, many political groups and terrorist may try to 'test the waters' or pursue a path of violence. This has been seen in Spain and Portugal and may even be applicable in case of Pakistan.¹⁹⁹ By 2007 the Musharraf regime was under pressure on the international and domestic front to bring back democratic governance, and it is at this time that the Lal Masjid clerics started an open campaign to what they termed as Sharia enforcement in Islamabad. Terrorism in Pakistan really took off only after the state crushed the rebellion in Islamabad with an iron hand, and conjectural as it is, may be an indication of regime instability signaling to the terrorists, to take up violence as a viable course.

If political organization is defined (in one of its many contexts) as the mobilization of a passive majority by an elite looking to change or improve the way things are done in a state, then terrorism becomes even more similar to political activism. This is succinctly put forward by a scholar as "Perhaps terrorism is most likely to occur precisely where mass passivity and elite dissatisfaction coincide."²⁰⁰ Of course the elite here are not the political elite or even the wealthier or more privileged class in society, but it is the ideological elite in the case of terrorism which gains ascendancy. Ideological elite, regardless of socio-economic status, is one which is dissatisfied with the status-quo, and is prepared to use even violence to achieve ideological utopias.

There are many studies that document the transformation of failed political movements into terrorist entities; even more noteworthy are failed or highly successful student-based mobilizations. In the former, aspirations are unrealized and increased mobilization is perceived

necessary, while in the latter, too much success and ambition may bring a student body into a cycle of competitive violence;²⁰¹ analogy maybe drawn with All Pakistan Student Muhajir Organization (APSMO) in Sindh, which later evolved into MQM.

The point here is not to make parallels between political parties with terrorism, or even more vulgarly, to draw parallels between political processes and terrorism as similar creatures, but to show the context of terrorism. Terrorism does not appear 'out of thin air' for 'irrational' reasons but is a product of violent expressions of dissent with political systems; it does not matter what sort of a political system it is. Democracies have been demonstrated to be as prone or even more to be affected by violent movements as any authoritarian system. In fact, there is more chance that democratic states, being burdened by accountability processes like due rule of law, will be less equipped than autocratic states to handle terrorism. It has been conclusively demonstrated, like for instance the Russian iron-hand policy of dealing with the Chechnya insurgency, that autocratic states with blatant disregard for rule of law and censorship policies, are more than able to handle violent movements than democracies.

In the Pakistani context, it is thus pre-mature to conclusively state that democracy has either hindered or promoted terrorism, until there is credible research to prove or disconnect the same. Similarly, governance paradigms of terrorism cannot and should not be invoked with confidence until one can co-relate datasets relating the variables. In Pakistan, primary research first needs to be there to elucidate these variables, and then assertions can be made with caution, not with the usual aplomb policy makers sometimes issue them.

It is also commonly heard in the Pakistani landscape that militants are all poor, illiterate, unemployed, 'have-nots,' who hate Pakistanis, which is why revert to terrorism. This belies that the terrorists in Pakistan are bloodthirsty irrational actors out to avenge economic disparity through violence, with obvious implications for counter terrorism if that were true. However, contemporary literature review has tended to suggest that that the post 9/11 presumed link between a reduction in poverty, and an increase in educational attainment and a simultaneous de-escalation of international terrorism is quite tenuous. The connections between poverty, education and terrorism have been suggested to be ephemeral, inasmuch the recent profiles of terrorists suggest that they are not the stereotypical impoverished and uneducated youths as was generally

presumed but are the progeny of years of frustrated political aspirations and indignity, which inculcates an acute sense of insecurity and consequent hatred against those who are ostensibly perceived to have brought about these conditions.

Much scholarly ink has been spilt in the quest for answers to what produces terrorists, and many theories have been put forward. These range from crime related theories of terrorism as a rational choice model,²⁰² homicide (and violent terrorism as a manifestation of it) being unrelated to economic conditions,²⁰³ and the demand and supply of hatred.²⁰⁴ Economic models which pertain to crime have also been applied to international terrorism.²⁰⁵ However, economic theories which explain terrorism through a rational choice economic model tend to determine that economics by itself cannot explain away terrorism; clearly more complex variables are needed.

Studies using hate crime as a result of economic conjugation of terrorism with poverty have also tended to come up inconclusive.²⁰⁶ Jefferson and Pryor concluded that "Economic or sociological explanations for the existence of hate groups in an area are far less important than adventitious circumstances due to history and particular conditions."²⁰⁷ These projections support Lerner's classic hypothesis that the "the Extremists are not simply the 'have-nots,' suggesting rather that they are the 'want-mores.'²⁰⁸ Lerner has also hypothesized that "poverty prevails only among the apolitical mass."²⁰⁹

As for terrorists being illiterate madmen hell-bent on murder, there are plenty of scholarly works to the contrary. For instance, Angrist's research in the West Bank and Gaza strip has indicated that even significant increases in educational attainment of Palestinians in the 1980s did not deter terrorism; rather it produced more literate terrorist.²¹⁰ A simplistic rational choice model of terrorism for economically deprived, uneducated individuals does not apply unambiguously to even the most extreme form of terrorist – the suicide bomber. Hassan Nusra's²¹¹ work and Berrebi's econometric models of Palestinian suicide bombers concluded that suicide bombers tended to have a higher high school and college attendance average than the general Palestinian population, and were less likely to come from poverty stricken families.²¹² Studies utilizing a broad based sample of many different

cultures and terrorist organizations have also yielded little direct relationship between terrorism and poverty.²¹³

Krueger and Maleckova postulate that terrorism is primarily a political, rather than an economic phenomenon.²¹⁴ It has been suggested that whilst linkages of poverty and militancy have not been demonstrated conclusively in the case of the terrorist leadership or elite, poverty and illiteracy may still be important factors in the motivations of the ranks and file of radical organizations. It has also been argued that militancy evolves in a conjunctural environment of many factors, which is particular to a specific region or ideology, and thus needs to be studied at sub-national, rather than international levels.

Lipset has pointed to several mechanisms, by which poor people with their harsh upbringing and authoritarian family patterns, are prone to join militant movements. The factors he points out are a low level of education, which tends to promote a simplified world view of politics, and an uncompromising nature due to economic insecurity, which leads to a heightened state of agitation to perceived disturbing events. This insecurity leads to a search for immediate solutions to problems, including taking up arms. Lipset also postulates that impoverished people are isolated from the activities and controversies of the society at large, which effectively cocoons them from the intricacies of political problems.²¹⁵ This also has deleterious effects on acquiring a spirit of tolerance. Houtman has expanded upon Lipset's thesis by further postulating in his sociological research that authoritarianism, intolerance of nonconformity, and racial prejudice are closely related to poor education.²¹⁶

Every country, region, city, district may have different drivers of radicalization; such conceptual clarity on the correlation of militancy with poverty is extremely scarce in Pakistan, with the largest contributions (numerically) made up by investigative newspaper articles and opinion pieces, which, however comprehensive, fall short of the meticulous detailing required in research. How does then one empirically co-relate educational attainment and poverty with a tendency to become radical? Theoretically, during bad economic times, relatively better qualified, better-educated individuals may add to the ranks of the unemployed, which decreases the opportunity costs for relatively accomplished, educated individuals to participate in seeking simple solutions to complex problems (for example engaging in crime to relieve

financial burdens or joining militant organizations to perform Jihad).²¹⁷ While a lack of educational attainment is disruptive of economic mobility, educational attainment without comparable employment opportunities is even more dangerous; expectations are raised which if left unfulfilled, cause cognitive dissonance between reality and expectation. This can be a major cause of disenchantment with the society, particularly amongst the youth. Militant groups may thus become increasingly free from demand constraints in times of economic recession.

Robert Kemp has ascribed the rise of radicalism in Afghanistan and the Pakhtun tribal areas of Pakistan to the disintegration of the mechanism of cooperation between the tribal society and the Pakistani state, with the ultra-orthodox elements filling in the resulting governance vacuum.²¹⁸ Kemp factors in poverty and unemployment as cogent factors, inextricably intertwined within the complex framework of possible drivers of escalation of extremism in the Pakistan's tribal society. He has, however, not demonstrated how poverty may have contributed to the influence of orthodox "foreign elements" into the area, and the linkages of poverty with militancy are not based on large cross-sectional studies. This is indicative of the problem; either robust statistically guided studies are not there, or any such research, if present, is not statistically significant; at least not enough to guide policy.

It needs to be remembered that both violent extremism and terrorism are multisystem phenomena integrated within deeply complex and highly networked co-occurring systems and scales, whose nuances need to be understood to provide insightful data about extremist narratives and behaviours.²¹⁹ However, the depth of Pakistan's insight into domestic extremism is superficial at best. Constraints in carrying out extensive research of extremism are due to lack of resources and information, whereas even if information is made available, its reliability is questionable. Also, the politics of research may not allow for accuracy of information, whereas sources of accurate information may not be available for academic analysis due to security constraints. Subjectivity of opinions is another issue affecting objective analysis, especially since historical data is not available in majority of areas which need to be investigated; this leads to dependence on subjective analysis and hypothetical conclusions.

For instance, as above, there is a dearth of studies in or about Pakistan which conclusively or at least by implication demonstrate the linkages

of poverty in a sub-national theatre in Pakistan. How can we then say that militancy in Pakistan is primary a result of poverty? Thus, studying the evolution of radicalization in context of isolated variables may not be a fruitful pursuit, especially in different theatres where these variables may have different trajectories; the Pakistani scenario may very well be a case in point wherein the relationship of poverty with radicalization is concerned, but without definite research, it is wrong and downright dangerous for policy echelons to say that militants in Pakistan arise simply out of poverty.

Just a superficial study of the issues that Pakistani policy makers seem to make causal utterances about, has shown the complexity of the relationships therein. Such policy statements are dangerous, as is the action taken upon these. If the policy stance is taken upon a certain pre-conception, gleaned from the policy maker's own mind or experiences, without testing, it may not necessarily represent the reality of the sub-national theatre for which that policy is being implemented. Thus, billions of rupees may go into funding some development scheme or the other which does not address the root cause of terrorism or extremism in that area, because it has not taken multifarious factors into account. This is downright dangerous and frivolous regarding state resources, especially in the cash strapped position Pakistan finds itself in. Policy makers need to stop taking decision based on personal beliefs and innuendos and start basing their decisions on sound data and analysis.

Policy making needs to be a holistic affair regarding terrorism and extremism in Pakistan, and if this is not done in a knowledge-based context, this results in ambiguity in security policies. When there is national security uncertainty, it is harder for states to explain to their publics clearly who the enemy are, which makes it more difficult to mobilize support for any national security strategy countering the uncertainty. There is no need to always project only the good news; public opinion can even be mobilized when a state tells its citizens that terrorism is inevitable. There just need to be clearly demarcated enemies of the state, and the state admits that there will be human or infrastructural losses along the way, but the state will fight back with all its might to eventually eradicate this menace. Negative goals such as minimizing losses in the face of threats can still be used if they are disseminated unambiguously to the target audience, rather than harping on about positive goals like becoming a terrorism-free-progressive nation overnight (or very soon), which will not gain traction with publics in states facing turbulence. Lofty as the aspirations are, and totally worth

striving for, even the less well-informed publics in turbulent states can discern between the reality and utopia. People, especially if they have been told all along that things have been well and always will be, but actually times have been turbulent, can read between the lines.

Noble as these ideals are, and certainly worth aspiring for, these may not help a state to gain credibility when besieged by impending terrorism, economic crunches and a general deterioration in law and order and governance regimes. People, especially in a state beset by problems, are essentially quite pragmatic in their outlook no matter what their literacy levels are and would be able to conceive in better terms what will be lost than what might be gained. Of course, when the threat is more or less totally eliminated, then the people will be more amenable to accepting themes like aspiring for top leadership status in the world, or any other lofty ideals that states should aspire to. However, once the low threat environment lasts for some time, people will not be that willing anymore to take losses along the way for realization of positive goals. For instance, citizens in a peaceful state will not be amenable to accepting losses from terrorism, on the road to attaining leadership status in the world. Public perception should be taken into consideration as critical factors in reducing ambiguity in national security doctrines.

When national insecurity adjustments that do not present a clear picture, such as an identifiable opponent, it is comparatively easier to have a national counter terrorism strategy than a counter extremism strategy, though even a clear CT strategy is problematic in itself. A preventing and countering violent extremism policy (PCVE) will be even more difficult to frame. This is in part due to the fact that few people will study vague and diffuse threats until they actually materialize in the flesh. However, there are certain ways that different theories can coalesce into setting some national security doctrines that remain fluid in the face of uncertain and diffuse threats. It is time to perhaps start studying them, and the first step for policy makers in Pakistan would be to stop relying on 'imported' models from the west or elsewhere that they have read about in books or newspaper articles or studied when on scholarship to a foreign university. Policy makers need to instead arm research institutions in Pakistan with the expertise to study complex problems like terrorism and extremism in Pakistan, in their own context. Once this credible research starts becoming available indigenously, it is imperative that this is incorporated in the future in policy imperatives.

Politics and national security

In a global recession like that of today, security paradigms could be reflective of the times being faced by politicians. "As political leaders play to their domestic galleries, they will surely take more nationalist and parochial positions on the big international issues. That is worrying because 2024 will be a year demanding intense international cooperation to cope with a deteriorating economic climate, climate challenges and a creeping recession. globalization as the steer of national security will depend more and more on the economic power of a country."²²⁰ National security cannot now just be comprehended in military terms alone, as the conventional concept of wars has changed with the advent of globalization. Thus, National security has to be understood in broader concepts such as political, economic, societal, and environmental and other non-military aspects.²²¹

Politics obviously plays a huge part, since internal conditions may be as instrumental as shaping doctrine as external ones.²²² national strategy may become the flag bearer of political stances rather than rational choice strategic ones. Peter Dubowitz has argued that national foreign policy interest is perceived by politicians in much the same way as domestic political power, since they want to use it as a means to consolidate political power. This amplifies when the threat is ambiguous, as unclear and ambiguous threats allow political agendas to slip in between the cracks and permeate national security policy. As Miroslav Nancie, Roger Rose and Gerard Gorla mention, 'the clearer the cues provided by the international environment, the slighter the domestic dissension concerning their interpretation'. By contrast, if the external threat is more ambiguous, the 'more domestic social and political calculations dominate the thinking of policy makers.'²²³

Political oversight on policy level is germane to reducing terrorism. Counter terrorism in the future will require complex investigations involving multiple countries, a variety of types of communication, and numerous sources of intelligence, collectively needing an ever-evolving need for more sophisticated forms of counterterrorism and greater 'cross talking' of stakeholders. A key security enabling environment is ideally created by politicians through legislation, budgets and policy decisions, in consultations with the security apparatus of the state. This was ostensibly achieved in Pakistan by forming the Parliamentary committee

on National Security or PCNS. Formed in November 2008, it started sending oversight reports but was critical of non-implementation of its recommendations from the very start²²⁴. Faced with difficulties of non-implementation from very beginning,²²⁵ ²²⁶ its role in operationalizing the National security strategy and taking forward counter terrorism legislation²²⁷ at best, and its efforts to coalesce a national security policy are not substantive.²²⁸ Some time ago, it became much more politicized when the Joint opposition refused to attend the in-camera Parliamentary Committee meeting because the Prime Minister at the time, Imran Khan, did not attend a single session of these briefings.²²⁹ PCNS was reinvigorated when the issue of talks with TTP was on the table in 2022, but it is debatable how much role it had in forming consensus since presumably the decision was being steered by the military establishment.²³⁰ Many observers in Pakistan are now sceptical of the political leaderships effectiveness in tackling the menace of terrorism unless the military steps in.

Patronage politics has been dubbed as constituting “the basic structures of politics” in Pakistan, which is not far from accurate.²³¹ As regards views towards security, Pakistan People's Party (PPP), established in 1967, portends to have a secular and independent outlook, but is generally swayed by ground realities. PML-N has tended to talk of an “Islamic welfare state”²³², but both it and the PPP remain firmly entrenched in the realpolitik of Pakistan, which enshrines propagation of patronage politics. On the other hand, PTI promised to usher in a corruption free era based on populist politics of Imran Khan. This proved illusory, as Pakistan went through yet more turbulent years.²³³

Anatole Liven says: "With the exception of the MQM and the religious parties, all of Pakistan's 'democratic' political parties are congeries of landlords, clan chieftains and urban bosses seeking state patronage for themselves and their followers and vowing allegiance to particular national individuals."²³⁴ It could be argued that PML-N and PPP fall squarely within this model, while PTI has also had to position itself within this patronage based network, while appealing to populist support from the masses.

This can be contextualized in terms of an organizational process model which envisages government as a collective entity comprising of semi-independent departments, or in case of Pakistan, patronage-based cliques

which have their own vested interests, and attempt to influence governmental policy towards coherence. This leads to incoherence as well, depending on the power plays between departments, politicians or entities than can influence security decisions.²³⁵ The major national parties seemingly exhibit incongruence towards national security goals, while at the same time being firmly entrenched in their own vested interest constituencies. Even though PML-N and PPP pay lip service to masses, both have large stakes in landed elites of the country. PTI postures itself on having populist support, but many of its members having seats in assemblies are feudal or legacy politicians with a track record of changing political parties for political expediency; there seems little second tier leadership capable of steering national security strategy.

The political fissures have the potential to increase ambiguity on matters relating to security, especially when narrow parochial political agendas such as patronage-based kinship relationships are ascendant. The only unambiguous stance that the politicians have is on India centrism and protection of nuclear assets, while all three major parties have differing attitudes towards engaging with the terrorist threat. Thus, taken in terms of politics as a steer in Pakistan, their potential for lending coherence to national security ambiguity is limited. Perhaps the only unambiguous steer towards a national security doctrine will continue to come from the military, as per observable trends.

Conclusions

The primary purpose of this paper is to present and analyse observable trends in Pakistan's security landscape, without making any value judgments. The focus is on identifying and highlighting the evolving patterns and dynamics within Pakistan's security regime, rather than assessing whether the variables discussed are inherently good or bad. The intention is to provide an objective overview of the changes taking place, aiding comprehension of the broader context and implications of these trends. This paper does not aim to advocate for or against any particular policy or approach, but rather to offer a clear and impartial examination of the factors shaping Pakistan's security environment.

Much of the debate in Pakistan revolves around the advent of terrorism in Pakistan which continuously seems to emphasize the Taliban phenomenon in Afghanistan and its spill over into Pakistan, and how society seems to have reorganized along ethnic and religious fissures especially in the context of the Zia era.²³⁶ However, many other issues need rethinking within the state, because much of what is said is anecdotal. Insecurity is multivariate in Pakistan, as it is anywhere else, and this has resulted in Pakistan looking for regional co-operation and for an enhanced optimism and investment into its military capabilities.

National security is a larger concept than just defence. It comprises the utility of power and the psychology of national vulnerability that go far beyond the mere protection of its territory. The distrust of both its eastern and western neighbours has manifested in a Pakistani worldview which is dominated by the threat of external forces bent on destroying the country, while the threat of extremism and radicalization has exponentially risen in Pakistan in the course of the last decades. Thus, Pakistan needs a clear blueprint or a roadmap for national security that clarifies the haze and goes beyond policies on paper, to definitive solution based on evidence.

The threats on the other hand are very real; extremism as a philosophy is by now deeply ingrained and rapidly spreading in large sections of Pakistani society. Representations of extremism in the media, both local and international, are blurred by an indistinct categorization of origin and purpose. This may be affecting strategies and policies towards containment of extremism, and radicalization of certain groups and communities. The only real evidence in its fight against terrorism are the

successes of the Pakistani military; when operations are taken in earnest by them, this tends to reduce the severity of terrorism measurably.

Most observers of terrorism in Pakistan have attributed military operations to play the key role in reducing terrorism.²³⁷ The role that civilian law enforcement organs have played in the two observed sharp downward spikes in terrorism may not be insignificant, but it still rests on shoulders of the military. Reviewing the law-and-order indices, it seems likely that police and related civilian counter terrorism apparatus of the state has had some role in terrorism reduction, but nowhere nearly as much as the military.

There are plenty of civilian security policies on paper, but much of the issues that were present during the first National Internal Security Policy (NISP) still remain; ostensibly, the first NISP came into being in 2014 to compensate for lack of coordination among the security and intelligence agencies; the process is still ongoing. The National Action Plan (NAP) has been successful mainly on the heels of kinetic military operations which displaced terrorism. Many of the initially stated problems in the NAP are still there, ostensibly because they needed to have been sorted out in the civilian realm.

This is because Pakistan's regulatory quality is consistently poor. There is a myriad of civilian security agencies, forces, paramilitaries, authorities, bureaus, etc. which deal with seemingly different spheres, but in practice replicate much of each other's work. Many mechanisms envisaged under constantly forming 'new' policy making, setting up new structures, could have been handled by effective resource utilization of already existing organizations. The fact that that such institutions are already there, but not performing their mandated functions, highlights that the issue in Pakistan is not the absence of institutions, but rather their capacity to deliver. A developing country like Pakistan has to seriously consider the immense resources associated with policy making; this is still being carried out with aplomb, without informed knowledge of issues involved.

This capacity gap obviously impedes police forces in Pakistan's ability to step up to challenges,²³⁸ and a mere increase in numbers by raising new forces – the traditional favoured response to crises in Pakistan – has not proved effective in stemming the tide of terrorism. For instance, not one police force can claim that it has disrupted entire terrorist networks, like for instance the TTP, though there are individual arrests being made

all the time.²³⁹ The police commonly counter by stating the lack of resources and political interferences in their work. It is beyond the scope of this work to comment or make value judgements, but one would presume that it is ostensibly the job of senior police leadership to have removed these obstacles by now.

This inertia is also observable in other parts of the civilian LEAs. Assuming that the resources are streamlined and are available for the national security environment – the issues of capacity gaps and weak regulatory practices still remain. As such, these issues will be daunting for the Pakistani establishment to overcome in the short run, as trends indicate. This becomes even more challenging in the face of the looming economic crisis, which by default excludes carrying out extensive, costly initiatives.

Thus, counterterrorism, and the few operational counter-extremism initiatives that have been carried out, seem to rest mainly on the laurels of the military. Public opinion has tended to shift; at one time or the other, it has tended to sway in the favour of the military, and sometimes not. However, in times of crisis and national emergency, whereby the army is 'seen' to be the most efficient organization, Pakistanis tend to look up to it. This has been the trend.

As stated in the beginning, national security doctrines rarely change overnight because they are affected through all the resources and rational (or not so rational) choices a country has made.²⁴⁰ These choices are sometimes a compulsion in response to perceived security threats, but even then, there is an ideological element to them, which steers the state in one direction or the other. India centrism and ideational hegemony within ummah is thus as much ideology for Pakistan, as it is part of national security doctrine. These have tended to remain fairly constant as trends as well, which indicates that they are embedded in the ethos of the state, and might not be so easily shaken, if at all. Thus, security doctrines are resistant to change unless, of course, there is something that radically alters the situation.

Such a situation could suddenly, for instance, arise today if the Afghan Taliban would agree to hand over TTP or pressurize the TTP to cease their activities against Pakistan. However, this seems unlikely in the short to medium term, because this would in turn be against the security doctrine of the Afghan Taliban, with whom TTP have been in partnership during the takeover of Kabul. Manhandling TTP might also

land them in the cradle of ISK, which the Afghan regime does not want, or can ill afford.

A major 'earth-shaking' event like the Taliban takeover of Kabul in the wake of the American departure, or the Ukraine war for that matter, comes only once in a while; when it does, it sometimes confounds even meticulously regimented security doctrines. However, security doctrine cannot be implemented on 'wish lists' alone.

In any case, states might be better served by relying on what they know, what they have, and what they feel should be done in the long term, rather than waiting for something to 'shake the board' in their favour. Aspirational goals are important, but they cannot become a state's reality until they have been achieved. It is one thing to 'wish for the world,' and entirely another to make do with what you have in the best way possible, until your aspirations have been attained.

In internal security doctrine, trend lines indicate that the army is still Pakistan's best bet in the war against terrorism, and perhaps even extremism. At the risk of repetition, this is not a value judgment but indicated by trend lines. This assumption is of course shaken up if we factor value judgments into it, judging by the recent civil-military relations, political process, and other issues in Pakistan. However, objectively, Pakistan has to fight terrorism once again, while coping with constantly rising extremism, amidst financial difficulties, political turbulence, and nothing much has changed regarding its hostilities with its neighbours.

This time around, TTP and other groups are based across the border, complicating the scenario. Trend lines have also indicated that the civilian LEAs have a historical legacy of not being able to take a leadership role in the fight against terrorism; at best, they are dependable allies of the military. Pragmatically, unless the civilian LEAs can reform themselves overnight, they cannot assume leadership in Pakistan's war against terrorism and extremism. This assumption of leadership is unlikely in the medium to short term as indicated by trend lines, LEAs being even more resource-constrained in times of the present economic crunch. However, the challenge from terrorism is a clear and present danger, not something on the horizon. One can wish for whatever one may, but the trend lines have spoken.

Notes and references

- ¹ It is the purpose of this paper to examine whether the national security paradigm of Pakistan has shifted in any significant manner during the last decade; the time period between 2014 and 2022 is particularly the area of focus. The previous paper in this series examined the period preceding 2013.
- ² Goldman, Emily O.(2001) 'New Threats, New Identities and New Ways of War: The Sources of Change in National Security Doctrine', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 24: 2, 43 — 76.
- ³ It is beyond the scope of this paper to argue for or against the geopolitical, human rights oriented, moral, social or other connotations of the debate around Pakistan's quest for national security. I am not saying that these variables are not important, in fact they are essential. However, in this paper, I have just limited myself to delineating the ambiguous and unambiguous variables within Pakistani national security doctrine. There are no value judgments.
- ⁴ See for example, Peter J. Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1996).
- ⁵ Supra Note 2.
- ⁶ Nicholas J. Spykman, 'America's Strategy in World Politics' (NY: Harcourt, Brace, and World 1942) p.447.
- ⁷ Arnold Wolfers, 'The Determinants of Foreign Policy', in 'Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics' (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press 1962) p.42.
- ⁸ Supra Note 2.
- ⁹ Pakistan's geographical location: A curse or a blessing in disguise? (2019) Daily Times. Available at: <https://dailymtimes.com.pk/481707/pakistans-geographical-location-a-curse-or-a-blessing-in-disguise/> (Accessed: January 6, 2023).
- ¹⁰ Ibid.
- ¹¹ Hans J Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations. The struggle for power and peace*. New York: Alfred A Knopf, pp. 79–80.
- ¹² John Braeman, 'Power and Diplomacy: The 1920s Reappraised', *Review of Politics* 44 (July 1982) p.345.
- ¹³ Joao Resende-Santos, 'Anarchy and Emulation of Military Systems: Military Organizations and Technology in South America, 1870-19307', *Security Studies* 513 (Spring 1996) p. 196.
- ¹⁴ Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane (eds.) 'Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change' (Ithaca, NY Cornell UP 1993).
- ¹⁵ Kal J. Holsti, 'National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy', *International Studies Quarterly* 1413 (Sept. 1970) pp.233-309.
- ¹⁶ Richard Hermann and Michael P. Fischerkeller, 'Beyond the Enemy Image and Spiral Model', *International Organization* 4913 (Summer 1995) pp.415-50.
- ¹⁷ Supra Note 15.
- ¹⁸ Afzal, Z. (2022) Pakistan as a leading state of Muslim ummah, thenews. The News International. Available at: <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/982247-pakistan-as-a-leading-state-of-muslim-ummah> (Accessed: January 18, 2023).

-
- ¹⁹ Fair, C.C. (2018) "Chapter 4," in *Fighting to the end: The Pakistan Army's way of war*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- ²⁰ George Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington DC: The White House 1990) p.7.
- ²¹ *Supra* Note 2.
- ²² Islam can't be separated from Pakistan: Kayani, *The News*, April 21, 2013, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-22367-Islam-cant-be-separated-from-Pakistan-Kayani>
- ²³ There is a plethora of literature on this, but I found a blog post by an unnamed author particularly instructive as a peek into this particular world view: see 'Why doubt that Pakistan is the Leader of the Muslim World?', *Defence.pk forum*, 09-02-2011, <http://www.defence.pk/forums/strategic-geopolitical-issues/127566-why-doubt-pakistan-leader-muslim-world.html>
- ²⁴ *Ibid*.
- ²⁵ 'Pakistan, Victim of Terrorism? Buying into Islamabad's narrative might be the best way to get cooperation', Sadanand Dhume, *The Wall Street Journal*, Asia Edition, May 18, 2011, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703421204576328812889029704.html>
- ²⁶ *The Poverty Radicalization Nexus in Pakistan*, *Global Crime*, Volume 11 Issue 4, 2010, p.399, <http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content= a929903465>.
- ²⁷ *Supra* Note 25.
- ²⁸ *Supra* Note 26.
- ²⁹ *Supra* Note 2.
- ³⁰ ICG, "Reforming Pakistan's criminal justice system", *Asia Report No. 196*, 6 December 2010
- ³¹ *Ibid*.
- ³² "Rights group urges Pakistan judges to stop censoring media", *Right Vision News*, 28 November 2012
- ³³ *World Justice Project Rule of Law, Factors assessing Rule of Law and ranking countries by comparison*, *World Justice Project*. Available at: <https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/> (Accessed: January 18, 2023).
- ³⁴ *Ibid*.
- ³⁵ *Ibid*.
- ³⁶ *Ibid*.
- ³⁷ *Ibid*.
- ³⁸ According to the 2020 Democracy Perception Index, 39% of Pakistanis believe that the country is not democratic enough and 72% express the belief that democracy is important. <https://www.allianceofdemocracies.org/initiatives/the-copenhagen-democracy-summit/dpi-2020/>
- ³⁹ *World values survey association , WVS Database Pakistan Survey Publications 2020*. Available at: https://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSNewsShowMore.jsp?ev_YEAR=2020&ev_MONTH=-1 (Accessed: January 20, 2023).
- ⁴⁰ 80% claimed that the military could play a very or somewhat positive role in government (in 2014, the latest year for which Gallup has data)

-
- ⁴¹ Supra Note 41.
- ⁴² The BTI Transformation Index analyzes transformation processes toward democracy and a market economy in international comparison and identifies successful strategies for peaceful change. See Pakistan country report 2022 on BTI transformation index, <https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/PAK>
- ⁴³ Newsdesk (2022) Pakistan Army launches massive relief operation for flood victims, The Express Tribune. Available at: <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2373124/pakistan-army-launches-massive-relief-operation-for-flood-victims> (Accessed: February 7, 2023).
- ⁴⁴ Kugelman, M. (2022) How bad governance exacerbated Pakistan's flooding, Foreign Policy. Available at: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/09/01/pakistan-flooding-crisis-climate-change-governance/> (Accessed: February 7, 2023).
- ⁴⁵ Munir, T. (2022) Pakistan's counter-terrorism efforts and the role of military courts, Modern Diplomacy. Available at: <https://modern diplomacy.eu/2022/02/09/pakistans-counter-terrorism-efforts-and-the-role-of-military-courts/> (Accessed: February 7, 2023).
- ⁴⁶ Pakistan country report 2022- see Supra Note 42.
- ⁴⁷ According to the World Justice Project's Report on the rule of law in Pakistan in 2018, only 56% of respondents had any trust in the courts and merely 17% had trust in the police. See Supra Note 33.
- ⁴⁸ 'Pakistan's Human Development in Musharraf Years- Highest in Pakistan's History', Riaz Haq, Siasat.pk, March 31, 2013, <http://www.siasat.pk/forum/showthread.php?174891-Pakistan-s-Human-Development-in-Musharraf-Years-Highest-in-Pakistan-s-History>
- ⁴⁹ Kim R. Holmes (2014) What is national security?, The Heritage Foundation. Available at: <https://www.heritage.org/military-strength-essays/2015-essays/what-national-security> (Accessed: February 7, 2023).
- ⁵⁰ Ibid.
- ⁵¹ Robert Gilpin, 'War and Change in World Politics'. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp. 22–23, 94–95.
- ⁵² Fareed Zakaria, 'From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role'. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998, pp. 2–3.
- ⁵³ World Bank Governance index, WGI-Interactive Data Access. Available at: <https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/Reports> (Accessed: February 7, 2023).
- ⁵⁴ Ibid.
- ⁵⁵ The BTI "Stateness" Index ranks countries according to the state of their democracy and market economy. See Supra Note 42.
- ⁵⁶ Ibid.
- ⁵⁷ Ibid.
- ⁵⁸ Ibid.
- ⁵⁹ Government of Pakistan. Economic Adviser's Wing, F. D. (2019, June). Pakistan Economic Survey 2018–19. Retrieved February 8, 2023, from <https://docs.edtechhub.org/lib/KNTFZ89B>.
- ⁶⁰ Supra Note 42.
- ⁶¹ The crisis (no date) WaterAid Pakistan. Available at: <https://www.wateraid.org/pk/the-crisis> (Accessed: February 7, 2023).
- ⁶² Ahmad, M. (2022) Decision to close markets by 8pm: Implementation linked to provinces' support,

thenews. The News International. Available at: <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/1022469-decision-to-close-markets-by-8pm-implementation-linked-to-provinces-support> (Accessed: February 7, 2023).

⁶³ Supra Note 42.

⁶⁴ 2020 PILDAT report on legislative development, Pakistan Institute of legislative development(PILDAT) , <https://pildat.org/>

⁶⁵ Supra Note 42.

⁶⁶ Ani (2021) Poverty in Pakistan rises to over 5% in 2020, Estimates World Bank, Business Standard News. Business-Standard. Available at: https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/poverty-in-pakistan-rises-to-over-5-in-2020-estimates-world-bank-121062200084_1.html (Accessed: February 7, 2023).

⁶⁷ HDI (2023) Human climate horizons data platform, Home | Human Development Reports. Available at: <https://hdr.undp.org/> (Accessed: February 7, 2023).

⁶⁸ Ahmed, A. (2020) Learning poverty in Pakistan may rise to 79PC due to Covid, DAWN.COM. Available at: <https://www.dawn.com/news/1587036> (Accessed: February 7, 2023).

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Supra Note 42.

⁷¹ United Nations Development Programme, Unleashing the potential of a young Pakistan, Human Development Reports. Available at: <https://hdr.undp.org/content/unleashing-potential-young-pakistan> (Accessed: February 7, 2023).

⁷² Pasha, Hafiz. (2020) Pakistan National Human Development Report 2020; The three Ps of inequality: Power, People, and Policy, UNDP. Available at: <https://www.undp.org/> (Accessed: February 7, 2023).

⁷³ Pakistan ranks 154th on UN's human development index (2020) The Express Tribune. Available at: <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2276065/pakistan-ranks-154th-on-uns-human-development-index> (Accessed: February 7, 2023).

⁷⁴ Ians, I. (2022) Pakistan drops 7 places to 161st rank in human development index, Business Standard News. Business-Standard. Available at: https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/pakistan-drops-7-places-to-161st-rank-in-human-development-index-122090900373_1.html#:~:text=Pakistan%20has%20dropped%20seven%20places,according%20to%20a%20UNDP%20report (Accessed: January 20, 2023).

⁷⁵ Jadoon, A. & Sayed, A. (2022, August 16). Understanding tehrik-e-taliban Pakistan's unrelenting posture. GW Program on extremism. Retrieved February 8, 2023, from <https://extremism.gwu.edu/understanding-tehrik-e-taliban-pakistans-unrelenting-posture>

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Reporter, T. N. S. (2022, October 21). Country's security not possible without strong economy: Ex-NSA. DAWN.COM. Retrieved February 8, 2023, from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1716122>

⁷⁸ Tola, A. The linkage between national security, economic growth, political standing and ecological footprint in Pakistan: A policy perspective. Hilal Armed Forces Magazine online. Retrieved February 9, 2023, from <https://www.hilal.gov.pk/eng-article/detail/NTg4NA==.html>

⁷⁹ How one identifies threats is often taken for granted by international relations theorists. Stephen Walt's notion of balancing against threats begs this important question. See Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1987).

⁸⁰ Samuel P. Huntington, 'The Evolution of U.S. National Strategy', in Daniel J. Kaufman et al. (eds.) *US National Security for the 1990s* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins UP 1991) pp.11-12.

⁸¹ Supra Note 2

⁸² Smith-Spark, L. (2021, July 23). A far-right extremist killed 77 people in Norway. A decade on, 'the hatred is still out there' but attacker's influence is seen as low. CNN. Retrieved February 9, 2023, from <https://edition.cnn.com/2021/07/22/europe/anders-brevik-july-22-attacks-norway-anniversary-cmd-intl/index.html>

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi 'Alternative Hard COIN Strategies for Pakistan', *American Foreign Policy Interests*, 2010, 32: 5, 313 — 327

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ ICG, "Pakistan: Countering Militancy in FATA", Asia Report No. 178, 21 October 2009. Also see FATA Research Centre, Daily Brief, 5 November 2012

⁸⁷ Jacinto, L. (2022, February 9). Pakistan's 'good taliban-bad Taliban' strategy backfires, posing regional risks. France 24 News Service online. Retrieved February 9, 2023, from <https://www.france24.com/en/asia-pacific/20220209-pakistan-s-good-taliban-bad-taliban-strategy-backfires-posing-regional-risks>

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi, 'Hating the Taliban, Hating the United States: Trajectories of Pakistan's Anti-Americanism', *American Foreign Policy Interests*, 2009, 31: 6, 376 — 388.

⁹⁰ Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi, "Geographic Trajectories of Al-Qaida and Taliban Terrorist Groups in Pakistan", *Journal of Strategic Security*, Journal Volume 3, Number 1- Spring 2010 Issue.

⁹¹ Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi, 'The Taliban Organization in Pakistan', *RUSI Journal*, Vol. 154, No. 5, October 2009.

⁹² Supra Note 2.

⁹³ Supra Note 84.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ ICG, "Pakistan: Countering Militancy in FATA", Asia Report No. 178, 21 October 2009. Also see FATA Research Centre, Daily Brief, 5 November 2012

⁹⁶ For a detailed discussion on the subject of the inefficacy of peace deals, see Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi, 'US and the Counterinsurgency: the Peace process in Pakistan', *American Foreign Policy Interests*, Volume 31, Issue 3, 2009.

⁹⁷ Nek Muhammad was a pro-Taliban tribal leader, who had shot to prominence in the wake of Shakai accord between Pak Army and the Wazir tribes, under which amnesty was granted to tribesmen and foreign militants were supposed to surrender and register with the Political Agent, the administrative representative of the state.

⁹⁸ Mumtaz Hamid Rao, 'The Death of Nek', Media monitors network website, June 24, 2004, <http://usa.mediamonitors.net/Headlines/The-Death-of-Nek>.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Amir Mir, 'War and peace in Waziristan', *Asia Times*, South Asia section, internet edition, May 4 2005, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/GE04Df03.html.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Muhammad Amir Rana, 'Another Deal with Militants for Peace in Tribal Areas', Pakistan institute of peace studies website, Southasianet-Pakistan section, <http://san-pips.com/PIPS-SAN>

Files/SAN-Pakistan/SAN-PAK-Article36/San-Pak-Main-A36-D.asp

- ¹⁰³ Bill Roggio, 'Pakistan signs the Bajaur Accord', *The Long War Journal*, March 17, 2007, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/03/pakistan_signs_the_b.php.
- ¹⁰⁴ '80 die in air attack on Bajaur seminary', *The News*, internet edition, Tuesday, October 31, 2006, http://www.thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?id=3945
- ¹⁰⁵ Mohammad Malick, 'Operation Sirat-e-Mustaqem: as straight as a coil!', *The news*, internet edition, Wednesday, July 02, 2008, http://www.thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?id=15696.
- ¹⁰⁶ 'A Profile of Mangal Bagh', Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi, *The Long War Journal*, November 11, 2008, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/11/a_profile_of_mangal.php.
- ¹⁰⁷ For officially communicated details of this operation, see Operation in Swat wrapped up: DGMO, *The News*, internet archives, January 17, 2008, http://www.thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?id=12355.
- ¹⁰⁸ Kaustav Dhar Chakrabarti, 'Swat slipping from Pakistan's hands', *Observer Research Foundation*, http://www.observerindia.com/cms/export/orfonline/modules/analysis/attachments/Swat_1233894953953.pdf.
- ¹⁰⁹ 'Pakistan Timeline: 2008', *Observer Research Foundation*, <http://www.observeindia.com/cms/sites/orfonline/html/assessment/timeline.html>.
- ¹¹⁰ Dawn.com. (2021, December 10). On again, off again: A timeline of govt-ttp talks. DAWN.COM. Retrieved February 9, 2023, from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1660188>
- ¹¹¹ "Militant attacks declined after Zarb-e-Azb operation: report". *The Nation*. 17 June 2015.
- ¹¹² Global Terrorism Index 2017, *Institute for Economics and Peace*, 2017
- ¹¹³ Army launches Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad against terrorists across the country, 22nd February, 2017. *The Express Tribune Online*. Available at: <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1335805/army-launches-country-wide-operation-terrorists/>
- ¹¹⁴ Sarfraz, H. (2020, February 22). In three years, Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad has cleansed Pakistan. *The Express Tribune*. Retrieved February 9, 2023, from <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2162284/three-years-operation-radd-ul-fasaad-cleansed-pakistan>
- ¹¹⁵ Ibid.
- ¹¹⁶ Applying Counterinsurgency Principles in Pakistan's Frontier By Joshua T. White Ph.D. Candidate, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and Research Fellow, Institute for Global Engagement Brookings Counterinsurgency and Pakistan Paper Series, No. 2,p.3.
- ¹¹⁷ Supra Note 75.
- ¹¹⁸ Abdul Sayed, Tore Hamming(2023, May) *The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan After the Taliban's Afghanistan Takeover*, CTC Sentinel, May 2023, Volume 16, issue 5.
- ¹¹⁹ Abdul Sayed, Amira Jadoon(2022, August 16) *Understanding Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan's Unrelenting Posture* August 16, 2022, Program on Extremism at George Washington University.
- ¹²⁰ Ibid.
- ¹²¹ Hussain, A. (2022, November 28). Pakistan Taliban ends ceasefire with Gov't, threatens new attacks. *Pakistan Taliban News | Al Jazeera*. Retrieved February 9, 2023, from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/11/28/pakistan-taliban-ends-ceasefire-with-govt-threatens-new-attacks>

-
- ¹²² Supra Note 117.
- ¹²³ See relevant columns of the matrix.
- ¹²⁴ See relevant columns the matrix.
- ¹²⁵ Syed Manzar abbas Zaidi, 'organizational Profiling of suicide terrorism; a Pakistani case study, 'defence studies,
- ¹²⁶ The data and figures in this section have been sourced from Pak Institute for Peace Studies' Annual Security Reports from 2020 to 2023. These reports are available at: <<https://www.pakpips.com/publications#151273092380-5-d52fde57-07fa>>
- ¹²⁷ Ibid.
- ¹²⁸ Ibid.
- ¹²⁹ Rahim, Nazim, and Asghar Ali. "The Sino-Indian Geo-Strategic Rivalry: A Comparative Study of Gwadar and Chabahar Ports." *Dialogue (Pakistan)* 13, no. 1 (2018): 89.
- ¹³⁰ Akhtar, N. (2022, July 26). Being Pakistan isn't easy; Geopolitics has made life difficult for Pakistan. *Pakistan Today*. Retrieved February 7, 2023, from <https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2022/07/27/being-pakistan-isnt-easy/>
- ¹³¹ Hashim, A. (2019, March 1). Modified from Timeline: India-Pakistan ties. *News | Al Jazeera*. Retrieved February 7, 2023, from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/3/1/timeline-india-pakistan-relations>
- ¹³² India-Pakistan relations plumb new depths in 2020. *The Economic Times*. (n.d.). Retrieved February 7, 2023, from <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-pakistan-relations-plumb-new-depths-in-2020/articleshow/79917285.cms?from=mdr>
- ¹³³ Situation along LoC saw improvement after Indo-Pak ceasefire in Feb 2021: Defence Ministry, *India Today*, December 17, 2022. <https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/loc-situation-improved-after-india-pakistan-ceasefire-february-2021-2310444-2022-12-17>
- ¹³⁴ Ibid.
- ¹³⁵ Conflict Between India and Pakistan, Center for Preventive Action, *Global conflict tracker*, April 09, 2024, <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-between-india-and-pakistan>
- ¹³⁶ USIP Report. (2022, August 15). *India and Pakistan at 75: Prospects for the future; Interviews with Ambassadors*. United States Institute of Peace. Retrieved February 7, 2023, from <https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/08/india-and-pakistan-75-prospects-future>
- ¹³⁷ Dawn. Pakistan Sentences Indian Spy Kulbushan Yadhav to death. *Dawn.Com*. April 10, 2017. The full text available at [https://www.dawn.com/news/1326109\(2017\)](https://www.dawn.com/news/1326109(2017)).
- ¹³⁸ Official Website. (2022, October 21). Pakistan exits FATF Grey list. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Government of Pakistan. Retrieved February 7, 2023, from <https://mofa.gov.pk/pakistan-exits-fatfs-grey-list/>
- ¹³⁹ Afzal, M. (2022, March 9). Terrorism in Pakistan has declined, but the underlying roots of extremism remain. *Brookings*. Retrieved February 7, 2023, from <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/01/15/terrorism-in-pakistan-has-declined-but-the-underlying-roots-of-extremism-remain/#:~:text=According%20to%20the%20South%20Asia,deaths%20>
- ¹⁴⁰ In November 2011, Pakistan offered India 'Most Favoured Nation' (MFN) trading status by the end of 2012.
- ¹⁴¹ Public Opinion in Pakistan in the Year 2004, *international India (2004-2016)* Drastic drop in public support for increasing cooperation with India in different fields (including education, sports,

terrorism etc.). Gilani poll/Gallup pakistan Islamabad, December 13, 2016, chrome-extension://efaidnbnmnbbpcjpcglclefindmkaj /http://gallup.com.pk/wp/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/13-December-2016-1.pdf

- ¹⁴²"India-Pakistan rapprochement: How long will it last?", Foreign Policy blog, 18 September 2012.
- ¹⁴³"India, Afghanistan to sign four pacts during Karzai's visit", PTI (Indian news agency), 6 November 2012
- ¹⁴⁴"India's growing stake in Afghanistan", BBC News Online, 28 June 2012
- ¹⁴⁵Jacinto, L. (2022, February 9). Pakistan's 'good taliban-bad Taliban' strategy backfires, posing regional risks. France 24 News Service online. Retrieved February 9, 2023, from <https://www.france24.com/en/asia-pacific/20220209-pakistan-s-good-taliban-bad-taliban-strategy-backfires-posing-regional-risks>
- ¹⁴⁶Madadi, S., Mulroy, M., & Dostyar, A. (2022, September 6). Pakistan-afghan Taliban relations face mounting challenges. Middle East Institute. Retrieved February 9, 2023, from <https://www.mei.edu/publications/pakistan-afghan-taliban-relations-face-mounting-challenges>
- ¹⁴⁷Ibid.
- ¹⁴⁸Ibid.
- ¹⁴⁹Ibid.
- ¹⁵⁰Inayat, Marvara. Conflict and Cooperation in South Asia Post 9/11: Implications for Pakistan's Security. Margalla Papers (2013): 75-96.
- ¹⁵¹Times, The Economic. US Welcomes India's role in boosting Afghanistan Military; Pakistan worried. The Economic Times. July 12, 2018. The full text available at [https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/us-welcomes-indias-role-in-boosting-afghanistan-military-pakistan-worried/articleshow/53642767.cms?from=mdr\(2018\)](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/us-welcomes-indias-role-in-boosting-afghanistan-military-pakistan-worried/articleshow/53642767.cms?from=mdr(2018)).
- ¹⁵²Gul, A. (2022, February 9). Taliban takeover of Afghanistan seen as 'rude awakening' for Pakistan. VOA. Retrieved February 9, 2023, from <https://www.voanews.com/a/taliban-takeover-of-afghanistan-seen-as-rude-awakening-for-pakistan/6434656.html>
- ¹⁵³Tensions high after Pakistan launches cross-border attacks into Afghanistan, Al Jazeera, 18 Mar 2024, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/18/pakistan-launch-retaliatory-strikes-inside-afghanistan-raising-tensions>
- ¹⁵⁴Rahim, Nazim, and Asghar Ali. "The Sino-Indian Geo-Strategic Rivalry: A Comparative Study of Gwadar and Chabahar Ports." Dialogue (Pakistan) 13, no. 1 (2018): 89.
- ¹⁵⁵Ibid.
- ¹⁵⁶Research, HKTD. The Belt and Road Initiative. Hong Kong Trade Development Council. The full text is available at <http://china-trade-research.hktdc.com/business-news/article/The-Belt-and-Road-Initiative/The-Belt-and-Road-Initiative/obor/en/1/1X000000/1X0A36B7.htm>
- ¹⁵⁷Naeem Ahmed, —Pakistan-US Relations: Threats and Responses, II in US Policy Towards the Muslim World: Focus on the post-9/11 Period ed., Saleem Kidwai (Maryland: University Press of America, 2010), 230.
- ¹⁵⁸USIP Report. (2022, August 15). India and Pakistan at 75: Prospects for the future; Interviews with Ambassadors. United States Institute of Peace. Retrieved February 7, 2023, from <https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/08/india-and-pakistan-75-prospects-future>
- ¹⁵⁹Pakistan-China Relations in a Changing Geopolitical Environment, Masood Khalid, Institute for South Asian Studies, 30 November 2021, <https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/papers/pakistan-china-relations-in-a-changing-geopolitical-environment/>

-
- ¹⁶⁰ Iqbal, Anwar. Any agreement on Afghan crisis to address Pakistan's equities: US. Dawn.Com. February 8, 2019. The full text is available at <https://www.dawn.com/news/1462527> (2019).
- ¹⁶¹ Goldman, Emily O.(2001) 'New Threats, New Identities and New Ways of War: The Sources of Change in National Security Doctrine', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 24: 2, 43 — 76.
- ¹⁶² Mir, N. A. (2021, November 9). Issues and mistrust in US-Pakistan relations. Atlantic Council. Retrieved February 9, 2023, from <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/southasiasource/issues-and-mistrust-in-us-pakistan-relations/>
- ¹⁶³ Tasci, M. (2022, October 11). US relations with Pakistan have gained new momentum: Expert. Anadolu Ajansı. Retrieved February 9, 2023, from <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/us-relations-with-pakistan-have-gained-new-momentum-expert/2707955>
- ¹⁶⁴ Angela Weiss. (2022, November 28). Opinion | the anti-american delusions of Imran Khan. The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved February 9, 2023, from <https://www.wsj.com/articles/anti-american-pakistan-army-economic-growth-gdp-imran-khan-india-foreign-policy-oil-fertilizer-russia-sanctions-nuclear-terrorism-jihad-11669248217>
- ¹⁶⁵ Sattar, U. (2022, November 16). Anti-americanism in Pakistan • stimson center. Stimson Center. Retrieved February 9, 2023, from <https://www.stimson.org/2022/anti-americanism-in-pakistan/>
- ¹⁶⁶ Anatol Lieven, "A mutiny grows in Punjab", *National Interest*, 23 February 2011
- ¹⁶⁷ Sattar, U. (2022, November 16). Anti-americanism in Pakistan • stimson center. Stimson Center. Retrieved February 9, 2023, from <https://www.stimson.org/2022/anti-americanism-in-pakistan/>
- ¹⁶⁸ Ibid.
- ¹⁶⁹ "Pakistani public opinion ever more critical of US", *Pew Global Attitudes Project*, 27 June 2012
- ¹⁷⁰ "US and Pakistan: a troubled relationship", *IISS Strategic Comments*, Vol. 18, No. 1, January 2012
- ¹⁷¹ H. Mullick, "Recalibrating US-Pakistan relations", *Washington Quarterly*, Summer 2012.
- ¹⁷² IISS, *The Military Balance 2012* (London, March 2012), p272
- ¹⁷³ Ibid.
- ¹⁷⁴ A. Bast, "Pakistan's nuclear calculus", *Washington Quarterly*, Fall 2011, p75; House of Commons Library Research Paper 07/68, *Pakistan's political and security challenges*, 13 September 2007, p47. The Federation of American Scientists' 'Status of World Nuclear Forces 2012' webpage gives an estimate of 90-110, as compared with 80-100 for India.
- ¹⁷⁵ Ibid.
- ¹⁷⁶ Pakistan's nuclear compulsions , Dr Maleeha Lodhi, *The News*, Tuesday, November 06, 2012, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-9-141314-Pakistan%E2%80%99s-nuclear-compulsions>
- ¹⁷⁷ Ibid.
- ¹⁷⁸ Jan S. Breemer, 'Technological Change and the New Calculus of War: The United States Builds a New Navy', in Peter Trubowitz, Emily O. Goldman, and Edward Rhodes (eds.) *The Politics of Strategic Adjustment: Ideas, Institutions and Interests* (NY: Columbia UP 1999)
- ¹⁷⁹ Chaim Kaufman and Charles L. Glaser, 'Establishing the Foundations of Offense-Defense Theory', paper presented at the NATO Symposium on 'Military Stability', 12-14 June, 1995, Brussels, pp. 12-13.
- ¹⁸⁰ Goldman, Emily O.(2001) 'New Threats, New Identities and New Ways of War: The Sources of Change in National Security Doctrine', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 24: 2, 43 — 76.

- ¹⁸¹ Joao Resende-Santos, 'Anarchy and Emulation of Military Systems: Military Organizations and Technology in South America, 1870-19307, *Security Studies* 513 (Spring 1996) p.2 18.
- ¹⁸² Pakistan's nuclear compulsions , Dr Maleeha Lodhi, *The News*, Tuesday, November 06, 2012, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-9-141314-Pakistan%E2%80%99s-nuclear-compulsions>
- ¹⁸³ Supra Note 106. Basit (pp82-4) argues that Pakistan's programme is "irreconcilable" with the Obama Administration's non-proliferation agenda but that it has calculated that any attempt to raise the issue publicly would simply backfire. He advocates 'publicly talking tough', sweetened by the offer of a US-Pakistan civil nuclear deal that would parallel the 2005 US-India deal.
- ¹⁸⁴ The Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan debate is another issue, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
- ¹⁸⁵ I am including 20 references, but there are literally dozens more on the topic. These and many other publications dwell on the phenomenon of rising extremism in Pakistan: Baqai, H. "Extremism and Fundamentalism: Linkages to Terrorism Pakistan's Perspective." *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science*, 2011. <https://www.academia.edu/download/82124156/26.pdf>. Basit, A. "Countering Violent Extremism: Evaluating Pakistan's Counter-Radicalization and De-Radicalization Initiatives." *IPRI Journal*, 2015. <https://www.ipripak.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/3-art-s-15.pdf>. Ahmar, M. "The Challenge of Extremism in Pakistan: Are There Lessons to Be Learnt from the Experience of Singapore." *IPRI Journal*, 2011. <https://ipripak.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/art2moos11.pdf>. Murphy, E., and Malik, A. R. "Pakistan Jihad: The Making of Religious Terrorism." *IPRI Journal*, 2009. <https://ipripak.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/art2eams2009.pdf>. Sial, S., and Anjum, T. "Jihad, Extremism and Radicalization: A Public Perspective." *Conflict and Peace Studies*, 2010. <https://www.pakpips.com/web/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/119.pdf>. Riffat, F. "Trends in Political and Social Extremism in Pakistan: A Case Study of Musharraf Era 2002-2008." *Journal of the Punjab University Historical Society*, 2016. https://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/HistoryPStudies/PDF_Files/4Paper-Vol-29-No-1-June-2016.pdf. Hanif, S., Khan, S. M., and Rasool, S. "Growth of Religious Extremism in Pakistan: Implications for State and Society." *Global Political Review*, 2020. <https://www.humapub.com/admin/alljournals/gpr/papers/eMFVMcDsBl.pdf>. Afzal, S., Iqbal, H., and Inayay, M. "Terrorism and Extremism as a Non-Traditional Security Threat Post 9/11: Implications for Pakistan's Security." *International Journal of Business and Social Science*, 2012. <https://www.academia.edu/download/53641077/21.pdf>. Fayyaz, D. S. "Impact of Violent Extremism on Pakistani Youth." *South Asian Studies*, 2020. <https://journals.pu.edu.pk/journals/index.php/IJSAS/article/view/3268>. Yaseen, Z., and Muzaffar, M. "Extremism in Pakistan: Issues and Challenges." *Journal of Politics and International Studies*, 2018. <https://jpis.pu.edu.pk/45/article/view/30>. Khan, K., and Kiran, A. "Emerging Tendencies of Radicalization in Pakistan." *Strategic Studies*, 2012. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48529358>. Ahmed, Z. S., and Jafri, Q. A. "Drivers of Violent Extremism in Higher Education Institutions of Pakistan." *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict*, 2020. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17467586.2020.1821068>. Kazmi, S. U. E. "Rise in Public Approval of Religious Extremism in Pakistan." *MPRA Paper No. 114872*, 2022. <https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/114872>. Rizvi, A. "The Extremism in Pakistan: A Religio-Political Study." Available at SSRN 2645637, 2015. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2645637. Saeed, L., Syed, S. H., and Martin, R. P. "Historical Patterns of Terrorism in Pakistan." *Defense & Security Analysis*, 2014. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14751798.2014.921450>. Afzal, M. *Pakistan Under Siege: Extremism, Society, and the State*. 2018. <https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=99uACwAAQBAJ>. Nasir, S. "Rise of Extremism in South Asia." *IPRI Paper*, 2004. <https://ipripak.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/paper7f.pdf>. Murphy, E. *The Making of Terrorism in Pakistan: Historical and Social Roots of Extremism*. Taylor & Francis, 2012. <https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9780203861691/making-terrorism-pakistan-eamon-murphy>. Nasir, S. *Extremism and Counter-Extremism Narratives in Pakistan: An Analysis of Narrative Building*. Taylor & Francis, 2023. <https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9781003386360/extremism-counter>

- extremism-narratives-pakistan-sadia-nasir. Abbas, H. *Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror*. Taylor & Francis, 2015. <https://api.taylorfrancis.com/content/books/mono/download?identifierName=doi&identifierValue=10.4324/9781315701912&type=googlepdf>.
- ¹⁸⁶ Fair, C. Christine. *Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. Also see Shah, Saeed. *Ethnic and Sectarian Violence in Pakistan: The Karachi Experience*. Islamabad: Islamabad University Press, 2015. There are numerous other publications citing these phenomena.
- ¹⁸⁷ Hussain, Zahid. *The Islamist: Why I Joined Radical Islam in Pakistan, What I Saw Inside, and Why I Left*. New York: Penguin Books, 2018.
- ¹⁸⁸ Khan, Mohammad. *The Balochistan Conflict: Historical and Political Dimensions*. Karachi: Pak Book Corporation, 2013. Also see Khan, Mohammad. *Political Instability and Extremism in Pakistan*. Islamabad: Oxford University Press, 2015.
- ¹⁸⁹ Hussain, Zahid. *A Tale of Two Pakistanis: The War on Terror and the Road Ahead*. Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2020.
- ¹⁹⁰ George J. Stigler, *The Danger of Making Policy Based on Assumption*, Chicago Booth, June 11, 1964, <https://www.chicagobooth.edu/review/danger-making-policy-based-assumption>
- ¹⁹¹ Arshad Ali, *Economic cost of terrorism: a case study of Pakistan*, chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpgclefindmkaj/https://www.issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/1299569657_66503137.pdf
- ¹⁹² *Pakistan: Challenges of a Weak Democracy*, International Crisis group, 28 January 2019, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/pakistan/pakistan-challenges-weak-democracy>
- ¹⁹³ Ibid.
- ¹⁹⁴ See, for example, John Crayton, "Terrorism and the Psychology of the Self," in Lawrence Freedman and Jonah Alexander, eds., *Perspectives on Terrorism* (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1983), pp. 33– 41; or Jillian Becker, *Hitler's Children* (Philadelphia: J. P. Lippincott, 1977).
- ¹⁹⁵ Weinberg, L. (1991). *Turning to terror: The conditions under which political parties turn to terrorist activities*. *Comparative Politics*, 23, 423– 438.
- ¹⁹⁶ Richard Gillespie, *Soldiers of Peron* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), pp. 257– 258.
- ¹⁹⁷ Astrid von Borcke, "Violence and Terror in Russian Revolutionary Populism: The Narodnaya Volya, 1870– 1883," in Wolfgang Mommsen and Gerhard Hirschfeld, eds., *Social Protest: Violence in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Europe* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), pp. 48– 62.
- ¹⁹⁸ Mino Monicelli, *L'Ultrasinistra in Italia: 1968– 1978* (Bari: Laterza, 1978).
- ¹⁹⁹ Weinberg, L. (1991). *Turning to terror: The conditions under which political parties turn to terrorist activities*. *Comparative Politics*, 23, 423– 438..
- ²⁰⁰ Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," *Comparative Politics*, 13 (July 1981), p. 384. See also Richard Rubenstein, *Alchemists of Revolution* (New York: Basic Books, 1987), pp. 65– 85.
- ²⁰¹ Manfred Hildermeier, "The Terrorist Strategies of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party in Russia, 1900– 1914," in Mommsen and Hirschfeld, eds., p. 86.
- ²⁰² Becker, Gary S. 1968. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach." *Journal of Political Economy*. March/April, 76:2, pp. 169 – 217. Also see Ehrlich, Isaac. 1973. "Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation." *Journal of Political Economy*.

-
- May, 81:3, pp. 521–65. Also see Freeman, Richard. 1996. "Why Do So Many Young American Men Commit Crimes and What Might We Do About It?" *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Winter, 10:1, pp. 25–42. And see Piehl, Anne Morrison. 1998. "Economic Conditions, Work, and Crime," in *Handbook on Crime and Punishment*. Michael Tonry, ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 302–19.
- ²⁰³ See Pehal above. Also see Ruhm, Christopher. 2000. "Are Recessions Good for Your Health?" *Quarterly Journal of Economics*. May, 115:2, pp. 617–50.
- ²⁰⁴ Glaeser, Edward L. 2002. "The Political Economy of Hatred." Mimeo, Harvard University, August.
- ²⁰⁵ Landes, William. 1978. "An Economic Study of U.S. Aircraft Hijackings, 1961–1976." *Journal of Law and Economics*. 21:1, pp. 1–31. Also see Sandler, Todd, John T. Tschirhart and Jon Cauley. 1983. "A Theoretical Analysis of Transnational Terrorism." *American Political Science Review*. March, 77:1, pp. 36–54.
- ²⁰⁶ Hamm, Mark S. 1998. "Terrorism, Hate Crime, and Antigovernment Violence: A Review of the Research," in *The Future of Terrorism: Violence in the New Millennium*. Harvey W. Kushner, ed. London: SAGE, pp. 59–96. Also see Kressel, Neil J. 1996. *Mass Hate: The Global Rise of Genocide and Terror*. New York: Plenum Press. Also see Green, Donald P., Jack Glaser and A. Rich. 1998. "From Lynching to Gay-Bashing: The Elusive Connection Between Economic Conditions and Hate Crime." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*. 75:1, pp. 82–92.
- ²⁰⁷ Jefferson, Philip and Frederic L. Pryor. 1999. "On the Geography of Hate." *Economics Letters*. December, 65:3, pp. 389–95.
- ²⁰⁸ Lerner, Daniel. 1958. *The Passing of Traditional Society*. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press.
- ²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*
- ²¹⁰ Angrist, Joshua. 1995. "The Economic Returns to Schooling in the West Bank and Gaza Strip." *American Economic Review*. December, 85:5, pp. 1065–087.
- ²¹¹ Hassan, Nasra. 2001. "An Arsenal of Believers." *New Yorker*, November 19, pp. 36–41.
- ²¹² Berrebi, Claude. 2003. "Evidence About the Link Between Education, Poverty and Terrorism Among Palestinians." Mimeo, Princeton University.
- ²¹³ Russell, Charles and Bowman Miller. 1983. "Profile of a Terrorist," in *Perspectives on Terrorism*. Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources Inc., pp. 45–60. Also see Taylor, Maxwell. 1988. *The Terrorist*. London: Brassey's Defence Publishers.
- ²¹⁴ Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection? Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Volume 17, Number 4, Fall 2003, Pages 119–144.
- ²¹⁵ Lipset, Seymour Martin. *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*. New York: Doubleday, 1960.
- ²¹⁶ Houtman, Jan. *Class and Politics: A Survey of the Relationship between Authoritarianism, Intolerance of Nonconformity, and Racial Prejudice*. 2003.
- ²¹⁷ *Ibid.*
- ²¹⁸ Kemp, Robert. 2008. *Religious Extremism and Militancy in the Pashtun Areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan*. In *BC Journal of International Affairs*. Volume 11, Spring 2008.
- ²¹⁹ Chapter 16, Resilience to Violent Extremism and Terrorism: A Multisystemic Analysis, Michele Grossman in *Multisystemic Resilience: Adaptation and Transformation in Contexts of Change*.

-
- <https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190095888.001.0001> , Online ISBN: 9780197541159 ,Print ISBN: 9780190095888 ,Publisher: Oxford University Press
- ²²⁰ 'Hey, there's still a world to run; Global leaders will be preoccupied by politics at home. That augurs ill for globalization', *The Economist*, November 17, 2011, <http://www.economist.com/node/21537036>
- ²²¹ Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, 'Security: A New Framework for Analysis' (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998).
- ²²² Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein (eds.) 'The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy' (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1993).
- ²²³ Miroslav Nincic, Roger Rose, and Gerard Gorski, 'The Social Foundations of Strategic Adjustment', in Peter Trubowitz, Emily Goldman, and Edward Rhodes (eds.) *The Politics of Strategic Adjustment: Ideas, Institutions and Interests* (NY: Columbia UP 1999) p.179.
- ²²⁴ 'NA body call for strict tone with the US on drone hits', *The News*, April 30,2011. Also see 'No Operation Under Foreign Pressure', by Muhammad Saleh Zaafir, *The News*, July 09, 2010: <http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=29931&Cat=13&dt=7/9/2010>
- ²²⁵ Citizens Performance Report: Performance of the Parliamentary Committees on Defence and National Security', March 15, 2008 – March 15, 2012, PILDAT, (May 2011): <http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/CMR/Report-PerformanceoftheParliamentaryCommitteesofDefenceandNationalSecurityMar08toMar11.pdf>
- ²²⁶ Performance of the Parliamentary Committee on National Security, PILDAT Citizens monitoring Report, March 2012, PILDAT,(March 2012) http://www.pildat.org/publications/publication/CMR/PerformanceoftheParliamentaryCommitteeonNationalSecurity_Report_March2012.pdf
- ²²⁷ Ibid.
- ²²⁸ Ibid.
- ²²⁹ Hussain, N.B.| A. (2021) Why has joint opposition refused to attend PCNS meeting in camera?, Brecorder. Available at: <https://www.brecorder.com/news/40137876> (Accessed: January 6, 2023).
- ²³⁰ PCNS unanimously agrees to continue talks with TTP (2022) *The Express Tribune*. Available at: <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2365074/pcns-unanimously-agrees-to-continue-talks-with-ttp> (Accessed: January 6, 2023).
- ²³¹ Anatol Lieven, 'Pakistan: A Hard Country' (London, 2011), p,205,238.
- ²³² "Shahbaz aims at making Pakistan an Islamic welfare state", *Pakistan Observer*, 15 August 2012. The PPP has also used a similar phrase. See: "PM urges national to renew pledge to make Pakistan real Islamic welfare state", *Right Vision News*,10 November 2012.
- ²³³ Inam Ul Haque. (2021, December 15). PTI government - an assessment. *The Express Tribune*. Retrieved February 8, 2023, from <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2334053/pti-government-an-assessment>
- ²³⁴ World values survey association , WVS Database Pakistan Survey Publications 2020. Available at: <https://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSNewsShowMore.jsp?evYEAR=2020&evMONTH=-1> (Accessed: January 20, 2023).
- ²³⁵ Hammond, Paul. 1961. *Organizing for defense*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Also Huntington, Samuel. 1961. *The common defense*. New York: Columbia University Press, and Schilling, Warner, Paul Hammond, and Glenn Snyder. 1962. *Strategy, politics, and defense budgets*. New York: Columbia University Press. Also see Wohlstetter, Roberta. 1962. *Pearl Harbor: Warning and decision*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,

²³⁶ (Nasreen Akhter, "Pakistan, Afghanistan and The Taliban," *International Journal on World Peace* 25, no. 4 (December 2008): 49-73; Daud Khattak, "The Complicated Relationship between the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban." *Combating Terrorism Center at West Point* 5, no. 2 (February 2012): 1-24.). Also see

Frederic Grare, "The Evolution of Sectarian Conflicts in Pakistan and the Ever-Changing Face of Islamic Violence." *Journal of South Asian Studies* 30, No. 1 (April 2007): 127-143. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00856400701264068>; Abdul Basit. "Why Sectarian Violence Is Resurging in Pakistan." *The National Interest*, 24 October, 2016.

Also see Shaun Gregory. "The ISI and the War on Terrorism." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 30, No. 12 (March 2007):1013-1031. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100701670862>; Safdar Sial, "Pakistan's role and strategic priorities in Afghanistan since 1980." Report published at Norwegian Peacebuilding resource Centre, June 2103.

²³⁷ Mukesh Kumar Khatwani and Ishrat Afshan Abbasi, "An Overview of Major Military Operations in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan." N.D. May, 2018. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/326225279_An_Overview_of_Major_Military_Operations_in_the_Tribal_Areas_of_Pakistan; Iram Khalid and Muhammad Iqbal Roy. "Pakistan's Military Operations: The Counter terrorism." *JRSP* 53, No. 2 (July-Dec 2016): 239-251; Zahoor Khan Marwat, "Three years of Radd-ul-Fasaad's success." *The News*, 14 March, 2020.

²³⁸ I am citing 20 sources here- there are dozens more that have commented on this:

1. Tellis, Ashley J. *Pakistan and the War on Terror: Conflicted Goals, Compromised Performance*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/237810665_Pakistan_and_the_War_on_Terror_Conflicted_Goals_Compromised_Performance.

2. Hussain, S., B. Hussain, and W. Ahmed. "Problems Faced by Women Police in Pakistan." *Pakistan Journal of Criminology* 8, no. 1 (2016): 86-103. <http://www.pjcriminology.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/PJCVol8No1January2016.pdf#page=86>.

3. Imam, S. K. "Law Enforcement in Times of Violent Demonstrations." *South Asian Journal of Management Sciences* 15, no. 2 (2021): 35-52. <https://sajms.iurc.edu.pk/issues/2021b/SAJMS150206.pdf>.

4. Irshad, M. "Terrorism in Pakistan: Causes & Remedies." *Dialogue (Pakistan)* 7, no. 3 (2011): 224-241. https://www.academia.edu/download/104295650/Dialogue_July_September2011_224-241.pdf.

5. Yusuf, M. *Pakistan's Militancy Challenge: From Where, to What*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2014. <https://books.google.com/books?id=t2D4AgAAQBAJ&pg=PA15>.

6. Ahmed, N. "Pakistan's Counterterrorism Strategy: A Critical Overview." In *State-Based Violence and Deobandi Militancy in Pakistan*, 313-332. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. <https://jsshuk.com/oj/index.php/jssh/article/download/79/70>.

7. Waseem, Zoha. "'Brothers in Arms'? A Police-Paramilitary Partnership in Karachi." *Policing and Society* 31, no. 1 (2021): 1-14. <https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10092016/1/Final%20Accepted%20Manuscript%20Zoha%20Waseem%20for%20REF.pdf>.

8. Fair, C. Christine, and Seth G. Jones. "Pakistan's War Within." *Survival* 51, no. 6 (2009): 161-188. https://christinefair.net/pubs/51-6-13_Fair_and_Jones.pdf.

9. Niaz, I. "Pakistan's Crisis of Governance and the Resurgence of Terrorist Violence Since August 2016." *Asian Affairs* 48, no. 3 (2017): 360-378. https://www.academia.edu/download/53363027/PAKISTAN_S_CRISIS_OF_GOVERNANCE_AND_THE_RESURGENCE_OF_TERRORIST_VIOLENCE_SINCE_AUGUST_2016.pdf.

10. Gul, Imtiaz. *The Most Dangerous Place: Pakistan's Lawless Frontier*. New York: Penguin UK, 2010.

-
11. Zanini, Michele, and Sean J. A. Edwards. "The Networking of Terror in the Information Age." In *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy*, edited by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, 29-60. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1382/RAND_MR1382.pdf#page=43.
 12. Khan, Amil U. *The Terrorist Threat and the Policy Response in Pakistan*. Zürich: ETH Zürich, 2005. <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/13595/Policypaper11.pdf>.
 13. Abbas, Hassan. *Reforming Pakistan's Police and Law Enforcement Infrastructure*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2011. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/SR266-Reforming_Pakistan%E2%80%98s_Police_and_Law_Enforcement_Infrastructure.pdf.
 14. Tankel, Stephen. *Domestic Barriers to Dismantling the Militant Infrastructure in Pakistan*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/299505889_Domestic_Barriers_to_Dismantling_the_Militant_Infrastructure_in_Pakistan.
 15. Shaukat, M. A. "Role of Police in Countering Terrorism: A Comparison Between Pakistan and the United Kingdom." PhD diss., University of Cambridge, 2021. <https://search.proquest.com/openview/965b8ff3220cf7a94325ba9814b165ce/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=2026366&diss=y>.
 16. Nawaz, Shuja. *Countering Militancy and Terrorism in Pakistan: The Civil-Military Nexus*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2016. <http://www.globalstrikemedia.com/uploads/3/7/7/4/37740703/sr393-countering-militancy-and-terrorism-in-pakistan-the-civil-military-nexus.pdf>.
 17. Karim, Abdul. *Counter Terrorism, the Pakistan Factor*. New Delhi: Ashish Publishing House, 1991. <https://books.google.com/books?id=QoqwQb38SQEC&pg=PA1>.
 18. Iqbal, Khalid. *The Making of Pakistani Human Bombs*. New Delhi: HarperCollins, 2015. <https://books.google.com/books?id=ppkpCwAAQBAJ&pg=PR7>.
 19. Gunaratna, Rohan, and Khalid Iqbal. *Pakistan: Terrorism Ground Zero*. London: Reaktion Books, 2012. <https://books.google.com/books?id=QD9qPQznBXYC&pg=PP1>.
 20. Bennett, Brian T. *Understanding, Assessing, and Responding to Terrorism: Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Personnel*. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2018. <https://books.google.com/books?id=8qtMDwA AQBAJ&pg=PR13>.

²³⁹ Ibid.

²⁴⁰ Supra Note iv.