

SABAOON-II DERADICALIZATION PROGRAM

A TRANSFORMATIVE MODEL OF PEACE EDUCATION

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Preface

The field of counterterrorism studies is a constantly developing area that encounters various obstacles. Its task involves addressing ongoing inquiries about the attributes, origins, ideologies, methods, and strategies of terrorist organizations as well as the reactions of counterterrorism units. While the use of force is undeniably an essential aspect of counterterrorism approaches, the process of disengagement, deradicalization, and reintegration holds equal significance as vital elements of an effective counterterrorism strategy. Muhammad Naeem Dar, a veteran of the Pakistan Army, brings extensive experience in both the war on terror and supervising a major counter-violent extremism (CVE) initiative in Pakistan. With a deep knowledge of globally recognized CVE frameworks, complemented by practical insights, Dar is well-equipped to assess domestic extremism challenges and propose effective steps for crafting an effective CVE strategy tailored to Pakistan's needs.

He contributes through detailed discussions that center on the intricacies of deradicalization and fundamental principles essential for enhancing the effectiveness of any CVE project. Commencing with an exploration of the

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emergence of violent extremism during the 20th century, the book delves into its consequential connection with the evolution of CVE within the broader framework of counter-terrorism tactics. Dar takes a worldwide approach to understanding deradicalization, illustrating this with instances from nations like Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Denmark, Australia, and the United Kingdom. He sheds light on the contradictions inherent in the global CVE strategies which gave rise to the phenomenon of Islamophobia across the globe. Subsequently, he offers his perspective on the various terminologies that exist within the domain of terrorism studies.

At the heart of the book lies an intricate examination of the Sabaoon-II program, recognized as Pakistan's most extensive deradicalization initiative, presently operational in the merged tribal districts (formerly FATA) of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Naeem holds that the cultural context of the former FATA region significantly contributed to the cultivation of violent tendencies in the society. He illustrates his perspective by capturing a holistic view of the tribal culture as reflected in a poem he authored during his time of military service in that region. He considers the economic hardships faced by the local population and a multitude of structural flaws as the key drivers behind the emergence of violent extremism in the area. After analyzing the region's perspective, he outlines the fundamental elements of the Sabaoon-II project, outlining the approach involving psychological and theological intervention, and the

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challenges the program faced in bringing positive changes in the behaviors of hardcore former militants from a disbanded extremist group.

A significant limitation in Pakistan's CVE strategy revolves around insufficient government funding and a lack of coordinated efforts to curb the escalating threat in the country. The deradicalization of incarcerated individuals and the engagement of the local community in the reintegration of rehabilitated individuals are common practices in Western countries. Unfortunately, in Pakistan, both the local community's involvement and the prison authorities' commitment to these crucial aspects of human transformation seem to be lacking. Naeem presents the Sabaoon-II as a successful model to be replicated across different regions of the country and offers insightful recommendations for enhancing capabilities and addressing the extremist menace in Pakistan. In conclusion, this work holds immense significance within the CVE literature. It is a must-read for individuals interested in understanding or combating violent extremism not only in Pakistan but also in global contexts.

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Acknowledgment

I bow my head in gratitude to the Almighty Allah for aligning me with deradicalization efforts at Sabaoon-II which eventually connected me to the esteemed academic world. In my capacity as the focal person managing the project's training and administrative aspects, I was afforded the chance to directly observe and oversee the deradicalization process. This experience significantly contributed to my understanding of the subject matter. The project helped me discover how cultural violence, system failures, and inequitable allocation of economic resources at the national level can distort the human psyche to the extent that actions deemed ignoble by society might appear virtuous within a particular community. Upon uncovering this reality, the individual acts of brutality may pale in comparison to the colossal malevolence perpetuated by the system. If tasked with identifying the foremost crucial element within a successful deradicalization program, the ultimate key in my perspective would be to "Provide unconditional support to program beneficiaries." Reflecting on the Sabaoon journey fills me with a profound sense of lifelong accomplishment, while also affording me the opportunity to enhance my own sense of compassion and

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empathy. These elements, in turn, have served as the impetus behind the writing of this book.

The idea of this book might not have come to fruition without the unwavering moral and academic support of my university professor, Dr. Irfan Mahsud. His encouragement to translate my experiential insights into writing aimed to bridge the existing gap within contemporary deradicalization research. I also extend my appreciation to Ms. Feriha Peracha for her substantial support. She not only introduced the Sabaoon-II team to the realm of deradicalization but also helped us in comprehending the intricate technical aspects of our work. Likewise, the valuable contributions from Mr. Zia Ullah, Mr. Mazhar Ali, Ms. Tabassum, and Dr. Malik Masood ur Rehman were of great assistance in understanding the Pukhtun culture and political dynamics of the FATA. I also feel indebted to honourable scholars late Rahim Ullah Yousafzai, Dr. Lutfur Rehman, and Dr. Ubric M. Cornelius for educating me on the subject and sparing precious time for the interviews. The precious views of all these scholars have not only put me wise on the subject but are also a source of great value addition to this monograph. My profound gratitude to Professor John Horgan for his generous words about my book. Out of his busy schedule, he spared a lot of time to respond to my multiple emails and his invaluable guidance assisted me in improving the quality of my work.

Undoubtedly, the writing of this book also stands as a testament to the encouragement and assistance extended by

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my lovely wife who shouldered a significant portion of my domestic obligations, allowing me the time and focus necessary for this endeavor. I hold a deep sense of gratitude not only towards her but also towards the collective of supporters who consistently stood by me, offering both moral and tangible support whenever it was needed. Their presence has been instrumental in turning this aspiration into a reality, and for that, I am sincerely thankful.

Muhammad Naeem Dar

Author

Abbreviations

AAB	Abdullah Azam Brigade
ABC Youth Program	Active Bara Citizen Youth Program
AI	Ansar ul Islam
APS	Army Public School
BIGREX	Beratungs-und Interventionsgruppe Gegen Rechtsextremismus
CONTEST	Counter Terrorism Strategy
COR	Community Outreach Program
COVID	Corona Virus Disease
CPEC	China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
CTC	Counter Terrorism Committee
CTD	Counter Terrorism Department
CTE	Counter Terrorism and Extremism
CTED	Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate

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CTITF	Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force
CVE	Counter Violent Extremism
DDP	Deradicalization, and Disengagement Programs
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
DRC	Deradicalization Center
DREP	Deradicalization and Emancipation Program
ETA	Euskadi Ta Askatasuna
FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal areas
FCKP	Frontier Corps Khyber Pukhtunkhwa
FCR	Frontier Crime Regulations
GCERF	Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund
GCTF	Global Counter-Terrorism Forum
GOs	Governmental Organizations
GTReC	Global Terrorism Research Center
ICPVTR	International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research
ICV	Islamic Council of Victoria

ABBREVIATIONS

IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IG	Inspector General
IJJ	International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law
IRA	Irish Republican Army
IRP	Islamic Relief Pakistan
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
ISSA	Islamic Social Services Association
KP	Khyber Pukhtunkhwa
LC	Liaison Committee
LI	Lashkar-e-Islam
LoD	Lecture and Open Discussion
NACTA	National Counter Terrorism Authority
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NISP	National Internal Security Policy
NWA	North Waziristan Agency (now North Waziristan district)
PA	Political Agent
PESCO	Peshawar Electric Supply Company
RAND	Research and Development
RAW	Research and Analysis Wing

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RRG	Religious Rehabilitation Group
SAP	Social Action Plan
SRSP	Sarhad Rural Support Program
SWAaT	Social Welfare Academics and Training
SWT	Social Workers Team
TLP	Tehrik-e-Labaik Pakistan
TTP	Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNCCT	United Nations Counter-Terrorism Center
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USA	United States of America
VEBS	Violent Extremism Belief Scale
VEm	Violent Extremism
VEO	Violent Extremist Organization
WoT	War on Terror
XEN	Executive Engineer

Introduction

With the dawning of the 21st century, a fresh wave of security challenges swept across the global landscape. The seismic impact of the 9/11 bombings on the twin towers and the Pentagon compelled the nations to overhaul their domestic security apparatus. The once-reliable security approaches had grown obsolete in the face of swiftly evolving threat perceptions, affecting virtually every nation-state worldwide. In the new security paradigm, the very dynamics of warfare underwent a profound shift. The theater of conflict transitioned from open battlegrounds to intricate close-quarter scenarios, and the adversary transformed from a conspicuous presence to an enigmatic and invisible force. This transformation catalyzed the evolution of novel tactics and advanced military equipment, all conceived with the aim of effectively countering these emergent and evolving threats

Yet, the story of the two-decade-long struggle against terrorism starkly underlines the reality that sheer reliance on robust military measures falls short in securing lasting global peace. Despite the considerable wealth, resources, and state-of-the-art weaponry held by the US and its NATO allies, their prolonged war efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq

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stand as examples of unmet goals. In both instances, new terrorist outfits arose from the ashes of their predecessors, exposing the limitations of a solely military approach. In pursuit of its aims to defeat *Al Qaeda* and the Islamic State, the world has witnessed a mushroom growth of deadly militant organizations in the world since the War on Terror (WoT) began. American President George W. Bush termed the 9/11 attacks on American soil as an attack on the heart and soul of the world thus declaring war against all elements involved in exporting or supporting terrorism.¹ The war thus starting, gradually took the whole world in its fold, with Muslim majority states facing the major brunt.² While on one hand, the Muslim states suffered major political, economic, and security setbacks in the form of infrastructural devastation and human loss, the rest of the world also did not remain unaffected by its deadly repercussions. A huge number of militants hailing from the West also traveled to Afghanistan Pakistan, and the Middle Eastern states to participate in self-proclaimed *Jihad*. On the return of these foreign fighters back to their homes, they created a serious threat to the internal security of their respective countries;³ and a terrorism upsurge in other parts of the world.

The declining security situation around the world calls for revamping of strategies, and the development of critical thinking to discover the root causes of violent extremism (VEm) in the victimized societies. In the opinion of Albert Einstein, the problems we are facing today cannot be solved

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with the same level of thinking that created them.⁴The esteemed philosopher regards existing knowledge as principally blemished and responsible for breeding today's problems, thereby emphasizing the need for the creation of new knowledge through a superior level of thinking. In his opinion, the old thoughts, beliefs, and narratives need to be challenged and critically analyzed to find the way forward. There is a growing consensus amongst political sages that the use of the kinetic approach was essentially flawed and inadequate to deal with problems like radicalism and VEm. Even well before the event of 9/11 Joseph Nye being a chief proponent of soft power has been critical of the US foreign policy. While discussing the ruling period of various ancient empires, he says that the US' journey to decline began in 1989 which is too early as compared with other empires in the past. Nye attributes this early decline to the US' extensive reliance on kinetic means and inadequate use of its soft power.⁵ Many other academics including Schmidt, Angell, and Gunaratna have also been suggesting the US to incorporate soft power as an essential tool in its counter-terrorism strategy.⁶ As the WoT lingered on, opposition to the use of the kinetic approach also kept gaining strength due to the highly inauspicious outcomes of the war. In 2009 David Miliband was found publically denouncing the coalition's counter-terrorism strategy. Miliband openly confessed that the fight against terrorism had caused more harm than good.⁷

Eventually, in May 2005 a paradigm shift was noticed in the US strategy on terrorism when Bush Administration decided to shift focus from the manhunt for *Al Qaeda* leaders to countering VEM and winning hearts and minds.⁸ This policy vividly quoted as “Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)” was aimed at adopting softer and smart ways to counter radical Islam through the battle of ideas.⁹ Before this breakthrough, the terminology of “Violent Extremism (VEM)” was customarily used to refer to neo-Nazism and Far Right-wing¹⁰ but henceforth, it merely became a reference point for “radical Islam.” This policy shift added another important dimension to the WoT, as critics from around the globe started interpreting it as a war against Islam; which on the one hand kicked off the worldwide Islamophobia campaign and on the other hand it marginalized the Muslim communities dwelling in the West. After the advent of a new policy, several terms like Radicalization, Counter radicalization, Deradicalization, and Violent Extremism, popped up in academic circles. The scholars started brainstorming on these themes and produced huge piles of scholarly works over the last two decades.

The concept of transforming radical beliefs and ideology of hardliners and combatants though existed well before the event of 9/11, but after the incident, it caught special attention in academia. Peeping back into history reveals that during the 20th century, as well several reintegration programs were run as an important tool to counter

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extremist, separatist, and insurgent movements like the Irish Republican Army (IRA), Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC), and Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA in Basque) in various countries.¹¹ However, the concept of deradicalization as a tool for transforming violent ideologies, and extremist behaviors and attitudes was developed after the incident of 9/11 attacks.¹² Subsequently from 2005 onwards, at both national and international levels, the policymakers have been focusing on the development of various models for combating radicalism under the umbrella of CVE policy.

On account of Pakistan's frontline status in WoT and its closer proximity to Afghanistan, it has been a serious victim of VEm since the inception of the war. During the WoT, Pakistan suffered approximately 70000 casualties and a huge loss to its economy amounting to nearly 150 billion USD.¹³ In the post-9/11 period, the erstwhile amity with the Taliban came to a sudden halt when Pakistan decided to side with US and NATO allies, which consequently led to the emergence of *Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan* (TTP) - a terrorist organization in erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. Moreover, the extremist elements construed Pakistan's alignment with the US coalition forces as an act of disloyalty to Islamic *Ummah*¹⁴ and declared self-proclaimed *Jihad* against the Pakistan military. The narrative caught the attention of the general public all across the country and perplexed the minds of even moderate people in Pakistan. Although this narrative

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did not cause a major dent in the ideological beliefs of people hailing from urban areas, it adversely affected the belief system of socio-economically deprived people of south Punjab and FATA who though have very brief religious education but are sharply inclined towards religion. The phenomenon of extremism thus resulted in an abrupt rise of several militant organizations followed by a huge tide of terrorism all across Pakistan. The soaring VEM threat inside the country eventually motivated the Pakistan government to incorporate softer means into its counter-terrorism policy. Accordingly, in October 2008, the Pakistan government engaged Singapore's International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) for the establishment of the National Rehabilitation Program in the country.¹⁵

The first-ever CVE program in Pakistan came up in 2009 with the title 'Deradicalization and Emancipation Program' (DREP) after the successful completion of a military operation (Rah-e-Rast) against TTP in district Swat. The program encompassed the deradicalization and rehabilitation of detained militants apprehended during the military operation in Swat valley.¹⁶ The DREP model had three subsidiary projects including, *Sabaoon*¹⁷ (raised in Batkhela, district Malakand in 2009 for juveniles between 12-18 years of age), *Rastoon* (raised in Barikot district Swat in February 2010 for youth between 19-25 years of age), and *Mishal*¹⁸ (raised in Mingora district Swat in September 2010 for adults militants) all functioning under the supervision

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of Pakistan military.¹⁹ Henceforth, several CVE models started coming up (under the supervision of security agencies) in erstwhile FATA, and extremism-prone districts of Khyber Pukhtunkhwa (KP) and Baluchistan provinces. The under- review CVE model of *Sabaoon-II* located in village Shakas of *Tehsil*²⁰ Jamrud, district Khyber (KP) came up in 2015 and is supposedly the largest, and the only existing model in Pakistan since the rest of the programs came to an end by early 2020.²¹

Before heading further, it is important to clarify a few qualms concerning its nomenclature and location which are likely to confuse the audience in the subsequent chapters of this book. The project derives its name from the aforementioned *Sabaoon* deradicalization center Batkhela (district Malakand). Both *Sabaoon* (Malakand) and *Sabaoon-II* (Bara) share an affiliation in the sense that both projects were raised with the initial support of the same NGO 'Social Welfare Academics and Training' (SWAaT)²² that provided psychosocial support to them, therefore because of common affiliation and optimistic epistemology of word '*Sabaoon*' this title was copied with the addition of roman numeral 'II.' Subsequently, in January 2020 the Malakand-based *Sabaoon* had to be closed due to the reduced strength of beneficiaries, hence resulting in the merger of both *Sabaoons* into one "*Sabaoon-II*" that presently exists in village Shakas. At times, *Sabaoon-II* is also referred to as Deradicalization Center Bara (DRC Bara). The DRC title is though more popular amongst the locals and in few academic write-ups, but *Sabaoon-II* is

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regarded as its official title; however, the suffix 'Bara' denotes its earlier location where it was initially raised in 2015. Although *Sabaoon-II* shifted to its present location Shakas (*Tehsil Jamrud*) in July 2018, 'Bara' remained affixed to the title as it is vividly known amongst Governmental and non-governmental circles by the same reference.

Literature Review

Terrorism studies have been the trendiest and sizzling topic since the event of 9/11 occurred in 2001. In the ensuing years, 'Deradicalization' gathered enormous attention in academia, resulting in the production of huge piles of literature on the subject with maximum contributions coming up from the Western world. While undertaking the assignment of authoring this book, the initial effort was to look for indigenous knowledge compiled by Muslim academics as most of the regions affected by the menace of radicalization and VEm happened to be either Muslim states or those bearing sizeable Muslim populations. During the course of research work it was revealed that although Muslim academics have made sizeable contributions to the field of terrorism studies, but sadly, they fail to make a worthwhile impact at the global level as most of the literature exists in native languages. Similarly, the academic contributions on their behalf in universally understandable English language especially in the domain of Deradicalization studies are barely minimal that may not constitute more than 5 percent of world-wide published

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material. Here, it is pertinent to mention that differentiating between Muslim and non-Muslim academics is not at all aimed at creating a bias, rather the goal is to underscore the importance of indigenous knowledge in the comprehension of an issue for framing a policy to counter it. From Structuralism point of view, the true interpretation of various ideas and concepts is possible only if they are analyzed in the light of relevant language, literature, culture, and traditions. In short, if radicalization and the phenomena associated with VEm are assumed to be inseparably associated with the Muslim community only, then the incorporation of vital indigenous knowledge on behalf of Muslim scholars is inevitable for the accomplishment of deradicalization studies. In this respect, Hamed El-Said is a prominent name who fills this wide academic gap through his scholarly contributions in the field of deradicalization. While most scholars may have a conventional approach towards Islamic ideology, Hamed El-Said endeavors to uncover the hidden truths underlying the predominant discourse on the subject and renders his opinion in light of various verses of the Qur'an and *Ahadith*.²³

Pakistan has been a major victim of the global terrorism wave, but surprisingly there are only a few prominent names that made significant contributions in the realm of deradicalization. Feriha Peracha- the leading exponent and pioneer of deradicalization work in Pakistan holds vast practical experience in deradicalization studies, as her NGO

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(SWAaT) had been actively engaged in psychosocial therapy of *Sabaoon* (Malakand) and *Sabaoon-II* (Bara) based beneficiaries since the very inception of both programs. She has written several articles on the associated domains of VEm and deradicalization, and her chief contribution to terrorism studies is the development of the “Violent extremism belief scale” (VEBS) which may help in screening individuals suspected of bearing VEm beliefs.²⁴ Another native scholar Abdul Basit has contributed a few valuable articles on Pakistan-based CVE programs. His works reflect a complete autopsy of Pakistan’s CVE strategy and analysis of the fundamental causes of radicalism in Pakistan. Basit identifies the loopholes in the system; and proffers valuable recommendations to affect a positive change in the national CVE policy.²⁵

Besides Feriha, and Abdul Basit, many other native scholars have made valuable academic contributions to this field, but there are a couple of dilemmas consistently attached to Pakistan-based research work; one- the scholar community as a whole seems inclined towards writing on the two renowned and oldest CVE programs (*Mishal*- Swat and *Sabaoon*-Malakand) only, while variably missing the rest including the under review *Sabaoon-II* model; two- the predominant emphasis of most writings remain on highlighting the causes of radicalization, deradicalization training modules, challenges involved and recommendations parts only, whereas discussion on core concepts of deradicalization, and mechanics of theological

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& psychological intervention either look completely missing or touched upon in a cursory manner merely.

Acknowledging the hefty academic contributions of Western scholars, perhaps, the whole world stands deeply indebted to the great scholarly works produced by them. John Horgan's works in the interrelated domains of counterterrorism, serve as a beacon for understanding the fundamentals of deradicalization studies. Horgan's personal experience in the field of psychology allows him to critically analyze the militant's mind and explores how social factors affect the engagement and disengagement of individuals with the militancy.²⁶ Daniel Koehler's book *'Understanding Deradicalization: Methods, Tools, and Programs for Countering Violent Extremism'*²⁷ is a masterpiece in the realm of deradicalization studies that has gathered profound applause from all around the globe. The finest thing about the book is that it is a unique product of both theory and practical knowledge, which encompasses all the relevant aspects of deradicalization work in a highly eloquent and comprehensive manner. The scope of the book is so vivid that it qualifies to be termed as a compendium of deradicalization. While Koehler admires the valuable scholarly contributions of esteemed scholars around the world, he also expresses his concern over the inadequacy of theoretical framework and experience-based studies in the field of deradicalization.²⁸ The deradicalization programs do not work in isolation, rather they need to be supported with sound CVE policies and essential groundwork in the

society to enable it to absorb the reformed individuals in it. The critical analysis of West-dominated CVE policies in the world articulated by Arun Kundnani and Ben Hayes highlights the inbuilt paradoxes and idiosyncrasies of global CVE strategy and explains how it has marginalized the Muslim community and has contributed to further growth of extremism in the world.²⁹ Horgan draws attention towards addressing the core grievances held by detainees and argues that deradicalization programs can never be expected to fix the menace of terrorism on permanent grounds unless we slash the basic factors underpinning their engagement.³⁰

While deradicalization studies are seen as still in the infancy stage³¹, the significant works in relevant domains produced over the last two decades are sizeable enough to frame an effective deradicalization program in any part of the world. The renowned compilations by El-Said (*New Approaches to Countering Terrorism; Designing and Evaluating Counter Radicalization and Deradicalization Programs-2015*); Tore Bjorgo and Horgan (*Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement-2008*); and Angel Rabasa (*Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists-2010*) provide deep insight into various aspects of deradicalization models in the world. The works of Horgan and Altier (*The Future of Terrorist De-Radicalization Programs-2012*); Darcy Noricks (*Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together-2009*) and Kurt Braddock (*Weaponized Words: The Strategic Role of Persuasion in Violent Radicalization and*

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Counter-Radicalization-2020) shed light on psychological and social aspects governing the engagement and disengagement of an individual. The remaining gaps regarding theoretical framework, and tools and methods of deradicalization have been adequately covered by Koehler through his experience-based knowledge and extensive research work on the subject. Apparently, all the required knowledge looks perfectly in hand, but still, there is ample room for improvement in the deradicalization studies. To fully grasp the essence of this book, it may be appropriate to bear a few simple questions in mind, which the author attempts to answer in the light of his experience-based knowledge held in this book. Why the degree of success in the case of each model does not seem exceeding a certain limit, while under review model *Sabaoon-II* claims a cent percent result? Is one specific model workable in other parts of the world without incorporating indigenous knowledge? Is every victim state capable of flowing huge lumps of money like Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and the Western world to counter the menace or does the relentless flow of money guarantee sustainable deradicalization of belligerents? If not! what option does a poor country have? Perhaps, even the best program backed by huge financial support is likely to doom unless it is meticulously crafted with the incorporation of vital indigenous knowledge and relentlessly executed under some basic honour codes. The above questions call for defining some guiding principles that could guarantee the success of a deradicalization

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program regardless of geographical boundaries and the magnitude of wealth in the backup. This book manifests the practical application of the “Principles of Transformative Model for Peace Education” (suggested by Turay & English 2008) which helped *Sabaoon-II* achieve cent percent success without conceding a single recidivism case to date of its compilation. The core hypothesis of the research work is that religion is not the central cause of VEm in the Khyber district of erstwhile FATA; rather, multiple structural flaws and cultural violence combined with pseudo-Islamic values goaded the people towards militancy in the region. The study employs a theoretical framework based on the theories of “Conflict triangle” and “Cultural violence” propounded by Johan Galtung to understand the root causes of VEm in the conflict zone of Khyber. Galtung explains that “certain aspects of a culture illustrated by its religion, ideology, and language assume the symbolic value and reason for the existence of that specific culture; and these aspects can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence.”³² He goes on to say that cultural violence makes the violence look justified- or at least not wrong.”³³ The major part of this research is based on ethnographic studies as the author himself has been a member of the pioneer team involved in raising *Sabaoon-II* and managed its training and administrative affairs for a significant period. The book embraces the opinions of various segments of society including ex-militants, local intelligentsia, notables, and *Sabaoon-II* staff to reveal the

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hidden realities underpinning the mayhem. The sampling for interviews was planned to be purposive as it was expected that the respondents may not be easily convinced for interviews, or they may not divulge the precise information owing to obvious reasons of sensitivity of the issue and personal insecurities of the people. A partial limitation associated with deradicalization studies in Pakistan is inaccessibility to information, as the law enforcement agencies of the state do not allow free access to information fearing risk to the personal security of the researcher, and the state in a broader context. For the same reasons, this book uses pseudonyms to hide the true identity of natives and ex-militants interviewed during the research work. This book is different from others as it is based on first-hand knowledge and narrates the deradicalization of hardcore militants in open-prison settings with zero recidivism cases. The breed of militants *Sabaoon-II* dealt with was also fairly different from the rest as they were ideologically much more rigid, hostile, and intimidating in nature; therefore the deradicalization studies shall remain unaccomplished without incorporating vital knowledge from this book.

Chapter 1 offers a bird's-eye view of the international security situation and significant developments at the global level that eventually forced the US to revisit its counter-terrorism policy in 2005. The primary aim of including this chapter in the book is merely to build a perspective for the new audience and develop an

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understanding of global CVE programs and relevant terminologies before leaping into the case study of *Sabaoon-II*. The central argument of the chapter revolves around the paradoxes and idiosyncrasies attached to the US CVE policy, which resulted in the marginalization and further radicalization of the peace-loving Muslim community in the West. The author makes mention of the dilemma with terrorism studies that several concepts related to terrorism studies lack universal recognition, and attempts to challenge a few concepts and terminologies through logical reasoning. The chapter also sheds light on the UN counter-terrorism strategy and the role of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in generating a cohesive response to emerging threats at the global level. The later part of the chapter briefly explains the salient contours of several renowned contemporary CVE programs around the world followed by a glimpse of Pakistan-based CVE efforts.

To fully grasp the case study of *Sabaoon-II*, it is obligatory to have a fair idea of the socio-cultural, and political settings of the area; therefore chapter 2 sheds light on the genesis of extremism in Khyber district. The chapter starts with an ode composed by the author during his military service in the conflict zone, which gives a broad view of the predominant tribal culture of Waziristan and the rest of the agencies in FATA. The central argument encompasses the description of the key factors responsible for precipitating VEm in local society. In the light of Johan Galtung's "Cultural Violence" theory, the author makes an opinion that certain aspects of

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the *Pukhtunwali* (pukhtuns³⁴ code of life) are responsible for nourishing violent behaviours in society. The profound affection of natives towards religion combined with naïve knowledge of religious tenets offered an opportunity to the local pseudo-Islamic scholars to exploit the situation and goad the people to militancy. The chapter also describes how the state perpetrated structural violence upon the natives by depriving them of basic needs necessary for the evolution of a healthy society.

Chapter-3 covers the holistic view of the *Sabaoon-II* CVE project. It gives a chronology of events that led to the establishment of *Sabaoon-II* Deradicalization Center Bara with a brief account of militancy in the Khyber district that was more of a struggle between various factions for controlling the political economy rather than a mere religious brawl. The central argument incorporates a discussion of various training modules and the rehabilitation efforts undertaken by *Sabaoon-II*. It narrates the untold story of the *Sabaoon-II* program, and how its team accomplished the arduous tasks in the face of serious threats and challenges to their lives. It describes how the social workers' team enlightened the local women and rejuvenated the local youth to reconstruct the rubbles on a self-help basis. Towards the end, the author defines the cardinal principles of the *Sabaoon-II*-based therapeutic model, which helped the outfit achieve peace-oriented goals without conceding a single relapse case.

Finally, Chapter 4 sums up the study with some key findings and recommendations for the formulation of a sustainable CVE policy at the national level. The chapter draws attention to the dearth of ethnographic studies and indigenous research work in the field of deradicalization studies which entailed several setbacks to the national cause. Resultantly, the state not only failed to sell its narrative to the outer world, rather it also had to bank on foreign ideas for formulating an effective counter-strategy at home. The author argues that any strategy based on foreign ideas is likely to collapse unless it integrates vital indigenous knowledge. This research is significant as it would allow the presentation of the national narrative and recognition of Pakistan's peace efforts at the global level; and shall also allow people to learn more about deradicalization means, carry out critique on it and help further evolution of deradicalization studies around the world.

Globalization of Countering Violent Extremism Policies

Since the beginning of the WoT, the threat of VEM has exponentially increased. As is today, this threat is geographically more dispersed and even more localized than in 2001 when it was confined to merely a few states; yet, it does not seem waning despite the mobilization of national governments, state security departments, and multilateral institutions around the world.¹ In 2001, under the auspices of the UNSC and the concurrence of global leadership, the Bush administration decided to lead the WoT with lofty ambitions to root out terrorism, establish peace, and make the world a better place to live. But what happened was just the opposite, as the pandemic gradually flourished both horizontally and vertically,² and now it has become an enigma for the whole world to wait and see how long it takes to disappear from the face of the earth. Amidst all the failures to contain the perceived threat in Afghanistan, the Anglo-American coalition decided to open yet another front against Saddam Hussein-led government in Iraq in 2003, with an optimistic

approach that oppressed Iraqi people would side with the coalition forces against the tyrant ruler.³ Ironically, this strategy turned into a fiasco, as it resulted in an abrupt upsurge in *Al Qaeda's* activities in Europe.⁴ The earliest indicator of *Al Qaeda's* influence in Europe was exhibited in the form of Madrid commuter train bombings on March 11, 2004, in which 192 people died and more than 1400 wounded as a result of ten devices exploding shortly before morning 0800 hours.⁵ Fernando Reinares refers to this incident as *Al Qaeda's* revenge, which Osama bin Laden had publicly promised in October 2003 on the pretext of Spanish involvement in the Iraqi invasion.⁶ This incident passed on a strong signal to the global hierarchy that although the US had shredded the organizational infrastructure of *Al Qaeda* in Afghanistan, but *Al Qaeda* had substantively instituted its stronghold inside the West.

During the period from 2001-2005, the main focus of US strategy had been on extra-judicial violence to kill or capture and torture the suspected *Al Qaeda* leaders, but this strategy did not seem to make headway as it resulted in further proliferation of threat to Europe as well.⁷ Therefore in the face of grave setbacks to the policy and failures in the achievement of pronounced goals in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US decided to revisit its counter-terrorism policy in 2005.⁸ The new strategy termed as 'counter violent extremism (CVE) strategy' incorporated the concept of complementing hardcore military operations through the employment of the 'Winning hearts and minds' campaign

and countering the spread of so-called 'radical Islam' through a battle of ideas against extremist ideologies.⁹ While the policy added another dimension of battling ideas to warfare, it also invited extensive criticism from several European countries and Muslims around the world. The CVE policy meant that on one hand hardcore military operations would continue, and on the other hand, the practicing Muslims suspected of bearing ideas that did not align with the cultural and religious doctrine of the Western world will be subjected to theological interventions. A significant impact of the US policy shift was the marginalization of the Muslim community living in the West which could even result in the radicalization of law-abiding peaceful citizens and becoming supportive of *Al Qaeda's* ideology.¹⁰

Definitions and Terminologies

The research reveals a consistent dilemma with terrorism studies that several concepts related to terrorism studies lack universal recognition. The definitions of core concepts like extremism, terrorism, and radicalism oscillate between write-ups of various scholars hailing from diverse religious, ideological, and regional backgrounds. As the use of these terminologies has become a routine affair in academic circles and both public and governmental settings, there is a need to discuss these concepts to develop a better understanding of this study. Kundnani and Hayes regard the US CVE policy as the battle of ideas against extremist

ideologies and radical Islam.¹¹ If this policy is genuinely a battle of ideas against so-called radical Islam then it is obligatory to examine the concept of Extremism in the light of Islamic literature. Although there exists no accurate definition of 'Extremism' in Islam, however, if extremism means lacking moderation in ideas and leaning towards extreme ones, then this phenomenon has been condemned by Qur'an and *Hadith* numerous times. For instance, Prophet Muhammad (May peace be upon him) would tell his companions "O' people! beware of exaggeration in religious matters for those who came before you were doomed because of exaggeration in religious matters."¹² As per a layman's understanding extremism means bearing immoderate ideas which lead to chaos in society. Going by this approach extremism may be equated with the Arabic word *Fa'sad* which means spreading anarchy in the system by upsetting the equilibrium. On an occasion Allah says in Qur'an, "and when it is said to them, do not spread anarchy on the earth, they say, we are but reformers."¹³ Astonishingly, this happens to be the verbatim stance of contemporary militants too, who proclaim to be rather reformers instead of being called terrorists. On another occasion, Allah enjoins upon people to, "eat and drink from the provisions of Allah and do not commit abuse on the earth by spreading anarchy."¹⁴ The first Muslim caliph- Abu Bakr Siddique (may Allah be pleased with him) would always instruct the commander of his troops to abide by the rules of engagement before sending them to the battlefield,

I command upon you ten injunctions, remember these; do not embezzle; do not cheat, do not break trust, do not mutilate the dead; do not kill a child or an old man or a woman; do not hew down a date, palm or burn it; do not cut down a fruit tree; do not slaughter a goat or cow or camel except for food... Maybe, you will pass near people who have secluded themselves in monasteries- leave them and their monasteries.¹⁵

The succeeding Caliphs including Umar bin Khattab, Uthman bin Affan, Ali ibn Talib, and famous Muslim general Khalid bin Waleed are also reported to have issued the same instructions to their subordinate commanders while moving to the battlefield.¹⁶ The emphasis of Islam on human rights and rules of engagement for the protection of war victims can be gauged from the historic fact that Islam furnished these conventions back in the 7th century A.D, whereas the Western struggle for *Jus ad Bellum* and *Jus in Bello* started in the 17th century and continued till 20th century A.D. (Geneva conventions -1949).¹⁷ Based on the Prophet's conduct during the wars against his opponents, Muslim scholars have compiled Islamic conventions of war awarding extensive human rights not only to the prisoners of war, rather to all including men, women, children, material, and property of the adversary.¹⁸ The Islamic books dealing with *Jus ad Bellum* and *Jus in Bello* were named *Siyar*.¹⁹

The in-depth study of Islamic literature reveals that extremism has no place in Islamic ideology, rather it is merely a state of mind that lacks the vital element of moderation in the thought process of an individual

regardless of his colour creed, or the nation he belongs to. When this imperfect state of mind negatively affects society such that an individual's actions instill fear amongst innocent people; cause physical damage to the private and collective property of society; cause harm to social fiber or threaten the life of other individuals through violent behaviours, the individual is believed to be an extremist. Now an important question arises as to who would decide the element of negativity in the behaviours of people. Is there a standard yardstick to judge extremism in an individual or does any central authority exist in the world to standardize ethical rules for all nations and states to follow? Most certainly, in this multi-cultural, multi-lingual, and multi-religious world, there stands no such chance. The straightforward answer to these questions may be that either Qur'anic verses may be accepted as standard guidelines to bring uniformity of approach or every nation-state to define these terms as per local cultural and religious norms. The philosophical contrast between the Islamic and non-Islamic world is so vivid that certain acts which are acceptable amongst non-Muslims in the name of individual liberty and modernism are indeed highly abominable in the eyes of Islam and vice versa. The non-Muslim society regards wearing the headscarf as a symbol of suppression of women, but Islam views it as modesty. In the West nudity or wearing revealing clothes may be regarded as modernism, but in Islam, it is highly immoral. The West may view the ridiculing of prophets as freedom of speech,

but it is an act of blasphemy in Islam. Muslims tend to look up to religion in every aspect of life, whereas non-Muslims may regard it as backwardness, extremism, or fundamentalism. Amidst these overwhelming differences, converging the whole world on uniform cultural values and belief systems seems to be an inaccessible goal. The Holy Qur'an says, "O mankind! We have created you from a single male and a female, and made you in nations and tribes, that you may know one another, surely the most noble of you in the sight of Allah is the most righteous among you."²⁰ From a progressive point of view, the inbuilt diversity in the cultural values, traditions, and belief systems of the world indeed adds beauty to the universe, rather than a source of hatred for each other. The more a healthy mind learns about other cultures, the more it develops love and attraction towards them; however, a sick mind is likely to develop envy greed, and hatred for others. The conflict occurs when in pursuit of globalization various states or nations try to carve out uniformity of approach by imposing a specific ideology on other nations thereby seeking forced compliance from them. Primarily, the idea of carving out uniformity in a heterogeneous world is based on an extremist approach that denies the right of survival to other ideologies.

The concept of Radicalism is closely related to and sometimes is interchangeably used with the word 'extremism,' however, they are not essentially the same. Daniel Koehler defines 'Radicalism' as "a process of an

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individual's de-pluralization of political concepts and values (e.g. justice, freedom, honor, violence, democracy) according with those concepts employed by a specific ideology."²¹ Charles E Allen describes radicalization as, "the process of adopting an extremist belief system, including the willingness to use, supports or facilitates violence, as a method to affect societal change."²² Going by Daniel's definition, If radicalization is a process of de-pluralization of one's political concepts, then most Americans who believe democracy to be the only acceptable form of governance stand radical to the non-believers of democracy and vice versa. Perhaps every ideology is inherently different from others and involves self-exaltation and deflating other ideologies; therefore the stage is set for any type of direct violence.²³ The chronicles of history reveal that Nelson Mandela, Martin Luther King Junior, George Washington, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, and Mahatma Gandhi were all radicals in the eyes of respective despotic regimes, but simultaneously they were heroes for their suppressed nations. This logical reasoning implies that radicalism is a relative term and is not an undesirable notion; rather it is the brainchild of a healthy-thinking mind that criticizes the existing values and paves the way for the evolution of new knowledge for the progress of society. Hamed El-Said believes that radicalization is not an illicit act and considering this phenomenon as illegal generates ethical dilemmas."²⁴ He goes on to say that even most Western

democratic states do not consider radicalization as illegal.²⁵ Peter Neumann rather glorifies radicalization and says,

Not only is being a radical no crime in America, but the very idea of radicalism also has a positive connotation in a nation whose founding principles were seen as radical, even revolutionary, at the time. Only when radicalization crosses the line and becomes violent do we treat it as illegal and criminal.²⁶

Having viewed radicalization from various angles, it can be inferred that radicalization is not a negative notion; however, if it is inevitable to give it a negative color, then we may need to redefine radicalization such as, "Radicalization is a state of mind, wherein an individual lacks the sense of acceptability for the peaceful co-existence of people beholding diverse political, ideological, religious, and socio-cultural beliefs, and tries to enforce his such ideas upon others through coercive means." Deradicalization is the process of renouncing an extremist philosophy of life, with a conviction that the use of violence is not an acceptable way of effecting change in society.²⁷ A study compiled by RAND Corporation defines Deradicalization as "a process through which an individual overthrows extremist philosophy, rejects violence as a means to affect social change, and instead starts believing in political pluralism."²⁸ Counter-radicalization denotes the process of preventing vulnerable youth, groups, and communities from falling prey to radicalism. The target of counter-radicalization is not the terrorist, rather it aims at the groups and the people who can be approached by violent

extremists to seek sympathy, support, or recruitment in the extremist outfit.²⁹

John Hogan's work on the concept of Disengagement comprehensively covers both physical and psychological aspects leading to the phenomenon of disengagement of an individual. "Disengagement of an individual from terrorism does not necessarily mean that he is not non-radicalized too, nor deradicalization necessarily accompanies disengagement."³⁰ Disengagement is a transitory phase between engagement and deradicalization, and the individual still retains an option to re-engage or head towards deradicalization. Disengagement may occur under various circumstances; firstly, a militant rejects the violent means to effect change but chooses to continue the same struggle academically; secondly, a militant believes in violence and the veracity of his cause, but temporarily becomes dormant till the rise of a favorable situation to re-engage; thirdly, disengagement may also occur as a result of peer group pressure or as a result of disaffection from an individual or ideology that inspired him to engage in militancy.³¹ Usually, it is perceived that the disengagement phase precedes the deradicalization phase, but at times it may happen in the reverse order. For instance, during an interview with an ex-militant of the *LashkarIslam* organization, it was revealed that though he knew the path he had been treading was not correct, he could not disengage due to fear of severe retributions on behalf of his militant outfit.³²

In the realm of counter-terrorism studies, there are two major types of programs; one is 'Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs and the other is Deradicalization, and Disengagement Programs (DDP). The 'DDR' programs usually include three phases: first- the collection and destruction of the belligerent parties' weapons; second- the demobilization and dismantling of groups and militias involved in militancy; and third- the reintegration of former militants back into society through psychological counseling, education, and financial assistance.³³ Most DDR programs were designed for countries facing active insurgency or civil wars and became a special tool to be used by the UN for peacekeeping missions.³⁴ The 'DDP' mainly refers to programs designed for helping individuals to quit violent radical behaviors and exit terrorist groups, followed by their rehabilitation in society. The focus of these programs is not only on radicalized individuals; rather it works proactively to prevent vulnerable people from leaning towards violent movements.³⁵ Most CVE programs presently being run around the world may be considered to fall in the ambit of DDP. Although the fundamental idea behind both DDR and DDP is to bring peace and stability to a victimized region at the end of the war, both differ from each other about their application in different settings; DDR stands more relevant to countries confronted with active insurgency, whereas DDP pertains to all states whether currently face-off with insurgency or facing substantial VEM threat.

United Nations Counter-Terrorism Strategy

After the incident of 9/11, the UNSC provided the basic platform to generate a cohesive response to emerging threats at the global level. The flagship resolution 1368 was passed on 12 September 2001-just a day after the 9/11 incident which unequivocally condemned the horrific terrorist attacks on American soil and called for all nations to work together to bring justice to the perpetrators, organizers, and sponsors of these attacks.³⁶ On September 28, 2001, UNSC passed Resolution 1373, which comprehensively covered the key aspects associated with terrorism. The significant features of the resolution include; one- the establishment of a counter-terrorism committee (CTC) to monitor the implementation of minutes of the resolution; two- the resolution called for all the member states to block financial support of terrorist outfits and freeze the financial assets of people associated with terrorism; three- emphasizes upon states to formulate strict laws to criminalize the act of providing or collecting such funds by their nationals, which could be possibly used for financing terrorism.³⁷

During the period from 2002 to 2004, several major terrorist attacks occurred around the globe (including Bali bombings, hostage-taking in Moscow, followed by bomb attacks in Kenya, Bogota, Columbia, Istanbul, and Madrid) which shook the world and challenged the efficacy of global strategy on counter-terrorism. In the follow-up of these incidents, UNSC resolution 1535 was passed in March 2004,

deciding upon the creation of a counter-terrorism committee executive directorate (CTED) to enhance the CTC's ability to monitor the implementation of resolution 1373 and effectively continue the capacity-building work, in which it was engaged.³⁸ Resolution 1566 adopted by UNSC in October 2004 called for establishing an international fund to compensate victims of terrorist acts and their families.³⁹ Resolution 1624 was passed in September 2005, and was later termed by UNSC as the bedrock of its global CVE strategy; it stressed the vital role of media, civil and religious communities, and educational institutions in nurturing healthy environments which are not conducive to the proliferation of terrorism. The resolution called upon all the member states to resolve their regional disputes, promote inter-faith harmony through dialogues, and criminalize the act of inciting terrorism through hate speech and denying safe havens to persons guilty of such conduct.⁴⁰ The UNSC resolution 2178 adopted in September 2014 brought a decisive swing in UN counter-terrorism policy when the focus shifted from countering terrorism to countering violent extremism (CVE). This paradigm shift in UN strategy came up when ISIS succeeded in seizing large swaths of territory in Iraq and Syria. Fearing terrorists' ability to attract recruits from other countries, UNSC adopted this resolution, thereby decreeing upon states to prevent the transit of suspected individuals in and out of their countries. Resolution 2178 emphasized upon member states to take measures to prevent radicalization,

mobilization, and recruitment of individuals into terrorist organizations by engaging local societies and non-governmental actors in evolving policies to counter violent extremist narratives that can provoke terrorist acts.⁴¹

Since the time of the 9/11 bombings- over approximately two decades the UNSC has adopted 47 resolutions⁴² that define the salient perimeters of global counter-terrorism strategy. Presently more than 30 agencies are working under the banner of the UN in countering terrorism; the most prominent being, Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), Counter-terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED), the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF), the UN Counter-terrorism Center (UNCCT) and the Terrorism Sanctions Monitoring Committees. The main task of these agencies is to offer capacity-building assistance to member states.⁴³ From time to time CTC has been consistently innovating new legislation and carrying out in-house readjustments corresponding to the rising challenges; but certain legal constraints, infrastructural inconsistencies, and varying levels of response on behalf of member states have gravely marred the overall efficiency of the UN's global counter-terrorism strategy.⁴⁴

Contemporary Transformative Models in the World

The global campaign on CVE has given birth to a plethora of transformative models over the past two decades with a common goal of toning down the extremist

and violent behaviors of both combatants and potential combatants. As per rough estimation around fifty countries around the world are presently hosting CVE programs with the exact number of models yet to be ascertained as each country is simultaneously administrating several programs in its different regions with different titles, varied features, and diverse scopes. One glaring difference between Western and non-Western models is that most Western models incorporate active participation of civil society including NGOs and the private sector⁴⁵ whereas, in the case of non-Western models civil society looks relatively inactive due to the predominant role of government agencies. As one model does not suit all, therefore every state has tweaked a certain model according to its local settings, resources at hand, and the nature of threat perception in that country. The objective of this study is not to re-discuss the worldwide programs that have been discussed by several scholars umpteen times; however, for the sake of general awareness, it is pertinent to have a bird's-eye view of a few renowned models around the globe.

Saudi Arabian Model

The Saudi model (commonly known as the Prevention, Rehabilitation, and After-care approach) is considered as one of the most successful programs in the world⁴⁶ and is usually regarded as a role model for other states as well. The Prevention part includes religious and psychological conditioning that occurs during the detention period in

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prison. The individuals showing positive behaviors and who have not been involved in serious crimes are shifted to a rehabilitation center called 'Prince Muhammad bin Nayef Center' where they are imparted vocational skills besides intensive psychological and theological intervention.⁴⁷ The most auspicious feature of the Saudi model is its 'After-Care' component which gives it an upper edge over the rest of the programs in the world. It includes sizeable monthly stipends, heavy donations for marriages, and provision of cars, housing, and health care for the whole family. During a visit to Prince Muhammad bin Nayef Center in 2015, an ex-official of *Sabaoon-II* observed that the beneficiaries enjoyed an extravagant lifestyle such that their amenities matched those available in a not less than a five-star hotel.⁴⁸

Yemen's Model

Yemen's deradicalization program is perceived to be the oldest one in the Middle East that was kicked off in 2002 in prison-based settings.⁴⁹ After the 9/11 attacks, the Yemeni government arrested a large number of people who were thought to be affiliated with terrorist networks in Afghanistan and had some connection with the USS Cole bombings; besides many having only a peripheral connection with extremism.⁵⁰ As the pressure from their families grew stronger the government decided to release the individuals who had not committed serious crimes after reforming their ideology through a religious dialogue. As a result of the dialogue, the government released 364 detainees after getting signed a certificate from them that

they renounce their previous ideology.⁵¹ According to the government, 90 percent of the beneficiaries of the program had been radicalized in Saudi Arabia and other countries and had spent time in Pakistan and Afghanistan, therefore awarding amnesty on the condition that they will not recede to terrorism seemed justified.⁵² The program included only limited assistance for jobs and monitoring of beneficiaries for at least one year. Most scholars regard the Yemeni model as a failure due to a large number of recidivism cases⁵³ and few fundamental errors in the whole project; firstly- the program merely relied on religious dialogue while disregarding the individual's psycho-social therapy and psychoanalysis before reintegration, and secondly, the program lacked strong financial support and a sound rehabilitation plan to keep them away from extremist activities.

Denmark's Aarhus Model

Aarhus is a non-prison-based governmental model being run by Danish police since 1980. Initially, the program was developed to address the issues related to youth gangs only, but after the event of 9/11, it also incorporated ideological intervention as an essential component to address radicalization issues in society.⁵⁴ The program revolves around information houses located in the various community areas of Aarhus city. Each information house has a mixed team of police officers and social workers who obtain information regarding suspected radicals through consistent interaction with the local community. On

identification of suspected cases, a task force comprising officials from a wide range of government agencies and mentors reaches out to the concerned individual and imparts required assistance in the form of theological intervention or provision of job, or dealing with drug issues. Aarhus is a classic example of cooperation between government and civil societies.⁵⁵ Germany's Beratungs-und Interventionsgruppe Gegen Rechtsextremismus (BIGREX) model also works on the lines of the Danish Aarhus model which came up in 2001; the major difference is that Aarhus is run by local police of Aarhus city whereas BIGREX is managed through state criminal police who along with social workers team delivers the required assistance to the suspected cases at their homes.⁵⁶

Singapore's Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG)

During 2001-2002 the law enforcement agencies of Singapore arrested 34 members of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) - a proscribed militant organization affiliated with *Al Qaeda* in Singapore.⁵⁷ Since the individuals had not committed any crime on the soil of Singapore, therefore due to legal constraints the government could neither prosecute the individuals nor they could be released fearing the uncertainties associated with their release.⁵⁸ On the other hand, any unwarranted action on the government's behalf could also lead to fear, panic, and severe disturbance due to the presence of a sizeable Muslim community in Singapore.⁵⁹ Hence the government decided to engage a group of religious teachers commonly known as *asatizah* for

the transformation of their extremist ideologies, which later formed a voluntary group to be termed as Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG).⁶⁰ When started in 2003, the group consisted of 16 male teachers who would work on detainees and 5 female teachers who focused on the rehabilitation of their families.⁶¹ Gradually, RRG kept broadening its scope and size as the number of members grew from 16 in 2003 to 34 in 2016.⁶² Since most of the RRG members were not qualified in counseling methods, therefore the government of Singapore arranged special training schedules to impart counseling skills to the RRG's members.⁶³

Initially, the path they trod was not smooth as a part of the Muslim community and detainees would also tag the group as 'hypocrites' or government agents.⁶⁴ But RRG successfully continued its journey to clarify the ideas that instill hatred and violence in society and tarnish the image of Islam. As is now, RRG also conducts seminars and public talks to the community to spread the true peaceful version of Islam; and in recognition of its services, it became Singapore's first organization to receive *Anugerah Jauhari Berita Harian* 2014 or Berita Harian Achiever of the Year Award.⁶⁵

British 'Prevent' Program

The Prevent program is one of the four components of the UK's Counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST-2); other components including Pursue, Protect, and Prepare. Since the 'Prevent' component is the flagship component and

others are generally related to government policies to check proliferation through administrative actions, therefore we confine to the description of Prevent methodology only. The 'Prevent' component focuses on the prevention and disruption of VEm in society through the partnership of local NGOs, police, and local government.⁶⁶ It simultaneously works on five prongs; prong one aims at promoting moderate Islamic scholars and countering radical Islamization at all forums; prong two aims at countering radicalization through the internet, mosques, schools, and various community places; prong three works on mentoring individuals who are found vulnerable to radicalism. To implement prong three, the government has introduced the 'Channel' project. The 'Channel' identifies potential radicals through intelligence networks or the local community including family, friends, teachers, and close associates. After identification, the 'Channel' team assesses the individual's belief system and then decides upon the type and level of intervention required for him through police, local imam, or some family member.⁶⁷ The methods of intervention used by the 'Channel' include conflict management, psychological counseling, career services, and theological debates. A glaring observation about its *modes operandi* is that, even though an individual has not broken the law as yet but is found to have connections with extremists, he stands qualified for intervention by the 'Channel' team. Although many countries have emulated the 'Channel' program, generally it is not much liked by the

community as it is considered to be spying on the private lives of the general public.⁶⁸ The fourth prong of the 'Prevent' works on increasing the resilience of communities in combating extremist ideologies while prong five focuses on addressing the resentments and afflictions of the society which ultimately lead to the radicalization of people.⁶⁹

Canadian Model

Canada's counter-terrorism strategy came up in 2013 by the name 'Building Resilience against Terrorism' and works on four major prongs including, (1) Prevent (2) Detect (3) Deny (4) Respond.⁷⁰ Like the British CONTEST-II strategy, Canada also has a vital 'Prevent' strand that works roughly on the same lines as the British 'Prevent' program does. As part of the 'Prevent' strategy, the Calgary police introduced a 'ReDirect' project in 2015. Since the ReDirect staff acquired initial training from British 'Channel' staff, therefore, both 'ReDirect' and 'Channel' programs generally function on the same lines.⁷¹ ReDirect receives information regarding suspected cases through phone calls from loved ones, and after a complete assessment of the individuals decides upon the type of assistance to be provided to the individual.⁷² Since the Canadian government was late in developing an indigenous counter-terrorism strategy, several community groups initiated their programs, of which the Islamic Social Services Association (ISSA) and Hayat Canada Family support foundation are two prominent names.⁷³ Out of these two groups, only Hayat Foundation could successfully deliver nationwide counseling services with

the support of private donations;⁷⁴ Hayat's main objective is to target the families and friends of individuals who are either already engaged with a radical organization or are heading towards extremism. Although Hayat successfully provided nationwide counseling services to the concerned families, recently its activities have considerably reduced due to a shortage of resources.⁷⁵

Victoria Prison Model

In 2010, the Australian government established the Global Terrorism Research Center (GTReC) at Monash University with the task to carry out research on causes of radicalization and formulate policy guidelines for devising CVE strategy in Australia.⁷⁶ Hence, the first-ever deradicalization effort was started by Victorian authorities as a pilot project in Melbourne prison in 2010. It is a type of model most commonly found in European prison settings wherein vocational training, psychosocial therapy, and post-release job settlement are observed as routine practices for a long; however, what makes it different from other prison models is, its focus on theological intervention which is not a common practice in European prisons. The program works with the close collaboration of the Islamic Council of Victoria (ICV). The ICV sends scholars to prison every week that imparts religious intervention to detainees arrested on terrorism-related charges. The ICV *imams*⁷⁷ deliver lectures and debates on various concepts baffling their minds and impart the true version of Islam concerning *Jihad* and other important aspects related to human rights.⁷⁸ The Goulburn

jail in New South Wales (Australia) also imparts theological intervention through its innate chaplaincy that provides religious mentoring to all detainees including Jewish Christians, Hindus, and Muslims through clergies of their respective faiths.⁷⁹

As part of its counter-radicalization campaign, Victoria has also developed a non-prison model known as Lecture and Open Discussion Forum (LoD) introduced in 2010. The program focuses on the counter-radicalization of society and rehabilitation of former violent extremist detainees. The Victorian police in collaboration with ICV interact with former detainees every month and deliver lectures on religious matters usually inside a local mosque.⁸⁰ Sydney police also developed a counter-radicalization model on the same lines called Community Outreach Program (COR) in 2007. This program targets the vulnerable Muslim youths wandering in the streets through a Liaison Committee (LC) comprising a social worker, a psychologist, and a police official. The LC identifies hotspots in the city where the youth (including school dropouts with no jobs, and those involved in drugs) usually wanders in the streets at night and imparts the required therapy to the targeted individuals.⁸¹

Pakistan-Based CVE Efforts

Pakistan's first-ever National Internal Security Policy (NISP) came up in February 2014. As per the policy guidelines, the prime responsibility to prepare a

comprehensive national counter-terrorism strategy rests with National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA). Its mandate includes the collection of information from all quarters and dissemination to all stakeholders, establishing liaison with concerned international entities, carrying out research work on the fields related to terrorism and extremism, and implementation of the Counter-terrorism and extremism (CTE) policy of the state.⁸²The performance of NACTA has not been so encouraging during the past years largely due to an acute shortage of funds and essential staff. Its performance can be gauged from the fact that after its inception in 2008, the first-ever meeting of its board of governors was held in September 2018 that was chaired by the then-prime minister of Pakistan- Imran Khan.⁸³ Thereafter, although NACTA has improved upon the number of meetings (the 18th meeting held in March 2021), but it still needs to go a long way before it becomes an assertive and effective unit. NACTA's annual report (2019) reflects certain achievements in capacity-building training of judges, prosecutors, investigators, and intelligence agencies personnel,⁸⁴ The reduced number of terrorism acts, and the increased number of tourists in victimized areas of Pakistan display substantial success on behalf of NACTA.⁸⁵The number of CVE projects in Pakistan has reduced from ten in 2015⁸⁶ to merely one in 2023 while the requirement for such programs has increased manyfold in the wake of soaring radicalism in the society. While monitoring and assisting countrywide CVE projects is its

prime responsibility, the *Sabaon-II* officials deny the existence of any affiliation or contact with NACTA, let alone thought of any assistance provided by the focal counterterrorism institute of the state.

A strong theological base forms the bedrock of the emergence and existence of Pakistan, therefore an obvious tilt of a common citizen towards religion is a natural phenomenon. The Pakistan-based society is a blend of diverse ethnicities and the nature of radicalization also differs from region to region. The lineage of CVE programs in Pakistan can be traced back to 2008 when the Pakistan government engaged Singapore's 'International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research' (ICPVTR) to seek assistance for the establishment of the national rehabilitation program in Pakistan.⁸⁷ The main objective behind initiating CVE programs in Pakistan was to offer an incentive to incarcerated militants to reform their ideology and provide them a second chance to lead a peaceful life.⁸⁸ Consequently, after the end of military operation Rah-e-Rast in Swat valley, Deradicalization and Emancipation Program (DREP) was kicked off as a joint venture between the Pakistan army and a Lahore-based local NGO 'Hum' in 2009. Initially, the program had three major components; one- *Sabaon* for juveniles between 12 to 18 years of age at Batkhela in Malakand division; two- *Mishal* for adult detainees at Mingora in district Swat; three- *Rastoon* for youth between 19-25 years age at Barikot in district Swat.⁸⁹ Subsequently, *Zarghoona* and FEAST projects also came up

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in Swat; *Naway Sehr* and *Ghalani* projects at Bajour and Mohmand districts (erstwhile FATA) respectively in 2011; *Heila* and *Sparlay* in district Tank in 2012.⁹⁰ Similarly, a few other Deradicalization centers were also established in other districts of FATA, KP, and Baluchistan province. Although all the above-mentioned programs other than the under-review (*Sabaoon-II*) have been closed either due to the accomplishment of their mission or due to lack of requisite funds; but to put the records straight, and acknowledge the vital role they played in the establishment of peace and stability in the country, it is appropriate to describe salient contours of a few renowned projects.

*Sabaoon*⁹¹ happens to be the flagship project of DREP that was raised for the rehabilitation and deradicalization of juveniles (12-18 years of age) apprehended during the Swat military operation. The project was launched in September 2009 with an initial strength of 22 children retained in a rehabilitation camp in Batkhela (Malakand division of KP province).⁹² Most of the participants were well-trained militants who had undergone extensive training, and could proficiently use small arms weaponry and many of them had also been trained for suicide bombing as well. The most horrible thing that came up during the psychoanalysis of these juveniles, as narrated by Feriha Peracha is that most of the *Sabaoon* kids showed signs of physical abuse during their militancy careers.⁹³ The *Sabaoon* deradicalization training regime included four primary components including the psychological, religious, vocational, and

social modules; however, the main emphasis of the program focused on the educational grooming of the kids and consistent engagement with their parents and families. *Sabaoon* offered formal education to the participants like regular students of any government school affiliated with the KP Board of Education.⁹⁴ *Sabaoon* was an open-prison model, and the beneficiaries were treated like regular hostel students. *Sabaoon*(Malakand) attached huge importance to the role of parents in the deradicalization of juveniles; therefore, it allowed frequent interaction of beneficiaries with their families. In January 2020, the program was terminated and its beneficiary juveniles (approximately 20) were merged with *Sabaoon-II* Bara.

*The Mishal*⁹⁵ program was emulated from the Saudi Arabian model and was raised at the site of an under-construction hotel- Pythom in Mingora (district Swat) in 2010. The Pythom compound had a detention center wherein the militants were housed in prison-based settings. The *Mishal* team would maintain a track record of incarcerated militants' behavior during detention and after thorough psychoanalysis would select suitable individuals for imparting deradicalization training. Besides psychotherapy and theological interventions, *Mishal* would also impart six months of vocational training to militants in various trades by professional instructors. The social module training focused on the development of social skills and resilience amongst the beneficiaries by encouraging them to participate in sports and cultural activities so that

they may not face many difficulties during the rehabilitation phase.⁹⁶

Apart from military-run deradicalization efforts, the Punjab police also took an initiative in 2011, under the supervision of the Counter-terrorism Department (CTD) to impart deradicalization training to militants of local proscribed sectarian organizations.⁹⁷ The pilot project involved theological intervention, psychological reconditioning, and vocational training of the beneficiaries. During the period from July 2011 to July 2012, three batches comprising a total strength of 311 beneficiaries graduated from the said program. The project remained functional for merely one calendar year and was short-closed in 2012 due to undisclosed reasons by the Punjab government.⁹⁸

Analysis

Horgan and Braddock recommend using the terminology of “Risk reduction programs” to be more precise for referring to deradicalization initiatives.⁹⁹ Horgan and Altier co-authored an article, *The Future of Terrorist Deradicalization Programs*, in which they call these risk reduction programs to be nothing more than a trash heap of silver bullet solutions unless we have a deeper understanding of the factors that lead to disengagement and re-engagement of individuals in terrorism.¹⁰⁰ The words of Braddock, Horgan, and Altier have a very deeper meaning that, unless the real drivers and motivational causes of extremism are not precisely addressed, the

deradicalization initiatives either stand useless or may be termed as flimsy measures that moderate the threat level on a provisional basis only. Taking the lead from the above argument, if peace and stability is the ultimate objective of worldwide deradicalization efforts, then there is a need to focus on the root causes that breed radicalism in various communities. In reality, radicalization has innumerable forms that are usually area-specific with a varying degree of threat in each region. For instance, in European settings, violence comes up as a result of some bigoted ideologies like a certain nation is more civilized and modern than others; whites are more intelligent and logical than non-whites; or certain beliefs are indisputably true and not believing in them reflects badly on the non-believers, not on the belief.¹⁰¹ Galtung believes in the strong presence of these ideas in Western culture. Imagine America's staunch belief in democracy, and see how in its pursuit, it triggered violence all around the world since the inception of the cold war. Intoxication of American youth with the notion of 'American Exceptionalism' such that, "the United States is inherently different from other nations,"¹⁰² is an example of cultural violence as it involves self-exaltation and deflates the existence of other nations thereby setting the stage for direct violence.¹⁰³ Similarly, the post 9/11 marginalization of Muslim communities in the West, debate on growing beards and wearing *hijab*, and blasphemous acts of desecrating the Qur'an and Holy Prophet are a few violent acts on behalf of West-based populations that result in

further radicalization of the Muslim world.¹⁰⁴ In light of the above argument, it can be inferred that addressing the unconventional behaviors of society assumes much greater importance than merely focusing on the deradicalization of ex-militants and incarcerated criminals.

A broader view of worldwide CVE efforts reveals that all these programs have roughly the same concept and similar features but are essentially different from each other in terms of their methodology and resources at hand. The European programs are generally focused on counter-radicalization, involving the active participation of governmental institutions, NGOs private sector, and almost all segments of society. The concept of psycho-social therapy, combined with vocational training and rehabilitation plan in prison-based settings is a usual phenomenon that has been existing in the West for a long time. Similarly, Western academia has also contributed extensive research work on counterterrorism studies which allowed respective governments to formulate proactive strategies to combat the menace in their respective countries. Paradoxically, in the Muslim-majority states of the Afro-Asian region where the threat is much more intense, the seriousness at both governmental and civil society levels seems to lie below the desired threshold. For instance, Pakistan's focal organization on terrorism-related work is NACTA which was established in 2008, but the organization could not convene a single meet till September 2018, when its board of governors finally met for the very

first time in the initial ten years.¹⁰⁵ Likewise, the scholarly contributions in the field of academia are also not significantly high. Resultantly, the dearth of indigenous research compels the state to import foreign ideas that may not essentially fit into the local dynamics. Generally, most models in the Middle East and Southeast Asia pursue both deradicalization and counter-radicalization projects.¹⁰⁶ Singapore's RRG model is a classic example of the significant role played by civil society in combating terrorism. It is a kind of model that is not only comprehensive in all respects; rather it is much more cost-effective and suits all nations regardless of their economic status and threat perception. While the Saudi program is highly cherished in the world, it involves the circulation of huge money¹⁰⁷ and therefore seems relatively impractical for most Afro-Asian countries due to the paucity of resources.

The global CVE policies have a few innate paradoxes which are considered counter-productive to the success of the CVE programs. While CVE programs work on the deradicalization of extremist elements, these inconsistencies are manipulated by extremists to invite a huge influx of new radicals to their entity. For instance, as per UK's Home Office report, most young Muslims in the UK were recruited to militant organizations as a result of alienation and social defection- extremist elements may not have advocated them for violence but they provided an environment for some to join the violence.¹⁰⁸ The White

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House defines VEm as, "Individuals who support or commit ideologically-motivated violence to further political goals."¹⁰⁹ Going by this definition, all the foreign interventions on behalf US and her NATO allies, to promote democracy around the world, fall in the ambit of VEm. Also by this definition, the contemporary US' drive to regime change in Middle Eastern countries stands unwarranted as it draws fuel from the theory of 'American Exceptionalism.'¹¹⁰ Similarly, Denmark's action plan to prevent extremism defines extremism as, "totalitarian and anti-democratic ideologies, intolerance to the views of others, hostile imagery, and a division into 'them' and 'us'."¹¹¹ Going by this definition, a large chunk of the Danish population, though peaceful by nature, fall in the loop of extremism as they may carry a degree of intolerance towards others or distinguish some people to be insiders and others outsiders. But regrettably, there is no CVE policy formulated to prevent the spread of Danish nativism or American Exceptionalism.¹¹² A pragmatic approach suggests that the paradoxes and mockeries associated with definitions of various concepts and CVE strategies are likely to persist as long as the world does not become a homogeneous unit with a singular government and uniform belief system. Every nation-state defines the core concepts as per its own suiting and devises strategies to serve its national interest in the best possible manner, therefore seeking universal concurrence in all domains is

not only impractical but reflects a de-pluralistic approach rather.

Conclusion

As a result of the revised counter-terrorism strategy of the US, a large number of CVE programs emerged all across the globe with a common goal to transform extremist ideologies. The lineage of CVE programs in Pakistan can be traced back to 2008 when the Pakistan government engaged Singapore's 'International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research' (ICPVTR) to seek assistance for the establishment of the National Rehabilitation program in Pakistan. The main objective behind setting off CVE programs in Pakistan was to offer an incentive to incarcerated militants to reform their ideology and provide them a second chance to lead a peaceful life. After the successful military operations in Swat valley three different projects by the name of *Sabaoon*, *Mishal*, and *Rastoon* came up in district Swat and Malakand in 2009; followed by a chain reaction resulting in the rise of many other projects in KP and Baluchistan provinces. The programs remained functional for different periods, and were later terminated due to undefined reasons; however, *Sabaoon-II* which was established in *Tehsil* Bara in 2015 is presently the only functional model in the country. While Pakistan suffers from an enormous VEM threat all across the country, the corresponding CVE efforts are far too less than the actual requirement. Although CVE programs have traversed a

long distance, the Deradicalization studies are still in the infancy stage. There is no singular solution that can eliminate terrorism from all parts of the world, as the nature and degree of threat differ from state to state. The states which are socio-economically more developed are face-off with relatively milder threats, as compared to under-developed nations of Asia and Africa. The focus of Western programs is mainly on counter-radicalization efforts to prevent the Muslim youth from heading towards extremism through a joint venture by the government and civil society, but such efforts have also implied a major setback to the Muslim communities in the form of social marginalization in Europe. The global community needs to acknowledge that terrorism and Islam are not binary terms having any remotest possible connection with each other, nor terrorism can be associated with any religion of the world; Islam rather holds the credit for prescribing peaceful codes of life addressing the rights of both men and material during peace and war back in 7th century A.D, while the West was reclining in dark ages. Empirical evidence from past and contemporary history indicates that marginalizing a part of society is highly detrimental to the growth and prosperity of a country, therefore local governments need to reverse the Islamophobic campaign and focus on the root causes that provide favourable grounds for cultivating negative behaviours in the society, instead of mere reliance on CVE programs.

The Genesis of Extremism in Khyber District (Erstwhile FATA)

Waziristan

In the dry and arid land of Wazirs¹
 Infested with IEDs, Mullahs, and Ameers²
 Friends are rare; foes are more
 Life weighs less; money means more
 Environs swarming with shells and bullets
 Hurl a challenge round the clock
 Who dares to repress the flock?
 Where life treads on brink of death
 Death fears wrath of Wazirs
 It is the land of Wazirs!
 Humanity reeling down in feet
 Looks for amity, love, and peace
 Scenes glorious, verdant, and green
 At times stark, horrible, and freak
 So akin to milieu is the mood of Wazirs
 Merciless to the loser, yet hospitable to all
 Such contrasts, though hard to endure,
 Make me love them even more
 Through thick and thin they stick to own code
 But refuse to become part of the fold
 Bore arms right from mothers' wombs
 Would go to the ends to settle the scores

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They look straight in eyes, though laden with guilt
May lose all, but pride and ego to stay intact
Where the stench of medieval is still so fresh
It is the land of Wazirs

(*Muhammad Naeem Dar*)

Starting this chapter with an ode composed by the author during a military operation (Zarb-e-Azb-2014) in North Waziristan district (an agency of erstwhile FATA) elaborately explains the root cause of militancy in Khyber district as generally speaking the cultural attributes of Waziristan, Khyber, and rest of districts of erstwhile FATA are not much dissimilar to each other. Since the inception of the Afghan-Soviet war, religious fanaticism has been posing a major threat to the internal security of Pakistan; and in recent times the political polarization of society and severe economic crises have further augmented the threat manifolds. A strong theological base being the bedrock of the very existence of Pakistan induces a natural inclination of citizens towards Islam. In Pakistan-like societies, anything offered in the religious coating is usually widely accepted by the public, which may even lead to unwitting support of extremist agenda, but such support does not necessarily mean that people endorse violence.³

The rhetoric for the implementation of *Sharia* in Pakistan on behalf of the clergy is as old as its inception as an independent state. Over the past seven decades, this rhetoric has been thoroughly used by countless politicians to merely luster their parochial politics; but during the

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recent past, it was most horrendously used by militants to amass public support all across Pakistan in general and the FATA region in particular. Pakistan-based society is a blend of diverse ethnicities connected through a common religious bond. Like these ethnicities have distinct cultural traditions and customs, the society can be further subdivided into various segments based on the disproportionate distribution of wealth and economic infrastructure. Correspondingly, the degree and nature of radicalization also vary from ethnicity to ethnicity and region to region. For instance, the people of erstwhile FATA are considered to be sharply inclined towards religion-based radicalization; radicalization of few elements in Baluchistan may be attributed to political marginalization and economic deprivations; whereas Punjab and Sindh-based radicalization endures a sectarian flavor.⁴

Empirical evidence reflects a strong nexus existing between the extremist elements and the criminal cadre of the country. The criminals carry out target reconnaissance for the militants; offer logistic support and residence facilities to them; and share with them the bounties earned from bank dacoities, land grabbing, and car snatching. In reward for their services to militant organizations, the criminals earn the protection of militants and eternal atonement of past sins for their misperceived *jihadi* cause. In the opinion of Abdul Basit, the chief objective for Pakistani people to join militancy is either to serve God, or they do it under certain socio-financial compulsions. He goes on to

say that only a handful of individuals are ideologically motivated, while for most people *Jihad* is merely a job.⁵ According to research carried out by Imtiaz Gul, 100 percent of the terrorists from erstwhile FATA were unemployed, out of which 80 percent were from the age group between 15-28 years, and unmarried, and none of them was an orthodox religious follower, whereas 10 percent of them were liberal seculars.⁶

Cultural Violence

The Khyber district is predominantly occupied by pukhtuns of the Afridi tribe who have built up a reputation as fierce fighters over the centuries.⁷ The history of FATA depicts that the people of these areas never accepted any outsider, and maintenance of stability in these areas always remained a big challenge for the invaders.⁸ During British rule, the tribes of FATA were granted partial autonomy to run their internal affairs under their religious customs and local traditions. The tribal elders, known as *Maliks*, were given subsidies by the British in return for their services like maintenance of peace, keeping important roads like the Khyber Pass open, and arresting rebellious elements from the region.⁹ The accounts of history also mention a few other titles associated with FATA; for instance *Yaghistan* (the land of un-ruled people)¹⁰ or by the title most renowned in Pakistan "*Elaqa-e-Ghair*"¹¹ which also means the same. Since FATA retained its partial autonomy after the emergence of Pakistan in 1947, therefore it remained out of

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the jurisdiction of Pakistani law. Accordingly, for a long time, this area has served as an asylum for most outlaws who would flee from settled areas of Pakistan to FATA agencies to evade the state's jurisprudence.¹²

Johan Galtung believes that an entire culture cannot be categorized as violent; however, there are only certain aspects of a culture that can be branded as cultural violence.¹³ Though the aspects identified by Galtung are many, for this study, we select a few prominent aspects that have a considerable impact on the overall demeanor of pukhtun culture - the religion and *Pukhtunwali* ideology. The strength of pukhtuns' affiliation with religion can be gauged from the fact that pukhtuns converted to Islam as a whole unit and to date, one may not find any non-Muslim pukhtun around the globe.¹⁴ During the early years of Islam, Qais Abdul Rasheed (a founding father of pukhtuns) is said to have traveled to Mecca to embrace Islam and pledged the loyalty of his whole tribe to the Holy prophet Muhammad (may peace be upon him).¹⁵ James W. Spain refers to an incident of a British officer Captain J. B. Bowring's murder by an on-duty sentry Kabul Khan of south Waziristan scouts. The officer was sleeping on the rooftop when the sentry fired a shot at him resulting in his on-spot death. On probing the matter, Kabul Khan confessed that his *Mahsud*¹⁶ comrades had incited him to execute the officer because he was sleeping with his feet towards Mecca.¹⁷ This incident not only reflects pukhtuns' level of attachment to the religion but also exposes their

utter ignorance and vulnerability to exploitation by hostile elements in hybrid warfare settings. During the great games of the 19th century, the Afghan rulers extensively used religious rhetoric to mobilize the pukhtun community of FATA against British India. During the Soviet-Afghan war and recent WoT, the FATA and contiguous settled areas of KP became the hub of militancy. Millions of Afghan refugees migrated to Pakistan and settled in these areas. As a result, it created a huge economic and humanitarian crisis for Pakistan. Besides numerous adverse effects on the social fabric, it completely transformed the socio-political landscape of the area such that; the local autonomy and judiciary system shifted from local *Maliks* to the *Mujahidin* commanders; traditional *madrassas* became training camps for recruits, and erstwhile moderate *Mullahs* were replaced by the volatile ones.¹⁸

On meeting the end goals of Afghan *Jihad* rationalism demanded the discontinuation of state-sponsored *Jihadi* policy, but regrettably future of, wayward freewheeling *Jihadi* organizations was left either to their own choice of destiny or to be exploited by any regional/extra-regional actor in its favor. Consequently, in the post-9/11 period when Pakistan chose to side with allied forces, the extremist elements construed this act of state as siding with infidels and enacted a verdict of self-proclaimed *Jihad* against the Pakistan army. The local self-proclaimed *Mufties*¹⁹ wittingly, unwittingly, or under coercion manipulated Qur'anic verses of *Jihad* to motivate the natives for

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militancy. Accordingly, in pursuit of the profound rewards of *Jihad* and *Shahadat*²⁰ pseudo-Islamic *jihadists* crossed all the limits of savagery and wickedness. The militants carried out bomb explosions in *imambargahs*²¹, mosques, and markets, killed moderate Islamic scholars, politicians, and innocent people regardless of their faith, gender, and age; targeted security forces, destroyed schools, colleges, hospitals, and infrastructural systems of the state; they crippled the economy of the state, and above all ransacked the peace of whole society.

The savagery on behalf of militants reached the climax on 16 December 2014 when 6 militants of *Tehrik-e-Taliban* Pakistan (TTP) sneaked into the premises of the Army public school (APS) Peshawar and massacred more than 141 people including teachers and 132 young students.²² This incident is a classic example to explain how the religious aspect of cultural violence can make ignoble acts look noble to religious fanatics. In Galtung's words, "it is just a matter of changing the moral color of an act from red/wrong to green/right or to yellow/acceptable; for instance, depicting murder on behalf of the country as right and committing same on behalf of oneself as wrong; or in another way, cultural violence makes reality opaque, so that we do not see the violent act, or at least do not consider it as violent."²³ In the FATA-based society, the people look upon religious scholars as chosen ones and closer to Allah, therefore tend to follow them blindly; and this is exactly what pseudo-religious scholars did to the people. They subverted the

minds of people to a degree that reality became opaque to them; barbarism looked like an act of virtue, and playing soccer with the slaughtered heads of innocents became a favorite sport for them.

Ideology is another major aspect of cultural violence that makes people believe illegitimate acts look right. Though ideology is a positive force that instills drive in a nation to progress and a reason to exist, it also bears a dull shade as well. While an ideology owns the self-proclaimed right of excellence and survival, it denies the same to other ideologies.²⁴ The classical example in this context may be, the staunch belief of the USA and most European nations that democracy is the best form of rule, and the rest of all forms are anarchic; hence, to save the world from anarchy, the USA bears the right to pursue its regime-changing policy all across the globe, through all means.²⁵ Other prominent examples of ideology-based cultural violence may include Hitler's Nazism in Germany and the *Hindutva* ideology of dominating other religions in India. The negativity about an ideology is that, while it glorifies the charisma of its beholder and inflates the value of self; it degrades and even humiliates the values of others.²⁶ *Pukhtunwali* ideology is referred to the pukhtun people, which holds a central place in the structure of the pukhtun cultural system. It means "pukhtun code of life." An excerpt from the book, 'Pathans of the latter day' written by James W. Spain best explains *Pukhtunwali*. Spain cites the definition from the autobiography of Mian Gul Abdul

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Wadud Badshah (founder of the state of Swat) titled 'The Story of Swat.' He says,

Pukhtunwali is the name given to the valor, sense of honor, and the unwritten law of the nation..... hospitality, generosity bravery, truthfulness, straightforwardness, keeping of promise, patronage of the weak, giving shelter to all including enemies, moral courage in claiming one's rights, sacrificing one's life for personal as well as national honor, dying in the name of religion, and several other desirable attitudes and worthy traditions.²⁷

While *Pukhtunwali* has numerous positive attributes providing stability to the system, it also yields some negative ramifications on the behavioural upbringing of the pukhtun community. For instance, *Tora* (meaning sword) is one of the most significant attributes of *Pukhtunwali*; the word was coined and glorified in the songs of great Pashto poet Khushal Khan Khattak to signify individual valor and steadfastness in war.²⁸ Puktuns are a highly spirited race that rejects the option of slavery to other tribes and nations, and their pride in cultural traditions has helped them maintain their independent aura through the ages. The famous British statesman and ex-prime minister Sir Winston Churchill happened to serve in NWFP during his service in the British army. He defines Pukhtuns' character as, every man is a warrior, a politician, and a theologian..... For the purpose of life the most elaborate code of honor has been established and on the whole, faithfully observed. A man who knew it and observed it faultlessly might pass unarmed from one end of the frontier

to another. The slightest technical slip would however be fatal.²⁹

A famous saying, "Pathan can live without food, but cannot exist without enmity" reflects the aggressive and warrior-like instinct of pukhtuns. The inter-tribe and intra-tribe rivalry is a common phenomenon that has existed in pukhtun culture for ages. On being asked as to why pukhtuns have an extreme love for weapons, an old Khyberite pukhtun replied, "having a charming wife and a lovely personnel rifle is the dream of every pukhtun."³⁰ The pukhtuns are innately aggressive and like to be recognized through acts of valor and gallantry, therefore in the initial days of enrolments in militant organizations in erstwhile FATA, a huge number of wayward youth joined militancy just for the power glamour, and to display their loyalty to the tribe.³¹ *Nang* (honor) is an important code of *Pukhtunwali* that implies that a tribesman is indebted to use all means to guard himself, his honor, and the honor of his family.³² Till the recent past, (before the start of military operations by the Pakistan Army) the erstwhile FATA-based tribes had their integral militias and well-dugout defence lines along their tribal boundaries. Bloodshed in the name of tribal affinity is regarded as a legitimate and sacred duty and a source of immense pride for every tribal in the region. *Milmastyā* (hospitality), and *Nanawatey* (forgiveness and asylum) are also very attractive tribal values, but they also brought hellfire on Afghanistan when the Taliban government refused to hand over Osama bin Laden (OBL)

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to the US in post-9/11 developments.³³ A brighter side of pukhtun culture is that when they forge a friendship with someone, they honor it through thick and thin.³⁴ In the tribal culture, even if the staunchest enemy seeks refuge, *Pukhtunwali* warrants respectable treatment with the assurance of an optimum level of security to him. During an interview with an eminent scholar Rahim Ullah Yousafzai narrated an excerpt from his last interview with Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omar. On a question to Mullah Omar as to why he was adamant about not handing over Osama bin Laden to the USA government despite the cognizance of inauspicious results to follow his decision, he replied,

Though it is the unanimous opinion of my council that he should not be handed over to the USA; personally, as a Muslim, I believe that we should not betray a person who has been fighting along with us against the Soviets, and I won't like chronicles of Afghan history to remember Mullah Omar or Taliban government as traitors who betrayed their guest.³⁵

Swara is an important custom of *Pukhtunwali* that gives the impression as if the status of woman is not more than the personal property of her parents or male siblings. According to this tradition, women (mainly sisters and daughters) are given in marriage to the opponent's families to end the blood feuds.³⁶ Similarly, if a female elopes with some male to marry him without the consent of her family, *Pukhtunwali* warrants the killing of both, or the siblings of the woman ought to kill the complete family of the man

who fled with that lady. Another significant tenet of *Pukhtunwali* is *Badal* which means revenge; it implies seeking justice or taking revenge against the wrongdoer at all costs.³⁷ Failure to seek the revenge for murder is an unmanly attribute on part of the victim's family. A renowned Pashto proverb describes, "it is never too late, even though the blood is avenged after a hundred years of enmity."³⁸ Amongst more orthodox tribal people, an adult is not regarded as a man lest he has not shed blood in his life. These are the few aspects of *Pukhtunwali* that endorse the legitimacy of violence under various conditions. One of the most distressing facts about 'Cultural violence' is that it is permanent in nature and diminishes from society at an exceptionally slow pace.³⁹ Hence uprooting cultural violence from society becomes an extremely daunting task that requires not only flawless acumen and brilliance but also calls for strong perseverance at the state level.

Structural Violence

Structural violence refers to the violence perpetrated upon people by the system that in turn engenders violent behaviors amongst the common people. The state is responsible for the development of education, health, security, and economic infrastructures for the equal growth of all communities in the state. If these basic needs of a certain community are not being fulfilled, it means that the state is committing structural violence. According to the law of nature, 'Violence breeds violence; so, the unsatisfied basic

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needs, compel the people to react violently. Galtung perceives freedom, survival, identity, and well-being of every individual, as the basic human needs that the state must provide to its citizens.⁴⁰ The history of structural violence and corruption in FATA is spread over more than a century. While Pakistan gained independence in 1947, the erstwhile FATA took another 71 years to finally come out of the clutches of a British-brewed exploitative system of governance. Since 1947, FATA enjoyed a unique political status; constitutionally it became part of Pakistan in 1947, but practically it remained independent in managing its internal affairs. The independent status meant that natives could decide their internal disputes of civil nature through the traditional *Jirga*.⁴¹ The Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) usually termed as 'black' or 'draconian rule' was the only legal administrative mechanism through which erstwhile FATA was governed by the Pakistan government.⁴²

The functioning of tribal affairs revolved around local *Maliks* under the principal authority of the Political Agent (PA) appointed by Governor KP. Frequent interactions with the notables of NWA revealed that, various influential groups in a district (of FATA) contest for the appointment of their candidate as PA in their district. This exercise includes political lobbying and the collection of huge amounts of money to be offered as a bribe to the selection board. For hearsay, the minimum acceptable bid for this appointment, back in 2014 was approximately rupees 500

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million. Eventually, on selection as PA, the individual returns the favor to his patrons by awarding them various contracts for development projects in the area. To exemplify one such favor discovered by the author relates to a project of a Girls' high school in village X⁴³ of NWA. A local *Malik* sold an acre of his land to the government for the establishment of the aforementioned school at a price much higher than the market rate. Subsequently, through manipulation, he succeeded in getting the contract and a handsome amount from the government for the construction of the school on the same acre of land he had sold to the government. Astonishingly, the end product that came out of the project was a huge fort-like house, to be occupied by his sons and scores of grandchildren, but in good faith, he displayed a roadside signpost that showed an inscription 'Government Girls High School Village X.'⁴⁴ This is just one example out of hundreds of ghost schools, basic health units (BHU) and hospitals existing in FATA. The system of governance as inherited from the British suited the powerful, the *Maliks*, the politicians, and the bureaucracy; therefore they always resisted a positive change despite being cognizant of the critical need for the change.⁴⁵

Security is an important aspect of the state's obligations towards its people. Soon after independence, the Pakistani government revised the British policy and decided to pull back all regular troops from the FATA.⁴⁶ Resultantly the PA was left with Levies and *Khasadar* forces whose members are

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raised from local tribes. The proficiency of the *Khasadar* force can be gauged from a few ground realities associated with it; for instance, the force does not have its uniform; arranging personal weapons, transport, and food during duty is the personal responsibility of the individuals; there is no retirement date for a *Khasadar* unless he requests for appointment of his son as a replacement. In case a *Khasadar* expires, his eldest son (even though a toddler) stands eligible to replace his father; *Khasadar* gets no training as he is considered to be well-trained in weapon handling due to his tribal lineage.⁴⁷ The Levies force, usually referred to as tribal police is comparatively better equipped and organized than the *Khasadar* force, but the major issue with both forces is of impartiality element. Since their recruitments are politically based, therefore personal relations and tribal affinity usually restrict their capabilities to operate beyond certain limits. During the interview, an ex-militant (now a graduate of *Sabaoon-II*) said,

I never wanted to join militancy but I was coerced to do so. The militants told my family to either bequeath a son for the cause of *Jihad* or give them rupees 30000 per month. They also gave a second option that either my family should quit the area or be ready for extermination. Under these circumstances, I was forced to join militancy.⁴⁸

This is a common story shared by nearly sixty percent of ex-militants who graduated from *Sabaoon-II*. Similarly, large numbers joined militancy under the rhetoric of tribal affinity and pressure of elders. Eventually, public brutalities

and the show of force on behalf of terrorists coerced the people to join militancy, thereby resulting in the spread of the terrorism pandemic in the whole region. Hence, to sum up, the effects of structural violence in the words of Johan Galtung, "a violent structure leaves marks not only on the human body but also on the mind and spirit. Massive direct violence over centuries seeps down and deposits as huge reservoirs of structural violence. After some time direct violence is forgotten, but the discrimination and prejudice as labels of structural violence persist through the ages."⁴⁹

Socio-Economic Factors

As of today, the FATA-based society can be divided into two distinct classes; the haves and the have-nots. Lack of development funds and corruption at the administrative and political levels did not allow socio-economic development in the region. The felony and malpractice on behalf of powerful elites not only restricted the growth of the middle class in the area but also created a wide gap between *Maliks* and tribal people. Consequently, in the wake of the 9/11 incident, local *Maliks* were the worst affected community in FATA. As per Paracha, during WoT hundreds of *Maliks* and tribal elders were killed by *Tehrik-e-Taliban* Pakistan (TTP) and other militant groups,⁵⁰ which created a judicial vacuum and enfeebled the *Jirga* system. To fill the void, TTP and other organizations jumped in to take over the responsibility of the local judiciary. Initially, the militants succeeded in winning the support of locals

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through speedy justice and certain superficial actions reflecting their Islamic agenda, but over time excessive violence, rampant extortion, and abuse of power dissuaded the general public from extending further unconditional support to the militants.

Traditionally, erstwhile FATA agencies have been a refuge for lawlessness, corruption, and mayhem. The lack of infrastructural development pushed the whole region towards extreme poverty. Though the general public is fairly upright, but a few social ills are very common in the name of the trade and are seldom regarded as unlawful; for instance, drug business, and smuggling are not considered wicked acts. Most car lifting and kidnapping for ransom incidents happening in Punjab and KP provinces find their traces linked with FATA. For long, it has been a common practice that the criminals would flee to FATA agencies after committing crimes in the settled areas of the country, to evade jurisprudence; and the local mafias would use these criminals to their advantage. In this manner, the lawlessness helped the development of a natural nexus between the proscribed organizations and various mafias all across the country. To put it in a nutshell, the mafias provide logistic and financial support to the militants, and in return receive their shelter and atonement of past sins by supporting the pseudo-*Jihadi* cause.

During an interview with a close ally of Mangal Bagh (commander-in-chief of *Lashkar-e-Islam* organization), who later surrendered to the military revealed that the main

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conflict between Mangal Bagh and Qazi Mehboob (commander-in-chief of *Ansar ul Islam* organization) was not of religious or sectarian nature, rather both wanted to dominate the Tirah valley- the center of hashish-based political economy,⁵¹ and supposedly the biggest hashish market of Asia.⁵² On a weekly basis, Mangal Bagh would collect approximately 50 million rupees on account of tax from the Tirah-based Hashish market.⁵³ The official statistics held with *Sabaoon-II* depict that a significant number of people joined militancy for the reason of financial support as the terrorist organization would offer them monthly stipends (at the rate of approximately 100-150 USD per head). Many people joined militancy because they had heavy debts on them or they had family rivalries; therefore, the organization would not only shelter them from the moneylenders, but it also provided the authority to make quick money from the riches of the area and settle scores with personal enemies in the garb of false *jihad*. One ex-militant brought to *Sabaoon-II* from Bajour district (erstwhile FATA) confessed that he took rupees 500 only for planting an improvised explosive device (IED) by the roadside, which eventually took the lives of three soldiers of the Pakistan military.⁵⁴ This reflects how poverty and deprivation can push people to such a low ebb of morality that they do not hesitate to slay a few individuals merely for peanuts' sake.

Education is another important aspect that remained neglected in the whole country, but the erstwhile FATA

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reflects one of the lowest literacy rates in Pakistan. The development of the education sector had never been a priority of any past government of Pakistan. While the deficiencies in this aspect were adequately met in the rest of the country through the private sector, erstwhile FATA remained in oblivion partially due to its peculiar political status and largely due to the negligence of the state. Whatever meager educational funds were allocated by the federal government would either go down in corruption or they can be seen in the form of ghost schools widely spread over the landscape of the erstwhile FATA. The void created in the education sector also resulted in the phenomenon of mushroom growth of the *madrassa* education system all across the country. The most auspicious thing about *madrassa* schooling is that besides imparting free religious education, the *madrassas* also offer free-of-cost feeding and boarding facilities to the poor. Since people in the region are generally impoverished and have tens and scores of children; therefore with limited financial resources and a conservative mindset, the *madrassa* system offers a suitable alternative for the education of youth.⁵⁵

While the state did not provide adequate education opportunities, it also failed to monitor the syllabus being taught and activities being undertaken in the *madrassas*. These *madrassas*- most of them being run by pseudo-Islamic scholars, subverted the minds of youth, which eventually led to the development of violent behaviors in society. The legacy of *madrassa*-based militancy that started during the

Afghan *Jihad* back in the 1980s carried on till the advent of the 21st century; but, the subversion phase starting after the 9/11 incident was much more lethal as it disillusioned the youth against their own state and military forces. The intensity of hatred and animosity against their brethren was so severe that no segment of society remained safe from the barbarism of militants. The *madrassas* became the cradle of terrorism wherein young recruits would get formal militancy training and innocent juveniles were prepared for suicidal attacks against Muslim brethren in the name of phony *Jihad*.

Geostrategic Factor

Besides numerous structural flaws and socio-religious shortcomings, the geostrategic significance of the Khyber Pass/ district has also played a vital role in breeding violence in the region.⁵⁶ The incident of 9/11 caused unprecedented unrest in Pakistan. The geographical location of Pakistan is such that destabilization of the internal security situation seems to be a natural phenomenon coming up as a result of the Great games of the 21st century presently going on in south Asia. While India aspires to achieve regional domination and a much greater role in global politics after the exit of the USA from Afghanistan, the USA supports India to counterbalance China in the region.⁵⁷ In pursuit of her goals, India perceives Pakistan as a major hazard, challenging her designs in the region; therefore, it endeavors to slash Pakistan's interests

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in Afghanistan through its soft power, and strategic alliance with past governments of Afghanistan.⁵⁸

Pukhtuns on both sides of the Pak-Afghan international border have common trade, religious, cultural, and family relationships; therefore any turbulence on one side of the border has a natural spillover effect on the other side as well. During the Soviet-Afghan war, approximately 3.27 million refugees migrated to Pakistan,⁵⁹ which not only caused a huge burden on the fragile economy of the country but also caused grave damage to the social fiber of the country. Gunrunning, drug trafficking, and sectarian violence are a few products of the same era following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The foreign fighters who had come for *Jihad* from Arab and Central Asian States during the Soviet-Afghan war remained settled in Afghanistan and erstwhile FATA even after the disintegration of the Soviet Union.⁶⁰ After the 9/11 incident, when Pakistan chose to side with allied forces, the local extremist elements and the aforementioned foreign fighters joined hands with foreign players and declared self-proclaimed *Jihad* against Pakistan and started terrorist attacks all across the country.⁶¹ Thus, the area and the people of FATA which were assumed to be a strategic strength for Pakistan became the hub of militancy and were exploited by both regional and extra-regional powers to precipitate instability inside Pakistan.⁶² In 2016, Pakistan law enforcement agencies captured an Indian naval officer Kalbhushan Yadav from Baluchistan.⁶³ The captured officer

confessed that he had been conducting terrorist activities inside Pakistan at the behest of the Indian Intelligence Agency Research Analysis Wing (RAW).

The historic relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan always remained inauspicious as Afghanistan always remained a close ally of India except for a short duration of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.⁶⁴ Both sides accuse each other of harboring militants and hatching terrorism on their soil. Since Pakistan had become an extension of the Afghan war due to FATA's geographical contiguity with Afghanistan, therefore allied forces had been conducting drone attacks in Pakistan in the pursuit of terrorists fleeing from Afghanistan. The civilian casualties as a result of these drone attacks would give a further boost to the radicalism amongst the local youth, who would in return rise for *Badal* (revenge) against the Pakistan military.⁶⁵

Analysis

During the initial 40 years of existence, Pakistan had registered a 6 percent average growth rate, which placed her ahead of neighboring states India and Bangladesh, but since 1990 onwards there has been a consistent decline in the economy of the state.⁶⁶ A weak economy results in the inability of the state to fulfill the basic human needs of the people; and according to Galtung's philosophy, the unfulfilling of basic needs and economic deprivations is a kind of direct violence the state inflicts upon its people.⁶⁷ These shortfalls in the FATA spread over more than a

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century have not only impinged physical deprivations, but they have also left deep marks on the mind and spirits of common citizens that do not seem to fade away any time soon. Correspondingly, the utility of CVE programs generally in Pakistan and especially in FATA is also likely to persist for times to come.

The gap between the haves and have-nots is consistently increasing all around the world as a natural outcome of capitalist entrepreneurship thereby driving the societies towards increased crime rates. Moreover, excessive use of the internet and social media also acts as a catalyst for spreading extremist ideas and overall radicalization of the whole society. The frequency of blasphemous acts on behalf of Western society has sharply increased over the last two decades. Any such act happening in any part of the world causes instant religious-based strife inside Pakistan. A common Pakistani from rural background looks upon religious scholars as enlightened people and closer to Allah, therefore, he tends to follow them blindly. The gathering of huge mobs and causing heavy damage to the government and private properties during prolonged sit-ins has become a common phenomenon in major cities of Pakistan. Though the situation gradually pacifies with the intervention of the governmental officials, a notion of victory developed on the government's behalf in the context of such momentary successes is essentially flawed and based on utter misperception; rather it's nothing more than a

postponement of threat, and perhaps the worst is yet to come.

The complex interdependence between Afghanistan and India has further widened the already existing gulf between Pakistan and Afghanistan which has exposed Pakistan on both eastern and Western fronts. Both Pakistan and Afghan governments have been blaming each other for supporting extremist elements on each other's soil, which reflects a serious trust deficit between both states. Besides this, the China-Pakistan economic corridor (CPEC) being a major strategic development of the 21st century has also slashed vital regional interests of both the US and India; therefore to counterbalance, India supports the anti-state and extremist elements in Baluchistan and KP provinces to sabotage the CPEC project and destabilize the security situation inside Pakistan.

The political antagonism on behalf of certain religious and mainstream parties to pursue their parochial political goals is consistently rising and stands vulnerable to exploitation by hostile agencies. Any trivial event in the future, as it happened in Lahore in April 2021,⁶⁸ will have the capacity to escalate to mass-scale uprisings throughout the country. The potential value of such minor incidents can be gauged from the fact that merely an incident of self-immolation in Tunis⁶⁹ in 2010 led to the phenomenon of Arab Spring in the Middle East countries later on. The nature of threat specific to Pakistan is multi-dimensional which keeps shifting to various interrelated domains.

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Restraining in one domain makes it appear in other domains: from socio-economic to ideological, religious, political, identity crisis, or geostrategic domains and vice versa. This process keeps moving in a vicious circle, thereby stalling the overall progress of the country. In the context of Pakistan, outright elimination of all the root causes of extremism may not be possible with existing knowledge and resources in a short period but the immediate establishment of risk reduction programs in threat-prone areas is inevitable for the state.

Conclusion

Pukhtuns are one of the most energetic and enthusiastic people in Pakistan who have always played an important role in the evolution and existence of Pakistan as an independent state. Their fondness for religion and cultural ideology stands prominent amongst all ethnic communities of the country. The instincts like audacity, valor, perseverance, aggression, and loyalty to the land make up the character of an average pukhtun youth. While the state could channel the abundant energies of FATA-based people in an organized manner, it left the tribals at the mercy of a corrupt system that did not allow the socio-economic growth of natives, which consequently led to the development of negative behaviors in the society. The hostile agencies operating in the region dexterously used the pseudo-Islamic scholars to accomplish their realist designs and subverted the innocent tribals against

Pakistan's armed forces thereby causing rampant civil unrest all across the country.

The current study reveals that in Pakistan-based society, anything offered in the religious coating is usually widely accepted by the public, which may even lead to unwitting support of extremist agenda, but such support does not necessarily mean that people endorse violence. In the milieu of hybrid warfare, soaring poverty, and narrow politics by several mainstream political, religious, and sub-nationalist parties, radicalism is consistently rising in the country. An increased frequency of violent protests and sit-ins on the issue of blasphemy, outrageous speeches, and relentless bashing of state institutions are a few manifestations of sizzling radicalism in Pakistan. If direct violence as a product of extremism is not visible through the naked eye to the people sitting at the helm of affairs, does not imply that it does not exist in the country, rather where ever socio-economic disparities and structural violence exist, extremism lays as sediments in the foundations of that society. It exists as negative peace that may transform to direct violence anytime in any form in vulnerable areas of the country.

Having known the drivers of extremism in the erstwhile FATA region, it is imperative upon incumbents to discover the roots of extremism in other parts of the country as the dynamics of radicalism vary from region to region. As of today, there is a serious deficiency of indigenous research work on deradicalization in Pakistan which needs to be

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compulsorily filled to design effective CVE projects all across the country. Reliance on foreign-based research may temporarily do the trick as regards initial learning, but to develop a sound and credible deradicalization model there is a need to incorporate indigenous knowledge. The chapter concludes that cultural violence is a permanent feature that stays for long periods in a society, therefore the threat of VEm in Pakistan is likely to persist for long times to come. The state needs to take pragmatic steps to provide quality education, healthcare, job opportunities, social justice, and security to enable the culture of violence to gradually vanish from society; otherwise, mere academic efforts to establish a culture of peace through debates, lectures, and seminars are not likely to bear much fruit.

Sabaoon-II Transformative Model

A successful counter-terrorism strategy needs an effective non-kinetic effort that should complement the kinetic efforts undertaken by the state. The study of existing worldwide counter-terrorism strategies suggests the requirement of two distinct prongs within the domain of non-kinetic efforts; one- a deradicalization prong aimed at focusing on already radicalized offenders; and two- a long-term counter-radicalization effort that would check further radicalization of society, stop further recruitments, and choke the flow of supporters and sympathizers from the dissident groups of society. In January 2014, the then Prime minister of Pakistan-Nawaz Sharif visited *Mishal*, and *Sabaoon* deradicalization centers based in Swat and Malakand districts respectively. During the visit, he not only applauded the military's efforts being taken in the direction of peace but also stressed the need to emulate such projects in other parts of the country as well.¹

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The active militancy in the Khyber district started in 2005, which initially bore a sectarian color² and later transformed into militancy having multiple dimensions, like tribal supremacy, and a feud over the political economy of the region. During the period (2005–2015), several militant organizations including *Lashkar-e-Islam (LI)*, *Ansar ul Islam (AI)*, *Amr bil Ma' roof wa Nahi anil Munkar*³(commonly known as Namdar Group), Abdullah Azam Brigade (AAB), and *Jamaat ul Ahrar* (a splinter group of *Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan*) remained involved in deadly feuds amongst each other to dominate Khyber district being the hub of local political economy and area of extreme strategic significance for all the major players engaged in the WoT.⁴The militant groups including LI, AI, and Namdar group had their respective FM radio channels to deliver sermons to the people in their respective dominions within the Khyber district.⁵ They implemented strict *pseudo-Shariah* rules in their respective territories and prescribed severe punishments for the offenders as per their respective interpretations of the religion.⁶ While TTP, LI, and AAB openly challenged the government writ, fought against security agencies, and carried out attacks both inside and outside the district; AI and Namdar group confined their activities to the district area and remained relatively docile to the state. Subsequently in October 2014, when the state launched a military operation (Khyber-I) in the Khyber district, approximately 700 individuals defected to LI and surrendered to the military. The interviews with various

surrendered militants revealed that a major segment had already been disenchanted with the conceptual framework of the militant organization for quite some time and wanted to quit militancy, but being uncertain about the state's response, and likely reprisals on behalf of LI commander Mangal Bagh, they were looking for an apt moment to exercise the option of surrendering to the military. Eventually, a thoughtful and benevolent gesture on behalf of the state to deradicalize and rehabilitate the surrendered militants radiated an encouraging message to the people of the Khyber district as nearly every family had one odd representative with the proscribed organization. Although the surrendered people included a huge chunk of BLACK category militants, the core idea behind awarding amnesty, was to secure strategic victory by achieving long-term peace and stability in the area.

The *Sabaoon-II* project came up in December 2014 with the collaboration of Frontier Corps Khyber Pukhtunkhwa (FCKP) and FATA Secretariat and became fully functional in all respects from February 2015 onwards. The then Governor KP Mehtab Ahmed Khan Abbasi being the first Chairman Board of Governors visited *Sabaoon-II* in March 2015 for the formal inauguration and committed to extending all possible assistance in running such programs in FATA. Initially, the project constituted 3 deradicalization centers functioning under the central authority of a local sub-unit of FCKP, with a total capacity of approximately 700 beneficiaries, but as time moved on, the number of

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beneficiaries continued decreasing, and eventually, in July 2018, the 3 centers squeezed to merely one, that is presently functional in village Shakas of *Tehsil* Jamrud (district Khyber) with an existing strength of 126 beneficiaries. The mission statement as displayed on the main wall of *Sabaoon-II* reads,

“Provide an environment conducive for the restoration of self-respect of selected individuals (beneficiaries) to deradicalize them and remove their psychological burden to make them (primarily) and their families (secondarily) useful members of society.”

To achieve the above-quoted mission, FATA Secretariat sanctioned approximately 40 million Pakistani rupees, for the establishment of the project under the supervision of FCKP. For the initial year of its establishment in February 2015, it followed the template of *Mishal* and *Sabaoon* (Malakand) for imparting deradicalization training to the beneficiaries; however, subsequently, its scope was expanded to the social deradicalization program of *Tehsil* Bara, Khyber district. The *Sabaoon-II* project is different from the rest of the CVE projects in the world in three conspicuous respects; firstly, it is an open-prison model despite bearing a huge number of BLACK-category war criminals; secondly, its administration claims to have no recidivism case to date, and thirdly, its scope is not limited to the mere transformation of ex-militants, rather it aims at transforming whole society of *Tehsil* Bara through its community engagement program. While rest of the CVE programs in Pakistan have terminated over time, *Sabaoon-II*

is the only model that still exists because of its utility and central location near Peshawar. The program reflects a distinct example of a transformative model for peace education of a strayed society and a manifestation of the strong will of the state to end the miseries of its people through soft means. The first batch that was inducted in *Sabaoon-II* comprised nearly 602 militants of *Lashkar-e-Islam* that included war criminals of all shades. ie. BLACK, GREY, and WHITE. Most individuals were aboriginals of *Tehsil Bara /Khyber* district hailing from sub-clans of the Afridi tribe; however, a small number hailed from other tribes and agencies of FATA as well. Since rest all the CVE programs in Pakistan have been terminated, *Sabaoon-II* now stands open for war criminals from all across the country. From time to time, new beneficiaries keep pouring in from various internment camps from all across the country. A psychologists' team visits the internment camps around the country on a regular basis and selects suitable individuals for deradicalization training at *Sabaoon-II*.

On arrival at the compound, the individuals are subjected to a medical examination, followed by an initial risk assessment by the psychologists' staff. Although there are no definite measures to gauge the precise level of radicalization in a person, however, the local psychologists' team has indigenously developed a scale that keeps maturing with time. Based on the initial risk assessment of the individuals, and the nature of war crimes committed by them, the psychologists recommend the training duration

and extent of theological and psychological intervention required by each individual. The program provides decent living standards to the beneficiaries which although do not match the Saudi Arabian or European models, but by far they are much superior to the average living standards of the natives or those being offered to the incarcerated people in Pakistan. Acknowledging the significance of family care in reshaping shattered personalities, the beneficiaries are offered casual leave on a regular basis besides offering monthly stipends worth rupees 7500 to support their families.

Social Module

It is the flagship component of the *Sabaoon-II* program owing to its diverse nature and its central role in the overall success of the project as a whole. Psychoanalysis of human nature reveals that most individuals incline towards inapt behaviors because of rejection by society, therefore social uplift of the beneficiaries, their families, and the community they hail from becomes the primary objective of a comprehensive deradicalization program. At the time of induction of the first batch, nearly all the beneficiaries were either hash smokers or at least they would not consider its use or trade as an immoral practice. Except for a few numbers out of the initially inducted 602 beneficiaries, they either had no formal schooling or very brief *madrassa* education. Their appearance represented a demeanor of the medieval age's rowdy mercenaries with

long hair, stinking filthy outfits, and extremely crude manners; and yet they would consider their erstwhile opponents (Pakistan military) as infidels and misguided people. The social module simultaneously works on two prongs with distinct objectives. i.e. the core prong and the community engagement prong. The core prong refers to activities involving individual grooming of the beneficiaries while the community engagement prong involves reaching out to the locals of Bara and developing resilience in the society.

The Core prong activities focused on the reconstruction of shattered personalities of the beneficiaries, cultivation of good manners, improving their life skills, and reviving their confidence in the state so that when they move back to their homes, natives should accept them as decent and useful members of the society. As a foremost measure to start with the process, it was necessary to detoxify the beneficiaries to bring them into a mental state wherein they could positively respond to the therapies being imparted to them. Accordingly, through a close liaison with Peshawar-based NGO 'Dost Foundation,' *Sabaoon-II* carried out detoxification of all beneficiaries for the initial three months. Though complete success in this regard could not be attained, however, after disbanding drugs, their use inside the compound became merely a rare phenomenon. The next goal in the social domain was inducing various disciplines in their lives and affecting some cosmetic changes in their appearance; for which *Sabaoon-II* relied on

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employing a military training model. This model replicates the 'Shock Incarceration Treatment program' that has been successfully working in several New York-based prisons since the 1980s. While the Shock incarceration treatment program comprises vocational training and psychosocial therapy components like most models in the world, it stands different from others as it incorporates certain military-specific drills including daily regimental parades, physical training, various disciplinary codes, etc.⁷ Similarly, the *Sabaoon-II* training schedule also includes such important military drills that not only refurbished their exterior part but also helped in improving the discipline of the individuals. During the initial days of their induction, displaying utter disrespect to food was a common practice amongst most beneficiaries; while eating they would either spill a lot of food or they would kick the utensils as a gesture of disapproval of the menu or show their aggression against the setup. To mold their habits amicably, the psychologist staff of Sabaoon-II was instructed to dine with the beneficiaries to inculcate mess mannerisms and guide them through relevant *Ahadith*⁸ and *Sunnah*⁹ of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (May peace be upon him).

The pukhtuns being a highly energetic race has an exceptional flair for sports. The local administration encourages everyone to attend the evening games period and also arranges sports competitions for the beneficiaries on a regular basis so that they may release their pent-up

energies in a healthy manner. Besides this, the training department regularly conducts a wide range of life skills workshops to impart positive behaviors and create awareness about women's rights, human rights, drug abuse, and the importance of education and peace in society. The program lays a special focus on commemorating national events and days with full enthusiasm and religious fervor. On these special occasions, the beneficiaries deliver patriotic speeches, sing national songs, perform tableaux and drama skits, and chant slogans to express their feelings of love and affection for the state. One of the beneficiaries, who had been earlier a staunch opponent of the military and an influential commander of *Lashkar-e-Islam* composed a national song to perform at his Reintegration ceremony, which signifies a major shift in his ideology from terrorism to patriotism. Other than the celebration of national days, *Sabaoon-II* also regularly plans musical nights, variety shows, and various recreational activities in which every individual gets a chance to participate, explore inner happiness, and ward off the miseries of their life. The administration plans excursion trips to various historic and recreational places which not only refresh their minds but also help broaden the mental horizons of the beneficiaries. During their first trip to Peshawar Museum (just at a leap's distance from Bara town), one of the beneficiaries said that he had never been to Peshawar before. The program also arranges regular workshops on conflict management skills that help

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individuals to cope with minor issues and challenges coming their way as a routine matter. Motivational speakers deliver lectures on the social obligations of a Pakistani citizen and a good Muslim signifying the importance of peace and harmony in society. Regular pep talks by the officials of Sabaoon-II and guest speakers played an instrumental role in reducing the psychological burden of the beneficiaries and taming their behaviours according to the desired perimeters.

The community engagement program was not originally part of the initial plan, but subsequently, a need was felt to sterilize the society from the infectious ills that helped the growth of extremist behaviors in the society, develop resilience in society, and activate the youth of Bara to solve minor local issues on self-help basis. Since the initial intake of the project mainly comprised beneficiaries from 6 sub-clans of the Afridi tribe residing in *Tehsil Bara*, therefore community engagement activity was restricted to the geographical boundaries of Bara only. The social workers' team (SWT) of *Sabaoon-II* comprises two female social workers, and a male team leader assisted by a few support staff members only. Although the team appears to be quite brief in size, the change they recorded in the socio-political landscape of Bara is quite encouraging; rather it won't be untrue to say that the main goal behind selecting the title of this study (Transformative Model for Peace Education) was mainly to highlight that how *Sabaoon-II* transformed the local society through peace education.

Active Bara Citizen Youth Program usually called as ABC youth program is the leading project of *Sabaoon-II* that simultaneously works on both male and female prongs of society. *Tehsil* Bara being the hub of militancy in the Khyber district received maximum pounding during the insurgency period which destroyed the already fragile socioeconomic and institutional infrastructure of the town. The main idea behind this project was to activate youth and channel their energies for the restoration and development of the demolished local infrastructure. The ABC program was aimed at injecting a strong drive in the youth to resume the repair work on a self-help basis without wasting their time and potential at the cost of attaching high hopes with the system to come to their rescue. The process of youth activation started in the mid of 2015 when the SWT started engaging young males (18-32 years of age) from all 6 sub-tribes of the Afridi clan (*Shalober, Sipah, Qamar Khel, Qamber Khel, Malakdin Khel, and Akka Khel*). During engagement, the SWT would visit each sub-tribe and ask for volunteers who wanted to do something positive for local society. As soon as their numbers reached 300 (with equal representation of all 6 sub-tribes of Bara), the SWT invited them for a workshop at the *Sabaoon-II* location. During the workshop, the individuals were asked to write four (single-word) reasons that brought turmoil to Bara. Individual analysis on behalf of 300 participants resulted in coming up with nearly a dozen of reasons. Following a scientific method based on mutual discussions and excessive brainstorming

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through different phases, brought all participants to a mutually agreed set of four reasons (*Jihalat*,¹⁰ State's negligence, lack of leadership, and poverty) behind the existing crisis in the area. Having identified the root causes of the crisis, the participants were invited to suggest suitable measures to overcome these predicaments. Eventually, after long brainstorming sessions spread over 2-3 days, the participants agreed on a four-pronged solution to the prevailing crisis. For instance, to overcome *Jihalat* all agreed to work in the direction of renovation, repair, and re-opening of existing schools in the area; to extinct poverty, all agreed to bring back the fled away factory owners to the area, revive local industries and resume farming in the area; and the leadership void to be filled by youth itself by assuming the leadership role and start networking with the government officials to draw their attention towards the miseries of the general public.

The most cherishable part of this exercise is the democratic essence of the whole process which fairly transmuted erstwhile dissenting opinions into a set of mutually agreed goals to be pursued by the newly budding leadership of Bara. Through this exercise, the participants learned a democratic way of expressing their points of view and tolerating ideas that did not conform to theirs. When the participants of this exercise returned to the community, the lofty ideas of ABC youth were warmly welcomed by nearly all segments of society, except for several elders and notables for the fear of losing their political status at the

hands of youth; however, its popularity amongst local youth had a snowball effect as the total number of volunteers increased from mere 300 to approximately 3000 within a few days only.¹¹

How does ABC program function? The ABC youth program has a central committee including an elected president, vice president, general secretary, and media in charge. The central body devolves the authority down to each sub-tribe committee that has a similar hierarchy as that of the central committee. Each sub-tribe committee also owns a workforce of at least 200 volunteers from respective tribes for the execution of plans approved by the central committee. Through consensus, each sub-tribe identifies an issue in its area and formulates a social action plan (SAP) to counter the problem. The SAP is then discussed with the central president, and in case it is approved, the sub-tribe president designates a working committee for the execution of work on each SAP. With the availability of a sizeable workforce at the disposal of each sub-tribe, the respective president gets the leverage to simultaneously work on various SAPs within his area.

What achievements ABC program has made so far? ABC program has several accomplishments to its name. These achievements may not sound enormous to a layman hailing from the prosperous areas of the country, but those who are well aware of the local dynamics of Bara, are expected to acknowledge the invaluable drive and self-confidence the ABC program induced into the local youth. For instance,

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during the early days of the program's activation, Bara had been facing a severe shortfall of electricity supply in the area; to be more specific, the area would get merely one hour of supply on a daily basis. To counter this issue, a youth delegation visited the office of the executive engineer (XEN) of Peshawar electric supply company (PESCO) and invited him for a dialogue with the local community. During the dialogue, the PESCO official admitted negligence on the part of his department and committed to awarding a due share of the electric supply to the area. As of now, the area gets at least 18 hours of electric supply daily which is indeed a result of a noble effort on behalf of local youth.

In the fields of health and education, their feats include the up-gradation of the local Dogra hospital and the activation of all basic health units (BHU) inside Bara through consistent liaison with the Health Department of FATA and the provincial government of KP. According to unofficial resources, 95 percent of schools that were in a deplorable state have now been fully renovated and activated with almost a hundred percent presence of students, teachers, and staff. The accomplishment of these targets is mainly attributable to the relentless pressure youth maintained on the local authorities which accelerated the pace of work in the area. The consistent liaison with the local authorities has built up a credible working relationship between the youth and the local government such that government officials like Assistant/Deputy

Commissioners/ Inspector General KP police prefer integrating youth support in undertaking different projects in the area. As part of the initial practice, the youth would approach governmental organizations (GOs) and NGOs for development projects in the area; but as of now, most GOs, NGOs, and UN agencies themselves prefer approaching the ABC program for the distribution of welfare aids to the common people and undertaking various development projects in the area. Their reliance on ABC youth is mainly because of the youth's transparency and their updated knowledge of basic surveys required for various projects in the area.

Another noteworthy accomplishment on the part of ABC youth is the concrete lining of all irrigation drains in *Tehsil* Bara- a task that remained unaccomplished for several decades in the past. The youth galvanized the irrigation department for this important task and approached various NGOs including Islamic Relief Pakistan (IRP) and Sarhad rural support program (SRSP) for providing requisite funds for the canal lining project. This development not only assured equal distribution of water to the farthest fields but also resolved eternal disputes rising over theft and unjust distribution of water to all parties. Qamar Khel Baazgarha is one of the remotest areas of *Tehsil* Bara where people are extremely poor and farming was not possible due to lack of water. ABC youth committee constructed a small rainwater dam for the locals which boosted the prospects of agriculture in the area. To ensure the sincerity of the cause

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in their work and avoid unnecessary criticism from the spoilers, the ABC program prescribes a few codes of business for its volunteers. A few of them include; saying 'NO' to the drugs; do not politicize the ABC program by associating it with a specific political party; do not give a religious color to the program. In pursuit of their mission, the ABC youth has been actively engaged in organizing social activities like staging protests against the drug trade inside Bara and organizing processions and car rallies on 23rd March (Pakistan Day) to display solidarity with the nation. One of the respondents revealed that in June 2020 when Manzoor Pishteen- a pukhtun nationalism activist visited Bara to spread his spiteful ideology to the natives of Bara, the local youth played a vital role in creating awareness about his vicious ideology that ultimately led to a flopped show on behalf of Pishteen's group. The efforts of local youth towards the green revolution and healthcare also deserve recognition as they played a significant role in the success of the prime minister's billion tree project and the anti-polio campaign in Bara. The youth accompanied the polio teams for their protection while going door to door to convince the locals to comply with the state's vision of eliminating the fatal disease from Pakistan.

What contributions female wing has made to the success of the ABC program? There is no comparison between the progress of male and female wings as the cultural constraints do not provide a level playing field for both genders. Those who are familiar with local dynamics and especially the security

situation of Bara back in 2015; they can precisely make out, how audacious it was to send young female workers into the field for family intervention; especially when life threats had been explicitly sounded to the female workers. The female team comprises two social workers who are qualified in matters of religion, psychology, and general life skills. The team regularly visits local girls' schools, interacts with local women and families of the beneficiaries; discuss their routine problems, inquire about their opinion on various social problems, and suggest suitable solutions to their issues. The female SWT educates the women on maternity issues, personal hygiene, women empowerment, and the importance of education for women. Apart from imparting general awareness, the female wing also runs 4 community centers in Bara. These centers impart vocational skills in tailoring and carpet weaving trades to the young girls and women of the area. Presently, these centers have an accumulative strength of approximately 2000 girls and women, while hundreds of them are on the waiting list for the program. *Sabaoon-II* arranges sewing machines and funds for small-scale entrepreneurship with the assistance of various NGOs. Some of its graduates have become successful businesswomen and are playing a lead role in managing their family expenses. The female wing has played a significant role in persuading women to self-education and education of their young girls who are the most neglected part of society in this field. The female wing started a girls' school in the private house of a female master

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trainer of the *Sipah* tribe-based community center in 2016. The school gradually became very popular in the area as the number of students increased from only a few dozen in early 2016 to 240 in 2021. The passion of local women for education can be gauged from the fact that although an NGO- Islamic Relief Pakistan (IRP) provided funds for school bags stationery and textbooks, the above-referred lady managed the administrative affairs and monthly salary of hired teachers from her personal account. However, this school could not function for very long as it came to an end in late 2021 either due to paucity of funds or due to the non-availability of the erstwhile patron lady who had shifted to some other city. The tangible achievements of the female wing may not sound mammoth, but in intangible terms, the female wing has traversed a long distance from the point in time when locals would not allow newspapers to come to their women to a point wherein the spaces in the same centers have shrunk to accommodate those held up in waiting list.

Besides the above-mentioned activities, the male wing of the ABC program arranges sports tournaments quite often in Bara which allow youth to release their aggression and energies in the field, instead of leaning towards unhealthy activities. *Sabaoon-II* uses radio as an important medium to outreach the masses in Bara. The Khyber radio- that had previously played a vital role in the radicalization of the Bara-based society by militant organizations; on reinstatement of the government's writ in the area, *Sabaoon-*

It also banked on the same medium for the deradicalization of general masses. Khyber Radio FM network allocates approximately one hour to *Sabaoon-II*-related programs for 5 days a week. The radio programs usually provide specific information to youth about business opportunities and the promotion of local sports events; however, the radio jockeys skillfully integrate positive messages with the main theme to propagate peace, and harmony amongst the local audience.

Religious Module

Amongst most scholars, there is a common agreement that in a CVE program while other modules are equally important, incorporation of the religious module also assumes top priority.¹² Perhaps, religion is an integrating force that reconstructs the shattered soul of a person suffering from psychosis issue.¹³ Therefore no matter, whatever may be the underlying causes of extremism in society, religious underpinnings can be of great help in readjusting the psychological disorders of individuals and hence achieving the state of deradicalization in a society. During an interview with a close associate of Mangal Bagh (MB) and later a graduate of *Sabaoon-II*, he said,

I joined *Lashkar-e-Islam* with a purity of heart to respond to a noble call of *Jihad* given by Mangal Bagh. Initially, MB would strictly follow Islamic tenets; he would cut the hands of a thief, and bring justice to all, but as soon as he started killing local *Maliks* and other innocent people for not giving him money or not complying with his unfair demands, I realized that I had been with a wrong man,

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but unfortunately, I could not quit the organization for the fear of severe upshots on me and my family.¹⁴

A series of interviews with ex-militants of LI leads to an understanding that most people before surrendering to the military had realized that the fight they were engaged in had nothing to do with religious struggle, and they had long been fed up with their frantic lifestyle. Bearing, all this in mind theological intervention was not an extremely big challenge, but there was a dire need to delegitimize the false religious ideas and replace them with legitimate ones. Hence reforming the religious belief system became the central goal of the complete program. It was rather shocking to discover that the people who left their homes for the implementation of the *Shariah* law had no clue about the basics of Islam. As per a religious instructor employed at *Sabaoon-II*, more than 75 percent of beneficiaries could not recite the complete text of *Salaut* (obligatory religious prayer offered 5 times a day) while a few percent did not know anything about Islam except for merely *Kalima tul tayyaba*,¹⁵ and to one's horror, one of them had no idea, even about the name of religion. When asked about his religion, he somberly replied, "Hmmmmmm.....Sorry! I just forgot it." During the visit to *Sabaoon-II*, we find several *Ahadith*¹⁶ and verses of the holy Qur'an displayed along the walls of the compound to induce feelings of repentance and regret amongst the beneficiaries. These illustrations mainly depict prophecies by the Holy Prophet about the rise of *Khawarij*¹⁷ towards the end of time. The holy prophet Muhammad (May peace be upon him) referred to *Khawarij* as "they will

be the worst amongst all living beings,¹⁸ they will kill the Muslims and spare the idolaters;¹⁹ their slogans and apparent talk shall be attractive and inspirational²⁰ but intrinsically they shall be cruel, barbaric and obnoxious people.”²¹ Although displaying these *Ahadith* created a widespread stir amongst all beneficiaries who would frequently turn up to *Sabaoon-II* officials for the removal of illustrations, but the authorities persisted with the practice as it helped to ingrain guilt feelings among the beneficiaries. Later on, some of the GREY-shade beneficiaries, bearing a much decent and moderate demeanor, also gave positive feedback that this action on behalf of authorities was justified and had driven countless people towards *Tauba* (repentance & reconciliation).

During the early days of the program, the responsibility of theological intervention was entrusted to official *Khateeb*s²² of the military but presently these duties are being performed by a civilian religious scholar hired on contract by *Sabaoon-II*. The religious module encompasses teaching Qur’anic text and daily discussions on various topics like women's rights, gender equality, *Haqooq-ul-Ebad* (Human rights), *Rizq-e-halal* (legitimate livelihood), the concept of *Jihad*, and *Fitna-e-Khawarij* (upheaval and disruption caused by ousted people). A common setback with religious intervention in most CVE programs is that the beneficiaries view religious healer as their ideological enemy who is essentially misguided and propagates a state-approved version of Islam.²³ Moreover, they also hesitate in asking

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critical questions as they fear negative bearings on the prospects of their passing out from the institution.²⁴ To overcome this dilemma, *Sabaoon-II* promotes critical learning methods in which participants clear their doubts through mutual discussions and the religious teacher assumes the role of merely a guide or a moderator. The program advocates close interaction between the therapists and beneficiaries during off-duty hours to have informal sessions, wherein the beneficiaries usually feel comfortable asking critical questions boggling their minds. For a long period, the *Sabaoon-II* model continued a practice of inviting guest speakers for religious therapy of beneficiaries, but the frequency has been considerably reduced over time due to multiple reasons including COVID-19 and security concerns.

Psychological Module

Raafia and Feriha call the process of radicalization of individuals an act of 'metaphoric murder' committed by violent extremist organizations (VEOs). On the recruitment of new individuals, the VEOs strip off their previous identity, impart their extremist ideology, provide them aliases, and give them a new purpose of life towards the achievement of extremist agenda goals.²⁵ By this yardstick, if radicalization is a 'metaphoric murder' then the psychological module in a CVE program plays a quintessential role in finding the original identity of a radicalized individual. Similarly, a sense of rejection by

society and negligence on behalf of the family also harms the development of individual behaviors. During an interview with a middle-aged beneficiary of *Sabaoon-II*, the author asked him to count the names of his 14 children out of his two wives. Astonishingly, the respondent could only do that after making several attempts as each time he would miss one odd name. While his reply to the question reflected his casual interest and acute negligence in the brought up of his children, it also left the writer perplexed as to why people would go for scores of children if they cannot be brought up well; however, this enigma soon came to an end when another respondent revealed a much dreadful aspect of the tribal culture that, tribal people usually have more kids as they fear losing few numbers in the wake of family and tribal feuds.²⁶

How does the psychological module work? The staff composition of *Sabaoon-II* is such that the psychologists' staff form the permanent part of the project while the military staff keeps rotating quite often; therefore due to their permanent presence, multi-role characteristics, and vast experience-based knowledge, the psychologists assume a central position in the whole system. The unconditional positive regard on behalf of psychologists' staff and their central role in the overall deradicalization process place them in a highly esteemed position in the eyes of beneficiaries. The beneficiaries consider psychologists as their saviors, which helps the rapid development of a therapeutic alliance between both, hence inducing

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conscious will in their minds to cooperate with psychologists. Presently, for the strength of 126 beneficiaries, *Sabaoon-II* maintains a team of 5 psychologists including 2 females for juveniles, family intervention, and community engagement programs. After the initial psychoanalysis, the therapist holds multiple individual sessions with each beneficiary and tries to identify the pathology, and reasons for joining militancy. Having done this entire exercise, he recommends suitable therapy for the individual to develop cognition in the individual. There is a typical trait amongst most offenders that under state custody, they do not confess their crime as they fear retributions.²⁷ This has been a regular phenomenon with *Sabaoon-II* beneficiaries too, that they would seldom confess their crime despite exhibiting solid behavioral changes in their personality. To qualify for the reintegration ceremony, each beneficiary is required to submit a confessional statement, which is a prerequisite being followed by both *Sabaoon-II* and *Sabaoon-Malakand* models; but the question arises whether the confessional statement is a standard yardstick to judge the deradicalization of an individual? Feriha Peracha believes that a confessional statement is obligatory as it lends leverage to the state to admonish him in case the individual recedes to the old pattern of life.²⁸ Empirical evidence reveals that the state of radicalization or deradicalization of a person is concerned with the state of mind which is an intangible value, whereas confession is a physical value that does not essentially mean

deradicalization. A person may confess his crimes for the satisfaction of the therapist and may also pretend behavioral changes to fulfill the essential conditions imposed upon him by the system to qualify for the reintegration criterion, whereas, in reality, he may still be carrying radical thoughts. On the other hand, it is believed that a criminal's mind remains consistently haunted by the crimes he committed. While this regretful state of mind may lead to the development of cognition in a person, simultaneously the overwhelming fear of retributions may also prevent him from making confessions in front of the officials. During service at *Sabaoon-II*, the author himself recorded clear behavioral changes on the part of 90 percent of beneficiaries but almost all of them did not make a formal confession for the obvious fear of retributions. In the opinion of Ubric M. Cornelius, confession is merely a procedural requirement imposed by the Roman Catholic clergy, while it has nothing to do with therapeutic procedures.²⁹

The *Sabaoon-II* psychologists employ a wide range of psychotherapies to bring desired changes in the personality of beneficiaries. For instance, 'Drama therapy' is a beneficial tool for individuals, struggling with social stigma, or lacking social skills.³⁰ The official staff frequently organizes variety shows wherein the beneficiaries are encouraged to participate in joyful and heartwarming activities, cracking jokes, sharing inspiring anecdotes, and short drama skits. The drama skits are usually conceived around a progressive

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theme and beneficiaries are encouraged to play roles in skits that depict positivity and sound moral values. Drama therapy brings positive mood changes, releases depression, and develops empathy in their personalities.³¹ 'Narrative therapy' is another useful tool that is commonly used by psychologists in forensic settings. Usually, every criminal has a self-assumed blemished life story and bears a negative self-image in his mind that restricts him from leaning towards positivity. Through narrative therapy, the therapist reminds him of his positive traits and persuades him to replace his tainted image with a virtuous one.³² The therapist helps him to forget his blemished old story and encourages him to rewrite a pleasant one. Though all these therapies played a vital role in the deradicalization of *Sabaoon-II* beneficiaries, the Islamic therapeutic model also helped in reshaping their behaviours. The Islamic model says that the sin of all sins is *Jihalat* (lack of knowledge) which provides the basis for all mental diseases.³³ Imam Ghazali - a prominent Muslim theologian, jurist, philosopher, and psychologist of the 11th century says that "an individual continues on the wrong path because he lacks knowledge of Allah's magnanimity to pardon all sins (except the sin of associating partners to him), even though his sins fill the whole space between the earth and skies."³⁴ In the holy Qur'an, Allah Almighty proclaims Himself to be *Al-Tawwab* (The acceptor of repentance) and the only condition He attaches with forgiveness is untainted resolve to remain abide by His commands thereon. While no

therapeutic model in the world claims to transform major personality disorders permanently, only the Islamic therapeutic model promises sustainable reformation of chronic cases through *Tauba* (repentance).³⁵As per the opinion of a beneficiary, the major factor that played a vital role in transforming the minds of militants was the self-precedence set by the training staff in following the *Shariah* codes.³⁶The civil and military staff employed at *Sabaoon-II* would offer prayers in the same mosque standing shoulder to shoulder with beneficiaries. They offered unconditional positive regard to the people bearing chronic criminal records and dozens of slaughters at their hands. These evocative actions on behalf of the military staff also resolved the erstwhile qualms about their faith as a major chunk of Khyber-based ignorant society considered the Pakistan army as infidels on the provocation of local pseudo-Islamic scholars. The kind gesture of the state to award pardons to all beneficiaries compelled them to retrospect at their end which ultimately led to the stage of self-purification, and transformation of their ideology.

Education and Vocational Training

The research related to the genesis of extremism in FATA revealed that scarcity of financial resources and unsatisfied basic needs provoked people to adopt deviant behaviors and join criminal gangs. It has also been observed that the progressive societies which are socio-economically more stable, their citizens are less prone to extremism and

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militancy.³⁷ A large number of people in the Khyber district were drawn to militancy because the militant organizations offered them regular monthly stipends and unrestrained authority to make money from the riches of the area. During the psychological intervention, a beneficiary shared an anecdote with his therapist in an amusing manner that,

During militancy times, whenever we wanted to make a quick buck, we would abduct Mr. Taza Gul ³⁸ to a deserted hut in the area, would tie up his limbs, and start sharpening our blades in front of him. Upon seeing this activity, Mr.X would ask as to why we were doing all that to him; and we would soberly tell him to give us 5 lac rupees or we would slaughter him; upon which he would right away agree to give us the required amount and we would free him after getting the money. *Hahahaha.....*

Sabaoon-II offers, a wide range of vocational trade training, educational opportunities, and a monthly stipend of rupees 7500 to each beneficiary. The juveniles' wing has 9 youths for whom both formal education and vocational training are mandatory, while the adult section gets training in vocational trades only. The vocational trades include heavy machinery operators, tailoring, computer education, carpet weaving, driving, welding, carpenter, vehicle mechanic & electrician, mobile repair, and home appliances electrician courses. Since vocational training is not mandatory for beneficiaries above 50 years of age, therefore middle-aged people have the option to either sit with adults' education class, or agricultural and honey bee farming classes. At the time of induction for training, a beneficiary selects a trade of his choice, and in case he feels

unsatisfied, he reserves the right to change it subsequently. In 2016-17 when the local industries/factories of Bara became functional again, approximately 250 beneficiaries of the program were awarded unskilled labor jobs in the factories. As of now, approximately one hundred out of that strength have risen to the rank of skilled labor and are earning handsome salaries up to rupees thirty thousand a month, which stimulates a desire amongst the rest to take a keen interest in vocational training and earn a legitimate livelihood for their families. In 2016, *Sabaoon-II* also commenced a project for the vocational training of the unemployed youth of Bara. The project imparted vocational skills to hundreds of local youth for a couple of years but later it was abandoned due to lack of requisite funds.

Apart from male-oriented developments, *Sabaoon-II* has commenced a few projects in the domain of women empowerment as well. The female social workers run four women's community centers in Bara, wherein young girls and local women are imparted formal education, embroidery, tailoring, and carpet weaving skills. When this project started back in 2016, the *Sabaoon-II* administration used to provide free sewing machines to the women upon completion of their training but later on, this practice was abandoned due to a shortage of funds and a sharp increase in the number of beneficiary women. At present, approximately two thousand girls and women are getting vocational training at these centers, while equal numbers are on the standby list. In the field of formal education of

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girls, *Sabaoon-II* provides academic and financial support to several local schools. In 2016 it established a private school for local women and girls of the sub-tribe *Sipah* in the house of a local lady who would look after the administrative affairs of the school besides offering salaries to the teaching staff from her personal account. The school remained functional for approximately 5 years and imparted basic education to hundreds of students before it finally closed in 2021 due to administrative and economic constraints.

Rehabilitation and Monitoring

After successful deradicalization training, the rehabilitation, and monitoring of graduated beneficiaries is an equally important phase that requires deliberate planning and forceful execution to ensure the success of the complete CVE project. Usually, the individuals released from jails or such projects face multiple problems in blending with society. Despite the development of strong cognition and firm resolve to leave the old patterns of life, many individuals recede to old behaviors just because they fail to get suitable jobs as society is not ready to accept the ex-offenders. Resultantly, they find requisite comfort in the company of erstwhile comrades thereby leading to their re-engagement with VEm. In European settings, rehabilitation and reemployment of released prisoners through the assistance of government, NGOs, and social activists is a routine practice that has existed for a long,³⁹ but this aspect seems completely missing in third-world countries

including Pakistan. Being cognizant of problems likely to be faced by beneficiaries during the rehabilitation phase, the program has dedicated a special effort to develop a capacity-building strategy for the area. The rehabilitation strategy includes; (1) Amicably removing frictions between beneficiaries and locals through local *Sarishtha* committees;⁴⁰ (2) Liaison with government institutions and political administration for infrastructural development, (3) Liaison with local industrialists, factory owners, and NGOs for creating job opportunities for the beneficiaries; (4) Financial support for setting up private shops and workplaces; (5) Post-reintegration monitoring of beneficiaries to ensure that they do not recede to militancy and to remove the impediments hindering their rehabilitation process.

After completing the prescribed training period, the beneficiaries are subjected to a final risk assessment to gauge their existing radicalization level. Similarly, the instructors from vocational and religious modules also carry out final assessments in their respective domains. The individuals who qualify for the obligatory benchmarks, their names are recommended to the evaluation board for final approval. Eventually, the individuals approved by the board are reintegrated with society through a ceremony organized at the *Sabaoon-II* auditorium. At the time of reintegration, the administration provides a tool kit and a merit certificate for successful completion of training in respective vocational trades; however, the beneficiaries with extremely poor backgrounds or extraordinary

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performance during training are also awarded sizeable financial packages for setting up minor workshops in their village. As a procedural requirement, the beneficiary being passed out needs to acquire guarantors from amongst his family and notables of the area that the individual will not engage in anti-social activities, and in case he moves out of his native place, they will apprise the *Sabaoon-II* officials about his location and activities. The program has indigenously developed a deliberate monitoring system that keeps the organization well-connected with the beneficiaries after their reintegration. Over 8 years of its existence, it has so far graduated 1501 individuals till the date of compiling this research. Most of the graduated beneficiaries are settled within the geographical boundaries of FATA, while many have also shifted to Karachi, Peshawar, and several other towns of the country. However, the monitoring team of *Sabaoon-II* keeps updating the present location of beneficiaries through an integral information network. Besides this, several law enforcement agencies including military intelligence tentacles also help corroborate the latest information on the current location and activities of the beneficiaries.

Principles of Transformative Model

The existing literature on deradicalization studies reveals that there are no silver bullets to end terrorism, nor there is a single universal method which if emulated in all parts of the world, would essentially bring success;⁴¹

however, to fill the gap Thomas Mark Turay and Leona M. English have offered few assumptions that may be taken as guiding principles to formulate a transformative model of peace education. The universal nature of these codes warrants their applicability to all societies around the globe regardless of local dynamics. The principles suggested by Turay and English include *Diversity, Participatory learning, Globalized perspectives, Indigenous knowing, and Spiritual underpinnings*.⁴² It cannot be said with certainty whether these principles are being currently followed by any CVE model in the world, but surely they form the cornerstones of the *Sabaoon-II*-based therapeutic model. This study not only testifies the veracity of Turay and English's postulates but also suggests slight modifications in the set of principles, based on the understandings developed during the execution phase of the *Sabaoon-II* program. The *Globalized perspectives* principle though retains its philosophical significance, but without undermining the valuable works of esteemed scholars, it is being substituted with two other codes namely, '*unconditional positive regard*', and '*perseverance*' for the purpose of this study.

Unconditional Positive Regard

Unconditional positive regard means that the therapist accepts the client totally for who he or she is without evaluating, judging, or disapproving his character. This attitude of positive regard creates a non-threatening context in which the client feels free to explore and share hostile or abnormal feelings without worrying about personal

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rejection by the therapist.⁴³ If deradicalization is the true aim of an efficient CVE program, then there is a need to create such healthy and conducive environments for learning positive behaviors; but unfortunately, most prison-based CVE programs fail to create such atmospheres. Michel Foucault propounds that jails are factories of criminals. He equates mental hospitals and schools with jails as they all induce necessary compliance instead of encouraging reformation through critical learning.⁴⁴ Feriha believes that the prison settings rather incriminate the casual offenders and permeate criminal behaviors instead of eradicating them.⁴⁵ She strongly condemns the idea of imprisoning juveniles and instead recommends the establishment of rehabilitation centers for young offenders on the lines of *Sabaoon* -Malakand.⁴⁶

The *Sabaoon*-II program is an open prison model that provides conducive environments for the deradicalization of a large number of hard-core militants including many labeled as BLACK-category criminals. In the pursuit of larger national interests, the officials of the program extend unconditional positive regard for all beneficiaries regardless of the gravity of crimes committed by them. When the program was kicked off in 2015, the military officials of the program embraced the militants- erstwhile blood-thirsty enemies with an open heart thereby imparting confidence in their minds that, no matter how ignoble their past had been, they were still acceptable to the nation provided they commit to mellow their behaviors thereon.

Paradoxically, the treatment rendered to prisoners at renowned *Abu Ghraib* and *Guantanamo Bay* jails was highly derogatory and inhumane, which later resulted in the further radicalization of people released from there.⁴⁷ In the personal reckoning of the author, the *Unconditional positive regard* principle holds paramount importance and forms the backbone of a deradicalization program. Unless the radical minds have a firm inner feeling that the program is sincerely aimed at their reformation and based on the true spirit of forgiveness, and mutual harmony, the positive change in their behaviours is supposed to be interim only. To induce such a level of confidence, the instructional and administrative staff was obliged to accommodate at the same location where the militants resided under ordinary inner perimeter security. Although *Sabaoon-II* ensured a strict outer cordon in the wake of looming threat perception, the inner cordon was however intentionally relaxed to avoid casting an image of a jail; rather it will not be false to say that inner security was merely an administrative arrangement aimed at maintaining discipline inside the compound. The *Sabaoon-II* officials would visit the beneficiaries in their rooms after the last light, would listen to their personal issues, share experiences, and intermittent jokes to develop a trustworthy therapeutic relationship with them. Eventually, over the first six months of the program, frequent interactions with beneficiaries in the classrooms, playing field, mosque, and dining room created an atmosphere, that their deradicalization seemed to be a

natural outcome of *unconditional positive regard* extended to them.

Diversity

The 'Diversity' principle calls for holistic nature of the program that encompasses all aspects related to the radicalization and deradicalization of a society. In a nutshell, it implies that a CVE program ought to be comprehensive enough such that every facet should complement the primary effort instead of entangling into a vicious circle of countering the threat on the one hand and reproducing the radicals on the other hand. Diversity necessitates nurturing a pluralistic society where people holding divergent political and religious ideas may also enjoy equal comfort as people with orthodox ideas. Ironically, in the Western states, this principle does not seem to be followed in the true letter and spirit, as the core issues leading to the radicalization of the Muslim community are not being adequately addressed. As the term 'extremism' has become a reference point for Muslims around the world, therefore most ideology-based CVE programs focus on targeting Muslim communities, which has resulted in the further marginalization of a major chunk of the population in Europe.⁴⁸ While on the one hand, CVE programs are consuming huge capital and vital energies of the European states; on the other hand, the general public seems relentlessly inclined to deflate Islamic ideology by criticizing religious customs like wearing *hijab* and growing a beard. The incidents of desecration of the Holy Qur'an,

and mocking the Holy Prophet Muhammad (May peace be upon him) have become a routine affair in the West. Instead of taking stern action against such acts, the respective governments tend to provide shelter to the blasphemers in the name of individual liberty and freedom of speech.⁴⁹

The West needs to acknowledge that the Muslims place Qur'an and the Holy Prophet Muhammad (May peace be upon him) in the highest possible esteem, therefore their anger and fury over such acts is a natural phenomenon. Similarly, in pursuit of a single high-value target, allied forces have been killing scores of innocent civilians including women and children through drone attacks, which resulted in the further radicalization of local youth who would rise for revenge (*Badal*) against the Pakistan army being perceived as an ally to the USA in the WoT. The 'Diversity' principle demands the engagement of the whole community and sterilizing it from all infectious ills that may contribute to the radicalization of the general public. Acknowledging the significance of this principle, the *Sabaoon-II* program lent substantial weight to the creation of favourable environments in Bara that subsequently helped the rehabilitation of ex-militants back into society. The efforts in the domain of community engagement went a long way to develop social acceptance for the beneficiaries in the society thereby slashing the chances of their regression to violent behaviours.

Indigenous Knowledge

The success of any transformative model is highly dependent on one major factor, that transformative learning has to be contextualized to the area where it is enacted. Even the best possible transformative model of the world with optimum resources and ideal environments is likely to doom if it does not incorporate indigenous knowledge. It implies that, for imparting required therapy, the therapist has to have a firm grip over contesting ideologies and requisite knowledge about native culture. The shortage of qualified Islamic scholars is a widespread problem in most prison-based CVE programs in Europe, therefore for theological intervention, they rely on prison imams.⁵⁰ On the other hand, few Western countries have hired these services from local Islamic councils as well; for instance, the 'Prevent' component of the British-based 'CONTEST-2' strategy hired the services of several local Islamic NGOs like the Muslim Council of Britain, the British Muslim Forum, the Sufi Muslim Council, Faith Matters, and the Quilliam Foundation.⁵¹ Similarly, in Australia, the New South Wales Goulburn prison gets theological intervention support from Victorian Islamic Council.⁵²

Paradoxically, in the context of Pakistan, despite an abundance of scholars available all across the country, their services have not been judiciously used for the deradicalization of radical groups. Perhaps, one plausible reason for not approaching the scholars' community is their security concerns, as several renowned Islamic scholars

who challenged Taliban ideology, had been executed by terrorist organizations;⁵³ therefore the *Sabaoon* - II authorities did not feel appropriate to risk the life of the rest. During the initial days, the program also faced considerable opposition in arranging highly popular and well-reputed Islamic scholars, but subsequently, it succeeded in managing a few local speakers who could make a worthwhile impact on the minds of beneficiaries. To exemplify the advantage of indigenous knowledge, there is an incident related to community engagement by the female social workers of *Sabaoon-II*. The female social workers used to visit the area to impart a few vocational skills including tailoring skills to the local women. Due to the non-availability of sufficient cloth for practicing cutting skills, the social workers would usually provide them English and Urdu newspapers in place of cloth. Subsequently, one pleasant morning, a message was conveyed to the *Sabaoon-II* officials on behalf of locals that concerned authorities ought to quit providing newspapers to their ladies as they comprised pictures of *Na'mehram*⁵⁴ males that could perhaps contaminate the modest minds of their women. On another occasion also, the officials received a message to refrain from sending female social workers for community engagement programs as the pukhtun code did not permit ladies to roam around (without *mehram*); and in case, the ladies do not abstain they should be ready to meet a suicidal attack on their vehicle. Although these challenges were extremely dire, the sheer acquaintance of the *Sabaoon-II* staff

with local traditions and customs helped them resolve the issues amicably which could otherwise be highly detrimental to the achievement of the envisaged goals of the project.

Spiritual Underpinnings

Turay and English have emphasized the incorporation of *Spiritual underpinnings* in their model for peace education for the reason that many people have religious and spiritual beliefs and values that are central to how they deal with conflict.⁵⁵ Carl Gustav Jung is an eminent psychologist of the 20th century whose major work happened to be with psychotics. He writes in his book '*Psychology and Religion*' that, religion is one of the oldest and earliest things that had an impact on the psychology of mankind. It is not merely a historical or sociological phenomenon, rather, it is something of considerable personal concern to a great number of people. Carl Jung opines that religion is an integrating force of personality, while psychosis is the opposite of religion as it disintegrates the personality.⁵⁶ Based on his experience Jung gives a comprehensive statement that,

"I have treated many hundreds of patients. Among those in the second half of life – that is to say, over 35- there has not been one whose problem in the last resort was not that of finding a religious outlook on life."⁵⁷

Though people may not look much religious in routine life, presumably most people (other than agnostics) find tranquility, solace, and safety at the mere thought of a

mosque, chapel, or temple. Perhaps, this sensation occurs because religion is inherently an integrating force that reassembles a shattered soul, and makes him feel relaxed on performing certain meditations.⁵⁸ Though debatable for some, there is a predominant notion that intrinsically every religion is peaceful, and no religion teaches to disrespect other religions or spread chaos in society; however, it depends on the user how he uses or interprets the religion to pursue some specific goals. From the aforementioned assumptions, it may be deduced that regardless of local dynamics, and the type of faith the beleaguered community beholds, the religious module essentially forms part of every CVE program. As religion was the main rhetoric used by militant organizations to attract the recruitment of locals of district Khber, therefore the use of religious underpinnings was a natural requirement in the context of the *Sabaoon-II* model. During the phase of insurgency, the beneficiaries of *Sabaoon-II* regarded Pakistan Army as an infidel force, but when they observed the military officials keenly following *Shariah* codes in their routine life, the former tainted image of the military gradually faded away and within the first six months of the project, more than 90 percent people were almost de-radicalized. To a question posed to an ex-militant (who later graduated from *Sabaoon-II*) as to how he developed cognition, he replied,

I never wanted to surrender but when I saw my comrades defecting, I lost the will to fight and hence surrendered to feign the military authorities for some time. Subsequently, during training at *Sabaoon-II*, I keenly

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observed the behaviors of military staff, saw them practicing Islamic values better than myself, and hence decided to change myself roughly a year after my surrender.⁵⁹

During service at *Sabaoon-II*, the author keenly observed the behavioral changes in the above-mentioned beneficiary and found him molding his character into the desired perimeters in a highly appreciable manner. While commenting on the behavior of the same beneficiary, a local psychologist narrated that during the training, a few dissenters had tried to incite him for violence against the officials over some trivial issue at *Sabaoon-II*, but he solemnly declined to revert to old behaviours against his benefactors.

Perseverance

Every individual has his own particular set of beliefs, behaviors, and inclinations, which he develops over a long period of life. Transforming one's approach and belief system in a brief period is an uphill task that requires an acute degree of perseverance and tolerance on the mentor's part. The biggest challenge in this regard is building up a sustainable and trustworthy therapeutic alliance between therapist and client. In most prison-based models, the subject usually considers himself at right and regards the therapist as an enemy and a misguided person who represents a state-owned fake version of religious beliefs;⁶⁰ therefore breaching his defence mechanism and developing a credible repute is a highly astute and painstaking process that may require enormous determination at therapist's

end. During the deradicalization process, the therapist may also come across certain challenges which may break his will to continue the therapy, but sheer courage and perseverance get him going. For instance, as mentioned earlier two female social workers were threatened with a suicidal attack during their community engagement work, but instead of complying with the terrorists' demand they continued their duty by saying, "We know what we are doing is right, and we don't mind even though we lose our life in the line of duty." Handling chronic cases of mental disorders and drug addicts is a highly daunting task that requires a lot of patience and determination on the part of a therapist. The *Sabaoon-II* model did not have serious mental disorder cases except for a few who were handed over to the political administration of the Khyber district, in the wake of their acute mental illness. To sum up the discussion, it may be said that reforming shattered personalities and affecting positive changes in their ideology are extremely challenging tasks that demand sheer determination, patience, and courage on the therapist's part.

Participatory Learning

Participatory learning allows the learners to explore what they need to learn and how they need to learn instead of internalizing dogmas spewed by the instructor. *Sabaoon-II* employs a method of learning that involves critical thinking on behalf of all participants. The beneficiaries generate discussion on the topics of their own choice and the teacher assumes the role of merely a moderator who

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guides the discussion towards the desired direction and gives intermittent corrections to the class. During psychological and religious interventions, the instructors do not right away refute the beliefs possessed by the beneficiaries, rather they calmly listen to the views and experiences of all. The participants name the issues boggling their minds, analyze them from a variety of perspectives and finally reach solutions through mutual discussions.⁶¹ The solutions so reached are assumed to be much more lasting than those imposed upon the participants. The participatory learning principle yielded multiple advantages to the *Sabaoon-II* program; one- the class atmosphere became alive; two- it allowed every beneficiary to share his point of view with the class and learn from others; it developed endurance amongst the participants to listen calmly to the dissenting opinion of others, and above all, it diminished the predominant impression that the participants are being indoctrinated with the state-owned fake ideology.

Analysis

No transformative model can be called as precise and perfect, as terrorism studies related to deradicalization are still in the infancy stage and evolving with every passing day.⁶² On the other hand, while one program does not suit all regions, there is no standard yardstick to measure the performance and efficiency of a specific model.⁶³ Existing literature on the subject reveals that each program though

follows a distinct approach but in essence, they all are similar and work towards a common goal to transform the violent behaviors of society through peace education. The success of a transformative model is however largely dependent on the fact that how finely the basic humane values like compassion, sympathy, care, and positive regard for others are integrated with the main curriculum. The secondary factors which give strength to the therapeutic model include the resources at hand and the zeal with which the program is executed and followed by a sound rehabilitation plan of course. While all these factors complement each other in attaining success, the deficiency of a single factor may gravely affect the overall success of the whole program. Finding ideal settings may not be possible anywhere, as the magnitude and degree of these variables differ from program to program and region to region and so does the degree of success in each case. Although there is no standard formula to judge the efficacy of a program, the only plausible criterion presently at hand to evaluate a model may be either to gauge it through its achievements or recidivism cases on its record.

Having studied the complete framework and functioning mechanism of *Sabaoon-II*, it is not easy to correlate the program with any other CVE model in the world. Apparently, the program resembles a blend of European and Asian models that have roughly the same components like, vocational training, psychological and religious therapy, familial interactions, and followed by a

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rehabilitation plan. But in several respects it is surprisingly different from other projects in the world; one- it deals with hardcore BLACK-category militants but in open-prison settings; two- its community engagement program is fairly diverse and different from others; three- it has no recidivism case to the date of compiling this research; and lastly- its basic honour codes are not so commonly heard of in any other program. The program is conspicuously different from other projects in another way that the brand of militants *Sabaoon-II* happened to deal with were extremely crude and ferocious as many of them had been involved in the slaughtering of dozens of innocent people. They either had no formal schooling or negligible *madrassa* education, including scores of people who could not correctly recite *Kalima tul Tayyaba*⁶⁴; but these challenges had a silver lining too that these individuals had voluntarily surrendered to the state; and perhaps, transforming their ideology did not require humongous efforts other than perseverance, patience, and constancy on mentors' behalf.

The accomplishments of *Sabaoon-II* may be attributed to a few distinct aspects of its therapeutic model and honour codes observed by its officials. The unconditional positive regard assured the beneficiaries that no matter what they had done in the past, they could win a second chance to lead a peaceful life by modifying their behaviours. This assurance went a long way in establishing harmony and a strong alliance between the benefactor and the beneficiaries, which forms the basis of any therapeutic model. A few

practices on the part of local staff like offering prayers together, playing sports and dining with them, socializing during off timings, and listening to their minor family issues, are a few significant aspects that gave enormous strength to its therapeutic model.

For theological intervention, the program initially relied on the official *Khateeb*s,⁶⁵ who were although amply qualified in Islamic studies but lacked professional counseling skills. The beneficiaries would usually regard *Khateeb*s as agents of the government, harping on the fake version of Islam. Subsequently, the administration adequately addressed this shortfall by employing critical learning methods in the classroom and hiring a specialist scholar qualified in pedagogical skills. The magnitude of theological intervention at *Sabaoon-II* has partially reduced, as the frequency of inviting guest speakers has considerably declined over time. This shortfall is quite plausible in the case of Western CVE models where Muslim scholars may not be abundantly available, but in the case of Pakistan-based programs, it is attributable to some undisclosed policy concerns at the state level.

The program claims a hundred percent success rate as none out of a total of 1501 graduates passed out so far has receded to militancy. This claim may look a bit pompous and exaggerated to the audience, but there are a few strong reasons to believe it to be correct. For instance, roughly the entire beneficiary lot joined the program voluntarily; secondly, the cordial and relaxed atmosphere of the

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Sabaoon-II is not so commonly found in other models; thirdly, the community engagement program developed favorable grounds for the fusion of beneficiaries in the society that eventually prevented the individuals from regression to old behaviors; and lastly, the major chunk of beneficiaries still resides within geographical boundaries of *Tehsil Bara*, that are controlled environments being monitored by multiple LEAs and intelligence networks. Given that *Sabaoon-II* has several unique achievements on its part, it cannot be ruled out that several numbers out of 1501 graduates may still possess a varied degree of radicalism, but presumably, they have opted to remain dormant till the rise of some favourable situation; however, it may not be refuted also that as per the official statistics, none has receded to militancy to the date of compiling this study which is certainly a worthwhile achievement on part of the program.

Conclusion

Sabaoon-II program was raised in *Tehsil Bara* in 2015 by the Pakistan military to deradicalize the militants and their families to make them useful citizens of Pakistan. The program envisages psychosocial and religious therapy, vocational training, rehabilitation, and community engagement components within the geographical boundaries of *Tehsil Bara*. Though its apparent framework resembles most CVE programs in the world, intrinsically it is quite different from its peer programs. It may not be

possible to create a universally applicable CVE program as every region has its specific dynamics, but there exists a possibility for the evolution of basic codes that may apply to all CVE programs in the world. The chapter enumerates the guiding principles that contributed to the success of the *Sabaoon-II* model and are also likely to generate further discussion and research questions for the evolution of deradicalization studies. The study highlights the significance of dispensing positive treatment to the people which can do kind of wonders that shells and bullets can't. The chapter also signifies the importance of the community engagement component in any transformative model in the world. To ensure the smooth rehabilitation of ex-militants, there is a need to develop resilience in society, so that after reintegration, they may not face many hazards in blending with the community

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After the revision of the counter-terrorism strategy by the US, a large number of CVE programs started emerging in various parts of the world with different approaches but a common goal to transform extremist ideologies in their respective states. Horgan and Braddock being critical of the deradicalization efforts recommend using the term “Risk reduction programs” for these initiatives.¹ Horgan and Altier move a step forward by calling them a trash heap of silver bullet solutions unless we acknowledge the true reasons for the radicalization of people.² The words of highly esteemed scholars have a very deeper meaning that calls for thoughtful retrospection and correcting the anomalies in the system which lead to the engagement of masses in VEm. The study finds out that extremism has innumerable forms that are usually area-specific with a varied degree of threat in each region. In the West violence comes up as a result of some bigoted ideologies like a certain nation is more civilized and modern than others; whites are more

intelligent and logical than non-whites. Western strong belief in democracy to be the only acceptable form of government and American exceptionalism also transpire radical thoughts. The fact that US' staunch belief in democracy has triggered how many foreign interventions all around the globe is not hidden from the world. Similarly, needless debates on wearing *hijab* and frequent blasphemous acts against the Holy Quran and the Holy Prophet Muhammad (may peace be upon him) create a widespread stir among Muslims thereby inducing bitterness in the community as a whole. The study ascertains that addressing the unconventional behaviors of society assumes much greater importance than merely focusing on the deradicalization of ex-militants and incarcerated criminals. A pragmatic approach suggests that the paradoxes and inconsistencies associated with definitions of various concepts and CVE strategies are likely to persist as long as the world does not become a homogeneous unit with a singular government and uniform belief system. Every nation or state defines the core concepts as per its own suiting and devises strategies to serve its indigenous interest in the best possible manner, therefore seeking universal concurrence in all domains is not only impractical, instead it reflects an extremist approach at their end.

The study of worldwide CVE efforts reveals that all these programs have roughly the same concept and similar features but are essentially different from each other in

terms of their methodology and resources at hand. The Europe-based programs reflect the active participation of governmental organizations, NGOs, the private sector, and almost all segments of society. Whereas, the Muslim majority states of the Afro-Asian region where the threat is much more intense, the seriousness at both governmental and civil society levels seems lying much below the desired threshold. The dearth of indigenous research work on behalf of Muslim scholars has deprived the Counter-terrorism studies of vital knowledge that could not only mitigate the Islamophobic feelings around the world, rather it could also help to devise sustainable CVE policies all around the world. Singapore's RRG model is a classic example of the significant role played by civil society in combating terrorism. It is a kind of model that is not only comprehensive in all respects; rather it is much more cost-effective and suits all nations regardless of their economic status and threat perception. The Saudi program is one of the most cherished models in the world, but it involves the circulation of huge money³and therefore seems relatively impractical for most third-world countries due to their economic constraints.

The research related to the investigation of core reasons for extremism in the Khyber district reveals that the state's incapacity to fulfill the basic human needs of locals, and bad governance led to the growth of extremism in the society. The gap between the haves and have-nots is consistently increasing all around the globe thereby driving societies

towards increased crime rates. Any blasphemous act happening in any part of the world causes instant religious-based strife inside Pakistan. The gathering of huge mobs and causing serious damage to the government and private properties during prolonged sit-ins has become a common phenomenon in major cities of Pakistan. The study explores that the prevailing geostrategic situation, geographical contiguity with Afghanistan, and a few aspects of native culture had a significant influence on the evolution of extremism in the Khyber-based society. Although false religious rhetoric provided a basic platform to amass local support for militancy, outrightly religion cannot be blamed for creating chaos in society as no religion in the world endorses violence let alone religion Islam which literally means peace. In the context of Pakistan, outright elimination of all the root causes of extremism may not be possible with existing knowledge and resources in a short period, but the immediate establishment of risk reduction programs in threat-prone areas is inevitable for the state.

The study finds that there cannot be a single program that may be replicated in all parts of the world nor there exists a standard yardstick to gauge the efficiency of a specific model. The success of a transformative model is however largely dependent on the fact that how finely the basic humane values like compassion, forgiveness, and positive regard for others are integrated with the main curriculum. The secondary factors which give strength to a therapeutic model include the resources at hand and the

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zeal with which the program is executed and followed by a sound rehabilitation plan for beneficiaries. While all these factors complement each other in attaining success, the deficiency of a single factor may gravely affect the overall success of the whole program. Finding ideal settings may not be possible anywhere, as the magnitude and degree of these variables differ from program to program and region to region and so does the degree of success in each case. However, the only plausible criterion presently at hand to evaluate a model may be either to gauge it through its achievements or recidivism cases on its record. The study explores that, although *Sabaoon-II* resembles a blend of European and Asian models that have roughly the same components, in essence, it is surprisingly different from the rest as the challenges it faced were much direr than other programs. The beneficiaries of *Sabaoon-II*'s model were much more vicious and were put to deradicalization in open-prison settings even though several of them had been involved in slaughtering incidents during their militancy career. But these challenges had a silver lining too that they had voluntarily surrendered to the state, therefore, their reformation did not require enormous efforts other than perseverance, patience, and constancy on the part of mentors. The unconditional positive regard' on behalf of the staff members assured the beneficiaries that no matter what their past had been like, they could still win a second chance to live a peaceful life by affecting positive changes in their behaviours. This assurance bond between both parties

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gave enormous strength to the *Sabaoon-II*-based therapeutic model that ultimately led to an unblemished victory over the militant ideology.

The study finds that the use of religious underpinnings in any program is highly inevitable for its success. Religion being an integrating force reconstructs the shattered souls of people all across the globe, but transforming the deeply ingrained religious ideas of militants is a highly arduous task as they are usually inclined to rejection of government-owned religious ideology. Hence requisite pedagogical skills based on critical learning methods assume supreme importance to breach the defense mechanism of the beneficiaries' minds. The study finds that most foreign CVE models are inclined towards benefitting from local religious organizations for theological intervention, but Pakistan-based programs have partially ignored capitalizing on the extraordinary resources of the state in the field of religion. The claim of a hundred percent success rate on behalf of *Sabaoon-II* may look a bit pompous and exaggerated to the audience, but there are a few strong reasons to believe it to be correct. For instance, roughly the entire beneficiary lot joined the program voluntarily, so the chances of regression ought to stand minimal; secondly, the cordial and relaxed environments of the *Sabaoon-II* are not so common amongst other programs; thirdly, the community engagement program developed favourable grounds for the absorption of beneficiaries in the society that prevented the individuals from regression to old

behaviors; and lastly, the major chunk of beneficiaries still resides within geographical boundaries of *Tehsil Bara*, that are controlled environments being monitored by multiple LEAs and intelligence tentacles. Given that *Sabaon-II* has several unique achievements on its part, it cannot be ruled out that several numbers out of 1501 graduates may still possess a varied degree of radicalism, but presumably, they have opted to remain dormant till the rise of some favourable situation; however, it maynot be refuted also that as per the official statistics, none has receded to militancy to the date of compiling this study which is certainly a worthwhileachievement on part of the program.

Way Forward

The global community needs to acknowledge that terrorism and Islam are not binary terms having any remotest possible connection with each other, nor terrorism can be associated with any religion of the world. In view of an increased rate of blasphemous acts, unnecessary criticism ofIslamic values, and the marginalization of the Muslim community the gulf between the Muslim and non-Muslim world has widened over the last two decades which needs to be shrunk through pragmatic means. It is pertinent to add that demonizing a segment of society on the basis of its inherent cultural values provides the recipe for the self-destruction of society as a whole, therefore instead of mere reliance on CVE programs, the Western governments need to reverse the Islamophobic campaign and focus on the root

causes that provide favourable grounds for cultivating negative behaviours in the society,

If extremism in Pakistan is not visible in full bloom as yet, does not imply that it does not exist, rather where ever socio-economic disparities and structural violence exist, extremism lies as sediments in the foundations of that society. It exists as negative peace that may transform to direct violence anytime in any form in vulnerable areas of the country. In the milieu of hybrid warfare, increased poverty, and narrow politics by several mainstream political, religious, and sub-nationalist parties, radicalism is consistently rising in the country. An increased frequency of violent protests and sit-ins on the issue of blasphemy, outrageous speeches, and relentless bashing of state institutions are a few manifestations of sizzling radicalism in society. In such circumstances, the government tends to rely on state institutions to pacify the situation, which may at times lead to confrontation between the state and citizens. Any unfortunate incident like Model Town Lahore (17 June 2014) or frequent clashes between police and political parties will have the capacity to escalate the situation to nationwide violence. The government needs to create an intermediate buffer force based on moderate religious scholars of all sects and dispassionate political figures to mediate between the mobs and the government and pacify the situation without the involvement of state agencies.

NACTA was envisaged with an encouraging and progressive mandate in 2008 to promote CVE efforts in

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Pakistan, but it remained dysfunctional due to understaffing and a lack of resources. Academically, NACTA may have few feathers in the cap but the ground picture does not reflect any noteworthy accomplishments on its behalf. The government needs to fulfill its existing deficiencies and make it operationally more agile to meet its mandatory objectives in a befitting manner.

The 'Religious Rehabilitation Group' (RRG) model of Singapore happens to be a great success and merits replication in other parts of the world. Pakistan also needs to replicate the same model at the provincial level with a mandate to deliver public talks, hold seminars, impart psychosocial and religious therapy to incarcerated people, and resolve the qualms of the general public through religious workshops and an online website. The most striking aspect of this model is that it is based on volunteership and the members do not accept stipends or rewards from the government; hence it is not likely to burden the national exchequer as well. However, in case the provincial governments could manage some donors, the funds may be utilized for the rehabilitation of prisoners, and the welfare of their families as poverty is also a major cause of engagement in criminal activities in Pakistan. Family care is an important component of a successful CVE program that helps revive the trust of prisoners in the state thereby reducing the chances of their re-engagement in criminal activities.

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The Punjab Police started a deradicalization program to deal with the elements involved in sectarian strife inside Pakistan. The program remained functional for merely one odd year (2011-2012) and was later terminated either due to insufficient resources or some other political/administrative issues. The jails of Pakistan are full of radical and criminal elements that deserve to get a second chance to resume their life. The psychologists' team of *Sabaoon-II* visits various internment centers all across the country to select suitable war criminals for the deradicalization course. On parallel lines with *Sabaoon-II*, it is suggested that the deradicalization of incarcerated individuals may also be started by respective police authorities in each province. This is likely to help the rehabilitation of huge people who inadvertently committed some minor crimes, and are now eager to give up a criminal pattern of life. Besides the idea of prison-based deradicalization centers in each province, provincial governments may also need to consider the establishment of non-prison-based deradicalization centers in remote areas which are more vulnerable to extremism threats.

Johan Galtung says that cultural violence is an invariant, rather a permanent feature that stays for long periods in a society. The relentless extortion of basic human rights has left deep marks on the mind and spirits of common citizens that are not likely to diminish anytime soon; hence, the utility of CVE programs is likely to persist in Pakistan for a long time to come. Pakistan needs to establish a National

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Deradicalization Academy which shall help with capacity-building training of the staff to be employed in various deradicalization centers in the country. At the time of raising *Sabaoun-II*, the staff employed for psychosocial therapy and religious intervention were completely devoid of counseling skills. The establishment of an academy shall not only cater for such shortcomings but shall also promote research work for exploring the latest methods of counseling and deradicalization around the globe.

Over the last two decades, there has been a lot of research work carried out in the realm of deradicalization and counterterrorism studies, with most of the contributions coming up from Western scholars. Reliance on foreign-based research may temporarily do the trick as regards initial learning, but to develop a sound and credible deradicalization model there is a need to incorporate indigenous knowledge. Acknowledging the overwhelming significance of indigenous research work, Pakistan needs to either raise a separate department of VEm in leading universities of the country or integrate extremism-related courses in the existing departments of law, psychology, criminology, social sciences, and Islamic studies. The government may also enjoin upon students of the aforementioned departments to undertake 6 months internship in prison-based or non-prison-based deradicalization centers to qualify for respective degrees. Accomplishing this action will not only resolve research-related issues but will also help with capacity-building

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training of staff besides cultivating compassion amongst the young scholars for a relegated part of society held in jails and internment centers of the country.

The ABC Youth Program being a sub-project of *Sabaoon-II* helped in revitalizing the energies of the local youth of *Tehsil Bara*. The youth program not only induced a drive in youth to address the sufferings of locals on a self-help basis; rather it also cultivated democratic cultures amongst the youth and provided a young and enlightened leadership to the area. The utility of such projects is not restricted to merely extremism-prone or socio-economically backward areas; rather it bears a universal character and can be emulated in any part of the world to develop team spirit amongst the youth and educate them on democratic behaviors and leadership skills.

The state's pragmatic steps to provide health, education, job opportunities, social justice, and security shall enable the culture of violence to gradually vanish from society, otherwise, mere academic efforts to establish a culture of peace through debates, lectures, and seminars shall bear no fruit. Although Pakistan lacks the kind of resources Saudi Arab and Singapore or any European country may have but certain useful measures do not require much money; merely assertiveness of state institutions and streamlining certain SOPs would do the trick, thereby slashing the chances of further proliferation at least by half the existing size.

NOTES

Chapter One: Introduction

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Chapter Three: The Genesis of Extremism in Khyber District (Erstwhile FATA)

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Chapter Four: Sabaoon-II Transformative Model

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- 3 Arabic words derived from Qur'an, which mean ,
"encouraging virtues and suppression of vices"
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- 5 D. Suba Chandran, "Khyber Agency: Indigenous Taliban, Illegal Radio Stations and Ineffective Administration," Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, (2006)
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- 7 Hamed Al Said, *New Approaches to Countering Terrorism; Designing and Evaluating Counter Radicalization and Deradicalization Programs* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 255.
- 8 Words of Prophet Muhammad (May peace be upon him)
- 9 Actions of Prophet Muhammad (May peace be upon him)
- 10 Arabaic origin word used in Urdu as well. The word denotes illiteracy or state of utter ignorance and oblivion..
- 11 Though every tribe has to have 200 volunteers as per standard operating procedure but practically their numbers exceed 500 individuals per tribe that makes a total strength of approximately 3000 in all 6 tribes of Bara.
- 12 Hamed Al Said, *New Approaches to Countering Terrorism; Designing and Evaluating Counter Radicalization and Deradicalization Programs* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 27.

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- 13 Carl Gustav Jung. *Psychology and Religion*. (Yale University Press, 1960)
- 14 Najeeb Ullah Khan, interview by author, April 20, 2021.
- 15 The formal sentence to declare acceptance of Islam. English translation being, "There is no God but Allah, and Muhammad is messenger of Allah."
- 16 Sayings of Prophet Muhammad (May peace be upon him)
- 17 Arabic word denoting "people ousted from Islam due to their rebellious and extremist ideology."
- 18 Sahih Muslim, vol 2, Hadith no. 1067, p. 750
- 19 Sahih Muslim, vol 2, Hadith no. 1064, p. 741
- 20 Tibrani: Al Mu'jamalOusat, vol 6, Hadith no. 1642, p. 186
- 21 Sunan Abu Dawood: Kitabul Sunnah, vol 4, Hadith no. 4765, p.243
- 22 Rank title for official clergy in Pakistan Army
- 23 Daniel Koehler, *Understanding Deradicalization: Methods, Tools and Programs for Countering Violent Extremism*. (London: Routledge, 2017), 119-135.
- 24 Ibid.
- 25 Raafia Raees Khan and Feriha Peracha. "Deradicalizing, Rehabilitating, and Reintegrating Violent Extremists," *US Institute of Peace*, (2017), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep20165>. (accessed on April 8, 2021).
- 26 Malik Masood ur Rehman Mahsud, interview by author, Peshawar, April 20, 2021.

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- 27 Ubric M. Cornelius, interview by author, Rawalpindi, May 10, 2021.
- 28 Feriha Peracha, telephonic conversation with author, June 9, 2021.
- 29 Ubric M. Cornelius (Psychology department National University of Science and Technology Islamabad) interviewe by author, Rawalpindi, May 10, 2021.
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- 34 Ibid.
- 35 Ibid.
- 36 Zamin Gul Khan, interview by author, April 21, 2021.
- 37 Hamed Al Said, *New Approaches to Countering Terrorism; Designing and Evaluating Counter Radicalization and Deradicalization Programs* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 258.
- 38 Local businessman of Khyber district.
- 39 Hamed Al Said, *New Approaches to Countering Terrorism; Designing and Evaluating Counter Radicalization and*

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- Deradicalization Programs* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 255.
- ⁴⁰ A committee of local elders/ notables marked by local government to resolve inter-personal feuds in each tribe.
- ⁴¹ Hamed Al Said, *New Approaches to Countering Terrorism; Designing and Evaluating Counter Radicalization and Deradicalization Programs* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015)
- ⁴² Thomas Mark Turay, and Leona M. English, "Toward a Global Culture of Peace: A Transformative Model of Peace Education," *Journal of Transformative Education* 6, no. 4 (October 2008): 286-301. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1541344608330602>.
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- 52 Hamed Al Said, *New Approaches to Countering Terrorism; Designing and Evaluating Counter Radicalization and Deradicalization Programs* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 76-95.
- 53 Sabir Shah, "Terrorists Target Eminent Men from all Walks of Life," *The News International*, May 2, 2015, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/38238-terrorists-target-eminent-men-from-all-walks-of-life> (accessed on July 27, 2021)
- 54 *Na 'mehram* is an Urdu word that literally means un-related man (usually used to codify people who are not allowed to see, meet or interact with a lady not related to him through kinship. In Islam the relatives of a female including father, real uncles, brothers, sons, sons in law, husband, and real nephews are classified as *Mehram* and rest all males fall in the category of *Na 'mehram*)

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- ⁶⁰ Daniel Koehler, *Understanding Deradicalization: Methods, Tools and Programs for Countering Violent Extremism*. (London: Routledge, 2017), 126.
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- ⁶⁵ Rank title for official clergy in Pakistan Army

Chapter FIVE: Conclusion and the Way Forward

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