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Bonn Conference 2011: Prospects for Peace and Stability in Afghanistan

Safdar Sial and Abdul Basit

This paper attempts to explore the promise Bonn-II holds for peace and stability in Afghanistan and the wider region. It tries to find answers to four main questions: Why hold Bonn-II conference? What was achieved after Bonn-I? What can and cannot be achieved through Bonn-II? And finally, what needs to be achieved? There have been many positive and negative developments between Bonn-I and the upcoming Bonn-II, but many political analysts consider the 2001 Bonn agreement a failure as far as political conflict and security are concerned. Governance and institutional reforms, realization and sustenance of political reconciliation, pursuance of effective foreign policy at the regional and international level, and development and consolidation of an indigenous economy and security apparatus are some of the post-transition responsibilities for which Afghanistan has to prepare itself by 2014 with help and support from the international and regional community. The degree of success of Bonn Conference 2011 can be measured from what it offers to achieve security, political reconciliation, and a successful and sustainable transition.

Political Economy of Tehrik-i-Taliban Swat

Muhammad Feyyaz

The recent insurgency in Swat presents a novel case study of a conflict that appears to have begun with socio-political aims but soon mutated into one in which economic benefits became paramount. The terror campaign by Tehrik-e-Taliban Swat (TTS), characterized by shifting religio-political motives, raising of phenomenal organisational structure and interest-centric regulation of violence, manifests the entire spectrum of political economy of an armed conflict. This study is an attempt to narrate and analyze how the entire operation was articulated and strategized by TTS. The paper traces TTS chief Fazlullah’s path to power including a discussion on how he developed his militant formations with benign support from other actors. The paper explores politico-economic dimensions of the Swat conflict and concludes by inferring that geopolitics and wealth accumulation, and not public good, were and are the principal motivations behind the facade of ‘jihad’ by TTS.
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Maoist Peace Process in Nepal: A Way Forward for India?

Nida Naz

This paper explores the Nepali Maoists’ decision to give up their armed struggle and opt for peaceful democratic means to seek the changes they had been striving for. By juxtaposing the Maoist conflicts in India and Nepal, it seeks to answer the question if lessons from the Nepali experience have any relevance to the situation in India. It argues that despite a number of inherent differences there still are a few measures in the Nepali peace process that can be used for peaceful democratic settlement of the Maoist conflict in India. The Maoist insurgencies in the two countries are analyzed to determine if the Nepali experience can be applied partially, fully, or not at all to the situation in India. This paper finds that the last two scenarios are least likely because the most suitable conflict resolution framework must be based on the internal political, economic and social aspects of a country. The first scenario is likely the most useful one where—based of common motives and causes, such as socio-economic deprivation, class segregation and people’s grievances—India can follow the broad strokes of Nepal’s peace process to resolve its own lingering conflict.

Sri Lanka’s Post-conflict Peacebuilding Efforts and Prospects for Positive Peace

Ajith Balasooriya

This paper examines the manner in which the Sri Lankan government is proceeding with its post-conflict peacebuilding efforts to achieve positive peace at the end of the conflict. It attempts to provide narratives on the government’s role in post-conflict peacebuilding as the responsible primary representative of the citizens of Sri Lanka. The first part of the paper describes the government’s post-conflict efforts including immediate humanitarian assistance, reconstruction and rehabilitation and mechanisms for addressing human rights violations and accountability issues to achieve the ultimate goal of positive peace. The second part focuses on the international community’s response to the government’s post-conflict peacebuilding efforts.
Bonn Conference 2011: Prospects for Peace and Stability in Afghanistan

Safdar Sial and Abdul Basit

1. Introduction

The Bonn Conference in 2001 had provided a roadmap for the political transformation of Afghanistan into a democratic state. The subsequent conferences on Afghanistan and the resulting agreements gradually became wider in scope, covering almost all aspects of state-building, such as security, economic reform, development and lately transition and political reconciliation. The upcoming Bonn Conference in December 2011 is significant in many respects. The pullout of international forces and the process of transition of security responsibility to Afghan forces have already begun. The United States and the Afghan government are trying to evolve political reconciliation through negotiations with the Taliban and Pakistan has also expressed its full support to an Afghan-led reconciliation process.

Although a lot needs to be done for a mature political and security transition in Afghanistan as well as in order to create consensus among different Afghan factions including the Taliban, yet Afghanistan is on the verge of entering a new phase whose fate would be decided largely by the upcoming Bonn Conference and the likely strategic partnership agreement between Afghanistan and the US.

The period between the 2001 Bonn Conference, or Bonn-I, and the more Afghan-led London Conference in 2005 had been characterized by a mix of successes, failures and grey areas for governance and state-building.¹ The main outcome of London Conference on Afghanistan was documented as the Afghanistan Compact, which, with commitments worth $10.5 billion by 60 states, laid down a scheduled roadmap for the next five years in three key areas: security; governance, rule of law and human rights; and economic and social development.²

The principles and benchmarks set forth by the London Conference were used as a foundation to develop the five-year Afghanistan National
Development Strategy (ANDS) in 2008. The goals set under ANDS also served as Afghanistan’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper.³

The period from 2009 onward saw renewed commitment to Afghanistan by the US, which coincided with a rise in the insurgency in Afghanistan. This stage was marked by a surge in troops and resources with increased short-term, development-oriented military engagement at the local level that has achieved mixed results. Many had questioned the effectiveness of this surge in troops, referring to the earlier Soviet experience in Afghanistan but there were few other alternatives available given the level of insecurity.⁴

The focus of London Conference on Afghanistan (January 2010) was on security, governance, transition and reconciliation. President Hamid Karzai sought to reinforce his political role by leading the peace process. The western allies, led by Britain and Japan at the conference, voiced support for Karzai’s plan by providing a fund to help lure Taliban fighters away from the insurgency with the promise of jobs and guarantees against retaliation. Approximately $140 million dollars were pledged towards that end.⁵ The Afghan government and its international partners agreed to the need for a reinvigorated and prioritized Afghanistan National Development Strategy, affording special attention to the key areas of security, economic development, governance, regional cooperation, and reconciliation and reintegration.⁶

The government of Afghanistan and the international community renewed their commitment to the Afghan people in the Kabul Conference on July 20, 2010, which was hosted by Afghanistan and co-chaired by the United Nations. Besides discussing issues of governance, rule of law, human rights, socio-economic development and political reconciliation, representatives from 70 countries endorsed President Karzai’s goal that Afghan forces should lead security operations across the country by 2014. At Lisbon Summit in November 2010, the three major declarations called upon the US, NATO and Afghanistan to create conditions for “irreversible transition to full Afghan security responsibility and leadership” in all provinces by the end of 2014.⁷

This paper attempts to explore the promise Bonn-II holds for peace and stability in Afghanistan and the wider region. It tries to find answers to four main questions: Why to hold Bonn-II conference? What was achieved after
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Bonn-I? What can and cannot be achieved through Bonn-II? And finally, what needs to be achieved? The methods of data collection for developing different sets of analyses around these questions included interviews with political analysts and experts on Afghanistan and also review of the existing literature on the subject.

2. Achievements after 2001 Bonn Conference

The 2001 Bonn Conference was held in the presence of the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Afghanistan and the participants agreed to the composition, functions and governing procedures for the Interim Administration, as well as to a further roadmap to establish a Transitional Authority, including a broad-based transitional administration, and convening of a Constitutional Loya Jirga within 18 months of the establishment of the Transitional Authority, in order to adopt a new Constitution for Afghanistan. The agreement also listed the legal and judicial framework that was to be applicable until a new Constitution was adopted.

What is there today in Afghanistan can in large part be credited to the process that started with the first Bonn Conference in December 2001. There have been a number of achievements despite multiple and varied challenges. If the issues of security and political representation are put aside, the experiment with democracy, local governance structures such as provincial councils, reconstruction of infrastructure, investment opportunities, access to better healthcare and education facilities, and protection for freedom of expression can be termed as some of the key achievements of Bonn-I. Similarly, international military and economic aid contributed to the inauguration on December 19, 2005 of the new National Assembly of Afghanistan. The country has gone through a power transfer through elections and there are 27 percent women in the parliament. Another major achievement has been the adoption of a progressive constitution that recognizes both Sunni and Shia branches of Islam, provides extensive human rights protection, including legal equality of women, and protects rights of religious minorities. Furthermore, around eight million children in schools, access of 80 percent rural communities to basic health, construction and repair of thousands of miles of roads, and the flourishing telecommunication sector in the country are all direct or indirect outcomes of the Bonn Conference plan. But there is
a big question mark over the sustainability of this whole system after US military presence in the country ends.

Same is the case with the specific goals that the US had, although they were not within the mandate of the 2001 Bonn Conference agreement. There has not been any major attack on US soil since 9/11, Washington has succeeded in dismantling sanctuaries of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan as well as killed most of Al Qaeda’s top leadership.

Rahimullah Yousufzai, one of Pakistan’s leading experts on Afghanistan, believes that there have been many positive and negative developments between Bonn-I and the upcoming Bonn-II. In addition to those mentioned above, he listed some other post-Bonn-I positives, such as development of human resource (25,000 Afghans have been trained in the US and other countries and about 170,000 Afghan security personnel have been trained), currency reforms, a functioning banking sector, and a revamped judiciary. At the same time, he noted that the Afghan elections were flawed and rigged; the government was not legitimate, had no constituency in the people; there was massive corruption, around 1,000 Afghans migrated daily to Iran for livelihood opportunities; socio-economic development was uneven and had not trickled down to the common people; political patronage had dented the Afghan political system; and the Afghan government was entirely dependent on foreign aid.

As far as political conflict and security are concerned, many political analysts consider the 2001 Bonn agreement a failure. Not only could it not address the core factors of conflict in Afghanistan but also became one of the root causes of the current state of conflict. It endeavored to install a government which was neither broad based nor inclusive. It also failed to look at the civil war in Afghanistan from the perspective of structural issues of Afghanistan. It was indeed not a post-conflict framework. Since Bonn-I was flawed the entire process of reconstruction and nation-building that followed had got off on the wrong foot.

Many Afghans believe that the power-sharing approach introduced by Bonn-I was a historical mistake as it supported promotion of warlords and faction leaders in the political arena. In simple terms, it created grounds for the revival of the Taliban movement. Some Afghans blame former US
Bonn Conference 2011: Prospects for Peace and Stability in Afghanistan

ambassador to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad and UN special representative for Afghanistan Lakhdar Brahimi for excluding the Taliban from the Bonn Conference in December 2001, which resulted in the resurgence of the Taliban. Others, meanwhile, accuse leaders of the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan of manipulating the political system and sabotaging all meaningful reconciliation efforts with the Taliban.\textsuperscript{18}

Since the Taliban, which were a major party to the conflict, were excluded from Bonn-I, the moot could not start a genuine and participatory political process in Afghanistan. The regional stakeholders also did not prioritize the Afghan agenda and tried to secure their own interests through Afghanistan by pursuing their proxy wars. Three major groups had emerged at Bonn-I: the Iran-backed Cyprus group; the Pakistan-backed Peshawar group; and the Hamid Karzai group, backed by the international community. All international and regional stakeholders were however morally and diplomatically expected to cooperate.\textsuperscript{19}

3. Current and Future Challenges for Afghanistan

On the eve of the second Bonn Conference, Afghanistan faces a litany of challenges stemming from a range of security, political and socio-cultural issues. This state of affairs gives a grim reminder to the conference participants that the gains made in Afghanistan so far are fragile and reversible. This section of the paper looks at the challenges and difficulties that participants at Bonn-II must find satisfactory answers to in order to ensure a peaceful and prosperous Afghanistan beyond 2014.

3.1 Security

Afghanistan’s security landscape is marred by an array of problems including resurgence of Taliban insurgents, mounting civilian casualties in armed conflict both at the hands of Taliban and NATO/ISAF forces, drug trafficking and illegal gun-running.

3.1.1 Status of Taliban Insurgency

The most potent and formidable challenge to a peaceful and secure Afghanistan is the growing Taliban insurgency. In recent years Taliban insurgents have not only emerged as an organized fighting force in
Afghanistan but they have gradually extended their area of activity as well. Despite claims by US-led NATO/ISAF forces of making considerable gains against Taliban insurgents the latter continue attacks and ambush targeting NATO and Afghan troops as well as targeted assassinations of government officials. The latest victims of the series of high-profile target killings include Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani (former Afghan president and chairman of the Afghan Peace Council), Jan Muhammad Khan (former governor of Uruzgan and a close aide to President Karzai) and Kandahar’s mayor Ghulam Haider Hamidi.

The Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan has expanded far beyond its strongholds in southeastern Afghanistan. Transcending its traditional Pakhtun base, the Taliban are exerting their influence in the central-eastern provinces as well. The current areas of insecurity include the capital Kabul where the insurgents have struck high-profile targets on several occasions. The insurgents also have a stronghold over the provinces of Logar, Wardak and Ghazni. They have influence in areas north of Kabul as well, including the provinces of Kapisa, Parwan and Laghman.

Expansion of Taliban’s influence in northern parts of Afghanistan, which were generally thought to be peaceful, poses serious security and political challenges to the Karzai government and international coalition forces.

Taliban insurgents have also become a formidable challenge militarily. Their ability to locally manufacture and procure improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and use them accurately to strike their targets has given the insurgency a new boost. In 2011, more than 55 percent fatalities among coalition forces were caused by IEDs.

Another factor which has added to Taliban’s capability to expand their influence in various parts of Afghanistan is their ability to portray themselves as a local resistant movement of Afghanistan. Afghan Taliban have gradually distanced themselves from Al Qaeda which has greatly enhanced their public image locally as well as internationally. Other factors that go in their favor at the local level include mounting conflict-related civilian casualties at the hands of NATO/ISAF forces in night-time raids and NATO airstrikes, and widespread unemployment, corruption and political patronage.
3.1.2 Capacity of Afghan Security Forces

There is a serious question mark over the capability and wherewithal of Afghan security forces to even perform routine policing duties, let alone counterinsurgency or counterterrorism operations. The presence of Taliban sympathizers and even Taliban militants in the Afghan security forces poses another challenge. Analysts assert that the current US and NATO efforts to develop the security forces in Afghanistan focus on quantity rather than quality. Secondly, loyalty and credibility of the Afghan security forces is highly questionable. Some among rural segments of Afghan Pakhtun society recognize Taliban’s narrative of seeking vengeance for killing of a fellow Muslim.26

Illiteracy is also a major challenge to the development of the Afghan security forces. Only 28 percent of Afghans are literate—43 percent males and only 13 percent females. About 70 percent of recruits to Afghan security forces are illiterate for all practical purposes. Some sources put the illiteracy rate of new recruits at 90 percent. The ability to read is deemed sufficient for a number of positions particularly non-commissioned officers and mechanics/logistics technicians.

Afghan National Police (ANP) is termed by many as massively corrupt.27 Many elements of the ANP are tied to politics and power brokers, either in a bid to be effective or to win/retain popular support. At the same time, the ‘building phase’ cannot be properly implemented unless the ANP has the capacity and integrity to support an effective civil rule of law by Afghan standards and customs.28 Known to resort to bribery, illegal tax collection, drug dealing and even murder, the ANP is feared and mistrusted by Afghan citizens, which not only undermines the legitimacy of the state but also that of the international community, particularly the US, which has bankrolled and trained the police.29

Afghan National Army (ANA) is much better compared to the ANP but it is under-resourced, ill-equipped, illiterate and poorly trained. The ANA is a central element of the US counterinsurgency campaign, and the international exit strategy, and has been portrayed as a rare success story in a conflict with few bright spots.30
Analysts argue that the ANA is far from ready to take over operational command and tackle security responsibilities on its own. The US is rapidly increasing the number of ANA troops, without taking into account financial sustainability or tackling the persistent structural flaws that continue to hamper the ANA’s ability to operate independently despite billions of dollars of US investment.

With ethnic frictions and political factionalism undercutting institutional loyalty, the ANA remains a fragmented force, serving disparate interests. Increasing troop numbers without tackling corruption, lack of accountability and poor discipline would not increase the army’s ability to confront the myriad security threats that the country faces. These shortcomings, combined with the haphazard approach to demobilization and reintegration, are undermining the army’s professionalism and capacity to counter the insurgency.31

3.2 Political Challenges

3.2.1 Governance and Legitimacy of Karzai Regime

Karzai was not well known in Afghanistan until his appointment as the Chairman of the Interim Administration in December 2001. However, he has gradually become a household name across the country. Winning the presidential election in October 2004 with 54 percent of the vote, he seemed to enjoy widespread popularity and legitimacy. Unfortunately, that image did not last very long. The level of public participation in the parliamentary elections in October 2005 decreased to a little over 50 percent compared to over 75 percent in the presidential election. That was interpreted as a sign of people losing faith in Karzai. Intensification of the Taliban insurgency in the south and east in 2006 and 2007 raised further questions about the Karzai government’s ability to provide security to the Afghan people. That coincided with the perceived marginalization of Northern Alliance in the government. A question often asked is that if the Pakhtun-dominated Karzai government faces such stiff opposition among Pakhtuns, how could Karzai hope to claim legitimacy among other ethnic groups?32

The factors affecting legitimacy of the Karzai regime are complex. The major factor which has raised several questions is the regime’s excessive reliance on
foreign aid and troops. The common Afghan believes that once foreign troops leave Afghanistan, the Taliban would take over Kabul within months, if not days. Karzai is seen as an American stooge who lacks roots or constituency among the Afghan people. Moreover, widespread differences among various government functionaries have also made for a thoroughly dented image of the regime besides raising questions about its legitimacy as a genuine representative of the Afghan people. Similarly, constant bypassing of Afghan parliament and Hamid Karzai by the US in several critical policy decisions has also called into question the authority of the current regime. At the same time, allegations of rampant corruption and inability to govern also call into question the legitimacy of the Karzai government.33

But some analysts believe that Karzai is the best option available in the prevailing circumstances and whether the US and Afghan factions like him or not he is the only figure that can lead the post-US withdrawal government in Afghanistan. Therefore, despite serious questions about his legitimacy he remains the best option.34

3.2.1 Political Reconciliation

The process of political reconciliation entails negotiations among different stakeholders in Afghanistan including the oppositional political forces and the insurgents. There is a realization that the withdrawal of US and NATO troops and transition to the Afghan forces cannot occur without an end to the civil war and a settlement among the government, the Taliban, as well as Pakistan, the US and the wider region.35

The Afghan government has been holding talks with the Taliban since 2005. Recently, the US, Germany and Qatar were also included in these talks; the first round of US talks with the Taliban was held in Munich on November 28, 2010, followed by another one in Doha on February 15, 2011 and the third again in Germany on May 7-8 this year.36 US Defense Secretary Robert Gates confirmed on June 19 that Washington was in direct talks with the Taliban, but he said it could be months before efforts to broker a peace deal in the country yield results. His comments came a day after President Karzai announced that the United States was in contact with the Taliban, a striking public acknowledgment of a peace initiative that had long been cloaked in secrecy.37
Karzai’s 70-member High Council for Peace—which is aimed at guiding future negotiations with the Taliban is composed largely of former warlords and commanders, with the exception of a few women—is unlikely to find many takers.\(^\text{38}\) Assassination of its chairman Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani by the Taliban has further eroded prospects of reconciliation. Rabbani was one of the few Afghan veterans who had contacts among different ethnic factions and also enjoyed support of regional stakeholders. Furthermore, Taliban are not likely to consider conditions by Karzai and the US that reintegration and reconciliation would only include those elements of the insurgency that snap ties with Al Qaeda, renounce violence and pledge allegiance to the constitution.\(^\text{39}\)

In any case, US talks with the Taliban have not moved forward after Agha Tayyab, the chief Taliban negotiator with the US, went off the radar. Taliban do not want the so-called ‘track-II’ diplomacy, they want the US to formally acknowledge a process of reconciliation and accept their demand for withdrawal of all forces from Afghan soil for these talks to begin. Moreover, the Afghan Taliban are not a monolithic entity. There are three major factions: the Mullah Omar-led Taliban movement; Haqqani Network; and Hizb-e-Islami.\(^\text{40}\) Some analysts are of the view that the US seeks to create rifts and divisions among Taliban ranks by simultaneously engaging different commanders of different factions.\(^\text{41}\) A similar view was expressed recently by key Haqqani Network leader Sirajuddin Haqqani that his group had rejected several peace gestures from the US and President Karzai’s government in the past because they were attempts to “create divisions” among the militant groups. He said the Haqqani Network would take part in peace talks with the Kabul government and the US only if the Taliban did.\(^\text{42}\)

Some other experts on Afghanistan assert that no side is serious about holding talks. The Taliban, they argue, are irreconcilable as they have a simplistic worldview, which they would not move an inch from. The Taliban are confident that they would frustrate and wear out the Americans and thus compel them to leave the region. As things move towards the international forces’ withdrawal and transition of security responsibility to the Afghan forces, the Taliban increasingly see themselves as victors of this war.\(^\text{43}\) Similarly, the US is not serious about genuine reconciliation but is posturing as part of a political strategy, where it is flirting with this option on the off chance that it might deliver desirable results. Another reason for pursuing
reconciliation may be to preempt criticism that the Americans did not try reconciliation and solely pursued a military agenda in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{44}

Another reason for the reconciliation overtures going nowhere are the distinct approaches and engagements of the US and Afghanistan with the Taliban. Rabbani’s peace council was engaged with different Taliban commanders at different times. Although Afghan Loya Jirga had given the mandate to the Afghan Peace Council to carry out negotiations with Taliban, the Americans forbade them from carrying out the talks.\textsuperscript{45} Some analysts believe that Karzai is serious about reconciliation and highlight the fact that Afghanistan and Pakistan are on the same page vis-à-vis reconciliation. But there is mistrust among different stakeholders with regard to talks with the Taliban and each is intent on pursuing his own agenda.\textsuperscript{46} Although the Afghan government, the US, NATO and most of Afghanistan's neighbors agree to the basic objective of reconciliation and accept that the Taliban should be involved in negotiations and granted some role in the subsequent government, but their interests and objectives vary greatly. Arriving at an agreement about the timing and prioritization of peace terms is likely to be difficult.\textsuperscript{47}

However, mutual lack of trust between Pakistan and Afghanistan as well as between Pakistan and the US has further made the Afghan political reconciliation and security transition plans questionable. The assassination of Osama Bin Laden in a May 2 raid by US Navy Seals in Abbottabad has severely strained ties between Islamabad and Washington.\textsuperscript{48} Pak-US relations are presently at an all-time low which does not augur well for the ongoing efforts for peace and security in Afghanistan. At the same time, cross-border militant incursions from Afghanistan into Pakistan and vice versa in the recent past have kept Pakistan and Afghanistan under pressure.\textsuperscript{49}

### 3.3 Socio-Economic Challenges

Afghanistan faces a number of pressing social and economic challenges in the short term. The viability of the Afghan state ultimately depends on its capacity to generate revenue. The concept and framework for economic regeneration needs to be articulated by the Afghans, aided by support mechanisms from outside, where needed. The bulk of international assistance to Afghanistan so far has been allocated to traditional security schemes and only a marginal amount has been directed towards building a viable economy.
and conditions necessary to sustain economic growth. The planned transition is not going to bear fruit without addressing these challenges.\textsuperscript{50}

A particular challenge is the massive unemployment among Afghan youth: in the next few years up to one million youngsters would be seeking jobs and only five percent of those would have had access to university education. Lack of employment opportunities for the immense majority of the young population may thus become the main problem facing Afghanistan, a situation that may be exploited by the Taliban or other militant groups in various ways. In addition to the impending youth bulge, there is also the problem of how to generate revenues in Afghanistan so that it becomes a viable country. Another example of the challenges ahead would be the oversized Afghan army that the ISAF is proposing to create in the next few years, as it would represent a substantial burden on the economy in the likely scenario of reduction in international resource allocation to Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{51}

However, there are reasons for cautious optimism as well. The mineral resources recently discovered in the country may generate around three trillion dollars in the foreseeable future. It is estimated that exploitation of these resources would not yield benefits for at least the next five years, corresponding to the period of transition, during which time there may be a sharp reduction in international aid without revenue becoming available from alternative sources.\textsuperscript{52} Appropriate involvement by the World Bank and other international financial institutions would be crucial in order to boost the Afghan economy.\textsuperscript{53}

The current transition and reconciliation efforts are not mutually reinforcing as they do not complement each other. In order to make these efforts more meaningful and result oriented Afghanistan’s security needs should be determined in a more comprehensive manner that also encompasses political development, socio-economic sustainability and human security.

4. Bonn Conference 2011: Opportunities, Limitations and Likely Outcomes

4.1 Why Bonn-II? Objectives and Agenda

The main issues to be discussed at Bonn-II would be civilian aspects of transition; post-2014 international involvement in Afghanistan and the ‘political process’, i.e. reconciliation.
On June 28 this year, the Afghan Foreign Minister said at the 11th International Contact Group (ICG) conference—hosted jointly by Afghanistan and Germany in Kabul with representation from 50 countries and regional and international organizations—that the Afghanistan International Conference in Bonn would be led by Afghans, for Afghans and hosted by the government of Afghanistan, as the only representative of the people of Afghanistan. The main discussion at the upcoming conference, he noted, would be on Afghanistan’s future milestones and the country’s partnerships, on the basis of the agenda set by the government of Afghanistan. That means that the Afghan government would chair the conference and President Karzai would be instrumental in composing the Afghan delegation and setting the agenda for Bonn.

Marc Grossman, the US senior representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, believes that much of what happens in Bonn in December would be linked to a meeting in Istanbul that the Turkish government is to host in early November. In a recent interview at the State Department in Washington, Grossman hoped that in Istanbul the neighbors and near neighbors of Afghanistan would come together and really show support for the war-torn country, and commit to things that are important to the Afghan people, including non-interference, promoting sovereignty and success of Afghanistan, and talking about a secure, stable, and peaceful Afghanistan in a secure, stable, and peaceful region. Besides the need for economic integration of the region, he mentioned two broad outcomes that should emerge from Bonn-II: international investment in the Afghan economy and Pakistan’s support for an Afghan-led reconciliation.

As a clear conference agenda is not available so far, some of the themes and objectives discernable from the opinion of the people interviewed for this study regarding what the Bonn Conference 2011 would or should focus on are listed below:

- To lay out economic initiatives that could help stabilize Afghanistan;
- To explore a mechanism/roadmap to make the Afghan political and security transition plan more stable and sustainable;
- To critically review the current and past policies in order to correct the wrongs and put Afghanistan on the right track;

- To come up with an agreed upon framework for political reconciliation whose mandate and scope enjoys the participation and support of regional and international stakeholders;

- To explore ways and means of meaningful engagement with the Taliban, and to work out a mechanism and a representative body which talks to the Taliban with a clear mandate;

- To get approval for the US strategic partnership agreement for Afghanistan from regional and international stakeholders;

- To assure the Afghan people that despite withdrawal of troops, the international community would not abandon Afghanistan or let it slide into yet another civil war, because such a state of affairs would not be in the interest of anyone;

- To debate and finalize if the future military strategy for Afghanistan would have a counter-terrorism or counter-insurgency focus;

- To look for a dignified exit for US/NATO forces; as a slowing US economy compels the Obama administration to pull the US forces out of Afghanistan at the earliest as the US president wants to focus more on the domestic agenda and down play foreign policy in the next presidential elections; and

- To explore ways and means of sustaining the house of cards that the US would leave behind in Afghanistan.

4.2 Composition of Afghan Delegation

As mentioned earlier, the Afghan government would host Bonn-II and would name the delegation that would represent the Afghan people at the conference.

Many believe that inclusion of Taliban in the Afghan delegation is detrimental to political reconciliation in Afghanistan which is directly linked
to peace and security. One fundamental reason for this belief is that the Taliban are a party to the Afghan armed conflict. Former Taliban officials Syed Akbar Agha and Mullah Abdul Salaam Zaeef have warned that excluding the Taliban from the Bonn process would increase violence in Afghanistan.57 But there are conflicting claims about inclusion of the Taliban. According to a statement from Afghan High Peace Council Secretary Ismail Qasemyar in August this year the Taliban could be part of the Bonn-II summit if they hold talks with the Afghan government, and approach the Afghan government in a peaceful manner.58

Nonetheless, whilst mid-level Taliban commanders have expressed their interest in seeking an end to the war through peace talks, senior Taliban leaders, including Mullah Muhammad Omar, have emphasized the unconditional withdrawal of all foreign forces from Afghanistan as a prerequisite for talks.59 Mullah Omar’s recent Eid message, carried by some Pakistani and Afghan media organizations, says that the upcoming Bonn Conference is merely symbolic as Afghanistan would not be represented by the genuine representatives of the Afghans, therefore, the Taliban would not participate in it.60 However, the full text of Mullah Omar’s Eid message does not explicitly say that the Taliban would not participate in the summit.61 Mullah Omar also states in his message that attention is not being paid to a comprehensive and real solution to the problems of Afghanistan. “Like the previous conferences and Jirgas, this conference is superficial and hype-oriented. They want to distract the attention of the public of the world from the real solution of the Afghan issue for some time. Only those speeches and addresses are expected here which are already approved by the White House and Pentagon.”62

But inclusion of the Taliban in the Afghan delegation is not the only thing that is being discussed in Kabul these days. There are fears that President Karzai would not be able to compose a delegation representative of all Afghan political and social segments. According to one view, the President is trapped in a small circle of traditional powerbrokers who were installed in key positions following the Bonn Conference in December 2001. Despite widespread criticism of rampant corruption and inefficacies in his government, President Karzai has largely refused to bring meaningful and radical changes in his administration over the past 10 years.63
There are indeed two kinds of narratives currently going on in Afghanistan. Pro-Karzai political analysts say that only government representatives and those selected by the government should attend Bonn-II, whereas others assert that civil society organizations, diverse political forces as well as the Taliban should also join the gathering.

The latter assert that in order to make the forthcoming Bonn Conference a real democratic and inclusive process all factions of Afghan society, including all political groups, civil society, and marginalized groups, particularly women, should participate, rather than only those hand-picked by the ‘under-mandated’ Karzai government. Najiba Ayubi, the representative of the Steering Committee for a network of 60 Afghan associations, expressed the apprehension at the Afghan Civil Society International Conference in Rome on May 24-25, 2011 that once again the presence of civil society may be no more than a mere facade with no real say in the decision-making process.64

Some analysts see some recent US and the UN initiatives as steps to reconcile with the Taliban before Bonn-II. The UN Security Council resolutions of June 17, dividing those sanctioned for their membership of Al Qaeda and the Taliban into two separate lists is a positive step towards national peace and stability. The UNSC later removed names of some Taliban leaders from the list of terrorists. These steps were seen by many as confidence building measures to persuade the Taliban to be part of the reconciliation process and also join the Bonn summit.

If the Taliban are invited and if they accept the invitation, another issue would be who represents the Taliban and other forces, including the Quetta Shura, the Haqqanis and the Hizb-e-Islami, etc. The big question now is whether all Afghan factions, including the opposition forces, would be part of the Afghan delegation. For if that does not happen then Bonn-II would be a repeat of the 2001 Bonn Conference. Many experts assert that Taliban’s inclusion in the Bonn summit in 2001 would have offered better prospects for peace, reconciliation and stability in Afghanistan. Many hope that backchannel diplomacy would be made public and streamlined and the entire process made official and announced at Bonn-II. However, the sudden disappearance of Agha Tayyab, the Afghan Taliban’s negotiator with the US, and increased violence by the Taliban in Afghanistan have diminished such a prospect.65
4.3 Issues of Social and Political Acceptance of Taliban

Segments of Afghan society have an ambivalent attitude towards reconciliation overtures with the Taliban. They are apprehensive of such efforts amid profound confusions about the modus operandi of inclusion of the Taliban in government or their social reintegration. Will it be democratic or not? Will such reconciliation and reintegration be on Taliban’s terms or will they be asked to be more human friendly and pro-development? There is also a serious concern that any haste on the international community’s part to include the Afghan Taliban without ensuring that they renounce violence and repressive human right policies can push Afghanistan back to the days of Taliban’s rule.

It is imperative to take the Afghan people into confidence about political reconciliation with the Taliban. These should particularly include sections who have been victims of Taliban atrocities during and after the fall of their regime, including women, and some ethnic and religious/sectarian segments of Afghan society. At present much attention is being paid to reconciliation with the Taliban at the political level but the fact that Afghan society has more problems with the Taliban than external actors do is being ignored. It would be difficult to ensure a unanimous understanding among all sections of Afghan society about a political settlement to end the conflict.66

Besides concerns of certain social segments, the political opposition forces in Kabul, who are expressing concerns about talks with the Taliban, are factions of the former Northern Alliance (NA) who fiercely resisted the Taliban in the 1990s. A revival of the NA is already underway. Three prominent former NA leaders announced an alliance this June, and meetings of other opposition factions have been held in this regard. The primary agenda and motive of the new alliance is to oppose talks with the Taliban.67

Within hours of Burhanuddin Rabbani’s assassination on September 17, Northern Alliance leaders, most of whom are ethnic Tajiks and Hazaras, as well as some prominent Pakhtun figures, were on television, denouncing the peace process and saying that the Taliban could not be trusted.68

Before the Taliban come to an agreement with the international community, it is important that they reach an understanding with the Afghans who resisted
them for years; otherwise reconciliation in name alone would be no solution to the conflict.  

4.4 Regional and International Actors: Positions and Attitudes

Afghanistan’s sustainability from the political and security standpoints hinges on the involvement of regional organizations and regional actors in the process. The regional context is still not conducive for a political settlement in Afghanistan. Owing to pervasive confusion and mutual distrust, regional and international stakeholders continue to assert their influence in Afghanistan. This in turn has generated cycles of allegations and counter-allegations.

The greatest fear for the German hosts at Bonn is that the summit might be used to promote a quick political fix which provides cover for a hasty US retreat but falls far short of the inclusive deal involving all major interests necessary for lasting peace. That all-inclusive deal would have to have the support of Afghanistan’s neighbors and near neighbors, and efforts to get Pakistan, Iran and India involved have not taken off so far.

There is no clarity or unanimity among regional stakeholders about the evolving situation in Afghanistan. Nor is there a comprehensive regional roadmap about Afghanistan’s future outlook. Washington is also sending mixed signals. Everyone is in a wait-and-see mode and trying to adjust to shifting US polices.

Analysts believe that each regional stakeholder would go to Bonn-II with his own set of priorities, interests and apprehensions. However, there appear to be some convergence points: making sure that Afghanistan does not slide back to the Taliban days or civil unrest; genuine commitments are received from the international community to keep the Afghan economy afloat; and there is a representative and broad-based national government in Afghanistan.

On all other points the strategic outlook of regional stakeholders diverges and is in conflict. Pakistan wants reconciliation efforts to succeed but with a major role for Islamabad so that Pakistan-backed interlocutors do Pakistan’s bidding in these talks. It also wants to ensure a friendly Afghan regime, minimal Indian influence in Afghanistan and US withdrawal with genuine
sureties that Afghanistan would not be abandoned. India would most probably want the US to stay on in Afghanistan, to minimize Pakistan’s influence in Kabul, and look for more economic opportunities.\textsuperscript{73} Currently, an Indo-Pak proxy war is underway in Afghanistan. The two neighboring countries are jockeying for a position of influence in the war-torn country. Reluctance on part of the Afghan government or the United States to address Pakistan’s misgivings increases the likelihood of growing Indian footprint, and in turn, New Delhi’s greater ability to manipulate the endgame negotiations and the political settlement.\textsuperscript{74}

Observing Iran’s general outlook towards Afghanistan unveils a very ethnic and faction-charged perception from Tehran. The Iranian policy revolves around the mindset that Iran is the guardian of Afghanistan’s Persian speaking communities—Tajiks and Hazaras—and its Shias against an often intrusive Pakhtun power.\textsuperscript{75}

China’s interests stem from a mix of economic and security considerations. The Chinese would want to see pacification of the Afghan theater but without permanent US presence. At the same time, they would look for economic and transit trade opportunities in and through Afghanistan and ensure that Uygur separatists do not get sanctuaries or training in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{76}

Some political analysts term the regional environment irrelevant as long as the US is present in the region. They believe that the day the US leaves Afghanistan new dynamics would emerge in the war-ravaged country and regional powers would come into play.\textsuperscript{77}

One ray of hope is that both regional and international stakeholders know very well that another uprising in Afghanistan is in no one’s interest. Therefore, if sanity prevails—although chances of that happening appear to be dim—there might yet be some positive outcomes from the Bonn summit.\textsuperscript{78} The regional and international participants would have to agree on a bare minimum agenda for endgame in Afghanistan to carry the process forward amid their diverging interests and perceptions. Regional countries have more responsibility regarding this because if they fail to evolve such a consensus it would be at the cost of their own peace and stability.\textsuperscript{79}
The future of Afghanistan is indeed very uncertain; the country stands at a crossroads, with key decisions to be taken by outside actors.

4.5 Afghanistan’s Post-transition Fortitude: Preparedness and Assurances

Governance and institutional reforms, realization and sustenance of political reconciliation, pursuance of effective foreign policy at the regional and international level, and development and consolidation of an indigenous economy and security apparatus are some of the post-transition responsibilities for which Afghanistan has to prepare itself by 2014 with help and support from the international and regional community. A great deal of work is indeed yet to be done. Kabul also needs assurances from participants at Bonn-II that they would help Afghanistan manage these and other burdens beyond 2014.

Improving the Afghan people’s confidence in their government requires improved service delivery, greater accountability, and more protection from predatory practices, particularly in communities where the Taliban are providing their own brand of brutal but efficient governance. As discussed earlier, Afghanistan faces multiple challenges in the political and socio-economic milieus. In fact, crucial capabilities have failed to develop early and public institutions which should deliver basic services are unable to meet their mandates or the expectations of the Afghan citizenry. It is increasingly apparent that the absence of a credible Afghan partner and senior Afghan leadership poses the greatest challenge to prospects for peace. Limited attention has been paid to capacity building of human resource. This has resulted in emergence of cultures of impunity and ineffectiveness. Key elements of the Afghan administration feel that preventing corruption from coming to light, criticizing Afghanistan’s foreign partners, and perpetrating electoral fraud are the most effective means of clinging to power.

The state of the Afghan government’s preparedness to manage the post-transition security burden is also not very different. At the January 2010 London Conference, President Karzai had stressed the need to ensure monopoly of the Afghan state over the use of force by bringing non-state security contractors under Kabul’s control and subjecting them to the laws of Afghanistan. But in reality the Afghan government’s writ is eroding with the passage of time. Pakistan Army chief Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani told a
foreign news agency on the sidelines of the NATO military committee conference in Seville, Spain on September 16 this year that he doubted that Afghanistan would be ready to take over security responsibilities from international troops by the time of their planned withdrawal in 2014.84

The Taliban have conducted several high-profile attacks even in the Afghan capital this year, particularly after the NATO-led forces handed over the city’s security to Afghan forces. On September 13, the Taliban struck at two of the most prominent symbols of US diplomatic and military presence in Kabul, the American embassy and the nearby NATO headquarters.85 On August 18, suicide attackers killed eight people at the British Council. On June 28, Taliban militants stormed Intercontinental Hotel and killed 13 people. On June 18, suicide attackers target a police station near the Interior Ministry building, killing eight people. Security analysts have expressed concerns about the manner in which Afghan security forces have handled these and other Taliban assaults.86

The ability of the Taliban insurgents to penetrate the capital's strongholds severely undermines the Afghan citizens’ faith in their security forces to protect them. Such attacks also highlight crucial questions about the ability of Afghan security forces to thwart insurgents particularly when the ongoing transition in Afghanistan rests on the assumption that the country's security forces and intelligence services would be ready to assume responsibility for the areas that are transferred.87

In this context, the Taliban increasingly appear to the Afghan people to be a better or equally horrid option. Indeed, the Taliban demonstrated greater capacity to provide local security (despite also being a source of violence), put a lid on corruption, belatedly reigned in the poppy industry and drug addiction, exuded a sense of moral authority, and forbade (rather than pillaged) private banks.88

Besides preparing itself for the post-2014 situation, Afghanistan also needs from the international community long-term support that is expected to be promised at Bonn-II. The US does not appear to be abandoning Afghanistan after 2014 as the two countries are entering a strategic partnership agreement. Marc Grossman, the US senior representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, said in interview this August that the US would like to complete the strategic
partnership document as soon as possible. He stated that the US and Afghanistan had already held two rounds of negotiations and that they were about 85 percent of the way there.89

The idea of the strategic partnership document is to define the relationship between Afghanistan and the United States after 2014. That is a signal not just to the insurgents but also to the people of Afghanistan, and the neighbors and near neighbors of the country, that the US has learned the lessons of 1989 and 1990 and is not going to abandon the country or the region again.90 But experts on Afghanistan in Pakistan believe that the strategic partnership agreement would marginalize reconciliation efforts,91 because it is a complete contradiction of the reconciliation process. On one hand, the US is engaging with the Taliban to pull out of Afghanistan, and on the other it is entering into this agreement with Afghanistan to stay in the country beyond 2014. They argue that reconciliation is realistically not possible because the US would not leave the region and the Taliban would not talk to them until all foreign forces pull out of Afghanistan.92

4.6 Prospective Outcomes and their Implications

What comes out of the forthcoming Bonn summit depends substantially on the agenda, composition of the Afghan delegation and also responses from the international community.

If the US and the West want to use the summit solely to lay the ground work for effective management of the transition and withdrawal of troops, there would be few prospects for long-term peace and stability in Afghanistan and the wider region because the fundamental factors of conflict would continue to exist. In such a situation, political and social polarization could increase in Afghanistan and might lead the country to another civil war.

The degree of success of this conference can be measured from what it offers to achieve security, political reconciliation, and a successful and sustainable transition.

Some analysts think that the summit would be a great success if the participants unanimously come up at least with a concrete and comprehensive roadmap for peace and stability in Afghanistan which takes into account the current ground realities in Afghanistan.93 They argue that
expecting that one conference would solve all problems or that all regional and international stakeholders would be in agreement on all the issues would be naïve and wishful. However, all the stakeholders can agree to a roadmap that guides and provides direction for achieving the stated objectives of political and security transition in Afghanistan. They also express hope that in the aftermath of Rabbani’s assassination, Bonn-II would also try to determine the future of the reconciliation process with the Taliban, and that such overtures could take off with a more nuanced and clear approach. If that happens Afghanistan would move towards relative peace and stability. The wider impact of such an outcome would be positive for the region and would usher in an era of economic cooperation and interdependence because a stable Afghanistan would not only ensure smooth and safe passage of the proposed gas pipelines to Pakistan, India and China but would also afford these countries access to Central Asian markets.

Some other analysts however assert that in face of the current ground realities in Afghanistan, Bonn-II would hardly leave any impact on the broader Afghan situation. Most of the analysts and experts on the Afghan issue interviewed for this paper did not attach much hope to Bonn-II. Many of them stated that within the parameters of its framework, Bonn-II would achieve minimum to modest results without any breakthrough. They predicted that no contentious issues would be taken up at the conference and status quo would continue in all probability. Some raised questions about the future pledges of the international community and its commitment to honor them fully. To them Bonn-II would be nothing more than political lip-service and lackadaisical economic pledges.

Similarly, some analysts expressed apprehensions that Bonn-II may not succeed in preventing Afghanistan from falling into another phase of bloodshed, anarchy, warlordism and civil war. In such a scenario, there would be factionalism where different groups in Afghanistan would seek support from different regional countries in a repeat of the 1990s scenario. Nonetheless, they asserted that the Taliban lacked the capability and resources to take over Kabul. Another factor that would foil their bid to capture Kabul after US withdrawal is the regional stakeholders’ unwillingness to allow such a situation to arise. The Karzai regime’s inability to survive after US withdrawal and the Taliban’s inability to capture Kabul
would push Afghanistan towards internecine factional wrangling and divisions along ethno-linguistic lines.96

However, it is clear that given the prevailing security, economic and political situation in Afghanistan, diverging perceptions and competing interests of regional stakeholders, and lack of political will on part of international stakeholders, there is little homework or preparedness to make the Bonn-II a successful event. Secondly, in the absence of at least some political consensus among different Afghan factions about possible ways and means of political transition in Afghanistan as well as differences among core stakeholders, i.e., Afghanistan, Pakistan and the US, there is little likelihood of Bonn-II delivering anything substantial.
Notes

7 Safdar Sial, ”Pak-Afghan Relations: Emerging Trends and Future Prospects,” *Conflict and Peace Studies* 4, no. 1 (2011). Three declarations were: Declaration by NATO and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on an Enduring Partnership; Declaration by the Heads of State and Government of the Nations contributing to ISAF; and “Lisbon Summit Declaration.” The Lisbon Declaration builds upon the international agreements at the London Conference and the Kabul Conference that focused on the agreed process of transition, which included aligning assistance with Afghan National Priority Programs as outlined in the Afghan National Development Strategy.
9 Tanvir Ahmed Khan (former foreign secretary Pakistan, and DG Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad), interview by Abdul Basit in Islamabad, September 6, 2011.
10 Wazhma Frogh, “Bonn II Paper Series One: Who is setting the agenda for another international Conference.”
11 Barnett R. Rubin and Humayun Hamidzada, “From Bonn to London.”
12 Wazhma Frogh, “Bonn II Paper Series One: Who is setting the agenda for another international Conference.”
13 Tanvir Ahmed Khan, interview.
15 Simbal Khan (Director, Afghanistan and Central Asia, Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad), interview by Abdul Basit in Islamabad, September 6, 2011.
Wajahat Ali (journalist and researcher), interview by Abdul Basit in Islamabad, September 8, 2011.

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88 “Written evidence from Professor Sultan Barakat & Mr Steven A. Zyck.

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90 Ibid.

91 Rahimullah Yousufzai, telephonic conversation.

92 Wajahat Ali, interview.

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94 Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, interview.

95 Rahimullah Yousufzai, telephonic conversation.

96 Tanvir Ahmed Khan, interview.
Political Economy of Tehrik-i-Taliban Swat

Muhammad Feyyaz

Introduction

The violence-wealth relationship in state and societal contexts is now a well established discipline of security studies, drawing upon rich scholarship by academics from diverse backgrounds. Even though separating the causal role of political and economic factors is difficult as the two are empirically interrelated, current debates regarding the causes of armed conflict focus in part on whether the main determinant of rebellions and civil wars is greed (the pursuit of profit) or grievance (the redress of injustice). This view has found its most systematic expression in a seminal work by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler. Their ‘greed-and-grievance model’ envisages rebels’ greed akin to loot-seeking as the main reason for civil war; hence they argue that commonly identified causes of conflict have no bearing on the outcome of a conflict. Instead, “individuals join rebel movements depending on the expected utility of their actions, which is a function of opportunities forgone by engaging in violence and the availability of lootable income, or the payoff.” “The true cause of much civil war is not the loud discourse of grievance but the silent force of greed,” they conclude.

Consequent to Collier’s formulations, a range of insightful writings have emerged in the last two decades, conceptually examining efficacy and place of economic determinism in civil wars on one hand, and empirically locating whether the presence of criminal behavior on the part of an armed group represents a meaningful end that the group pursues, or it is only the means by which they pursue their ends, on the other. Such a constant struggle is inherent in the relationship between crime and conflict—and it is also central to the greed versus grievance controversy. In essence, the discourse on ‘incentives and disincentives for violence’ posits that war is not always fought for an ultimate victory or political advances; rather “the main aim of fighting is no longer to win, but perpetuate a conflict for economic reasons.”

When viewed critically, the recent conflict in Swat presents a novel case study of a conflict that appears to have begun with socio-political aims but soon afterwards mutated into one in which economic benefits became paramount. The terror campaign by Tehrik-e-Taliban Swat (TTS), characterized by
shifting religio-political motives, raising of phenomenal organisational structure and interest-centric regulation of violence, manifests the entire spectrum of political economy of an armed conflict. The implicit role of women added a distinctive dimension to this reactionary war. This study is an attempt to narrate and analyze how the entire operation was articulated and strategized by TTS.

The paper begins with a theoretical explanation of the notion of political economy and its linkage with armed conflicts, followed by a discussion on the onset of the Swat conflict. It then traces TTS chief Fazlullah’s path to power including a discussion on how he developed his militant formations with benign support of other actors. This has been described by identifying phases of evolution of TTS, and encompassing also its salient characteristics and operational strategy. In particular, the inquiry outlines the motivation that drew women of Swat to play a role in building the foundational edifice of local militancy. Politico-economic dimensions of the conflict are a key focus of the subsequent part. The paper concludes by inferring that geopolitics and wealth accumulation, and not public good, were and are the principal motivations behind the facade of ‘jihad’ by TTS. The conclusion covers a few policy guidelines in broad terms. It is clarified that although some advocates of capitalism and individualism such as Gordon Gekko liken ‘greed’ to entrepreneurship and a fuel for motivation to work for the general ‘good’ both of oneself and others,9 this thesis employs the notion of greed expounded by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, which essentially means ‘loot-seeking.’10

The geographical area under review in this paper is collectively referred to as Swat; although the domain of TTS practically reigned over the entire Malakand Division (see map) which comprises six districts, one tribal agency and some territorial enclaves in the adjacent Kohistan Division. Settled districts of Malakand include Buner, Swat and Shangla, whereas others known as Provincially Administrated Tribal Areas (PATA) include Upper Dir, Lower Dir and Chitral districts; the tribal agency, also named Malakand, is situated at the doorway to the divisional area. PATA is represented in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province provincial legislature and the provincial governor can change or extend laws to PATA only with the President’s approval under the provisions of Article 247 of the Constitution of Pakistan. The Criminal Procedure Code that applies to the rest of the country does not
extend to PATA. However, unlike the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), PATA is subject to the jurisdiction of Pakistan’s regular court system.¹¹

Map of Malakand Division in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa¹²

Political Economy of Armed Conflicts

The term ‘political economy’ traces its origin to French writer Montchretien de Watteville, who used it in 1615 to describe ‘the science of wealth acquisition common to the State as well as the Family.’¹³ For mercantilist writers and policy-makers in the 17th century the economy was meant to serve the power and glory of (nation) state—striving for political power through economic means. The notion thus found its best expression in mercantilism as a system of political economy. By contrast, in later centuries, Adam Smith related wealth with public service, and not just the ability to maintain a large army—leading to the notion’s expansion as economics.¹⁴ In the 1960s, Russian writer Nikiten asserted that ‘bourgeois political economy represents the interests of the system that has long since become a brake on social development’ but in socialist context, it deals with relations among people and classes, and is concerned with their vital interests.¹⁵
During the Cold War, armed conflicts were a function of competing ideologies and were sustained by ideologues. Transformation of the international system severed this linkage, altering the existing relationship of politics with economy in a conflict paradigm on one hand and turning warring organizations to finance wars from non-structural and informal sources on the other. The resurrection invoked proliferation of literature on the political economy of conflict, leading to a dynamic debate on contemporary armed conflicts in the political and social sciences. The character of political violence henceforth became the focus of empirical research linking politics, economy, crime and violence. Many thus identified violence as a marketable good employed by rentier states, corrupt elites, conflict entrepreneurs and criminal networks to regulate their economic environment, while ‘globalization has [further] facilitated links between war economies and international markets.’ The evolved character of economic transactions predominantly in illicit and criminal realms by political, social and rebel elites thus distinguished political economy of conflict from its peace stream which is embedded in legitimate formal state mechanisms for growth and revenue. Even in the latter case, the adopted policies by a political government are often not the policies that economists recommend as the best or even the second best, due to influence of non-economic factors and vested interests, thereby looking at economic issues through the prism of politically motivated considerations. Political economy, thus emerged, encompasses “the distribution of power and wealth between different groups and individuals, and the processes that create, sustain and transform these relationships overtime.” It is this complex web of motives and interactions that has developed inalienable linkage of political economy with civil wars.

Political economy of militancy in Pakistan is distinct from the general meaning ascribed to political economy of conflicts elsewhere, especially in Africa. Barring alleged collusion of intelligence agencies with some militant organizations for trans-border activities or possibly nexus between political elites and organized criminal cartels associated with drug trafficking, there is no palatable evidence to support the view of active networking of conflict entrepreneurs with political elites in the government driven by economic motives. Consequently, the connotation of political economy vis-à-vis armed conflict employed in this thesis essentially implies its operation within the organizational framework of a militant outfit such as TTS as well as its league with conflict profiteers or mafias running organized crime cartels.
Drivers and Onset of Swat Conflict

Declared a State by the British in 1915, Swat along with the states of Dir and Chitral were merged with Pakistan in 1969. Prior to this integration, the people of Swat had access to expeditious justice under the Wali (ruler) of Swat through Qazi courts (Nizam-e-Adl).\(^{21}\) Until 1973, the judicial system of Swat was based on Frontier Crime Regulation (FCR) provisions similar to FATA.\(^{22}\) In 1974, the FCR was abolished in Swat and the Shariah or customary laws, which had been in place in Swat throughout its history as a princely state, replaced by the secular laws of the Pakistani central government which could not satisfy popular demands. Resultantly, a yearning emerged for imposition of Shariah to reinstitutionalize expeditious justice. That also marked the rise of militancy in Swat with the creation in June 1989 of the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammad (movement for the enforcement of Islamic Law), or TNSM, headed by Fazlullah’s future father-in-law Sufi Muhammad. The TNSM demanded replacement of customary tribal law with Shariah law. Afghan war veterans from FATA infiltrated the TNSM and received financial sponsorship from drug barons in the tribal region along the border with Afghanistan. The TNSM gradually gained public support and turned violent in 1994. The federal government at the time, headed by Benazir Bhutto, finally made a compromise with the TNSM to resolve the situation.\(^{23}\) The provincial government announced Nifaz-e-Shariat Regulation and the situation stabilized. In 1999, Nifaz-e-Shariat Regulation was improved and enforced as Sharai Nizam-e-Adl Regulation. However, the people continued to find fault with Sharai Nizam-e-Adl Regulation and the lingering issue heralded a new phase of turmoil in the first decade of the 21\(^{st}\) century. The Swat peace accord between the Government of the North West Frontier Province (now called Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and Sufi Muhammad was signed on February 16, 2009. This was followed by promulgation of Nizam-e-Adl Regulation 2009 by the NWFP Governor with the approval of the President of Pakistan.\(^{24}\) Under the deal, Shariah law was implemented in the region.\(^{25}\) Both the peace agreements signed between the NWFP government and TNSM head Fazlullah in 2008 and 2009 collapsed within months.\(^{26}\)

Swat rose to worldwide prominence in April 2009 when Fazlullah-led militants reached the fringes of Buner district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The event was a watershed for all protagonists engaged in power politics in Swat. Class consciousness, a non-responsive judicial system, fury over the
government’s pro-US policies, ramifications of the Afghan war and assertion of Wahhabi school of thought by Afghan clerics have underpinned the conflict in Swat. However, some critics claim that it is a fallacy to suggest that the anti-state insurgency in Swat was merely a desperate attempt to re-institute expeditious justice. The Taliban have had a ruthless agenda, which is largely driven by political and economic considerations. References to Shariah and expeditious justice in their rhetoric were deliberate and aimed at creating resonance among the people. Structural failings on part of successive dispensations to address issues of social exclusion played a crucial role in societal turbulences that preceded the emergence of Fazlullah’s militants. It was, however, institutionalization of militancy by Fazlullah and his zealous followers that accounted for the social commotion marking advent of violent politics in the region.

Fazlullah’s Path to Power

A local cable car operator and part-time guestroom attendant at Fizza Ghat near his native village Mam Dheri, Fazlullah was the principal mastermind who established and orchestrated a reign of terror in Swat. His path to power conceptualizes crafty machinations commencing with charming a daughter of Sufi Muhammad (his religious mentor) into a forced matrimonial relationship with him. His unusual rhetorical appeal distinguished him among youth while a reputation for homosexuality and a feminist outlook disgusted Sufi Muhammad, only to be reconciled during the joint ‘jihad’ in Afghanistan in late 2001 against US-led coalition forces. Fazlullah’s inherent gift of the gab amplified by an illegal FM radio channel bolstered his outreach to domestic audience by playing on narratives of social injustice and Swatis’ laissez-faire. On the political level, the local miscreant leadership was tacitly shored up, if not openly supported, by the politico-religious provincial government of the right-wing religious alliance Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) since 2002, which ignored their excesses and effectively gave them a free hand in Swat. The civil administration and police also followed the same policy as that of the provincial government, further emboldening the miscreants. A spate of national crises—especially accounts of killing of young girls from Swat in a security forces’ operation against religious extremists in Islamabad’s Lal Masjid in the summer of 2007—strengthened the miscreant leadership’s cause which became a catalyst for lack of popular trust in the federal government. It was this discontent with the dictatorial regime of Gen Musharraf as well as
the absence of Sufi Muhammad from the political scene—he was arrested and
imprisoned in 2002 upon his return from Afghanistan—combined with a
complicit right-wing provincial polity including sympathetic officials that
enabled Fazlullah to create his power base. Growing influence of Afghan
clerics imbued with Saudi version of authoritarian Islam in rural settings
proved efficacious in providing free conflict capital without too much effort
on the miscreants’ part.31

First Phase: Home to some 2.5 million practising Muslims, Malakand
Division and Swat in particular once boasted a strong civil society, and a high
level of education and healthcare compared to adjacent areas in FATA,32
making creation of a militant network here much difficult. Therefore,
Fazlullah built an organizational structure rooted in the rhetoric of ‘Shariah.’33
After Fazlullah’s early release from jail in 2002-2003, where he was
imprisoned while returning from his Afghan ‘jihad’, his native village Mam
Dheri became his main operational base for preaching extremist ideas across
Swat as well as identifying and incorporating local criminals to build a
hardcore inner circle. The local peasantry, which was the original land owners
in Swat, especially in Peshawar Valley, but was dispossessed during the era of
the Wali of Swat, were among the first to join Taliban ranks to reclaim their
lands from Khans.34 Their grievance was underpinned by historical injustice
by the Wali since 1917 when he abrogated ‘wesh’ system of rotational land
allotment to reward his supporters.35

It is instructive to see how women inspired by a range of motivational
variables responded to Fazlullah’s campaign during its nascent stage. To
begin with, Fazlullah used his radio sermons to oppose social taboos
discriminating against women availing their legal rights to inheritance,
“mehr” (amount of money paid by the groom to the bride), divorce and in
other familial settings.36 The extent of gold jewelry donated towards the
construction of Fazlullah’s seminary was a direct consequence of such
influences. The findings of a focused group discussion (FGD) conducted with
men and women groups in Swat clearly shows that people from Swat in
general and women in particular did play an active role in lending moral and
financial support to TTS.37 A local inhabitant made an interesting observation
during an interview with the author, contending that what drew the female
citizenry towards Islamic revivalism was their underlying inspiration to
reclaim relations lost to alluring dancing girls of Swat in an effort to preserve familial integrity. Likewise, the young women who were left behind by their overseas wards were socially somewhat independent and also vulnerable to exploitation to a large extent particularly fell prey to Fazlullah’s enticing sermons. Upon his call for ‘jihad,’ conservative women and commoners, who had a high degree of secular literacy but little understanding of the Quran, offered him a fertile environment to promote his agenda. Exciting religious fervor by citing from Quran and holy traditions and highlighting the role of pious Muslim women from the early era of Islam proved instrumental in stoking emotional consciousness among these women. Fazlullah cleverly aimed his radio propaganda at women, motivating them in every speech and sermon to send their sons, husbands and brothers for jihad. Appeals for vengeance in response to the Lal Masjid episode were yet another factor that played on the emotions of the ordinary rural women, who urged men in their families to take up arms against the state. An empowered status at home bestowed by a tradition of love marriages was used by household women to prevail upon their men to join the group of volunteers that constituted Fazlullah’s army. It is ironic that women also suffered the most during the subsequent phases of conflict. There are numerous accounts of Taliban forcibly marrying girls of their choice and then abandoning them to the mercy of other Taliban who fancied them. Key local commanders in Swat were reported to often have two, three or even four wives at a time, in disregard of the local social norms. Those resisting Taliban advances paid with their lives or those of their family members, in addition to being publicly whipped on baseless charges of immorality.

Second Phase: Active display of power by Fazlullah through intimidation and coercion began with accession of TNSM’s leaderless militant factions into his fold in late 2004. Through TNSM affiliates, he was able to develop wide-ranging connections with similar organizations active in the country and across the border in Afghanistan. His new associates included a TNSM faction headed by Maulvi Liaquat in Bajuar, Jaish-e-Muhammad (JM), Taliban from Waziristan as well as the Afghan Taliban, to name a few. In 2007, Fazlullah established militant training camps and started construction of a huge complex at Mam Dheri close to Mingora city. After announcing promulgation of self-styled Shariah, he established courts which started ‘administration of justice.’
The July 2007 Lal Masjid attack provided Fazlullah and his militants an ideal opportunity to take on the state security apparatus and its sympathizers in Swat. A demand by Baitullah Mehsud, who later became leader of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), for halting military action in Swat demonstrated the strengthening nexus between major Taliban groups and TTS at the leadership level. This alliance later resulted in recognition of vice-regency of Fazlullah within TTP and Baitullah conferred upon him the title of Taliban ‘Amir’ for northern Kyhber Pakhtunkhwa, i.e., the entire Malakand Division and adjacent settled districts of the province. Prior to this joining of hands, the TTS militancy lacked combat sting and relied mainly on only guerilla tactics, including bomb blasts, and sniper and improvised explosive devices (IED) attacks. The contention that the Taliban’s fighting skills had more recently been sharpened in the jihad against the Russians and later the Americans, and that they were not giving up easily, is neither substantiated empirically by recorded violent incidents nor by local military commanders who—with hindsight of experience from Waziristan—termed TTS cadre inferior to the Taliban in fighting potential. Available intelligence assessments put the TTS strength at the time at around 15,000—including 1,500 to 2,000 hardcore militants, 4,000 to 4,500 armed supporters in Swat and 8,000 to 9,000 sympathizers. It was the dispatch of hardened fighters from Waziristan, Bajaur and Dir, including a sizeable number of foreign fighters (Uzbeks and Chechens among them) that resulted in enhanced strength of TTS and restructuring of its military strategy in late 2007. Setting up dozens of illegal FM radio channels in Swat and 125 transmitters at the peak of the militancy in Swat was a visible demonstration of growing militant influence. The induction of foreign fighters, proliferation of funding sources and enlarged popular as well as mainstream politico-religious parties’ support added to Fazlullah’s support base.

**Consolidation:** As Fazlullah grew in power—he was now addressed as Abu Amir Swat—the organizational outlook, character, scale of operations and political objectives of TTS also kept changing, now increasingly inclined towards seizure of complete executive authority in Swat. Police, civil administration and the judiciary were expelled from the area, turning Swat into a virtual theocratic authoritarian regime. The entire militant grouping in the country increasingly looked at Fazlullah as the forerunner in establishing a Shariah fraternity as well as a haven, which they believed would benefit
militants in Afghanistan in the future. This is not uncommon with such religious groups, who may have different motives but share the lust for political power and the aspiration to take over the state.41

The fact that Fazlullah was pitted against a military regime which was in no way popular further worked in his favor. His political behavior towards his ethnic lineage and staunch advocates in Swat signified nuances of instrumentalism. He now targeted piecemeal the social capital that was once his asset. Application of fear factor against all sections of population, the government machinery and official infrastructure became the major determinant in the violent philosophy of TTS. The pattern of violence included indiscriminate killing of liberals and enlightened clergy, beginning with the rural areas and gradually expanding to urban centres to force the local population into submission. Targeted killing of local elite, beheading of police and Frontier Corps personnel and public display of their severed heads became the norm, with a view to harass the people and government functionaries alike. The MMA government remained passive throughout this period for its own political reasons. Radio broadcasts by Fazlullah were no longer simply ideological or propaganda programs, these were regularly used to declare individuals wajib-ul-qatl (liable to be killed). Dozens of government employees including local police officers were targeted in this manner. One measure of how seriously security personnel took these threats was resignations of numerous police and Frontier Corps personnel from their posts and announcement of such resignations in local newspapers.42 A parallel government had come into existence in Swat, forcing the state and its legal and administrative institutions to leave in the wake of mounting violence that characterized the dominant discourse of the conflict which ‘is often unrelated to objective truth.’43 In his article ‘Behind the Crisis in Swat,’ Sartaj Khan argued that the “current religious militancy raging in Swat is a class war.”44 He noted, “The militants are targeting the Khans regardless of their political affiliations and have given their fight a class dimension which, in the context of exploitation and oppression has gone on for centuries. The ‘war on terror’ has only aggravated the social situation in Swat and given birth to a movement which has its roots in history.”45 Asserting that there was no class war in Swat, Farhat Taj, a resident of Swat, contended: “The fact is that the Islamist militants are targeting those Khans who are politically active, who can be a hurdle in the way of the savage mediaeval order that the local
and foreign jihadis want to impose on Swat.” She rebutted Sartaj’s contention that only Khans were being targeted by the Taliban: “Jihadis are also targeting the poor political workers of political parties, especially the ANP [Awami National Party], not because they are Khans but because they have nationalistic and secular credentials.” For all intents and purposes, Fazlullah no longer identified with local ethnicity; his beliefs instead assumed anti-Pakhtun, anti-nationalist and anti-feudal dimensions, which were opposed to the traditional Pakhtun leadership and had increasing hues of apparent pro-Pan Islamism. In many ways, the contours of a larger debate on whether conflict is a function of selfless opposition to tyranny (the search for justice), or whether tyranny derives from the vanities of a few men (the search for private gain), could be discernibly observed.

At its peak, TTS was no less than a smart modern army. It comprised layered operational leadership, whose top echelons, along with its principal spokesperson Muslim Khan and head of complaint cell, formed part of Fazlullah’s shura. Besides devising an FM radio network based on knowledge he had acquired during a long stay at the US, Muslim Khan was responsible for liaison with Taliban networks based in FATA and Karachi. Each commander had a distinct outfit capable of assuming independent responsibilities. The second-tier leadership and foot soldiers were based in assigned sectors. The inbuilt logistic capabilities of TTS included explosive experts, FM base station network throughout Swat, a treasury, training centers, prisons and a huge complex of madrassas which served as offices, courts, and recruitment and propaganda centers. TTS also did not lag in provision of ‘entertainment’ to its cadres and operatives. Abductees released from TTS custody have given accounts of a sustained supply of women and wine to non-resident fighters. And yet the same lot was seen flogging women in public on charges of immorality, and the mothers of Swat who had initially supported the TTS were now begging the military to eliminate Taliban. The linkage of militants with foreign powers and their acts of horrific violence against the innocent people created mass resentment and even the Islamic political parties supported the army in its operations against the militants. The Pakistan government and military were thus able to take advantage of a major shift in public perception toward the Taliban in Swat as part of its successful effort to retake the valley.
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Political Economy and Sustenance Strategy

A decidedly sluggish governance structure was an important dynamic responsible for spawning violent overtures but political and economic motivations for armed conflict are not mutually exclusive. In Swat, in a war by ostensible religious extremists money was a major consideration, both as a source of financing the militancy as well as an incentive for control over the transit trade route to Afghanistan. Besides TNSM militants, many other elements also joined the TTS fold; these included gangs of car-lifters, the timber mafia, farmers who had disputes with Khans, loan defaulters, smugglers and many other criminal elements. TNSM’s slogan for implementation of Shariah in 1989 in reality became a movement of Dir traders associated with the transit trade between Pakistan and Afghanistan. People had expected unprecedented benefits if Sufi Muhammad’s movement was implemented including cheap raw material, electricity and tax-free vehicles, amongst other things. Because of perpetual changes in the administrative structure, Swat long remained outside the state’s taxation and customs jurisdiction. In addition to investment in small-scale silk, cosmetics and tourism industry, illegal activities including smuggling of luxury vehicles, gun running, drug trade, women trafficking, timber theft, etc., by criminal mafias had become a virtual shadow economy in the area. A steady flow of weapons from Afghanistan militarized the environment, which later provided the organizational basis for violence by groups organized as mafias. To some extent, the conditions were ripe for fostering higher levels of criminality.

The economic agenda of TTS initially resembled socio-economic mores of TNSM but gradually assumed a criminal character distinct in outlook from other militant structures in Pakistan. While it is not always possible to discern whether non-state armed actors were motivated by greed or grievance, but the balance often shifted over time. One can find various indications in this conflict and others where an insurgent group that was motivated into action for political reasons later found benefits in its illicit enterprise—and therefore an additional reason to continue fighting. Their ‘organized crime’ should be understood as one form of organized non-state violence among many where an ‘illicit power structure’ flourishes on illicit money to manipulate and assert its own interests. Unlike traditional economic organizations, militant/terrorist groups rely on five distinct sources of funding: direct contributions from
individuals; donations from charitable organisations; state sponsorship; profits from legitimate businesses—including tithing by the membership; profits from criminal enterprises—including skimming funds from legitimate organizations and extortion from individuals. All of these sources except state sponsorship are visible in the economic criminalization organized by Fazlullah at different points in time. That was why the donations TNSM received from the local population never crossed into millions.

From January to December 2005, which can be regarded as the first TTS fund collection drive, the receipts were reported to be between Rs. 154 million to Rs. 184 millions, mostly in kind such as jewellery, weapons, and construction material for the madrassa at Mam Dheri. Women were at the forefront in offering donations. In 2005, television camera crews in Swat captured for the first time images of Taliban receiving donations from locals, with wooden carts with mounds of cash on them parked in the streets as women dropped their jewelry into bags for masked young men carrying AK-47 assault rifles. As the security situation worsened between January 2006 and November 2007, TTS began to use every possible means to generate money, procure weapons and ammunition and pay salaries to what was now a much enlarged network. The spectrum of extortions was expanded to encompass all sources that are peculiar to international criminal cartels. Various criminal elements joined hands with TTS to further their interests. For example, Sirajuddin, one of Fazlullah’s trusted operational commanders who was reportedly a former deputy chief of TNSM, was associated with timber business. His motivation to join the militant organization was to exploit the timber wealth free from government restrictions. During the conflict, deforestation was carried out at an unprecedented scale in connivance with the local timber mafia. The government estimates the annual loss as a result of deforestation and illegal timber trade in Malakand Division at US $800 million. The devastation suffered by the forests in Swat in just 2008 was more than deforestation and timber theft over the previous two decades. A survey conducted by Aryana Institute for Regional Research and Advocacy in 2009 revealed that the forest sector in Swat alone had incurred a loss of over Rs. 8 billion in the last 16 months. Being shrewd investors, the timber mafia is believed to have spent part of their profits to sponsor the militancy. Not only did local commanders receive up to Rs. 25,000 and ordinary Taliban up to Rs. 10,000 as monthly stipends, but regular remunerations and welfare packages were also
instituted for the families of those killed or sent away from their native areas. Estimates of the money collected during this period (now in hard cash) were between Rs. 149 million and Rs. 170 million.

From November 2007 to May 2009, TTS became virtually unchallengeable through enhanced control over the entire spectrum of crime, in great part assisted by frequent peace deals with the government. Its income from various sources almost doubled. Militants looted hotels and resorts, made millions of rupees by auctioning off looted computers, cutlery, carpets and furniture. In perhaps the most well known case of TTS plunder, militants looted the Malam Jabba Ski Resort in June 2008 and later burned down half of the stately building and torched the ski lifts. In another case, the militants looted a provincial tourism development office, and auctioned millions of rupees worth of computers and office supplies. Targeting of the tourism industry, which employed more people than any other source of livelihood in Swat, enraged many locals. In addition to hotels and tourist sites, militants also looted houses and shops abandoned by fleeing residents, along with food storage depots, including a World Food Programme warehouse. They snatched dozens of vehicles, particularly all-terrain trucks and jeeps, from various government and non-governmental entities. They looted hospitals in Jowarh, Nawagai and Dewana Baba, taking away all sellable implements including ambulances. So-called ‘tax’ collection network spread to almost all areas of Malakand Division. Besides abductions for ransom, civilians were asked to pay levies on a monthly basis. There did not seem to be a uniform policy across Swat on what the militants demanded of the citizens. In some areas, Taliban charged fixed extortion amounts, for example, in Khwazakhela the shopkeepers reported paying $360 per month to the local TTS commander, irrespective of their earnings. Meanwhile, Swati families who received remittances from relatives living abroad were required to contribute as much as half of that amount to the militants. The militants also instructed that all amounts of religiously mandated charities should be paid to them and not to government and non-governmental organizations. Subventions from sympathetic foreign governments and funding from Pakistani Diaspora and sympathizers from other parts of country started to flow in, reaching the high mark of Rs. 708.6 million to Rs. 819.6 million. In addition to exploitation of the thick pine forests, emerald mines and archaeological artifacts had also been key sources.
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of revenue for the local black economy. Three shuttered emerald mines were seized by the Taliban in northwest Swat in February 2009 where excavation started at full speed. Over 200 laborers took part in extracting the precious stones, with the Taliban taking a third of the mined stones. Before the military seized control of the mines from the Taliban proceeds from sale of emeralds extracted for at least three months had lined the militants’ coffers and helped bankroll their insurgency. They sold the mined emeralds through open bidding. The Taliban earned US $50,000 a month from the mines. According to investigative reporters on the ground, “the gemstones are sold as quickly as possible at rates sometimes as low as US $50 per carat, far below their market price... [and] are then smuggled to Jaipur, India, before being transported to Bangkok, Switzerland and Israel.” Commenting on the political economy of Taliban’s reign of terror in Swat, Tom Burghardt notes that while proclaiming the purest motives for their crimes, TTP “emirs” were enriching themselves through various illegal schemes to loot the region's natural resources.

Whereas initially the Taliban in Swat had relied on popular appeal and soft power for receiving collections from the citizenry, subsequently they resorted to criminal extortions. According to the findings of a survey by Regional Institute of Policy Research and Training (RIPT), some key informants disclosed that besides enriching themselves by looting rich households, the militants also made money by selling the rubble of schools and hospitals they had bombed.

In April 2009, nearly two months after the militants had signed a peace deal with the government, around 100 militants tried to enter Buner via Gokand Valley and Qadar Nagar Pass. Later on hundreds of Taliban fighters occupied the shrine of eminent renowned saint Pir Baba and houses of elders of the tribal lashkar in Sultanwas. They looted science laboratories, libraries and burnt down furniture of schools in Gadezi, Daggar, Chamla and Chagharzi tehsils, besides looting equipment from Buner's hospital as well as office implements, vehicles and other articles of value from the district health office.

The military operation from May to August 2009 was the last phase of TTS existence as an organized force, when its supply lines were choked and access to funds dwindled fast. After August 2009, the Taliban presence in Swat was
eliminated and their ability to raise funds neutralized. One distinction of the militancy in Swat compared to insurgencies elsewhere was that “whereas attempts to eliminate illicit behavior often serve only to stoke the flames of the insurgency, especially when the populace depends on criminal proceeds to survive,” the population in Swat was overwhelmingly in support of uprooting criminal networks thriving on their wealth.

Cost of Conflict

The military’s Operation Rah-e-Rast, which was launched in May 2009, not only enjoyed popular backing but also witnessed a rare display of unanimity across the political spectrum in support of the decision to use force in Swat. The military operation against the Taliban prompted the largest displacement of people since the genocide in Rwanda, sending 2.3 million people fleeing to camps set up for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. In June 2009, the Pakistani government announced it had effectively pushed back the Taliban and began encouraging the displaced population to return to their homes, and the vast majority did so—in some cases in circumstances that were manifestly unsafe and untenable. The military operation was declared a success by August 2009, with the military announcing that it had routed the Taliban. Collateral damage during this phase was minimal since the population had fled the conflict zone prior to the operation. Currently, Swat stands clear of militants by and large and writ of the state has been restored to a considerable degree. The majority of the IDPs have returned to their homes and even though many still await reconstruction of their houses and rehabilitation of their businesses the impressive handling of the entire rehabilitation effort by Pakistan has been lauded by the international community. Independent sources estimate that there were nearly 2,000 civilian and up to 500 military fatalities in the conflict. According to the army, between 3,000 and 3,400 militants were killed.

Apart from the general suffering caused by the physical and psychological abuse and trauma to the masses during the active conflict that spanned over 21 months, the education, farming and tourism sectors bore the brunt of the devastation. A recent report by RIPORT has identified 12,025 psychological patients in Swat. Taliban attacks disrupted education of over 50,000 students, from primary to college level, according to official estimates. After the imposition of Nizam-e-Adl Regulation in April 2009 alone, around 4,000
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schools providing education to over 40,000 girls were shut down.\textsuperscript{80} Around 8 percent (427 out of 5,347) facilities in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which included schools and educational residences and hostels were damaged; of which 237 were destroyed and 190 partially damaged. These included 149 destroyed and 66 partially damaged girls' schools. The damage was estimated at Rs 2,696 million.\textsuperscript{81} Additionally, 5,934 housing units were destroyed and 7,280 damaged to various degrees; damage to the housing stock was the most severe in Swat district. In the energy sector, the total damages were Rs. 2,406 million (US $30 million). The major impact was faced by immovable assets of Peshawar Electrical Supply Company (PESCO), which was the sole distributor of electricity in the area. Direct damages were estimated at Rs. 769 million (US $9.6 million) whereas indirect losses (revenue loss during the crisis) were estimated to be Rs. 1,045 million (US $13.1 million). PESCO faced another indirect loss in the form of relief it provided to IDP camps, including establishment of electricity network as well as provision of electricity to the camps. The transport sector suffered a loss of Rs. 804 million (US $10 million). The health sector somehow survived serious degradation, but the total damage to the drinking water supply and sanitation facilities was estimated to be Rs. 62 million (US $0.8 million). An estimated one million people were directly affected as a result of this damage. The security sector almost evaporated in the area, warranting an investment of Rs. 7,787 million (US $97.3 million) for its restoration over a period of three years.\textsuperscript{82}

Acts of violence and terrorism by the militants not only destroyed the local infrastructure of schools, healthcare facilities and roads, they also destroyed the rural and urban economies in the region.\textsuperscript{83} The spread of Talibanisation, the subsequent bloodletting and the military operations seriously dented the image of Swat valley as a major tourist destination.\textsuperscript{84} Small shopkeepers, hoteliers and transporters were particularly affected. In the agriculture sector, fruit farms and cash crops were destroyed at a large scale, depriving the population of their means of subsistence.\textsuperscript{85} Other costs of the conflict included destruction of cultural heritage at Malam Jabba by religious zealots, who defaced the colossal Buddha image of Jahanabad as well as damaged Nangriyal rock carving, not to mention obliteration of the Malam Jabba tourist resort.\textsuperscript{86} It will take a long time for Swat to return to its pre-crisis situation with needs assessment envisaging around US $860 million for reconstruction of infrastructure in Malakand Division.
Conclusion

The evidence cited above provides only a snapshot of a much broader gamut of criminal behavior by the TTS echelons. The transmutation of rhetoric to violence strategy in order to subjugate public and seize their belongings indicates how Fazlullah operationalized his war campaign predicated essentially on predatory opportunism. The emergence of Taliban in Swat and their steady evolution into a multi-tiered and monolithic fraternity within nearly four years (2002-2006) vividly reveals this design. Barring the initial period of garnering public support, all of Fazlullah’s subsequent actions, especially the destruction perpetrated in the aftermath of the 2009 peace deal, the looting in Buner and eventual fleeing from the country contradict his slogan of ‘Shariah ya Shahadat’ (implementation of Shariah or martyrdom). The evidence highlights the manner in which the TTP and TTS leadership lives as well as arbitrary interpretation of religious injunctions by the militants as it suits their needs. An organizational leaning governed by materialism explains why a presumably religious movement turned into a rent-seeking grouping.87 It can thus be surmised that if allowed to perpetuate, Fazlullah’s reign would have followed a course of all repressive regimes characterized by loot-seeking and kleptocracy. Furthermore, even though Farzana Bari asserts that it is erroneous to infer from the physical absence of women in terrorist organizational set-ups that women are not playing or cannot play an active role in terrorist activities,88 women were practically involved to the extent of promoting the ideological cause of TTS. However, no evidence is found of their being active operatives in Fazlullah’s criminal activity.

The prevailing situation warrants expeditious multi-sphere rehabilitation and development to deny prospects for recurrence of militancy, besides restoration of the traditional tolerant Swati culture and heritage. In order to devise a strategy that isolates monetary benefits from militancy and regularize devices of shadow economy that provide oxygen to conflict entrepreneurs, it is essential that deliberate politico-legal efforts are made by the governance and political hierarchies to document the economy and broaden its base by involving all segments of local communities aimed at discouraging predatory tendencies. It is also imperative to develop coherent academic and institutional thought about political economy of organized
crime encompassing all its manifestations by drawing upon contemporary and emerging conflict paradigms from civil wars in Africa, Latin America and elsewhere. There is also a need to enlighten the citizenry regarding the true teachings of Quran through a structured process of dialogue and information. This can then be built upon to form a nationwide de-radicalization edifice to address the growing menace of societal extremism, particularly that directed at rural womenfolk. Swat has immense historical and archaeological importance in Pakistan’s civilizational milieu; efforts to preserve that should go beyond rhetoric. Abandoning such heritage would be a tragedy.
Notes

1 The author gratefully acknowledges the input provided by acquaintances, members of local/provincial administration, civil society, CEO Radio Swat, local military commanders and students from Swat and Police Research Centre, Peshawar. Comments and suggestions by anonymous reviewers were also of critical value in improving the form and substance of this paper.


3 Ibid.


10 The World Bank Development Research Group, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War.”

11 Post-Crisis Needs Assessment (PCNA) KPK and FATA – 2010 by EU, UN, World Bank, ADB, Government of Pakistan and KPK, coordinated by FATA Secretariat.

12 North West Frontier Province in the map is old name for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa


14 Ibid.


17 Philippe Le Billon, “The Root of All Evil: The Economics of Civil Wars.”


22 Read for example “History of FATA” by FATA Secretariat at http://fata.gov.pk.


24 Dr Noor Ul Haq and Yasir Imtiaz, “Swat Peace Accord.”


26 Hassan Abbas, “Militancy in Pakistan’s Borderlands.”


31 Conflict capital includes finances, human resource, weaponry and related sources. Here it implies availability of unemployed raw youth.


33 Shariah means divine law. It has different connotations in Muslim theology determined in accord with the particular jurisprudence school espoused by believers.

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Mr. Shah Sahib (former deputy commissioner Swat) and Mr. Humayun (ex political agent of Malakand Agency), interview by author in 93rd National Management Course held at National Management College, Lahore, October 28, 2010.

Shaikh Milli, one of the religious leaders during the early days of Yusufzai rule in Swat devised the system of ‘wesh’. This entailed rotation of land-holdings among clans and households every 10 to 20 years with permanent ownership of land to ensure equality through a system where no clan or household was in possession of superior or inferior land for all times. Later the Wali not only abolished the system but forbade non-Pakhtun to own land in Swat. For details see:


Farzana Bari, “Gendered Perceptions and Impact of Terrorism / Talibanization in Pakistan.”


Indra de Soysa, “Paradise Is a Bazaar? Greed, Creed, and Governance in Civil War.”

Sartaj Khan, “Behind the crisis in Swat.”

Ibid.

Farhat Taj, “No Class War in Swat.”

Ibid.


Indra de Soysa, “Paradise Is a Bazaar? Greed, Creed, and Governance in Civil War.”

Manzoor Ahmad, “Implications of the War on Terror for Khyber Pukhtunkhwa.”


K. Ballentine and J. Sherman, eds., The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance.
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55 Gretchen Peters, “Crime and Insurgency in the Tribal Areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan.”
58 The figures presented here were collected as a result of specially developed questionnaire in order to highlight how TTS managed to sustain itself economically.
60 Asif Mian, “FATA: Tribal Economy in the Context of Ongoing Militancy.”
64 Gretchen Peters, “Crime and Insurgency in the Tribal Areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan.”
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 Tom Burghardt, “The Political Economy of Taliban Terror in Swat Valley.”
71 Ibid.
73 Center for Public Policy Research Institute of Management Sciences Peshawar, “District Buner: A Socioeconomic Baseline and Displacement Impact.”
74 Gretchen Peters, “Crime and Insurgency in the Tribal Areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan.”
Ibid. The figures of IDP widely differ in estimates by different agencies. For example, The Post-Crisis Needs Assessment (PCNA) conducted in crisis-affected areas of KPK and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) – 2010 by four international development agencies in partnership with the Governments of Pakistan and KPK, and the FATA Secretariat put this figure at 1.5 million.

76 Amnesty International, “As If Hell Fell On Me: The Human Rights Crisis in Northwest Pakistan.”

77 Ibid.


82 Ibid.

83 Farzana Bari, “Gendered Perceptions and Impact of Terrorism / Talibanization in Pakistan.”


86 Rafi Ullah, “How green was my valley,” Friday Times, October 15-21, 2010.


88 Farzana Bari, “Gendered Perceptions and Impact of Terrorism / Talibanization in Pakistan.”

89 Rafi Ullah, “How green was my valley.”
Maoist Peace Process in Nepal: A Way Forward for India?

Nida Naz

Introduction

South Asia is one of the world’s most volatile regions due to diverse ideology-based conflicts and mainstream terrorism. Many of these conflicts are internal in nature but have international implications. The Maoist armed struggle, inspired by the classical Chinese Maoist ideology of Mao Zedong, erupted decades ago in India and Nepal and is spreading to Bhutan. But the Maoist ‘people’s revolution’ in Nepal and India has remained objective driven rather than strictly ideologically motivated owing to the muddle of jumbled Maoist, Marxist and Leninist ideologies. In India, the Maoist armed conflict has intensified over the years, posing the biggest internal threat to the political stability of the country. But the Indian government’s policies and strategies to resolve the conflict and restore its writ need to be reviewed for a long-term political solution that would be critical to the country’s progress as a social welfare democracy. In Nepal, the Maoists (Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist) fought a decade-long ‘people’s war’ against the monarchy. After the war, a process of negotiations and conflict resolution led to the Nepali Maoists opting for a political path to resolve the conflict. Only time will tell how comprehensive and successful the peace process is, however, Nepal has at least found a way to solve the problems democratically and peacefully in order to minimize prospects for conflict in the future.

The Maoist conflicts in the two South Asian countries apparently look similar as far as their causes, motives and modus operandi of the militants are concerned. Being former British colonies, both countries also share many historic aspects. Nepal is a landlocked country which has to depend on India for trade. In the past, poor border controls have allowed the left wing in India to export their radical ideology to Nepal and maintain a cross-border inter-structural relationship. Indian Maoists shared operational ties, including training and weapons, with the Nepali rebels until the Maoists in Nepal decided to pursue the peace process. Even now when the transnational operational linkage between these Maoist groups has ended to a large extent, the Indian opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is still apprehensive about
threats from the Nepali Maoists. Thus, both countries have new security concerns, which are not only qualitatively different from what they had been confronting previously but are also more difficult to respond to in certain aspects. The threat is more diffused in nature; it is not aimed directly at the territorial integrity of either country, but can still cause grave harm. A major threat is non-state actors in both countries developing linkages. Countering that challenge is more complicated than the past perceptions of threat to the territorial integrity of one state from the other.

In a comparative analysis of the two Maoist armed conflicts, the Nepali counter-insurgency narrative demonstrates the need for more than mere military strategy. This paper is an attempt to find common aspects of the two conflicts and determine if lessons from the Nepali Maoists’ peace process offer any help to resolve the Maoist insurgency in India in a peaceful and democratic manner. It is argued in this paper that despite a number of inherent differences there still are a few measures in the Nepali peace process that can be used for peaceful democratic settlement of the Maoist conflict in India. The Maoist insurgencies in the two countries are analyzed to determine if the Nepali experience can be applied partially, fully, or not at all to the situation in India. This paper finds that the last two scenarios are least likely because the most suitable conflict resolution framework must be based on the internal political, economic and social aspects of a country. The first scenario is likely the most useful one where India can follow the broad strokes of Nepal’s peace process to resolve its own lingering conflict, and, as this paper finds, this can be applied on the basis of common motives and causes, such as socio-economic deprivation, class segregation and people’s grievances. Moreover, absence of strong ideological basis makes it easier to detach the Maoists from their armed designs and to persuade them to pursue a negotiated settlement and peace.

The methodology of the paper includes a comparative analysis based on qualitative research, mainly relying on secondary sources such as online newspapers and analytical reviews of national and international experts. The Maoist conflict which is broadly explained and dealt with as an insurgency is discussed in terms of an armed conflict in this paper because many different strategies can be employed to resolve an armed conflict, whereas counter-insurgency limits the options for a peace process. According to the definition of Uppsala Conflict Data Program, an armed conflict is “a contested
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incompatibility which concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.” In view of this definition the Maoist unrest is considered an armed conflict. This paper primarily focuses on determining a suitable peace process that can maintain positive peace in the democratic society and not merely short-term absence of violence. Hence a focused peace process must include both peace building and peacemaking strategies leading to sustainable peace. A focused literature review for this paper included review of the provisions of the peace accord signed between Nepali Maoists and the government. The historical study and understanding of the Maoist armed struggle is primarily based on Kiyoko Ogura’s book “Seeking State Power: The Communist Party of Nepal,” Amelendu Guha’s “India’s Fourth Class: Casteless and Peasantry” and Nishchal Nath Pandey’s “Nepal’s Maoist Movement; Implications for India and China.” Furthermore, an informal talk was held with Ali Ahmed, a research analyst working at International Defense and Strategic Analysis (IDSA), New Delhi. Chanda Thapa, a Nepali activist, also shared her views. While there is substantial literature and research work available on the dynamics and onset of Maoist conflicts in the each of the two countries, very few researchers have attempted to study the two conflicts together or to focus on ways to end the conflict on the basis of lessons learnt from each other.

The first section of this paper gives an overview of the Nepali Maoist conflict, mainly focusing on the core causes, objectives, armed struggle, response of the state towards Maoists and the factors that led to the latter’s shift to political pursuit of their demands. It also analyses the peace process that led to the final peace accord. The second section is a synopsis of the Maoist conflict in India and looks at the two ideologically motivated but objective-driven conflicts by juxtaposing them. The next section notes the differences and similarities between the two conflicts and discusses the prospects for applying components of the Nepali peace process to the Indian case. This is followed by a concluding discussion.

Maoist Armed Conflict and Peace Process in Nepal: An Overview

Nepal’s present political instability and uncertainty regarding the future government carries a history of Maoists’ violent armed struggle—from 1996 to 2006—that claimed 13,000 lives and displaced over 50,000 people.
Moreover, differences amongst the United Communist Party of Nepal-Maoists (UCPN-M), Nepali Congress (NC) and United Marxist-Leninist Communist Party (UMLC) have also added to the insecurity and uncertainty among the Nepali people who, after the end of the civil war, got the right to decide for themselves who governs them and are eager to exercise that right in the best way possible. Therefore, it is important to take into account the retrospect of the Nepali civil war or ‘people’s war’ as it is also known, the main actors of conflict and the features of the peace accord that led to the current process of political transformation and national democratic institution building in Nepal.

Nepal’s downtrodden, poor and class-segregated farmers and villagers gathered under the banner of communism with the aim to abolish the autocratic monarchy and bring an end to the economic and social inequality in the country. But due to the differences in the interpretations of this ideology, the communist movement in Nepal experienced several splits and mergers. In their struggle for political power the leftist parties of Nepal failed to achieve their main stated objective, which was to improve the social and economic conditions of the ordinary Nepalese. In fact, the situation of the ordinary people continued to aggravate. Many rural areas suffered from extreme poverty and were utterly neglected by the government. Simultaneously, corruption dominated all public institutions in the country. The judicial process was so slow, expensive and biased that people had little hope of getting justice. Therefore, when the more radical Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) was formed in 1995 it received widespread public support. Basing their militant guerilla tactics on Mao’s strategy of protracted people’s war, the Nepali Maoists took the fight to the urban centers. Their main objectives were to overthrow the monarchy, bring socio-economic change, enforce radical land reforms and gain political power through their armed struggle. The Maoists managed to gain public support and sympathies on the basis of ethnic similarity, common grievances, ideological underpinning, entrenched poverty and social inequalities. Furthermore, the rebels found support among a substantial section of the female population by addressing their family and matrimonial disputes also punishing the men guilty of raping, drinking and ill behavior. In this regard the Jana Adalats (people’s courts) established by the Maoists played a vital role. These Kangaroo courts not only solved personnel disputes but also punished the
deviant by taking lesser trial time than regular courts. With significant public backing, the CPN-M managed to control various areas of the country’s mid-west as well as central and eastern Nepal. The state’s coercive machinery responded robustly to the Maoists’ ideological, political, organizational and material preparation for their ‘people’s war’ and in order to prevent them from expanding their control. A major police offensive, called Operation Romeo, was launched that further fueled Maoist aggression and they formally launched their violent ‘people’s war’ in 1996. The Maoist militants targeted police stations, killed many civilians including landlords, capitalist elite and also took control of many government headquarters. In 1998, another police-led operation, Kilo Sierra-II, was launched against the Maoist rebels. The Maoists responded by increasing the number and intensity of attacks on the police force. The formation of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in Nepal in 2002 was the outcome of the realization that the Maoists’ ‘people’s war’ could not succeed by pursuing Mao’s style alone and they also adopted the Marxist-Leninist style. The CPN (M) began its people’s war with a small number of fighters and gradually attained a status of well planned and organized group. During 1996 Maoists carried out nearly 6,000 major attacks against the police force that grew in number and lethality ever since. As a last resort, Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) launched airstrikes against the Maoists which compelled them to join the peace process and finally the political system in 2006.

The first round of negotiations between the CPN-M and the government of Nepal was held in 2001. During its national party conference in February 2001, the CPN-M first announced its primary political demands: convening of a roundtable conference with all political parties; formation of an interim government that included the CPN-M; and holding of elections to a constituent assembly which was to be tasked with drafting a new constitution. The demands demonstrated a major shift by the Maoists towards political means.

In July 2001, the government and the Maoists made mutual ceasefire declarations and started the first round of negotiations. Another cycle of negotiations was organized in September. Although the 9/11 attacks in the US had a dramatic impact on the situation in Nepal as Washington and New Delhi declared the CPN-M a terrorist group yet the negotiations continued. The three key demands of the Maoists were: giving to the people the right to
formulate a new constitution; dissolution of the incumbent government and formation of an interim government; and steps for establishment of a republic in Nepal. However, the CPN-M later gave up the demand for immediate establishment of a republic and instead suggested elections for the constituent assembly which would determine the future system of government. The CPN-M was quite flexible and willing to soften its demands in exchange for some concessions from the government.

However, during the third round of talks in November the government rejected all three demands of the Maoists, apparently feeling confident about US support and “growing anti-terrorist sentiments throughout the world.” The negotiations hit a brick wall, attacks resumed and a state of emergency was declared in the country. The rigid stance of the government was borne out of a belief that it would be able to suppress the Maoists solely by military means and therefore did not need to make any compromises.

On account of the monarch’s subsequent actions—such as dissolution of the House of Representatives and unilateral extension of the state of emergency—five main political parties of Nepal including the NC and the United Marxist-Leninist Communist Party started a protest movement against the autocratic regime of King Gyanendra. Even in such complex circumstances the CPN-M, which had always fought against the monarchy, accepted the offer of the palace-backed government to hold new peace talks. Both sides announced a mutual ceasefire and negotiations began in April 2003.

The CPN-M presented a 24-point list of demands, which, in addition to their previous demands, also included “the formation of a new national army that combined both the PLA and the RNA and declaration of Nepal as a secular state.” They also demanded the release of all Maoist detainees.

The government also withdrew its decision that had designated the CPN-M as a terrorist organization and issued a statement that it would notify Interpol “to withdraw the ‘red-corner’ notices against scores of Maoist leaders,” since that was one of the preconditions of the Maoists for resumption of negotiations.

The CPN-M abandoned its idea of establishing a one-party communist system and agreed to the need of a multi-party political system. The decision was
influenced by an analysis of the communist experience in the 20th century and
why socialism had been unsuccessful.25

However, the negotiations came to a stalemate again, because the roadmap
for peace, which was submitted by the government and rejected inclusion of
the CPN-M in the constituent assembly, was not acceptable to the Maoists.
Their frustration was aggravated by the fact that 19 rebels and civilians had
been killed on August 17 in a central district of Nepal in an operation by
government forces. The Maoists gave an ultimatum that unless the agenda
included a discussion on their participation in the constituent assembly they
would pull out of the ceasefire agreement. After the deadline mentioned in
the ultimatum ended the rebels resumed attacks against government forces.
They also revived their demand to abolish the monarchy in Nepal.

In 2005, King Gyanendra organized the second bloodless coup in the country
and dismissed the government, while Royal Nepalese Army detained leaders
of major political parties. This led to the beginning of a sort of cooperation
between the CPN-M and some other opposition parties. Even the US, India
and the UK, which had been providing military assistance to the government
of Nepal to counter the Maoist armed struggle, suspended their support
because of the king’s actions.

In its Central Committee meeting, the CPN-M decided to join hands with a
Seven-Party Alliance (SPA) of parliamentary parties—which included major
political parties of the country including NC, NC(D), CPN(UML), and ULF
and called for a movement for a “democratic republic”.24

Following numerous strikes, demonstrations and rallies against the king’s
rule organized by the political parties and supported by the population, the
monarch had to restore the House of Representatives, which immediately
voted to hold elections to the constituent assembly, abolished the monarch’s
special powers, changed the name of Royal Nepalese Army to Nepali Army
and proclaimed Nepal a secular state.25

In April and May 2006, the CPN-M and the new SPA government announced
a three-month ceasefire and new negotiations started on May 26, 2006. This
time the prospects for an agreement were high as both sides had agreed to
hold constituent assembly elections.26 CPN-M leaders began to appear in
public soon after that and repeatedly stated that they had no intention to return to an armed struggle. The CPN-M and SPA soon reached a historic eight-point agreement which included: formation of both an interim constitution and a power-sharing government within one month; dissolution of the House of Representatives and various levels of CPN-M’s ‘people’s government’; an invitation to the United Nations to supervise the arms management process for both the Nepali Army and the People’s Liberation Army until the constituent assembly elections are held.

Finally, on November 21, 2006, the government of Nepal and the CPN-M signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement that heralded a formal end to the armed conflict. The agreement also denounced any authority for the king in the state government.

This brief overview of the peace process in Nepal shows the transformation of the CPN-M from a group waging an armed struggle into a political party. It is clear that ideology was never the most important issue for the Maoists and as soon as they felt that they could achieve their goals by peaceful means they renounced their militaristic approach and completely changed their ideology. On the other hand, the government often complicated the peace process by posturing to keep the rebels out of the process and therefore leaving them no alternative but to continue their armed struggle.

In 2008, Nepal was declared a democratic republic. Although the political process was far from smooth, the CPN-M is no longer engaged in an armed struggle and has resolved differences with other parties by peaceful political means. Nepal is now in the process of drafting a new constitution. Therefore, even though many issues are yet to be settled it can be agreed that the peace process in Nepal has led to a successful outcome.

**Maoist Armed Conflict in India: Comparative Analysis**

The Maoist or Naxalite insurgency in India has also drawn significant attention in recent years much like the conflict in Nepal, on account to its violent nature, intensity and implications for regional peace and security. The insurgency has engaged the Indian polity in a prolonged confrontation against a movement that poses an enormous challenge to the prevailing political system. Maoist movements in both countries shared ideological,
strategic and socio-economic similarities, with some differences in their objectives. The attitude and response of the two governments towards the Maoist rebels have also been at variance. Therefore, the efforts and approaches to resolve the Maoist conflict have differed in both countries. In this respect, a comparative look at the two Maoist movements is important to determine the potential for replication of the peace process model employed by Nepal in India.

The economic and social imbalances in Nepal and India created fertile conditions for Maoism. The peasants’ uprising, during British colonial rule in particular, was a historical manifestation of the feudal structure of the state, and a socially rooted class and caste system. Marxism delivered the objective, leadership and doctrinal support to that movement. A faction of India’s mainstream Communist Party started a peasant uprising in Naxalbari in West Bengal in 1967 against excesses of landlords and centuries of poverty, brutality and humiliation. Weak and bad governance, collapse of the justice system in remote rural areas, exploitation of tribal people and forced displacement of farmers and tribes by the state for mega projects provided the impetus for left-wing Maoists to wage an insurgency against the state apparatus. In Nepal also, poverty and inequality, the governance crisis, and exclusion of ethnic groups from the political process had paved the way for the Maoist rebellion.

Although the Maoist movements in India and Nepal had a revolutionary character and set out to establish new political values and structures, the latter has increasing preferred pragmatism to idealism in recent years. The Indian Maoists want to overthrow the government through a protracted armed struggle. In their own words, they want to liberate India from ‘the clutches of feudalism and imperialism.’ The Maoists in Nepal, on the other hand, participated in a multiparty democratic system, abolishing the monarchy. They gave up their weapons and took steps towards integration into society after the 2006 peace accord. Their participation in the interim government in 2007 is evident of their pragmatic approach for achieving their goal. For the Maoists in Nepal, it is a change in tact from the classical Maoist class struggle. The Indian Maoists rejected the revisionist policy of their Nepali counterparts and kept the focus on their movement to overthrow the government through an armed struggle.
Considerable differences exist between the two states’ efforts against Maoist extremism. The Nepali government used the military against the Maoists before the latter chose to join the democratic process and agreed to a comprehensive peace accord. The use of the military signifies the application of the most severe of coercive measures against the threat that the Maoists pose to internal security in Nepal. Although the Indian government sees the Maoist insurgency as the “biggest internal security threat” to the country, as Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had stated in 2004, the counter-insurgency efforts mainly range from the use of force by police and paramilitary forces, to rallying public opinion against the Maoist extremism. The government has to face legal and public opposition on the question of massive military action against the Maoists. When the government intensifies its campaign, human rights groups also speak out against the use of India’s military against the country’s own people. The Nepali Maoists gave up their armed struggle following a negotiated settlement and participated in the interim government in 2007, but consolidated peace negotiations between the Maoists and the Indian government are still a far cry. The Nepali Maoists were engaged in their armed struggle in a country that was on the verge of collapse, all power was concentrated in the king and the subsequent opposition and demonstrations against the monarchy created a situation where the Maoists really had to come to the negotiations table and seek a peaceful and democratic end to the civil war although it involved a big trade-off for the group. Nevertheless, they did achieve their goal of ending the 240-year-old monarchy. The Maoists’ interest in negotiations owing to the uncertain future of the government also made the Nepal government willing to come to the negotiations table and achieve a comprehensive peace accord.

In India, on the other hand, neither the government nor the Maoists seem interested in a negotiated settlement of the conflict. The Maoists see their struggle as the people’s war aimed at emancipation of India’s oppressed and exploited classes. They oppose the idea of any kind of ‘government jointly with the comprador bourgeois-feudal parties’ and believe armed struggle to be their only option for achieving political power. For the Indian state, the Maoists are the biggest threat not only to the country’s internal security but also to its democratic tradition. The Indian state therefore focuses on the use of force to eradicate the threat and also puts pressure on the Maoists to join
the political process. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has urged the Naxalites to understand that “real power flows from the ballot box.” However, the Indian premier’s statement is at variance with the basic tenets of the Maoists who do not even believe in the prevailing democratic system in India. In October 2009, Indian Home Minister Palaniappan Chidambaram offered the main Maoist body a place at the negotiating table in exchange for a ceasefire. The Maoists rejected the proposal. Subsequently, the government intensified its operation against the Maoists and their sympathizers. In February 2010, Maoist leaders stated that they were ready for talks if the government stopped arresting and torturing the tribals. In May 2010, the Indian government again offered peace talks to the Maoist combatants after several humiliating attacks on the country’s armed forces. However, neither the government nor the Maoists seem interested in negotiations as long as they deem themselves to be in a position of strength. Unlike Nepal, any positive sign is yet to emerge in India that indicates any inclination to initiate the peace process between the Maoists and the government. The government of India is aware of the fact that the Maoists use calls for talks and any lull in conflict to amass more weapons and fortify their strength against the establishment. On the other hand, the Maoists’ demands for the government to create an atmosphere conducive for dialogue always clashes with the government’s condition of the Maoists giving up weapons. The growing number and intensity of Maoist attacks in Chhattisgarh, Jharkand, Orissa and West Bengal, along with the use of more lethal and sophisticated weapons, have caused mounting security concerns for India. With all these problems New Delhi is in urgent need of a workable strategy that can pacify the Maoist rebels and ensure peace in the region. The threat is also increasing for the Indian state as the Maoists are joining hands with other militant organizations with a similar agenda, such as those under the banner of Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA), which pledged in a resolution adopted at its fifth international conference in March 2011, held possibly somewhere in Nepal, “to develop ongoing people’s wars, initiate new ones, and accomplish a new democratic revolution in their respective countries.” Therefore, the Indian government and security forces need to adopt appropriate strategies for enduring peace by employing confidence-building measures and peacemaking instead of relying solely on the use of force.
On the other hand, Nepal is also facing left-wing Maoist extremists in its territory and is concerned that these Maoists might develop links with similar groups in India. It is suspected that they have developed ties with the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) in Bihar and the People's War Group (PWG) in Andhra Pradesh. Nepal would be particularly anxious to keep the left-wing extremists and Islamic radicals from joining hands. Presently, the Maoists are poorly armed but their destructive power can grow manifold if they are provided weapons and explosives by other militant organizations. India has denied reports that the Maoist rebels active in Nepal were operating from bases on Indian soil. It is clear that these new security challenges would have to be met through joint actions by the two countries, particularly in view of the crucial issue of radicalization as an obstacle to political solutions.\(^{42}\)

**Applicability of Maoists' Peace Process in Nepal to Maoist Conflict in India**

A comparative analysis of the Maoist armed conflict in Nepal and India reveals the many difference between the two conflicts, yet there are a few similarities that are compelling enough to at least consider initiating the peace process in India.

The two most pertinent differences are the dissimilar political situations of the two countries and the state’s inclination towards the use of force. For the last 50 years, Nepal has been searching for a system of governance that could satisfy the demands of its diverse population. Nepal has not been a stable state and despite periods of relative stability has a long way to go in the process of state building. In the circumstances, it was easier for Nepal to accommodate some of the demands of the CPN-M—such as dissolution of the government, holding elections to the Constituent Assembly, etc.—and engage the Maoists in the political process as it had been agreed that a new constitution would be formulated for the country. On the contrary, India has been a stable democracy throughout these years and government institutions have been functioning properly. Therefore, the Indian Maoists’ idea of toppling the government with a view to the people forming a new political order understandably does not appeal to the state. Firstly, it is impossible for a democratic government to resign and call for formation of a constituent assembly only to appease a rebel group, even if it is supported by a large section of the population. India already has a working constitution which has been amended several times, and is not generally believed to have any crucial
drawbacks that could lead to political crisis. Secondly, even if under some exceptional circumstances the government of India agrees to the insurgents’ demands it would lead to regional and international instability at such an enormous scale that the leading world powers would take all possible measures to prevent such an outcome.

Another significant difference between the two conflicts is that the Indian government has not yet used its army or air force against the Maoists. So far, paramilitary forces and the police have been fighting the rebels, unlike Nepal where the Royal Army had fought against the CPN-M militants. Therefore, New Delhi might still believe that in the form of its military it has a trump card up its sleeve that it can use to prevail upon the rebels. According to ripeness theory, parties to a conflict are more willing to negotiate if they realize that they have exhausted almost all of their resources/options. Analysis of ripe moments for conflict resolution suggests that when both sides know that neither can triumph over the other and the existing stalemate is mutually hurting they are more likely to consider pursuit of peaceful means as a way out.43 That was the case in Nepal, when after many years of armed conflict neither the government forces nor the Maoists could achieve a decisive military victory. That was arguably one of the main reasons why they finally started the peace talks and persisted with them even after several setbacks. But as mentioned earlier, the government of India has not exhausted its options yet and probably believes that it can defeat the rebels by military means. Therefore, it may be more reluctant to hold negotiations or give concessions to the rebels on any issue.

These two main differences, in addition to a few others, mean that the two scenarios of complete applicability and non-applicability of the Nepali experience are not relevant in India’s case.

However, despite all the differences there are some noticeable similarities between the two conflicts where Nepal’s experience can be replicated in India. The most crucial similarity is that ideology has never remained the main cause of rebellion in either country. After examining the development of the communist movement in Nepal it can be concluded that it never had a strong ideological basis in that country. Communist parties would merge and split again, some would cooperate with the monarch, and others would not. They would shift from one interpretation of communist ideology to another.
While the founders of the CPN-M had always taken the most radical line, it was not because of their ideology but on account of their disappointment with other parties who cooperated with the government and yet could not improve the situation in the country. As noted earlier, the Maoist movement in Nepal had stemmed “from deep-rooted socio-economic political grievances.” The government failed to address the grievances and the political parties that cooperated with the government were also not very helpful, which forced many people to consider more desperate and radical ways to solve their problems. After the success of the people’s movement in 1990, which compelled the king to lift the ban on political parties, the country adopted a new constitution and experienced some very important and positive political changes. That aroused great hopes among the Nepali population who thought that their country had finally set off on a path of “overall welfare and economic development”. However, this was followed by great disappointments as promises remained unfulfilled and political parties were caught up in their struggle for power. That led to the emergence of the CPN-M, which declared that it did not believe in the political process. But as soon as the government started suggesting reasonable solutions for the Maoists and promised to include them in the government they gave up their radical ideas and policies. Emphasis on a one-party system and achievement of objectives through armed struggle are crucial parts of the Maoist ideology. However, CPN-M’s actions—eventually agreeing to a multi-party system and joining the peaceful political process in the country—means that it actually abandoned the Maoist ideology. The fact that CPN-M representatives, who know better than anyone else the grievances of the most neglected and poor areas of Nepal, are now part of the political process in the country gives hope that those grievances would be overcome. That became possible because the government agreed not to see the CPN-M as a terrorist group and agreed to negotiate with it not only about ending the hostilities, but also about possibilities of their participation in elections as well as the overall political process. An effort to include former Maoist soldiers in the national army and rehabilitating them were also important decisions.

Since the causes of the Maoist movement in India are very similar and originate from social and economic deprivation, New Delhi can draw upon Nepal’s experience to deal with the lingering conflict. First and foremost, the conflict should not be considered a zero-sum game where the parties have
mutually excluding goals (the Maoists want to overthrow the government and change the political system and the government wants to preserve the existing political order and suppress the rebellion). India should look at Nepal’s experience where the rebels abandoned their ideology for the sake of real concessions promised by the government. If the Indian government tries to resolve the causes rather than the outcomes of the revolutionary movement the rebels would likely be more interested in negotiations because they run the risk of losing popular support if they opt not to do so. Secondly, in order to achieve such an outcome the government should stop labeling the Maoists as terrorists and, thirdly, New Delhi has to clearly demonstrate that it is willing to compromise on some things. These might include a guarantee not to prosecute the rebels who give up their weapons and join the negotiations as well as a promise to not prevent the Maoists from participation in the political process in the future provided they abandon their armed struggle. That means in essence that the Indian state should reconsider its policies towards the poorest and most neglected parts of the country and involve the local population in the decision-making process at the local and regional levels since officials from the centre do not want to be appointed to these rural areas and never visit them. That would show the people that the armed struggle is not the only way for them to achieve their goals or solve their problems. Instead of exploiting these regions the state should support them because that would bring stability to the whole country. And finally, the government should also start the long-term rehabilitation process for the people who have participated in the fighting. Otherwise, left on their own these people would sooner or later return to the use of weapons because that has been the only way of life many of them have ever known.

Conclusion

The civil armed conflict in India has caused so many casualties and led to so much destruction and instability within the country that it is necessary to use all possible means to stop the hostilities and initiate enduring peace. Therefore, it is argued that India should look at the example of its neighbor which managed to overcome the armed struggle of the Maoists and transformed them into political competition.

It is quite evident that the two cases are far from identical and the Nepali peace process cannot be blindly imitated by India. But it is arguable that talks
between the two sides should be initiated as soon as possible and New Delhi should at least try to apply the positives that emerged from the Nepal experience in order to pursue sustainable peace.

Even if the Indian government believes that it can still defeat the rebels by military means, which is likely to be very difficult even if it uses the army, it is better to choose the path of peaceful negotiations, because such internal conflict makes the poor regions even poorer, leading to further confrontation. That could lead to a situation where more people join the insurgency if they believe that they do not have any other option to get out of their desperate situation. In such a scenario, India would be caught up in a cycle of ever escalating conflict. At the same time, New Delhi has chances of achieving some sort of an agreement with the rebels if it demonstrates its willingness to make at least some concessions and stops treating them as a terrorist organization. The rebels must also reconsider their unrealistic goals and decide if they are interested in a solution to their problems or in an endless and exhausting struggle. Both sides have already expressed their willingness to negotiate which can serves as a positive indicator that peaceful resolution of the Maoist conflict in India is possible.
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Notes


5 Most of the Maoist groups in India have links with Maoists in Nepal, similarly Hindu radicals in Nepal have ties with groups in India. For more details see report http://www.san-pips.com/new/index.php?action=san&id=sa_1


7 ASM Belal (research analyst at BIPSS) and Samanta Ayba (associated with Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abkhazia) shared views with the author, July 2011.


12 Nischal Nath Pandey, Nepal’s Maoist movements.


16 Ibid., 21

17 Ibid., 22.
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18 Ibid.
19 Ibid., 23.
20 Ibid., 25.
21 Nischal Nath Pandey, Nepal’s Maoist movements, 117.
22 Ibid., 123.
24 Ibid., 27.
25 Ibid., 30.
26 Ibid., 31.
27 Ibid.
38 “Maoists are ready to talk if operations stop: Kishenji,” India Today, February 5, 2010, http://indiatoday.intoday.in/site/story/Maoists+are+ready+to+talk+if+operations+stop:+Kishenji/1/82691.html (accessed July 11, 2010)


Nischal Nath Pandey, Nepal’s Maoist movements, 30.

Ibid., 119.

Ibid., 35.
Sri Lanka’s Post-conflict Peacebuilding Efforts and Prospects for Positive Peace

Ajith Balasooriya

Introduction

The post-conflict peacebuilding efforts in Sri Lanka reveal another chapter of contemporary peacebuilding enterprise in the context of how Colombo has sought to pursue peace after the lingering conflict against Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Without any internationally recognized peacebuilding agreement or mandate, the government of Sri Lanka has engaged in activities it refers to as ‘national-owned peacebuilding.’ In line with the ultimate goal of peacebuilding, it is imperative that the government’s post-conflict measures meet the citizens’ expectations of peace after three decades of conflict in the country. Despite its military ‘victory’ against the LTTE in 2009, the government has not been successful in addressing the underlying causes of conflict in the last two years of negative peace. In order to achieve positive peace, the government has to move ahead with precise and comprehensive initiatives to overcome the causes of the prolonged conflict in the country. Yet measures such as reintegration of former LTTE combatants, and confronting the decades-long causes of the conflict, particularly by coming up with political solutions and tackling socio-economic structural issues of the conflict-affected communities, remain unaddressed.

Despite some acknowledgement of the government’s post-conflict peacebuilding efforts, the international community has also expressed concerns about legitimacy of Colombo’s actions in the final phase of the conflict and about the government’s failure to establish an internationally recognized mechanism of accountability in the two years of post-conflict peacebuilding.

This paper examines the manner in which Colombo has proceeded with its post-conflict peacebuilding efforts to achieve positive peace at the end of the conflict. An attempt has been made to provide narratives on the government’s role in post-conflict peacebuilding as the responsible primary representative of the citizens of Sri Lanka. The first part of this paper describes the government’s post-conflict efforts including immediate humanitarian
assistance, reconstruction and rehabilitation and mechanisms for addressing human rights violations and accountability issues to achieve the ultimate goal of positive peace. The second part of the paper focuses on the international community’s response to the government’s post-conflict peacebuilding moves. It illustrates the criticism and arguments of a range of actors from the international community in the context of positive peace. The last part of the paper analyzes and illustrates potential difficulties, both in the national and international contexts, which the government might face in bringing positive peace to the conflict-affected communities.

1. Sri Lanka’s Pursuit of Post-conflict Peace

Conflict erupts as a result of long-term deprivation of basic needs of people in a society. Johan Galtung\(^2\) states that deprivation of basic needs such as food, shelter, health, education, livelihood needs, social dignity and equal opportunities to participate in social and economic activities leads to both structural and direct violence. Direct violence can be eliminated through activities such as ceasefire agreements, negotiations and military interventions. Prevention of violence through such measures is called negative peace.\(^3\)

However, negative peace cannot halt structural violence due to its inability to change the existing social structures. Elimination of structural violence requires establishment and restoration of relationships, creation of social systems and conflict resolution. “Peace is not merely absence of direct violence but also absence of structural violence,”\(^4\) according to Galtung,\(^5\) who defined positive peace as such a scenario in a society where the ultimate goal is to prevent occurrence of violence. Therefore, “the value of the positive paradigm is its vision of bringing about peace rather than just resolving conflicts through political mechanisms.”\(^6\)

The protracted conflict in Sri Lanka can be defined as absence of non-violent/political means in a society\(^7\) comprising multi-ethnic, religious and cultural communities. Based on state policies that favor the Sinhalese majority, minorities have been treated as second-class citizens.\(^8\) Exclusion amid a religion-based caste system, uneven land distribution as well as frustrations over national political issues strongly but naturally led to radicalization of the Tamil community.\(^9\)
Since the 1980s, there had been multiple efforts to resolve the Sri Lankan conflict by both internal and international stakeholders. The failed peace process in 2002 created a grave security situation because throughout the process neither the Sri Lankan government nor the LTTE genuinely committed to durable peace. After three years of operations, government forces defeated the LTTE in 2009 and claimed that they had rescued over 300,000 civilians whom the LTTE was using as human shields. The government called the operation “the world’s largest human rescue mission” from a man-made disaster.

The government has responded to the situation since May 2009 in a number of ways in its quest for post-conflict peace.

1.1. Immediate Humanitarian Assistance

The government was prompt in delivering immediate humanitarian assistance. It was able to establish interim camps for all internally displaced persons (IDPs), including former LTTE carders. At all interim camps the IDPs were provided with basic necessities including food, shelter, medical facilities and sanitation. According to government sources and UNHCR reports, the government was able to provide education facilities to children at the camps. The government also provided livelihood opportunities and skills trainings to unemployed youth at the camps.

During the first phase of humanitarian assistance, the government completely barred international humanitarian organizations from delivering assistance to the conflict-affected civilians. Civil society organizations in the southern part of the country collected basic materials for delivery to the conflict victims of the north. The security forces minutely monitored and screened the civil society efforts. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was allowed to provide temporary shelter to the victims.

According to government sources, within six months Colombo was able to address the immediate needs of all IDPs without any significance challenge and made profiles of all IDPs who were housed in camps under the security forces’ supervision. Documentation of basic information of all IDPs including former LTTE combatants was completed, which included besides personal information, links with the LTTE, and education and skills that
individuals wanted to pursue in future.

Contrary to claims by government sources and UNHCR reports, international human rights groups stated that civilians who were directly affected by the conflict suffered from huge immediate humanitarian needs. The government was accused of failure to observe international standards in meeting immediate humanitarian needs as well as abuse and humiliating treatment of the detainees, particularly former LTTE combatants, in camps.

1.2. Reconstruction and Rehabilitation

The government launched a number of reconstruction and rehabilitation activities with support from some actors of the international community. Resettling IDPs in their native areas, providing livelihood opportunities to IDPs in camps and to those who had been resettled, providing education to children, including former child soldiers, establishing healthcare facilities, roads, and other infrastructure and reintegration of former LTTE combatants into mainstream society were some of the many challenges before the government.

According to the government, over 95 percent of IDPs were resettled in their native areas. At the 17th session of the United Nations Human Rights Council, government officials stated that the government's priority had been “the resettlement of the approximately 290,000 IDPs, while ensuring that they are provided adequate shelter, food, security and livelihood support.” Significant government-led measures included demining activities, reducing High Security Zones (HSZs) and implementing new livelihood activities for newly resettled civilians.

Amid little access for international humanitarian agencies, resettlement of IDPs and establishment of livelihood opportunities for them were initiated and some initiatives were implemented with assistance from supportive states including China and India and also from international development agencies such as Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and United States of America International Development (USAID). This development assistance significantly contributed to rebuilding the devastated infrastructure of the conflict-affected east and north of the country. Among an array of rebuilding activities, demining, construction of permanent
shelters, and provision of education, health, water and sanitation were prominent.

There has been overwhelming involvement of the security forces in the reconstruction and resettlement activities. Skilled military personnel have been assigned for demining and related activities. The last two years of the government’s rehabilitation efforts have benefitted from involvement of the security forces. This situation has also contributed to timely resettlement of IDPs in their native areas and improved national security in the areas where the insurgents had planted thousands of landmines.

The government claims that it has been able to rehabilitate and reintegrate more than 50 percent of former LTTE combatants into the mainstream. “Former child combatants have been rehabilitated and have been beneficiaries of educational programmes including vocational training and other professional trainings (information technology, dressmaking, building/construction, handicrafts, counselling, etc.) during their detention. “Of the 11,644 ex-combatants who surrendered or were arrested at the end of the conflict, 6,530 have already been rehabilitated and reintegrated into society.” The progress on rehabilitation of former combatants was amply demonstrated in the recently announced national examinations, where a considerable number of former LTTE combatants were selected for higher education in universities.

Furthermore, the government has launched social sensitization initiatives for former combatants. Some of the activities are giving the affected community lead in organizing rehabilitation activities as well as leadership and advocacy skills for taking up human rights-related issues of their communities with human rights organizations and the Human Rights Commission (HRC) of Sri Lanka.

It is argued that post-conflict peacebuilding in Sri Lanka is more economy centric. This contention is further borne out by the government’s Department of National Planning’s policy on development of the country’s northern and eastern parts. “Economic development can promote peace... Therefore, promotion of regionally balanced economic growth becomes necessary to secure peace and prosperity.” It is evident that during the operation against the LTTE and in its aftermath the government carried out massive
development activity. The Mahinda Chintana document states that such initiatives could overturn the narrow boundaries of ethnic and religious differences. In order to develop both the north and the east, two specific development programs called “Vadakkin Vasantham” (Northern Spring) and “Nagenahira Udanaya” (Eastern Awakening) were introduced. Under the two programs, development activities such as reconstruction of conflict-affected houses, education institutions, railways and livelihood activities in the regions were focused on.

Reducing the HSZs, demining farmland, lifting restrictions on fisheries, establishing market facilities and infrastructure have been among the most prominent activities. Some of the resettled IDPs have been employed in these activities to meet their livelihood needs.

1.3. Accountability and Reconciliation

The government has moved at a snail’s pace in putting in place accountability and reconciliation mechanisms among communities at different levels. Despite progressive efforts in rehabilitation, rebuilding and development, a lot remains to be done to improve the system to ensure justice for the victims and accountability for perpetrators of violations. However, the government has initiated several activities in the past two years to address the lingering causes of conflict. Recounting progress of these activities at the UN Human Rights Council, Sri Lankan officials stated that in “the comprehensive programme of socio-economic development in the former theatre of conflict, the government has commenced discussions with Tamil political parties examining constitutional, legal, and democratic reform.” The government is currently in the process of examining and assessing the enduring root causes of the conflict and has established a Lesson Learned and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) towards that end.

The LLRC is “founded on the principle of restorative justice, and focusing on identification of those responsible for past events related to the conflict.” In addition, the government has recognized healing and reconciling of ‘deeply divided’ communities as a major challenge in peacebuilding. Towards that end, political negotiations with leading political parties and leaders of the Tamil community are underway. In this respect, the 13th Amendment to the Constitution needs to be implemented. The government’s failure to devolve
policing, monitory and land allocation powers to the regions has had an adverse impact in this regard.

Recruitment of Tamil youths in the national police is an opportunity for the Tamil community to realize their aspirations. Sinhala and Tamil language and cultural exchange programmes improve links. A number of diverse socio-cultural activities have been conducted for reconciliation of diverse communities with the participation of civilians.

In the shape of HRC in Sri Lanka, the conflict-affected civilians have been given a forum to lodge complaints about human rights violations during and after the conflict. However, it remains to be seen how effective HRC would be in providing relief and implementing its decisions. The pace of government investigations of human rights violations is slow compared to implementation of development activities.

2. International Community’s Response to Government’s Post-conflict Initiatives

The government’s unilateral post-conflict peacebuilding has been highly criticized by a number of actors of the international community due to potential pitfalls. To assess the government-led peacebuilding activities, it is very important to have an overview of the international community’s responses in different perspectives. In order to discuss these responses, this part of the paper focuses on ‘western’, ‘regional’ and ‘other’ actors of the international community. These include the United Nations (UN) and its organs, states, international humanitarian organizations, human rights groups, think tanks, international media and individuals.

The international community has expressed deep concerns over lack of protection for conflict-affected civilians in Sri Lanka from all forms of human rights violations and absence of accountability for the perpetrators. It has further voiced concerns over the alleged war crimes and excesses by government forces.

2.1 Western Actors’ Response

Western actors slam the alleged grave violations of human rights, war crimes and crimes against humanity by the security forces in the final phase of the
anti-LTTE operation. International human rights groups, renowned media organizations, academics, think tanks and major western countries have consistently highlighted and criticized the alleged violations and called upon the United Nations to look into the government forces' actions in 2009 as well as in the post-conflict scenario. Based on the critical risk to the civilian majority, human rights groups have focused attention on whether the government follows international standards in delivering post-conflict humanitarian assistance. They argue that the situation had aggravated due to war crimes by government forces and a general lack of respect for human rights.

The two-year-long post-conflict peacebuilding efforts by the government have failed to enhance human rights protection for victims of the conflict, bring to justice perpetrators of the excesses, establish effective mechanisms for addressing the underlying causes of conflict, such as political grievances, or ensure social dignity and equal opportunity for all citizens to participate in social and economic activities. In view of these elements, the international community has criticized the government for not having clear and comprehensive peacebuilding activities and relying on military strategies rather than seeking to implement strategies to overcome prolonged causes of conflict. Such strategies have proven to be of little use in achieving social justice or reaching the goal of positive peace.

The final phase of the military action and triumph of government forces in the conflict created fears among the local and international rights groups about the fate of thousands of conflict-affected people. It is estimated that between 10,000 and 40,000 civilians were killed on account of various rights violations in the final phase of the military operation.31

Furthermore, there are apprehensions among western actors that the way the final phase of the military operation was conducted sets a bad precedent, and that lack of efforts to hold the perpetrators accountable might encourage other countries to emulate Sri Lanka’s example in internal armed conflict, leading to large-scale violations of human rights and humanitarian law. Western actors have highlighted that the Sri Lankan government’s ‘aggressive’ decision making and its direct influence over the security forces are increasing post-conflict in the country.32
The international community claims that the government’s efforts had been inadequate in protecting thousands of civilians. International pressure for an independent and impartial investigation into war crimes has led to the United Nations Secretary General appointing an expert committee to look into human rights abuses in Sri Lanka. Reports by the UN Secretary General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka, the UN Commissioner for Human Rights (CHR) and other UN experts point out that the government had violated human rights and humanitarian law in the conflict. According to the UN Secretary General’s experts panel:

The Panel found credible allegations that comprise five core categories of potential serious violations committed by the Government of Sri Lanka: (i) killing of civilians through widespread shelling; (ii) shelling of hospitals and humanitarian objects; (iii) denial of humanitarian assistance; (iv) human rights violations suffered by victims and survivors of the conflict, including both IDPs and suspected LTTE cadre; and (v) human rights violations outside the conflict zone, including against the media and other critics of the Government.

The US Department of State’s annual human rights reports, particularly for the years 2009 and 2010, found fault with the government forces’ actions and demanded that government take appropriate and timely measures on human rights violations. In his recent visit to Sri Lanka US Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia Robert Blake Jr. indicated that the government’s failure to fulfil its obligations on accountability might set international mechanisms in motion.

The US State Department’s 2010 Human Rights Report said about Sri Lanka: “The government and its agents continued to be responsible for serious human rights problems. Security forces committed arbitrary and unlawful killings, although the number of extrajudicial killings declined.” The US report further noted the government’s lack of transparency in accountability on impunity and stated that “there were no public indications or reports that civilian or military courts convicted any military or police members for human rights abuses.”

International rights groups have also been criticizing the government over alleged human rights violations since 2006. In particular, Minority Rights Group International (MRGI) has stated that for “members of the country’s two minority groups—Tamils and Muslims—living in the north and east of
the country, harsh material conditions, economic marginalization and militarism remain prevalent.”

These reports have repeatedly raised doubts about the government’s accountability mechanism and implementation of the LLRC.

2.2 Regional Actors’ Response

Response of the regional actors to the post-conflict peacebuilding is as significant in the Sri Lankan context. They have been accommodating, contributing to and defending the Sri Lankan government’s peacebuilding activities. China has been involved in peacebuilding activities in Sri Lanka since 2006. There have been three key elements of China’s involvement in Sri Lanka. It gave military assistance to the government to carry out mission against the LTTE. Since the end of the conflict, the Chinese have been providing massive humanitarian assistance to Sri Lanka aimed at infrastructure development and resettlement of victims of the conflict. Sri Lanka is often defended by China at the UN Security Council (UNSC) and other forums against UNSC permanent members’ proposals and criticism. This goes some way in explaining China’s dominant role in Sri Lanka in the post-conflict scenario.

Even though India helped the LTTE strengthen their military muscle in the 1980s, it later started operations against ‘terrorism in South Asia’, which directly affected the LTTE and its activities on the Indian soil. India’s policy against the LTTE led to a close and cordial relationship between New Delhi and Colombo. India has called upon Sri Lanka to take steady political actions to establish sustainable peace for all ethnic groups in the country.

Since the military defeat of the LTTE, India’s proactive approach in advocacy and development assistance has pushed the government in Colombo to take unwavering political action to establish positive peace for all ethnic groups in the country. India defends Sri Lanka on the world stage, particularly at UN human rights forums and other international events and closely monitors the government’s activities in the northern and eastern parts of Sri Lanka.

As a regional power, Pakistan helps Sri Lanka at the UN forums, where it has expressed solidarity and support with the government. Islamabad has
explicitly stated that the UN experts panel report is merely political and not a real attempt to verify or map human rights violations.\textsuperscript{44} Pakistan’s support has also led to enhancement of Sri Lankan military’s capability to act against terrorism. South Asian political analysts conclude that Sri Lanka has benefited greatly from regional powers’ support after 30 years of conflict.

2.3 Other Actors’ Response

Other actors of the international community largely mimic the regional actors’ example on the government’s post-conflict peacebuilding by supporting Sri Lanka in development activities and at UN human rights forums. Russia, as a permanent member of the UNSC, has been instrumental in defending Sri Lanka.\textsuperscript{45} Whenever the UNSC has considered the situation in Sri Lanka, Russia has resolutely opposed any coercive actions against Colombo by stating that any UNSC action was unwarranted and would amount to interference in the internal affairs of a stable state like Sri Lanka. Moscow’s role has directly challenged the western actors’ efforts to hold to account the Sri Lankan government for allegations of human rights violations. Russia has stated that the experts panel report is not a UN report, since it was prepared neither by a UN body nor even on the request of any UN body and now when Sri Lanka was “healing its wounds after long armed conflict, the UN may render its assistance, if needed, and not to complicate the process of reconciliation.”\textsuperscript{46}

Cuba, Israel, Libya, Myanmar, the Philippines, Ukraine, Venezuela and Vietnam have also extended support to Sri Lanka at the UN human rights and other forums whenever the situation in Sri Lanka has been discussed.\textsuperscript{47} However, many of these countries have been criticised by western countries and human rights groups on their own weak human rights record and “aggressive” behavior that has threatened world peace and security.

3. Colombo’s Initiatives and Prospects for Positive Peace

Bringing social justice to victims of the conflict and establishing violence-free social structures are key requirements for the government to achieve positive peace after the prolonged conflict. Building confidence among diverse communities and addressing their political and diverse socio-economic apprehensions should particularly top the peacebuilding agenda in Sri Lanka.
“The government’s intransigence and triumphalism a full two years after declaring victory over the LTTE has meant the country is yet to see any semblance of compromise or inclusiveness.”48 In order to achieve positive peace, the government would have to overcome several key challenges. It must ensure effective and accessible institutions of justice, reintegrate former combatants, revitalize the economy and restore basic needs of the conflict-affected communities.49

Nevertheless, establishing positive peace which addresses all structural issues for the victims and perpetrators of the conflict is far from straightforward. To achieve the goal of positive peace the government and its agents have to take responsibility and initiate systematic efforts to overcome the caste-based socio-economic practices in the Tamil community. Reports by the UN50 and rights groups reveal that lack of adequate employment opportunities have failed to meet the demands of youths in the conflict-affected areas. As long as the government fails to deal with these issues, the specter of resumption of conflict would never be too far away.51

Winning the hearts and minds of the conflict-affected population in the north and the east is one of the main hurdles for the government to achieve positive peace. In addition to addressing key issues facing all ethnic groups of the country, the government must particularly focus on all real or perceived injustices of the conflict-affected Tamil, Sinhala and Muslim communities in the northern and eastern parts of the country. Although the government claims to be in the process of developing Sri Lanka’s own model of peacebuilding, the main challenge for the government would be to put in place transparent and accountable mechanisms for peace with little international support or oversight. This opens the door to “high risk of abuse by the executive branch, the military and the security forces because it restricts accountability and transparency to the public, the news media, the legislature and the judiciary.”52

Failure to do so would leave unaddressed the conflict-affected civilians’ grievances on land issues, political representation, language barriers, reintegration of former combatants, effective restoration of civilians’ life without military disturbance, as well as accountability for perpetrators of human rights violations and compensation for thousands of war-affected civilians. Inability to resolve conflict-affected civilians’ problems might evoke a reaction against the military-dominated development projects.
Government restrictions on travelling, religious events, freedom of association and expression have displayed the parameters of Colombo’s military-led post-conflict efforts. The other important challenge for the government is to overcome a centralized reconstruction approach and ensure participatory and inclusive decision making in all aspects of reconstruction in consultation with conflict-affected communities. So far highly structured military institutions have been involved in the exercise and their officials just follow their superiors’ orders in reconstruction and resettlement rather than paying attention to the needs of the people. There is certainly a case for the government to focus more on this aspect and ensure human rights in line with international standards.53

Addressing socio-economic causes of conflict remains one of the key challenges to achieving positive peace. Caste-based social discrimination is yet to be taken into serious consideration in view of political rights in the majority-minority context, even though it is evident that caste remains a key qualification even to enter mainstream Tamil politics. Moreover, lopsided development does not take into account the Tamil community’s caste-based land ownership and its effects on the lower-caste civilians who have been discriminated against for decades. Therefore, the government has to establish new social structures which do not discriminate against citizens. Human rights analysts point out that the military-led resettlement efforts pursue superficial solutions to the decades-long causes of conflict, such as land issues under the Tamil customary laws based on caste.

In view of this, the government has to pay conscious and consistent attention to analyze these issues and devise responses that focus on integration and mainstreaming of the marginalized communities and prevent recurrence of conflict. Victims of the conflict demand their basic human rights and justice against the perpetrators at different levels and in different roles.

The government has indeed paid attention on how to strengthen national security in order to prevent terrorism or insurgent threats in the future. In the Sri Lankan context reconciliation and rebuilding of the conflict-affected communities is tantamount to enhancing national security and that presents another challenge. Toward that end, the government needs to tackle remnants of the LTTE in the context of international terrorism. As Gunarathna states that “the LTTE threat overseas prevails and Sri Lanka should enact
international law and jurisdiction, through which any terrorist operating overseas can be brought back home for justice.”

The government also has to determine how to cooperate with an array of international actors without antagonizing them and making them opponents of its efforts for positive peacebuilding. In particular, consequences of gigantic development projects by China have to be properly analyzed. Despite apparent economic growth immediately after the conflict, the cost of massive development projects, high interest rates and foreign debt would affect positive peace in many ways. The government has chosen to prioritize these development projects while failing to address a significant unemployment rate in the country. Most Chinese projects employ Chinese workers rather than providing employment to the domestic labor force. This is particularly unsettling in the context of livelihood challenges for the recently resettled conflict-affected civilians.

Moreover, the government has to seek a mechanism to gain support for ongoing peacebuilding initiatives from Sri Lankan diaspora in the western countries. Close cooperation with the international community, including UN agencies, INGOs and individual experts on humanitarian issues and respect for human rights and humanitarian law are also essential measures for establishing social justice mechanisms to achieve positive peace.

Furthermore, the government is yet to demonstrate capacity in significant peacebuilding aspects such as post-conflict changes in policy instruments, implementation of a comprehensive political process and reconciliation as well as present its actions for accountability to its citizens. Despite establishment of the LLRC, so far there are no established mechanisms to investigate, prosecute or penalize perpetrators of alleged rights violations and war crimes.

Although the government rejects the international community’s allegations as biased and questions credibility of the information they are based on by claiming that it comes from secondary sources, the government has to demonstrate its commitment to be held to account to all citizens. To achieve positive peace, it has to overcome these challenges in post-conflict peacebuilding, or else the military victory and post-conflict absence of violence would only prove to be an intermission before another conflict breaks out.
Conclusion

Post-conflict peacebuilding in Sri Lanka continues to explore new dimensions of contemporary peacebuilding, although the jury is still out on their effectiveness. As victors of the military conflict, the government’s post-conflict efforts since May 2009 have managed to bring negative peace in the country without any direct violence. As a result, the civil society has largely supported and shown a great deal of confidence in the government’s peacebuilding measures. Ownership by the people of the country’s post-conflict peacebuilding activities is central to sustainable and positive peace.

In the context of positive peacebuilding, it is true that some of the government’s Sinhalese-monopolized strategies and their implementation attended to nationally popularized political interests rather than dealing with the underlying causes of conflict. Many activities in post-conflict peacebuilding aim to address the symptoms of the existing issues rather than their causes. These activities cannot hope to achieve positive peace. The peacebuilding efforts are characterized by military-dominated half-measures to ensure negative peace rather than a credible and visible mechanism to bring social justice, accountability and post-conflict reconciliation for the conflict-affected civilians.
Notes

1 The terms positive and negative peace are adopted from Johan Galtung and will be explained later in the paper.
4 Ibid.
6 B.S. Grewal, “Johan Galtung: Positive and Negative Peace.”
9 M.R.N. Swamy, Tigers of Lanka: From Boys to Guerrillas.
16 Ibid.
18 Ministry of Defense, “Desist from arriving at hasty conclusions-Sri Lanka tells HRC.”
21 The American Center Colombo, “United States donates additional funds to WFP’s Sri Lanka operations,” American Centre Newsletter, August 2009, http://photos.state
Sri Lanka’s Post-conflict Peacebuilding Efforts and Prospects for Positive Peace

Observation by the author in Poonerin (North), April 10, 2011.

23 Ministry of Defense, “Desist from arriving at hasty conclusions-Sri Lanka tells HRC.”

24 Ibid.


28 Ministry of Defense, “Desist from arriving at hasty conclusions-Sri Lanka tells HRC.”


30 Ibid.


38 Ibid.

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41 Ibid.


Kashmir occupies a central place in the history of jihad in Pakistan. The jihad movement in Pakistan began in 1947 and continued without any interruption until 1979 although there were changes in its nature all through these years. The first jihad started immediately after the establishment of Pakistan. The ulema in the North West Frontier Province (named Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2010) issued fatwas (religious edicts) for waging jihad in Kashmir in 1948, and thousands of tribesmen from Pakistan’s tribal areas along the border with Afghanistan poured into Kashmir in response to their call and played a pivotal role in seizing control of a large part of the disputed region from India.

The Afghan-Soviet war in 1979 gave a perceptible boost to a culture of jihad in Pakistan and brought forth individuals who were later emulated by the Pakistanis, especially the youth, driven by idealism of a new kind. This jihad and those who engaged in it not only had an impact on Afghanistan and Kashmir but also made their mark on the politics, society and economy of Pakistan.

The Afghan Jihad is generally believed to be the cause of proliferation of jihadi fervor in Pakistan but the impact of the jihad movement initiated by Syed Ahmed Shaheed in the 18th century was already there even when the country came into being. When Pakistan was established jihadi organization Tehrikul Mujahideen was already active in parts of the tribal areas. This organization was led by followers of Ahl-e-Hadith school of thought who traced the organization’s origin to a movement led by Syed Ahmed Shaheed in the 18th century when the local tribesmen had put up strong resistance to the British and provided the core for the Islamist movements of Syed Ahmed Shaheed in British India. Syed Ahmed’s armed movement against Sikh rule in Punjab was aimed at establishing an Islamic state according to the principles enunciated by Sheikh Abdul Wahab Najdi—founder of the Wahabi movement—and gained remarkable momentum in the tribal areas. The struggle later became a movement against the British colonial rule and
remained active until Pakistan gained independence in 1947. Bajaur, Khyber and Mohmand tribal agencies were the strongholds of Syed Ahmed’s movement at that time.¹ Tehrikul Mujahideen, the party of Syed Ahmed, continued to operate under that name until 1979, even though many changes occurred in the group’s basic character.

**Fatwa of Jihad by Maulvi Fazl-e-Ilahi**

When the situation started deteriorating in Kashmir, ameer (chief leader) of Tehrikul Mujahideen Maulvi Fazl-e-Ilahi issued the first fatwa in support of jihad against Indian occupation in 1948, persuading the tribal Pakhtuns to engage in jihad in Kashmir and those who took part in that jihad were called mujahideen.²

Fazl-e-Ilahi has recorded in his memoirs that his men included: “Abdul Karim Khan, the ameer of Jamaat-e-Mujahideen from the center of Chamarqand [located in Mohmand Agency of FATA], Abdul Ghani Khan, the famous preacher of Islam, Hafiz Muhammad Yusuf Khan, and my son Muhammad Sulaiman Khan. The seminal figures of the Ghaznavi family, Omar Farooq Khan and Bashir Ahmed Khan were also part of this combination. Each one of them is equivalent to a thousand souls. These valiant souls are engaged in carrying out the important dual duty of propagating the Islamic faith and also inspiring people to sacrifice their lives in the name of God.”³

“They were engaged in these very preparations in the name of God when they received a message from the Dhond community [a Kashmiri tribe, mainly based in Poonch district], stating that the clarion call for jihad had been given; and they had to get together and put the rule of the Dogras to an end, and turn Kashmir, Poonch and Jammu into Darul Islam [abode of peace] once again. ‘One must reach there if one wanted to avenge the Muslims of Bihar who were killed in communal violence in 1946,’ they had said.”⁴

Tehrikul Mujahideen, which is deemed to be the first Jihadi organization in Pakistan, took part in the liberation movement of Kashmir with a jihadi aim in mind in 1948.

There were a few other attempts to set up jihad groups in Pakistan soon after the country was established. Most of these efforts were motivated by political
turmoil in the country and remained unsuccessful. For example, on September 24, 1947 Maulana Shabbir Ahmed Usmani announced the creation of an organization called Jamaat-e-Mujahideen Islam. Although the objective of this organization was to build an Islamic society but it may be considered a jihadi organization because of its objective and because they used the term “jihad” for this purpose. However, the organization never got a chance for practical jihad. The basic impetus for the organization was the August 11, 1947 speech by the founder of Pakistan Muhammad Ali Jinnah in which he had elaborated his vision of democracy in the new country. Religious scholars from Karachi and parts of Punjab had started a movement to ensure that that vision does not materialize. But the communal massacre in Punjab and Delhi in 1947 and atrocities against Muslims in Kashmir at the time played into the hands of these zealous clerics. From Khyber to Karachi, slogans were raised for jihad to ensure the glory of Islam. They not only resolved to conquer Kashmir and East Punjab but also vowed to raise the Pakistani flag on Red Fort in Delhi. When Jamaat-e-Mujahideen Islam started organizing protests, Maulana Zafar Ali Khan also announced to set up an organization of this kind, called Majlis-e-Tahaffuz-e-Pakistan. The following day, Maulana Zafar wrote an article in his newspaper Zameendar, which called upon “dignified Muslim youngsters” to end discrimination of east and west Punjab and NWFP and enlist in the union of Allah (in the form of jihad). The article was so aggressive that the government of Punjab stopped publication of the newspaper.

Known scholar of Sindh Hashim Gazdar suggested that in order to defeat Indian conspiracies to break up Pakistan there should not be any private recruitment of mujahideen under the supervision of religious scholars rather the government of Pakistan should dedicate an organization to training the people. Gazdar’s views were based on apprehensions among Sindhi leaders that Maulana Usmani’s ‘mujahideen’ may never reach Delhi’s Red Fort, but they would massacre Hindus in Sindh and expel this large minority population from the province. According to a report in Eastern Times on October 8, 1947, Maulana Usmani’s mujahideen organization was very popular, with more than 100 people enlisting every day and scores of its young members marching on roads raising slogans of Allah-o-Akbar.
But all these efforts remained confined to slogans and generally failed to inspire the masses. From 1950 until the late 1960s, there was little evidence of any active jihad group in the country or indeed any group that had active ambitions of jihad. Even Tehrikul Mujahideen became non-functional and focused on madrassa education.

**Al-Badar and Al-Shams Organizations of Jamaat-e-Islami**

When the separatist movement in East Pakistan gathered momentum towards the end of the 1960s, evidence of India’s involvement in creating unrest there started coming to the fore. When organizations such as Mukti Bahini became effective, the Jamaat-e-Islami took it as a war against Pakistan and Islam and responded by establishing organizations such as Al-Badar and Al-Shams in East Pakistan. These organizations instantly acquired the form of a militia, which considered their activities to be jihad. However, these organizations’ activities were confined to East Pakistan and they became less active after the fall of Dhaka. However, they did leave their mark and after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 it was organizations such as these that served as a conduit for recruiting Pakistani youth for the Afghan Jihad.

**Maqbool Butt’s Armed Movement**

In order to be able to understand the background of jihad in Pakistan, it is important to note the restlessness of the young generation in Kashmir after the Pakistan-India war of 1965. Pro-liberation Kashmiri activists Maqbool Butt, Amanullah Khan, Major Abdul Qayyum and Major Amanullah initiated a movement for establishment of an autonomous state of Kashmir in 1965. They decided to wage an armed struggle to press the governments of India and Pakistan to accept their demands. With this aim in mind, an underground guerilla organization National Liberation Front (NLF) was established. Maqbool Butt, along with his companions from NFL, started armed activities and acquired international notoriety for his actions. The 1971 hijacking of Indian aircraft Ganga by NLF men, who torched it at the Lahore airport drew the attention of the entire world towards the Kashmir issue. The armed struggle of NLF was directed towards liberation of Kashmir, and was not jihad in the religious sense. However, their armed movement paved the way for the armed religious movements that followed.
Group of Maulana Masood Alvi

JI's Al-Badar and Al-Shams and Kashmiri resistance groups were politically motivated but in 1973 an armed group with religious sectarian motives emerged. Maulana Masood Alvi, a teacher at Jamia Khairul Madaris, a Deobandi madrassa in Multan district of Punjab, founded an armed organization called Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen-e-Aalami in March 1973 with jihadi aims. The establishment of supremacy of Islam in an organized manner was declared to be its first objective. This organization established its training camp in a forest near Alipur Jatoi where its activists were given weapons training. The organization actively participated in the 1974 movement regarding the finality of prophethood, and came to an end after that. Maulana Alvi, however, diverted his attention to the madrassa of Maulana Khwaja Khan in Kundiyan Sharif where he trained students in the use of weapons. When the Soviet-Afghan war started in 1979, Maulana Alvi and his disciples, included Maulana Irshad Ahmad, went to Afghanistan to initiate jihad against Soviet troops and started preparing madrassa students to take part in it.

Rise of Deobandi Groups

Just as the war began in Afghanistan, a Jihadi mindset was promoted in Pakistan under state patronage. For a big part of Deobandi clergy the Afghan Jihad was a milestone in enhancing their strength in the country. Afghan Mujahideen leaders also shared their faith, which encouraged them to show solidarity with them. A countrywide fund-raising campaign was undertaken and these organizations and their ulema started sending young men to take part in practical jihad. The Deobandi ulema took on the task of enlisting students from madrassas, schools and colleges. Fatwas of jihad started coming in thick and fast. When the dead bodies of the Pakistani youth killed in the Afghan Jihad started returning to Pakistan, sentiments were further ignited.

The first fatwa regarding the Afghan war came in 1979 from the ameer of Jamiatul Ulema-e-Islam, Maulana Mufti Mehmood of the Deobandi school of thought. He declared that it was a duty enjoined on all Pakistani Muslims by Shariah to make individual and financial contributions to the cause of jihad. Following this fatwa, madrassa students in large number headed to Afghanistan to take part in the Afghan Jihad. Also, there was a manifold
increase in the number of Afghan students in the madrassas of NWFP, Balochistan and Punjab.

Subsequently, several other Deobandi clerics also issued fatwas for jihad, among them was Maulana Abdul Haq, head of Darul Uloom Haqqania at Akora Khattak. A substantial number of Afghan students were already receiving religious education at this institution. Several individuals who led this jihad rather prominently had been students of this institution. The Pakistani students there also joined these Afghans in jihad. As such, this institution played the role of a nursery for jihadis in the coming years.

Students of this institution were given several important ministerial and other positions in the Taliban government. Maulana Dr. Sher Ali Shah at Darul Uloom Haqqania gave an honorary degree in religious education to Taliban supreme leader Mulla Omar under the seal of this institution. The role of Darul Uloom has been rather prominent in the Taliban government, as also in the earlier mujahideen governments. Maulana Samiul Haq and Dr. Syed Sher Ali played a significant role in settling differences among various groups, creating an atmosphere of understanding and persuading important Mujahideen leaders to support the Taliban. That is why Mulla Omar had the highest regard for Maulana Samiul Haq among all the Pakistani ulama. Certain important jihadi leaders have stated that Mulla Omar never disregarded what the Maulana said.

Maulana Irshad Ahmad, Qari Saifullah Akhtar, and Maulvi Abdul Samad Sial, students from Darul Uloom Islamia, Banori Town Karachi, led the first group of Deobandi students to Afghanistan to take part in jihad. Their minds were occupied by the speech of an Afghan religious scholar, who came to preach jihad at their madrassa. However, only these three had come forward for jihad, while the rest of the students and teachers were reluctant as they were uncertain if fighting a war which was actually between the US and the Soviet Union would indeed be jihad. However, they were well aware of the dangers to the Islamic ideology in Afghanistan at that time.

Maulana Irshad, originally from Faisalabad district of Punjab, was 20 years old at the time, senior in age to the other two and a final-year student of Dar-e-Nizami. Therefore, the other two appointed him as their ameer. Qari Saifullah Akhtar, who later emerged as a powerful jihadi commander in
Afghanistan belonged to Christian sub-district of Bahawalnagar district in Punjab and was just 18 at the time.

Before entering Afghanistan, the group visited the offices of jihad organizations in Peshawar and, after a thorough probe, joined Harkatul Inqilab-e-Islami of Maulana Nasrullah Mansoor due to the group’s harmony with the young madrassa students’ Deobandi school of thought.

Qari Akhtar says: “When our first caravan got ready to go to Afghanistan in 1980, we first collected information about the jihadi organizations there. As per our knowledge, Maulana Nasrullah Mansoor Shaheed’s Harkatul Inqilab-e-Islami was the only organization that was entirely composed of Deobandi ulema and students. That is why when we reached Peshawar we met Nabi Muhammadi first. Our relationship with Harkatul Inqilab-e-Islami remained close until the advent of Taliban.

Kabul University Chancellor Maulana Peer Muhammad Rohani, and Deputy Minister Hajj and Wakf Maulana Commander Arslan Khan Rehmani are witness to this. We were with Commander Arslan Khan and assisted him. Our 21-year stint in jihad is a witness to the fact that we never had any contact with any other organization except Harkatul Inqilab-e-Islami.”

They spent four months in the anti-Soviet battle alongside Afghan mujahideen of their affiliated organization in Aragon area in the Paktia province of Afghanistan, just across the Pakistani border checkpoint of Lawara Mandi in North Waziristan. Their spirits were high after field experience of the battle and they believed that communism was a big threat to Islam and that all Muslims should jointly combat it. Maulana Irshad Ahmed decided to return to Pakistan to prepare more madrassa students for the ‘holy war’ while his companions Qari Saifullah Akhtar and Maulana Abdul Samad Sial remained in Afghanistan. Maulana Abual A’ala Maududi, founder of the Jamaat-e-Islami, a religious party in Pakistan, had already drawn the same conclusion about the Afghan war and his party was practically involved in it from the very first day. The Binori Town madrassa’s students also took it as a challenge that their opposite school of thought had taken a lead over them in jihad.
Two months later, Maulana Irshad returned to the front with 20 mujahideen and a huge amount of donations from Pakistan. Later, he and his friends decided to establish their own jihad organization and training camps. Maulana Noor Muhammad, a religious scholar from South Waziristan, persuaded them to set up their training camp in Wana, headquarters of the South Waziristan Agency in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. But at that time they neither had weapons nor owned land there and these were considered to be necessary requirements if one wanted to establish one’s own group. They could not purchase weapons as all of them were from poor families.

Qari procured a rifle by motivating a trader Haji Rasheed Ahmed from Toba Tek Singh about jihad. An Afghan commander Haji Asal Khan (father-in-law of Afghan commander Maulana Arslan Khan Rehmani) gave them a rocket launcher and Maulana Noor Muhammad allowed them to establish their camp on the premises of his madrassa and they were all set to launch their group, which they called Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami (HUJI). They established their base camp in Wana which they called ‘Darul Islam’ and it soon emerged as the most important jihad centre for Pakistani madrassa students.

In the early 1980s, the Darul Islam camp in Wana served as the launching pad for the mujahideen engaged in making forays into a large area of Afghanistan. Wana was swarming with agents of Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), along with Afghan and Pakistani jihad organizations, recruiting and training the tribal youth, arranging supplies and planning attacks against the Soviets. Meanwhile, Arab militants also built concrete bunkers in Shakai and Nawe Ada areas near Wana. Around this time mosques in the Middle East had started making donations worth millions of rupees available to madrassas for jihad. Consequently, there was a phenomenal increase in the number of madrassas in Pakistan. In this way, a new generation of ideologically indoctrinated trained warriors was being prepared to bring the whole world under Islamic rule.

Later, HUJI also established another camp in Kurram Agency in the area of Haji Maidan. In Afghanistan HUJI camps were located in Spinkai in Paktia province and Karari post in Khost province.
Change of Leadership and HUJI Al-almi

Until 1985, Maulana Irshad led the HUJI. He married on his parents’ insistence in 1985 and was killed four months later while fighting at Sherana in Paktika province on June 25, 1985. He was 26 at the time of his death and was buried close to where he died, in accordance with his will. After his death, Qari Saifullah Akhtar took over the organization’s leadership and tried to expand its network.

He established close links with foreign fighters and offered them training at the HUJI camps. Fighters from the Middle East, and South and East Asia also came under the HUJI banner and Qari Saifullah added the word ‘Al-almi’ (international) to the name of HUJI. During the Afghan Jihad, 27 foreign fighters were killed while fighting alongside HUJI militants. Among them 13 were from Bangladesh, seven from Burma, four from Turkey and three from Eretria.

Qari Akhtar organized the organization’s first annual congregation in Chechawatni (Punjab) to attract more human and financial resources and succeeded on both counts. He announced the first manifesto of the HUJI at the congregation, which was approved by all the leading Deobandi scholars who had attended the event including Maulana Yusuf Ludhianvi, Mufti Nizamuddin Shamzai and Maulana Sher Ali Shah.

The manifesto stated:

1. Allah is our Lord and Muhammad (peace be upon him) our prophet. Ka’aba is our Qibla (for prayers) and holy Quran is our book (to follow) and the lives of the Sahaba (companions of the prophet) are the standard of righteousness. All four schools of thought of (Ahle Sunnat Waljamaat) are correct and we are set to follow the philosophy of Shah Wali Ullah. The life of Syed Ahmad Shaheed is our lifestyle.

2. Our final destination is to get martyrdom in the line of truth and righteousness.

3. The first and foremost aim of our organization is the absolute dominance of Islam across the whole world.
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4. We strive for renaissance of Islam and restoration of its past glory and power through preaching and jihad.

5. We shall free the Muslims of the world from the clutches of occupation and slavery in the east and the west and eventually establish a united Muslim power in the world.

6. This is a completely religious and constructive organisation and has nothing to do with the prevalent negative politics.

7. As Allah commands to gather power (to defend oneself), being ever-prepared for jihad is our aim. We shall establish such institutions and training centres that produce a generation of valiant and committed mujahideen.

8. We shall become the second line of defence for every Muslim country.

9. We will not rest until all occupied Muslim lands are freed, all Muslim minorities get complete security and supremacy of Islam is established globally. We are ever ready to sacrifice our lives in order to guard and uphold the sanctity of signs of Allah (i.e., the holy sites of Islam).

10. Islam is the only code of life that can solve all our problems and promises equality and social justice. We invite all the people to join us in our struggle to help the suffering humanity and annihilate the forces of infidelity and evil under the banner of HUJI and prove themselves true and sacrificing Muslim.

Also at the congregation, 10 commandments or cardinal principles were approved, which were declared mandatory for every HUJI member to follow:

1. Every Mujahid will obey the ameer's instructions and will not question them.

2. Every member will keep all organizational matters secret. If he is found to have disclosed organizational matters, he will not only be expelled from the organization but also punished. Only the central executive committee (Majlis-e-Shura) is authorized to punish a guilty person after listening to his version.

3. In daily life every member will try to be a good Muslim and follow all Islamic teachings.

4. No one can raise objections to the duties assigned to him.
5. Only those individuals would be sent to the battlefield who are unmarried and have the permission of their parents and the district office of HUJI.

6. During training, every Mujahid would be responsible for his equipment and will be restricted to follow the training by the Ustad (trainer).

7. Mujahideen who are on leave will remain in contact with their respective area offices and will be answerable to these offices.

8. HUJI members are strictly forbidden from engaging in any sectarian activity and the central executive committee may take strict action against anyone who violates this prohibition.

9. Members must not argue with any outsider on sensitive issues and must avoid any confrontation.

10. Only the duly assigned members can collect funds for HUJI.

First Rift in HUJI and Establishment of Harkatul Mujahideen

While Maulana Irshad and Qari Saifullah Akhtar were making headway, some of their colleagues had concerns about the expanding network of the organization. They were led by Maulana Fazlur Rehman Khalil and Maulana Masood Alvi. Both were from Jamia Khairul Madaris Multan and wanted HUJI to concentrate only on the battlefront. They parted ways with HUJI. Maulana Alvi had the support of the mujahideen from the madrassas of Mianwali and Kundiyan. Alvi formed his own group called Jubbah Khalidiya. Maulana Fazlur Rehman Khalil, who had the support of Mujahid students from Dera Ismail Khan and North Waziristan, met with Alvi and both decided to form a new group which they called Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM).

Maulana Khalil became it’s the group’s ameer and Maulana Alvi its central commander.

Meanwhile, an Afghan student from Jamia Haqqania, Akora Khattak, Maulvi Younis Khalis had successfully launched guerrilla activities in Eastern Afghanistan from the platform of Hizb-e-Islami, a jihad organization. Soon another brilliant student of Jamia Haqqania, Jalaludin Haqqani, joined Khalis and they accelerated guerrilla operations in Khost province. Khalis was among the favorite disciples of Abdul Haq, the principal of Jamia Haqqania and asked his mentor for weapons and manpower. Abdul Haq tried to persuade Jamia Binori Town Students’ organization, HUJI, but it was already
engaged in jihad with Harkatul Inqilab-e-Islami, an Afghan Mujahideen group. That was the time when a race had begun among Afghan jihad organizations to win the support of Pakistani jihad volunteers not only to increase their manpower but also to raise funds because the volunteers were able to raise huge amount of funds from the people in Pakistan.

By the end of 1984, HuM had built its organizational structure and began jihad under the leadership of Jalaluddin Haqqani. The greatest responsibility of HuM was to gather human resource from Pakistan. It played a vital role in the conquest of Khost. On the Khost front, HuM’s first supreme commander Abdul Rasheed was killed as were Commander Maulana Shabbir, Mufti Abu Obaidah and Noorul Islam.

Even after the first rift, Qari continued to lead HUJI and further enhanced the organization’s capabilities to carry out small military operations. The first major strategic success of HUJI Al-almi was the conquest of Argon in southern Afghanistan with the help of some Arab groups. HUJI Al-almi also received the medal of bravery from the first Mujahideen government in Kabul after the Soviet pullout.

Reorganization of HUJI and Global Agenda

After the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan, Qari decided to reorganize the HUJI structure to expand its jihadi activities across the world. Around this time differences among Afghan commanders were emerging for the formation of the future government in Kabul but Pakistani and foreign fighters were worried about their own future. Muslim separatist and revolutionary movements were also gaining momentum across the world, especially in Kashmir, Central Asia, Burma, Bosnia, the Philippines, Eritrea, Somalia and Palestine.

Initially, Qari set up HUJI sections focussing on Kashmir, Bangladesh, Burma, Tajikistan and Bosnia. These sections independently managed their affairs and HUJI was responsible for coordination, training and sending the recruits to the battlefield. Qari had organized the structure on the pattern of Tableegi Jamaat, which is a missionary organization and has very fluid structure and its member run affairs of organization voluntarily in their respective areas. Later, Al Qaeda was organized on the same pattern and it may be claimed
with some justification that Al Qaeda had followed the blueprint of the HUJI structure. But HUJI lacked resources to keep its international structure intact. Qari’s proposal for expanding international outreach was approved at the HUJI executive body meeting held at its camp in Paktia.26

According to HUJI mouthpiece Al-Irshad; “During the Afghan Jihad HUJI leaders started paying attention to Kashmir and taking practical measures there. By the grace of the Almighty, now Burma, Kashmir and Tajikistan have become camps of HUJI and its mujahideen are active in the Philippine, Bosnia, Palestine and other occupied Muslim territories where HUJI training camps are also running.27 HUJI adopted the following motto: ‘The second line of defence of every Muslim country – Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami Al-almi.’28

According to a brochure published in 1991: “After Afghanistan the high-profile mujahideen of HUJI are registering victories in Kashmir, Burma, Tajikistan, Chechnya, Palestine and Central Asia. The organization has the distinction of bringing together for the first time under the green flag mujahideen from India, Bangladesh, Burma, Iran, Philippine, Malaysia, Africa, Britain, Ireland, Fiji, the US, most of the Arab states and Central Asia.”29 Before 9/11, HUJI’s six international chapters were in operation:

**Tajikistan**

Appearing for the first time in Tajikistan in 1990, the HUJI activists were mistaken for members of Pakistani Sunni extremist outfit Sipah-e Sahaba. But the HUJI group led by Khalid Irshad Tiwana was actually supporting Juma Namangani and Tahir Yuldashev who commanded the anti-government forces in the Ferghana Valley of Uzbekistan.

About the background of HUJI’s presence in Tajikistan, its commander-in-chief Khalid Tiwana stated in an interview published in the March 1996 issue of monthly Al-Irshad: “The flag of jihad in Tajikistan was raised by religious clerics, students of madrassas and organization of the orthodox Muslims, Nehzat-e-Islami Tajikistan. The mujahideen and Islamic forces around the world welcomed it and offered help. The HUJI commandos were the first to reach there. The head of the organization, commander Hidayatullah is working in those areas for the last 14 years. This was the era of Harkat-ul-Ansar. I was one of the instructors at the central training center. Meanwhile,
the central leadership organized a 60-member group of mujahideen for Tajikistan. Our leader Hassan Ahmad Talha hailed from Toba Tek Singh. Tajik militants were not trained fighters and it was very easy for the state to locate and kill them. We reached there with practical experience of the war in Afghanistan. First of all, we established our position on hilltops to hit helicopters with anti-aircraft missiles. It was because of this leading role that we played that the Tajiks requested us to organize their military operations. We operated heavy weapons and we led all their offensives and operations.”

Chechnya

Hidayatullah commanded the HUJI chapter fighting against Russian forces in Chechnya. The March 2000 issue of monthly Al-Irshad reported that the militia was closely involved in training guerrillas in Chechnya for which commander Hidayatullah was stationed there. Speaking about fatalities among the organization’s ranks in Chechnya, the magazine wrote, "Dozens of Pakistani fighters have been martyred in fighting against Russian infidels."

Uzbekistan

The HUJI chapter in Uzbekistan, led by Shaikh Muhammad Tahir Farooq, started its activities in 1990. The fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan proved a fatal blow for HUJI and its structure and the Uzbekistan chapter became independent of HUJI. Its recent activities are not known.

Bangladesh and Burma

In Karachi, there is a large concentration of Muslims from Arakan (Burma) and Bangladesh. The Korangi area is also known as the Burmese town and is called Mini Arakan with 30 Arakani madrassas operating there. Through the efforts of the teachers and students of these madrassas, the Pakistani branch of HUJI Arakan, was founded in 1988 with the objective of uniting the Muslim-majority areas of Arakan and starting jihad for their liberation. The weekly Zindagi, Lahore, published an interview with Maulana Abdul Quddus (head of HUJI Burma) in a special issue (January 25-31, 1998) on HUJI, which throws light on the background of this organization:
“As a result of Bangladesh’s effort, there has been a pact between Burma and Bangladesh according to which we were sent back to Burma in 1979. But as soon as my children began to go to madrassas, the soldiers came to beat me and then they closed the madrassas. Finally, I sought permission from my parents and came to Bangladesh. From there, through India, I arrived in the Islamic country of Pakistan. In Karachi, I began my education in Jamia Farooqia and Jamia Anwar ul-Quran. Meanwhile, the war in Afghanistan broke out and I went there several times at the invitation of HUJI and participated in jihad. I lived in Afghanistan from 1982 to 1988.”

**Bosnia**

The first HUJI group left for Bosnia from Karachi in June 1992. Later, Bosnian fighters came to HUJI camps to receive training.

**Palestine**

HUJI had harbored the desire from the beginning to establish a chapter in Palestine. The wish came true when a Palestinian commander in Afghanistan, Al-Sheikh Abul Siraj joined HUJI ranks and sent five HUJI commanders to Palestine. But these commanders were later called back because of concerns among some Palestinian groups that participation of foreign fighters could harm their cause and image.

**Jihad-e-Kashmir and Formation of Harkatul Ansar**

After the end of the Afghan war, HuM and HUJI separately started militant campaigns in Indian-held Kashmir where an armed movement for liberation from Indian rule was in its initial stages. Some youths from Kashmir had come to Maulana Masood Alvi for military training. Alvi laid the foundation of a jihadi organization for Kashmir, named Jamiatul Mujahideen, and assigned the Kashmiri youths responsibilities. Maulana Alvi died in a landmine blast in Paktia in 1988 and Maulana Fazlur Rehman Khalil took the lead of Harkatul Mujahideen and set up its network in Kashmir. The first HuM batch entered Indian-held Kashmir in 1989 and established their hideouts in Baramulla, Anantnag, and Poonch.

HUJI joined the Kashmir Jihad in 1991, when a few individuals from Indian-held Kashmir received training from its camps. The Kashmiri group was led
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by a Srinagar-based student, Maulvi Muzaffar, who insisted that HUJI form an independent group in Kashmir. He promised them logistic support. A separate group for Kashmir was formed and named HUJI Brigade 313, it was led by Commander Nasrullah Mansoor Langaryal, who entered Indian-held Kashmir on November 2, 1992. Illyas Kashmiri was named the group’s commander-in-chief. Kashmiri had fought in Afghanistan and also trained activists of Palestinian group Hamas. He introduced a new style of guerrilla war by combining Russian and Arab techniques.

In Kashmir, HUJI cadres were known as Afghans and initially the organization faced stiff resistance from local groups, who claimed that it was a Tableeghi Jamaat and had nothing to do with jihad. To counter anti-HUJI propaganda, Qari sent some Arab and Turkish fighters to Kashmir whose operations led to the propaganda slowly dying down.

At the same time, confrontation started between HUJI and HuM over jihad in Kashmir. Amid this confrontation, a group led by Maulana Shaukat Ali parted ways with HuM and formed Jamiatul Mujahideen. HUJI and HuM competed with each other in publicizing and exaggerating their jihadi activities and achievements. This led to mutual tension and bitterness. A number of leading Deobandi clerics such as Maulana Rasheed, Maulana Yusuf Ludhianvi, Maulana Dr Sher Ali, and Maulana Samiul Haq began rigorous efforts to end these groups’ wrangling. Eventually, in June 1993, both the organizations agreed to merge as Harkatul Ansar. Maulana Shahadatullah of HUJI was appointed the chief commander and Qari Saif head of the warfare department.

After Harkatul Ansar came into existence there was a boost in militant activities in Indian-held Kashmir. One reason for this was Commander Sajjad Afghani who was arrested in February 1994 along with Maulana Masud Azhar. Harkatul Ansar began efforts to get both of them released. After Sajjad Afghani's arrest, Commander Sikandar (Javed Ahmad Dabra) was made the chief commander in Indian-held Kashmir. He kidnapped two British tourists in April 1994 and demanded the release of Afghani and Azhar in exchange for the tourists. According to Masud Azhar, the Indian government had agreed to release them, and the leadership of Harkatul Ansar had ordered the
release of the tourists. Meanwhile, on November 11, 1994, a number of American and British nationals were abducted in New Delhi at Commander Sikandar’s behest. An organization calling itself Al-Hadeed claimed the responsibility. This name was used so that the Pakistani leadership of Harkatul Ansar might not exert pressure for release of the kidnapped. But not only were Azhar and Afghani not released, Harkatul Ansar also found itself in all kinds of trouble because of this misadventure.38

Rift in Harkatul Ansar

HuM had agreed to merge in HUJI under the banner of Harkatul Ansar on the condition that it would be entitled to part ways in case of any disagreement. In 1995, when an organization kidnapped some tourists to get Masud Azhar and Sajjad Afghani released, the leadership of HuM once again came under pressure and the US imposed a ban on it. The leadership of HuM and HUJI blamed each other for this. Eventually, both organizations reverted to their pre-merger identities. Another commander, Qari Zarar alias Qasai of HUJI, formed his own outfit called United Harkatul Ansar. Qari Zarar did not get support of the majority of fighters in HUJI and the group later merged with Jaish-e-Muhammad.

HUJI Maulvi Muzaffar Group

But the break-up of Harkatul Ansar created differences among the remaining HUJI group and Maulvi Muzaffar formed his own group. He had reservations about Punjabi and Afghan domination of the organization, which he believed was damaging the Kashmir freedom struggle. His group is still active in Kashmir and Commander Ashfaq heads it on the Pakistani side of Kashmir. Moreover, as the Taliban came to power in Afghanistan, HUJI got a new lease of life and many of its members got jobs in the Taliban army and administration.

Formation of Jaish-e-Muhammad

Jaish-e-Muhammad (JM) was officially launched on January 31, 2000 by Maulana Masud Azhar in Karachi after he was released in December 1999 by
Indian authorities in exchange for passengers from a hijacked Indian Airlines plane. Prior to the formation of JM, Azhar was the general secretary of Harkatul Ansar. He was on a mission in Jammu and Kashmir on a false identity and a Portuguese passport when he was arrested by the Indian security forces. It was Harkatul Ansar which planned and executed the hijacking. The alleged hijackers were Ibrahim Athar, (brother of Masud Azhar), Shahid Akhtar Syed, Sunny Ahmed Qazi, Mistri Zahoor Ibrahim and Shakir, all from Pakistan. When Azhar was released, Harkatul Ansar had already been added to the US list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO), which compelled its constituent groups to resume their pre-merger identities as HuM and HUJI. However, Masud Azhar decided to float a new outfit, primarily due to differences with Fazlur Rehman Khalil, the HuM chief, over management of funds. Khalil was also getting increasingly uncomfortable with Azhar’s strong and virulent anti-Shia tendencies. Azhar announced formation of JM from the Darul Uloom Islamia Binoria Town mosque in Karachi, one of the largest madrassas in Pakistan and one of the most influential centers of hard-line Deobandi Sunni Muslim ideology in the world.

The formation of the outfit was endorsed by chiefs of three leading madrassas in Pakistan, namely, Mufti Nizamuddin Shamzai of the Majlis-e-Ta’awun-e-Islami (MT) and the head of the Binori Mosque, Maulana Mufti Rashid Ahmed of the Darul Iftaa wal-Irshad and Maulana Sher Ali of Jamia Haqqania. According to a statement by Mufti Shamzai, the new jihadi organization came into existence as a result of the decision of ulama, who would patronize it for the sole purpose of organizing the mujahideen to respond effectively to Indian repression and extend support to the Kashmiri mujahideen in their struggle against the Indian rule.

A detailed report was published in the first few issues of fortnightly Jaish-e-Muhammad, Karachi, about the formation of JM. Following are some excerpts:

“It is a fact that Maulana Masud Azhar, along with his friends, Commander Sajjad Khan Shaheed, Commander Langaryal, Commander Maulana Abu Jandal and Hafiz Ilyas, had alienated themselves from all groups on May 22, 1998. The honor of spearheading the Kashmir cause in Pakistan goes to three spiritual figures: Mufti Rasheed Ahmad (late), Dr Maulana Sher Ali Shah, and Mufti Nizamuddin Shamzai. These three personalities were saddened by the
circumstances, and looked forward to some changes in the prevailing organizations. When the circumstances did not change even after their best efforts, they declared publicly their disassociation from these organizations. Under these circumstances, Masud Azhar went into meditation for some days and then went to those sincere mujahideen who were at higher posts in big organizations in those days but were unhappy with the leadership (of those organizations). He sought their opinion on three possible scenarios:

a. All of them join just one organization and work for its reform.
b. The Harkatul Ansar experiment should not be repeated. That is, both the big organizations may be invited to merge and work together.
c. A new organization on the pattern of the Taliban should be formed and all sincere mujahideen of the two organizations asked to join it.

It was decided after consultation that the first scenario was not desirable, because members of both organizations had come to Maulana Masud Azhar inviting him to join their organizations. Whichever organization the Maulana joined would be a cause of jubilation for members of that organization, but it will be difficult for members of the other organization to come and join their rival organization merely because Masud Azhar was in it. Insurmountable barriers of hate and enmity stand between them and this hatred and enmity has even divided the martyrs and prisoners. The decree of martyrdom is also being changed at the instance of some people. And even if one member joins the other organization because of personal conviction, the problem of security will haunt him. Finally, the Maulana’s hitherto neutral position vis-à-vis the two organizations will be compromised, and the other group will harbor a grudge against him just as they harbor grudges against leaders of their rival group. In this way, the hopes reposed in the Maulana by the mujahideen for reform will be dashed.

The second situation has already been tried and its result is there for everyone to see. Even if the leaders are invited to join, and their status ensured, they would still not accept one another with an open heart. Even while sitting together, they would still think about their personal interest and old ties. This happened when Harkatul Ansar was founded. One group had resolved on the very first day that they would remain faithful to their earlier organization and would return to it if so instructed. The failure of that experiment had left a deep scar. To repeat the same experiment would be like adding insult to injury.
The third option might, however, be considered by the ameer, taking the requirements of Shariah into account. In that case all the Jihadi groups might be invited to join the group unconditionally. Absolute obedience to the ameer should be ensured and all kinds of autonomy and individualism removed that have been the root cause of the two organizations’ division into eleven splinters. As consultation with the elders was required, no definitive decisions were made in the meeting. But this much was certain that a new organization was going to be formed for the betterment of the Muslim community. After this, Maulana Masud Azhar left for Karachi to consult religious leaders including Mufti Rasheed and Mufti Shamzai. They supported the proposal. Mufti Rasheed welcomed it and said a special prayer for its success. Honorable Mufti Shamzai also welcomed it very enthusiastically. After Friday prayers at Abdul Falah Mosque, Karachi, the name ‘Jaish-e-Muhammad’ was announced and a press conference arranged. International broadcasting agencies publicized the fact that Masud Azhar was the ameer of all mujahideen of Pakistan. After declaring of Jaish-e-Muhammad’s formation, Maulana Yusuf Ludhianvi (late) took initiation from Masud Azhar. In that emotionally charged atmosphere, Mufti Shamzai, Mufti Jamil Khan, Maulana Abdul Jabbar, Maulana Sajid Usman, and several mujahideen took initiation from the ameer. Thus Jaish-e-Muhammad was born amidst auspicious circumstances."

Maulana Masud Azhar clarified the objective of Jaish-e-Muhammad (JM) in his editorial of the June 2001 issue of the organization’s fortnightly magazine, also called Jaish-e Muhammad, in the following words:

“Jaish-e-Muhammad is a global Islamic movement/ organization based on the principles of Shariah. After just one year of its inception it has progressed much by the grace of God. This movement will remove apostasy and strive for the implementation of Shariah. For this, it has first reorganized its internal management. This organization is conducting jihad against the enemies of religion and the country, and trying to bring Muslims closer to the Prophet. It has just two targets: the enemies of Islam are its military targets, whereas the non-Islamic elements among Muslims are its Tableeghi target. In this age of distortion, this movement talks about pure Islam and, by God’s grace, its voice is being heard and accepted. This movement is free from any emotionalism. It does not talk of raising arms against everyone and at all times. Where Shariah unequivocally decrees it resorts to fighting, and where
Evolution of Militant Groups in Pakistan (II)

reformation is needed it uses words, spoken and written, instead of swords. Since this movement has been started merely for the pleasure of God, to establish His religion, to protect Muslims... and to bring to the right path those who have gone astray, to work in this movement is a great opportunity. What else should Muslims want except that they should invite people to the way of God and should be ready to make all kinds of sacrifices for Islam?”

**Quarrel with Harkatul Mujahideen for Resources**

When Jaish-e Muhammad was formed, several leaders of HuM and HUJI joined it. Among them were Maulana Abdul Jabbar, chief secretary of Harkatul Mujahideen, Maulana Sajid Usman, former deputy Ameer of HUJI, Maulana Qari Sadiq, former finance secretary of Harkatul Mujahideen, Qari Zarar alias Qasai, former chief commander of United Harkatul Ansar,


Most members of HUJI and HuM from Lahore, Gujranwala, Bahawalpur, Faisalabad, Sahiwal and Okara joined Jaish-e-Muhammad. According to the fortnightly Jaish-e-Muhammad:

“Ninety-five percent of the Pakistani Jihadis fighting for an Islamic state in Afghanistan joined Jaish-e-Muhammad. From Kupwara district of Occupied Kashmir, a former commander of Harkatul Mujahideen joined Jaish-e-Muhammad. After a few days, renowned guerrilla commander Mufti Muhammad Asghar Khan (a former member of Harkatul Mujahideen Majlis-e-Shura) joined Jaish-e-Muhammad along with his companions. In other words the entire set-up of Harkatul Mujahideen inside Occupied Kashmir has come under Jaish-e-Muhammad's control. The Ameer of Sipah-e-Sahaba in Pakistan, Maulana Azam Tariq has pledged total support to Jaish-e-Muhammad.”

According to Jaish sources, right after the founding of Jaish-e-Muhammad, quarrels started between it and HuM about resources. HuM accused Jaish of occupying 74 of its offices. Jaish-e-Muhammad argued that as most of the HuM members had joined it, it had a right on those offices. An HuM
commander claimed that Jaish had forcibly occupied HuM property worth more than Rs 30 million.

There were fierce clashes over distribution of resources in which Sipah-e-Sahaba supported Jaish-e-Muhammad. In the fights, two members of HuM died and many were injured. Jaish-e-Muhammad also suffered casualties. Finally, the issue was brought before the ulema of Jamiat-ul-Uloom-e-Islamia, Binori Town, and Darul Iftaa, Karachi, for arbitration. HuM was represented by Maulana Farooq Kashmiri, and Jaish-e-Muhammad by Maulana Abdul Jabbar. The arbitration committee consisted of Mufti Rasheed Ahmad, Mufti Shamzai, and Dr Sher Ali Shah. The committee held: “The HuM offices occupied by Jaish-e-Muhammad shall be returned to HuM; in return, HuM shall pay Rs 4 million to Jaish-e-Muhammad.”

After this decision, quarrels broke out between the two organizations again. HuM alleged that all the valuables had been removed from most of the offices that had been returned to it and the rest had been vandalized. This quarrel spread to Afghanistan as well and one Mujahid from Jaish-e-Muhammad killed a member of HuM there. The matter was sent to Shariah Court in Afghanistan, and finally, to Osama bin Laden himself. Osama gave HuM Rs 5 million and 12 new double-cabin pick-ups, and thus the matter was resolved. Bin Laden extracted a promise from HuM Secretary General Maulana Fazlur Rehman Khalil that HuM would not again come into conflict with Jaish-e-Muhammad.

(To be continued)
Notes

3 Ibid., 126.
4 Ibid., 125.
5 Ibid., 40.
6 Afghanistan was the only Muslim state where Hanafi sect was officially in practice.
7 Darul Aloom Binori Town is an important jihadi madrassa in Pakistan where most of the Pakistani jihadi leaders studied.
8 Monthly *Al-Irshad* (a publication of HUJI banned in March 2002), November 1989. According to this issue of *Al-Irshad*, the group had left Darul Uloom on February 18, 1980, for this purpose.
10 Dars-e-Nizami is the religious curriculum taught at Pakistani madrassas.
16 Ibid.
21 Ibid
23 Ibid.
26 *Al-Irshad* (HUJI anniversary number), February 1996.
28 Ibid.
29 Muhammad Amir Rana, *A to Z of Jihad Organizations*.

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32 Ibid.
33 Ibid., 166.
34 Al-Irshad, November 1999.
36 Muhammad Amir Rana, A to Z of Jihad Organizations.
37 Ibid., 168.
38 Ibid., 167.
Book Review

‘Global Security Watch’

Abdul Basit

Syed Farooq Hasanat’s ‘Global Security Watch’ is a valuable addition to a large body of literature being produced on the Islamist militancy and nationalist insurgency in Pakistan. Set out against a complex background of US troops’ gradual withdrawal from Afghanistan under the security transition plan, the ongoing reconciliation efforts with Afghan Taliban and the upcoming Bonn Conference in December this year, the book has arrived at an opportune time. Some issues of coherence, thematic glitches, spelling errors and factual inconsistencies notwithstanding, the book provides comprehensive insight into Pakistan’s security environment.

It extrapolates internal and external undercurrents of Pakistan’s security landscape in a systematic manner. The author argues that after two watershed moments in world history—World War II and the 9/11 attacks—the international strategic landscape underwent drastic transformation, and on both occasions Pakistan failed to reorient its security policies and has paid the price for that.

Being geo-strategically located in the world’s most difficult and volatile regions, where the top leadership of Al Qaeda and Taliban’s Quetta Shura are believed to be hiding, what happens in Pakistan has regional and international implications. Pakistan’s ability to tackle extremism in its restive tribal belt, along the Pak-Afghan border, and cooperation with the US and the international community would be pivotal in determining the outcome of the US mission in Afghanistan. Therefore, the international community can neither abandon Pakistan nor neglect it. Against this backdrop the book explains the significance of Pakistan’s strategic and security environment from a global perspective.

The author argues that changes in the international political system, especially after the Second World War, have transformed the traditional concept of security where it is no longer confined to internal or international armed conflict. Exclusive reliance on military might no longer suffices.
International security concerns have shifted from military capability to economic well being of a state. In line with these transformation, the concept of security does not entail “hard power” of military might alone but also “soft power”—i.e., institution building, industrialization, diplomatic skills, regional or international influence, human security as well as collective national will of the people to resist any external aggression—is an essential ingredient of comprehensive security doctrine of any modern nation-state.

The book outlines Pakistan’s internal security challenges by taking into account three major variables: political instability, economic vulnerability and nation building at societal level. The author identifies seven strategic issues which have shaped Pakistan’s security doctrine in the present and historical contexts. These include Pakistan’s geo-strategic location, wars with India, border/limited armed conflicts, regional border tensions, security-related issues, ethno-linguistic turmoil and nationalist separatism.

With the events of 9/11, the international strategic landscape underwent a drastic change and the same happened with Pakistan’s strategic concerns. According to the author, in this transformed regional and global milieu Pakistan failed to read its surrounding environment and thus failed in reorienting its security policies. Pakistan’s role at this crucial juncture was that of a silent spectator and absence of a popular democratic leadership further compounded this equation. The Pakistani ruling elite’s fixation with Indo-centric security threats obfuscated the country’s ability to make necessary adjustment in its strategic posture and security doctrine post-9/11.

The author has highlighted in great detail the unrest in Balochistan, the Islamist militancy in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and a general outlook of the country’s sectarian and extremist landscape in separate chapters, as well as Pakistan’s dealings with the US and Afghanistan. However, he has not devoted a separate chapter to the threat dynamics of Karachi’s ethno-political and criminal violence which significantly impacts the overall outlook and features of Pakistan’s volatile security landscape. Furthermore, despite outlining an impressive theoretical framework, the author analyzes the problems of security in a rather casual manner by taking a simplistic view of things. There is room for more research and empirical work. The book also relies on outdated data related to population figures and
Book Review

the number of terrorist attacks, making it difficult for the reader to grasp the current security environment of Pakistan in the right context.

The author prescribes four programmatic policy options to put the country’s security doctrine on the right track: continuation of the political process, which allows democratic institutions to flourish and entrench themselves in the decision-making process; improvement in the state-run education system; proactively addressing issues of poverty and unemployment; and, mainstreaming residents of the conflict-hit parts of the country.
Notes on Contributors

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Abstracts

The Process of Radicalization: Contextualizing the Case of Pakistan

Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi

Radicalization encompasses the entire spectrum of extreme responses that contextualize terrorism in Pakistan. It is widely agreed that although radicalization predisposes socio-political violence it does not necessarily have to necessitate it. There is nonetheless a commonly observed tendency to conceive of radicalization in terms of ideology alone. This is the contextual paradigm of ideology that resonates within paradigms of terrorism in Pakistan, wherein the terrorists have used a reductionist worldview to whittle down complex socio-economic, geostrategic and political problems, into essentially a contest between good and evil. After definitional and ideological explanations, the paper discusses at length some general factors of radicalization across Muslim countries in a comparative perspective to contextualize the case of Pakistan. These factors include: a youth bulge and economic disparity; polarization of education; democratic deficit; honor as an ideology; globalization and tribalism; role of ruling elite; and the 'petro-radicalization' process.

State-building in Afghanistan: Are Reforms Sustainable?

Umar Riaz

Afghanistan is a country most studied but least understood in conflict and post-conflict settings. This paper attempts to analyze the sustainability of ongoing political, security and economic reforms in view of the inherent structural fault lines and conflict drivers, which have been entrenched in the Afghan statecraft through decades of conflict. The paper identifies these sources of conflict and examines the viability and coverage of post-Taliban reforms and concludes that the reforms have failed to build the legitimacy,
capacity and effectiveness of Afghan institutions to sustain the reforms once the international forces leave the country and foreign aid dries up.

**Modes and Scale of Conflict in Pakistan’s Swat Valley (1989-2008)**

*Khadiim Hussain*

This paper investigates the modes and scale of conflict in Pakistan’s Swat valley between 1989 and 2008 on the basis of primary data. The primary data includes field work (participants’ observations), structured interviews with a stratified sampling of 350 respondents in the seven sub-districts of Swat, and analysis of official documents. The study brings home a clear pattern of conflict in Swat by identifying four overlapping and intertwining factors. The first factor is the socio-cultural dynamics of otherization and marginalization with special reference to gender and power relationship, the shift in religious authority and recognition of the landless ethnic Gujars and Ajars, besides the clergy. The second factor is related to structural or institutional vacuums due mainly to the promulgation and later disbandment of PATA Regulation of 1975 in Malakand Division. The third factor is related to evolution of a socio-political economy. The fourth factor seems to be the socio-ethnography of militant leaders such as Sufi Muhammad and Fazlullah.

**Politics of Radicalization and De-radicalization: Impact on Pakistan's Security Dynamics**

*Salma Malik*

The lack of consensus on the raison d’être of the state has gradually caused Pakistan to drift towards its current state of affairs where it is faced with extreme dichotomy between the moderates and the orthodox. In the 63 years of the country’s existence, the invocation to religion has moved from the personal domain to the mainstream body politic of the state, which now haunts it in the form of terrorism, militancy and extremist manifestations. The appeal towards religion and religiosity in the country grew together with deterioration in governance and the political state of affairs. The Soviet-Afghan war and the war on terror have added substantially to the extremist
manifestations. Given the deep roots of militancy and radicalization, the solution needs to be found at three levels: ideological, behavioral, and organizational. The official approach towards militancy and radicalization must find the right balance in the use of soft and coercive measures. There is a critical need to remember that in order to be effective military and political solutions need to go hand in hand, and the onus lies on both institutions to strike the right balance.
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