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Comment

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Rehabilitating Militants

Papers

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of Pakistan

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(1989-2008)

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Backgrounder

Evolution of Militant Groups in Pakistan (1)



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Comment

Swat De-radicalization Model: Prospects for Rehabilitating Militants

Muhammad Amir Rana

Countering terrorism needs a multi-faceted approach, which focuses not only on confronting it through the coercive apparatus of the state but also through disengagement strategies. Disengaging a militant from violence and extremist tendencies is an uphill task because of his or her ideological and political association with a cause. A number of countries have developed de-radicalization programs to deal with the issue but the extent of their success remains debatable, notwithstanding the claims made by the states. Rehabilitation of detained militants becomes an integral part of any such program as part of the prevention strategy. The prison holds crucial significance in the de-radicalization strategy as many of these programs—including those in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the United Kingdom—run in prisons. The logic for this approach is twofold: first, prisons offer an atmosphere where the detainees have time to think and interact with many influences; and second, if the inmates are not engaged in constructive activities, they would likely use their time in prison to mobilize outside support, radicalize other prisoners and, given the opportunity, attempt to form an operational command structure.¹

Pakistan Army launched an initiative for rehabilitation of detainees in the conflict-hit Swat region of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2009 after a successful military operation against extremist militants there. During the operation, thousands of militants and their active supporters either surrendered or were arrested or turned in by their families. They remain in the army's custody. In 2010, the army decided to screen detainees in order to identify hardcore militants. A de-radicalization program was launched for the detainees other than the hardcore militants. The initiative is in its initial phase still and there is room to learn from best practices and make adjustments where needed to improve its chances of success.

As mentioned earlier, rehabilitation programs for detainees are usually part of a larger de-radicalization strategy. Different states use different strategies but there are four major approaches in practice to rehabilitate individuals and vulnerable communities. These four approaches operate at the security, societal, ideological and political levels, and are based on the concepts of de-radicalization and counter-radicalization.² (See Table 1)

Table 1: De-radicalization Approaches

| Approach | Focus | Strategy | Objective |
|-------------|------------------------|---|--|
| Security | Detainees | Rehabilitation | Reducing security threats |
| Societal | Vulnerable communities | Engagement | Developing moderate tendencies |
| Ideological | Clergy | Highlighting religion's emphasis on peace | Developing counter arguments/ narratives |
| Political | Society at large | Winning hearts and minds | Neutralizing security threats |

There is a general agreement that the best practices on countering radicalization are a combination of all four approaches. Different states use different strategies ranging from engagement to winning the hearts and minds of the people. But the objective of most of the programs is neutralizing the security threats. Despite sharing common objectives, such programs in Muslim-majority states have some characteristics that differ from the models developed by non-Muslim states with a sizeable Muslim population. Programs by Muslim states focus mainly on prevention and creating an ideological response to radicalization. The Egyptian, Yemeni, Jordanian and Indonesian models essentially developed as ideological responses and the Saudi model emphasized on rehabilitation through psychological and social modules, along with ideological responses.³ (See Table 2)

Table 2: De-radicalization Programs: Models in Muslim Countries

| Model | Strategy | Constraints for Pakistan |
|---------------|---|---|
| Saudi Arabian | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prevention • Cure/rehabilitation • Care/support | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political • Ideological • Economic cost |
| Indonesian | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Highlighting the conflict as the country's own war • Role of former militants in rehabilitation • Effective policing • Efficient and effective prosecution | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Militant landscape is more complex • Failure to gain support of former militants for the process |
| Egyptian | Revision/ correction of concepts (<i>Tashih Al-Mafahim</i>) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sectarian divide • Inflexible religious discourse |
| Jordanian | Counter-narratives/ ideological responses dictated by the state | A forcible or aggressive approach would not work in Pakistan |
| Yemeni | Dialogue through a committee consisting of respected religious scholars | Lack of consensus among the clergy |
| Algerian | Reconciliation and transformation | Lack of political consensus |

Although many Muslim states have borrowed components of their counter-radicalization programs from the Saudi model, but they have failed to prioritize their strategies according to local needs because of a lack of resources, both financial and human. As an assessment notes: "Saudi Arabia has access to a significant amount of rentier income and is able to dedicate a large amount of money to the success of the program. In addition, Saudi clerics hold an authority enhanced by Saudi Arabia's claim to guardianship of the two holy cities in Islam. Saudi's vast resources, both monetary and religious, allow for program components that are difficult to replicate in other locations".⁴

To overcome these constraints, Indonesia employs a different tack and engages former militants to create an effective response to radicalization.⁵ The Yemeni jihadist rehabilitation program comprises a committee of religious scholars headed by Judge Hamoud al-Hitar for dialogue with Al Qaeda detainees.⁶ The initiatives have yielded mixed results which have been attributed to questions of credibility of former militants in Indonesia and of the Committee for Religious Dialogue headed by Al-Hitar in Yemen, which detainees often consider part of the state apparatus.⁷

But Egypt's 'great debate' among jailed militants, which challenged the militant narrative in that country, has proved effective, mainly because it was an initiative by members of militant group Gamaa Islamiyah themselves and the state encouraged the debate only at a later stage. The debate was initiated among thousands of imprisoned members of Gamaa Islamiyah and questioned the justification for violence in order to achieve their stated objectives. After the discourse, reading and furtive conversations, the detainees came to the conclusion that they had been manipulated into pursuing a violent path. Initiating the debate was obviously difficult as it faced strong initial opposition both inside and outside the prisons; however, eventually imprisoned members of Al Jihad, the most violent group in Egypt which was led by Ayman Al-Zawahiri, also began to express an interest in joining the non-violent initiative. But it was Dr Fadl, one of the architects of Al Qaeda's ideological paradigm, who turned the initiative into the 'great debate'.⁸

None of these initiatives have been adopted in Pakistan and the model being applied in Swat draws its contours from Saudi Arabia. But the challenges confronting Pakistan are complex. Algeria's Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation (CPNR) offers a model that can provide the basic contours for a de-radicalization strategy in Pakistan.⁹ Strategies for rehabilitation of detainees form an indispensable part of a comprehensive approach on de-radicalization. But even more crucial are lessons that Pakistan can learn from de-radicalization models of non-Muslim states, particularly development of accurate threat perceptions at the policy and implementation levels. Non-Muslim states prioritize security threats, as protection is a key element in their strategies. But that protection can be ensured only by analyzing the threats the militants pose both at the security and ideological levels. The

Australian de-radicalization model includes analysis as a key component in its strategies. (See Table 3)

Learning from these approaches and models can help evolve better counter-radicalization and de-radicalization strategies, but that would be effective only as part of a comprehensive policy response.

Table 3: De-radicalization Models Developed by Non-Muslim Countries

| State | Strategy | Constraints for Pakistan |
|----------------|--|---|
| United Kingdom | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pursue • Prepare • Protect • Prevent | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dissimilar patterns of radicalization |
| Singapore | Religious rehabilitation groups | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political • Such efforts may be perceived as attempts to promote secularism by force |
| Australia | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Analysis • Protection • Response • Resilience | Economic cost |

Although Pakistan’s rehabilitation program in Swat is not part of a comprehensive policy and is a counter-insurgency initiative introduced by Pakistan Army, but if implemented judiciously it can provide the basis for a broader de-radicalization strategy.

The initiative to rehabilitate detainees in Pakistan was taken in September 2009, with an initial cost of Rs 4.4 million, which was provided by the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provincial government.¹⁰ The program has three main components: one called Project Sabaoon, which focuses on juveniles; Project Mishal that concentrates on adult detainees; and Project Sparlay for family members of detained persons. The rehabilitation efforts have been divided into four main modules, including an educational module comprising formal education, especially for juveniles, to enable them to continue their education.

Another module includes psychological counseling and therapy for developing independent and logical thinking. The social module includes social issues and family participation and the fourth module includes vocational training, such as repairing home appliances, etc., to equip the detainees with skills that enable them to make a decent living. Through the initiative, over 400 individuals have been reintegrated into society so far.¹¹

Dr. Muhammad Farooq Khan,¹² a leading moderate religious scholar was the key figure in developing the Sabaoon component of the program. Dr. Khan developed counter arguments to confront extremist points of view.¹³ His charismatic personality was the driving force behind the success of the initiative at the initial stage but his assassination by Taliban in 2010 was a setback for the project.

Project Mishal aims at “providing an environment conducive for restoring the self-respect for selected individuals to de-radicalize and remove their psychological burden caused by ideological exploitation and /or coercion so as to make them and their families useful citizens of the society.”¹⁴ Mishal Rehabilitation Centre has reintegrated 400 individuals into society.¹⁵ After a screening process, low-cadre militants were identified, who did not have a leadership role and were not directly involved in killings or sabotage activities. According to the Deputy Inspector General (DIG) of police for Malakand Division, of which Swat is a part, this program may have saved many youngsters from gaining a radicalized worldview, but he believed that the phase after their reintegration seems to be the weakest link, because of the community’s attitude and the total dependence on the authorities for de-radicalization initiatives.¹⁶ The authorities at the Mishal Rehabilitation Centre stated that only 11 out of the 494 individuals released so far had received financial support to enable them to have access to livelihood opportunities.

As stated earlier, the Swat rehabilitation program is based on the Saudi model. As is obvious from the difficulties faced in the Mishal project, financial constraints were not considered while designing these initiatives. On the other hand, although Sabaoon is not facing any financial constraints, but lack of knowledgeable and devoted scholars, such as Dr. Farooq Khan, has certainly been a challenge. In addition to these constraints, the initiatives focus mainly on low-cadre militants, which come from poor economic

backgrounds. The rehabilitation of this rank is important but the program needs to be expanded to the mid-level cadre, which have more political and ideological tendencies for radicalization. If some of them are disengaged from militants and extremism, they can prove valuable assets in the de-radicalization process, as has happened in Indonesia. But disengagement of mid-level cadre is a difficult task, and countering their narratives is a challenge where Egypt has a good record.

The Swat model was developed in a post-insurgency perspective and the counter argument modules focus on defusing anti-state tendencies, but in Pakistan the militant landscape is quite complex and in the presence of other violent actors, who are involved in international and regional terrorism, this narrative cannot prevent them for joining other groups. Complete denunciation of extremism should be the objective of the program and a viable ideological anchor needs to be provided in the framework of nationalism and pluralism.

The Swat model can be replicated in other parts of the country after addressing the framework deficiencies and intellectual and financial constraints. But at the same time the civil administration needs to shoulder the responsibility. In other countries, such initiatives have been taken by the political government and implemented by the civilian administration. Only a representative and accountable political setup would have the credibility, legitimacy and mandate to take on the ideological and political sensitivities involved in the de-radicalization process.

Notes

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- ¹ "Prisons and Terrorism: Radicalization and De-radicalization in 15 Countries," (A policy report published by International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence (ICSR), London, 2010).
 - ² De-radicalization efforts refers to working with individuals who have committed acts of terrorism. Counter-radicalization refers to preventive measures to work with vulnerable communities.
 - ³ A group within the Saudi Ministry of Interior known as the Advisory Committee is responsible for administrating the de-radicalization program. The Advisory Committee consists of four smaller sub-committees: the religious subcommittee, the psychological and social subcommittee, the security subcommittee and the media subcommittee. (Asseri, Awadh, Ali, S, *Combating Terrorism, Saudi Arabia's role in the War on Terror*, Oxford, 2009).
 - ⁴ Amanda K. Johnston, "Assessing the Effectiveness of Deradicalization Programs on Islamist Extremists," December 2009, <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a514433.pdf> (accessed June 26, 2011).
 - ⁵ Nasir Abbas and Ali Imron are two former militants, who participate in the de-radicalization program by approaching Gamaa Islamiyah prisoners and challenging their beliefs (Johnston, "Assessing the Effectiveness of De-radicalization Programs on Islamist Extremists").
 - ⁶ Naureen Chowdhury Fink and Hamed El-Said, "Transforming Terrorists: Examining International Efforts to Address Violent Extremism," International Peace Council, 2011.
 - ⁷ Johnston, "Assessing the Effectiveness of Deradicalization Programs on Islamist Extremists."
 - ⁸ Muhammad Amir Rana, "The Great Debate," Dawn, March 28, 2011.
 - ⁹ Algeria's policies revolved around three central themes: first, restoring peace, this included grant of amnesty, reductions in sentences, and dropping of charges against all those who surrendered voluntarily, renounced violence and handed in their weapons; second, national reconciliation, solidarity, and reintegration; and finally, implementation of measures aimed at preventing recurrence of violence.
 - ¹⁰ Dr. Khadem Hussain, Director Bacha Khan Trust, Peshawar, interview by the author, July 13, 2011.
 - ¹¹ Qazi Jamilur Rehman, Deputy Inspector General of Police Malakand, interview by the author, July 4, 2011.
 - ¹² He was killed by Taliban on October 02, 2010.
 - ¹³ Dr. Muhammad Farooq Khan, "An Overview of Project "Sabaoon"," (Report on 1st Strategic Workshop on Rehabilitation & De-radicalization of Militants and Extremists, FATA Capacity Building Project, FATA Secretariat, May 2010).
 - ¹⁴ Qazi Jamilur Rehman, interview.
 - ¹⁵ Presentation at Mishal Rehabilitation Centre attended by the author, July 5, 2011.
 - ¹⁶ Qazi Jamilur Rehman, interview.

Abstracts

State-building in Afghanistan: Are Reforms Sustainable?

Umar Riaz

Afghanistan is a country most studied but least understood in conflict and post-conflict settings. This paper attempts to analyze the sustainability of ongoing political, security and economic reforms in view of the inherent structural fault lines and conflict drivers, which have been entrenched in the Afghan statecraft through decades of conflict. The paper identifies these sources of conflict and examines the viability and coverage of post-Taliban reforms and concludes that the reforms have failed to build the legitimacy, capacity and effectiveness of Afghan institutions to sustain the reforms once the international forces leave the country and foreign aid dries up.

The Process of Radicalization: Contextualizing the Case of Pakistan

Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi

Radicalization encompasses the entire spectrum of extreme responses that contextualize terrorism in Pakistan. It is widely agreed that although radicalization predisposes socio-political violence it does not necessarily have to necessitate it. There is nonetheless a commonly observed tendency to conceive of radicalization in terms of ideology alone. This is the contextual paradigm of ideology that resonates within paradigms of terrorism in Pakistan, wherein the terrorists have used a reductionist worldview to whittle down complex socio-economic, geostrategic and political problems, into essentially a contest between good and evil. After definitional and ideological explanations, the paper discusses at length some general factors of radicalization across Muslim countries in a comparative perspective to contextualize the case of Pakistan. These factors include: a youth bulge and economic disparity; polarization of education; democratic deficit; honor as an ideology; globalization and tribalism; role of ruling elite; and the 'petro-radicalization' process.

Modes and Scale of Conflict in Pakistan's Swat Valley (1989-2008)

Khadim Hussain

This paper investigates the modes and scale of conflict in Pakistan's Swat valley between 1989 and 2008 on the basis of primary data. The primary data includes field work (participants' observations), structured interviews with a stratified sampling of 350 respondents in the seven sub-districts of Swat, and analysis of official documents. The study brings home a clear pattern of conflict in Swat by identifying four overlapping and intertwining factors. The first factor is the socio-cultural dynamics of otherization and marginalization with special reference to gender and power relationship, the shift in religious authority and recognition of the landless ethnic Gujars and Ajars, besides the clergy. The second factor is related to structural or institutional vacuums due mainly to the promulgation and later disbandment of PATA Regulation of 1975 in Malakand Division. The third factor is related to evolution of a socio-political economy. The fourth factor seems to be the socio-ethnography of militant leaders such as Sufi Muhammad and Fazlullah.

Politics of Radicalization and De-radicalization: Impact on Pakistan's Security Dynamics

Salma Malik

The lack of consensus on the *raison d'être* of the state has gradually caused Pakistan to drift towards its current state of affairs where it is faced with extreme dichotomy between the moderates and the orthodox. In the 63 years of the country's existence, the invocation to religion has moved from the personal domain to the mainstream body politic of the state, which now haunts it in the form of terrorism, militancy and extremist manifestations. The appeal towards religion and religiosity in the country grew together with deterioration in governance and the political state of affairs. The Soviet-Afghan war and the war on terror have added substantially to the extremist manifestations. Given the deep roots of militancy and radicalization, the solution needs to be found at three levels: ideological, behavioral, and organizational. The official approach towards militancy and radicalization must find the right balance in the use of soft and coercive measures. There is a critical need to remember that in order to be effective military and political solutions need to go hand in hand, and the onus lies on both institutions to strike the right balance.

State-building in Afghanistan: Are Reforms Sustainable?

Umar Riaz

Post-conflict Project¹ of State-building in Afghanistan

The post-conflict project in Afghanistan started with conflicting aims² after the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001. The process of state-building can be divided into three phases. The first phase started with a quasi-hybrid peace-building operation,³ Bonn Agreement,⁴ which was endorsed by the United Nations.⁵ Cost estimates for the initiative were incorporated in a document titled 'Securing Afghanistan's Future' (2004) and a 10-year plan for legal reforms called 'Justice for All' (2005). The second phase began with signing of the Afghan Compact⁶ in London with commitments worth \$10.5 billion for the next five years by 60 states.⁷ The reforms formulated three critical pillars, aiming for the political, economic and social overhaul of the country.⁸ However, de-facto power of warlords and resurgence of Taliban meant that liberal state-building clashed with security imperatives and liberal peace builders had to act 'illiberally'.⁹

The informal but significant third phase started in 2009 with renewed commitment to Afghanistan by the US and coincided with a rise in insurgency in Afghanistan.¹⁰ This stage was marked by a surge in troops and resources¹¹ with increased short-term, development-oriented military engagement at the local level that has achieved mixed results.¹² Many commentators had questioned the effectiveness of this surge in troops, referring to the earlier Soviet experience in Afghanistan¹³ but given the levels of insecurity and inadequate domestic security in Afghanistan, there were few other alternatives available.

This paper tries to answer the question whether the reforms aimed at state-building in Afghanistan are sustainable. The answer lies in answers to some other questions, such as what were the factors or conditions which led to three decades of conflict in Afghanistan and which are sustaining the present insurgency? Another question is regarding the viability and coverage of the ongoing reforms and whether these reforms address the sources of instability.

The paper is divided into five sections. The first section identifies the aforementioned fault lines in Afghanistan's system. The second explains the security sector reforms and their impact as well as the effect of the reforms on 'warlordism' and insurgency. The third section details the effect of political reforms and how these have addressed political instability. Economic reforms are covered in the fourth section with an analysis of the role of foreign aid and domestic revenue generation. The last section contains conclusions of the analysis.

1. State-building and Sources of Instability in Afghanistan

There is general consensus in the extensive literature on state-building that the state has three core functions; providing security, and ensuring representation and welfare of the people through resource distribution.¹⁴ Capacity in these areas is deemed to cloth the state with legitimacy, and in the absence of that the state remains 'fragile' or 'failed'.¹⁵ The sources of instability in Afghanistan loosely coincide with the core theoretical functions of the state and their continued presence would make a stable Afghan state highly improbable.

1.1 Factional Polarization and Political Instability

Despite many ups and downs, Afghanistan has for most of its known history¹⁶ remained a heterogeneous and tribal state having multiple and conflicting legal, cultural and political systems.¹⁷ The politics worked on the basis of two networks, tribal and religious, with the latter gaining prominence after the 1979 Soviet invasion.¹⁸ Afghanistan's 'sub-national administration' emerged during the reign of Amir Abdul Rehman (1880-1901), who laid the foundation of divide-and-rule tactics,¹⁹ which were used again in 1967 by creating more non-Pashtun provinces and ultimately mobilized communities against each other.²⁰ Armed militias or warlords have thus become an integral part of this sub-national administration and a perpetual source of instability and conflict. The Afghan civil war (1992-1996) was a result of the embedded factionalism when all the regional fiefdoms matched each other in strength and foreign support but none had nationwide presence,²¹ resulting in destruction of infrastructure and paving the way for a Taliban takeover.

1.2 Internal Security and Lack of Order

The 1960s and 1970s were decades of relative security and peace in Afghanistan with the exception of a power struggle at the top. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan heralded a civil war which at its peak forced more than 5 million Afghans to become refugees and caused countless deaths. The Taliban expanded their control over Afghanistan rapidly and succeeded in establishing law and order, mainly because of a popular yearning for order and security.²² They claimed to unify the country with 90 percent of Afghanistan under their control,²³ but their rule brought further insecurity for vulnerable segments, such as women, religious minorities and those disagreeing with the Taliban's interpretation of religion.²⁴

However, despite substantial presence of international forces and rapid increase in local forces, security problems in Afghanistan seem to be aggravating.²⁵ Terrorists' attacks have resulted in more than half of the conflict-related civilian casualties, which the UN confirms have risen sharply.²⁶ Lack of security for Afghans and foreigners is reflected in tripling of armed attacks in the country from 1,558 to 4,542 in just two years from 2006.²⁷ It did not help matters that two-third of the casualties caused by the government occurred in errant international air strikes.²⁸ The latest annual survey by Asia Foundation has found that as in previous years security remained the main concern for the majority of the Afghan people and that 18 percent of those interviewed reported to be victims of violence,²⁹ and that an equal number of Afghans were victims of violence by Taliban and by the international forces.

The international coalition responded to the security situation by increasing the number of foreign troops on the ground in 2009, but the year still proved to be the deadliest for foreign and Afghan forces, with about 1,000 Afghan security forces personnel and 500 foreign troops killed.³⁰ The assassination of Osama bin Ladin is being touted as a major victory in the war on terror, but its impact on the insurgency in Afghanistan remains to be seen, with almost the entire Taliban leadership still intact.

1.3 Dependent Economy

Prior to 1979, Afghanistan's rulers made few efforts to make the economy viable and independent³¹ and relied on foreign assistance and, to a small extent, on gas revenues to sustain the economy. Afghanistan thus kept lagging economically and the country was little more than a subsidized buffer state depending on foreign sources to maintain peace or fight civil wars, with poppy as a sustained economic source, which even now makes up for two-fifth of the country's real GDP.³² With the state seen as a buffer between Russia and British India, the rulers played both powers against each other to extract resources from them.³³ During the comparatively stable period for Afghanistan from 1933 until 1978, the focus of modernization was on infrastructural development rather than on enhancing the productive capacity³⁴ and modernization seemed to be targeted towards the needs of the ruling elite.³⁵ Domestic revenues remained between 6 or 7 percent of the GDP with security and communications consuming more than 60 percent of the budget³⁶ and the bulk of the government expenditure financed by foreign aid.³⁷

The resistance movement in the 1980s ran a parallel economy funded by the US, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, while the Kabul government's economy was funded by the Soviet Union, which sustained it even after the withdrawal of Soviet troops, until 1992. The disintegration of the Soviet Union also led to the collapse of the communist government in Kabul which by that time had become unable to even ensure provision of food supplies to the population. The economy of the 1990s was a typical example of a failed state with the collapse of monetary, fiscal and exchange rate regimes, destruction of infrastructure and shifting of trading activity to regional centers like Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif and Kandahar. The task before the international community after 2001 was not just to provide basic services and restore communication links, but also to revive the productive capacity of the state so that it is able to sustain itself without foreign support.

2. Security Sector Reforms

This section offers a brief overview of the coverage of different components of security sector reforms, such as army, police, and DDR (demobilization, disarmament and reintegration) in light of the two main challenges to

security, i.e., insurgency and warlordism. The section also includes analysis of the effectiveness and sustainability of these reforms.

The security sector received a superficial and vague mention in the Bonn Agreement when reference was made to extension of authority over militias and formation of a 'judicial reform commission'.³⁸ It took additional emphasis by President Hamid Karzai³⁹ and a spike in the insurgency to evoke renewed international interest in the security sector reforms. However, the short-term counter-insurgency focus of these reforms has deprived the process of realizing the long-term goal of a sustainable, stable and accountable security apparatus.⁴⁰ The Afghanistan Compact brought the earlier lead donor system⁴¹ of the security sector reform to a close and reforms have been taken over by a joint board of the Afghan government and the UN,⁴² but the US remains the main contributor, financing the majority of security reforms.⁴³

2.1 Military Reforms

Military reform was the most well-resourced pillar of the security sector reform agenda, consuming \$3.5 billion until 2005, compared to \$900 million for the police.⁴⁴ Initially, there was some disagreement over the strength of the army. Qasim Faheem, the Afghan defense minister at the time, wanted to merge his militia into the army and advocated for a force of 200,000 while NATO favored a 50,000-strong Afghan army. Eventually, it was decided that the Afghan National Army (ANA) would have 70,000 troops.⁴⁵ The current strength of the ANA is 138,000, with a target of 171, 000 by October 2011. Contrary to earlier claims,⁴⁶ the army is considered poorly trained,⁴⁷ and its sustainability in terms of the economic conditions and its coverage of the area after the announced handover to Afghan forces in 2014 remains highly doubtful.⁴⁸

The ANA has also been a victim of chronic ethnic factionalism right from its inception, when 90 of the first 100 generals were ethnic Tajiks,⁴⁹ an imbalance which was addressed by a quota system in 2003 but Pashtuns and Hazaras still complain about under-representation. An expansion in the insurgency has also caused extensive desertions in the army with around 40 percent troops of a typical battalion always absent without leave and it is estimated

that 20 percent of the troops would not enlist again after their three-year contract expires.⁵⁰

2.2 Police Reforms

The process of police reform was formally launched in Afghanistan with Germany as the lead nation opening the German Police Project Office (GPPO) in April 2002 but development of the initiative has remained lackluster.⁵¹ The US joined the process in 2004 with the award of a contract to set up a Central Training Center (CTC) and seven Regional Training Centers (RTCs).⁵² The US interest resulted in provision of more resources⁵³ and the number of police personnel was projected to reach 130,000 by the end of the year 2010.⁵⁴

Despite the recent emphasis, police remain a corrupt, incompetent, fictionally divided⁵⁵ and illiterate⁵⁶ force unable to provide basic security to citizens, much less have an effective counter-insurgency role.⁵⁷ Most of the 31 police generals chosen by the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) in 2005, have been fired, jailed or forced to flee the country amid charges of corruption.⁵⁸ Many experts are of the view that inefficiency and indiscipline of the police played an important role in turning large sections of the population away from the government and towards the insurgents.⁵⁹ Furthermore, there is still confusion about the future role of police, mainly whether the force would focus on community policing or act as 'light infantry'.

The police reforms, which is the focal point of the exit strategy of international forces, are short term and fragile, in addition to being badly coordinated and beset by delays. In March 2010, less than 12 percent of police units were considered capable of operating on their own despite an investment of over \$6 billion since 2001.⁶⁰ Ad-hoc and quantitative programs, such as Focused District Development and Police Mentor and Liaison Teams, have failed to incorporate the need for community policing or long-term sustainability of police as an institution.⁶¹

2.3 Judicial Reform

Judicial reforms are the most neglected part of the reform process since the international intervention in Afghanistan and received scant mention at the

initial Bonn and Tokyo conferences as well as at the 2006 London Conference. This lack of attention to the justice sector is not surprising given the short-term security goals as compared to a long-term investment in the criminal justice system.⁶² The judiciary is still dominated by the clergy, which plays a central role in determining and undermining the legitimacy of governments.⁶³ Little effort has been made to reconcile the formal and informal justice systems,⁶⁴ leaving the system in the shambles.⁶⁵

Following the Rome Conference, the Afghan government has also adopted a transitional justice plan for peace, justice and reconciliation.⁶⁶ However, there are apprehensions that the program may become a device to victimize those who were part of the resistance against the Taliban as all the other groups have either become part of the government or are insurgents who are being encouraged to lay down their weapons and hold negotiations with the government.⁶⁷ The Taliban continue to practice their brand of justice in the south, taking advantage of the weak and corrupt official justice system.⁶⁸ According to estimates by the United Nations, the formal courts in Afghanistan cover only 20 percent of all judicial functions and are discredited by rampant corruption and widespread impunity.⁶⁹ It is a major stigma for the judicial system that victims of 'collateral damage' in air strikes have no legal recourse. Rule of law and due process have been further undermined by allowing NATO forces to kill narcotics traffickers without any legal process.

2.4 Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration

The process of demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) has been widely seen to be flawed and has contributed to fragmentation and insecurity in Afghanistan.⁷⁰ The warlords in the Northern Alliance were important players in the Bonn process and managed to exclude provisions regarding disarmament.⁷¹ The agreement only stated that "upon the official transfer of power, Afghan armed forces and armed groups in the country shall come under the command and control of the Interim Authority, [and] be re-organized according to the requirement of the new Afghan security and armed forces."⁷² These vague provisions about reorganization, without any enforcement mechanism, doomed the DDR process.

Militia commanders also managed to subvert the process⁷³ by getting their men absorbed wholesale into the government or transformed into ubiquitous security companies.⁷⁴ A regular DDR program, called Afghans New Beginning Program, was launched in 2003 to disarm and reintegrate 100,000 members of Afghan militias. The figure was later reduced to 40,000 but the number of those disarmed under the program remained around 10,000.⁷⁵ The DDR program gave way to Disarmament of Illegal Groups Programs, these included the National Independent Reconciliation Commission, launched in 2005 with Sibghatullah Mujaddedi as its chairman in order to reintegrate former fighters.

Other programs including the Afghan Social Outreach Program and Allegiance Program were largely regarded as failures⁷⁶ with the emergence of 'revolving-door reintegrees'.⁷⁷ The strength of militias in Afghanistan is still around 120,000, according to the ANBP database, with larger groups regarded as a threat to the government.⁷⁸ With the \$1.3 billion Community Defense Initiative by the US in 2009, which succeeded the Afghan Public Protection Program, the disarmament drive took a different turn, as local militiamen were rearmed to fight against the Taliban.⁷⁹

2.5 Sustainability of Security Sector Reforms

Afghanistan has received unprecedented international attention (from the UN, 60 donor states, 18 international agencies and 150 NGOs),⁸⁰ military commitment (140,000 security personnel from 40 countries)⁸¹ and \$15 billion in aid since 2001,⁸² but even NATO estimates suggest that 200 of the 399 Afghan districts are sympathetic to, or controlled by, anti-government forces and 32 out of 34 Afghan provinces have shadow Taliban governors.⁸³

The sustainability of security reforms in Afghanistan is continuously questioned on three grounds. First is the issue of financial sustainability, as now the cost of maintaining the 200,000-strong Afghan security forces is around \$3.5 billion, with \$2.5 billion for the army and \$1 billion for the police.⁸⁴ The number of security personnel is slated to be around 300,000, including 170,000 army and 120,000 police personnel by the end of 2011. That means that the country would have to bear a cost many times more than its domestic revenue of \$910 million and the cost would remain unsustainable even if the GDP and revenue collection are doubled.⁸⁵ An Afghan army fully

trained and equipped by the US can only be a transitional measure and would pose political problems in the long run.⁸⁶ The state of the police is equally fragile with less than 12 percent police units capable of operating on their own, despite an investment of \$6 billion since 2001.⁸⁷ Ad-hoc programs such as Focused District Development and Police Mentor and Liaison Teams have failed to incorporate community policing or even ensure long-term sustainability of police.⁸⁸

The second issue in security sector sustainability is the lack of control by the Afghan government, which has been frustrated by proxy warlords.⁸⁹ Despite the presence of international troops and a large number of Afghan security forces personnel, Kabul's control remains minimal, which is fast eroding the confidence of the people in the government's ability to ensure long-term peace and stability and negotiations with the Taliban are seen as the inevitable outcome.

Coherence and unity of command in Afghan Army is the third question mark as Afghan security forces have traditionally switched loyalties whenever the patronage system to maintain the loyalties has broken down.⁹⁰ This pattern could re-emerge when external budgetary support contracts, leaving the state vulnerable in the hands of forces with questionable discipline.⁹¹ Ethnic divisions in the army are another risk as the main areas of operation and troop deployment are mainly confined to the Pashtun belt, while the force is largely deemed to consist of Northern Alliance sympathizers.

3. Political Reforms

Even before the decades of conflict, Afghanistan had struggled with political stability and democratic overtures.⁹² Barfield describes the situation as a stalemate where no one could achieve power or legitimacy to restore political order without resorting to continued armed conflict.⁹³ In the post-Taliban settings, order has been enforced by international forces and citizens are mere recipients rather than the driving force. Whether that has altered the political structure and would the arrangement survive after the departure of the coalition forces are questions that demand a thorough examination of political reforms.

The present political reforms commenced with 'warlord democratization',⁹⁴ by involving those militia commanders who fell on the right side of the war on terror. Dependence of the state on donors for support and policy making has made Afghanistan a classic case of imposed 'shared sovereignty'.⁹⁵ Lack of accurate information about the demography of Afghanistan has also undermined the political process. Most of the Afghan governments, including the present one, have avoided holding a census, content with persistence with the historical claim of Pashtun majority in Afghanistan even though there are considerable difference among various estimates of the population.

3.1 Elections and Role of Parliament

Elections in Afghanistan have often been touted as a success story with three elections held in the last five years, but even optimistic observers acknowledge a limited role of the legislature. The answer to the gap between performance and expectation lies in the electoral system. The rare and controversial electoral system of single non-transferable voting (SNTV)⁹⁶ is considered a disservice to Afghans who deserve a clean and transparent legislature.⁹⁷ Political parties are allowed in Afghanistan but the election system prevents them from fielding candidates formally.⁹⁸

In the last elections, in spite of the government's estimates that 1,100 candidates had links with armed groups, only 34 were disqualified, largely because of poor vetting.⁹⁹ Out of 249 deputies, 40 were militant commanders, 24 were linked to criminal gangs, 17 were drug traffickers and 19 faced allegations of involvement in war crimes.¹⁰⁰ The parliament, however, promulgated legislation that gave amnesty to anyone involved in armed conflict in the last 25 years.¹⁰¹ The voters' turnout in the elections has also been on the decline and after an extraordinary 70 percent in the 2004 presidential election, it was just 30 percent in the last elections. The 2009 presidential elections were a real low point for Afghan politics as one-third of the ballots were alleged to be tainted by fraud.¹⁰²

3.2 Horizontal Power Sharing and Role of Ethnic Factions

Ethnic ties, as the theory goes, are stronger, more durable and more rigid than ordinary political groupings and likelihood of violence is very strong in

countries such as Afghanistan, which have one ethnic majority and several small minorities.¹⁰³ Ethnic diversity in Afghanistan has historically created competing power centers and in the post-Taliban reforms, all factions competed in a zero-sum game for gaining a foothold at the cost of others.¹⁰⁴ Johnson argues that the fragmentation of society would continue until the control of government by one dominant group or ethnic politics makes way for increased internal conflict.¹⁰⁵

In Afghanistan, erstwhile militia commanders and modern-day warlords have maintained their legitimacy, resources and support by taking advantage of the security situation and the state's weakness and have been accepted as politico-military actors in the otherwise liberal state-building process.¹⁰⁶ The state on the other hand is trapped in a real catch-22, torn between the goal of liberal democracy and co-option of warlords for survival. President Karzai has thus kept the political arrangement fluid by rotating rather than removing the leaders involved with military groups and/or the drug economy.¹⁰⁷

3.3 Vertical Power Sharing and Center-Periphery Relations

The unitary state created by the 2004 Constitution is a 'patrimonial' presidential system with the powers of appointments of ministers, 34 governors, 399 sub-governors and other positions resting with the president. All the administrative and financial decisions are made in Kabul with no governance capacity at the provincial level.¹⁰⁸ The arrangement has further disempowered tribal authorities which has rendered the system unsuitable for a traditional Muslim country afflicted by ethnic, tribal and sectarian divisions.¹⁰⁹ There have been some efforts to extend the reform process out of Kabul but attempts to encourage development at the grassroots have amounted to little¹¹⁰ even after several initiatives.¹¹¹

The growing insurgency and alienation of local communities has led to the creation of 'second best' and hybrid civil-military solutions such as Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), in order to expand the authority of the central government to the regions.¹¹² Despite acquisition by NATO as a "template for expansion", the PRTs remain ridden with confused mandates, cosmetic civilian role, logistic shortcomings and questionable effectiveness.¹¹³ This has

just provided local power holders a chance to bargain aid for peace or power for security.

3.4 Corruption and Governance

Governance as defined by the World Bank is a 'set of institutions by which authority in a country is exercised,'¹¹⁴ and whatever authority left to the Afghan government is devoured by corruption with Afghanistan ranked second in terms of corruption internationally. A World Bank report has found that the real beneficiaries of foreign assistance have been the urban elite, much to the frustration and anger of the rural population.¹¹⁵ The vicious cycle of cronyism in Afghanistan in which appointments are used for political survival is reminiscent of the early 1990s, when the state of affairs had led directly to the rise of the Taliban.¹¹⁶ One of the starkest findings of an intelligence survey conducted by Afghan National Security Directorate was that the failure of governance was one of the leading causes of the insurgency.¹¹⁷

After initial western efforts to install ailing King Zahir Shah in Kabul, Hamid Karzai was chosen because he was a Pashtun, western oriented and neutral. The last fact made him more dependent on his international benefactors, especially the US. This also led him to adopt survivalist and accommodative tactics, trying to make everybody, including US diplomats and Afghan warlords, happy at the same time and finding presentable figures from Pashtun Diaspora in order to assuage Pashtun fears, at the cost of sustainable, representative and accountable institutions. Rubin has aptly remarked about Karzai and his ministers: "They are Pashtuns and they are leaders but they are not leaders of Pashtuns. They do not have those networks that make political base in Afghanistan."¹¹⁸

There is mounting frustration in the West over the corruption and failure of governance in Afghanistan but the policy of co-option of potential spoilers by the US required President Karzai¹¹⁹ to adopt a governance strategy based on delicately balancing the interests of clergy, tribal elders and warlords.¹²⁰ The 'fraudulent' 2009 elections eroded whatever trust was left between Karzai and his international backers.¹²¹ Leadership, besides Karzai and his team of technocrats, is still insecure in the face of the traditional power bases and being a minister in the cabinet does not confer any inherent

power upon the incumbent.¹²² Other than ‘technocrats’ and ‘Diaspora’ the leadership consists of the same actors who were instrumental in the 1992-96 civil war with the exception of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who is siding with the insurgents.¹²³

4. Economic Reforms

The London Conference in 2006 was the first concrete step towards initiating broader economic reforms compared to Bonn’s one-dimensional emphasis.¹²⁴ The Afghanistan Compact signed in London promised a ‘shared vision’ in the presence of representatives of 60 states and international agencies. An effort was also made to link the Afghanistan Compact with Afghan National Development Strategy and a Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board was also created. The process was meant to ensure Afghan ownership of reforms but external actors continue to control the process from behind the scenes.¹²⁵ The main feature of economic reforms is still achievement of security through development, a belief shared by the security forces and NGOs alike. The emphasis is therefore on the ‘iconic projects’ that dramatically change the quality of life of local communities.¹²⁶

4.1 Role of Foreign Aid

Historically, foreign assistance has influenced state builders to mobilize coercion and legitimacy and this “unearned income” in the form of aid has provided the rulers with capital and ultimately undermined legitimacy.¹²⁷ The present aid-induced state-building in Afghanistan is also considered inadequate¹²⁸ as well as costly, short term and security driven. The US, which is the largest donor and has contributed one-third of all aid to Afghanistan since 2001, spends around \$36 billion a year on its military in Afghanistan,¹²⁹ compared to \$3.9 billion earmarked in FY2011 with 90 percent of the funds meant for the security sector.¹³⁰

According to estimates, 40 percent of the aid – a total of \$6 billion – has made its way back to the donors because of proliferation of contractors, \$2,000-a-day consultants and conditionalities.¹³¹ More than 75 percent of all aid to Afghanistan funds projects that are directly implemented or contracted, making the whole exercise self-defeating and unsustainable.¹³² As most of the aid is channeled off-budget, there are two bureaucracies operational in Kabul,

one belonging to the Afghan government's public sector and the other managed by the donors.

Foreign aid has also had a crowding out effect by shifting manpower and resources to external actors from the domestic economy.¹³³ Aid in Afghanistan is a reflection of a supply driven approach with emphasis on what can be funded rather than what is desirable.¹³⁴ This has thus blurred the difference between disbursement, expenditures and outputs. Afghan Donor Assistance Database, which has been touted as the most sophisticated system of donor accountability, only keeps accounts of disbursements and not of the actual detail of expenditures.¹³⁵

4.2 Budget and Fiscal Capacity

Fiscal dimension of state building—the ability to mobilize and spend domestic resources—is crucial to the success of peace-building efforts.¹³⁶ The Afghan government's control over its annual budget is tenuous and parliament's oversight non-existent. In 2007, only 40 percent of the total \$4.3 billion in expenditures were channeled through core budget,¹³⁷ while for FY2011 out of \$3.94 billion approved by the US, only \$800 million would be channeled via sources other than the US government—\$600 million through Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund (managed by the World Bank for the government of Afghanistan) and \$200 million as direct support.¹³⁸ Waldman has estimated that the Afghan government has no information on how more than one-third of the aid for the country has been spent since 2001, leaving the Ministry of Finance handicapped to pursue key reforms.¹³⁹ Limited budgetary control of the government over its own expenditures has hindered the development of fiscal policy and policy management and has left no room for the state's accountability to its citizens.

Taxes constitute a uniquely small proportion of the Afghan budget as shown by various authors¹⁴⁰ and although domestic revenues are rising, the fiscal contribution has been stagnant at 8 percent of the GDP for the last few years, accounting for 66 percent of the government's budget and just 28 percent of the spending.¹⁴¹ In addition, the improvements have largely come about because of temporary capacity injections. The tax base has remained limited to custom revenues on regional crossing points of Herat, Kandahar, Balakh and Nangarhar, which also happen to be territorial bases of regional

warlords.¹⁴² Progressive taxes like income tax or value-added tax are still a far cry in Afghanistan.

4.3 Structural Indicators: Investment, Industry, Agriculture

All efforts to stabilize Afghanistan would falter if the sectors of economy that drive structural growth, such as export-based industry, agriculture and essential services, are not expanded. The situation is far from satisfactory. According to the estimates of Afghan Investment Support Agency (AISA), bribery and insecurity resulted in 50 percent reduction in foreign businesses in 2007-08.¹⁴³ An exchange rate inflated due to aid and drug money subsidizes cheap imports and creates an imbalance in foreign trade, suppressing any hope of reviving the export sector.¹⁴⁴ Capital formation through mobilization of savings and creation of local industry to replace imports does not seem to be the policy makers' priority. The US goal of eradication of poppy but lack of support for agriculture—which employs two-third of the Afghan population—has further aggravated the situation.¹⁴⁵ The US reserved only \$240 million for 2010-11 in the new strategy for agriculture as compared to \$437 million for counter narcotics and \$600 million for PRTs.¹⁴⁶

4.4 Sustainability of Economic Reforms

Afghanistan continues to defy the conventional post-conflict literature on economic recovery which predicts signs of recovery after five or six years. World Bank studies show that a post-conflict country's ability to absorb aid increases from the third year onwards,¹⁴⁷ while another study puts the number of years for recovery at five.¹⁴⁸ This lack of recovery is mainly due to the hollow foundations of economic measures which do not result in establishing fiscal capacity of the government.¹⁴⁹ The situation would only worsen after the end of the post-war economic boom as the International Monetary Fund has also warned that the sources of the rebound would be insufficient over the long term to sustain growth and alleviate poverty.¹⁵⁰ Suhrke has noted from earlier reform processes in Afghanistan that without strong leadership, supportive constituency and a strong element of endogeneity, reforms are unlikely to be effective.¹⁵¹

The recent GDP growth has mainly been fueled by foreign aid which accounts for 90 percent of expenditures and 60 percent of the GDP¹⁵² while the narcotics economy accounts for one-third of the Afghan GDP. The aggressive counter-narcotics policies pursued by the international community can further lead to contraction of the real GDP by 6 percent.¹⁵³ A fall of more than six points in 2007 due to drought sheds serious doubts about the ability of the Afghan government to sustain this growth rate.¹⁵⁴ The unpredictable aid flows have made the Afghan economy akin to a 'casino economy' with many players and no regulation.¹⁵⁵

The geographical focus of economic reforms has also been uneven, benefiting the power players using the perverse incentive¹⁵⁶ of violence and insurgency. The formal regional economy of the state, however, has been conspicuously neglected, giving rise to serious economic insecurity for the landlocked country which is dependent on Pakistan and Iran for all of its trade and economic survival. In terms of social development, Afghanistan remains the second poorest country in the world with abysmal social indicators and basic human development indicators falling even after the reforms.¹⁵⁷ After aid dries up, the Afghan economy is unlikely to support its population, which is among the youngest in the world (an estimated 57 percent are younger than 18), amid few employment opportunities.¹⁵⁸

5. Conclusion

This paper aimed at analyzing the sustainability of the security, political and economic reforms by identifying three key conditions embedded in the Afghan State which are referred to as 'conflict drivers', i.e., security, factionalism and economy. The post-conflict project envisaged a liberal peace model for Afghanistan but faltered in achieving stability.¹⁵⁹ This paper finds that the government in Kabul has failed to implement a meaningful DDR program, leaving room for parallel security apparatus. The Afghan government has failed to address the insurgency even with the help of 140,000 foreign troops and would find itself in a very precarious situation if it has to cope with the Taliban on its own.¹⁶⁰ The paper also finds that the current number of Afghan security forces personnel is economically and politically unsustainable for a fragile economy like Afghanistan.

Political reforms have aggravated existing political instability and democracy has been little more than an illusion for the ordinary Afghan.¹⁶¹ A controversial electoral system has excluded political parties and hindered functioning of a representative parliament. Economic reforms introduced after 2001 have failed to transform Afghanistan from a dependent 'subsidized' state into a fiscally independent economy. Foreign aid which was supposed to revive institutions did exactly the opposite by reverse transferring of funds. It is therefore concluded that the political, security sector and economic reforms in Afghanistan are unlikely to be sustainable without addressing the core challenges and sources of instability, which necessitate a continuous inflow of funds and military power.

Notes

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- ¹ Astri Suhrke, "Reconstruction as Modernization: The 'Post-Conflict' Project in Afghanistan," *Third World Quarterly* 28, no. 7 (2007):1291-1308.
 - ² Isac Kfir, "Is there any hope for Peacebuilding in Afghanistan?," *Global Research in International Affairs* 14, no. 3 (2010); and Anatol Lieven, "The War in Afghanistan: Its Background and Future Prospects," *Conflict Security and Development* 9, no. 3 (2009):333-359. The initial aim was to capture or kill Bin Laden and the Taliban leadership and to end the incessant instability which later evolved to include goals like state-building and counternarcotics.
 - ³ Astri Suhrke, A. Strand and K.B. Harpikven, *Conflict and Peacebuilding: Afghanistan, Two Years after the Bonn* (www.cmi.org/pubs, 2004), 875-880.
 - ⁴ Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions (Bonn Agreement) signed on December 5, 2001 in Bonn, Germany.
 - ⁵ UN Security Council Resolution 1383, December 6, 2001.
 - ⁶ Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh and M. Schoiswohl, "Playing with Fire? The International Community's Democratization Experiment in Afghanistan," *International Peacekeeping* 15, no. 2 (2008): 252-267.
 - ⁷ Afghan Compact and National Development Strategy for Afghanistan is available on www.and.s.gov.af.
 - ⁸ Marina Ottaway, "Rebuilding State Institutions in Collapsed States," *Development and Change* 33, no. 5 (2002): 1001-1023; and Astri Suhrke, "Reconstruction as Modernization: The 'Post-Conflict' Project in Afghanistan".
 - ⁹ Roger Mac Ginty, "Warlords and the Liberal Peace: State-Building in Afghanistan," *Conflict Security and Development* 10, no. 4 (2010): 577-598; and Jonathan Goodhand and M. Sedra, "Bribes or Bargains? Peace Conditionalities and 'Post-Conflict' Reconstruction in Afghanistan," *International Peacekeeping* 14, no. 1 (2007): 41-61.
 - ¹⁰ Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy 2010, US Department of State.
 - ¹¹ The troops are numbered around 140,000 including 100,000 by the US.
 - ¹² Adam Grissom, "Making it up as go along: State Building, Critical theory and military Adaptation in Afghanistan," *Conflict Security and Development* 10, no. 4 (2010): 493-517.
 - ¹³ Sultan Barakat, and S.A Zyck, "Afghanistan's Insurgency and the Viability of a Political Settlement," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 33, no. 3 (2010):193-210.
 - ¹⁴ Sara Lister, "Understanding State-Building and Local Government in Afghanistan," Crisis States Research Center LSE, Working Paper no. 14, 2007; and Barnett R. Rubin, "Peacebuilding and State-Building in Afghanistan: Constructing Sovereignty for whose Security?" *Third World Quarterly* 27, no. 1 (2006): 175-185.
 - ¹⁵ Derrick W. Brinkerhoff, "Rebuilding Governance in Failed States and Post-Conflict Societies: Core Concepts and Cross Cutting Themes," *Public Administration and Development* 25 (2005):3-14.
 - ¹⁶ Antonio Giustozzi, "Afghanistan: Transition without End, An Analytical Narrative on State-Making," Crisis Research center LSE, Working Paper Series 2 Paper no. 40, Nov 2008, <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/22938/1/wp40.2.pdf>.

- ¹⁷ Ibid.
- ¹⁸ Oliver Roy, "Islamic Radicalism in Afghanistan and Pakistan," UNHCR, Writenet Paper, June 2001.
- ¹⁹ Isac Kfir, "Is there any hope for Peacebuilding in Afghanistan?"
- ²⁰ Barnett R. Robin, *The fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and collapse in international system* (Yale University Press, 1995), 43.
- ²¹ Antonio Giustozzi, "Afghanistan: Transition without End, An Analytical Narrative on State-Making."
- ²² Seth G. Jones, "The Rise of Afghanistan Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad," *International Security* 32, no. 4 (2008): 7-40.
- ²³ Ahmad Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and fundamentalism in Central Asia* (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 2010); and Antonio Giustozzi, "Afghanistan: Transition without End, An Analytical Narrative on State-Making."
- ²⁴ Ahmad Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and fundamentalism in Central Asia*.
- ²⁵ A CSIS study noted the rise of suicide attacks from 2 in 2003 to 137 in 2007 and number of terrorist attacks doubling from 491 in 2005 to 1,127 in 2008.
- ²⁶ UNAMA, *Armed Conflict and Civilian Casualties in 2008*.
- ²⁷ Seth G. Jones, "The Rise of Afghanistan Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad."
- ²⁸ "Afghanistan caught in crossfire," *Economist*, Sept 17, 2008.
- ²⁹ Asia Foundation's Survey of Afghan People in 2010.
- ³⁰ Rani D. Mullen, "Afghanistan in 2009: Trying to Pull Back from the Brink," *Asian Survey* 50, no.1 (2010): 127-138.
- ³¹ Antonio Giustozzi, "Bureaucratic Façade and Political Realities of Disarmament and Demobilization in Afghanistan," *Conflict, Security and Development* 8, no. 2 (2008):169-192.
- ³² Anatol Lieven, "Afghanistan: an Unsuitable Candidate for State-Building," *Conflict Security and Development* 7, no. 3 (2007): 483-489. The figures are attributed to estimates by NATO.
- ³³ M. Hassan Kakar, *A Political and diplomatic History of Afghanistan 1863-1901* (Leiden: Brill, 2006).
- ³⁴ Antonio Giustozzi, "Afghanistan: Transition without End, An Analytical Narrative on State-Making."
- ³⁵ Ibid.
- ³⁶ Maxwell J. Fry, *The Afghan Economy: Money Finance and the Critical Constraints to Economic Development* (Leiden: Brill, 1974).
- ³⁷ Barnett R. Robin, *The fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and collapse in international system*, 43.
- ³⁸ Bonn Agreement 2002.
- ³⁹ Cyrus Hodes and M. Sedra, "The Search for Security in Post-Taliban Afghanistan," *Rutledge Adelphi Paper* no. 391, 2007. Karzai called it hope for future generations at national symposium for SSR on 30th July 2003.
- ⁴⁰ Jonathan Goodhand and M. Sedra, "Bribes or Bargains? Peace Conditionalties and 'Post-Conflict' Reconstruction in Afghanistan."
- ⁴¹ Barnett R. Rubin, and H. Hamidzada, "From Bonn to London: Governance Challenges and the Future of Statebuilding in Afghanistan," *International Peacekeeping* 14, no. 1 (2007): 8-25. UK took the lead for counter narcotics, Italy for Judicial System, Germany for Police and Japan for DDR.

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- ⁴² Ibid. US also led an overhaul of Ministry of Interior and Police after lackluster progress by Germany.
- ⁴³ Jonathan Goodhand and M. Sedra, "Who Owns the Peace? Aid, Reconstruction and Peacebuilding in Afghanistan," *Disasters* 34 (2010): S178-S102.
- ⁴⁴ Cyrus Hodes and M. Sedra, "The Search for Security in Post-Taliban Afghanistan," Rutledge Adelphi Paper No. 391, 2007.
- ⁴⁵ Ibid.
- ⁴⁶ 'Afghanistan Compact' set a new deadline by asserting that "by the end of 2010, a nationally respected, professional, ethnically balanced Army to be fully established that is democratically accountable, trained and organized to meet the security needs of the country commensurate with the nation's economic capacity"
- ⁴⁷ Jonathan Goodhand and M. Sedra, "Who Owns the Peace? Aid, Reconstruction and Peacebuilding in Afghanistan." Many observers have criticized the 'train and equip' approach towards SSR with an aim to put more "boots on ground".
- ⁴⁸ International Crisis Group, 2010, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/B115-afghanistan-exit-vs-engagement.aspx>.
- ⁴⁹ Anja Manuel and P.W. Singer, "A New Model Afghan Army," *Foreign Affairs* 8, no 4 (2003): 57; and Sven G. Simonsen, "Leaving Security in Safe Hands, Identity, Legitimacy, and Cohesion in the new Afghan and Iraqi Armies," *Third World Quarterly* 30, no. 8 (2009): 1483-1501. Simonsen also notes that Tajiks are still over-represented in the Army Officer Corps.
- ⁵⁰ Hodes and Sedra, *The Search for Security in Post-Taliban Afghanistan* (2007), 58; and Adam Grissom, "Making it up as go along: State Building, Critical theory and military Adaptation in Afghanistan." Both estimates are on the basis of field surveys.
- ⁵¹ Hodes and Sedra, *The Search for Security in Post-Taliban Afghanistan*. Germany spent \$80m between 2002-06 but concentrated more on senior level neglecting the field staff.
- ⁵² Ibid.
- ⁵³ Ibid. US spent total of \$4.6bn on Police training in 2002-08.
- ⁵⁴ Adam Grissom, "Making it up as go along: State Building, Critical theory and military Adaptation in Afghanistan." There are four types of Police forces in Afghanistan i.e. Afghan Civil Police (ACP), *Grandarmirie* type Civil Order Police, Border Police and Specialized Police all under the central government.
- ⁵⁵ International Crisis Group, 2005. Most of the AMF commanders moved their militia men to Police to circumvent the DDR process. The trend was most common in Highway Police which was later disbanded.
- ⁵⁶ Hodes and Sedra, *The Search for Security in Post-Taliban Afghanistan*. It's estimated that 80% of Police officials are involved in drug trade and 70% are illiterate.
- ⁵⁷ Seth G. Jones, "The Rise of Afghanistan Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad."
- ⁵⁸ Peter D. Thrruelsen, "Striking the Right Balance: How to Re-build the Afghan National Police," *International Peacekeeping* 17, no. 1 (2010):80-92.
- ⁵⁹ Andrew Wilder, *Cops or Robbers: The struggle to Reform the Afghan National Police* (Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2007), http://www.areu.org.af/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=39&Itemid=73.

- ⁶⁰ Peter Middlebrook and S. Miller, "From Compact to Impact: Defining Joint Donor Response to the 2008," (paper, Paris conference on Afghanistan, March 2010), http://www.geopolicity.com/upload/content/pub_1287582893_regular.pdf.
- ⁶¹ Jonathan Goodhand and M. Sedra, "Bribes or Bargains? Peace Conditionalities and 'Post-Conflict' Reconstruction in Afghanistan."
- ⁶² Ibid.
- ⁶³ Barnett R. Rubin, and H. Hamidzada, "From Bonn to London: Governance Challenges and the Future of Statebuilding in Afghanistan." Government of Afghanistan only responded by re-creating the Taliban era's 'notorious' ministry of 'prohibition of vice and enforcement of virtue' which was responsible for egregious human rights violations and suppression of women.
- ⁶⁴ Goodhand and Sedra, "Bribes or Bargains? Peace Conditionalities and 'Post-Conflict' Reconstruction in Afghanistan," 87.
- ⁶⁵ Thomas Barfield, N. Nojumi and A. Their, *The Clash of Two Goods: State and Non-State Dispute Resolution* (Washington DC: United States Institute for Peace, 2006), 6. Authors note that post-Taliban system remains a shambolic array of dysfunctional courts, ad-hoc elders' councils and rule by local strong men.
- ⁶⁶ Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh and M. Schoiswohl, "Playing with Fire? The International Community's Democratization Experiment in Afghanistan," 255. Rome Conference was convened in 2007 and donor support of \$360M was pledged.
- ⁶⁷ Barnett R. Rubin, and H. Hamidzada, "From Bonn to London: Governance Challenges and the Future of Statebuilding in Afghanistan," 17.
- ⁶⁸ Adam Roberts, "Doctrine and Reality in Afghanistan," *Survival* 51, no. 1 (2009): 29-60. Robert also points to absence of justice sector from US counter-insurgency manual. See also Saleh "Strategy of insurgents in Afghanistan" quoted in Seth G. Jones, "The Rise of Afghanistan Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad."
- ⁶⁹ Watson, *The Times*, Dec 18, 2006.
- ⁷⁰ Steven A. Zyck, "Former Combatant Re-Integration and Fragmentation in Contemporary Afghanistan," *Conflict, Security and Development* 9, no. 1 (2009): 111-131.
- ⁷¹ Bonn Agreement, Dec 2001. The agreement only said about DDR that "upon the official transfer of power, afghan armed forces and armed groups in the country shall come under the command and control of the Interim Authority, be re-organized according to the requirement of the new Afghan security and armed forces"
- ⁷² Ibid.
- ⁷³ Roger Mac Ginty, "Warlords and the Liberal Peace: State-Building in Afghanistan."
- ⁷⁴ Sultan Barakat, and S.A Zyck, "Afghanistan's Insurgency and the Viability of a Political Settlement," 194; and Sven G. Simonsen, "Leaving Security in Safe Hands, Identity, Legitimacy, and Cohesion in the new Afghan and Iraqi Armies," 1488.
- ⁷⁵ Barnett R. Rubin, and H. Hamidzada, "From Bonn to London: Governance Challenges and the Future of Statebuilding in Afghanistan," 15.
- ⁷⁶ Matan Chorev and Jake Sherman, "The Prospects for Security and Political Reconciliation in Afghanistan: Local, National and foreign Perspectives," (Workshop Report, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, Cambridge, May 2010), <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/reconciliation-afghanistan.pdf>. Report

- also notes that 50 % of “reconciles” of US military’s outreach program were not found genuine according to a UN study.
- ⁷⁷ Steven A. Zyck, “Former Combatant Re-Integration and Fragmentation in Contemporary Afghanistan,” 114. UNAMA estimated the militia members figure as 94,000 but the Defense Ministry put the figure at 250,000.
- ⁷⁸ Michael Bhatia and M. Sedra, *Afghanistan, Arms and Conflict; Armed Groups, disarmament and security in a post-war society* (London and New York: Rutledge, 2008), 16.
- ⁷⁹ Seth G. Jones and A. Munoz, *Afghanistan’s Local War: Building Local Defense Forces* (RAND, 2010).
- ⁸⁰ Adam Grissom, “Making it up as go along: State Building, Critical theory and military Adaptation in Afghanistan,” 498.
- ⁸¹ *Ibid*, 503.
- ⁸² Mathew Waldman, *Aid Effectiveness in Afghanistan* (Kabul: Agency Coordinating Body for Afghanistan Relief, 2008), [http://www.acbar.org/ACBAR%20Publications/ACBAR%20Aid%20Effectiveness%20\(25%20Mar%202008\).pdf](http://www.acbar.org/ACBAR%20Publications/ACBAR%20Aid%20Effectiveness%20(25%20Mar%202008).pdf).
- ⁸³ Jeffery Dressler and C. Forsberg, *The Quetta Shura Taliban in Southern Afghanistan: Organistation, Operations and Shadow Governance* (Washington DC: Institute for Study of War, 2010), http://www.understandingwar.org/files/QuettaShuraTaliban_1.pdf.
- ⁸⁴ Barnett R. Rubin and A. Rashid, “From Great Game to Great Bargain,” *Foreign Affairs* 87, no. 6 (2008): 30-44.
- ⁸⁵ Barnett R. Rubin, and H. Hamidzada, “From Bonn to London: Governance Challenges and the Future of Statebuilding in Afghanistan,” 181; and Goodhand and Sedra, “Bribes or Bargains? Peace Conditionalities and ‘Post-Conflict’ Reconstruction in Afghanistan,” 47.
- ⁸⁶ B. R. Rubin and A. Rashid, “From Great Game to Great Bargain.”
- ⁸⁷ Peter Middlebrook and S. Miller, “From Compact to Impact: Defining Joint Donor Response to the 2008.”
- ⁸⁸ Adam Grissom, “Making it up as go along: State Building, Critical theory and military Adaptation in Afghanistan,” 87; and Goodhand and Sedra, “Bribes or Bargains? Peace Conditionalities and ‘Post-Conflict’ Reconstruction in Afghanistan,” 47.
- ⁸⁹ Goodhand and Sedra, “Bribes or Bargains? Peace Conditionalities and ‘Post-Conflict’ Reconstruction in Afghanistan,” 46. The individual militia commanders are given \$10,000 per month.
- ⁹⁰ Antonio Giustozzi, “Afghanistan: Transition without End, An Analytical Narrative on State-Making.” He has estimated the number of regular force during Zahir Shah’s period as 80,000 which was used in three coups i.e. 1973, 1978 & 1979 and strength of regular army under Rabbani in 1995 was 70,000.
- ⁹¹ Mark Sedra, “Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan: The Slide towards Expediency,” *International Peacekeeping* 13, no. 1 (2006): 94-110.
- ⁹² Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh and M. Schoiswohl, “Playing with Fire? The International Community’s Democratization Experiment in Afghanistan.”
- ⁹³ Thomas Barfield, *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010).

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- ⁹⁴ Jonathan Goodhand and D. Mansfield, "Drugs and (Dis)Order: A Study of the Opium Trade, Political Settlement and State-Building in Afghanistan," Crisis States Center LSE, Working Paper Series 2, Paper No 83, Nov 2010. Authors argue that the Bonn agreement's failure to reflect de-facto regional power structures led to fuelling of insurgency especially from Pakistani side
- ⁹⁵ Stephen D. Krasner, "Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States," *International Security* 129, no. 2 (2007): 85-120.
- ⁹⁶ Andrew Reynolds, "The Curious Case of Afghanistan," *Journal of Democracy* 17, no. 2 (2006): 104-117. SNTV system aims at exclusion of Politic parties from the electoral process by making one province as single constituency and allocating a number of seats which in case of Afghanistan are 2 to 33(for Kabul) but a person can only cast his vote for one candidate thus making its impossible for political parties to field candidates.
- ⁹⁷ The system is used only in Jordon, Vanuatu, and Pitcarin islands and is suitable for small constituencies having less then 4 candidates and is not generally desirable as a mean for turning votes to seats in a democracy
- ⁹⁸ Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh and M. Schoiswohl, "Playing with Fire? The International Community's Democratization Experiment in Afghanistan," 257.
- ⁹⁹ Goodhand and Sedra, "Bribes or Bargains? Peace Conditionalities and 'Post-Conflict' Reconstruction in Afghanistan," 50.
- ¹⁰⁰ Andrew Wilder, *A House Divided? Analyzing the 2005 Afghan Elections* (Kabul: AERU, 2005), http://www.areu.org.af/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=39&Itemid=73.
- ¹⁰¹ Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh and M. Schoiswohl, "Playing with Fire? The International Community's Democratization Experiment in Afghanistan," 261.
- ¹⁰² Rani D. Mullen, "Afghanistan in 2009: Trying to Pull Back from the Brink," 31. The turnout was 70% in 2004, 53% in 2005. Latest parliamentary elections manifested the stellar level of fraud in which around one million votes rejected and results announced after considerable delay with the tussle still on.
- ¹⁰³ Seth G. Jones, "The Rise of Afghanistan Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad."
- ¹⁰⁴ Thomas H. Johnson, "Afghanistan's Post-Taliban Transition: The State of State-Building After war," *Central Asian Survey* 25 (2006): 1-26.
- ¹⁰⁵ Ibid.
- ¹⁰⁶ A. Roberts, "Doctrine and Reality in Afghanistan," 49.
- ¹⁰⁷ Goodhand and Sedra, "Bribes or Bargains? Peace Conditionalities and 'Post-Conflict' Reconstruction in Afghanistan," 49.
- ¹⁰⁸ Sara Lister, "Understanding State-Building and Local Government in Afghanistan."
- ¹⁰⁹ Barnett R. Rubin, A. Saikal and J. Lindley-French, "The Way Forward in Afghanistan : Three Views," *Survival* 51, no. 1 (2009): 83-96.
- ¹¹⁰ Sara Lister, "Understanding State-Building and Local Government in Afghanistan," 12.
- ¹¹¹ Barnett R. Rubin, and H. Hamidzada, "From Bonn to London: Governance Challenges and the Future of Statebuilding in Afghanistan," 19; and Sara Lister, "Understanding State-Building and Local Government in Afghanistan," 6. Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) is responsible for the 'peripheral'

- areas but their role is limited to centrally supervise programs like National Solidarity Program (NSP) by approving specific projects
- ¹¹² Ibid. PRTs were supposed to “assist Afghanistan to extend its authority and enable SSR and reconstruction efforts
- ¹¹³ Touko Piiparinen, “A Clash of Mindsets? An insider account of Provincial Reconstruction Teams,” *International Peacekeeping* 14, no. 1 (2007): 143-157. Piiparinen was Finnish diplomat who served as international representative on one of the PRTs.
- ¹¹⁴ “Governance matters,” a World Bank report, 2006.
- ¹¹⁵ A World Bank report in 2005.
- ¹¹⁶ R. Mullen “Afghanistan in 2009: Trying to Pull Back from the Brink,” 133. A graphic example of state of governance was seen when a person who had served time in US prison for drug trafficking was made governor of a province Two of the starkest examples of corruption include the involvement of Central Bank head in plundering the assets and seizure of US\$50Million from Ahmed Shah Massoud’s brother at the airport.
- ¹¹⁷ Seth G. Jones, “The Rise of Afghanistan Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad.”
- ¹¹⁸ Barnett R. Rubin, “(Re)Building Afghanistan: The Folly of Stateless Democracy,” *Current History* (April 2004): 167.
- ¹¹⁹ Ibid. Rubin has aptly remarked about Karzai and his ministers “They are Pashtuns and they are leaders but they are not leaders of Pashtuns. They do not have those networks that make political base in Afghanistan’
- ¹²⁰ Matan Chorev and Jake Sherman, “The Prospects for Security and Political Reconciliation in Afghanistan: Local, National and foreign Perspectives;” and Sara Lister, “Understanding State-Building and Local Government in Afghanistan,” 5.
- ¹²¹ Ibid, Chorev and Sherman.
- ¹²² Barnett R. Rubin, “(Re)Building Afghanistan: The Folly of Stateless Democracy,” 166.
- ¹²³ Many observers put the number of Hekmatyar affiliates in parliament at 40.
- ¹²⁴ An International Crisis Group report in 2007.
- ¹²⁵ Jonathan Goodhand and M. Sedra, “Who Owns the Peace? Aid, Reconstruction and Peacebuilding in Afghanistan,” 91. The ANDS document was penned by international consultants and reflected donor goals rather than Afghan needs
- ¹²⁶ Sultan Barakat, A. Giustazzi, C. Langton, M. Murphy, M. Sedra and A. Strand, *A Strategic conflict Assessment of Afghanistan* (London: Department for International Development, 2008), 65.
- ¹²⁷ Goodhand and Sedra, “Bribes or Bargains? Peace Conditionalities and ‘Post-Conflict’ Reconstruction in Afghanistan,” 43; and Barnett R. Rubin, and H. Hamidzada, “From Bonn to London: Governance Challenges and the Future of Statebuilding in Afghanistan,” 175-185.
- ¹²⁸ Per capita assistance for Afghanistan is one third of Iraqi assistance and one twelfth of what was provided in Bosnia a decade ago. Dobbins et al, America’s role in nation building.
- ¹²⁹ Mathew Waldman, *Aid Effectiveness in Afghanistan*.
- ¹³⁰ Hodes and Sedra, *The Search for Security in Post-Taliban Afghanistan* (2010), 85.

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- ¹³¹ Mathew Waldon, *Aid Effectiveness in Afghanistan*, 10; and Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh and M. Schoiswohl, "Playing with Fire? The International Community's Democratization Experiment in Afghanistan," 258.
- ¹³² Barnett R. Rubin, and H. Hamidzada, "From Bonn to London: Governance Challenges and the Future of Statebuilding in Afghanistan," 23.
- ¹³³ Ibid, 51.
- ¹³⁴ Peter Middlebrook and S. Miller, "From Compact to Impact: Defining Joint Donor Response to the 2008."
- ¹³⁵ The DAD database can be assessed at <http://dadafghanistan.gov.af/>.
- ¹³⁶ James K. Boyce and M. O'Donnel, *Peace and the Public Purse: Economic Policies for Postwar State building* (Bolder CO: Lynne Reinner, 2007).
- ¹³⁷ Jonathan Goodhand and M. Sedra, "Who Owns the Peace? Aid, Reconstruction and Peacebuilding in Afghanistan," 89.
- ¹³⁸ "AfPak Regional stabilization Strategy," US Department of State, 2010.
- ¹³⁹ Mathew Waldman, *Aid Effectiveness in Afghanistan*.
- ¹⁴⁰ Astri Suhrke, "Reconstruction as Modernization: The 'Post-Conflict' Project in Afghanistan," 1301.
- ¹⁴¹ William Byrd, *Responding to Afghanistan's development challenge: An assessment of Experience during 2002-2007 and Issues and Priorities for the Future* (Washington DC: World Bank, 2007); and Barnett R. Rubin, and H. Hamidzada, "From Bonn to London: Governance Challenges and the Future of Statebuilding in Afghanistan," 17.
- ¹⁴² Astri Suhrke, "Reconstruction as Modernization: The 'Post-Conflict' Project in Afghanistan," 1301. It has been estimated that local war lords collect more taxes for their own use than for re-imburement to the central government.
- ¹⁴³ Quoted in Sultan Barakat, and S.A Zyck, "Afghanistan's Insurgency and the Viability of a Political Settlement," 194.
- ¹⁴⁴ Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, "Conflicted Outcomes and Values (Neo) Liberal Peace in Central Asia and Afghanistan," *International Peacekeeping* 16, no. 5 (2009): 635-651.
- ¹⁴⁵ Steven A. Zyck, "Former Combatant Re-Integration and Fragmentation in Contemporary Afghanistan;" and Barnett R. Rubin, and H. Hamidzada, "From Bonn to London: Governance Challenges and the Future of Statebuilding in Afghanistan," 21.
- ¹⁴⁶ "AfPak Regional stabilization Strategy," US Department of State, 2010. The agriculture strategy is called "civilian-military agri-development strategy" and focuses on 'raid response' and 'quick impact' projects.
- ¹⁴⁷ Barnett R. Rubin, et al., "Building a New Afghanistan: The Value of Success, the Cost of Failure," Center on International Cooperation, Policy Paper, 2004), 19.
- ¹⁴⁸ James Dobbins, et al., *America's Role in Nation Building: From Germany to Iraq* (Washington DC: RAND Corporation, 2003), 12.
- ¹⁴⁹ William Byrd, *Responding to Afghanistan's development challenge: An assessment of Experience during 2002-2007 and Issues and Priorities for the Future*.
- ¹⁵⁰ Barnett R. Rubin, and H. Hamidzada, "From Bonn to London: Governance Challenges and the Future of Statebuilding in Afghanistan," 20.
- ¹⁵¹ Goodhand and Sedra, "Bribes or Bargains? Peace Conditionalities and 'Post-Conflict' Reconstruction in Afghanistan," 43.

- ¹⁵² Jonathan Goodhand and M. Sedra, "Who Owns the Peace? Aid, Reconstruction and Peacebuilding in Afghanistan."
- ¹⁵³ Barnett R. Rubin, and H. Hamidzada, "From Bonn to London: Governance Challenges and the Future of Statebuilding in Afghanistan," 21.
- ¹⁵⁴ Jonathan Goodhand and M. Sedra, "Who Owns the Peace? Aid, Reconstruction and Peacebuilding in Afghanistan," 80.
- ¹⁵⁵ Alexander Cooley and J. Ron, "The NGO Scramble. Organisational Insecurity and the Political Economy of Transnational Action," *International Security* 27, no. 1 (2002): 5-39.
- ¹⁵⁶ Steven A. Zyck, "Former Combatant Re-Integration and Fragmentation in Contemporary Afghanistan," 125.
- ¹⁵⁷ Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh and M. Schoiswohl, "Playing with Fire? The International Community's Democratization Experiment in Afghanistan," 25. Authors also put the informal figure of below poverty line as 50%. See also UNDP Human Development Report for 2009. Life expectancy is stagnant at 43 as compared to 64 in the region, Infant Mortality of 200 per thousand, one out of five children is malnourished and only 12% have access to clean drinking water and sanitation.
- ¹⁵⁸ Barnett R. Rubin, and H. Hamidzada, "From Bonn to London: Governance Challenges and the Future of Statebuilding in Afghanistan," 20.
- ¹⁵⁹ Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, "Conflicted Outcomes and Values (Neo) Liberal Peace in Central Asia and Afghanistan," 648.
- ¹⁶⁰ International Crisis Group noted in 2010 that the exit strategy sounds fairly simple; try to pound the Taliban, build support by protecting civilians, turn disillusioned Taliban over to the government, and create resilient security forces ; but the problem is that none of this is working.
- ¹⁶¹ Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh and M. Schoiswohl, "Playing with Fire? The International Community's Democratization Experiment in Afghanistan," 253.

The Process of Radicalization: Contextualizing the Case of Pakistan

Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi

To be a radical is to be the extreme relative to something that is defined or accepted as normative, traditional, or valued as the status quo; it is a total departure from the mainstream political thought of a society or group. However, radicalization gets clarified only by its association with extremism within the context that one is looking for. Nobody consents to being labeled as an extremist, no matter how radical their worldview, and thus the term lacks contextualization by ownership. Extremism is the link in the chain which terminates in violence, though extremism does not necessarily have to overtly manifest itself; an extremist thought process by itself contributes to the radicalization of society. It is arguably even more dangerous than express manifestations of radicalization, since it insidiously finds its way into the mind of the citizen. Talibanization is just one example of manifestations of extremism in Pakistan, since it is not just an overtly expressed set of behaviors, but a thought process as well which can translate into action. Though this may not necessarily happen in the case of many citizens of Pakistan who are exposed to this phenomenon, the potential for instilling extremist ideals which may translate into action cannot be ignored.

The threat from extremism labelled radicalization is also usually defined as a process whereby an originally moderate individual or group of individuals becomes progressively more extreme in their thinking, and possibly their behavior, over time. For the purpose of this study Flaherty's definition of radicalization¹ suffices, since it encompasses the entire spectrum of extreme responses that one would want in order to contextualize terrorism in Pakistan. This implies a sense of futility evoking desperate measures, wherein destruction of the existing order is seen as a desirable goal, which precludes any compromises or power sharing. This would seem to hold true from the Taliban insurgency to militant organizations to individuals which wish to deconstruct the existing order to bring about a new one, without clear notions of the trajectory of such processes beyond a hazy concept of implementation of Shariah.

There is a sense of emergency and urgency in the radicalized population, wherein the ends justify the means. The reason for choosing this particular definition was due to its underlying prospect of violent change exerting its own inherent appeal, which seemed a good benchmark for the study. Thus, even when power sharing in forms of negotiated compromises was on the table for insurgent populations in Pakistan such as the Taliban, they preferred continuation of violence, which in essence was an end rather than the means to an end. In all these processes, individuals changed from a state of passiveness or activism to become more revolutionary, militant or extremist. This radicalization is often associated with youth, adversity, alienation, social exclusion, poverty, or perceptions of injustice to oneself or others.

Why is radicalization dangerous? This can be explained from observation of ideologues and instigators of extremist movements, who tend to rely on “black-or-white” or “all-or-none” thinking to direct the radicalization process.² A cognitive divide of social perceptions is created between elements supportive of extremism and the 'others', namely, people outside one's social and ideological group or “in-group”.³ Violence toward the 'out' group can thus be facilitated by thinking of its members as being justifiably excluded from the moral considerations one would impact upon members of one's own group, making violence morally sanctionable. This can also be done by resorting to a higher legal sanction than man-made law, bringing divine sanction and ideology into play. The perception that a shunned social category is outside the boundaries of the in group's sphere of morality can free individuals to become morally disengaged in their behavioral interactions with members of the social category so shunned.⁴

Notwithstanding the attention paid to radicalization as a precursor to terrorism or even a “root cause” of terrorism and socio-political violence, it is widely agreed that although radicalization predisposes to such violence it does not essentially have to necessitate it. For instance, according to a Global Futures Forum (GFF) report, “radicalization is a process, not an end unto itself, and it does not necessarily lead to violence”.⁵ Simply put, radicalization cannot be a sufficient cause of terrorism because most radicals are not terrorists, but the entrenchment of radicalization processes within terrorists indicates its associations with terrorism. This may be why the term violent radicalization is often encountered in discourse on terrorism, since radicalization by itself is insufficient to explain the trajectories of terrorism. If

violence were indeed necessitated by radicalization, the qualified term would simply be redundant. Prevalent terms such as violent radicalization or militant radicalization thus tend to qualify certain forms of radicalization with violence to elucidate the association of radicalization with violence.

Another layer of contextualization to radicalization also needs to be added; there is a commonly observed tendency to conceive of radicalization in terms solely of ideology. Religious zealotry, extremism and militancy, or whatever one prefers to call them, are often associated with retrogressive barbarism, lack of education and absence of a civilized mindset which is deemed the very opposite of what is considered 'modern'. This recourse to colonial binaries is as retrogressive as radicalization itself, and even resembles the social cognitive division process as mentioned above.

Instead of trying to analyze radicalization as some kind of inherent flaw within a particular people, religion, culture or belief system, it is advisable to examine the trajectories of the political economy of radicalization, so that some variables can be identified. This is the same process that scholars have used to differentiate between Islam and Islamism, as essentially the conflicts between competing social classes attempting to establish their hegemony and deploying religion, or a specific form of it, to justify their position in the social and economic hierarchies.⁶ Thus, Islamism, which is a form of radicalization and representative of it, provides an ideological cover for class-based privilege and exploitation; arguably, radicalization consists of the same process constructs as its subcategory of Islamism.

It is also necessary to clarify the association of ideology with radicalization at the outset, since the debate about ideology being the major construct of radicalization rages on. The simplifications of complex issues into binary oppositions which create a visceral impact are a characteristic of ideologies, especially when they tend to articulate a set of grievances of one set of people against the other.⁷ This is also the predominant process within radicalization.

This is the contextual paradigm of ideology that resonates within paradigms of terrorism in Pakistan, wherein the terrorists have used a reductionist worldview to whittle down complex socio-economic, geostrategic and political problems into essentially a contest between good and evil. Thus, there are hardly any grey areas for terrorists in Pakistan, i.e., a fellow citizen

not following the terrorist ideology is clearly a *murtid*, one who has turned away from true faith as perceived by one school of thought or sect against the other.

The need for action which edifies the spirit and allows the ideology to grow has been a common theme within anarchism, fascism, communism, and for the purpose of this study, Islamism.⁸ When there is a conducive environment that induces a sense of emasculation or despair, ideology can provide not only a source of solace, but an impetus for action for populations undergoing stress. Thus, venting of grievances through the platform of ideology, whether it is Jihadism, Salafism, Takfir or any other, has the potential of making the message resonate to other persons undergoing similar stimuli. Since an ideology is self replicating, it would have the potential of attracting more converts, and in essence it is actually more powerful than the violent behavior that it inculcates. In the context of Pakistan, this means that extremist terrorist ideologies are the overarching paradigm which drive and also foster terrorism, and in many cases radicalization.

Regardless of the processes exerting influence on a radical, who we shall refer to later, it is necessary to understand the dynamics of the process. Some scholars, such as Marc Sageman,⁹ hold the view that radicalization does not follow any fixed sequence, while others, like Silber and Bhatt, tend to view radicalization as a path which may lead to terrorism based upon a clearly demarcated series of stages.¹⁰ One of the prevalent models is a four-stage model, which includes pre-radicalization, self-identification, indoctrination, and “jihadization”, respectively. Sequential models such as this one essentially represent radicalization as key transition points along a time course, leading from the normal life of individuals to their departure from the mainstream centre of society.

It also needs to be realized that a single variable is not always enough to radicalize individuals. For example, religion as an ideology or set of ideologies is often unthinkingly invoked as the paramount disposing factor behind radicalization in Pakistan, without taking into account the fact that issues of terrorism and extremism do not arise from ideology alone. Rather, the problems that Pakistan is confronted with also arise from fundamental socio-economic and class inequalities, which have allowed the ruling classes to espouse, promote and encourage orthodox, rigid and fundamentalist

versions of religion, as opposed to the more tolerant, peaceful ones that the dispossessed classes reflect. As Pakistan redefined its identity by invoking the Arabian origins of Islam during the Afghan Jihad heydays, the relatively more tolerant, syncretic and peaceful strands of Islam in South Asia have been increasingly replaced by harsh, literalist and bland versions of Arabian Islam amongst an extremist fringe.

Contextualizing Variables for Radicalization in Pakistan

Youth Bulge and Economic Disparity

Another layer of contextualization also needs to be added with regards to the demographic variables affecting this radicalization, if it indeed is a process. Radicalization does not affect all classes homogenously, but has had a more observable effect on Pakistan's youth. This youth bulge of Pakistan's population between ages 15-24 is estimated at 36 million, while a staggeringly high number of 58 million individuals are below the age of 15.¹¹ Together, they make up nearly 60 percent of Pakistan's population, a proportion that is second only to Yemen,¹² with the added variable of Pakistan having a male cohort that is larger than its female counterpart. This is particularly relevant in the sense that the literature on youth radicalization is focused almost solely on males. Even though fertility rates in the country have decreased modestly, the current rate of 3.8 births per female will carry Pakistan's youth bulge well beyond 2025, giving a projected estimate of Pakistan's population under the age of 24 reaching 51.4 percent of the total in 2030.¹³

High unemployment and income disparity have all the potential for young Pakistanis to be swayed towards radicalization, and add support for militant agendas from among the Pakistani populace. This income disparity has manifested itself by the ratio of the highest to the lowest income quintiles ranging from 3.76 in 2001 to 4.15 in 2005, and further to 4.2 in 2005-06. The high level of underemployment for the young from lower socio-economic classes causes an escalating strain. While the growing economy has expanded the labor market, and the unemployment rate has declined to around 5.32 percent, the modest improvement cannot cope with the rapidly expanding youth bulge. This alienates the poor segment of the youth bulge, since the majority of non-elite young men can only find relatively menial, unfulfilling jobs.¹⁴ Radicalization is one of the ways that the poor and the dispossessed

find voice, since the path to radicalization demands action to challenge the status quo, often in the form of violent activism. This violent action may become terrorism in its extreme manifestations, or smolder within the non-elite youth in the form of extremism. Thus, presuming radicalization to be a process and also assuming certain Pakistani demographic segments to be more vulnerable to it than others, one can draw up empirical frameworks of how individuals in Pakistan tend to get radicalised, and then populate these frameworks with data.

Polarization of Education

There has also been a radicalization polemic inherent within the educational system in Pakistan. While education is a universal panacea for many social evils, it can also be used as a tool-kit to influence minds and mould attitudes, sometimes in the form of a return to traditional values, or as a pretext of 'saving the children from degenerate cultural influences'. If this presumption is accepted that education can change a nation's ethos, then a distortion of educational policy should logically have the ability to disrupt the thought processes of the students, especially in a post-colonial society. This is because post-colonial societies and newly emerged states usually struggle between a need to preserve a heritage which has often been a motivating cause of their creation, and change from outside which is often seen as imposition of a colonizer's thought processes.¹⁵ This urgently felt need of inculcating a sense of collective identity, to protect the fledgling nation state from forces which are perceived to threaten that identity, often creates acute insecurity. This tension is intensely felt in the educational discourse, curricula, theories and institutional practices in such states.

Pakistan started out with a narrow technical base, and thus with the prevailing ideology of development being the goal, a large number of institutions of technical education were established. These institutions enjoyed many incentives such as massive tax holidays.¹⁶ This development-oriented worldview also found expression in the curriculum of the 1950s, which tended to focus on nationalism perceived in futuristic and modernist terms.¹⁷ Rather than a tangible foe, the enemies were "ignorance, backwardness, parochialism, corruption, black marketing, superstition and lack of industry".¹⁸ At the same time the focus was more outward looking as well, since Pakistan was expected to compete on par with the comity of

nations. The vision of the government of the day was that narrow nationalism in the modern world was not enough; and if the child was given only that, it would be a disservice to him.¹⁹ Military ruler Ayub Khan was himself a proponent of such reform; this is illustrated by his comments that 'when nationalism, in its extreme form, takes charge, human reasoning gets second place'.²⁰ This perception was conducive to producing a much more forward looking curriculum than would appear later, emphasizing multiculturalism and recognizing the tempering effects of humanity on ideology.

The succeeding state of insecurity in the 1960s and the 70s culminated in Ziaul Haq's efforts to reform the curriculum according to a particular worldview; this radically altered the curriculum, particularly social sciences. Zia's educational policy of 1979 stated that the highest priority would be given to the revision of the curricula with a view to reorganizing the entire content around Islamic thought and giving education an ideological orientation so that Islamic ideology permeates the thinking of the younger generation and helps them with the necessary conviction and ability to refashion society according to Islamic tenets.²¹

Thus, curriculum revision committees were set into motion to marginalize what would be conceived as disruptive forces of parochialism and religious diversion. The Afghan Jihad also precipitated a mindset in which the most militarized entities were most useful, which shifted the emphasis towards a more martial ideology of an exclusionary Sunni state much on the model of Iran as a Shia one.²²

In the succeeding democratic governments, hardly any comprehensive educational policy emerged; the 1998 educational policy demonstrated the largely continued practices: "educational policy and particularly its ideological aspect enjoys the most vital place in the socio-economic milieu and moral framework of a country...We are not a country founded on its territorial, linguistic, ethnic or racial identity. The only justification for our existence is our total commitment to Islam as our identity. Although the previous educational policies did dilate on Islamic education and Pakistan Ideology but those policies did not suggest how to translate the Islamic Ideology into our moral profile and the educational system."²³ This is the thought process which still continues to shape the curriculum, particularly the social studies throughout Pakistan today.

While many apologists more or less correctly point out that there is no inherent material in the social studies textbooks that explicitly glorifies the violent form of jihad,²⁴ the effect of a polarized historiography on immature minds cannot be ignored away. Contextualizing the shaping of attitudes from this process, one can induce why this polarized process is dangerous and has the ability to radicalize students in a society. This can be explained with reference to the above mentioned “black-or-white” or “all-or-none” thinking to direct the radicalization process.²⁵ A cognitive divide of social perceptions is created between elements supportive of extremism and the ‘others’, namely, people outside one’s social and ideological group or “in-group”.²⁶

Since the elite classes in Pakistan have abandoned the public education system, relying instead on a mainly English-speaking private sector, a wider divergence of educational discourses has become all the more evident. While all schools are bound to follow similar syllabi in subjects such as Pakistan Studies, even then a number of private schools now encourage objectivity and creative thinking among students, which is done by reliance on histories more open to interpretation. This stratification of Pakistan's educational infrastructure has created significant divergences of worldviews which are representative of their curriculum design, whether by design or by default. Madrassa students tend to gravitate more toward jihad, a weltanschauung arguably created by their educational discourse and its emphasis on strict ritualism, and no margin for objective thinking. Public school or Urdu-medium students are comparably more tolerant, but still have imbibed radical ideas as illustrated by Christine Fair in her seminal works. The private sector educated elite children have more leeway for objective thinking, but tend to relate little with the two more mainstream student streams.²⁷

This trend of polarization springing from dynamics of education also effectively contributes to a widening social divide, which the extremist project exploits by manipulating a social and opinion leadership vacuum. Thus, this has the tendency to promote a ‘class war mentality’ in which a culturally ‘centrist’ class is increasingly wedged in between an indifferent secular elite and an activist ultra-right,²⁸ which may force this centre to choose sides. Since the elites do not identify with this centre either, the radicals are the more natural partner due to being more accessible.²⁹ As Denoeux puts it: “when one focuses on their fundamental convictions, their most cherished values, and the kind of society and political order they aspire to create, moderates

have far more in common with radicals than they do with Western-style democracies” (which is what the secular elite essentially promote).³⁰

Democratic Deficit

Authoritarian politics in Pakistan has also affected this radicalization process; it has often been argued that since democracy came late to Pakistan and has faced numerous difficulties, this allowed the processes initiated by Ziaul Haq to take root. It has also been argued that dictatorships have tended to enable the incumbent government to adopt repressive measures and ultimately abolish democracy itself, since these movements were used by governments to justify the continuation of repressive policies. Such arguments were accepted by Western states which feared that radical Islamists, upon assuming power, would also turn against their interests.

These regimes ostensibly inculcated virulent anti-American rhetoric in place of political dissent.³¹ Thus, by analogy to the Middle East, the conclusion was quickly drawn that the democratic deficit in Pakistan had contributed to the emergence of Islamist terrorism. However, this is notwithstanding the fact that the transition from dictatorship to democracy has often been turbulent and that ‘more than a few established democracies have struggled with persistent terrorist threats.’³² Many scholars have argued on both sides of the spectrum; Mohammed Hafez’s ‘Why Muslims Rebel’ and Jennifer Noyon’s ‘Islam, Politics and Pluralism’,³³ for example, argue for a connection between the absence of democratic politics and Islamist violence and radicalization. Hafez documents Muslim rebellions which resulted from institutional exclusion and discrimination, while Noyon argues that Islam and democracy are compatible, and that democratic participation by Islamists discourages radicalization. Indeed, studies on democracy and terrorism (which is an extreme form of radicalization) do not demonstrate a simple causal relationship between the lack of democracy and terrorism anywhere in the world, as a seminal work by Martha Crenshaw suggests.³⁴ She built her premise on Luigi Bonanate’s works, arguing terrorism and radicalization to be a result of retaliation in ‘blocked’ societies resistant to innovation.³⁵ Similarly, surveying the American political scene, Christopher Hewitt concludes that ‘the resort to violence is most likely to take place when members of a group have their hopes and aspirations raised, but then become disillusioned with the political process.’³⁶

Honor as an Ideology, Globalization and Tribalism

Why is Pakistan so radicalized? Besides other explanations, one could argue that the exaggerated trajectories of Islamism are the reaction of a world influenced by the response of traditional cultures to globalization. The reaction is a mixture of bewilderment, anger, fascination, incomprehension, confusion, seduction and violent hatred with Western modernity. The Islamic world to a great extent still holds on to tribal and cliquish emotive sentiments of group loyalty or social solidarity. Akbar S. Ahmed has hypothesized that the onslaught of globalization has caused an exaggerated variant of group loyalty to emerge, which he has termed 'Hyper Assabiyya'.³⁷ He suggests that this exaggerated group loyalty can become the basis of identification with Muslims under peril anywhere in the world, which can be a cause for emergence of 'fundamentalism'.

The warped identity of social solidarity indeed revolves around a distorted perception of honor, which is diametrically opposed to the commonly held perceptions of honor as chivalry. It is this metamorphosis of honor as the exaggerated feeling of group solidarity of Islamism, based upon a perception of grave necessity of redemption of this violated collective honor, which arguably contributes to radicalization in Pakistan. This is one of the responses to globalization that the society in Pakistan is trying to come to terms with, which also needs to be understood.³⁸

A much more connected and communicative world has made the Muslims think that they had been victimized in conflicts left over from centuries of European wars and from decolonization. The perpetual Palestine problem and the thorny Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan were seen as legacies of blatant colonial aggression. Chechnya, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, etc., were seen as avoidable human tragedies, if it were not for the intransigence of the western powers, which were perceived to have acted disproportionately quickly in the Gulf War as opposed to these orphan conflicts. Thus, hegemony over oil was perceived to have overtaken human rights interests. This started to be a widespread perception in the Muslim world.

The post-1973 oil shock era also ushered in a time of intensifying strains, faltering ideologies and crumbling institutions, wherein the vacuum needed

to be filled. Islamism provided such an alternative due to "... an emotionally familiar basis of group identity, solidarity, and exclusion; an acceptable basis of legitimacy and authority; an immediately intelligible formulation of principles for both a critique of the present and a program for the future. By means of these, Islam could provide the most effective symbols and slogans for mobilization, whether for or against a cause or a regime."³⁹

Although globalization has brought undeniable benefits to the world, for many in the developing societies globalization is synonymous to Armageddon, as explained by Dr Mahathir Mohammad:⁴⁰ "Muslims and Muslim countries are faced with a tremendous and frightening challenge. Globalization in the form that it takes now is a threat against us and our religion."⁴¹ Globalization has unfortunately also been an agent of despair, particularly for Muslim societies: "I try very hard to be optimistic about the Muslims in the 21st century of the third millennium of the Christian era," confesses Dr. Mahathir Mohammad. "But I must admit that it is very difficult for me to be optimistic. I find few Muslims understand reality."⁴²

The modern Muslim nation-states are legacies from the era of Anglo-French imperial domination and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and have thus had their boundaries redrawn by colonial powers, which sometimes cut straight across the tribal and rural heartlands, separating a particular tribe, caste or religious minority across a line or divide. Imposed boundaries of this kind are bound to create a stronger feeling of group solidarity in a group which feels that it has been sequestered. The fact that there exists a cognitive dissonance between the past and the present, the unified empires of yore and the squabbling Muslim nation-states of the present, creates an opportunity for the alarmist to play upon these sentiments by highlighting this "fall from grace". This perception is heightened by the fact that the unified Muslim polity of state and religion is currently a modern fiction.

Despite the commonly held perception that the institutions of state and religion are unified in Islamic polity, most observable Muslim societies did not conform to this ideal, but were built around separate institutions of state and religion.⁴³ Keddie has described the supposed near-identity of religion and the state in Islam as "more a pious myth than reality for most of Islamic history."⁴⁴ This holds particularly true for societies which tend

to hold on to concepts of honor and group solidarity based upon tribal or loose religious affiliations. Thus, when there is a perceived feeling of honor having been slighted and religion targeted, the resulting religious hatred takes on an almost mimetic quality, no matter which religious group feels it is being plotted against. Everyone who is a member of the group which perceives that it has had its collective honor violated closes ranks, and anyone not adhering to the philosophies of the group is considered an outsider, apostate, *murtid*, *kafir* or infidel.

Thus, honor violated, especially religious honor, is a powerful driving force which spurns evil behavior. Honor is taking hold in the minds of young Muslims at a dangerous time, when a large percentage of the population in the Muslim world is young, dangerously illiterate, unemployed, and can therefore be easily manipulated by radicalizing forces, making them prone to join fundamentalist projects. In essence, a tribal (group) interpretation of Islam offers a better explanation of the fact that the Taliban were indeed funded and raised by the Saudi government with the help of Pakistan. It also explains why they had support from a Muslim society where tribalism is strong, as in some parts of Saudi Arabia. Even Mullah Omar, the supreme Taliban leader, rose to prominence when he reportedly rescued the honor of a girl by releasing her from the clutches of a minor warlord. Thus Islamism, even in the breeding ground of the Afghan Jihad, took its cue from tribal mindsets, ideologies and above all redemption of honor prevalent in tribes.

Role of Ruling Elites

The ruling leadership in Pakistan has led the nation on Islamist trajectories, whether by default, design or misplaced intentions.

Radicalization of religion in many Muslim countries such as Pakistan need not be considered as a revolt against modernity per se, but against the backdrop of failed attempts to impose a Western or Marxist 'imported' variant of it, which failed against the staunch resistance from the traditionalists, in the process veering many of these defensive entities towards Islamist trajectories. Dismal socio-economic frameworks and income inequalities also ensured that the elite felt insecure about their power base, and tended to hold on to it by processes varying from brutal

military dictatorships to appeal to Shariah. Zakariyya says that the recent resurgence of Islam is "a clear reflection of the lack of consciousness among the masses. The spread of these movements becomes inevitable after more than thirty years of oppression, the suspension of reason, and the domination of a dictatorial political system."⁴⁵

The supremacy of the leadership is a resonation of the colonial past in many of these post-colonial countries; since the colonizing force was generally a symbiotic entity with the local elites, these elites opted for a favorable compartmentalization of policy, as against a uniform national political arena which would have allowed populist politics to flourish. The unbridled power of monarchy in the Gulf States and tribal chiefs in East Africa and Nigeria, along with feudalism in Pakistan are expressions of the spectrum of elites which went along with the center (a colonial power at one time) in order to negotiate as an entity on behalf of vested groups. When direct rule from the Centre was preferred, as in Algeria, the system tended to break down, which espoused the cause of the elites in reaching centre stage in politics in many post-colonial Muslim nation states. As a preferred governance framework, the inherent power relationship structures within colonialism were perpetuated in continuum by these elites, until they met expressions of resentment, most notably from the Islamist movements in these countries.

Then there is the problem of tribal sentiments in such states. If we follow Khaldun's philosophy,⁴⁶ then logically, the tribal cliquish mindset of the leaders in an Islamic country which has been raised from the ashes of tribalism would tend to persist even in a state framework. This seems to be somewhat the situation in present day Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, all states which are most affected by violent Islamism and tribalism; not coincidentally, autocratic leaders in these states have been blamed for the current dilemmas of these states.

Delving into the universe of Muslim leadership in the twentieth century, a bewildering array of kings, military dictators, mullahs, democrats and tribal men (Taliban) emerges; adding to this motley arraignment of leadership are newly emerging aggressively literalist Islamist movements, which are expressions of the ultra right or neo left. This has fostered the creation of leaderships which share the same characteristic of having a political agenda

of survival or sustaining of foisted regimes on a populace; since this is a system of governance imposed by an elite driven by political motives of sustenance of a certain regime or agenda, it can loosely be classified as elitist political Islamism. The connotations of this type of Islamism are that due to the top-down enforced agendas (whether political or Islamist), reactionary Islamism takes root in the society, much of which is due to state policies, whether as a direct or indirect consequence.

It is also pertinent that even when Muslim states in the Far and Middle East such as Syria and Iraq were taken over by military dictators, the late Hafez Assad in Syria and Saddam Hussein in Iraq tended to repose their trust in members of their own tribes and sects. Similarly, Zia in Pakistan reposed confidence only in the puritanical Deobandi persuasion of Islam, which resonated with his own worldview of how things ought be run with religious fervor, particularly in the context of 'jihad' in Afghanistan.

Islam with its clarion call for implementation of Shariah has been widely used throughout the Islamic world to mobilize the masses. The spectrum of ruling elite which has utilized it for the political purpose ranges from secular nationalist to pan-Arabist to Marxist, which utilized its populist appeal to support agendas of self preservation. Paradoxically, many of the same rulers created Islamist movements, which they then crushed with an iron hand. In Egypt, Nasser attempted to make the prestigious Al-Azhar University dependent on the government in order to lend religious legitimacy to governmental policies, including his ruthless suppression of Muslim Brotherhood.⁴⁷ Saddam Hussein, the leader of the zealously secularist Ba'ath party, put "God Is Great" on the Iraqi flag, and engaged in speeches about the duty of jihad in a failed effort to get Iraqis to fight to defend his regime.⁴⁸ Zia created the Jihadist groups, and then attempted to disown 'turncoats,' independent-minded warlords like Masud who wanted an Afghanistan free from Pakistani control.

Another type of model one could examine to draw analogies with Pakistan is the type of governments which modeled themselves on the Stalinist model. The ruling elite of many of Islamic states used the rhetoric of the rising of the proletariat against the bourgeois, which petered out with the advent of the end of the Cold War. As in Iraq and Syria, these 'caring' regimes evolved into little more than brutal dictatorships utilizing the

devices of *mukhabbarat* (secret police) as coercive instruments. An epitome of this variant is Nasser's government in Egypt, and Numairi's government in Sudan, which prompted violent reaction by Islamists. Nasser's strong-arm tactics would later spark the Islamist movement, particularly Muslim Brotherhood, into a roaring flame. However, what is not very well appreciated is that Sadat, with his purportedly patronizing attitude towards Islamist groups, was perhaps even more instrumental in igniting these movements. The Islamists felt betrayed by Sadat's unfulfilled promises, which would lead more radical Islamists like Al-Jihad into a causal loop with violence begetting more violence. Qutb's simplistic analysis has been inspirational for a vast majority of Islamists disillusioned by regimes which could be clearly discerned to have one agenda; self sustenance. Thus Qutb used the classical pre-Arabian Islamic concept of 'jahiliya' or ignorance to denounce the Muslim leadership, which he saw as failing to overthrow the yoke of the West.

The ruling leadership in this category has skillfully tended to exploit the apprehension of the West regarding a communist advent in the Islamic world before the end of the Cold War, and an Islamist takeover after 9/11. The argument forcefully put forward by this ruling elite is; we are all that stood between the annihilation of the West by communists earlier, and by Islamist weapons of mass destruction currently, particularly in the context of nuclear Islamic state like Pakistan. Debatably, that is why the US was so anxious to appease Gen Pervez Musharraf and bolster his military dictatorship in the grab of a 'chief executive' against the wishes of nearly the entire electoral mass, which conclusively ousted him from office when relatively transparent elections were held. The leaders in this category have either been courted as darlings of the West, or as pariahs, depending upon the perspective. An allegation commonly leveled against this type of ruling elite is that they have tended to get away with literally anything, as long as they were being perceived by the West to be supporting it.

The placing of Islamic tradition at the altar of political objectives and nationalistic causes has gravely affected the perception of Islam, particularly in the West. This is paradoxical inasmuch many of the leaders in this category tended to woo the West, but caused a schizoid identity crisis in their conservative masses. Increasingly, since Islamic heritage was selectively sifted through to support shifting and temperamental political

causes,⁴⁹ the intellectual revivalism in the Muslim world suffered greatly. Also, Islam started to connote a politics of identity, amongst which exploitation of feelings of the masses by the leadership for their own ends became inextricably intertwined with political agendas; this also served to display to the outside world a distorted picture of political Islam.

The 'Petro Radicalization' Process

Zakariyya illustrates another trajectory of radicalization prevalent amongst Muslim states. "A specific type of Islam has been gathering momentum of late, and the appropriate name that applies to it is 'Petro-Islam.' The first and foremost objective of this type of Islam has been to protect oil wealth, or, more appropriately, the type of social relations underlying those tribal societies that possess the lion's share of this wealth. It is common knowledge that the principle of 'the few dominating the largest portion of this wealth' permeates the social structure [of the Gulf region].... oil wealth has not resulted in lasting solutions even in the societies themselves and has remained, more often than not, a privilege in the hands of the few at the expense of the majority and in the hands of the present generations at the expense of future ones."⁵⁰

The 'Islam' that he speaks about is predominantly the Saudi-bred creed of Wahabism promoted by Muhammad Ibn Wahab, which carries strong undercurrents of tribalism. This has spread from the Arabian Peninsula to distant theaters such as Afghanistan and Pakistan, due to Saudi financing and help to the Afghan Jihad. The Wahabi movement was in fact a religious expression of a pro-Arab ethnocentrism, that was as vehemently opposed to Ottoman Turks (which epitomized the height of Islamic society in that age) as it was to Christians and Jews; Muslims deemed as non-practicing by Wahabis were considered even more heretical.⁵¹

The Saudi export of Wahabism and Salafism to different theaters is well known; what is not appreciated is the huge transformative effect this has had. An example is Pakistan's neighboring Afghanistan, which is now shrugged away as an eternally radical state; this is just not true, at least in the context envisaged of mullahs running amok for centuries in this state. It is true that adherence to Islamic ritualism is inbred in the lifestyle of the Afghans and the Pakistani tribals, regardless of whether they really are

religious or not. The panoply of adherents includes former King Zahir Shah, communist pro-Russian ministers, and Mujahideen warriors. That is the point, however, where the analogy breaks down; Islam in Afghanistan (and arguably in Pakistan's tribal belts by analogy) had historically been extremely tolerant, and not at all the 'push it down your throat' type.⁵² Minorities such as Sikhs, Hindus and Jews had enjoyed minimal persecution in Afghanistan; in fact they were quite wealthy and controlled the money markets. Even the Afghan mullah was a laissez faire variety of preacher who would admonish people for not coming to prayers regularly, but would rarely preach sectarianism and politics. Saudi money and Pakistani expertise at running the Afghan Jihad created a whole new intolerant breed of Islamism, the repercussions of which continue to be a predominant recurring theme of this century.

Then the year 1992 saw a watershed; this year, not coincidentally, corresponds to the Taliban gaining strength in Afghanistan. After 1992, the brutal civil war created irreconcilable schisms within Islamic sects and ethnic groups, setting the stage for the contemporary intolerant Afghanistan. Masud's massacre of the Hazaras in Kabul in 1995, the Hazaras' massacre of the Taliban in Mazar in 1997, and the Taliban massacres of Hazaras and Uzbeks in 1998 mark brutal 'Islamocide' perpetrated by Muslims in the name of their indigenous breed of ideology.⁵³ This was a novel phenomenon in Afghanistan's history, creating the present religious divides. Minority groups all but fled the country, since the ethnocide committed above, coupled with the Taliban's deliberate anti-Shia program transformed the fiercely independent tribalism of the Afghans into a militant fundamentalism.

Conclusion

Thus, the radicalization process in Pakistan can have many trajectories, all of which will need to be elucidated coherently in their own context and polycentric paradigms to be demonstrable as variables which have caused radicalization in Pakistan. This paper identifies only a few of them, at the same time highlighting the fact that the arguments for and against a particular viewpoint run in both directions, even at the abstract level, making delineation in particular theatres a tremendously difficult task. Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) has been a pioneer at conducting such

studies in specific theaters in Pakistan, but much more needs to be done than can possibly be attempted in theatres, some of which are at best hostile terrain for any such research to be conducted. Even a cursory glance reveals the complexities inherent in eliciting a tangible response which can be interpolated into any meaningful research into the phenomenon of radicalization in Pakistan. Then there is the fact that much of the response will be subjective, and reducing bias in any statistically based study, which has to depend a lot on social variables which affect the outcome would require expertise in such phenomenon. Perhaps the answer lies in strengthening institutions which have been attempting this complicated task from the very beginning, and trying to comprehend that whatever little has been attempted in the past needs to be concretized much more before we can finally begin to understand what radicalization in Pakistan entails.

Notes

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- ¹³ Ibid
- ¹⁴ Ibid.
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- ¹⁶ Rubina Saigol, *Becoming a Modern Nation: Educational Discourse in the Early Years of Ayub Khan (1958-1964)* (Islamabad: COSS, 2003).
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- ¹⁸ See the *Sharif Report on Education*, p.116.
- ¹⁹ *Speeches and Statements of Field Marshall Mohd. Ayub Khan* (Karachi: Pakistan Publications, 1961), 82.
- ²⁰ Rubina Saigol, *Knowledge and Identity: Articulation of Gender in Educational Discourse in Pakistan*, (Lahore: ASR, 1995), pp. 243-247.

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- ³⁶ Christopher Hewitt, "The Political Context of Terrorism in America: Ignoring Extremists or Pandering to Them?" *Journal of Peace Research* 16 (1979): 340.
- ³⁷ Akbar S. Ahmed, *Islam under Siege* (Lahore: Vanguard Press, 2003).
- ³⁸ Postmodernists like Jean Baudrillard see the globalization as rich West confronting "the distress and catastrophe" of Africa, Asia (where the majority of the Muslim population lives), and Latin America in a mutually self-destructive and symbiotic

relationship". Globalization is thus "part-promise, part-reality, and part-
imagination."

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- ⁴⁰ Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: The story of the afghan Warlords* (London: Pan Macmillan, 2001), 49.
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- ⁴⁶ According to Ibn Khaldun's cyclical theory of tribal settlement: "...outlying tribes tied together by kinship solidarities conquer, settle, and rule a state. In time kinship loyalties loosen, the rulers urbanize and their state loses control over distant tribes, and the cycle begins again."
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- ⁴⁹ Ibid.
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Modes and Scale of Conflict in Pakistan's Swat Valley (1989-2008)

Khadim Hussain

Introduction

Two events—one in the late 1980s and the other that began in the early 80s and precipitated in the early 90s—coupled with the prevailing social, cultural, class and gender frictions—have largely defined the critical situation in recent years in the Swat valley, in Malakand Division of Khyber Pakhtunkwa (KP). Firstly, a section of the local population petitioned the Peshawar High Court in 1989 to seek a declaration that the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) Regulation of 1975—a legal framework distinctive from the rest of Pakistan—was unconstitutional.¹ Secondly, the Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i-Shariat-i-Muhammadi (TNSM) was formed in 1992 by Sufi Muhammad, a Jamaat-e-Islami renegade, who managed a madrassa in Kambar, Dir.² The TNSM was largely behind the radicalization that followed in the valley.

The first event seems to have indicated the desire of the people to get rid of the discriminatory and marginalizing legal regime, while the second evidenced a shift in religious authority in the valley as the TNSM attracted extensive support in Swat, especially from the upper part of the valley. The discourse of power, ideology and control was reconstructed which counted on the socio-cultural frictions prevalent in the valley. The Pashto era in the valley before 1917 had particular legal, social, cultural and political frameworks.³ The influence of these frameworks continued although with changing dynamics during the 1917 to 1969 period when Swat was a distinct state first within British India and then in Pakistan.⁴ The status of clergy, the landless (*Faqir*), and women could be traced back to the Pashto era in order to understand the modes and scale of conflict in the Swat valley.⁵

It is significant to understand the shift in religious authority, socio-cultural dynamics in evolutionary perspective, gender dynamics and legal battles in the context of Swat in order to comprehend the complete picture of the present conflict in the Swat valley. It is assumed in this study that the modes

and scale of socio-cultural and socio-political conflicts already existed in the valley and the introduction of emerging geo-strategic and institutional factors brought the region to its present critical stage.

It is also assumed that the nature of conflict in Swat from 1989 to 2008 may be systematically comprehended at the ideological, socio-cultural, institutional/structural and geo-strategic levels. Moreover, the mode and scale of the conflict may also be understood through observing the patterns of ideological persuasion, social contagion and territorial expansion by the TNSM and the Swat chapter of Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).⁶

This study relies upon primary and cross-disciplinary data to understand the hypothetical transitivity, cultural frictions and logics of differentiation (group formation, otherization, etc.).

Methodology

Structured interviews from the seven sub-districts of Swat—Barikot, Babuzai, Kabal, Charbagh, Khwazakhela, Bahrain and Kalam—were carried out on the history, culture, society, social transformation, institutionalization and militancy. Fifty respondents from each tehsil were selected and stratified on demographic, professional, socio-class, age and partisan basis for expert opinion and valid observations of Swat in the cultural, historical, social, religious and political contexts. Besides interviews, analysis of official documents such as Fatawa Wadudia, PATA regulations of 1975 and 1976, Nifaz-e-Nizam-e-Shariah Act 1995, Nizam-e-Adl (Shariah) Ordinance 1999, the peace agreement reached between Taliban and the KP provincial government on May 21, 2008 and the subsequent promulgation of Nizam-e-Adl (Shariah) Ordinance 2008 were also analyzed to understand the context of state intervention in determining the modes and scale of conflict in the Swat valley. The primary data was also analyzed through participant observation (field work) as a regular observer of the events in the valley from the late 1980s until today.

Socio-cultural Dynamics in Swat Valley in Evolutionary Perspective

The stratification of society in Swat on the basis of the landed (*Dautari*) and the landless (*Faqir*) on the one hand and on the basis of ethnicity and

religiosity (Mian, Mullah and Ami) on the other was largely formalized after the state of Swat was formed in 1917. In 1969, Swat merged into Pakistan and its status as a state ended. During the state era, established mechanisms for conflict resolution developed a legal framework of sorts that could be conveniently called customary law.⁷ Schisms in the social fabric were culturally and administratively cemented in an effective manner as "traditional elites, divided into two prominent social groups, had to give space to the religious and the marginalized groups because of the politics of social grouping."⁸

The cultural fabric under such dynamics had remained diverse and inclusive. According to Khurshid Khan, Assistant Professor at the Department of History at Mingora Degree College, Swat:⁹

Mela [sporting and entertainment fair] was the main component of cultural ceremonies in the valley. The state-sponsored *mela* on the bank of River Swat was the most famous event. The Wali [of Swat] would visit the *mela*. Dances, circus and many items of entertainment were integral parts of the *mela*. Elders always talk about those bygone days. During Eid ceremonies, besides men, women also used to gather around the tombs of saints. They used to spend a day in shopping and singing. The Pakhtun code and state authority gave protection to females attending *melas* in Swat.

A high level of satisfaction was observed among the older generation of Swat regarding the legal and administrative capability of the Swat state. Karim Bakhsh, a 55-year-old farmer of Utrore, near Kalam, says, "During the era of Wali (title of ruler of the Swat state), a murderer would be arrested within 24 hours. The crime rate was low and the *Qazi* would decide a case within hours."¹⁰ Religiosity in the valley had remained in consonance with the cultural inclusiveness. The people across the valley were followers of Imam Abu Hanifa. The religious class had no concern with worldly affairs. That class was only responsible for leading prayers five times a day, funeral prayers, *khatam* and solemnizing marriages. A *maulvi*, or cleric, used to spend his life on the income of Sirai land and charity. He would not be a member of the jirga or the lashkar.¹¹ Besides the religious class, the landless (*Faqir*), mostly ethnic Gujars and Ajars, remained culturally absorbed in the broader social fabric but remained socio-politically unrecognized.

It was observed that besides exclusion from the jirgas and the lashkars, very few, if any, intermarriages took place between the ethnic Yusufzais and the landless or the *mullahs*, mainly due to the socio-politically stigmatized status of *mullahs* and *Faqirs*.¹² According to Zabardast Khan, a Yusufzai, "it was considered against the code of Pakhtunwali to sell one's land to a Gujar or Ajar."¹³ This norm effectively kept the landless on the periphery of society in the valley within an otherwise inclusive socio-cultural fabric. The absence of political institutionalization further shrank the socio-political space for the landless and the *mullahs* as political parties and political activities were banned in Swat until the state was merged into Pakistan in 1969. According to Inamullah, a teacher and social worker in Swat:¹⁴

The law and order situation was better on account of the fact that the state was run by one person. The same is true for the quantity and quality of the infrastructure. But human rights were severely violated. Forced labor was very common, and there was no awareness of civil and human rights. The state seemed to be enjoying a moderate and even secular profile, but people were happy to get their cases decided in a short time.

It seems that although there were schisms in the socio-cultural fabric of Swat as well as a lack of political institutionalization, the people had a higher level of satisfaction. It was that satisfaction that kept the friction in the socio-cultural fabric dormant. Once the legal and administrative framework of the Swat state came to an end, that friction started making itself visible in the valley. According to Sultan-e-Rome:¹⁵

With the merger of Swat State, confusion and chaos prevailed. The litigants did not know where to turn [to] for justice. Quick and cheap trials and decisions, whether just or unjust, and their proper execution and implementation came to an end. The prolonged procedures, undue delay, great expenditures, high bribes, misuse of *riwaj* (customs) and the further deterioration of PATA highly aggravated almost all the people of Swat.

This process seems to have affected the already vulnerable classes of the Swat valley in several respects, including socio-cultural. The simmering friction in the socio-cultural fabric started coming up to the surface. Socio-political re-adjustments and re-alignments started taking place in all parts of Swat. While the lower part of the valley took little time to get accustomed to the sluggish

Pakistani state institutions—this part had already started evolving into a semi-urban society—the upper part, which was predominantly rural, remained embroiled between the pre- and post-state attitudinal systems and customary law.

The pattern of decisions in both traditional and state jirgas, the pattern of intermarriages and the pattern of land owning in a society where land owning played a significant role in determining the level of power and acknowledgement indicate that the process of otherization had already started. That process seems to have already brought the marginalized segments into a somewhat isolated social group in the valley. Otherization of the group had already started reinforcing the isolation, especially in the wake of denial to social services like health and education.

Structural Vacuums and Conflict

The state of Swat was merged into Pakistan in 1969, and all laws applicable in Pakistan were extended to Swat immediately afterwards. The courts and the legal system were functioning there in the same manner as elsewhere in Pakistan until 1974. But in 1975, the federal government introduced the PATA Regulation, eclipsing the regular laws in force in the region at the time.

The PATA Regulation was an odd combination of authoritarianism, ignorance of the changing social structure of the Swat valley, and conventions framed to appease the local elite. Judicial authority was transferred from the regular courts to the deputy commissioners of the districts in Malakand Division. A jirga consisting of local notables would decide cases of conflict among the people of the area under the supervision of a tehsildar (revenue officer).

The jirga members would be selected from among the landed gentry, and the clergy of the area would sanction the decisions made by the jirga. Appeals against the jirga's decision could be made to the deputy commissioner and the provincial home secretary.

Revenue, judicial and executive powers were thus vested in a single individual—the deputy commissioner of the district—completely ignoring

the socio-political and economic dynamics that were fast changing the very fabric of society in the valley. Under the PATA Regulation, the timber mafia ruthlessly engaged in depleting the natural resources of the valley in connivance with the district administration and the jirga members. The educated middle class was expanding and lawyers, teachers, doctors, businessmen and activists had started making an impact on society in the valley.

Several NGOs took up projects that created awareness among the people about human rights and the environment. Moreover, political parties such as the Pakistan People's Party, Awami National Party, Pakistan Muslim League, Jamaat-e-Islami and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam also developed their constituencies in Swat, Buner, Dir and Chitral districts of Malakand Division.

While the educated middle class and socio-political activists were busy with their awareness raising programs in the Swat valley, lawyers in the late 1980s submitted a petition in the Peshawar High Court (PHC) pleading for the abolition of the PATA Regulation. The PHC granted the petition in February 1990. The federal government appealed to the Supreme Court which upheld the PHC verdict four years later, ruling that the PATA Regulation was unconstitutional.¹⁶

Several interviews suggest that in the late 1980s and the early 90s, new aspirants for socio-cultural spaces, especially, middle-class businessmen, the landless and small land owners who had gone abroad to earn a living, had started making their presence felt. The socio-cultural recognition, however, was continuously denied to the new aspirants for power and prestige in society. Hence, a two-pronged vacuum—the socio-cultural vacuum and an administrative-legal vacuum—fragmented the society that went unnoticed by those who wielded socio-political power.

Shift in Religious Authority: Formation of TNSM in Malakand

Another significant development in Malakand Division at the time was Maulana Sufi Muhammad's departure from the Jamaat-e-Islami. He became a member of Dir's district council and also ran a madrassa in Balambat area of Dir. Both the traditional elite and the provincial bureaucracy were keen to

retain their absolute power in Malakand Division. This was in the early 1990s when the power of the Taliban was expanding in Afghanistan with the help of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Deobandi madrassas were sending militants across the border to help the Taliban in Afghanistan and the renewed zeal of the clergy in KP province was making an impact across the Pashtun belt.

By the time the Supreme Court declared the PATA Regulation unconstitutional, the TNSM had become so powerful that it brought the entire Malakand administration to a standstill in 1994, demanding the imposition of Shariah in the Swat valley and other districts of Malakand Division.

Instead of extending the regular laws to Malakand that had been eclipsed due to the introduction of the PATA Regulation, the provincial government recommended the introduction of the Shariah Nizam-i-Adl Ordinance in 1994, acquiescing to the demagogic antics of the TNSM and compounding the confusion created by the provincial bureaucracy.¹⁷ The ordinance made it compulsory for the civil courts to seek the assistance of a *Muawin Qazi*, who was a cleric, and an *Aalim Wakil*, learned in Islamic law. The advice of the cleric, however, was not binding on the civil courts.

The TNSM objected to this arrangement and the federal government promulgated the Shariah Nizam-i-Adl Regulation 1999, thereby increasing the clerics' influence in the courts. The caretaker provincial government proposed the ill-advised Shariah Nizam-i-Adl Regulation 2008 that would make the courts subservient to the clerics while the revenue and executive authority would be exercised by the local administration.

The TNSM was active in Dir, Buner and Swat even before the Supreme Court of Pakistan ruled on the federal government's appeal against the Peshawar High Court verdict on the PATA Regulation. It is now a well-known fact that a deputy commissioner of Lower Dir remained in close contact with Sufi Muhammad, who established and strengthened his organization with the help of the local administration and local notables. In the early 1990s, Sufi Muhammad had established links with Mufti Abdur Rashid of Al-Rashid Trust and Maulana Masud Azhar, head of Jaish-e-Muhammad.

A year after Masud Azhar announced the launch of Jaish-e-Muhammad, he visited Swat to meet Sufi Muhammad. In a large public gathering in Mingora, Sufi Muhammad and Masud Azhar pledged to thunderous applause of their supporters to wage jihad against the infidels. This explains the pouring in of the Jaish activists into Swat to help local militant leader Fazlullah in his war against the state. The links also speak volumes of the militants' networking in the Pashtun belt.

Sufi Muhammad had passed a decree that military training was a religious obligation for all Muslims of the Swat valley. The training was carried out through the networking mentioned above. This decree, along with the decrees of other jihadist ideologues, such as Mufti Nizamuddin Shamzai, Mufti Abdur Rashid, Masud Azhar and Maulana Tahir Panjpeeri, brought about a substantial shift in religious authority by effectively constructing a Salafi jihadist ideology and by communicating it to a larger audience through various channels of communication, including illegal FM radio channels and pamphlets. The principles of jihad, thus, underwent a substantial change with respect to its mode and nature. Firstly, the principle of declaration of jihad by the '*Ulul Amr*' (the sanctioning authority of the government) was rationalized by arguing that as there was no genuine '*Ulul Amr*' in Pakistan and Afghanistan, one could wage jihad against the two states to bring about Shariah rule in these states. Second, the principle of jihad to be waged only by the rightful authority in defense of the Muslim norms and symbols was sought to be rationalized by making the argument that in the absence of a rightful authority it was obligatory for every adult Muslim to wage jihad under an organization.

The power politics and the shift in religious authority took a new turn after these administrative, judicial, social and religious developments. A vacuum was created not by the Supreme Court decision on the PATA Regulation but the collusion of the administration with Sufi Muhammad, who wreaked havoc in Malakand Division, according to interviews with knowledgeable circles of Swat. The political administration of the time allowed Sufi Muhammad a free hand to regain the power he had lost through the Supreme Court decision.

Mode and Scale of 2006-08 Conflict

One of the major reasons for the turmoil in the Swat valley through 2006-08 can be traced back to this confusion created by the local elite and the state. The key to understanding the internal factors lies in understanding the composition of Fazlullah's supporters. The majority of them belonged to the lower rung of the social structure – mainly groups that lacked a share in land holding in the area. Fazlullah communicated with them in their language through his FM radio channel, giving voice to their frustrations, and owning them as his own. That gave Fazlullah's supporters in the marginalized groups a sense of empowerment.

Both the state and the traditional and political elite of the valley failed to respond to the aspirations of those who remained marginalized. The modern educated clergy and the new aspirants for socio-cultural recognition became wealthy but had no social credibility, even political parties hesitated to award them tickets to contest elections. Awareness raising and other activities by a wave of non-governmental organizations in the early 1990s as well as the process of urbanization contributed to the erosion of the traditional power bases and cultural space began to be occupied by the above mentioned classes. The clergy had gained political influence after the Soviet-Afghan war. The student wing of the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), a right-wing political party, had started occupying the public educational spaces. Wahabi intrusion in the valley through madrassas in the late 80s and the early 90s along with the influence of Jaish-e-Muhammad on the TNSM and subsequently on Shaheen Force of Fazlullah and the Swat chapter of the TTP all played a role in the lead up to the Fazlullah-led insurgency against the Pakistani state. The shift in religious authority became complete after the Wahabi intrusion in the valley as a result of the dissemination of the discourse of jihad by the TNSM besides the virtual occupation of public educational institutions such as colleges and universities by the JI.

The Story of Fazlullah

On the basis of interviews with close relatives of Fazlullah, it is not very difficult to discern the dynamics of his rise and the evolution of his militia. Fazlullah was born and brought up in Imam Dherai, a village to the north of

Mingora, the main business hub of Swat, across the River Swat. The area was home to the Nepkikhels, a sub-clan of the Yousufzai tribe. Fazlullah passed his 12th grade exam from Government Jahanzeb College Swat in the late 1980s when the Afghan war was at its peak. His father, who had sold almost all his property and was landless for all practical purposes, came under the influence of Sufi Muhammad of the TNSM and sent Fazlullah to Sufi Muhammad's madrassa in Dir. There Fazlullah developed cordial relations with Sufi Muhammad's family and was later married to one of his daughters.

Fazlullah actively participated in the insurgency orchestrated by Sufi Muhammad's TNSM in 1994. The insurgency brought Malakand Division to a standstill and ended with the promulgation of the Nizam-i-Adl Regulation of 1995. Later, when Sufi Muhammad led a militia of some 10,000 men from Malakand Division to Afghanistan in October 2001 to fight alongside the Taliban, Fazlullah accompanied his father-in-law. After the international forces dismantled the Taliban government in Afghanistan, Sufi Muhammad and Fazlullah were arrested on the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan and imprisoned. Fazlullah was released from prison a year later.

Fazlullah then settled in his native town but had no job and started working as a chair-lift operator in a concern established by his cousin, Sirajuddin, who later became his spokesperson. With the help of the local population and the financial and technical support of a native of Kuza Bandai, a village adjacent to Imam Dherai, he started an illegal FM radio channel in 2004. The support was rendered by Habib Khan, who had made his fortune while working in Britain, and was known in the locality as a staunch Wahabi jihadist. Around this time, Fazlullah developed contacts with the late Maulana Abdur Rashid of Lal Masjid in Islamabad. He later declared himself a disciple of Abdur Rashid.

Fazlullah's Strategy in Swat

On the basis of 200 interviews and participant observations from 2004 to 2007, it is easy to see the strategy adopted by Fazlullah to bring about a substantial shift in the socio-cultural and socio-political power structures in the Swat valley on the basis of a version of Salafi jihadist ideology. His strategies

included ideological persuasion, social contagion, social control and expansion of that control.

The discourse Fazlullah constructed revolved around jihad, martyrdom, revival of the glory of Islam, anti-modernism and anti-women and anti-state narratives. The illegal FM radio proved to be an effective tool to disseminate the discourse because it was inexpensive and easily accessible in the upper valley in particular and in the lower valley generally.

During the social contagion stage, Fazlullah identified the US and the state of Pakistan as the enemy, acknowledged and highlighted the lot of the marginalized, established a madrassa and *markaz* or centre for ideological persuasion at Imam Dherai on communal land with the local population's support and started to help the people resolve their daily problems and conflicts. Fazlullah developed a strong local resource base by persuading the natives working in the Middle East and in the West to donate generously to the newly established madrassa.

During the stage of social control, Fazlullah established a loose militia, called Shaheen Force which was later merged into the TTP, established a parallel judicial system, and started targeting those who were socially, culturally and politically influential in the upper valley. His militia also co-opted criminal gangs in and around Swat that provided him with trained hands in gun-running. Throughout this time, Fazlullah continued to develop his organizational structure. He gradually isolated the community by banning television, Internet and girls' education. The target killing and virtual slaughtering of those suspected to be 'spying' for the authorities, also inculcated fear in the community.

The state institutions in the upper valley were effectively defeated during the stage of social control. Fazlullah's militia started running a parallel judicial system, parallel administration and recruiting from almost all parts of Swat, especially from the towns of Charbagh, Kabal and Matta. Fazlullah's organizational structure became robust, networked and hierarchical after he joined the Baitullah-led TTP and became the Swat chapter head of the militant outfit. Militant training and recruitment drives were launched across the Swat valley. Some observers believe that the right-wing Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal

(MMA) government in the NWFP facilitated Fazlullah to gain control of the area in many ways. Firstly, the provincial government disallowed any move by the local administration and the federal government to block Fazlullah's control of the valley. Secondly, the provincial government simply looked the other way as Fazlullah started large-scale recruitment and amassed financial resources and used his illegal FM radio channel to spread his extremist ideas.

Gender Dynamics

It will not be out of place to mention the role of women in Fazlullah's movement on the basis of interviews with 150 women of the community. The women from both rural and urban areas around Mingora in the age bracket of 55 and above were swayed by the message of the firebrand Fazlullah as he used the radio channel to spread his ideas. The elderly women lent full support to Fazlullah through donations to build his *markaz* and madrassa in Imam Dherai. The elderly women of the Swat valley had struggled to reconcile with the fast pace of social changes around them, including more educated women professionals venturing out to participate in the social, cultural and economic life of the valley in the late 1980s and the early 90s.

The old generation of women was largely conservative and viewed with great antagonism young women moving away from their socio-cultural roles. This developed fragmentation and frictions in identity narratives and hence they adopted the interpretation disseminated by Fazlullah related to the very narrow socio-cultural role of women. As the older generation of women still had a position of influence within the domestic domain, they started supporting Fazlullah financially. They rationalized their support, both financial and socio-cultural, in the wake of the shift in religious authority and the consequent capture of cultural, social and political spaces by Fazlullah's militia.

Military Operations in 2007-08

The Frontier Constabulary (FC) and police launched a crackdown on Fazlullah's militia in July 2007 on the orders of the provincial government. As Fazlullah's militia had gathered considerable strength by the time, the operation by the FC failed, further consolidating the control of Swat by

Fazlullah. Kabal, Matta, Khwazakhela and Fatehpur sub-districts came under his militia's complete control. Target killing of local influentials, destruction of girls' schools, suicide bombings and attacks on state installations and security personnel became pervasive in the valley. Almost all state institutions, including the police, the local administration, public schools, banks and courts, retreated or closed down.

After the failure of the FC operation, the army was called in to regain control of the area in August 2007. The intensity of the conflict in the valley increased after the July 2007 security forces operation against militants and seminary students holed up in Lal Masjid in Islamabad. It was during the military operation between August and December 2007 that Fazlullah's militia developed a strong linkage with militant leaders Baitullah Mehsud in Waziristan and Faqir Muhammad in Bajaur Agency.

The military announced victory in the operation against Fazlullah and his militia in December 2007 but fieldwork after the operation suggests that the militia, its recruitment and training centres and its network remains intact. The militia kept on running a parallel administration and judiciary in the upper part of valley even after the operation was declared successful. There was a lull in the conflict during the February 2008 general elections. After the elections, the newly elected coalition provincial government of Awami National Party and Pakistan People's Party started a dialogue with the militants after releasing Sufi Muhammad who was still in jail. A peace deal between the government and Fazlullah's militia was signed in May 2008. According to several interviews in the upper valley of Swat, the deal provided an opportunity to Fazlullah's militia to reorganize. The peace agreement collapsed a few months later due to different interpretations by the two sides of various clauses of the agreement. Another military operation was launched in July 2008. This time the operation disrupted some supply lines of the militia although the command and control structure of the militia could not be effectively dismantled.

The Geostrategic Factors

Some observers believe that the role of national and international actors might not be ruled out in the prevailing situation in the valley. They are of the

opinion that the US might be interested in containing the march of the Chinese to Pakistan's Gwadar Port and the Karakorum Highway to access trade routes and Central Asian oil reserves, which might jeopardize US trade interests in the region. The Inter Services Intelligence, observers believe, might be interested in blocking the deployment of NATO forces in the region. Residents in Matta, Durushkhela and Ningolai stated in their interviews that they had seen Jaish-e-Muhammad militants and those who might have come from Waziristan helping the local Taliban gain control of upper Swat.

Pakistan has known strategic interests in the region through Afghanistan. Many believe that Pakistan would like to trump the Indian interests in the region. That might have prompted a part of the intelligence establishment to support the Taliban in one way or the other. Surveys in the Pashtun belt found similar perceptions among the common people.

Conclusion

The local socio-cultural dynamics—including the changing gender role, a shift in religious authority, evolution of the socio-political economy of the valley, the institutional conflict (relations between the federation and the province), the legal disputes in 1994 and more recently, socio-ethnography of militants leaders, the strata of Fazlullah's recruit in the context of international/transnational dimensions, the TSNM and the Afghan Taliban, the post-9/11 context and collaboration with the war on terror have altered the local dynamics of conflict, eventually accelerating the retreat of the state in the Swat valley. All four levels of conflict in Swat played overlapping roles to develop a full-scale insurgency in the Swat valley between 1989 and 2008. Further research may be needed to understand the comparative roles of all these factors in determining the modes and scale of conflict in Swat.

Appendix

Major points of the May 2008 peace deal between the government and Swat Taliban

(Source: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/05/pakistani_government.php)

- Shariah law would be imposed in Swat and Malakand;
- Pakistan Army would gradually withdraw troops from the region;
- The government and the Taliban would exchange prisoners;
- The Taliban would recognize the writ of the government and cooperate with security forces;
- The Taliban would halt attacks on barber and music shops;
- The Taliban would not display weapons in public;
- The Taliban would turn in heavy weapons (rockets, mortars);
- The Taliban would not operate training camps;
- The Taliban would denounce suicide attacks;
- A ban would be placed on raising private militias;
- The Taliban would cooperate with the government to vaccinate children against diseases such as polio;
- Fazlullah's madrassa would be turned into an Islamic university;
- Only licensed FM radio stations would be allowed to operate in the region;
- The Taliban would allow women to perform their duties at the workplace without any fear.

Notes

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- ¹ Inam-ur-Rahim and A.Viaro, *Swat, an Afghan Society in Pakistan* (University of Geneva, 2002); Sultan-i-Rome, "Merger of Swat State: Causes and Effects," (MARC Occasional Papers, No.14, Modern Asia Research Centre, The University of Geneva, April 1999); Sher Muhammad (advocate), interview by the author in Mingora (Swat), April 2007.
 - ² Khadim Hussain, "Terrorism in the Pashtun belt: Analytical framework for finding mediatory solutions," 2008, <http://www.airra.org/documents/AbstractTerrorism%20in%20the%20Pashtun%20belt.pdf> (accessed October 30, 2009).
 - ³ Frederick Barth, *Political Leadership among the Swat Pathans* (London: Athlone, 1959).
 - ⁴ Frederick Barth, *The last Wali of Swat* (US: Waveland Press, 1985); Sultan-i-Rome, "Da Said Babaji Na thar Wali Swat pourey," *Pukhto* 29, no.11 (1997): 12.
 - ⁵ Sultan-i-Rome, *Swat State, 1915-1969-From Genesis to Merger: An Analysis of Political, Administrative, Socio-Political, and Economic Development* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008); Abdul Wadud, *The story of Swat as told by the founder* (Peshawar: Ferozesons, 1962).
 - ⁶ Khadim Hussain, "The truth about PATA regulation," *Dawn*, April 3, 2008, <http://www.dawn.com/2008/04/03/ed.htm#4> (accessed November 1, 2009).
 - ⁷ Inam-ur-Rahim and A.Viaro, *Swat, an Afghan Society in Pakistan*.
 - ⁸ Shaukat Sharar, interview by the author in Swat, December 2008.
 - ⁹ Interview by the author in Mingora (Swat), December 2008.
 - ¹⁰ Interview by the author in 2007.
 - ¹¹ Khurshid Khan (Assistant Professor, Department of History, Degree College, Mingora), interview by the author in Mingora (Swat), December 2008.
 - ¹² The few cases of intermarriages between the Yousufzais and the mullahs and the landless that were observed by this author indicate that the couples were ostracized in the local community because of marrying against the consent of the Yousufzai families.
 - ¹³ Interview by the author in Miandam (Swat), January 2006.
 - ¹⁴ Interview by the author in 2007.
 - ¹⁵ Sultan-i-Rome, "Merger of Swat State: Causes and Effects," (MARC Occasional Papers, No.14, Modern Asia Research Centre, The University of Geneva, April 1999)
 - ¹⁶ Khadim Hussain, "The truth about PATA regulation."
 - ¹⁷ Sher Muhammad, interview.

Politics of Radicalization and De-radicalization: Impact on Pakistan's Security Dynamics

Salma Malik

Pakistan today stands at a major crossroad where the choice for the moderate and enlightened foundations on which the country was built is threatened by a steadily increasing radical expression of religion. While this spread of religious radicalism and its violent manifestation in the form of militancy and jihad have domestic origins, much of it has come up as a result of policies pursued during the 1980s as a direct consequence of Pakistan's collusion with the US in a bid to oust the Soviet Union from neighboring Afghanistan. The issue of radicalization of Pakistan's policy outlook is nonetheless linked to the question of state formation. The dichotomous debate on whether the state was created for safeguarding Islam or for protection of rights of the disenfranchised and beleaguered Muslim population of British India remains not only unanswered, but has gradually caused the country to drift towards its current state of affairs. The state envisioned and conceived by Muhammad Ali Jinnah and the political elite supporting the cause prior to 1947 was to be a tolerant, moderate and accommodative society, which would accord respect and equal status to everyone, regardless of class, caste or creed and where political and, specifically, religious identity were questions of personal choice for each individual.¹ However, in the 63 years of the country's existence, the invocation to religion has moved from the personal domain to the mainstream body politic of the state and that now haunts it in the form of terrorism, militancy and extremist manifestations.

The idea of a tolerant Muslim state, which would protect, promote and respect the religious and political aspirations of not only its Muslim citizens, but also of followers of other faiths, was very clearly laid out by Jinnah in his August 11, 1947 address to the Constituent Assembly.²

Unfortunately, this message was lost very soon after the creation of Pakistan. Several factors contributed to this development, first and foremost was to build a rationale for the independent Muslim state, which now faced a "Hindu" India supported by the British. The religiously motivated groups and factions effectively used perceived threats from India as a rallying call for

jihad. Ironically, these very factions had previously rejected the very idea of creation of Pakistan. However, not only did this post-independence crisis offer them a shot at legitimacy, but also enhanced their political clout in certain segments of society. The passage of the Objectives Resolution in 1949 further minimized the secularist ambience of the country. In the following decades, the country not only faced political instability coupled with repeated imposition of martial law, and constitutional crises but also a gradual rise in religious radicalism and politics of Islamization.

Contrary to the often believed notion that Pakistan was conceived as a radical ideological state, in reality the appeal towards religion and religiosity grew together with the worsening of governance and political state of affairs. The appeal towards religion was also an attempt towards seeking unification and a national identity. It was during the Soviet-Afghan war for the first time that a “reverse indoctrination” of sorts in favor of the Mujahideen became discernable within the army: the “handlers” were won over by the cause of jihad in suppression of the authority of the state. What comes first: Islam or the state? By the 1990s, public discussions demonstrated that more and more Pakistanis were inclined to say that they were Muslims first and Pakistanis later.³

This has led to a situation today where the country is faced with extreme dichotomy between the moderates and the orthodox, between those who—owing to the altered dominant discourse since the 1970s—perceive Pakistan to be a state created solely in the name of Islam and one which is the rightful custodian of Islam, with an enhanced sense of Islamic *Ummah*, and place pan-Islamism ahead of nationalistic fervor. The meta-narrative which politically rallied the Muslims of British India under the banner of Muslim League, *Pakistan ka matlab kya; La Ilaha Illallah* (What is the meaning of Pakistan; there is no lord worthy of worship but Allah), got resuscitated under military dictator Gen Ziaul Haq. The discourse took a different direction, with textbook syllabi remodeled. In certain refugee and predominantly Afghan-Pashtun population areas, the textbooks introduced were part of a University of Nebraska project, supported and funded by the CIA.⁴ Unfortunately, this renewal of ultra orthodox religiosity was in utter contrast to the moderate and tolerant religious practices which were part of the country's inherent culture. As Paul Brass aptly points out, “Islamic ideology is a social construct sponsored by elite in pursuit of political objectives.”⁵ Last, although by no

means the least, was the open-arms policy Pakistan adopted during Zia's rule towards Afghan refugees, who fled their country first in the wake of the April 1978 Saur Revolution, and thereafter following the 1979 Soviet invasion.

The resistance by the Afghans against the Soviets was dubbed as 'jihad' and the fighting forces as 'Mujahideen', giving the entire operation a religious connotation, which attracted many to take up arms and fight in the name of Allah. The CIA-sponsored "jihad" became a success, because of the massive influx of weapons, money and resources from virtually across the world. For many in the US administration, Afghanistan was the opportunity to avenge Vietnam,⁶ and they would spare no effort to achieve that goal. For the Soviet Union, which was already stretched thin both in military and economic terms, Afghanistan was the proverbial last straw that led to the ultimate collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). For the military regime in Pakistan, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan brought about international acceptance and recognition, helping it gain legitimacy both externally and internally, and using religion very effectively to further its agenda.

Ironically, the 'Mujahideen', who had been hailed as heroes and hosted to dinners at the White House, were promptly discarded when the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan and the US proxy war in the region ended. With nothing in terms of a proper post-conflict reconstruction plan in sight, except an exceptionally flawed Geneva Accord, Afghanistan predictably soon fell victim to internal strife and intense clashes among militias of different warlords. The same 'Mujahideen', trained by the CIA and the ISI, now became mercenaries with heavily armed militias, fighting each other to claim control of Kabul. Pakistan being the immediate neighbor remained constantly affected by these developments, not least because of shared ethnic population and Islamabad's deep involvement in Afghanistan, which stemmed from multiple factors. Afghanistan was and still is, albeit with a different connotation, considered by Islamabad as its strategic depth. Given the civil war in the country, millions of Afghan refugees in Pakistan did not return to their homeland. The open border between the two countries not only proved a haven for smuggling and trafficking of all sorts of contrabands, but lack of the writ of the state also resulted in attracting non-state actors such as Al Qaeda and many others to establish their presence in the tribal area. After 9/11, US forces once again entered Afghanistan, but this time the 'Mujahideen' were the dreaded Taliban and terrorist elements, who had

sided with the perpetrators of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US, and were to be hunted down, detained or killed. For the domestic audience in Pakistan, Washington's selective engagement with Islamabad not only enhanced anti-American sentiments, but a clear dislike emerged for the Pakistan military and correspondingly the government, for initiating operations against insurgents and militants in north-western Pakistan in a war that many did not consider their own. A number of madrassas, which were traditionally religious seminaries attached to mosques, became lethal jahdi training camps, as well as recruitment centers for fighters, at times by both internal and external forces. These were funded generously by Saudi, Emirati or Iranian money.

Following the "success" of the 'jihadis' in Afghanistan, the strategy was replicated in Indian-held Kashmir, resulting in a long drawn out, low-intensity conflict there. The returning jihadis, not only found a footing in every Islamist liberation movement worldwide, but were also used by their creators even inside Pakistan, which resulted in intensified ethnic and sectarian fissures that have become more entrenched over time, now manifesting themselves in the form of pockets of full-fledged radicalized insurgency in the northwestern part of the country. This had serious consequences for the internal security and sovereignty of the state, as militant groups such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, Jaish-e-Muhammad and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan turned large parts of the country into killing fields, eroding the writ of the state there.

The decision makers, both military dictators and democratically elected rulers, failed to appreciate the dangers as they exploited religion as a tool to gain legitimacy and internal unification. With religion moving from the periphery to occupy centre stage in the political and social discourse, the socio-cultural landscape of the country drastically changed. Codified laws on blasphemy, Hudood Ordinances, Islamic code of punishments and imposition of a puritan Shariah – first experimented by General Zia and later considered even by democratically elected Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif – were followed by calls for implementation of *Shariah* by non-state actors in areas such as Swat and elsewhere, indicating a dangerous erosion of the writ of the state. On the one hand, these actions were instruments to establish the Islamic credentials of the state, and on the other they also empowered the

privileged mainstream sections of the country and significantly reduced the critical liberal space.

Although the government denies any support for radical elements, yet when it comes to the securitization of Pakistan's eastern border with India, non-state actors are considered as proxy allies and viable strategic assets by many who set the security calculus. There is little realization that such policies are counter-productive, as Khaled Ahmed has aptly pointed out:⁷

The induction of jihad into national war had its consequences for the sovereignty of the state and its "monopoly of violence." The formation of jihadi militias and their location within civil society after their military training tended to create multiple centers of power in Pakistan. ... There are non-state actors, meant originally to strike outside Pakistan, who are now striking inside Pakistan on behalf of the very foreign states once targeted by Pakistan through them.

This has given rise within the country to pockets of militancy, which have become ungovernable as well as completely lawless. The nexus between the politicized clergy and religious radicals has totally transformed the face of the country. These radical elements are trained in combat, detest the West's modern values, and are adept at the use of sophisticated technology that helps them wage their campaigns. In the 1990s, Pakistan slipped into a deadly spiral of sectarian violence, which has since been overshadowed by large-scale militancy, marked by target killings, hostage taking and suicide bombings. The state policy of nurturing and tolerating militant outfits as strategic assets may have been deemed tactically viable, but strategically and in view of long-term consequences it has had extremely disastrous consequence for both internal security and external outlook of the state.

Given the socio-political and economic situation, more and more people are getting radicalized and are being drawn into the vicious web of militancy. Another crucial and often overlooked aspect is that of the link between lack of adequate education, underdevelopment, poverty and the appeal towards militancy and radicalization. Pakistan is a county of 185 million people and the figure could reach 335 million by the year 2050, according to UN estimates. Along with a fast growing population, Pakistan also hosts one of the youngest populations in the world as well as very high population density. Around 59 percent of the country's population, or 101.95 million

people, are below the age of 24.⁸ With worsening economic and social indicators, the prospects of this youth bulge being used by extremists and radical elements are alarming. With faith-based orientation coupled with declining opportunities, the people particularly the youth are more driven towards the ideologues who promise money, empowerment, employment as well as a sense of purpose.

In order to seek solutions to these problems, one must also examine what militancy and radicalization mean. Militancy can be explained as an aggressive posture in support of an ideology or cause, which would require use of force or violence directly, either in offence or in defence, thereby justifying the use of force based on the ideological rhetoric of the particular group.⁹ In contemporary discourse, militancy is very often considered synonymous with radicalization and terrorism. In literal terms, it may be considered the state or condition of being combative or disposed to fighting,¹⁰ which may entail active championing of a cause or belief. Radicalization is a process of relative change in which a group undergoes ideological and/or behavioral transformations that lead to rejection of democratic principles (including the peaceful alternation of power and the legitimacy of ideological and political pluralism) and possibly to the use of violence, or to an increase in the levels of violence, to achieve political goals.¹¹

Would these literal interpretations make militancy and radicalization mere attitudinal and behavioral problems, an unbridled aggression or blind pursuit of ideology (religious or secular) through the irrational and indiscriminate use of force? Answering this question is critical in order to seek a lasting solution to these ills. Usually the response to these issues swings between the use of military power or reliance on a softer approach aimed at changing the hearts and minds of the people. Given the complexity of the problem, the best workable solution would be a combination of the two. De-radicalization is a process of relative change within religious movements, in which a radical group reverses its ideology and de-legitimizes the use of violent methods to achieve political goals, while also moving towards an acceptance of gradual social, political and economic changes within a pluralist context.¹²

Given the deep roots of militancy and radicalization, the solution can be found at three levels: ideological, behavioral and organizational.

A solution at the *ideological* level entails a militant or radicalized group undergoing such a process that does not have to ideologically abide by democratic principles. These democratic norms can both be electoral or liberal, and the group which voluntarily or driven by incentives, enters the said process, may also not participate in an electoral process. At this stage *de-militancy* or *de-radicalization* is primarily concerned with changing the attitudes of armed, violent and ideology driven (religious or political) movements away from violence, rather than towards democracy. Many de-radicalized groups might still hold xenophobic and anti-democratic views.

At the *behavioral* level, it involves practically abandoning the use of violence to achieve political goals without a concurrent process of ideological de-legitimization of violence. The *organizational* level entails the dismantling of the armed units of militant or radical organizations, which includes discharging/demobilizing as well as disarming their members without the units breaking into splinters, getting defused or plunging into internal violence.

These three frameworks can either be applied simultaneously as a holistic process working at all three levels, or substantively—which would encompass a successful process of de-radicalization/ decommissioning of militant outfits at both the ideological and behavioral levels but not at the organizational—and lastly, pragmatically, indicating de-radicalization and de-militancy at the behavioral and organizational levels, but without an ideological de-legitimization of violence. Questions regarding the adequacy and success of such processes—that is the probability and likelihood of simultaneously aiming for and achieving these goals—are obviously important. But even before that it needs to be determined if the process should be holistic or piecemeal. Should a process of de-radicalization that appears more ideological in nature in comparison to the militancy which exhibits militaristic tendencies be tackled exclusively in their isolated domains or a strategy comprising the two should be applied? An important issue that comes up usually while undertaking such a process is to determine who the main stakeholders are and how the process could be initiated.

In the preceding paragraphs, the focus has been on the structural aspect of radicalization and militancy, which has both internal and external stimuli, be that legitimization of violent politics as a viable military strategy, considering

the militant or radical elements as a strategic asset or a proxy ally, entering into selective geo-strategic engagements or maintaining a warped sense of identity politics. Some remedial measures could be reforms and improvement in the security and justice sector. Such reforms include strengthening the capacity and capabilities of law enforcement agencies, including police. Currently, most counter-insurgency operations in Pakistan are being carried out by the army, which like any conventional military has been trained to fight a traditional adversary and not internal asymmetrical warfare.

In the post-9/11 military operations, Pakistan has suffered the loss of life of more than 5,000 military personnel and 30,000 civilians.¹³ Around 60,000 troops are deployed for counter-insurgency operations, a scenario that is not viable or sustainable in the long term. In the unprecedented prevailing scenarios, the military has to prepare for battle on both the traditional eastern front with India as well as the western border, where the distinction between enemy and friendly forces is increasingly blurred. Ideally, the counter-insurgency operations should be spearheaded by law enforcement agencies and institutions. However, in Pakistan's case not only are these institutions underdeveloped and ill-equipped but also once Pakistan allied with the US in the war on terror the bulk of counter-insurgency training was provided to the military, and not the law enforcement agencies, leaving them deficient in the face of a very well-equipped and organized adversary. The security sector, both the military and the law enforcement agencies, must be complimented by a robust judicial process, which delivers decisions in an expeditious manner. This is critical because many a time arrested hardcore terrorists and insurgents are released owing to limitations of the judicial process or the investigation machinery, mainly on account of lack of evidence or some other lacuna. Also, in view of the authority and coercive force at the disposal of the security agencies, there is an absolute need for accountability, professionalism and transparency. Until an organization maintains professionalism as well as both internal and external accountability, there are risks of security forces personnel acting with virtual impunity and becoming repressive in the absence of accountability mechanisms. There also need to be layers of transparency, starting from public to at least institutional transparency, where at least the legislative bodies are properly informed.

In order to bring about structural changes, which would have immediate to long-term effect, winning the hearts and minds of the affected and vulnerable

groups is extremely important. The youth and socially marginalized and less educated segments of society are among the vulnerable groups, who, owing to a lack of opportunity and incentives, are not only susceptible to radicalization but also to joining militants' ranks. Counter-measures must include promotion of shared and non-negotiable values, including respect for the rule of law, freedom of speech and belief, equality of opportunity, tolerance, respect and protection of all human rights, and establishment of an education system that neither discriminates on the basis of belief or ethnicity nor reflects sectarian or ethnic biases. At present, mainly three education systems co-exist in the country, including madrassas or religious seminaries catering to a large population group comprising of a poor and highly disadvantaged segment of society. In the war on terror, the West focused exclusively on the madrassas and the curriculum taught there as the fountainhead of religious militancy. The madrassa has roots in the Islamic history, where it was the epitome of learning and education of all kinds. Gradually, this institution became a source of education, shelter and sustenance for the poorer segments, and carried with it a promise of future earning. During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, financial and other resources and the zeal for ousting the Soviets at all cost, turned this seat of learning into a breeding ground for militancy and radicalization. However, extremist and militant perspectives are by no means the exclusive domain of the madrassa system. The public education system fares no better, with the curriculum advocating hatred and breeding intolerance and a linear perspective. Lastly, the private school system, which is exclusive to a certain income bracket, with the number of beneficiaries considerably lower than the previous two categories, also does not provide any guarantee against radicalization.

There is an urgent need to expand the provision of education in schools and madrassas for all, irrespective of class, creed or financial status. Across the board review of textbooks, and curricula and reforms in the education sector must aim at promoting inter-faith harmony and tolerance. Besides promotion of a uniform system at private and public schools, the state must also ensure better socio-economic incentives for education and enhance work opportunities, as poverty, intolerance, ignorance and socio-economic hardship provide fertile ground for breeding militancy and radicalization. De-radicalization and counter-militancy processes need to run in tandem with military action, and support garnered from political actors, legislators,

media as well as leadership of faith-based institutions. Successful de-radicalization and reintegration models practiced in several countries, including Malaysia and Saudi Arabia, need to be studied and tailored to local needs, keeping in view the socio-economic and cultural norms. Thus, by promoting local solutions, and building adequate civic capacity, a sense of ownership in the process can be created. In such programmes, the role of women is critical, as the proverbial silent majority is not only a victim of the vicious cycle of violence and radicalization, but can also help implement a successful reintegration process. The media can both spoil and facilitate these efforts and must be used in a non-partisan fashion to promote communal and inter-faith harmony and to build narratives of de-radicalization and counter-militancy.

Last but not least, the official approach towards militancy and radicalization must find the right balance in the use of soft and coercive measures. The military also needs to learn lessons from the counter-insurgency efforts so far. There is a critical need to remember that military and political solutions go hand in hand to be effective, and the onus lies on both institutions to strike the right balance. Given the multiple threat levels, there is no space for complacency. Any sustained and successful campaign must be multifaceted and able to detect altering ground realities and respond accordingly. That obviously demands better intelligence coordination. Schemes such as arming and encouraging private or citizens' militias have drastic long-term consequences for the state. Promotion through review, reform and mutual deliberations of a holistic governance mechanism will go a long way in finding workable solutions to the challenges that pose the greatest threat to the country. Harboring and facilitating militant elements has proven counter-productive in the past and is unlikely to work in the future either. The state needs to learn that ensuring human security is the best way to ensure national security.

Notes

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- ¹ "Mr. Jinnah's presidential address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on August 11, 1947," transcribed from printed copy by Shehzaad Nakhoda, *Dawn*, Independence Day Supplement, August 14, 1999, http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/legislation/constituent_address_11aug1947.html, (accessed June 23, 2011).
- ² Ibid.
- ³ Khaled Ahmed, "Pakistan and nature of the State: Revisionism, Jihad and Governance," *Criterion Quarterly* 5, no. 2 (2010): 6.
- ⁴ The primers provided to students at junior or entry level actually taught the Urdu alphabet thus: *Alif* for Allah, *Bay* for *Bandoq* (gun), *Jeem* for Jihad, and *Kaaf* for *Kafir* (infidel). The word infidel also accompanied a uniformed Soviet soldier. There were many such examples, which at a very young and impressionable age very subtly conditioned children's minds towards the CIA-sponsored resistance movement.
- ⁵ Mohammad Waseem, "Origins and Growth Patterns of Islamic Organizations in Pakistan," <http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Edited%20Volumes/ReligiousRadicalism/PagesfromReligiousRadicalismAndSecurityinSouthAsiach2.pdf>, (accessed June 23, 2011).
- ⁶ Steve Coll, *Ghost wars: the secret history of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet invasion to September 10, 2001* (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), 91-97.
- ⁷ K. Ahmed, "Pakistan and nature of the State: Revisionism, Jihad and Governance," 5-9.
- ⁸ Shahid Javed Burki, "Historical Trends in Pakistan's Demographics and Population Policy;" and Moeed Yusuf, "A Society on the Precipice? Examining the Prospects of Youth Radicalization in Pakistan," in Michael Kugelman and Robert M. Hathaway, eds., *Reaping the Dividend: Overcoming Pakistan's Demographic Challenges* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2011), 56-105.
- ⁹ "Critical Analysis of the Rise of Islamic Militancy," http://conservancy.umn.edu/bitstream/47081/4/Critical_Analysis_of_the_Rise_of_Islamic_Militancy.pdf, (accessed June 23, 2011).
- ¹⁰ www.thefreedictionary.com/militancy.
- ¹¹ Omar Ashour, "Votes and Violence: Islamists and the Processes of Transformation," in *Developments in Radicalisation and Political Violence* (London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR) at Kings College, 2009), 5.
- ¹² Ibid.
- ¹³ "Sacrifices in war on terror should be acknowledged: Gilani," <http://www.dunyanews.tv/index.php?key=Q2F0SUQ9MiNOaWQ9MjY1NDU>, (accessed June 23, 2011).

Backgrounder

Evolution of Militant Groups in Pakistan (1)

Muhammad Amir Rana

1. Introduction

Albert Einstein said problems could not be solved by the same level of thinking that created them. The statement fits like a glove to Pakistan's counterterrorism approach that is characterized by a lack of innovation and creativity.

Many believe that Islamabad lacks a coherent and comprehensive strategy to stem the rising tide of religious militancy and fight the menace of terrorism. But the government cites as proof of its commitment the establishment of National Counterterrorism Authority (NACTA) to examine the problem and devise a viable policy.

It is not clear how much time NACTA would take to accomplish this job and, more importantly, if it would be able to rescue the country's security doctrine from shadows of the Soviet-Afghan war. Pakistan's present security narrative was developed in the context of that conflict, making it convenient for the defense establishment and the political administration to blame all domestic problems on external forces and factors. This approach has failed to evolve in synch with emerging threats. The country's militant landscape has changed significantly in recent years, with militant strands such as the Punjabi Taliban posing new and increasingly worrying challenges for the state.

The militancy in Pakistan has become a complex phenomenon with ever-changing dynamics. An improved and coherent approach to address the issue of militancy requires a composite knowledge base. This report is an attempt to explore the complexities of the phenomenon with a view to develop better understanding, which is critical to the ability to respond to the challenge on the policy, implementation and societal levels. In this perspective the report explores three dimensions of the militant landscape in Pakistan:

- i. ***Historical Perspective:*** Comprehension of the ideological and tactical evolution of militant groups in Pakistan must be the first step towards evolving a comprehensive policy. Although considerable literature is available on the historical perspective of militant groups, but most of it is based on secondary sources and is loaded with factual inaccuracies. An analysis based on faulty data obviously cannot lead to accurate threat assessment. Furthermore, Pakistani militant groups have kept changing their strategies and tactics according to the circumstances and countermeasures they have faced. The available data is old and few attempts have been made to update it with a view to understand the patterns of evolution of militant outfits.

- ii. ***Complex Organizational Structures and Linkages:*** The nature and agendas of militant groups in Pakistan in recent years have been anything but stagnant. Militant groups faced internal fissures, external pressures and kept changing their strategies and nexus. The groups involved in terrorist activities across Pakistan are largely splinters of banned militant organizations, in addition to a few groups that have emerged recently. The banned organizations, which were once acknowledged as strategic assets of the state, have nurtured narratives of extremism or destruction. Although their focus was initially on ridding the Muslims of Kashmir, Afghanistan and other regions of the world of tyrannical rule, review of their literature and stated objectives lays bare sectarian motives and ambitions for achieving an ultra-orthodox theocracy in Pakistan. However, realization of theocracy in the country was the 'secondary agenda' of the militant organizations, once they had achieved their objectives in Kashmir, Afghanistan and elsewhere. However, splinter groups of the militant outfits have prioritized the initial secondary agenda and started pursuing it through violent means, which has been their sole tactic to pursue their objectives. The splinters, which are often referred to as 'Punjabi Taliban',¹ have snapped links with their banned parent organizations, often declaring them puppets of official agencies, and developed a rapport with Taliban and Al Qaeda militants based largely in Pakistan's lawless tribal areas bordering Afghanistan. Most banned organizations use many covers for their operations. The first response of banned organizations to official

clampdown in recent years has been to start operating under a new name. Changed names of charities also mask their links with militant organizations. The proscribed Jaish-e-Muhammad militant group is now active as Tehrik-e-Khuddamul Islam, while raising funds and launching campaigns as Al-Rehmat Trust, the charity wing of the organization. Similarly, Jamaatud Daawa (JD) is carrying out its activities as Tehrik-e-Tahaffuz-e-Hurmat-e-Rasool, while Idara Khidmat-e-Khalaq oversees the group's charitable projects and fund raising through donations, etc. In this context, understanding the structural complexities of the militant groups can help evolve better counterstrategies.

- iii. ***Accurate Threat Perception:*** Accurate threat perception is crucial to effective response to the threats Pakistan faces. A clear approach based on a distinction between the challenges of a tribal insurgency and pervasive terrorism besetting the country is required at the policy level. Al Qaeda, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other militant groups in Pakistan may have a nexus but their operational strategies and partners are different. Countermeasures at the security, political and ideological levels need to factor in those differences and respond accordingly. Understanding the nature of the challenge in each context is also important. The security challenges in the tribal areas and parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are inherently different from those in Punjab and urban Sindh. The tribal areas are in the throes of an extremist militancy, which has local and regional context and the militants have resorted to violent acts of terrorism as a tactic against the security forces. In mainland Pakistan, however, terrorism has its roots in the ideological, political and sectarian narratives developed by the religious parties, militant groups and, at times, by the state itself. The disparate nature of threats calls for an equally diverse approach to counter them. Concentrating on banned organizations alone rather than their splinters, over which the parent outfits have no control, misses a trick and emergence of further splinters among these organizations can complicate the counter-terrorism effort even more. In this perspective, a comprehensive study of the militant landscape of Pakistan is urgently needed. Divided into two parts, this report offers a backgrounder on the militant groups, as well as the nature of threats they pose and how to counter them. Before going

into further detail a brief outlook of religious organizations in Pakistan would help understand the phenomenon. The first part consists of an introduction to religious organizations in Pakistan.

2. Mapping the Religious Organizations in Pakistan

As many as 239² religious organizations operated in Pakistan at the national and provincial level in 2002; at present their number is 232. These organizations pursue multiple agendas, such as transformation of society according to their ideologies, enforcement of Shariah law, establishment of *Khilafah* (caliphate) system, fulfilment of their sectarian objectives and achievement of Pakistan's strategic and ideological objectives through militancy.

Although general trends are easy to identify, categorization of religious parties is not quite as straightforward, mainly because most of the religious organizations are working for multiple agendas, either themselves or through affiliated groups and entities. A closer look suggests that even today most of the religious organizations in Pakistan move around or at least at some time had link with the main religious organizations which were active in the country in the 1950s, including the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP) and Jamiat Ahle-Hadith. These main organizations included All Pakistan Shia Political Parties, which became Tehrik Nifaz-e-Fiqah-e-Jafaria in the late 1970s. Almost all other religious outfits, whether working for missionary, sectarian or educational/charitable pursuits or engaged in militancy, are affiliated with or are break-away factions of these five major organizations. Most importantly, even the affiliates or splinters believe in the agendas of their parent organizations. The major difference is that the parent organizations' focus is on Islamization and that of the splinters on religio-socialization. The parent parties, which have a religious agenda and focus, are part of Pakistan's mainstream politics, believe in the Constitution of Pakistan, participate in electoral politics, and are classified as religious political parties.

In the last two decades another form of religious organizations has also emerged. These are the agents of Islamization and religio-socialization but believe that change is impossible within the Constitution of Pakistan and the current political dispensation. They deem democracy and the democratic

process inadequate for the change they pursue and advocate. Some of them—such as Jamaatud Daawa, the *Khilafah* movement, Hizbut Tehrir and Al-Muhajiroon—deem that democracy is an idea contrary to Islamic principles of governance and want to replace it with their own version of Shariah. Some groups such as Tanzeemul Akhwan and Tanzeem-e-Islami believe that Shariah cannot be introduced in its entirety through the democratic electoral process and consider use of force or toppling of the government as alternatives. These organizations have sectarian and militant tendencies but the dominant approach is renewalist, characterized by their quest for a complete change of system. This is contrary to the religious political parties' approach, which focuses on gradual change within the system.

In this perspective, the religious parties in Pakistan may be categorized according to their projected aims:

a. Sectarian

All parties that have a specific sectarian focus and promote antagonism against other sects of Islam or engage in sectarian rhetoric or armed conflict on sectarian lines are classified as sectarian outfits, notwithstanding their participation in electoral politics and in militant activities. Examples include Deobandi outfits Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ), and Bareilvi groups Sunni Tehreek (ST) and Jamaat-e-Ahle-Sunnat.

b. Religio-political

All those parties that believe in the Constitution of Pakistan and participate in electoral politics are classified as religious political parties regardless of their sectarian and religious reformist agendas, such as the JUI, JUP, JI, Markazi Jamiat Ahle-Hadith (MJA) and Shia group Islami Tehreek.

c. Non-political

All those parties that emphasize on missionary activities, Sufism, *Khilafah*, and have social or religious reform agendas are categorized as non-political despite their political, militant and sectarian affiliations. Such parties include Tanzeemul Ikhwan, Jamaatud Daawa and Minhajul Quran.

d. Militant Groups

All those outfits that pursue and promote militancy in Kashmir, Afghanistan and elsewhere and are active on the militant front are described as militant groups, notwithstanding their sectarian and political affiliations. These include the banned Jaish-e-Muhammad, Harkatul Mujahideen, Al-Badar Mujahideen and Lashkar-e-Taiba.

e. Taliban

Taliban are Islamist groups that emerged in Pakistan's Federally Administrative Tribal Areas (FATA) neighboring Afghanistan and parts of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province after 9/11. Initially, their objective was to wage war in Afghanistan against NATO forces. However, they subsequently adopted other agendas, such as Islamization in FATA and absorbed sectarian tendencies. Most of the Taliban groups belong to Deobandi school of thought, but some groups, which emerged in response to actions of the Taliban or other sectarian groups with similar causes also fall in the same category. Examples include Ansarul Islam, a Barelvi-dominated organization in Khyber Agency, and Shah Khalid Group, a Salafi outfit in Mohmand Agency of FATA.

Many terrorist cells mainly from non-Pashtun areas are jointly referred to as "Punjabi Taliban". This is a brand name for terrorist groups detached from the mainland militant organizations, as well as for the newly emerged terrorist cells with similar causes. The reference to Punjab, the most populous province, is not necessarily to highlight a strand of militants on an ethnic or linguistic basis, as Punjabi Taliban groups comprise militants from across the country. In the Soviet-Afghan war, the Afghan Mujahideen used the term 'Punjabi Mujahideen' to refer to militants from mainland Pakistan. When Pakistani groups started contributing to the insurgency in Indian-held Kashmir, they were referred to as 'Afghan Mujahideen', although most of the militants were from the Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces. In this context, it is not surprising that after the Taliban emerged in Afghanistan in the mid-1990s, Pakistani groups there were tagged as Punjabi Taliban. Afghan and Pakistani tribal Taliban use the same term for them.

f. *Khilafah* Movements

These include the outfits that do not believe in the Constitution of Pakistan or the democratic dispensation and want *Khilafah* rule in Pakistan. For the purposes of this study, they are referred to as *Khilafah* movements regardless of their sectarian affiliations. Examples include Hizbut Tehrir and Tanzeem-e-Islami.

3. Distribution of Religious Organizations in Pakistan

As mentioned earlier, there are over 230 religious parties operating in Pakistan. In 1947, only six religious parties were active—the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), Tehreek-e-Ahrar (TA), Khaksar Tehreek, Jamaat-e-Ahle-Hadith (JA) and Shia Political Party (SPP). In 1948, the *Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan* (JUP), representing the Bareilvi school of thought, emerged. The proliferation of religious organizations in Pakistan started in the 1970s and reached its peak during the Soviet-Afghan war in the 1980s. The total number of religious organizations in Pakistan had reached 30 until 1979, including seven from the Deobandi school of thought, five subscribing to Bareilvi and four each to Ahle-Hadith and Shia beliefs, while three groups that were either splinters of or influenced by the JI also surfaced. In the 1980s, a sharp increase in the growth of religious parties was observed and their number rose to 239 in 2002. These figures only take into consideration organizations at the national, regional and provincial level. The number runs into thousands if small groups at the local level are also counted. Among the 239, as many as 21 parties participate in electoral politics, 148 work purely on sectarian agendas, 24 are associated with militant jihad, 12 groups seek establishment of a caliphate system in the country and do not believe in the democratic dispensation, 18 are missionary in nature—focused mainly on preaching their sectarian thoughts—while 10 operate as charities.

The highest concentration of these religious organizations is in the Punjab province, where 107 organizations have their headquarters. (See Table 1) The provincial capital Lahore, which is considered the cultural capital of the country, can also be described as the capital of religious organizations. It is the only city in the whole of South Asia where at least 71 religious organizations operate. Multan is the second major hub in the province where 18 religious organizations have their headquarters. Kashmir and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa follow the trend with 48 and 43, respectively, but figures for these two regions also include small militant groups and Taliban factions. If

these are not counted the strength of religious organizations in the two regions is quite low. In Sindh, most of the religious organizations have their headquarters in Karachi, mainly because of the ethnic diversity, and social and cultural landscape of the city and because the city is the financial capital of the country and a major donation base for religious organizations.

Table 1: Religious Organizations (2002)³

| Sect/School of Thought | Political | Sectarian | Militant | Educational/other | Total |
|------------------------|-----------|-----------|----------|-------------------|-------|
| Deobandi | 4 | 33 | 5 | 3 | 45 |
| Barelvi | 6 | 22 | 13 | 2 | 43 |
| Ahle-Hadith | 4 | 10 | 3 | 3 | 20 |
| Shia | 3 | 16 | 3 | 1 | 23 |
| Jl and its factions | 3 | - | 4 | 7 | 17 |
| Others | 4 | 1 | 76 | 10 | 91 |
| Total | 24 | 82 | 104 | 26 | 239 |

Table 2: Religious Organizations (2011)⁴

| Sect/School of Thought | Political | Non-Political | Sectarian | Militant | Educational/other | Total |
|------------------------|-----------|---------------|-----------|---|-------------------|-------|
| Deobandi | 8 | 5 | 16 | 19 | 5 | 53 |
| Barelvi | 8 | 11 | 11 | 4 | 5 | 39 |
| Ahle-Hadith | 3 | 2 | 6 | 5 | 2 | 18 |
| Shia | 3 | 3 | 12 | 1 | 1 | 20 |
| Jl and its factions | 3 | | | 4 | 11 | 18 |
| Others | 4 | | 1 | 1) Tribal Taliban factions:28 2) Punjabi Taliban factions:23 3) Kashmir & FATA-based militant groups ⁵ : 13 3) Foreign militant groups: 5 | 10 | 84 |
| Total | 29 | 21 | 46 | 102 | 34 | 232 |

i. Barelvi

The majority of Muslims in Pakistan follow the Sunni/Barelvi school of thought. Until 2002, Barelvis ran 39 religious organizations in Pakistan, but now the number has dropped to 36. Most militant groups of the Barelvi sect have disappeared from the scene following the post-9/11 government policy towards militant groups.⁶ However, Barelvi outfits are still larger in number than those of other sects. Even in terms of small local groups operating at the district and sub-district levels,⁷ Barelvis are ahead of other sects. In 2011, 36 major Barelvi organizations were operating throughout the country—seven of them were political, 11 sectarian, 12 non-political/missionary and four militant. Four organizations were working in the field of education. (See Table 3)

There are clear divisions among the Barelvis on the basis of the Sufi order they follow, but these differences have little impact at the organizational level, as major parties have representations from all Sufi orders.

Table 3: Barelvi Organizations

| No | Name | Established | Nature |
|----|--|-------------|--------------------------|
| 1 | Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (Noorani) | 1951 | Political/religious |
| 2 | Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (Niazi) | 1988 | Political/religious |
| 3 | Markazi Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (Fazal Kareem Group) | 1999 | Political/religious |
| 4 | Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (Nifaz-e-Shariat) | 1998 | Political/religious |
| 5 | Nizam-e-Mustafa Party | 2002 | Political/religious |
| 6 | Pakistan Awami Tehreek (PAT) | 1990 | Political/religious |
| 7 | Jamiatul Mashaikh | - | Political/religious |
| 8 | Sunni Tehreek | 1990 | Sectarian/political |
| 9 | Jamaat-e-Ahle-Sunnat | 1953 | Sectarian |
| 10 | Aalmi Tanzeem Ahle-Sunnat | 1998 | Sectarian |
| 11 | Tehreek Minhajul Quran | 1989 | Non-political/missionary |
| 12 | Aalmi Daawat-e-Islamia | 1998 | Non-political/missionary |

Evolution of Militant Groups in Pakistan (1)

| | | | |
|----|------------------------------------|------|--|
| 13 | Tehreek-e-Fidayan Khatm-e-Nabuwwat | 1998 | Sectarian |
| 14 | Daawat-e-Islami | 1984 | Non-political/missionary |
| 15 | Anjuman Talaba-e-Islam | 1968 | Student wing of JUP |
| 16 | Anjuman Naojawan-e-Islam | 1998 | Sectarian |
| 17 | Mustafai Tehreek | 1996 | Sectarian |
| 18 | Ameer-e-Millat Foundation | 1998 | Non-political/charity |
| 19 | Ulema Council | 1998 | Non-political |
| 20 | Majlis al-Daawa Islamia | 1990 | Non-political/missionary |
| 21 | Ittehadul Mashaikh | - | Sectarian |
| 22 | Tanzeem Mashaikh-e-Uzzam | 2001 | Non-political/missionary |
| 23 | Jamaat Raza-e-Mustafa | - | Sectarian |
| 24 | Sunni Ulema Council | - | Non-political |
| 25 | Sawad-e-Azam Ahle-Sunnat | 2001 | Sectarian |
| 26 | Sipah-e-Mustafa | 1989 | Sectarian |
| 27 | Karwan-e-Islam | 2000 | Sectarian |
| 28 | Shairaan-e-Islam | - | Militant/sectarian |
| 29 | Idara Tanzeem Daawat-e-Islam | 1999 | Non-political/missionary |
| 30 | Tehreek-e-Jihad, Jammu-o-Kashmir | 1997 | Militant |
| 31 | Tanzeemul Madaaris Ahle-Sunnat | - | Non-political/educational |
| 32 | Lashkar-e-Islam | 1996 | Militant |
| 33 | Mustafwi Student Movement | - | Student wing of PAT |
| 34 | Majlis Ulema-e-Nizamia | - | Non-political |
| 35 | Anjuman Asatiza-e-Pakistan | - | Non-political/educational |
| 36 | Ziaul Ummat Foundation | - | Non-political/educational |
| 37 | Sunni Jihad Council | - | Militant/sectarian |
| 38 | Sunni Ittehad Council | 2009 | Alliance of Sunni organizations against extremism ⁸ |
| 39 | Tanzeemul Madaris | | Educational board from Barelvi madrassas |

ii. Deobandi

Fifty-three organizations of the Deobandi sect operate in Pakistan. (Table 4) Until 2002, the number of Deobandi organizations was 45. (Table 1) In the past few years, factions of the JUI have further fractured into three groups and the party now has six active factions. The new organizations include militant groups, mainly Taliban outfits, and others groups that split into factions over internal differences. The TTP,⁹ Jundullah and Lashkar-e-Islam emerged as new groups, while the banned Jaish-e-Muhammad (JM), Harkatul Mujahideen (HM) and Harkatul Jihad-e-Islami (HUJI) splintered into groups. The Jamaatul Furqan is a splinter group of the JM, while HUJI militants Commander Illyas and Maulvi Muzaffar have parted ways with their parent organization. Harkatul Mujahideen Al-Almi is a splinter group of the HM.

The three factions of the JUI that came into existence between 2002 and 2008 include one formed by Maulana Asmatullah and Hafiz Muhammad Barech in Balochistan a month ahead of the 2008 general election. The split badly affected the JUI showing in the elections. Expressing lack of faith in the JUI-F leadership, Maulana Khaleel Ahmed formed his own faction, the JUI-Haqeeqi, in 2005. JUI-Sami also suffered an internal crisis in 2005, with one of its main leaders forming a faction called JUI-Senior.

In 2011, 53 religious political parties of the Deobandi sect were operating across Pakistan—seven were political, 16 sectarian, 12 non-political/missionary, 19 militant and four worked in the education field.

Table 4: Deobandi Organizations

| No | Name | Established | Nature |
|----|--------------------------------------|-------------|---------------------|
| 1 | Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Fazlur Rehman) | 1949 | Political/religious |
| 2 | Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Samiul Haq) | 1981 | Political/religious |
| 3 | Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Nazriati) | 2008 | Political/religious |
| 4 | Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Senior) | 2005 | Political/religious |

Evolution of Militant Groups in Pakistan (1)

| | | | |
|----|--|------|-----------------------|
| 5 | Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Qadri) | 1981 | Political/religious |
| 6 | Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Haqeeqi) | 2006 | Political/religious |
| 7 | Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan | 1985 | Sectarian/political |
| 8 | Tablighi Jamaat | 1920 | Missionary |
| 9 | Jamiat Eshaat-e-Tauheed-o-Sunnat | 1939 | Sectarian |
| 10 | Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi | 1990 | Militant |
| 11 | Majlis-e-Ahrar Pakistan | 1939 | Sectarian/political |
| 12 | Jamiat Ahle-Sunnat | - | Sectarian |
| 13 | Ahle-Sunnat-wal-Jamaat | 2003 | Sectarian |
| 14 | Tehreek Difa-e-Sahaba | 1987 | Sectarian |
| 15 | Wafaqul Madaaris Al-Arabia | 1987 | Educational |
| 16 | Pakistan Shariat Council | - | Educational/sectarian |
| 17 | Jamaat-e-Ahle-Sunnat (Northern Areas) | 1990 | Sectarian |
| 18 | Ittehad Ulema-e-Baltistan | 1995 | Sectarian |
| 19 | Jaish-e-Muhammad | 2000 | Militant |
| 20 | Harkatul Mujahideen | 1987 | Militant |
| 21 | Harkatul Mujahideen Al-Aalami | 2001 | Militant |
| 22 | Harkat-e-Jihad-e-Islami | 1980 | Militant |
| 23 | Harkat-e-Jihad-e-Islami (Ilyas Kashmiri Group) ¹⁰ | 1991 | Militant |
| 24 | Harkat-e-Jihad-e-Islami (Muzaffar Kashmiri Group) | 1997 | Militant |
| 25 | Harkat-e-Jihad-e-Islami (Burma) | 1988 | Militant |
| 26 | Jamiatul Mujahideen Al-Aalami | 1983 | Militant |
| | Jamaatul Furqan | 2002 | Militant |
| 27 | Jundullah | 2003 | Militant |
| 28 | Jundullah (Balochistan) | 2005 | Militant |
| 29 | Lashkar-e-Jhangvi | 1996 | Sectarian/militant |
| 30 | Lashkar-e-Islam | 2004 | Sectarian/militant |

| | | | |
|----|---|------|-------------------------|
| 31 | Tehreek-e-Taliban ¹¹ | 2000 | Militant |
| 32 | Punjabi Taliban ¹² | 2007 | Militant |
| 33 | Mashaikh-e-Pakistan | - | Religious |
| 34 | Tehreek Nifaz-e-Islam | 2007 | Militant/sectarian |
| 35 | Majlis Sianatul Muslimeen | 1944 | Missionary |
| 36 | Pakistan Ulema Council | 2000 | Religious |
| 37 | Aalmi Majlis Khatm-e-Nabuwwat | 1949 | Religious/sectarian |
| 38 | Tehreek Tahaffuz-e-Khatm-e-Nabuwwat | 1949 | Religious/sectarian |
| 39 | Pasban Khatm-e-Nabuwwat | 1949 | Religious/sectarian |
| 40 | International Khatm-e-Nabuwwat Movement | - | Religious/sectarian |
| 41 | Sawad-e-Azam Ahle-Sunnat | - | Sectarian |
| 42 | Tehreek Khuddam Ahle-Sunnat | - | Non-political |
| 43 | Azmat-e-Islam Movement | 1995 | Political |
| 44 | Anjuman Khuddam al-Din | - | Non-political |
| 45 | Majlis Tanseeq-e-Islami | 2001 | Non-political |
| 46 | Muttahida Ulema Council | - | Non-political/sectarian |
| 47 | Jamiat Talaba-e-Islam (F) | - | Student wing |
| 48 | Jamiat Talaba-e-Islam (S) | - | Student wing |
| 49 | Sipah-e-Sahaba Students Movement | 1987 | Sectarian/student wing |
| 50 | Majlis-e-Amal Ulema-e-Islam | 1998 | Non-political/sectarian |
| 51 | Mutaamar Al-Muhajiroon | - | Non-political |
| 52 | Khaksar Tehreek | | Political/religious |
| 53 | Tehreek Khilafat-e-Rashida | 2004 | Khilafah |

iii. Ahle-Hadith

There are 18 groups of the Ahle-Hadith sect working in the country. Of these, three also participate in electoral politics, six are sectarian, five have educational or missionary focus, and five are militant outfits.

Table 5: Ahle-Hadith Organizations

| No | Name | Established | Nature |
|----|--|-------------|--------------------------------|
| 1 | Markazi Jamiat Ahle-Hadith (Sajid Mir) | 1956 | Political/religious |
| 2 | Markazi Jamiat Ahle-Hadith (Ebtisaam) | 1994 | Political/religious |
| 3 | Jamaat Ahle-Hadith | 1919 | Political/ missionary |
| 4 | Jamaat Ghurba-e-Ahle-Hadith | 1986 | Sectarian/religious |
| 5 | Jamaatud Daawa | 1986 | Sectarian/social |
| 6 | Jamaatul Mujahideen | 1837 | Sectarian/militant |
| 7 | Tehreekul Mujahideen | 1989 | Militant |
| 8 | Jamaatud Daawa illal-Quran-wa-Sunnat | - | Militant |
| 9 | Lashkar-e-Taiba | 1991 | Militant |
| 10 | Khairun Naas ¹³ | 2004 | Militant |
| 10 | Ahle-Hadith Youth Force (Sajid Mir) | 1986 | Sectarian/student organization |
| 11 | Ahle-Hadith Youth Force (Ebtisaam) | 1995 | Sectarian/student organization |
| 12 | Tablighi Jamaat Ahle-Hadith | - | Missionary |
| 13 | Wafaqul Madaaris Salafia | - | Educational |
| 14 | Shabban-e-Ahle-Hadith | - | Sectarian |
| 15 | Ahle-Hadith Student Federation | - | Student organization |
| 16 | Tahaffuz-e-Haramain Sharifain Movement | - | Non-political/religious |
| 17 | Jamiat Ulema-e-Ahle-Hadith | - | Non-political/religious |
| 18 | Markazi Jamaat Ahle-Hadith | 1995 | Political/religious |

iv. Shia

Twenty main groups and parties belonging to the Shia sect are operating in Pakistan. Out of these, four are political, 12 are sectarian, one each militant and educational and the rest are non-political and engage in charity work.

Table 6: Shia Organizations

| No | Name | Established | Nature |
|----|---|-------------|--|
| 1 | Tehreek-e-Islami | April 1974 | Religious/political |
| 2 | Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqh-e-Jafaria (TNFJ) | 1984 | Religious/political |
| 3 | Jafaria Alliance | - | Religious/political |
| 4 | Shia Political Party | - | Religious/political |
| 5 | Imamia Student Organization (ISO) | 1972 | Sectarian/student organization |
| 6 | Jamiat Ulema-e-Jafaria | - | Religious/sectarian |
| 7 | Imamia Organization | 1976 | Sectarian |
| 8 | Mukhtar Force | 1999 | Sectarian |
| 9 | Pasban-e-Islam | 1989 | Sectarian |
| 10 | Tehreek-e-Tahaffuz Haqooq-e-Shia (TTHS) | 1990 | Sectarian |
| 11 | Sipah-e-Muhammad | 1990 | Sectarian |
| 12 | Hizbul Momineen | 1991 | Militant |
| 13 | Shia Supreme Council | 1972 | Sectarian |
| 14 | Tehreek Haqooq-e-Jafaria | 1990 | Sectarian |
| 15 | Aalmi Majlis Ahle-Bait | - | Sectarian |
| 16 | Jafaria Student Organization (JSO) | - | Sectarian/ student wing of Tehrik-e-Islami |
| 17 | Wafaqul Madaaris Shia | 1980 | Educational |
| 18 | All Shia Action Committee Pakistan (ASAC) | - | Sectarian |
| 19 | Millat-e-Jafaria Rabita Council (MJRC) | - | Non-political |
| 20 | Pasban-e-Aza Karachi | - | Non-political |

v. Jamaat-e-Islami

The Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) has 11 major affiliated organizations that have focused on areas as diverse as militant jihad, education and charitable pursuits and raising their voice for workers' rights. In addition, there are

eight organizations that either broke away from the JI or were created by members of JI under the influence of Maulana Maududi, the JI founder, for social and educational reforms. (See Table 7)

Table 7: JI Affiliates and Breakaway Factions

| No | Name | Established | Nature |
|----|---|-----------------|--------------------------------------|
| 1 | Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) | August 26, 1941 | Political/religious |
| 2 | Tanzeem-e-Islami | 1972 | Khilafah movement |
| 3 | Tehreek-e-Islami | 1993 | Political |
| 4 | Markazi Anjuman Khuddamul Quran | 1972 | Missionary |
| 5 | Jamiat Ittehadul Ulema Board | - | Ulema wing of JI |
| 6 | Shabab-e-Milli | - | Youth wing |
| 7 | Pasban | 1990 | Movement for social change/political |
| 8 | Islami Jamiat-e-Talaba (IJT) | - | Student wing |
| 9 | Jamiat Talaba-e-Arabia | - | Madrassa student wing of JI |
| 10 | Rabitatul Madaaris | - | Educational board of JI madrassas |
| 11 | Hizbul Mujahideen | 1989 | Militant |
| 12 | Al-Badar Mujahideen | 1991 | Militant |
| 13 | Hizb-e-Islami | 2000 | Militant |
| 14 | Jamiatul Mujahideen | 1991 | Militant |
| 15 | National Labor Federation | - | Labor wing of JI |
| 16 | Pakistan Islamic Medical Association (PIMA) | - | Medical wing of JI |
| 17 | Pakistan Business Forum | - | Traders' wing of JI |
| 18 | Tehreek-e-Mehnat Pakistan | - | Industrial workers' wing of JI |
| 19 | Islamic Directorate of Education | - | Educational |

4. Militant Groups

There are 15 major militant groups that originated in mainland Pakistan and are operating in Indian-held Kashmir, Pakistan's tribal areas or in Afghanistan. If groups from Kashmir and FATA are included the number of militant outfits reaches 102. Groups from the mainland include one from the Barelvi school of thought, two each from Ahle-Hadith and the JI and the rest from the Deobandi sect. (See Table 8)

Table 8: Militant Groups Operating¹⁴

| No | Name | Sect | Head | Area of Operation | Current Status |
|----|---------------------------------|-----------------|------------------------------|--|-------------------|
| 1 | Lashkar-e-Taiba | Ahle-Hadith | Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi | Kashmir and India | Banned but active |
| 2 | Jaish-e-Muhammad | Deobandi | Maulana Masood Azhar | Pakistan | Banned but active |
| 3 | Hizbul Mujahideen ¹⁵ | Jamaat-e-Islami | Syed Salahuddin | Kashmir | Active |
| 4 | Al-Badar Mujahideen | JI | Bakht Zameen | Pakistan and Kashmir | Active |
| 5 | Harkatul Mujahideen | Deobandi | Maulana Fazlur Rehman Khalil | Kashmir and Afghanistan | Active |
| 6 | Harkatul Jihad-e-Islami | Deobandi | Qari Saifullah Akhtar | Kashmir, India, Bangladesh and Afghanistan | Active |
| 7 | Harkatul Jihad-e-Islami (Burma) | Deobandi | Maulana Abdul Quddus | Arkan province of Myanmar | Not known |
| 8 | Jamaatul Furqan | Deobandi | Maulana Abdul Jabbar | Pakistan and Kashmir | Active |

| | | | | | |
|----|------------------------------------|-------------|--|----------------------|-----------|
| 9 | Jundullah | Deobandi | Ataur Rehman | Karachi | Active |
| 10 | Jundullah Balochistan | Deobandi | Abdul Malek Reigi ¹⁶ | Balochistan and Iran | Active |
| 11 | Lashkar-e-Jhangvi | Deobandi | Muhammad Akram Lahori | Across Pakistan | Active |
| 12 | Jamiatul Mujahideen Al-Aalmi | Deobandi | Maulana Abdullah from Dera Ismail Khan | Kashmir | Active |
| 13 | Harkatul Mujahideen Al-Aalmi | Deobandi | Muhammad Imran | Karachi | Active |
| 14 | Tehreekul Mujahideen ¹⁷ | Ahle-Hadith | Sheikh Jamilur Rehman | Kashmir | Active |
| 15 | Sunni Jihad Council | Barelvi | | Kashmir | Suspended |

5. Kashmir

As many as 10 major religious parties operate in Pakistani administrative Kashmir, most are offshoots of Pakistani religious parties. These include three from the Barelvi sect, two each from the Deobandi, Ahle-Hadith and Shia sects, and one from the JI. Of these, only the JI directly takes part in elections, while the other religious parties confine themselves to supporting mainstream political parties, mainly because of their own lack of popular support.

Table 9: Religious Organizations in Kashmir

| No | Name | Head | Sect | Nature |
|----|--------------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------|---------------------|
| 1 | Jamiat Ulema-e-Jammu-o-Kashmir | Pir Atiqur Rehman Faizpuri | Barelvi | Political/religious |
| 2 | Jamaat-e-Islami | Sardar Ejaz Afzal Khan | Jamaat-e-Islami | Political/religious |

| | | | | |
|----|---------------------------------|----------------------------|-------------|---------------------|
| 3 | Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam | Maulana Saeed Yousaf | Deobandi | Political/religious |
| 4 | Jamiat Ahle-Hadith | Maulana Shahab Madani | Ahle-Hadith | Political/religious |
| 5 | Islamic Democratic Party | Ghulam Raza Shah Naqvi | Shia | Political/religious |
| 6 | Jamaat Ahle-Sunnat | Mufti Wajahat Hussain Shah | Barelvi | Religious |
| 7 | Ahle-Sunnat wal Jamaat | Mufti Muhammad Owais | Deobandi | Religious |
| 8 | Tehreek-e-Jafria | Mufti Kifayat Naqvi | Shia | Religious |
| 9 | Jamaatud Daawa | Maulana Abdul Aziz Alvi | Ahle-Hadith | Religious |
| 10 | Tehreek Nifaz-e-Nizam-e-Mustafa | Maulana Arif Gillani | Barelvi | Religious |

The total number of militant groups operating in Kashmir is 23. Of these, 15 have their origins in Kashmir and Pakistani commanders lead the rest. The groups led by Pakistanis are more powerful, like Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Muhammad, Al-Badar Mujahideen and HUJI Brigade 313. Hizbul Mujahideen, Jamiatul Mujahideen, Al-Barq and Al-Omer Mujahideen are among influential groups formed by Kashmiris in Indian-held Kashmir. Six Kashmiri groups have affiliations with political parties and have predominantly nationalist, rather than religious, tendencies.

Table 10: Militant Groups in Kashmir

| No | Name | Head | Sect /Party |
|----|---------------------|------------------------------|----------------------|
| 1 | Hizbul Mujahideen | Syed Salahuddin | Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) |
| 2 | Lashkar-e-Taiba | Maulana Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi | Ahle-Hadith |
| 3 | Jaish-e-Muhammad | Maulana Esmatullah Muaviya | Deobandi |
| 4 | Muslim Janbaz Force | Muhammad Usman | - |
| 5 | Hizbullah | Javed Dand | - |

| | | | |
|----|--|---|--------------------|
| 6 | Al-Jihad | Nazeer Kernai | Peoples League |
| 7 | Al-Fatah Force | Bashir Ahmad Khaki | Peoples League |
| 8 | Harkat-e-Jihad-e-Islami | Commander Imran | Deobandi |
| 9 | Tehreekul Mujahideen | Sheikh Jameelur Rehman | Ahle-Hadith |
| 10 | Hizbul Momineen | Shuja Abbas | Shia |
| 11 | Tehreek-e-Jihad | Major (r) Tariq Kiani | Barelvi |
| 12 | Islamic Front | Bilal Baig | - |
| 13 | Al-Barq Mujahideen | Farooq Quraishi | Peoples Conference |
| 14 | Jamiatul Mujahideen | Ghulam Rasool Shah alias General Abdullah | Jl descendent |
| 15 | Harkatul Mujahideen | Maulana Farooq Kashmiri | Deobandi |
| 16 | Al-Umar Mujahideen | Mushtaq Zargar | - |
| 17 | Hizb-e-Islami | Masood Sarfraz | Jl |
| 18 | Al-Badar Mujahideen | Bakht Zameen | Jl |
| 19 | Harkat-e-Jihad-e-Islami 313 Brigade | Maulana Ilyas Kashmiri | Deobandi |
| 20 | Harkatul Jihad-e-Islami (Muzaffar Group) | Maulana Muzaffar Kashmiri | Deobandi |
| 21 | Lashkar-e-Islam | Maulana Liaqat Azhari | Barelvi |
| 22 | Jamiatul Mujahideen (Al-Aalmi) | Maulana Habibur Rehman | Deobandi |
| 23 | Jamaatul Furqan | Commandeer Abdul Jabbar | Deobandi |

6. Gilgit Baltistan

In Pakistan's Gilgit Baltistan region all seven religious political parties are sectarian in their outlook but also take part in the political process. Of the seven parties, only the Jamaat-e-Ahle-Sunnat does not take part in electoral politics. As is the case in Kashmir, all these parties are the offshoots of

mainstream Pakistani religious forces. The Millat-e-Islamia, the JI and the JUI are considered more influential parties.

Table 11: Religious Organizations in Gilgit Baltistan

| No | Name | Headed by | Sect | Nature |
|----|---------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------|---------------------|
| 1 | Millat-e-Islamia | Syed Raziuddin | Shia | Political/religious |
| 2 | Tehreek-e-Jafaria | Agha Syed Rahatul Hussaini | Shia | Religious |
| 3 | Jamaat-e-Ahle-Sunnat | Qazi Nisar | Deobandi | Religious |
| 5 | Ittehad Ulema-e-Baltistan | Maulana Sanaullah Ghalib | Deobandi | Religious |
| 6 | Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam | Qazi Inayatullah | Deobandi | Political/religious |
| 7 | Jamaat-e-Islami | Mushtaq Ahmad Advocate | Jamaat-e-Islami | Political/religious |

7. Tribal Areas¹⁸

In Pakistan's tribal areas, or Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), as they are formally known, several religious organizations are operating with agendas ranging from militant and sectarian to enforcement of Shariah. Clear categorization of these groups has become difficult, especially after the emergence of Taliban groups across FATA and Provincially Administered Tribal Areas of (PATA) of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province as well as their spread into settled areas of the province. Affiliates of religious political parties and militant groups originating from mainland Pakistan—such as the JI, JUI, Jaish-e-Muhammad, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi—are easier to identify. These groups are affiliated with local Taliban groups. There is a thin line differentiating between Taliban and other militant groups in FATA who demand imposition of Shariah. Besides the Taliban in Pakistan, who associate with their namesakes in Afghanistan, some militant groups in FATA and PATA are also fighting government and allied forces in Afghanistan but do not call themselves Taliban. These include the Jamaatud Daawa wal Quran-o-Sunnat—the oldest militant group in FATA's Bajaur tribal region and Afghanistan's Kunar province—and groups affiliated with Hizb-e-Islami, such as Al-Badar Mujahideen. There are some groups which

focus on enforcement of Shariah, such as the Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-Muhammadi (TNSM), Lashkar-e-Islam and Ansarul Islam. (See Table 12) Although Taliban groups are also divided on tribal, ethnic, ideological and sectarian lines, they share the common agenda of militancy in Afghanistan. The number of Taliban groups in FATA exceeds 50 but only the major Taliban groups are listed in Table 13. Smaller Taliban groups are often affiliated with the major groups.

Table 12: Non-Taliban Militant Groups

| No | Name | Areas of Concentration | Sect |
|----|---------------------------------------|------------------------------|---------------|
| 1 | Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi | Bajaur, Malakand | Deobandi |
| 2 | Jamiat Ishaat al-Tauhid wal Sunnat | Bajaur, Malakand | Deobandi |
| 3 | Lashkar-e-Islam | Khyber Agency | Deobandi |
| 4 | Ansarul Islam | Khyber Agency | Barelvi |
| 5 | Tanzeem Ahle-Sunnat wal Jamaat | Khyber Agency | Barelvi |
| 6 | Jamaatud Daawa wal Quran-o-Sunnat | Bajaur, Mohmand, Afghanistan | Ahle-Hadith |
| 7 | Al-Badar Mujahideen | Malakand, Bajaur | Hizb-e-Islami |

Table 13: Important Taliban Groups

| No | Name | Tribe | Headed by | Strength ¹⁹ | Area of Concentration |
|----|--------------------|----------------|--------------------|------------------------|------------------------------|
| 1 | Baitullah Group | Mehsud | Hakeemullah Mehsud | 20,000 | South Waziristan Agency(SWA) |
| 2 | Shehryar Group | Mehsud | Shehryar Mehsud | 150-200 | SWA |
| 3 | Said Alam Group | Mehsud | Said Alam | 100 | SWA |
| 4 | Mullah Nazir Group | Ahmadzai Wazir | Mullah Nazir | 4,000 | SWA |

Evolution of Militant Groups in Pakistan (1)

| | | | | | |
|----|----------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|---------|-------------------------------|
| 5 | Abbas Group | Ahmadzai Wazir | Commander Abbas | 150-200 | SWA |
| 6 | Noor Islam Group | Ahmadzai Wazir | Noor Islam | 300 | SWA |
| 7 | Haji Sharif Group | Ahmadzai Wazir | Haji Sharif | 500 | SWA |
| 8 | Haji Omer Group | Ahmadzai Wazir | Haji Omer | 500 | SWA |
| 9 | Ghulam Jan Group | Ahmadzai Wazir | Ghulam Jan | 200 | SWA |
| 10 | Javed Group | Karmazkh el Wazir | Commander Javed | 150-200 | SWA |
| 11 | Awal Khan Group | Bhittani | Commander Awal Khan | 150-200 | Jandolain area in SWA |
| 10 | Angaar Group | | | 100 | |
| 11 | Bhittani Group | Bhittani | Asmatullah Shaheen | 150 | Jundola in SWA |
| 12 | Gul Bahadur Group | Utmanzai Wazir | Qari Gul Bahadur | 800 | North Waziristan Agency (NWA) |
| 13 | Daur Group | Daur | Sadiq Noor | 500-600 | NWA |
| 14 | Khaliq Haqqani Group | Daur | Abdul Khaliq Haqqani | 500 | NWA |
| 15 | Wahidullah Group | Utmanzai Wazir | Wahidullah | 200 | Spalga area in NWA |
| 16 | Saifullah Group | Turikhel, Utmanzai Wazir | Commander Saifullah | 350-400 | NWA |
| 17 | Abdul Rehman Group | Daur | Abdul Rehman | 150-200 | Mirali in NWA |
| 18 | Manzoor Group | Daur | Commander Manzoor | 12-150 | Eidaq area in NWA |

| | | | | | |
|----|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------|----------------------------------|
| 19 | Haleem Group | Daur | Haleem Khan | 100 | Mirali in NWA |
| 20 | Maulvi Faqir Group of TSNM | Mamund | Maulvi Faqir | 1,500-2,000 | Bajaur Agency |
| 21 | Tehreek Jaish-e-Islami Pakistan | | Commander Waliur Rehman | | Bajaur Agency |
| 22 | Karawan Naimatullah | | Haji Naimatullah | | Bajaur Agency |
| 23 | Dr Ismail Group | | Dr Ismail | 600 | Bajaur Agency |
| 24 | Maulana Abdullah Group | | Maulana Abdullah | 400 | Utamzanai sub-district in Bajaur |
| 25 | Omer Group | Qandhari sub-tribe of Safi tribe | Omer Khalid | 2,000 | Mohmand Agency |
| 26 | Shah Sahib Group | | | 1,000 | Lakaro area in Mohmand Agency |
| 27 | Commander Tariq Group | | Commander Tariq | 500 | Darra Adam Khel |
| 28 | Saad Fazl Group | | Saad Fazl Haqqani | 500 | Kurram Agency |

8. Punjabi Taliban

Although a media report²⁰ quoting intelligence sources claims that around 17 banned terrorist organizations are active in the Punjab province but independent sources count more than 37 groups operating as Punjabi Taliban.²¹

Among these groups, 24 are breakaway factions of Pakistani militant groups, who were once engaged in Kashmir and Afghanistan, or were part of

sectarian terrorist organizations in Pakistan. Amongst these, 12 groups originated in Punjab, four in Karachi, one each in Balochistan, Kashmir and Islamabad and two in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Fourteen new terrorist cells have emerged apparently in reaction to the state's alliance in the war on terror, military operations in Pakistan's tribal areas and the security forces' operation at Lal Masjid in Islamabad in 2007. Most of these groups do not have any link with existing militant or sectarian organizations and have between five and 12 members. These groups typically contacted the Taliban in the tribal areas and offered their services as volunteers for jihad. A brief description of the two types of Punjabi Taliban is given below:²²

1. *Lashkar-e-Zil*: The group is involved in many terrorist attacks in Pakistan, mainly targeting the military and the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI).
2. *Asmatullah Muaviya Group*: *Muaviya*, the head of the group, was part of many militant organizations in Pakistan, including Harkatul Mujahideen and Jaish-e-Muhammad. The group specializes in suicide attacks.
3. *Qari Zafar Group*: Formed by Qari Zafar from Karachi, this is a splinter group of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and is notorious for targeting the security forces, especially the police in Punjab.
4. *Badar Mansoor Group*: Mansoor is a resident of Dera Ismail Khan in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. He was an important commander of Harkatul Mujahideen. He formed his own group in 2005 and moved to South Waziristan. The group is involved in sectarian killings and attacks on public places.
5. *Bengali Group*: Headed by Farooq Bhai Bengali, this group specializes in suicide attacks. Most of its members are from Karachi's Bengali and Burmese immigrant communities. The group is considered a splinter of Harkatul Jihad-e-Islami (Burma).
6. *Amjad Farooqi Group*: Amjad Farooqi was a member of Harkatul Jihad-e-Islami and was involved in many terrorist attacks in Islamabad, including an assassination attempt on former military

ruler Gen Pervez Musharraf. He was killed by the security forces in 2004. His followers formed this group and named it after him. The group is now active in Islamabad and Rawalpindi.

7. *Gandapur Group*: The group is active in Mianwali district of Punjab.
8. *Usman Kurd Group*: Kurd heads this group, which is a Balochistan-based faction of the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ). The group has Punjabi and Urdu-speaking militants in its fold.
9. *Maulvi Rafiq Group*: Based in Sada, Kurram Agency, this group is mainly involved in sectarian violence.
10. *Kaleemullah Group*: This group comprises of former members of LJ from Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
11. *Gul Hassan Group*: This is a splinter of Jaish-e-Muhammad and is affiliated with the TTP.
12. *Abdul Jabbar Group*: A splinter of Jaish-e-Muhammad, this group is mainly involved in fighting in Afghanistan.
13. *Qari Yasin Group*: This is a splinter group of LJ. The head of the group hails from the central Punjab district of Kasur.
14. *Noor Khan Group*: This is another LJ splinter group, headed by Rana Afzal alias Noor Khan.
15. *Fedayyan-e-Islam*: This is an alliance of six Punjabi Taliban groups. The Illyas Kashmiri, Asmat Muaviya, Qari Zafar, Rana Afzal, Qari Hussain and Commander Tariq groups are parts of this alliance. The alliance launches coordinated terrorist attacks inside Pakistan.
16. *Qari Shakeel Group*: This is a splinter of LJ. The group has links with Mohmand Agency-based Taliban.

17. *Maulvi Karim Group*: This group is active in Rahim Yar Khan district of Punjab. A former member of HUJI, Maulvi Abdul Kareem, heads this group.
18. *Qari Imran Group*: The group is a splinter of HUJI and is active in Punjab.
19. *Qari Saifullah Group*: Qari was a founder member of HUJI, but after 9/11 that organization was crushed by the law enforcement agencies. Qari was arrested in 2004. Upon his release in 2008 he tried to revive the group again. Now the group is active in Lahore and surrounding districts of Punjab.
20. *Matiur Rehman Group*: Headed by a former member of HUJI, Matiur Rehman alias Samad Sial, this group is active in South Punjab.
21. *Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (Malik Ishaq Group)*: The group's head, Malik Ishaq, is in jail and facing trial for his role in many terrorist attacks, but the group remains active in Punjab.
22. *Qari Ahsan Group*: Crime Investigative Department (CID) Punjab in its 12th edition of the red book, titled 'Most Wanted High Profile Terrorists', claims that the group specializes in making explosives and suicide jackets.
23. *Baba Ji Group*: This group is operating in Mailsi and Bahawalpur districts of Punjab and has been classified by the Punjab CID as among the most dangerous in the province.

9. Religious Parties Alliances

Eight religious and militant groups' alliances also exist in Pakistan, of which six are active. Three alliances are essentially political coalitions, including the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), while the agenda of two is militant and that of the rest sectarian. Milli Yekjehti Council was formed to counter sectarianism in the country in the 1990s.

Table 14: Religious Parties Alliances

| No | Name of Alliance | Component Parties | Nature | Current Status |
|----|------------------------------------|---|---------------------|--|
| 1 | Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) | Jl, JUI-F, JUI-S, JUP-N, IT, MJAHA | Political | Active but difference have emerged among its component parties |
| 2 | United Jihad Council (UJC) | HM, MJF, TM, TJ, AUM, ABM, IF, AFF, HUJI, HB, AJ, HBM and JM | Militant | Active |
| 3 | Afghan Defense Council (ADC) | Jl, JUI-F, JUI-S, JUP-N, IT, MJAHA, SSP, TIP, TIK, TI, HM, JM, LT, HUJI, ABM, PSC, TTA, MUC, IKN, JMP-Z, JITS, SAA, ML, PUC, MAM, MP, MUF, BP, JIU, PPI, NPP and JUI (Azad Kashmir) | Political/religious | Non-functional |
| 4 | Milli Yekjehti Council (MYC) | SSP, SM, TJ, Jl, JUI(F), JUI-S, JUP-N and MJAHA | Religious | Non-functional |
| 5 | Jammu Jihad Council (JJC) | HUJI 313 Brigade, LT, ABM, HM and TM | Militant | Active |
| 6 | Difaa-e-Islam Mahaz | All Ahle-Sunnat organizations in Lahore | Religious | Active |
| 7 | Pakistan Islami Ittehad | Markazi Jamaat Ahle-Hadith, Jamiat Ahle-Hadith Supreme Council Peshawar and Jamiat Ahle-Hadith Azad Kashmir | Religious/political | Active |
| 8 | Ittehad Tanzeemat-e-Deeni Madaaris | Five madrassa boards of Deobandi, Bareilvi, Ahle-Hadith, Shia sects and Jamaat-e-Islami | Educational | Active |

10. Religious Charities

Thirteen major charities affiliated with religious or militant groups operate in Pakistan. Most of these charities came into being after the ban on militant groups in 2002. The banned groups changed their identities to avoid government restrictions. After the curbs, Al-Rehmat Trust became the cover name for Jaish-e-Muhammad and Al-Hilal Trust for Harkatul Mujahideen. Some charities were also affected by the ban because of their alleged links with terrorist groups; they also changed their names. Al-Rasheed Trust now operates as Al-Amin Trust and Al-Akhtar Trust as Azmat-e-Pakistan Foundation.

Table 15: Religious Charities

| No | Name | Affiliation | Areas of Activities |
|----|-----------------------------|------------------|--|
| 1 | Maymar Trust | Deobandi/Taliban | All provinces of Pakistan and Azad Kashmir |
| 2 | Azmat-e-Pakistan Foundation | Deobandi/Taliban | All provinces of Pakistan and Azad Kashmir |
| 3 | Al-Khair Trust | Deobandi | All provinces of Pakistan and Azad Kashmir |
| 4 | Al-Rehmat Trust | Jaish-e-Muhammad | All provinces of Pakistan and Azad Kashmir |
| 5 | Idara Khidmat-e-Khalq | Jamaatud Daawa | All provinces of Pakistan and Azad Kashmir |
| 6 | Al-Khidmat Foundation | Jamaat-e-Islami | All provinces of Pakistan and Azad Kashmir |
| 7 | Al-Asr Trust | Deobandi | Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab |
| 8 | Al-Hilal Trust | Deobandi | Khyber Pakhtunkhwa |
| 9 | Al-Naser Trust | Deobandi | Karachi |
| 10 | Binoria Welfare Trust | Deobandi | Karachi |
| 11 | Al-Khidmat Welfare Society | Jamaat-e-Islami | Karachi |
| 12 | Al-Mustafa Welfare Society | Barelvi | All provinces of Pakistan and Azad Kashmir |
| 13 | Ansar Welfare Trust | Ahle-Hadith | Azad Kashmir |

11. Student Wings of Religious Organizations

Twelve religious, militant and sectarian groups maintain their student wings, which operate mostly in formal governmental and private sector educational institutions.

Table 16: Student Wings of Religious Organizations

| No | Name | Affiliation | Nature/Agenda |
|----|--|------------------------------------|----------------------------|
| 1 | Islami Jamiat-e-Talaba (IJT) | Jamaat-e-Islami | Political |
| 2 | Jamiat Talaba Arabia | Jamaat-e-Islami | Political |
| 3 | Islami Jamiat-e-Talibaat | Jamaat-e-Islami | Political |
| 4 | Jamiat Talaba-e-Islam (JTI) | Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam ²³ | Political |
| 5 | Sipah-e-Sahaba Students Pakistan (SSSP) | Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan | Sectarian |
| 6 | Imamia Student Organization (ISO) | Millat-e-Jafria | Sectarian |
| 7 | Ahle-Hadith Student Federation ²⁴ | Markazi Jamiat Ahle-Hadith | Sectarian |
| 8 | Ahle-Hadith Youth Force | Jamiat Ahle-Hadith | Sectarian |
| 9 | Talaba Jamaatud Daawa | Jamaatud Daawa | Militant/sectarian |
| 9 | Anjuman Talba-e-Islam (ATI) | Jamaat-e-Ahle-Sunnat | Religious |
| 10 | Mustafawi Students Movement (MSM) | Tehreek Minhajul Quran | Political |
| 11 | Jafaria Student Organization | Tehreek-e-Islamia | Sectarian |
| 12 | Tehreek Talaba-o-Talibat | Lal Masjid | Violent religious movement |

12. Religious Educational Organizations

Every Muslim sect in Pakistan has its own set of madrassas and has formed its own educational boards to oversee curriculum development and holding

of examinations in the madrassas. The Deobandi sect manages the highest number of madrassas, 8,199, followed by 1,952 Barelvi madrassas.

Table 17: Religious Educational Organizations

| No | Name | Sect | Headed by | Number of Affiliated Madrassas ²⁵ |
|----|-------------------------------|-----------------|-------------------------------|--|
| 1 | Wafaqul Madaris Al-Arabia | Deobandi | Maulana Saleemullah Khan | 8,199 |
| 2 | Tanzeemul Madaris Alhe-Sunnat | Barelvi | Maulana Mufti Muneebur Rehman | 1,952 |
| 3 | Wafaqul Madaris Al-Salafia | Ahle-Hadith | Maluana Naeemur Rehman | 318 |
| 4 | Wafaqul Madaris Shia | Fiqah-e-Jafaria | Maulana Niaz Hussain Naqvi | 381 |
| 5 | Rabitaual Madaris Al-Islamia | Jamaat-e-Islami | Maulana Abdul Malik | 371 |




Chart of Barelvi Parties in Pakistan




Chart of Deobandi Organizations in Pakistan




Chart of Shia Organizations and group in Pakistan




Chart of Ahl-e-Hadis Organizations and Groups in Pakistan

Note

-
- ¹ "Punjabi Taliban" is a brand name for terrorist groups detached from the mainland militant organizations, as well as for the newly emerged terrorist cells with similar causes. They have developed affiliations with Taliban and Al Qaeda.
- ² Muhammad Amir Rana, *A to Z of Militant Organizations in Pakistan* (Lahore: Mashal, 2002).
- ³ Ibid.
- ⁴ Data compiled by the author through monitoring of media, the Election Commission of Pakistan and from sources in religious organizations.
- ⁵ These were not counted in the Tables of sectarian distribution of the organizations.
- ⁶ Muhammad Nawaz Kharal (spokesman of Sunni Ittehad Council), interview by the author in Lahore, 2010.
- ⁷ Ibid.
- ⁸ According to the spokesman of the organization, Nawaz Kharal, it is now transforming into a political electoral alliance.
- ⁹ All Deobandi Taliban groups from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the tribal areas are categorized as one organization, because of similarities in their agendas, tactics and strategies. These are also united under the banner of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan.
- ¹⁰ Illyas Kashmiri was killed in a drone strike in South Waziristan on June 7, 2011.
- ¹¹ Taliban are divided into several groups. Here they are categorized as one group because of ideological and sectarian affinity.
- ¹² Punjabi Taliban are not a monolithic entity and consist of many small groups.
- ¹³ This was breakaway faction of Lashkar-e-Taiba. Its current status is not known.
- ¹⁴ Groups from Kashmir, Gilgit Baltistan and semi-autonomous tribal areas are not included in this table.
- ¹⁵ Hizbul Mujahideen has infrastructure in Kashmir but it also has a network in Pakistan.
- ¹⁶ He was captured and hanged by the Iranian authorities in 2010.
- ¹⁷ Tehreekul Mujahideen is a Kashmir-based group, which also it has its network in Pakistan.
- ¹⁸ Pakistan's tribal areas include Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA).
- ¹⁹ The strength of these groups is based on estimates by local journalists and tribal elders.
- ²⁰ "Active militant networks in Punjab," *BBC Urdu* (accessed July 27, 2010).
- ²¹ Muhammad Amir Rana, "Unpacking Punjabi Taliban," *The Friday Times*, Lahore, July 30-August 05.
- ²² Ibid.
- ²³ All factions of the JUI have their distinct student wings.
- ²⁴ All factions of Jamiat Ahle-Hadith have their separate student wings.
- ²⁵ Daily Jang, September 2, 2005.

Notes on Contributors

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Abstracts

Prospects for Pak-China Relations in 2011: Political, Militant and Public Views

Nida Naz

The friendly ties between Pakistan and China span 60 years. Despite the close relations, a number of factors demand close introspection to analyze the future course and direction of bilateral ties. In this regard, assessing the views of Pakistan's mainstream, nationalist and religious-political parties, militant organizations and the public in general towards ties with China is very important. This paper examines these views in order to determine the level of political and socio-economic support in Pakistan for long-term strategic relations with China. This analysis suggests that continued insecurity and violence in Pakistan can undermine the country's engagement with China, particularly in the economic and trade spheres.

Pak-Afghan Relations: Emerging Trends and Future Prospects

Safdar Sial

This paper analyzes the emerging trends and future prospects for Pakistan-Afghanistan relations. It elaborates the implications of Pak-Afghan ties for the counter-terrorism campaign and reduction in violence and insecurity in the two countries in particular and the wider region in general.

Analysis of Peace Agreements with Militants and Lessons for the Future

Sohail Habib Tajik

Since 2004, Pakistan has concluded a number of peace agreements with militants in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the Khyber

Pakhtunkhwa province in the hope of addressing unrest there. Each time this hope has been dashed due to one reason or another. This paper endeavors to highlight the circumstances in which these peace deals were signed. The broader perspective in which such agreements were made as well as review of various clauses of peace agreements highlight the drawbacks of these agreements. Any peace agreement with the militants made from a position of weakness is likely to be counter-productive. It is also bound to fail in absence of consultation with local tribes, clarity of objectives and broad political support.

Pakistan's ties with Central Asian States: Irritants and Challenges

Farhat Asif

Despite high hopes Pakistan is yet to translate the huge potential in trade and economic collaboration with the Central Asian republics into concrete progress. That is partly because of the many irritants and challenges that have cast a long shadow on mutual relations. One of the main geographical impediments has been the lack of a direct land connection between Pakistan and these post-Soviet republics. Instability in Afghanistan, FATA and Balochistan are also crucial factors in realization of the potential.

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