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Prospects for Pak-China Relations in 2011: Political, Militant and Public Views

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Pakistan's Relations with Central Asian States: Irritants and Challenges

Analysis

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Understanding North Punjab in the Context of
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Muhammad Amir Rana

Associate Editor

Najam U Din

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**Pak Institute for Peace Studies
(PIPS)**

Post Box No. 2110
Islamabad, Pakistan
+92-51-2291586

www.san-pips.com
editor@san-pips.com

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Abstracts

Prospects for Pak-China Relations in 2011: Political, Militant and Public Views

Nida Naz

The friendly ties between Pakistan and China span 60 years. Despite the close relations, a number of factors demand close introspection to analyze the future course and direction of bilateral ties. In this regard, assessing the views of Pakistan's mainstream, nationalist and religious-political parties, militant organizations and the public in general towards ties with China is very important. This paper examines these views in order to determine the level of political and socio-economic support in Pakistan for long-term strategic relations with China. This analysis suggests that continued insecurity and violence in Pakistan can undermine the country's engagement with China, particularly in the economic and trade spheres.

Pak-Afghan Relations: Emerging Trends and Future Prospects

Safdar Sial

This paper analyzes the emerging trends and future prospects for Pakistan-Afghanistan relations. It elaborates the implications of Pak-Afghan ties for the counter-terrorism campaign and reduction in violence and insecurity in the two countries in particular and the wider region in general.

Analysis of Peace Agreements with Militants and Lessons for the Future

Sohail Habib Tajik

Since 2004, Pakistan has concluded a number of peace agreements with militants in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province in the hope of addressing unrest there. Each

time this hope has been dashed due to one reasons or another. This paper endeavors to highlight the circumstances in which these peace deals were signed. The broader perspective in which such agreements were made as well as review of various clauses of peace agreements highlight the drawbacks of these agreements. Any peace agreement with the militants made from a position of weakness is likely to be counter-productive. It is also bound to fail in absence of consultation with local tribes, clarity of objectives and broad political support.

Pakistan's ties with Central Asian States: Irritants and Challenges

Farhat Asif

Despite high hopes Pakistan is yet to translate the huge potential in trade and economic collaboration with the Central Asian republics into concrete progress. That is partly because of the many irritants and challenges that have cast a long shadow on mutual relations. One of the main geographical impediments has been the lack of a direct land connection between Pakistan and these post-Soviet republics. Instability in Afghanistan, FATA and Balochistan are also crucial factors in realization of the potential.

Prospects for Pak-China Relations in 2011: Political, Militant and Public Views

Nida Naz

1. Introduction and Methodology

Pakistan's geostrategic location makes it a frontline state in the political, economic and military strategic contexts of regional and international relations. It also offers challenges for Pakistan to architect its foreign policy in accordance with the quadrilateral China-Pakistan-India-US linkage. The United States and China consider Pakistan as their strategic and prized partner but Islamabad's relations with Beijing have remained far more friendly and free of hiccups, which is more than what can be said of its ties with Washington.

For over six decades, Pak-China relations have had a strong foundation in mutual cooperation and interest. Since the commencement of their bilateral relations, many changes have occurred bringing qualitative and quantitative modifications to the political, strategic and economic affairs of the two neighbors. With the changing dynamics of the region pertaining to the pre- and post-9/11 scenarios the friendship between China and Pakistan has grown to higher levels of cooperation. The pre-9/11 period could be manifested as an eye opener for Pakistan on account of Washington's inclination towards New Delhi and China's immense and matchless support for Pakistan, including that rendered at the political and military/defense fronts during Pakistan's wars with India. Moreover, throughout the tensions and confrontations between India and Pakistan, China has tried to minimize the confrontation, encouraging the two neighbors to engage in political talks and ensure peace in the region.

After 9/11, Pakistan became a frontline state in the war on terror and offered vital support to the US. China has not only supported Pakistan's stance on the war on terror but also assisted the country both diplomatically and materially. China's main interest has been to curtail a nexus of the Afghan Taliban, Pakistani militants and Uyghur separatists in the Chinese province of Xinjiang.¹

China and Pakistan celebrated 2011 as the year of Pak-China friendship to commemorate 60 years of bilateral diplomatic ties. The December 2010 visit

by Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao to Pakistan expanded mutual collaboration, especially in the field of development and trade. Recent events, especially the global financial crisis, have emphasized China's crucial role in regional and global politics.

This study is an effort to understand how the mainstream political parties, religious-political parties, nationalist political parties, militant organizations and the people of Pakistan in general view Pakistan's ties with China. These views have been used to determine the level of political and socio-economic support factors in Pakistan for long-term strategic relations with China.

The key research questions on which diverse views were sought are as under:

1. Where is China placed in Pakistan's foreign policy priorities and bilateral engagements and is a readjustment required?
2. What are the areas of convergence of interest, particularly in political, socio-cultural and security/defense contexts, which promise better relations between the two countries?
3. What are the regional and global dynamics which impact Pak-China relations and how?
4. How do Pakistanis view China as an emerging superpower and what implications do they see for Pakistan?
5. How do India, the Kashmir conflict, and the war on terror influence relations between Pakistan and China?
6. Can a continued presence of actors of violence and insecurity in Pakistan adversely affect Sino-Pak relations, particularly in the context of a Uyghur separatist movement in China?

Both primary and secondary data was used to gauge the public's perception and views regarding these research questions. The primary data included 14 structured and non-structured interviews conducted in Islamabad with representatives of various political parties—including the mainstream political parties, nationalist political parties and religious-political parties. The available literature on the subject was also analyzed. Because of a lack of primary data to assess the views of the militant and insurgent groups in Pakistan, data from secondary sources, including publications of militant and religious organizations, was relied upon.

2. Political Reflections

2.1 Mainstream Political Parties

Cementing ties with China has remained a key plank of Pakistan's foreign policy regardless of the political party in power or the form of government. Therefore, it becomes all the more important for policymakers to have a clear picture of the perspective of all active political parties.

2.1.1 Pakistan People's Party (PPP)

The PPP is the main ruling party in Pakistan's central coalition government as well as a coalition partner in all the provincial governments except Punjab. The PPP envisions a foreign policy which strives to enhance and diversify the existing ties between China and Pakistan beyond political and security exchanges and to harness economic and trade links. It believes that these economic links should not only revolve around imports from China, but should also ensure access for Pakistani products to China.²

The PPP believes that Pakistan's relations with China are not one-way traffic but are mutually beneficial. Historically, Pakistan's role in bringing China and the US closer to each other in the 1970s and Pakistan's support for China for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) indicate the significance Pakistan attaches to its ties with China.

The PPP supports China's stance on Uyghur separatists and considers it an internal matter for the Chinese. The party also believes that a new thaw in Sino-India relations cannot affect China's friendship with Pakistan. In fact, China can help India and Pakistan improve their relations by removing bilateral misgivings and mistrust.³

The party is also of the opinion that Pakistan's decision to join hands with the US in the war on terror has not undermined Pak-China relations. PPP Information Secretary Fauzia Wahab says, "China has always acknowledged and understood Pakistan's security constraints. This fact should be seen in its historical context, as Pakistan has been a US ally since 1951 and entered into two defense pacts with the US, i.e., the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954 and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1955."⁴

The PPP believes that the presence of some Uyghur Chinese separatists in Pakistan's tribal areas has disconcerted the two countries' ties to some extent. However, there is no other major factor that can damage Pakistan's ties with China. The PPP information secretary also cautions Pakistan to be diligent in strengthening its relations with China. She believes that Pakistan has to discard its covert Jihadi policies.

2.1.2 Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N)

Led by Nawaz Sharif, the PML-N is a mainstream political party in Pakistan. The party has the second largest number of seats in the National Assembly and is in power in the province of Punjab. Until recently, the PPP was also the PML-N's coalition partner in the provincial government in Punjab. The PML-N attaches utmost importance to Pakistan's ties with China. The party considers China Pakistan's "all-weather friend" and believes that cooperation between the two neighboring countries is fruitful for both and for the region at large. The party considers that the leadership of both countries must take practical measures to sow the seeds of friendship between the youths of Pakistan and China to further enhance these relations. It also urges increasing people-to-people contact in all walks of life.⁵

The PML-N says that both the countries have always helped each other in times of need. The party believes that despite a fragile economy, weak political system and a volatile security situation, Pakistan is China's strategic ally amid growing US-India relations. Mutuality of interests is the focal point of the two neighboring countries' relationship.

On the question of Uyghur separatists, the PML-N maintains, "China is a sovereign state and has the right to act against any revolt or uprising within its borders." The party does not see growing trade between India and China as a threat to the longstanding Pak-China relations. However, it does not see a Chinese role in resolving the issues of discord between India and Pakistan including Kashmir, as China also has border disputes with India.

The PML-N considers that China's rise as a global power is in the best interest of Pakistan and would lead to more effective political and diplomatic support for Pakistan. The party does not think that Pakistan's

decision to become a US ally in the war on terror has had any adverse implications for Pak-China relations. China realizes Pakistan's problems, the PML-N emphasizes.

2.1.3 Pakistan Muslim League-Zia (PML-Z)

The PML-Z, led by Ijazul Haq, is a faction of the Pakistan Muslim League Quaid-e-Azam (PML-Q). The party does not have any seat in the national or provincial legislatures. The PML-Z considers relations with China as the cornerstone of Pakistan's foreign policy. It sees Pak-China friendship growing not only at the state level but also at the level of the people. Due to its unique geostrategic location, Pakistan has a lot to offer not only to China but to other neighboring countries as well. However, that would happen only if Pakistan overcomes the challenges of militancy and terrorism and strengthens itself internally, the PML-Z maintains.

The party supports China's stance and policies on the issue of Uyghur separatists and considers it an internal security matter for Beijing. It also stresses that if any infiltration is occurring from Pakistan into Xinjiang it must be checked and any Uyghur militants hiding in Pakistan should be arrested and handed over to China.⁶

The PML-Z believes that Pakistan must do away with its capitulation to US policies and dictates if it wishes to continue its cordial ties with China. Although China has always understood Pakistan's constraints and security vulnerabilities, Islamabad's dealings with any other country must not be at the expense of its ties with China.

The party sees growing Sino-India trade links and economic cooperation as a positive development for the whole of South Asia, which, it says, would benefit Pakistan as well by ushering in an era of mutual cooperation and interdependence in the region. The party believes that any intermediary role by China in resolving the Kashmir dispute can be most useful at the UNSC, as being a permanent member of the Security Council China can push India to fulfill its obligations under UN resolutions. The PML-Z maintains that although Pakistan's decision to join hands with the US in the war on terror has not hurt Pakistan's relations with China, Islamabad must carefully

formulate an independent foreign policy to ensure the equilibrium required to keep Beijing on board.

2.1.4 Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid-e-Azam (PML-Q)

The PML-Q remained in power from 2002 until 2007 during the regime of former President Gen Pervez Musharraf. Currently, the PML-Q is the second largest opposition party in both the National Assembly, after the PML-N, and the Punjab Assembly, behind the PPP. That makes it one of the significant political actors in Pakistan. The party considers that China has a pivotal role to play across the political spectrum in Pakistan. Faisal Saleh Hayat, the PML-Q parliamentary party leader in the National Assembly, says that China and Pakistan have multi-dimensional relations which have common geopolitical grounds and security perceptions. The PML-Q attaches great significance to Pakistan's ties with China and has endeavored to enhance people-to-people contact through various initiatives in order to diversify these ties.

Talking about instability in Pakistan, the PML-Q leader stressed that China wants Pakistan to be a strong state internally and has always been ready to assist Pakistan on the security and defense fronts. In the party's view the friendly relations between China and Pakistan cannot be undermined by the difficult security situation in Pakistan. Hayat sees the unrest in Xinjiang as an issue directly linked to terrorism and says that every government in Pakistan has tried to enhance bilateral relations by taking into account issues of key concern for China, including the situation in Xinjiang.

The PML-Q thinks that Pakistan's ties with the US are undergoing a shift as Pakistan is increasingly inclined towards China in terms of trade and economic partnership. The PML-Q leader does not think that the growing ties between China and India are at the expense of Beijing's relations with Islamabad. He says that bilateral ties between Pakistan's two biggest neighbors are purely trade-based because India and China economically complement each other. Hayat does not think China can play a significant role on Kashmir, as resolution of the Kashmir dispute depends upon the will of the Kashmiri people and upon India's stance.

The PML-Q leader believes that attacks on Chinese workers in Pakistan are a manifestation of militants targeting foreigners and does not think that Chinese nationals are specifically targeted. He holds that the Chinese nationals working on development projects in various parts of Pakistan face no threat from militants merely on account of their nationality.

2.1.5 Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM)

The MQM is an ethno-linguistic political party which has its support base in Karachi and urban areas of the Sindh province. It is the second largest party in Sindh after the PPP in terms of representation in the legislature. The PPP and the MQM are coalition partners at the center and in Sindh. Led by Altaf Hussain, who lives in self-imposed exile in London, the MQM is known for its anti-feudal, middle-class politics. The party believes that Pakistan should do away with its pro-Western foreign policy outlook and look eastwards. In that regard, MQM considers China as the most important regional and global power with which Pakistan should enhance its ties as an equal business and economic partner. The party holds that historically Pak-China relations have been confined to defense and security cooperation but both countries need to expand cooperation in other fields as well. The spillover of China's booming economy should also reach Pakistan.⁷

The MQM thinks that despite multiple problems, mainly political instability, a weak economy and poor law and order, Pakistan has a lot to offer China including a warm-water deep-sea port at Gwadar, a gigantic market of 180 million people and most importantly a trusted ally which has always supported China on all issues. The party thinks that once Pakistan's economic condition improves, Chinese multinationals could have tremendous opportunities in Pakistan to invest in the fields of telecommunications, information technology, mining, electronics and the automobiles industry, as well as in the education and health sectors.

The MQM considers the killings of Chinese engineers and skilled workers in Balochistan a failure on Pakistan's part to protect them. It believes that such incidents would not hurt state-to-state relations but could jeopardize the ongoing development projects in Balochistan by various Chinese companies. The party feels that Pakistan should stop towing the US line if it wants to keep long-term cordial relations with China. It thinks that China's rise as a global power opens

doors to various international markets for Pakistani products and thus it is in the interest of Pakistan to reformulate its foreign policy with a “look east” focus.⁸

2.1.6 Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf (PTI)

The PTI is an emerging political party and views Pak-China ties as one of the critical foundation stones of Islamabad’s foreign policy. The party’s spokesperson on foreign affairs, Dr. Shireen Mazari, holds that despite the country’s internal difficulties, a fragile security situation and faltering economy, Chinese companies and firms have not only been investing in Pakistan but are also involved in major construction work. Pakistan is also a gateway to the Muslim world for China and also provides Beijing access to the Indian Ocean to counter efforts by the US and India to encircle it.⁹

On Uyghur separatists, the PTI supports China’s anti-terror and anti-extremist policies and considers them China’s internal security matters. The party does not consider the growing Sino-India trade relations as a challenge to Pakistan’s ties with China, since these relations are not at the expense of Pakistan. On the contrary, the party believes that the thaw in Sino-India ties could pave the way for China to remove mistrust between India and Pakistan. The PTI thinks that China can be a more trusted intermediary from the Pakistani side. However, it thinks that China cannot play a major role in resolution of the Kashmir dispute because it also has a border dispute with India.¹⁰ In PTI’s view, given the strategic nature of Sino-Pak relations, China’s rise as a global power is bound to be beneficial for Pakistan. As it grows in stature, China would also be a new and more forceful voice on international issues. China’s clout would mean more diplomatic support for Pakistan on crucial issues on almost all major international forums. On Pakistan’s support for the US-led war on terror, the PTI holds that Washington’s pressure and the manner of Pakistan’s capitulation to the US have inadvertently led to Pakistan sidelining its relationship with China.¹¹

2.2. Nationalist Political Parties

2.2.1 National Party (NP)

National Party (NP) is a pro-federation party which has roots in Balochistan and is known for its anti-feudal, middle class and socialist politics. The NP’s

foreign policy outlook and views about China emanate from its stance on the Balochistan conflict. These views directly relate to China's role in the construction of the Gwadar seaport, Saindak copper and gold project and other major projects which Chinese firms have undertaken in Balochistan.

Soon after gaining independence, Pakistan started taking orders from the US and Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan visited the US in 1951, the NP says. Entering into two defense pacts further pushed Pakistan into the capitalist block and under the American security umbrella, the party states.¹²

In the international scenario which has changed from a bipolar world to a uni-polar one and which is once again gradually moving toward a multi-polar order with China and India as emerging powers, the NP believes that instead of joining the Chinese or the American camp, Pakistan should maintain an independent foreign policy based on self-interest. Pakistan should have good relations with every country that supports those interests, be it China, the US, Russia or India.

The party also considers that an ideal context for mutually beneficial relations does not exist between Pakistan and China, as the internal dynamics and external policy outlooks of both countries differ widely except for two major factors, i.e., competition with India and growing US-India ties and China's dire need for access to a warm-water port to ensure smooth oil supply to its growing economy throughout the year. Dr Abdul Maalick, head of National Party, maintains, "China needs Pakistan for two main reasons. Firstly, if the US-India détente grows further Pakistan would be a balancing force for China to counter India. Secondly, if ever a situation of a blockade of China appears Balochistan would be very useful for China due to the strategic importance of the Makran coast."¹³

Regarding China's role in Balochistan, NP leader Dr. Ishaque Baloch maintains that, unlike India, China is not interfering in Balochistan. However, the party believes that China is exploiting the province's resources through the various projects it has undertaken and that Pakistan must control these projects itself.¹⁴

The party believes that the growing Sino-India relations have no adverse implication for Pakistan as China's ties with Pakistan and recent overtures

towards India are guided by self-interest. For China, Pakistan continues to retain its importance.

On the issue of Uyghur separatists, the NP maintains that the Chinese look at and treat the militants in Xinjiang in the same manner as Pakistan treats militant extremists or Jihadis. The NP believes that the killings of Chinese nationals in Balochistan have not had “too much of an impact” on Sino-Pak relations. However, the party foresees that the two countries’ ties could be affected by three factors: terrorism; a conflict between China and the US where the Pakistani political establishment might have to choose one side; and infiltration of Uyghur separatists into Xinjiang from Pakistani territory.¹⁵

2.2.2 Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PkMAP)

Mehmood Khan Achakzai heads the PkMAP, which enjoys great following in the Pashtun-dominated areas of Balochistan. Leaders of the PkMAP have been elected to the provincial assembly, National Assembly and the Senate since 1988. The PkMAP was part of the All Parties Democratic Movement (APDM) and boycotted the 2008 general elections. Being a democratic, progressive and nationalist party, the PkMAP attaches great significance to Pakistan’s relations with neighboring countries including China. However, the party believes that China has not raised its voice against successive military regimes in Pakistan and holds that Beijing must support democracy in Pakistan.¹⁶

The party sees growing relations between India and China as a good omen for regional economic cooperation from which Pakistan could equally benefit. China’s policy of opening up to India would provide Pakistan with an opportunity to remove mistrust with India through China’s help. The PkMAP maintains that China has little role in resolution of the Kashmir dispute in the absence of a major breakthrough on the issue by Pakistan and India.¹⁷

The party believes that Pakistan’s decision to join the war on terror has not hurt its relations with China. It strongly condemns the killings of Chinese engineers and workers in Balochistan and thinks that the presence of Chinese Uyghur militants in Pakistan’s tribal areas could be detrimental to Pak-China relations in the long run. The PkMAP holds that Beijing must also come up with a strategy to help eliminate terrorism in both Pakistan and China.

China's rise as a global power can be beneficial for Pakistan in many ways, the party says, adding that the two sides should expand their cooperation beyond defense, nuclear power and missile technology, and work together in the health, energy and development sectors as well.

2.2.3 Awami National Party (ANP)

The ANP is a left-leaning, progressive political party which advocates the vision of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Khan Abdul Wali Khan. Its main area of electoral influence is the Pashtun-dominated areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan and Karachi. The ANP is part of the ruling coalition with the PPP in the center and the major ruling partner with the PPP in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. As per its manifesto, the ANP believes that Pakistan's relations with China should be based on impartiality and non-interference. The Pak-China relationship should not be that of a patron and client but of equal partners based on mutual respect. Pakistan should have good relations with all its neighbors including China.¹⁸

Mian Iftikhar Hussain, Minister for Information in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, proclaims on behalf of his party that there is great scope for cooperation between the two countries but in the past Pakistan and China have not benefited from each other in the manner that they should have. They could benefit a lot more from each other only if Pakistan does away with its policy of supporting Jihadis. Due to the pervasive insecurity and terrorism in Pakistan, Chinese investors are reluctant to invest in the country.¹⁹

The ANP says that Pakistan's decision to join the war on terror has not hurt Pak-China relations per se. Hussain says that Pakistan and the US have been allies before, including during the Soviet-Afghan war and Pakistan's relations with China would not suffer on that account. The ANP is of the view that China can only play a meaningful role as a mediator on the Kashmir dispute if Pakistan and India move forward with sincerity to resolve the matter.

The party maintains that China's rise as a global power would not benefit Pakistan until Pakistan comes up with something for itself. The Gwadar seaport has provided Pakistan with an opportunity to offer China a chance to benefit from Pakistan's unique geostrategic location. However, attracting China alone would not be enough. Pakistan must make Gwadar

attractive for other countries of Central and South Asia to make it more successful.

2.2.4 Jamhoori Watan Party-Talal (JWP-T)

After Baloch leader Nawab Akbar Bugti's death, the JWP was split into two factions, one led by the Nawab's son Talal Bugti and the other by his grandson Aali Bugti. Talal Bugti heads the JWP-T, which is a pro-federation party and believes in political struggle for people's rights.²⁰

The JWP-T manifesto refers to China as Pakistan's most important neighbor, its constant support for Pakistan on key issues at international forums and for being an 'all-weather friend'. However, the party thinks that Pakistan has failed to capitalize on Chinese friendship and support and has yet to learn from China's progress.²¹ The JWP-T maintains that with its weak economy, politically fragile structure and volatile security situation Pakistan can offer little to China. The party thinks that Pakistan should seek help from China to overcome its challenges. On the issue of Uyghur separatists, the JWP-T believes that China's adversaries are trying to weaken it from within and the problem in Xinjiang is a foreign-sponsored conspiracy against China.²²

The party sees Islamabad's blind capitulation to US dictates as the biggest stumbling block in Pak-China ties. However, it does not consider the increasing trade links between China and India to be detrimental for Pak-China relations. On the contrary, it opines that Pakistan should also pursue similar initiatives with India. China's rise as a global power is beneficial for Pakistan as a world led by China would be more suitable for Pakistan. The JWP-T sees no role for China in resolution of the Kashmir dispute until India and Pakistan demonstrate the required commitment to resolve the issue bilaterally.²³

The party believes that Pakistan's decision to join hands with the US in the war on terror does have some implications for Pak-China relations. JWP-T Central General Secretary Madni Baloch maintains, "The US has other objectives in the guise of the war on terror. Washington does not want to see increasing Chinese influence in the region in general and in Pakistan in particular. For instance, the Chinese have built the Gwadar port but the US does not want to see Chinese presence in Gwadar, even though China is the

most suitable candidate to run the port. A lot of subversive activities are being supported by the US in Balochistan to push China out. But, the Chinese understand the regional geo-politics and despite all these incidents they are still around.”²⁴ The JWP-T strongly condemns the killings of Chinese workers and engineers in Gwadar and others parts of Balochistan. The party sees involvement of foreign hands in these killings.

2.3 Religious Political Parties

2.3.1 Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F)

The JUI-F, headed by Maulana Fazlur Rehman, has parliamentary seats in the Pashtun belt of Balochistan as well as in parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The party recently pulled out of the PPP-led federal coalition government. However, it is a partner with the PPP in the Balochistan provincial government. The party is known for its religious politics and anti-America stance.

The JUI-F considers China the most important country in terms of Pakistan’s foreign policy considerations. The party maintains that in the 64 years since Pakistan’s independence, China is the only country to have consistently stood by it in times of need. The JUI-F believes that China is in a position to strengthen Pakistan politically and economically and Pakistan should seek China’s help to overcome its crises.²⁵

The JUI-F terms Uyghur separatism as China’s internal affair. The party thinks that the nature of Pak-China relations is completely different from Pakistan’s ties with the US. It says that what Islamabad can achieve by terming 2011 as “Pak-China friendship year” cannot be achieved by pursuing similar initiatives with the US.

The party believes that China’s growing ties with India are a bid to explore new markets for its products, that Beijing has every right to strengthen trade links with India and that they do not pose a threat to Pakistan. The party also considers China’s rise as a global power beneficial for Pakistan and thinks that as China rises, the chance of Pakistan being “blackmailed and bullied” by the US and the West would decrease. It maintains that China has always supported Pakistan’s stance on Kashmir and would continue to play a positive role in the future as well.²⁶

Pakistan's decision to join the US-led war on terror has not harmed Pakistan's relations with China. Terrorism is an international problem and China understands Pakistan's problems related to Afghanistan and militancy.²⁷

2.3.2 Markazi Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadith (MJAH)

The MJAH is a religious-political party which promotes the Ahl-e-Hadith movement in Pakistan. It used to be part of the now defunct Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), a six-party religious alliance formed in 2002. Led by Senator Sajid Mir, the MJAH envisions a foreign policy in which Pakistan establishes friendly and cordial relation with all its neighbors, including China. The party views China as an emerging economic and political power with which Pakistan should promote good relations with a futuristic perspective.²⁸

The MJAH maintains that Pak-China relations must transcend their one-dimensional nature and both countries should equally benefit from each other. The MJAH does not consider growing Sino-India ties a threat to Pak-China friendship as these ties are not at the expense of Pakistan. The party does not see any significant role for China in resolving the Kashmir dispute as long as Pakistan and the Kashmiris themselves do not make sincere efforts to push India to hold meaningful negotiations. The MJAH is of the view that the current wave of militancy and terrorism in Pakistan's tribal areas would not affect Pak-China relations if Pakistan does everything it could to deny safe havens in Pakistan to Uyghur separatists and prevents their infiltration into China from Pakistan.²⁹

3. Reflections of Militant Organizations

Understanding the prospects for Pak-China relations require a deep understanding of the many factors that play a vital role in shaping state relations and could influence them in the future. The main militant organizations in the country include Pakistani Taliban/ Jihadi groups and militant groups with a specific Kashmir focus. With various levels of ideological and operational linkages with Uyghur separatists, some of these organizations propagate threats and damage to the Chinese establishment at different levels, making them a challenge for China. In the post-9/11 environment, these militant groups are more influenced by developments in

the global jihad arena. China has repeatedly expressed concern at Islamist extremists operating in and around Xinjiang receiving support from extremist elements abroad.

3.1 Local Militant Groups

Jamatud Dawa (JuD)

The JuD, headed by Hafiz Muhammad Saeed is a major militant group in Pakistan. The organization's professed ideology goes beyond merely challenging India's sovereignty over Indian-administered Kashmir.

The organization's soft stance towards China was on display during a rally organized by JuD on Kashmir Solidarity Day on May 5, 2010 in order to support the right to self-determination of the Kashmiri people. Saeed supported the Chinese government for issuing a different entry permit to Kashmiris – as a mark of China's treatment of Kashmir as a disputed territory – and called it better than the policy of the Pakistani government. There have been reports that some Chinese Muslims are also enrolled in madrassas run by Jamatud Dawa and after studying there they could join the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), the armed wing of the organization. The JuD is active in Indian-administered Kashmir against New Delhi's there and lacks the ability to launch attacks in China without the support of Al Qaeda or local militant groups. It does not have a violent policy towards China.

Jaish-e-Muhammad (JM)

Jaish-e-Muhammad changed its name to Tehreekul Furqan on October 7, 2001 and then to Khuddamul Islam in 2002, after the group was banned by the Pakistani government on January 12, 2002. Now it is operating under a charity cover, Al-Rehmat Trust. When Pakistan handed over 13 Chinese nationals studying at a Deobandi madrassa in northern Pakistan, the JM condemned the action and announced to support the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) militants.³⁰ Students at Islamabad's Lal Masjid, who had abducted nine Chinese women in June 2007, accusing them of running a brothel in the garb of a massage centre, also reportedly belonged to Jaish-e-Muhammad. JM is operating in Indian-administered Kashmir but its Jihadi agenda includes helping all 'oppressed' Muslims. It is one of the most violent

Jihadi groups, who, if persuaded by the Chinese militant groups, can launch attacks even inside China.

Harkatul Mujahideen (HM)

Harkatul Mujahideen (HM), changed its name to Jamiat-ul-Ansar on January 7, 2002 and then to Al-Hilal Trust in 2003 after group was banned by the Pakistani government on November 2003. Maulana Fazlur Rehman Khalil, who is stated to have close links with Osama bin Laden, is the HM chief.

Some reports had suggested the involvement of the outfit in Xinjiang but Khalil has denied these reports. In an interview, he stated that HM was not involved in Xinjiang. "We are proud of the friendship between China and Pakistan. The enemies of the two countries are the same. The US wants to draw a line between China and Muslim countries. No Chinese Muslim is getting training in the camps of Harkat. It's mere propaganda by the US and India."

Khalil's stance gets support from another report. Hamid Mir, a journalist who shot to fame after interviewing Osama bin Laden in 2001, has reported that the US authorities had approached Khalil in 1998 to "wage jihad" against China in its oil-rich Xinjiang province. However, according to Mir, Khalil rebuffed the offer. The group was blacklisted by the US State Department as a terrorist organization in 2003. Mir also believes that US agents have penetrated Taliban. Although Harkatul Mujahideen denies its links with Islamist militants in Xinjiang, some sources state that at least some Uyghurs had received training at Harkat's camps in Azad Kashmir. Harkatul Mujahideen has the capability to launch terrorist attack in Pakistan, India and Afghanistan by virtue of its strong links with Al Qaeda and other global Jihadi networks. However, the outfit apparently holds no grudge against China and the chance of it launching or supporting any attacks in that country remain miniscule.

Harkatul Jihad-e-Islami (HuJI)

The HuJI was the first Jihadi organization in Pakistan. It had a strong organizational structure and in addition to Pakistan and Indian-administered

Kashmir it also has networks in Chechnya, Uzbekistan, Burma and Bangladesh before September, 2001.

The HuJI was allegedly involved in facilitating the Uyghurs in fighting against Chinese rule. Associated with Al Qaeda, the HuJI apparently provided assistance to ETIM. HuJI leader Qari Saifullah Akhtar cemented ETIM's link with the Taliban and Al Qaeda. The group has camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Its deep links with Chinese Islamist militant groups provide it the capacity to launch terrorist attacks inside China. Owing to its extremely violent Jihadi agenda and close links with anti-China extremist groups in Xinjiang province, there are chances of the HuJI militants launching terrorist attacks inside China.

4. Public Standpoint

The Pakistan-China relationship at the people-to-people level is based on mutual trust. The average Pakistani considers China an all-weather friend, mainly on account of Beijing's staunch support for Pakistan on a range of issues, including Kashmir, at international forums. Moreover, due to China's unflinching support to Pakistan in its wars against India, and assistance in developing the nuclear and missile programs, the people of Pakistan hold China in high esteem. The people of the two countries share deep affection and warmth although they do not share a common religion, ideology or political projection. Harmony, abiding friendship and positive sentiments between the two people are echoed in the words often used to refer to Pakistan's friendship with China, that it is deeper than the sea and higher than the Himalayas.

After the Chinese premier's recent visit to Pakistan, the public affection for China has grown even further. Announcements of scholarships, educational benefits for Pakistani students and other development and welfare exchange programs have opened new opportunities for them. The recently inaugurated Pak-China Friendship Centre at Islamabad is also a symbol of friendship between the two countries at the public level.

5. Findings

- All mainstream and religious-political parties consider China a cornerstone of Pakistan's foreign policy. However, these parties assert that these relations must be diversified beyond political and security exchanges; cooperation should be enhanced in other fields as well and people-to-people contact should be expanded.
- Nationalist political parties mainly have two sets of views on China. Some nationalist parties, such as the mainstream and religious-political parties, refer to China as a country of utmost importance in their manifestos. While some others have an ambivalent attitude towards Pak-China relations. Without attaching any significant importance to Pakistan's ties with China, political parties in the latter category consider China a neighbor like any other. These views are shaped by the political parties' regional political outlook.
- All political parties think that the growing Sino-India ties are neither a challenge nor a threat to Pakistan-China friendship. On the contrary, they believe cordial ties between China and India are in the best interest of the region and China's warming relations with India would remove the trust gap between India and Pakistan and might lead to trilateral trade cooperation in the future.
- The regional and mainstream political parties stress upon stemming the rising tide of militancy and extremism as they believe that they could undermine Pakistan's ties with China.
- Across the political and ideological spectrum, all political parties believe that Pakistan's decision to join hands with the US in the war on terror has not affected Pak-China relations. However, if Islamabad continues to tow Washington's line meekly such subservient attitude could undermine its relations with Beijing in the long run.
- The political parties do not see a major role for China in resolution of the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. Some, however, think that being a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council China could play a positive role in pressing India to address the Kashmir issue.

- The rise of China as a global power is seen positively in Pakistan and the political parties believe that that is in Pakistan's best interest.
- Political parties consider the issue of Uyghur separatism in China's Xinjiang province as Beijing's internal security matter. They believe that on grounds of mutual collaboration and friendship any complaint by the Chinese regarding infiltration from Pakistani territory must be effectively addressed and not only must the infiltration be stopped but all those posing a threat to China's security must be apprehended and handed over to the Chinese authorities.
- The Kashmiri Jihadi groups do not pose any threat to China as these groups have a specific focus on India-held Kashmir.
- Due to the TTP's close links with Chinese militants, the possibility of the Pakistani Taliban launching attacks inside China cannot be ruled out.

6. Conclusion

Relations between Pakistan and China have stood the test of time and Beijing has not only understood Islamabad's constraints and security vulnerabilities vis-à-vis India but has also stood by Pakistan through difficult times. China's rise as a global power and its growing ties with India offer new opportunities of economic cooperation and increased peace and stability for the entire region. Doing away with the traditional mistrust between Pakistan and India can usher in a win-win scenario for all regional countries. To put its relations with China on an even more solid footing and to make them more meaningful and mutually beneficial, Pakistan has to pursue an independent foreign policy based on self-interest and must abandon the tendency to submit to US dictates. Moreover, Pakistan has to stem the rising tide of militancy and extremism and pacify the insurgency in Balochistan if it wants to benefit from the emerging regional and global trends in which China is bound to rise as a dominant player.

Notes

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- ¹ Kanti Bajpai, "Managing Ambivalence: Pakistan's Relations with the United States and China since 2001," in *Pakistan in Regional and Global Politics*, ed. Rajshree Jetly (New Delhi: Tolstoy House, 2009), 84.
 - ² Fauzia Wahab (Information Secretary, PPP), telephonic conversation, January 19, 2011.
 - ³ Ibid.
 - ⁴ Ibid.
 - ⁵ Siddiqui Farooq (Central Spokesperson, PML-N), interview by Nida Naz in Islamabad, January 15, 2011.
 - ⁶ Muhammad Ijazul Haq (President, PML-Z), telephonic conversation, January 14, 2011.
 - ⁷ Haider Abbas Rizvi (an MQM leader and member of National Assembly), January 28, 2011.
 - ⁸ Ibid.
 - ⁹ Dr Shireen M. Mazari (Spokesperson, PTI), email message to Nida Naz, February 6, 2011.
 - ¹⁰ Ibid.
 - ¹¹ Ibid.
 - ¹² Dr. Abdul Maalick Baloch (President, National Party), interview by Nida Naz in Islamabad, January 18, 2011.
 - ¹³ Ibid.
 - ¹⁴ Dr. Ishaque Baloch (Member of the National Party), January 26, 2011.
 - ¹⁵ Ibid.
 - ¹⁶ Usman Kakar (Senior Vice President, PkMAP), January 17, 2011.
 - ¹⁷ Ibid.
 - ¹⁸ Zahid Khan (Information Secretary, ANP), January 17, 2011.
 - ¹⁹ Mian Iftikhar Hussain (Minister of Information Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), January 14, 2011.
 - ²⁰ Daily *Aaj Kal*, (Urdu), Islamabad, May 26, 2009.
 - ²¹ Madni Baloch (Central Deputy General Secretary, Jamhoori Watan Party), January 14, 2011.
 - ²² Ibid.
 - ²³ Ibid.
 - ²⁴ Ibid.
 - ²⁵ Senator Ismail Baledi (a leader of the JUI-F), January 17, 2011
 - ²⁶ Ibid.
 - ²⁷ Ibid.
 - ²⁸ Professor Sajid Mir (Chief, Markazi Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadith), January 19, 2011.
 - ²⁹ Ibid.
 - ³⁰ *Jaish-e-Muhammad* (Urdu), monthly magazine of Jaish-e-Muhammad, June 2009.

Pak-Afghan Relations: Emerging Trends and Future Prospects

Safdar Sial

1. Introduction and Background

At the NATO Lisbon Summit in November 2010, three declarations called upon the United States, NATO and Afghanistan to create conditions for “irreversible transition to full Afghan security responsibility and leadership” in all provinces by the end of 2014.¹ The proposed transition requires an increase in the pace towards preparedness, in particular towards strengthening and enabling the political, administrative, judicial and security institutions in Afghanistan to effectively manage the post-transition responsibilities. Secondly, a more supportive role by the regional countries, particularly Pakistan, Iran and China, is imperative to facilitate the transition process. With regard to the first pre-requisite, efforts are under way in Afghanistan to find a workable framework for power-sharing with all ethnic groups, including the Taliban, to constitute a representative government in Kabul, with some basic ingredients of conflict-resolution and peace. As far as the second pre-requisite is concerned, Kabul’s focus has increasingly been on regional countries with an eye to the post-transition period.

These developments along with the recent Pak-US strategic dialogue and increasing interaction and bilateral engagement between Pakistan and Afghanistan describe how relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and certain other regional dynamics—particularly those related to security, terrorism and trade, etc.—are going to be transformed into new realities in the near future. In this backdrop, it is crucial to assess the nature of evolving relations and alliances, explore the level of convergence and/or divergence of interests and foresee national and regional security determinants and variables in South and Central Asian contexts.

This analytical report undertakes a part of this task and tries to explore emerging trends and prospects for Pak-Afghan relations and their implications for counter-terrorism and reduction in violence and insecurity in both countries in particular and the wider region in general.

Historically, Pakistan and Afghanistan have rarely been at ease with each other despite the fact that both are Muslim neighboring countries, and share more than 2,500 kilometers of border, called Durand Line, which was demarcated in 1893 following an agreement between the British Empire and the Afghan king. The Durand Line divides ethnic Pashtun tribes in the Pak-Afghan border areas.

Ethnically, Pashtuns constitute the majority of the population of Afghanistan and also have considerable population in Pakistan. They are Pashtu speaking people of southeastern Afghanistan and northwestern Pakistan. The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan, which comprise seven tribal agencies are populated by a little over 3 million Pashtuns, in addition to the 28 million Pashtuns who live in Pakistan and the 15 million in Afghanistan. The tribes on both sides of the border intermarry, trade and feud with one another. They largely share a common religious sect, Sunni or Hanafi Islam. These tribes have been living together for centuries and even today's Pak-Afghan border has only symbolic significance for them and tens of thousands travel across it on a near daily basis. According to Pakistan's ambassador to Afghanistan Muhammad Sadiq, some 52,000 Afghans crossed the border into Pakistan everyday in 2009 for business, jobs, medical treatment, education or in order to visit their relatives.² More visitors are now undertaking documented travel between the two countries by obtaining visas or visit permits.

The two countries have a long history of mistrust and both have accused each other of harboring the other's opponents and interfering in their affairs. Pakistan accuses Afghanistan of sheltering Baloch nationalists since the 1970s. The Pakistanis also allude to the fact that Afghanistan was the only country that had resisted Pakistan's membership of the United Nations and that as recently as the communist regime in Afghanistan it had closer relations with India than with Pakistan.³ The increasing Indian influence in Afghanistan in the present context also adds to Pakistan's concerns. Afghanistan says that Pakistan supported the Afghan Taliban in the 1990s, and provided refuge and shelter to them later in its tribal areas and other parts such as Quetta from where they, along with Pakistani Taliban, have regrouped and launched attacks on Afghan, US and NATO forces.⁴ Some Afghans also criticize Pakistan's role in the Soviet-Afghan war when Pakistan's military ruler Gen Ziaul Haq had promoted jihad in Afghanistan, funded thousands of madrassas, armed domestic Islamist organizations, and in the process "militarized and radicalized the border

region.”⁵ Other Afghan concerns relate to Pakistan’s focus on only dealing with Pashtun leaders in Afghanistan, meddling in Afghanistan affairs and not treating the country on equal basis.

Pakistan attaches great importance to establishment of a friendly government in Kabul to secure its western borders, while Afghanistan categorizes that as Pakistan’s interference in Afghan affairs. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistan had supported the Afghan resistance and later the Taliban, with the same aim.

Although both countries have begun to evolve friendly relations in regional frameworks, the fundamental issues remain intact. For instance, Afghanistan still does not recognize Durand Line as international border between the two countries. Kabul blames Islamabad for fueling the insurgency in Afghanistan in order to destabilize the government of President Hamid Karzai and install a friendly or a more compliant government in Kabul. In turn, Islamabad alleges that Kabul has given shelter to Baloch nationalist insurgents and allows India to use Afghan territory to fuel the insurgency in Balochistan.

However, there is considerable goodwill towards Pakistan among the Afghan people for helping them in their hour of need. In the last 30 years, Afghans of all ethnicities and political views have taken refuge in Pakistan: whether following the mass exodus after the Soviet occupation or flight from atrocities of a decade-long internecine war. At one point, over 5.5 million Afghan refugees were living in Pakistan; currently the number is around 3 million. A large number of Afghans continue to work and study in Pakistan. Some 28,000 Afghans have studied at Pakistani universities and colleges in the last three decades.⁶ Until last year, 6,000 Afghan students were enrolled in Pakistan’s colleges and universities; constituting nearly 60 percent of all Afghans studying in institutions of higher education abroad.⁷ Over 500 Afghan nationals attended courses at the Agriculture University of Peshawar alone. Scores were trained in other professions ranging from medicine to civil aviation. Many successful professionals in Afghanistan today have studied in Pakistan.

Similarly, over 90 percent of Afghans who seek medical treatment abroad visit Pakistan. Most of the Afghan patients opt for free treatment at government hospitals or healthcare facilities run by philanthropists and charity organizations. While wealthy Afghan patients are welcomed by

many countries, Pakistan has kept its doors open for the less affluent ones also.⁸

Presence of a large number of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, the long border, conducive environment for Afghan nationals to live, work and access education and health facilities in Pakistan, and shared religious and ethnic ethos were perhaps some of the factors which prompted Afghan President Hamid Karzai to declare Pakistan and Afghanistan the conjoined twins while addressing the media in Islamabad on March 11, 2010.

The other reasons for Afghanistan's increasing realization that it needs Pakistan, particularly after withdrawal of US troops, are linked to political, geo-strategic and economic factors. Both countries face similar threats of militancy and terrorism which makes not only bilateral but also regional cooperation and joint counter-terrorism mechanisms imperative to deal with these threats.

Bitterness of the recent past seems to be subsiding now and Pakistan is being seen once again as a key player for resolving the conflict in Afghanistan. Both Pakistan and Afghanistan appear set to work together to counter not only militancy and terrorism but also pave the way for a stable and peaceful region. However, despite some positive developments in that regard irritants remain. Both countries have legitimate security concerns which have internal and external dynamics. There is no end in sight to the war on terror in which both countries are partners. The role of the United States and the fate of the war on terror would essentially determine the future of Pak-Afghan relations. All these issues are discussed below.

2. Security Perspectives of Pakistan and Afghanistan

Pakistan and Afghanistan have both had reservations about the other country's role with regard to their internal security. The actors of violence and terrorism in both countries have many similarities and can be categorized as local and foreign militant groups. The local militant groups are mainly the Taliban groups operating in both countries. They want to topple the governments of the two countries and transform society according to their interpretations of Islam. However, Taliban in both countries have clearly sharp differences when it comes to strategic objectives. There are divisions

even within the ranks of Pakistani Taliban groups on issues related to strategic and tactical priorities; some are exclusively focused on fighting in Afghanistan while others are also targeting the Pakistani people and security personnel. But the Taliban groups operating in both countries do not have great ideological differences.

The situation in Pakistan appears to be more complex when one looks at the increasing nexus between Taliban groups mainly based in FATA and parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and some other mainland militant, or Jihadi, groups and also terrorist groups with sectarian motivations. Foreign militant groups such as Al Qaeda and Central Asian militants add a dimension of global jihad to this already complicated militant landscape, besides providing ideological and financial mentoring to most of the militant groups operating in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

In addition to religiously motivated militant and sectarian groups, Pakistan faces a nationalist insurgency in Balochistan. The capital of the province, Quetta, is also allegedly home to senior Afghan Taliban, referred to as 'Quetta Shura'. Other areas of concentration and influence of local and foreign militant groups inside Pakistan are the border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan.

As mentioned earlier, both Pakistan and Afghanistan believe that insecurity and violence in their countries stems mainly from cross-border movement of militants. It does not necessarily imply that the other country is orchestrating lawlessness and militancy in the neighboring country. The occasional blame-game also serves domestic political purposes. But public perceptions in both countries are changing and people are increasingly convinced that by externalizing the issues of insecurity and violence, the governments primarily try to hide their own shortcomings.⁹ Yet Pakistan's partial responsibility in the ongoing insurgency in Afghanistan and Afghanistan's partial responsibility in the insurgency in Balochistan and parts of FATA and KPK remain. According to some analysts, in both cases the two countries are exploiting already troubled situations rather than architecting them.

Only recently have the two countries started to realize that they have a common enemy in militants and terrorists.¹⁰ Some analysts assert that Afghanistan has apparently started to trust the political government in Islamabad but still views the Pakistani military establishment with

suspicion.¹¹ Pakistan's major security perspective is not only confined to the spread of insecurity and terrorism it has witnessed at the hands of Taliban groups but it also takes into consideration the role of Afghanistan and India in sheltering and supporting the Baloch insurgents, respectively.

3. Pakistan's Responses to Militancy and Terrorism

Pakistan's relations with its neighboring states, Afghanistan, India, China and Iran are directly connected with its internal and regional security. The geo-strategic dynamics and the presence of militant extremists in Pakistan and Afghanistan signify that peace and security are possible only through collaborative regional approaches.

The internal security situation continues to be a pressing challenge for Pakistan. Critical security challenges remain unaddressed, with the government yet to evolve an effective and comprehensive counter-terrorism policy. The challenges consistently highlighted in the last few years have not been addressed. Better coordination among intelligence agencies, capacity building of law enforcement agencies, curbs on terrorism financing and, most importantly, adequate measures to prevent banned militant groups from operating across the country remain persistently lacking.

Amid multiple challenges and threats such as political instability, institutional confrontation, economic volatility and a precarious security situation both internally and externally, Islamabad has undertaken a host of strategies in the last couple of years to address the mounting challenges. A summary of these responses is given below:

- In the conflict-hit areas of KPK and FATA, the government responded with wide-ranging political and military interventions to counter the militancy. Military campaigns continue in areas where militant networks still hold sway.¹²
- Efforts are under way to reconstruct the destroyed infrastructure and repatriate internally displaced persons to areas where military operations have been concluded. The KPK government approved a peace-building initiative, called the Post Crisis Need Assessment (PCNA), which guides the political and development initiatives.

- Through formation of peace committees and anti-Taliban lashkars in FATA and KPK, the government tried to encourage residents of the conflict-hit areas to assist the security forces in ensuring law and order in the areas purged of militants. But the government's scant support to lashkars and peace committees creates difficulties for them and risks inter-tribal clashes.
- In 2010, the KPK administration directed government departments to sack employees found guilty of supporting the militants.
- After promulgation of Counter-Terrorism Ordinance 2010 in KPK, Governor Owais Ghani ordered implementation of the ordinance in the conflict-hit areas of KPK's Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA).
- The federal government gave approval last year for trial of some 3,000 militants arrested from Malakand Division, including chief of the banned Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi, Sufi Muhammad, and former TTP spokesperson in Swat Muslim Khan. The militants were to be tried in Malakand Division. However, the trials have not yet begun.
- The Federal Interior Ministry lifted an official ban on recruitment in the paramilitary Frontier Corps (FC) in KPK and FATA and 4,000 new inductions were planned in 2011. The new recruits would get bullet-proof jackets and new vehicles.
- Unlike the government's emphasis on reconciliation in Balochistan in 2009, its strategy in the province in 2010 was a combination of carrot and stick. The government expedited the pace of development projects, extended an olive branch to exiled Baloch separatist leaders for negotiations, recruited over 3,900 candidates in the provincial education department under the Aghaz-e-Huqooq-e-Balochistan Package, and announced a 100 percent increase in the number of seats reserved for Baloch students in the universities and higher education institutions of Punjab. The government also banned five Baloch militant/insurgent organizations, namely Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), Baloch Liberation Front (BLF), Baloch Republican Army (BRA), Lashkar-e-Balochistan and Baloch Musallah Difai Tanzeem in September last. Their bank accounts and other assets were also frozen.

Critical Challenges: Some critical challenges still remain in countering terrorism and militancy and restoring peace in the country.

- There are no major changes in the militant landscape of FATA, which has continued to revolve around the same dynamics in the last few years.
- Despite a dip in the number of attacks in KPK in 2010 compared to 2009, the security landscape is still vulnerable to militant attacks, as is demonstrated by intermittent and sporadic acts of violence by the Taliban.
- The overall security situation in Balochistan continues to deteriorate amid a combination of nationalist insurgency, sectarian-related militancy, Taliban presence in the northern part of the province, politically motivated target killings, attacks on educationists, NATO supplies and enforced disappearances/illegal detentions.
- Intermittent cycles of violence lead to complete breakdown of law and order in Karachi, causing an acute sense of insecurity among the city's residents and bringing the economic activity in the country's financial capital to a halt.
- The reincarnation of banned sectarian outfits under new names displays the ineffectiveness of official bans as a tool to tackle sectarian violence in the country. The fluid nature of sectarian militant outfits makes detecting and cracking down on them all the more difficult.
- The continuing wave of terrorist attacks in Pakistan demonstrates not only that the terrorists retain the ability to strike across the country despite major military offensives, but also that they are not interested in suspended the attacks. A nexus of Al Qaeda, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and militant (*Jihadi* and sectarian) groups on mainland Pakistan is behind the prevailing wave of terrorism.
- Growing radicalization in Pakistan makes a large and unemployed population of youth susceptible to courting by the militants. Meanwhile, the Al Qaeda network in Pakistan attracts radicals from all over the world for terror training.
- Pakistan is yet to develop a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy amid a systemic lack of ownership, consistency and direction of the overall security and counter-terrorism approach of the state.

- The high ratio of acquittal of suspected terrorists by courts of law in 2010 raised concerns about institutional deficiencies in the prosecution and judicial systems.

4. War on Terror and US

Much instability and disruption has occurred in Pakistan and Afghanistan in the war on terror that began in the region nearly 10 years ago. After 9/11, the US had described Al Qaeda and its sanctuaries in Afghanistan as its major concern. A destabilized South Asia was perceived by the US as a dangerous place that could afford Al Qaeda and other terrorists safe havens to consolidate their position and propagate for a 'true Islamic caliphate' by overthrowing the 'western puppets' ruling these countries. Irrespective of the extent to which these objectives have been met, the situation in Pakistan and Afghanistan remains alarming.

Pakistan had joined the war on terror after the US had already taken the main world powers on board in its efforts to evolve consensus against terrorism and Al Qaeda. Pakistan's refusal to join in could have isolated it internationally, which could have led to heavy economic and political costs. Secondly, an isolated Pakistan was likely to be considered part of the problem of terrorism and militancy. Thirdly, and most importantly, India could have capitalized on the international campaign against terrorism to target the Kashmir-focused militant groups based in Pakistan.

Although Pakistan's tensions with the US and Afghanistan continued after it became part of the war on terror, these tensions had a different character as Pakistan was now part of the alliance, and was providing crucial infrastructure and intelligence support for the counter-terrorism drive. The Arab, Afghan and other militant groups active in Afghanistan got shelter in Pakistan's tribal areas and a new brand of Taliban, the local or Pakistan Taliban, joined them to wage battles against the US and NATO forces in Afghanistan. In the emerging complex landscape of militancy the militants started to launch attacks inside Pakistan.

The US, Afghanistan and other allies have consistently pressed Pakistan to 'do more' against the local and foreign militant groups in its tribal areas which they think are not only providing support to the Taliban in Afghanistan but are also

training the militants who believe in waging a 'global jihad' and are, or can be, involved in acts of terrorism around the globe. Pakistan on the other hand cites its losses and contribution in the war on terror and the resulting threats of insecurity, violence and terrorism for the state and society. Pakistan argues that it faces the threat of terrorism more than any other country and cannot counter it without international support and assistance. The militants have certainly bracketed Pakistan with the US and its allies, and have been launching attacks in Pakistan, particularly since 2004-05.

The most recent US strategic review of its Af-Pak policy in December last put more pressure on Pakistan as Washington thought that Islamabad should do more to eliminate terrorists hiding in its tribal areas and that doing so would strengthen the anti-Taliban war in Afghanistan. Pakistan asserted that this analysis was skewed and was a bid to mask the failures of the US and its allies in Afghanistan.

Pakistan and the US remained engaged in a strategic dialogue in 2010. The first ever strategic dialogue at the ministerial level was held on March 24-25, 2010 in Washington. Two rounds of strategic dialogue followed in July and October 2010.¹³ Washington's interest in the strategic dialogue was apparently to find a way with Pakistan's assistance for a safe and dignified exit from Afghanistan and ensure regional security, whereas Pakistan was mainly interested in US assistance for its economy, and in assurances that Afghanistan's territory would not be used against Pakistan by India. The Tripartite Commission (Afghanistan, Pakistan and US) also reviewed occasionally how the war on terror could be fought effectively and how internal security and economic conditions of Pakistan and Afghanistan could be improved.

At present, North Waziristan is a source of friction in relations between the two allies because of Washington's demand for a military offensive in the region along the Pak-Afghan border which Washington describes as the launching pad for violence in Afghanistan. But Pakistani military leadership has resisted US pressure and insisted that it was constrained by operations against militants in other areas and efforts to consolidate the gains made in the fight against extremists in Pakistan. The army says that it would move into North Waziristan at a time of its own choosing.

Other irritants include the CIA-operated drone strikes in Pakistan's tribal areas. In 2010, a 165 percent increase was witnessed in such strikes.¹⁴ Growing public pressure against drone strikes could have political implications for Pakistan's partnership in war on terror. Although drone strikes do not directly affect Pak-Afghan relations, public sentiments have some relevance for Pakistan's foreign policy, particularly at the political level.

5. Irritants in Pak-Afghan Relations

India's role: The US and its allies find it difficult to 'tinker' Pakistan Army's Afghan policy which is fundamentally India-centric.¹⁵ Pakistan has always considered India a threat to its stability and existence, and in order to counter-balance this threat over the last two decades it has attempted to secure its western borders with Afghanistan. Certain sections within the military think of Afghanistan as Pakistan's strategic depth in case of an attack on the eastern border by India.¹⁶

Afghanistan and the US are aware of Pakistan's concerns with regard to Indian influence in Afghanistan. Pakistan believes that India's role in Afghanistan is not confined to the development and reconstruction effort but rather it seeks to use its presence in Afghanistan to create instability in Pakistan, particularly in Balochistan, FATA and Karachi.

After independence from Britain, the Pashtunistan issue provided India with a chance to pressurize Pakistan on both the eastern and western borders. Later Afghanistan became a battleground for an India-Pakistan proxy war. India was part of a vicious propaganda campaign launched against Pakistan in Kabul during the communist regime.¹⁷


Notions of 'balance of power' and 'strategic depth' have long haunted the Afghans who consider such efforts by Pakistan as interference in Afghan affairs. On the other hand Pakistan believes that a pro-India government in Kabul is a critical danger to its security. The Afghan people fear a return to Taliban rule. The situation demands addressing the trust deficit between Pakistan and Afghanistan by demonstrating that Islamabad is committed to playing a sincere role to allay concerns of the Afghans.

At present Pakistan's 'bottom-line' in strategizing its policy towards Afghanistan seems to be a 'proxy-free' Afghanistan. Some analysts believe that Pakistan has revisited its Afghan policy and committed itself to non-interference. Pakistanis believe that the Americans have a confused strategy on Afghanistan; that the reconciliation policy, first embraced by the US in its annual review, was not aligned with the transition process; and not enough attention had been paid to development.¹⁸

Cross-border movement of militants: The Taliban insurgency and border security are two major and interconnected issues that have had an impact on regional security and Pak-Afghan relations.

Uncontrolled flows of people and legal and illegal goods have traditionally taken place across the Pak-Afghan border, along Pakistan's FATA region, districts of Dir and Chitral in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Balochistan.¹⁹

One of the main challenges faced by Pakistan and Afghanistan is the security of their border, which is porous to a great extent for common citizens and militants. Both countries have deployed their border security forces there, with some 1,000 border control posts on the Pakistani side and 100 on the Afghan side. Border tensions in the form of attacks and clashes are mainly related to infiltration of militants across the Pak-Afghan border. (See Chart 1) Both countries and other allies in war on terror understand that it is not possible to seal the border and that cross-border movement of militants cannot be checked without support from local tribesmen.²⁰



Finally, tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan on water sharing are also expected to emerge in the near future. A number of rivers are shared, including the Kabul River, on which a dam has been proposed in Afghanistan. There have been attempts to renegotiate a 1921 water treaty on water sharing between the two countries.²¹

Pashtun factor: Until recently, Pakistan was blamed for its Pashtun-specific foreign policy towards Afghanistan. But over the years Pakistan, particularly its embassy in Kabul, has launched extensive efforts to reach out to non-Pashtun Afghans. Pakistan's ambassador to Afghanistan has made extensive visits to northern Afghanistan and inaugurated several Pakistan-funded development projects there. All this demonstrated that Pakistan's Afghan policy is no longer entirely Pashtun-specific. Seemingly this irritant in Pak-Afghan relations is transforming into an opportunity.

6. Promising Developments: Bilateral and Regional

Since President Karzai's re-election in 2009, there has been a positive shift in Pakistan-Afghanistan bilateral policies and also in regional perspectives. Although political leaders still issue statements critical of the other country, they are far less venomous and frequent than before. Increased bilateral visits and interaction have considerably overshadowed such statements.

President Karzai visited Pakistan in March 2010 to seek Islamabad's support for reconciliation with the Taliban. He acknowledged that Pakistan had a critical role in dialogue with the Taliban. Media reports suggest that Pakistan principally agreed and tried to broker a deal between Kabul and the Haqqani network and presented a roadmap for political settlement.

But talks between Kabul and the Haqqanis failed to get Washington's backing. The Americans were apparently interested in holding talks only with Mullah Omar. The Haqqanis have also shown little interest in joining the Afghan government, unlike Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's militia, which in 2010 presented a 15-point peace plan to Karzai. Ground realities suggest that it is not possible for any Taliban group, including the Haqqani network, to completely break away from Al Qaeda. They can only offer an assurance that they would try and persuade Al Qaeda to not attack US or NATO

forces, and guarantee that their soil would not be used for terrorist attacks against the West.

The reconciliatory overtures with Taliban in Afghanistan have also inspired debates in academic and policy circles in Pakistan for a similar reconciliation with Pakistani Taliban. But in 2010 that did not get serious attention of the political and military establishment. The main reason behind that may be the two opposing approaches to tackling the Taliban problem. The allies want talks with Taliban in Afghanistan but demand military action against them in North Waziristan. Ground realities suggest that the issue would remain critical in 2011.

Some recent high-level exchanges between Afghanistan and Pakistan have resulted in a renewed commitment to security collaboration and trade relations, with a transit trade agreement signed. Afghan interior minister Mohammad Hanif Atmar and head of the National Directorate of Security Amrullah Saleh, two key members of the Afghan security establishment, who were seen as anti-Pakistan, were sacked. Many analysts saw Karzai playing the Pakistan card in the face of a sudden US withdrawal. Pakistan saw this as an opportunity to reassert its comparative strength as a neighbor of Afghanistan. It also saw itself replacing India in Afghanistan as a key ally.²² Afghanistan also tried to address another key concern for Pakistan regarding harboring Baloch insurgents by sending Brahamdagh Bugti, a key Baloch militant leader who had been hiding in Afghanistan, packing.

Track-two diplomacy also continues between the two countries to find a future framework for engaging Afghanistan, Taliban and Pakistan. Mullah Rocketi, former Taliban interior minister, is leading this exercise.

Recently the Afghan President expressed increasing interest in engaging regionally with Afghanistan's neighbors, apparently with a view to prepare his country for departure of US troops. He even went to the extent of saying that any decision about permanent US military bases in Afghanistan would be subject to the wishes of the Afghan people and also neighboring countries, particularly Pakistan, Iran and China.²³

Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani visited Kabul in December 2010, exchanged views with members of Afghanistan's Chambers of Commerce

and Industry and discussed the newly signed Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA). He also asserted that parliamentarians could play a positive role in bringing people of the two countries closer.²⁴ A joint declaration issued at the end of Gilani's visit said the two countries reiterated their commitment to effectively cooperate, combat and defeat the terrorists' threats and eliminate their sanctuaries.

President of Pakistan Asif Ali Zardari, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad and President Karzai were part of the 11th Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) summit in Istanbul, on December 23, 2010.²⁵ In a mini-summit in Turkey on December 27 President Hamid Karzai discussed security-related issues with Pakistani officials and stressed that the security of Afghanistan and Pakistan was inter-linked.²⁶

A high-level delegation of Afghan High Peace Council, led by former Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani, visited Pakistan in February 2011 and met religious scholars, leaders of political parties, parliamentarians, and government and military officials. One of the many purposes was to see prospects for Pakistan's role in the reconciliation process with the Taliban. The delegation saw a great urge for peace at every level in Pakistan and hoped that Pakistan would play a major role in reconciliation and rebuilding of Afghanistan. The delegation returned home with the impression that Pakistan genuinely desired to be part of the Afghan solution and if Pakistan's genuine concerns in Afghanistan were addressed, Islamabad would be ready to play the role of a peacemaker.²⁷ The visit was in a way an expression of how Afghanistan and other stakeholders in the Afghan conflict had started to think about Pakistan with regard to its role in the future of Afghanistan. The council was constituted by Afghan President Hamid Karzai after getting a mandate from a traditional 'Loya Jirga' in September 2010, which was attended by some 1,600 delegates from across Afghanistan. Following the visit of the delegation, Pakistan and Afghanistan agreed on January 7, 2011 to establish a high powered Joint Consultative Commission to pursue peace in Afghanistan.²⁸

Not so long ago the current regime in Kabul and its international backers opposed giving Pakistan any role in resolving the Afghan conflict. Instead, Pakistan was considered solely responsible for keeping the Taliban intact by providing the militants safe havens, enabling them to hide, train and launch

attacks against the Afghan and international forces. But the recent developments have put Pakistan centre stage and provided it with an unprecedented opportunity to play a role in helping to end the Afghan insurgency.

The Afghan Peace Council's visit to Islamabad was followed by a visit by Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Salman Bashir to Kabul for policy consultations and exploring ways of strengthening bilateral ties.

US Vice President Joe Biden visited Islamabad on January 12, 2011, after meeting Afghan President Hamid Karzai in Kabul. In Pakistan, he met the president and the army chief to discuss the Afghan strategy and eventual pullout of US forces. The two sides deliberated at length on the need for jointly charting a course of action to bring peace and stability to the insurgency-torn Afghanistan and the region. The United States was reportedly interested in finding out "Pakistan's bottom line" and its "intentions" regarding Afghanistan. The United States also acknowledged as "legitimate" Islamabad's apprehensions about foreign intervention in Pakistan through Afghanistan. Pakistan vowed to continue its policy of non-intervention and of respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Afghanistan.²⁹

President Zardari met with Afghan Foreign Minister Dr Zalmay Rassoul on January 27 in Islamabad, and called for joint bilateral efforts to resolve all issues disturbing regional peace, security and stability.³⁰ Addressing the inaugural ceremony of the Wolesi Jirga (lower house of parliament) on January 26, the Afghan President reiterated that Afghan soil would not be allowed to be used against Pakistan.³¹

Pakistan and Afghanistan signed the Pak-Afghan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA) for boosting bilateral trade and exports on October 28, 2010 in Islamabad.³² The new accord was to replace the 1965 bilateral trade agreement that governed the transit of goods to a landlocked Afghanistan through Pakistan. The issue of bank guarantees and some other matters have however held up the implementation of the agreement, which was scheduled to become operational on February 12. In line with the international practice, it was made mandatory in the new transit law for Afghan importers to deposit with Pakistani authorities a bank guarantee equivalent to the taxes on

goods. The Afghan government wants this clause removed while Pakistan says it is part of the agreement and cannot be done away with at a technical-level meeting.³³

Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India agreed on December 11, 2010 to proceed with the TAPI gas pipeline starting from Turkmenistan and ending in India after passing through Afghanistan and Pakistan.

With regard to joint counter-terrorism efforts, Pakistan and Afghanistan agreed to boost intelligence sharing in August 2010. President Karzai and Pakistan Army chief Gen Ashfaq Kayani met on the sidelines of the 31st Tripartite Commission meeting of military representatives in Kabul on August 9 to discuss the revised counter-terrorism strategy.³⁴ In December, the Turkish President announced after a trilateral summit in Istanbul that Turkey, Pakistan and Afghanistan would hold joint military exercises as part of efforts to build trust between Kabul and Islamabad.³⁵

7. Conclusion

Given the geographical, political and economic realities in Afghanistan, efforts for reconstruction of the battered country, which already face criticism on accounts of lack of integration, direction and political will, are likely to assume a traditional and indigenous outlook after the US and its allies leave the region.

Pakistan's foreign policy towards Afghanistan seems to have acquired a progressive outlook with the objective of ensuring peace and peaceful co-existence in the region. A shared threat from terrorists seems to be the underlying factor.

Pakistan remains concerned over India's presence and influence in Afghanistan and holds it responsible for supporting the insurgents in Balochistan. Afghanistan's main concern is Taliban's shelter in Pakistani tribal areas and cross-border movements of militants to support the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan has to live with its domestic and regional realities, which is perhaps what has persuaded President Karzai to think more in regional

terms. That is something which can be built upon to establish friendly relations among regional countries, particularly with a view to establishing peace.

Secondly, the US is aware that after its troops leave Afghanistan, the country can drift into anarchy and civil war as had happened in the early 1990s after the Soviet withdrawal. It needs 'assurances' from regional stakeholders that they would commit themselves to achieving enduring peace and stability.

Pakistan also faces extensive security threats from domestic militant groups and cannot afford to let militancy and terrorism continue in Pakistan and the region at large. Militancy and terrorism are neither in the interest of Pakistan nor Afghanistan. This is something which can pave the way for long-term strategic collaboration between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Economic and trade collaboration and availing economic opportunities are dire needs of both countries.

Finally, neither country can ignore the wishes of their people for peace, prosperity and security. An unstable Pakistan or Afghanistan would continue to pose a threat to regional and world peace. A visible alignment of interests among Pakistan, Afghanistan and even the US is vital to determine the future course of the war on terror, and also relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Notes

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- ¹ See the "Declaration by NATO and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on an Enduring Partnership," the "Declaration by the Heads of State and Government of the Nations contributing to ISAF," and the "Lisbon Summit Declaration." The Lisbon Declaration builds upon the international agreements at the London Conference (January 2010) and the Kabul Conference (July 2010) that focused on the agreed process of *Inteqal* (transition), which included aligning assistance with Afghan National Priority Programs as outlined in the Afghan National Development Strategy.
 - ² Mohammad Sadiq, *Pakistan-Afghanistan: The Conjoined Twins* (Kabul: Publication Department of Embassy of Pakistan in Kabul, May 2010).
 - ³ Afghanistan voted against Pakistan's accession to the United Nations after its independence because of Kabul's claim on the Pashtun territories located on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line. This claim quickly generated a quasi-alliance between Kabul and New Delhi, and Islamabad saw in the Soviet invasion an opportunity to try and reverse that situation.
 - ⁴ Aqeel Yousufzai (a Peshawar-based journalist and author of two books on Taliban and Talibanization in Pakistan and Afghanistan), interview by the author, February 2011.
 - ⁵ Barnett R. Rubin and Abubakar Siddique, "Resolving Pakistan-Afghanistan Stalemate," United States Institute of Peace, October 2006.
 - ⁶ Mohammad Sadiq, *Pakistan-Afghanistan: The Conjoined Twins*.
 - ⁷ Ibid.
 - ⁸ To quote some examples, 40 percent of patients in Peshawar's major government hospitals and 11 percent patients in tertiary hospitals all over Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are Afghans; over 50 percent patients in major government hospitals in Quetta are Afghan nationals; and two Pakistani philanthropic hospitals perform free eye surgeries on about 30,000 Afghans every year. (Source: Mohammad Sadiq, *Pakistan-Afghanistan: The Conjoined Twins*, (Kabul: Publication Department of Embassy of Pakistan in Kabul, May 2010).
 - ⁹ Aqeel Yousufzai, interview by the author.
 - ¹⁰ Dr. Akbar Khan (Editor Frontline), February 2011.
 - ¹¹ Aqeel Yousufzai, interview by the author.
 - ¹² Military operation Rah-e-Nijat, launched in South Waziristan and Orakzai agencies in 2009, continued in 2010. A second military offensive was launched in Orakzai Agency in March and the army declared around 90 percent of Orakzai had been cleared of militants. A military operation in Kurram Agency was still underway as the year 2010 ended. Three small-scale military campaigns were launched in 2010, in Frontier Region (FR) Kohat (January), in FR Peshawar (September), and in Kala Dhaka area in Mansehra district of KPK (April).
 - ¹³ Humera Iqbal, "Pak-Afghan ties in the Light of Pak-US Strategic Dialogue," *Regional Studies* XXIX, no. 1 (2011).
 - ¹⁴ *Pakistan Security Report 2010* (Islamabad: Pak Institute for Peace Studies, 2011).
 - ¹⁵ Aqeel Yousufzai, interview by the author.

- ¹⁶ Marco Mezzera, Safiya Aftab, "Pakistan State-Society Analysis," Initiative for peace-building funded by European Union, January 2009, available at http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2009/20090300_cru_pakistan_mezzera.pdf.
- ¹⁷ Aqeel Yousufzai, interview by the author.
- ¹⁸ Baqir Sajjad Syed, "Warming Pak-Afghan ties signal new strategic alignment," *Dawn*, January 19, 2011.
- ¹⁹ Marco Mezzera, Safiya Aftab, "Pakistan State-Society Analysis."
- ²⁰ Dr. Akbar Khan.
- ²¹ Marco Mezzera, Safiya Aftab, "Pakistan State-Society Analysis."
- ²² Shuja Nawaz, "Wikileaks' aftermath in the region," *The Boston Globe*, August 6, 2010.
- ²³ *Daily Aaj Kal* (Urdu), Islamabad, February 20, 2011.
- ²⁴ *Dawn*, December 6, 2010.
- ²⁵ *Dawn*, December 24, 2010.
- ²⁶ *Dawn*, December 28, 2010.
- ²⁷ Hasan Khan, *Dawn*, January 24, 2011.
- ²⁸ *The News*, Islamabad, January 8, 2011.
- ²⁹ *Dawn*, January 13, 2011.
- ³⁰ *Pakistan Today*, January 28, 2011.
- ³¹ *The News*, Islamabad, January 27, 2011.
- ³² *Daily Times*, October 29, 2010.
- ³³ Mubarak Zeb Khan, "Differences stall enforcement of new Afghan trade accord," *Dawn*, Islamabad, February 14, 2011.
- ³⁴ *Daily Times*, August 10, 2010.
- ³⁵ *Dawn*, Islamabad, December 25, 2010.

Analysis of Peace Agreements with Militants and Lessons for the Future

Sohail Habib Tajik

1. Introduction

Pakistan, the second most populous Muslim state, possesses the seventh largest military force of the world and is part of the elite eight-nation nuclear club.¹ Concomitantly, it is also the fifth most violent nation,² and the 10th most fragile country in the world.³ This violence and fragility can be ascertained from the fact that some 10,000 people were killed in Pakistan in violent incidents in 2010, as compared to 7,123 killed in Afghanistan and 4,021 in Iraq.⁴

Since it became a frontline state in the war on terror, incidents of violence and terrorism have been on the rise in Pakistan, particularly after 2005-06. It has adopted various policy options, including military, political and socio-economic, to counter the rising terrorism and militancy. One such policy instrument has been the signing of peace agreements with the militant outfits in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Peace deals have been an important tool in Pakistan's conflict management strategy because of their history in the region as a non-military option and their resonance with the tribal culture.

The purpose of this study is to analyze the various peace agreements which the government of Pakistan signed with the militants in FATA and KPK beginning in 2004. The study endeavors to explore the broader perspective in which these agreements were signed, clauses of the various peace agreements, observations noted in their backdrop and the drawbacks of such policy. Finally, suggestions for the future course of action are given along with steps for a holistic approach towards conflict management.⁵

2. Methodology

Both primary and secondary sources were relied upon to understand and analyze the government's peace accords with militants. Books, journals, transcripts, and national and international media reports were reviewed.

Most of the quantitative data was retrieved from the websites of the Government of Pakistan, RAND National Defense Research Institute, Global Terrorism Database (GTD), Terrorism Research Center (TRC), South Asian Terrorism Portal (SATP) and the International Crisis Group.

Since no police force operates in the semi-autonomous FATA region, the Intelligence Bureau's reports were the main official source available on major events in that region. The primary data included interviews with various political agents in FATA, lawmakers from Swat, leaders of political parties, and serving and retired bureaucrats with insight on the issues that are the subject of this study. Some of the key terms and concepts referred to in this study have been defined below:

Peace agreements: Accords intended to contain a violent conflict or to significantly transform it so that it can be more constructively addressed.⁶ The main types include:

Ceasefires: Temporary suspension of armed conflict for an agreed-upon timeframe or within a defined area while political negotiations are conducted to find a durable solution.⁷

Pre-negotiation agreements: Agreements that determine procedural issues such as schedules, agendas, participants and location for peace negotiations.

Interim agreements: These are commitments to reach a negotiated settlement to build confidence between the parties.⁸

Comprehensive agreements: These agreements address the substance of the underlying issues of discord. Their conclusion is often marked by a handshake, signifying an "historical moment" that ends a longstanding conflict.⁹

Procedural components set out the processes that establish and maintain peace. These include the establishment of schedules and institutions that facilitate the implementation of substantive issues such as elections, dispensation of justice, disarmament and respect for human rights.¹⁰

Substantive components are parts of the agreement that define what is going to change after the peace agreement is reached. Substantive components

include political (distribution of power), economic (management of natural resources) and social structural changes that are needed to remedy past grievances and provide for a more fair and equitable future.¹¹

Organizational components are arrangements intended to promote the peace consolidation efforts after the agreement. They include a neutral monitoring capacity to ensure that peace agreement commitments are honored as well as steering capacity which keeps the implementation process on track and resolves disagreements through political negotiations.¹²

Militancy refers to the state or condition of being combative or disposed to fight. It is also the active championing of a cause or belief. **Militants** are members of warring groups.

3. The Context

The situation in Pakistan's tribal areas bordering Afghanistan is not only complicated because of the porous border, and complex administrative structure but also explosive due to its trans-national and international linkages. The uncertainty over how to handle the tribal lands "makes the problems in Iraq look like a picnic."¹³

3.1 Complex Administrative Structure

The tribal areas and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa exhibit complex and diverse administrative structures with seven tribal agencies of FATA and six Frontier Regions (FRs); six Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) districts and three PATA enclaves, 18 settled districts and one hybrid area (Malakand Agency).

FATA consist of seven agencies: Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram, North Waziristan and South Waziristan. These agencies are administered by the federal government through the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Governor and Political Agents.¹⁴ There are six transitional areas wedged between the tribal agencies and the settled districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa which are called Frontier Regions (FRs). These are FR Peshawar, FR Kohat, FR Bannu, FR Tank, FR Dera Ismail Khan and FR Lakki. The FRs are administered by the provincial government through the district coordination officer (DCO) of the respective settled district, who exercises powers comparable to those of a political agent in FATA.¹⁵

The six PATA districts, i.e., Chitral, Upper Dir, Lower Dir, Shangla, Buner and Swat, were carved out of princely states in 1969. They are administered provincially but an act of the federal parliament or the provincial assembly cannot be extended to them unless so directed by the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Governor. The three PATA enclaves are the former princely state of Amb, Kala Dhaka (in Mansehra district) and the tribal area of Kohistan district.

The 17 settled districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are managed by the provincial government without any specific role for the Governor. The Malakand protected area is unique in the sense that it is called an agency but has no political agent. The administration is run by a Nazim (administrator) and a DCO. However, no district police officer (DPO) or police stations are present there.

Under articles 246 and 247 of the Constitution, the parliament cannot legislate for FATA and PATA unless the President so directs. Legislators from FATA can legislate for the whole country but not for their own region.

3.2 Metastasis of Militancy

The regions bordering the Durand Line, the Pak-Afghan border, have been referred to as 'terrorist Disneyland'.¹⁶ The militancy has spread from this region into various directions, manifesting the following patterns:

Local-National:

The militancy has a local-national dimension. It is raging in the seven tribal agencies, six Frontier Regions, six PATA districts, 18 settled districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and other parts of Pakistan in varying shades and intensity.

Transnational and Regional:

The Taliban from Afghanistan have found a sanctuary in the tribal areas where they come to rest and recover, replenish their revenues, recruit new cadres, hibernate in the winter and infiltrate into Afghanistan in the summer.¹⁷

The insurgency in Afghanistan has great repercussions for Pakistan. It operates on three fronts. The northern front, where mainly Hizb-e-Islami militants are active, spans Nurestan, Konar, Laghman and Nangarhar provinces of Afghanistan as well as parts of Pakistan across the border.¹⁸ The

central front, comprising foreign fighters (Arabs and Central Asians), covers the Afghan provinces of Khost, Paktia and Paktika as well as Bajaur area of Pakistan.¹⁹ The southern front, which mainly comprises of Afghan Taliban, is based in Helmand, Kandahar, Zabol and Uruzgan provinces of Afghanistan as well as parts of Balochistan.²⁰

International Dimension: the Epicenter

Militants from Pakistan's border areas have been linked to a range of international terrorist attacks and plots, such as the July 2005 bombings in London, the foiled 2006 plot against transatlantic commercial flights, the foiled plots in Germany and Denmark in 2007, and the 2008 arrest of terrorism suspects in Spain.²¹

Until 2008, the number of foreign fighters present in the tribal areas was estimated to be 500-600, according to former President Pervez Musharraf, whereas Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani said the number was 1,200 and the Interior Ministry cited the figure of 8,000.²² However, the FATA Additional Chief Secretary claims that there were 18,470 foreign fighters in FATA, including 5,000 Saudis, 4,500 Uzbeks and Chechens, 3,000 Yemenis, 2,000 Egyptians, 2,800 Algerians, 400 Tunisians, 300 Iraqis, 200 Libyans and 200 Jordanians. Recent estimates suggest that the number of foreign militants in FATA is between 3,500 and 5,000. These militants constantly keep changing their locations to avoid US drone strikes and military operations by the Pakistan Army.

Chinese Uyghur militants of the East Turkistan Movement, Uzbek rebels from Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and Chechens are among those operating in the tribal belt.²³

4. Federally Administered Tribal Areas

In 1893, with a view to divide and weaken the 11 main Pashtun tribes and turn Afghanistan into a buffer zone between the British and Russian empires, British diplomat Sir Henry Mortimer Durand established Durand Line which serves as the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan.²⁴ In 1901, the British Raj imposed on the tribal areas a series of laws, known as the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR), which were ostensibly based on tribal customs (*riwaj*) and the Pashtun code of ethics known as *Pashtunwali*.²⁵ According to the FCR, the

people were free to govern their internal affairs according to tribal codes, while the colonial administration held authority in what were known as 'protected' and 'administered' areas only.²⁶

According to the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan, FATA remains under the direct executive authority of the President (Articles 51, 59 and 247). Laws framed by the National Assembly do not apply there unless specifically ordered by the President. Some of the draconian clauses in the FCR violate human rights and democratic principles. These include:

Section 21: Collective responsibility of the tribe empowers the administration to punish the whole tribe for individual misconduct.

Section 22: Territorial responsibility empowers the administration to impose fine on an entire village for an individual's offence.

Section 40: A preventive provision pertaining to good conduct under which individuals can be detained for years without recourse to appeal.

The governance of each tribal agency rests with a Political Agent (PA), who is assisted by assistant political agents, tehsildars (administrative heads of sub-districts) and naib tehsildars (deputy tehsildars), as well as personnel of local Khasadars force and security forces (Levies and Scouts). The PA is the administrative head of an agency, arbitrator of inter-tribal disputes, armed with judicial powers and supervisor of development, etc. The government functions through tribal intermediaries: *maliks* (representatives of the tribes) and *lungi* holders (representatives of the clans).

In the last 60 years, the state has failed to invest either in human development or physical infrastructure of FATA to bring it at par with other parts of Pakistan. The development indicators show a bleak 17% literacy rate, one doctor for every 8,000 people and only 100 high schools compared to 500 madrassas.²⁷

The traditional *jirga* system is becoming an ineffective instrument for local conflict resolution because the poor and more vulnerable segments of society cannot afford to convene a *jirga* due to its expensive formalities such as the cost of hospitality of the *jirga* members. In most cases *jirga* decisions favor the richer or the more influential party.

Some recent changes in the traditional power structures of FATA have become a serious source of instability. Firstly, the influx of Arab 'mujahideen' in the 1980s and of Taliban and Al Qaeda militants since 2001 brought political Islam, money, and illegal economic activity to the region and buttressed the emergent Islamist leadership.²⁸ Secondly, migration of the population to the settled areas of Pakistan and the booming oil economies in the Gulf has injected substantial remittances to families which in the past had relatively low social status in the tribal society. These families now seek power and influence consonant with their new financial status. Migrants have also become acutely conscious of inequities in the tribal areas and have garnered greater appreciation for the rights that Pakistani citizens everywhere except FATA enjoy.²⁹

Thirdly, the role of the *mullah* and political Islam has expanded into FATA and adjoining areas. The prominence of the *mullah* and the collapse of the *malik* system is one of the most important changes in FATA in the recent years.³⁰

Finally, US-led military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and action by the Pakistan Army in the tribal areas have contributed to the growth of Islamism and even Islamist militancy in the region. It is difficult for many tribal residents to understand how the *mullahs* and militants, who were once considered heroes and given support in the bid to drive Soviet troops out of Afghanistan, are now branded as villains.³¹

5. Military Operations and Peace Agreements

In the post-9/11 scenario, Pakistan became the frontline state in the US-led war on terror. To purge its tribal areas of foreigner and local militants, the Pakistani military launched *Operation Meezan* in 2002 and entered FATA for the first time since the country's independence from British rule in 1947. Some 80,000 military and paramilitary troops were deployed in FATA.³²

In March 2004, under intense US pressure, Pakistan Army launched an operation in Kaloosha village near Wana, the administrative headquarters of South Waziristan, with the belief that a surgical operation would eradicate the militants.³³ However, the militants ambushed the troops, inflicted heavy losses on them and took officials hostage. Due to increasing casualties on both sides as well as high public resentment resulting from indiscriminate shelling, the government soon opted for a peace deal with the militants.³⁴

5.1 Shakai Agreement

The signing of peace agreements with pro-Taliban militants started with the Shakai agreement, which the government signed with Nek Muhammad and other militant commanders at Shakai, South Waziristan on March 27, 2004. Nek, a charismatic Yargulkhel Wazir known as the Che Guevara of Wana, was a battle-hardened commander of Taliban who provided sanctuary to the chief of Uzbek militants Tahir Yaldochev in the military operation in Kaloosha.³⁵

The main clauses of the agreement were:

- The government would release all individuals taken prisoner during the military operation.
- The government would pay compensation for casualties during the operation.
- The government would pay compensation for collateral damage caused during the operation.
- The government would not take action against Nek Muhammad and other wanted individuals.
- The government would allow foreign 'Mujahideen' to live peacefully in Waziristan.
- Local 'Mujahideen' would not resort to any action against the land and government of Pakistan.
- 'Mujahideen-e-Waziristan' (fighters from Waziristan) would not take part in any action in Afghanistan.

The peace accord failed because of disagreements over registration of foreigners with the authorities. The government claimed that the militants were required to register 'foreign fighters' in the area and surrender them to the government. However, the militants claimed that there was no such clause in the agreement.

On June 11 2004, the military operation was re-launched. Nek was killed by a missile launched from a US drone on June 19, 2004.³⁶ The agreement remained in place for less than 50 days.

Observations:

- The agreement led to the tribal dissidents morphing into a powerful militant group which became a permanent feature of the tribal landscape and further reinforced polarization.
- Pakistan's strong support for the stance of the US in the war on terror and reliance on the use of military means further militarized the situation.
- In the peace agreement, the militants were given a status equal to the government.

5.2 Sararogha Peace Deal

The militancy, which was hitherto restricted to areas inhabited by the Ahmadzai Wazir tribes of South Waziristan, started spreading to the Mehsud-dominated areas of South Waziristan by the spring of 2004.³⁷ The two Mehsud commanders spearheading the militancy in their respective areas were Abdullah and Baitullah. The government opted for another peace deal in a bid to bring calm to the Mehsud territories. The deal was inked between pro-Taliban militant Baitullah Mehsud and the government of Pakistan through the mediation of a local *jirga* at Sararogha, South Waziristan, on February 22, 2005.³⁸

The six clauses of the written agreement were:

- Baitullah and his group would neither harbor nor support any foreign fighter in their area.
- Baitullah and his supporters would not attack any government functionary nor damage official property. They would also not create any hindrance in development activities.
- The government would not take action against Baitullah and his supporters for their past actions. However, they would be dealt with as per the law if they were found involved in any terrorist or criminal activities in the future.
- Any culprit found in the Mehsud area would be handed over to the government.

- All the issues not covered by the agreement would be resolved with mutual consultation between the political administration and the Mehsud tribe.
- In case of violation of any clause of the agreement, the political administration was empowered to take legal action.

The agreement was signed by Baitullah Mehsud and members of the local *jirga*.

Observations:

- The agreement did not cover cross-border infiltration or attacks in Afghanistan.
- There was no clause concerning the surrender of foreign fighters.
- There was no provision that militants would surrender their weapons.
- The agreement became controversial after reports emerged that money had been paid to the militants during the negotiations.
- Abdullah Mehsud, the second most important militant commander in the region, opted out of the agreement.

5.3 Miranshah Peace Accord

The militancy that began in the Ahmadzai Wazir territories of South Waziristan in 2003 spread to the Uthmanzai Wazir areas of North Waziristan in 2005.³⁹ The government writ receded in North Waziristan as the militants attacked security forces personnel and convoys. The political administration was effectively restricted to government buildings.⁴⁰ When the cost of military options exceeded the benefits, the government opted for a 16-point peace deal with the militants of North Waziristan on September 5, 2006.

The undertakings by the Uthmanzai Wazirs, including local Taliban, religious leaders, elders and tribesmen, included:

1. There would be no attacks on law enforcement personnel and government property. There would be no target killings.

2. No parallel administration would be established in the area and the government's writ would prevail. In case of any problem, the political administration in consultation with the Uthmanzai tribes would resolve the issue according to the traditions and the FCR.
3. There would be no cross-border militant activities in Afghanistan. However, there would be no restriction on crossing the border for trade/business and for meeting relatives according to the local *riwaj*.
4. There would be no terrorist activity in the districts adjacent to North Waziristan.
5. All foreigners residing in North Waziristan would either leave Pakistan or remain peaceful according to the prevailing law and the current agreement. All the clauses of the agreement would also apply to the foreigners in the tribal agency.
6. All captured government property during the operation including vehicles, weapons or any other equipment would be returned.

The government's undertakings included:

1. All individuals apprehended during the operation would be released and would not be arrested again on the previous charges.
2. The government would release all political benefits.
3. The government would remove all newly established checkpoints on the roads and would post Levies and Khasadar personnel on the old checkpoints as was done in the past.
4. The government would return all vehicles, weapons and other equipment captured during the operation.
5. The government would stop all land/air operations and all issues would be resolved according to the local traditions.
6. The government would pay compensation for collateral damage to the affectees.
7. There would be no restrictions on carrying weapons as per the tribal tradition. However, restrictions would continue to be imposed on heavy weapons.

8. Implementation of the agreement would begin with the withdrawal of the army from the check posts to the barracks.

As per the agreement, a 10-member committee was to be established. The committee comprised clerics/elders and representatives of the political administration. The committee was to be responsible for establishing a link between the government and the Uthmanzai tribes and review and ensure the implementation of the agreement. Any individuals or group not abiding by the agreement or disrupting peace in Waziristan was to be proceeded against. The agreement was signed by Hafiz Gul Bahadar, Maulana Sadiq Noor and Maulana Abdul Khaliq. The peace deal broke down on May 20, 2007.

Observations:

- An unspecified amount of money was transferred from Pakistani government's coffers to the militants. A vague term "foreigners", a euphemism for Al Qaeda and other foreign militants, was used.⁴¹ Some 100 mid-level Taliban and Al Qaeda commanders and foot soldiers were released from custody.⁴²
- During the signing ceremony of the agreement in the soccer stadium of Miranshah, security cover was provided by the militants while their flag was fluttering over the scoreboard of the stadium.⁴³

5.4 Khyber Agency Pact

While the insurgency incubated and matured in Waziristan, militancy in Khyber Agency had been raging on Deobandi-Barelvi fault-lines for several years.

This militancy remained restricted to Bara subdivision and Tirah Valley of Khyber Agency. The main militant outfits in the area were Lashkar-e-Islam, led by Mangal Bagh; Ansarul Islam, led by Qazi Mehboob; and Amr Bil Maroof Wa Nahi Anil Munkir (promotion of virtue and prevention of vice), headed by Haji Namdar. These groups were mainly 'moral brigades' and not part of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, the umbrella organization of Taliban militants in the country.

Khyber Agency, which borders Afghanistan on one side and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province on the other, is important not only because the

main supply route of the NATO and US forces in Afghanistan passes through it, but also because of its proximity to Peshawar, the KPK capital.

To counter the impending danger of the militants consolidating their position in Peshawar and to keep the NATO forces supply line via Khyber Pass open, the government launched Operation Siraat-e-Mustaqeem (right path) against militant outfits in 2008. However, the immediate trigger for this operation was the abduction of 16 Christians, including two priests, on June 21, 2008 by Lashkar-e-Islam.⁴⁴ After several days of military sweeps in the Khyber Agency, the operation came to an end and a peace deal was signed by the government, represented by the political agent, and an 18-member *jirga* of Afridi tribes. According to the agreement:

- Law enforcement agencies and government property would not be targeted. There would be no target killings.
- Armed patrol would be the prerogative of the government.
- No parallel administration would be set up. Any problems that crop up would be resolved through the FCR and as per the local tradition.
- There would be no incursions into Peshawar district and other settled areas.
- Any foreigner in Bara sub-division would leave Pakistan.
- Government officials and law enforcement personnel would not be threatened. The tribes and Khasadars would be responsible for the protection of the roads as per *riwaj*.
- Khasadars and government officials would be allowed to work and would not be threatened or forced to quit their jobs.
- Development work would not be impeded.
- Guarantees for peaceful behavior of any criminal from the settled areas of Pakistan would be given by the concerned tribe.
- No training camp would be operated against Pakistan. Action against any militant camp including any suicide camp would be taken by the concerned tribe and the government as per traditions and the FCR.

- Display of unlicensed weapons in government offices and Bara bazaar would be banned except for those authorized by the Peace Committee of Afridi tribes.
- No propaganda against Pakistan and its institutions in the form of pamphlets or CDs would be allowed.
- Heavy weapons would not be allowed in the tribal territories.

Observations:

- a. Lashkar-e-Islam leader Mangal Bagh alleged that the aim of the operation was to please the US. The timing of the operation was significant in that regard, launched as it was before the Prime Minister's upcoming visit to the US.
- b. The operation targeted "empty buildings [used by] banned organizations," and "not a single leader or fighter [of these organizations] was captured."⁴⁵
- c. Mangal Bagh insisted on continuing his struggle against criminal elements in Bara.
- d. On the day of peace deal, five Frontier Corps personnel were killed and three wounded in Khyber Agency.⁴⁶

4.5 Swat Agreements

The Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) of KPK comprise mainly of six districts: Swat, Shangla, Upper Dir, Lower Dir, Chitral and Buner. These districts previously constituted the princely states of Swat, Dir and Chitral. However, in 1969 PATA regulations were imposed there which were quashed by the Supreme Court in 1994. This abolished the customary tribal courts based on local traditions and replaced them with the civil law of Pakistan. This sparked an uprising spearheaded by Sufi Muhammad, leader of Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (movement for the implementation of *Shariah* law). The TNSM said it wanted imposition of *Shariah* which the then government of KPK (called NWFP at the time) promised. There was a similar uprising in the region in 1999. In 2002, Sufi was arrested while entering Pakistan after fighting alongside the Taliban against the US forces in Afghanistan. In Sufi's absence his more radical son-in-law Fazlullah,

nicknamed 'Mullah Radio' because of his speeches on illegal FM radio channels, became active. The violence by Fazlullah's militant group in Swat precipitated a military operation there in 2007.

The first peace deal in Swat was struck on April 20, 2008 between the Awami National Party-led provincial government and followers of the TNSM led by Sufi Muhammad. As per the agreement, the government accepted the right of every Muslim to 'peacefully' work for the enforcement of *Shariah*. The TNSM dissociated itself from the elements attacking the security forces and a *fatwa* was issued against attacks on security personnel which were considered against Islamic teachings. The TNSM renewed its pledge to support the state institutions and enable the state to restore its writ in the region. The agreement paved the way for the release of Sufi Muhammad, who had been in jail since February 2002.

The second Swat peace agreement was inked on May 21, 2008 between Swat militants operating under the command of Fazlullah and the Awami National Party-led government. It was a 16-point handwritten accord in Urdu. During the negotiations process, the Swat chapter of the Taliban was represented by their spokesperson Muslim Khan, Ali Bakht, Maulana Muhammad Amin, Mehmood Khan and Nisar Khan, while the government team consisted of senior ministers Bashir Bilour and Rahimdad Khan, NWFP Environment Minister Wajid Ali Khan, Awami National Party (ANP) provincial President Afrasiab Khattak and MPA Shamshir Ali. The first round of talks was held in Chakdara on May 9, in which both sides agreed to a ceasefire, and the second on May 13. After achieving consensus on several issues, the agreement was signed on May 21. The clauses of the agreement stated:

- The militants agreed to accept and honor the writ of the federal and provincial governments.
- *Shariah* would be implemented in Malakand Division in letter and spirit.
- The militants would not criticize or abuse the religion of other citizens.
- Cases of the imprisoned militants would be reviewed and a decision about their release made.

- Personnel of law enforcement agencies, government officials, buildings and installations, police stations, police officials, Police Lines, army, Frontier Corps, Frontier Constabulary, bridges, roads and electricity installations would not be attacked. There would be a ban on private militias. The Taliban would denounce and disown suicide attacks, remote-controlled bomb blasts and bomb blasts in all private or government buildings and shops.
- The army would be gradually sent back to the barracks in accordance with the prevailing situation.
- All foreign militants would be handed over to the government. The militants would not attack barber shops or markets visited by women.
- The government would look into the damage caused during the security forces' operations and would compensate all the deserving victims.
- The Taliban would not oppose campaigns to vaccinate children against polio and other diseases, and would not obstruct women's education.
- There would be a complete ban on display of weapons and only licensed weapons would be allowed.
- Incidents of abduction and vehicle theft and snatching would be condemned and eliminated and all those places where militants and suicide bombers were trained or explosives were made would be dismantled.
- In line with the rules of the authorized license, there would be permission to talk on FM radio channels.
- The local Taliban would cooperate with the government in investigation of incidents of murder, robbery and other crimes.
- The government would take action in the area against oppressors, those taking bribe, adulterers, thieves, dacoits and kidnappers in order to rid the society of such elements.
- An Islamic university would be set up in Imamdheri Complex, which would be run by a joint government-Taliban committee.

- An 11-member joint committee was named to ensure the implementation of the agreement. The members of the committee included Wajid Ali Khan, MPA Dr Shamshir Ali, the Malakand Range deputy inspector general of police, the Swat district police officer and the Swat district coordination officer from the government side and Maulana Muhammad Amin, Ali Bakht, Muslim Khan, Mehmood Khan and Nisar Khan from the Taliban.

Observations:

- The agreement failed to mention anything about Taliban commander Fazlullah or whether he had been granted amnesty.
- Hard-core Jihadi elements such as Jaish-e-Muhammad and non-local militants, mostly from Punjab, started violating the agreement almost instantly. Immediately after the agreement, a militant commander, Said Jamal, announced establishment of a *Shariah* court in Swat for settling local disputes. Only hours before the signing of the Swat peace deal, two girls' schools were torched and a policeman shot dead.⁴⁷ The militants continued running training camps in the hills. They carved out 'no-go' areas and nominated their 'governors' there.
- As many as 400 Swat policemen resigned after the peace deal, most likely because they feared reprisal attacks by militants. The Swat militants had reportedly said that they would not abide by the peace agreement if a similar deal was not reached with the Tehrik-e-Taliban in Waziristan, a stipulation which was not included in the Swat peace deal.

5. Views of Different Stakeholders

In this complex conflict, the divergent views of the various stakeholders have been discussed below:

Militants

- Every time a peace agreement is at hand, US drones strike the tribal area.

- Pakistan Army is fighting Washington's war against its own people, and is killing innocent tribesmen.
- 'Mujahideen' would continue 'jihad' against US-led forces in Afghanistan and if Pakistan tries to stop them, they would fight against Pakistani forces as well.

United States

- US analysts described the peace deals as tactical moves by the militants to gain advantage from the government without changing their violent ways.
- Ceasefires were used to erect a parallel system of government complete with *Shariah* courts, taxation, and recruitment of militants' own 'police' force.
- Peace deals weaken Pakistani state institutions and prolong the insurgency rather than curtailing it.
- Past peace accords had not resulted in a reduction in violence.
- The Pakistani government appeared to take a harder stand against Al Qaeda to please the United States and a more permissive posture with the Taliban, who in turn worked with other militant groups.⁴⁸

Pakistan

- The three core Pakistani defense concerns are to contain Indian hegemony; not to permit development of pressures which would threaten retention of nuclear weapons by Pakistan; and retention of leverage over political developments in Afghanistan and to have a pro-Pakistan government in that country.
- Pakistan deployed 120,000 forces to take on the militants, compared to the combined NATO-ISAF force of 50,000 in Afghanistan. Pakistan established 669 patrolling posts while Afghanistan only had 69 posts along the border. Pakistani security forces suffered more casualties than the 40-nation NATO-ISAF forces operating across the border.

- The US was interested in eliminating only Arab fighters in the region. US drones did not take action when information about Pakistani Taliban was shared.

6. Drawbacks of Past Agreements

If peace is to be measured in terms of the number of attacks on the military and paramilitary forces, then the tribal areas remained mostly peaceful in the immediate aftermath of signing of peace agreements. However, target killings of tribal elders, sporadic attacks on government installations, torching and bombing of girls' schools, beheadings of alleged criminals, closing down of barbershops, bombing of CD shops and intermittent displays of force by the militants continued.

The decisions on the peace agreements in the tribal areas were made entirely by the military. The basic flaw with the agreements, both in Ahmadzai Wazir and Mehsud areas, was that they were between the military and the militants and focused mainly on areas of concern for the military, i.e., attacks on security forces personnel. In return, the militants were offered a free hand in the area. Such agreements also gave an equal status to the militants as a party vis-à-vis the state. The government further undermined its position by signing the pact in the quarters of the militants which according to the tribal traditions of *Nanawatay* meant that the government was responsible for the entire crisis.

The process of 'militant-military agreements' has gradually eroded the local tribal and administrative structures. Agreements with the military also bolstered disregard for other government institutions by the militants, fuelling a perception among them that if the military could be co-opted, other government institutions could be conveniently ignored.

The Miranshah agreement of 2006 was signed with the tribal militants of North Waziristan from a very weak position. The military had started vacating the check-posts even before the agreement was inked. The text of the agreement is also a testimony to the fact, demanding a lot of the government in exchange for the militants stopping attacks on military installations. This agreement signed between the militants and military appeared to be aimed at appeasement rather than peace. The Shakai agreement proved to be the first step on a slippery slope in legitimizing the status of the local militants as power brokers and further eroded the administrative channels.⁴⁹

The initial peace agreements were cobbled together in extreme secrecy, to the extent that even the names of the signatories were not known in some accords such as the Shakai agreement. The text of the agreement were neither available to the public nor the media.

Since the insurgency has regional and international implications, various stakeholders, NATO and the US in particular, were not taken on board regarding peace overtures with the militants. Consequently even when an agreement with the militants was in the works, US drones strikes continued inside Pakistan. These strikes not only violated Pakistan's sovereignty but also undermine the state's ability to ensure the promised peace and cessation of hostilities.

No verification mechanisms were put in place to ensure that the militants follow through on their commitments, such as not indulging in cross-border infiltration. Weak enforcement mechanisms were in place in case the militants reneged on any promise under a peace agreement. This was mainly because the militants were armed to the teeth and the tribes that were expected to enforce the agreements lacked the capacity and the weapons to match the militants' force. It was obvious from the outset that the local tribal elders could pose little challenge to the militants who were fighting troops from armies of nearly 50 countries in Afghanistan.

Future Strategy

The fact that all these 'peace' agreements were followed by military operations against the militants in the same area is a testimony to their failure. There are also inherent problems in dealing with the militants. Firstly, the Pakistani Taliban was founded as a militant armed organization and, unlike the Irish Republican Army (IRA) or Hezbollah, lacked a political wing. Secondly, they were not structured and hierarchical but horizontally compartmentalized. Hence, agreements in one or more agencies could not be taken as a comprehensive peace deal. Thirdly, the ideologically motivated non-state actors did not believe in borders and boundaries; fighting for causes and not countries. The following factors need to be considered in the future to make any agreement in the tribal areas successful:

- In most of the previous agreements, the government negotiated from a position of weakness, demanding too little and offering too much. A predetermined sense of siege drove the government negotiators to agree to the militants' terms in a rush. This not only left the militants walking away with more than they had hoped for, but also led to eventual military operations against the same after the collapse of the agreements that compounded the miseries for the local population. Any future agreement would have to be signed from a position of strength. The government should remember that the militants would fear a breakdown of talks as much as the government does.
- The local tribes/population that bore the brunt of collapse of the so-called peace agreements were not involved in the agreements. As stated earlier, the agreements were between the military and the militants. There is a pressing need to consult the local population as well as civilian institutions in making the key decisions about the terms of the agreements.
- A glance at past agreements in Waziristan shows that the only objective that the state wanted to achieve was to secure an end to attacks on the security forces. It seemed to have been taken for granted that if there were no more attacks on the security forces everything else would automatically fall into place. That has not happened. On the contrary, as a result of these agreements, the militants grew in strength to such an extent that they did not brook dissent from the local population, and undermined public welfare through schools, hospitals and development projects. The civilian administration and the peaceful citizens of the tribal areas would have to be involved in the key decisions regarding the peace agreements so that the agreements are not on the terms of military and the militants alone but also consider the concerns of the local population. A peace that only aims at a ceasefire between militants and the military aims too low. The objective must be the welfare of the population and a state of affairs for the local people where access to rights such as health, education and a dignified existence are guaranteed, development takes place and dissent is not countered by force.
- All previous deals with the militants, with the exception of the Swat agreement, were hammered out under the umbrella of a dictatorial

regime with minimum input from political forces. Any future peace deal requires political endorsement for legitimacy.

- The military's presence in civilian areas is a magnet for the militants. The army should be deployed along the Pak-Afghan border and at the FATA-KPK boundary. This deployment should be carried out in a phased manner. However, the army may be utilized for specific surgical operations with a precise timeframe and objective.
- There should be an independent structure and mechanism to disarm and demobilize the militants and reintegrate them into society. The program should involve surrender of all weapons other than rifles and pistols that the tribal people traditionally carry.

7. General/Holistic Approach

Any peace deal in the future would be short-lived if the context in which violence is perpetrated remains unchanged. So far, peace deals have been signed by both parties to gain time, only to resume fighting a few months later. For a comprehensive peace accord, the following steps should be taken:

- The government requires strong action to purge the areas of criminal elements who have found safe havens in the tribal belt in order to wean off support for the militants, and to prevent them from setting up their own 'justice systems'.
- Peace can be tenuous at best in any area where human rights are not respected and the people feel that they do not have a stake in the system. FATA has long remained a hub of criminal activity and weapons and narcotics trafficking. The state institutions should be strengthened to deal with these problems instead of leaving the people to fend for themselves. The people should have a say in the decision-making process through the traditional and administrative forums.
- Some analysts hold that the local government system of 2001 abolished the executive magistracy system, which was an important tool for maintenance of law and order. In the absence of magistracy, a vacuum is created which has weakened the writ of the government.

The space created by the peace agreements could have been better utilized in the presence of executive magistracy.

- The insurgency in Afghanistan is mainly indigenous and the stability of the Karzai regime cannot be guaranteed from Islamabad. The Ghilzai tribes in southeastern Afghanistan, which are the main support base of the Taliban, are not represented in the Afghan government. The Karzai government is mainly composed of Tajiks, Uzbeks and Durrani Pashtuns. The insurgency may be difficult to stamp out unless the Ghilzais are included in the Kabul government.
- FATA should be integrated into mainland Pakistan through a constitutional package involving extension of the Political Parties Act to the region. In no way should the rights of a citizen residing in FATA be less than those enjoyed by Pakistani citizens elsewhere in the country. The state should not have a separate system for FATA. Policing and action against criminals and militants should be the domain of the state and the tribesmen should not be asked to police or hunt for criminals.
- Writ of the higher judiciary should be extended to FATA.
- The powers of the President under articles 246 and 247 of the constitution in respect to FATA should be given to parliament.
- Pakistan should effectively demonstrate that FATA is not a safe haven for militants with extra-territorial aims. For that, Durand Line should be strengthened and the territorial integrity of Pakistan safeguarded.
- Given the proven failure of the military solutions, it is time to engage those elements within the Taliban ranks who are amenable to abandoning violence. The 'irreconcilables' should be isolated and forcefully dealt with.

8. Conclusion

Pakistan's tribal areas have been blinking on the global radars for all the wrong reasons. The militancy in these areas is growing and has implications not only for Pakistan but also has regional and international repercussions. To contain this militancy, Pakistan has taken various measures, which have not

worked. These steps could not succeed because of the archaic administrative set up in the tribal belt, the emphasis on military means and absence of political support for policies, actions under external compulsions rather than on account of domestic needs, trans-national character of the insurgency and negotiating from a position of weakness.

Pakistan needs a comprehensive counter-insurgency policy based on three pillars: military, political and economic. Priority should be given to integrate the tribal areas into Pakistan through political and administrative reforms. Such policies should prioritize national interest with strong political and public backing. Institutions need to be strengthened to enable the people to not only live in peace but also to access justice.

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Pakistan's Relations with Central Asian States: Irritants and Challenges

Farhat Asif

Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the energy-rich and land-locked Central Asian Republics (CARs) have assumed great significance in Pakistan's foreign policy considerations. Pakistan's geographical proximity with the Central Asian region, the geo-political and geo-economic significance of the CARs and the desire to become the gateway to Central Asia have stimulated Islamabad's interest in building closer political and economic ties with the region, which includes five republics of the former Soviet Union: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

Historically, the areas that make up Pakistan have had close cultural and economic relations with the region. Central Asia has been closely tied to its nomadic people and the Silk Route, which has acted as a crossroads for the movement of people, goods, and ideas between Europe and Asia for centuries. British occupation of India and Russia's control over Central Asia had disrupted these ties in the late 19th century. Soon after gaining independence from Britain in 1947, Pakistan joined the anti-communist bloc, which prevented Islamabad from developing close relations with the Central Asian region. Pakistan had no direct contact with Central Asia under Soviet rule and Islamabad's support for the Afghan Mujahideen in the Soviet-Afghan war added to frosty relations. Support for extremist forces in Afghanistan in the 1990s, and emergence of several Jihadist/militant movements in Central Asia also complicated Islamabad's relations with the region.

Pakistan renounced its pro-Taliban policy after 9/11 and the shift in Pakistan's foreign policy since then has enhanced Islamabad's cooperation and economic links with Central Asia. However, the nature of Pakistan's relations with former Soviet Central Asia has largely been economic rather than political or strategic.

This paper endeavors to analyze Pakistan's foreign policy towards the CARs

over the course of years. It focuses on the factors that enhance or diminish the prospects for close collaboration between Pakistan and these post-Soviet republics.

The Context

Pakistan and the CARs share many things including religion and cultural ties. However, Islamabad's desire for close political and economic ties with the Central Asian region has been plagued by its foreign policy, mainly on Afghanistan. Pakistan's ties with the region are nowhere near as robust as the initial warmth had indicated when these Central Asian republics gained independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union. A multitude of internal and external challenges facing the region have hampered progress in that regard.

Unlike the other main players in the region, including Russia, China, India, Iran, Turkey and the US, Pakistan's political conditions and fragile economy have prevented it from engaging with Central Asia. The unrest in Afghanistan has also affected Pakistan's ties with the CARs. The poor law and order situation in Balochistan and FATA, particularly along the border with Afghanistan, is a major challenge in the realization of the economic ventures that Pakistan seeks to pursue in the form of proposed pipelines bringing oil and gas from Central Asia to Pakistan, China and India.

Competing interests of various regional and global powers, aimed at accessing the energy resources of the Central Asian region have also been a hurdle in Pakistan's efforts to cultivate good relations with the CARs. The presence of US and NATO forces in the region has implications for inter-state relations, particularly US-Russia ties. Two factors most likely to sway the foreign policy of the CARs are potential economic benefits and getting rid of the extremist elements linked to the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

Challenges in Pakistan's Relations with CARs

Various irritants and challenges that have a bearing on relations between Pakistan and the Central Asian states are discussed in the following pages.

Geography

Lack of a common border with any Central Asian state is one of the primary impediments to accessing the region. Tajikistan, which has borders with Afghanistan and China, is the most strategically located country from Pakistan's standpoint. Wakhan Corridor, an area in far northeastern Afghanistan that connects Afghanistan and China, could be the most convenient land link between Pakistan and Tajikistan. At its narrowest point Wakhan is 16 kilometers wide. However, the security situation in Afghanistan has been the principal barrier in trade through this channel as well as pursuit of economic interests between Pakistan and Central Asia.

Pakistan has long portrayed itself as a natural trade route for Central Asian republics to reach world markets by availing transit facilities and access to Pakistani seaports. Several agreements have been signed to develop the communication links, including road and rail links. However, lawlessness and instability along all these routes have proven to be a major hurdle in realizing the potential for economic cooperation.

Teething problems

The CARs have encountered a litany of post-independence problems, including rapid economic and socio-political transformation, security challenges, and suppression of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Under Soviet rule, the CARs were largely isolated from the rest of the world. Moscow handled foreign relations and direct cooperation even among the CARs was limited. When the Soviet Union collapsed, the governments of these new states were novices in managing foreign affairs. These states have much to offer to the world, including economic benefits and strategic advantages. In the initial years after their independence, the approach of the new states was mainly exploratory; policies were tentative and largely reactive to external pressures. However, these states have been seeking to expand their role internationally and within a relatively short period their priorities and approaches to foreign policy issues have become increasingly apparent.¹ Participation in Russian-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), US-dominated NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP)

Program or the Sino-Russia-dominated Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is a reflection of that ambition. In the absence of an integrated policy in response to the changing strategic environment, the characteristic feature of the foreign policy of each of these states is one of the fluctuating alignments. Mistrust and suspicion have often encouraged the CARs to pursue policies at the cost of their neighbors, and a unified stand on important issues remains elusive.

The post-9/11 scenario has hastened developments in domestic politics and inter-state relations. Pakistan has emerged as a frontline state in the war on terror. Pakistan is trying to develop new avenues for cooperation with the CARs and has strived to improve its image smudged by years of support to extremist elements in Afghanistan. Pakistan, along with the CARs, is an important member of the Economic Cooperation Organization and its observer status in the organizations such as SCO shows the CARs' acceptance of Pakistan as a valued partner.

Afghanistan

In the context of Pakistan's ties with the CARs, Afghanistan's security situation is of immense significance since Afghanistan offers the most direct access for the Central Asian region to ports and markets in South Asia and the Persian Gulf. Afghanistan can also be the conduit for Central Asian oil and gas to South Asia and Iran. But such benefits for both Pakistan as well as Central Asia could be realized only when the situation in Afghanistan is sufficiently stabilized and secure land access is possible.

The Soviet withdrawal in 1989 and the US disengagement from the region left a political vacuum in Afghanistan. Pakistan, because of its protracted engagement there, found itself in a dominant position. Other regional countries also sought to gain influence in Afghanistan without much success.² After the Soviet pullout, the Afghan civil war was transformed the country into a hub of drug trafficking, gun running and smuggling of consumer goods to Pakistan and Central Asia.³ The situation aggravated further as international actors and neighboring countries started supporting opposing sides.⁴

Taliban's emergence in 1994 was perhaps the most important development in post-Soviet Afghanistan. Initially, the Afghan people welcomed the Taliban due to prevalence of lawlessness, anarchy and excesses of warlords in the country. The Taliban vowed to disarm the warring factions, establish rule of law and peace by implementing Shariah in Afghanistan.

The rise of the Taliban presented Pakistan with an opportunity to have a friendly government in Kabul and realize the objective of a land transit route to Central Asia. Pakistan was among the few countries, including Saudi Arabia, who officially recognized Taliban's government in Afghanistan.⁵

In the context of the US-led war on terror, Central Asia once again became a region of utmost importance not just for Pakistan but for other regional and international players as well.

Economic and Political Challenges

The conditions in Pakistan have progressively worsened since 9/11 amid a flagging economy, poor law and order and political instability, which have affected Islamabad's ability to expand economic ties with Central Asia. Although the CARs have large reserves of oil, gas and enormous mineral wealth, they have been unable to tap this wealth on account of their weak economies and lack of technological prowess.

Pakistan and the Central Asian republics have signed several memoranda of understanding on economic cooperation and collaboration in various fields. An inter-governmental Joint Economic Commission has also been set up with the countries in the region to give impetus to trade, economic and scientific cooperation. But the expected economic growth has not materialized mainly because of lack of implementation of the agreements.

Pakistan and Central Asian states are members of ECO, whose main objectives include developing and improving the economic infrastructure and transportation system in the region. However, the organization has lost its effectiveness and has been eclipsed by the emerging SCO, which has in its folds two major powers, Russia and China.

Balochistan

The strategic importance of Pakistan's Balochistan province has grown since China started building a deep sea port in Gwadar.⁶ Pakistan's economic development depends on how it takes advantage of the tremendous economic and trade potential of energy-rich Central Asia. Balochistan is a vital link to expansion of economic ties and cooperation with Central Asia. But all that would depend on ensuring security and law and order in the province.

Balochistan is ideally situated to cater to the energy and trading needs of other countries in the region and make Pakistan an energy hub for Asia. The Gwadar deep sea port is expected to serve as a secure storage and transshipment hub for the Middle East and Central Asian oil and gas supplies through a well-defined corridor passing through the country.⁷ In fact, if all goes as planned, Gwadar would be the terminus of multi-billion dollar gas pipelines, be it from Daulatabad's fields in Turkmenistan, South Pars fields in Iran or from Qatar. A nationalist insurgency, the centuries-old *Sardari* system thriving in Balochistan and sentiments of lack of control over their natural resources have hampered development and progress in the province. Assassination of Baloch leader Nawab Akbar Bugti in August 2006, terrorism, and target killings on ethnic and sectarian lines have added to the turmoil in this strategically important province. The convergence of stakes of major regional powers and international gas and oil companies is bound to bring increased international focus on the situation.⁸ That might lead to the proposed Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline becoming the first thing to be scuttled, along with Pakistan's regional security. Pakistan's eastern neighbor India might still talk of seeking a stable Pakistan that is open to an acceptable settlement on Kashmir, but it would be in New Delhi's interest to see Pakistan trapped in the Balochistan quagmire.⁹

The prevailing security situation is not conducive for foreign investments in the province. Only political reconciliation can ensure the security environment needed for sustaining the ongoing development process and luring foreign investment that would help the province and eventually the country.¹⁰

Regional and International Political Dynamics

India

India lacks a direct geographical links with Afghanistan and Central Asia. It has to pass through Pakistani territory for any access to this region. By keeping close links with Afghanistan, especially post-9/11 and supporting the Karzai government, New Delhi has managed to expand its role in the war-torn country. Islamabad has also charged India of seeking to create unrest along Pakistan's western borders, especially in Balochistan, and exploiting the situation.¹¹

India's ties with Central Asia grew after 9/11 amid perceptions of a shared threat from Islamist militants. India and the CARs have been engaged in close collaboration in order to contain cross-border terrorism, extremism and drug trafficking. The Central Asian region's borders with Afghanistan have made the secular regimes in the region vulnerable to the impact of religious extremism and ethnic unrest. Indian policymakers believe that any advance by Islamist militants in Central Asia could invigorate similar elements active in Indian-administered Kashmir.

India has also proposed an energy pipeline from Russia across Central Asia and China. Another gas pipeline which is of significant interest to New Delhi seeks to connect India to Turkmenistan through Afghanistan and Pakistan, although progress in that regard depends on the nature of relations between New Delhi and Islamabad as well as the security situation in Afghanistan. The degree of strategic cooperation between India and the CARs is evident from the fact that New Delhi has established a military base at Farkhor in Tajikistan. The base has been operating since May 2002 in an area close to the border with Afghanistan. This has had serious implications for Pakistan's strategic interests in Central Asia. India also has the observer status with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.¹²

Russia

Pakistan's relations with Russia have never been very friendly, mainly on account of Islamabad's support for the Mujahideen in the Soviet-Afghan war. But after 9/11, Moscow's ties with Islamabad have improved and that has

been a factor in warming of the latter's relations with the CARs. Russia considers Central Asia its strategic backyard and is very sensitive to any factor that might impact the region. Therefore, Pakistan must be vigilant in its stance on Afghanistan.

The majority of the ruling elite in Central Asia comprises former leaders and members of the Communist Party. Russians are a major ethnic group in Central Asia and wield influence in decision-making bodies. Due to the legacy of Indian-Soviet relations, their approach towards regional policies is often pro-India. This approach poses a challenge for Pakistan regarding its position in Central Asia. Pakistan is striving to develop economic linkages that it hopes would not only create confidence that facilitates cooperation in various fields but would also ward off any irritants that undermine its relations with Russia and Central Asia.

China

Pakistan and China share many common objectives vis-à-vis Central Asia, most significant among them being trade and cooperation in the energy sector. China's technical and financial support in building the multi-billion-dollar Gwadar port aimed at channeling trade between the eastern parts of Central Asia—eastern Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan—and Pakistan through Xinjiang is progressing, although difficulties in upgrading Karakoram Highway might prove to be an obstacle. In political and security terms, however, the two countries follow independent policies towards Central Asia. Initially China viewed Pakistan's support to the Taliban with considerable unease, because it apprehended that Uyghur militants in Xinjiang might find a safe haven in Afghanistan under Taliban rule. China has backed Pakistan's support for the war on terror and its stance to abandon the Taliban regime. Beijing sees US military presence in Central Asia as a strategic threat to its security and an attempt to encircle China.

Iran

Iran and Pakistan have a history of close relations with the Central Asian region, which could be categorized as a combination of cooperation and rivalry. Both countries have been striving to build multilateral economic cooperation bilaterally and with the CARs through ECO. However, Tehran

and Islamabad have divergent views on Afghanistan. Pakistan had supported the Taliban movement, whereas Iran had backed the Northern Alliance in the Afghan civil war. After the fall of the Taliban regime and a shift in Pakistan's policy on Afghanistan the two states have come closer. Pakistan's recent discussions with Iran with a view to seek transit for Central Asian oil and gas to Pakistan are bound to improve the relations further.¹³

United States

Pakistan supported the United States in the war on terror in order to further its national interests. This support has led to considerable economic assistance for Pakistan although that has not shored up the country's economy on account of many internal factors. The US has also established military bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, causing both Russia and the China to voice their concern over a permanent US military presence in the region. As a "frontline state" in the war on terror, and a "non-NATO ally" Pakistan offered the US a land transit route to Afghanistan for military supplies. Islamabad harbors concerns that the US policy regarding the future of Afghanistan might not be in synch with Pakistan's priorities.

NATO

Active participation of the CARs in NATO's PfP program, the Northern Atlantic Cooperation Council, staging of NATO's joint military exercises in Central Asia and renewed diplomatic ties with NATO states, are all indications of the Central Asian republics' desire to forge closer ties with the West in order to eliminate possibilities of Russian military domination and ward off threats of terrorism and extremism from Central Asia.

Prospects for Pakistan

Changes in the regional dynamics after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and specifically after 9/11, have enabled Pakistan to cultivate relations with the CARs. Pakistan's policymakers now have to formulate a comprehensive policy on the Central Asian republics in order to turn constraints into opportunities. Pakistan must develop good diplomatic ties with these states as well as develop economic ties with them by facilitating them with regard to

trade and pipeline routes. This can only be done if Pakistan improves its economic, security and political conditions. Pakistan can boost ties with Central Asia by undertaking both individual and joint ventures in all economic fields. These could include establishing business and trade houses, banks, insurance groups, professional services, and development of infrastructure. Pakistan can also offer assistance by sharing with the CARs expertise in management and financial institutions. At the same time, Afghanistan should not be overlooked. Establishment of peace in Afghanistan is of utmost importance in order to maximize economic prospects for both Pakistan and the CARs.

Recommendations

- Pakistan must establish cordial relations with each Central Asian republic as each of them follow a distinct foreign policy.
- Despite facing irritants and challenges in Central Asia, Pakistan must implement all economic agreements with the Central Asian region. Pakistan must not wait for return of peace to Afghanistan before facilitating transit and pipeline routes from the CARs and develop the road and rail infrastructure.
- In order to benefit from this resource-rich region, Pakistan must look for multi-dimensional prospects for development. Cooperation and constructive engagement should be the cornerstone of Pakistan's approach towards this region.
- Pakistan must evolve a vibrant, non-aligned foreign policy, based on respect for the sovereignty of these states. Islamabad must not side with any party involved in the conflicts in Central Asia or anywhere else for that matter.
- Islamabad must use regional and international forums in order to develop trust in Pakistan and enhance economic and political cooperation. It should also establish various research centers in order to facilitate economic progress and conflict prevention.

- There should be frequent exchanges of scholars, cultural representatives, and government officials to develop better mutual understanding and people-to-people contact. Pakistan can also enhance relations by offering scholarships to Central Asian students in various fields. Exchange of research scholars, teachers and professors could be another avenue for cooperation. On return to their countries, these individuals could be goodwill ambassadors and facilitate further expansion in relations.

Notes

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- ¹ Shirin Akiner, "Regional Cooperation In Central Asia", 190-193, <http://www.nato.int/docu/colloq/2001/2001-17e.pdf>.
 - ² Imtiaz Gul, *The Unholy Nexus* (Pakistan: Vanguard Books, 2002), p. 43.
 - ³ Dr Maqbool Ahmad Bhatti, "Internal and External Dynamics: Pakistan's perspectives", in K M. Asif, (ed) *Central Asia internal and External dynamics*, (Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad, 1997).
 - ⁴ Ahmad Rashid, *Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia* (Yale University Press, 2002), p. 7.
 - ⁵ <http://reviewessays.com/print/Central-Asian-Game/20690.html>
 - ⁶ Ziad Haider, "Baluchis, Beijing, and Pakistan's Gwadar Port" *Politics and Diplomacy*, (Spring/Winter 2005), p. 99.
 - ⁷ "Pakistan's economy to remain robust: survey" <http://www.defence.pk/forums/economy-development/1049-pakistan-economy-news-updates-archive.html>
 - ⁸ Sherry Rehman, "Balochistan after Bugti", *Dawn*, Islamabad, September 9, 2006, <http://archives.dawn.com/2006/09/09/ed.htm#4>
 - ⁹ Ibid.
 - ¹⁰ Syed Fazl-e-Haider, "Energy port of the future" *The News*, Islamabad, June 26, 2006.
 - ¹¹ Dr Major Muhammad Khan, "Great Game for Gas and Oil in Central Asia and its implications," (NDC Journal 2004), p. 126.
 - ¹² Dr Moonis Ahmar, "Shangai summit and beyond", *Dawn*, June 24, 2006.
 - ¹³ Svante E. Cornell "Regional Politics in Central Asia: the Changing Roles of Iran, Turkey, Pakistan and China" in *India and Central Asia: Building Linkages in an Age of Turbulence*, (New Delhi: SAPRA Foundation, 2003) www.silkroadstudies.org/pub/030720Sapra.pdf

Analysis

Agenda of Religious-Political Organizations: A Discourse Analysis

Muhammad Amir Rana

The religious-political organizations in Pakistan have been striving to achieve their agendas since the country gained independence in 1947. Their primary focus has been on Islamization¹ of the state and religio-socialization² of society. They made early gains on the Islamization front, by managing to define the ideological discourse of the state through the Objectives Resolution of 1949. These organizations also had their say in the form of a formal constitutional acknowledgment that “divine” laws will have precedence over laws made by parliament and also managed to get *Shariah* laws adopted during the rule of military dictator Gen Ziaul Haq. Despite these significant achievements, the religious parties are still struggling for absolute Islamization of the state.

At the same time, they have been promoting a discourse of religious socialization, which dovetails with their political objectives. On that front also their achievements are significant since the trends of religio-socialization are becoming increasingly visible in society. The ultimate goal of both the religious discourses is to enforce Islam in every sphere of life by blending the following six variables: political Islamization, renewalist movements, Sufism, *Tableegh* and *Da'awa* (preaching and call to Islam), sectarianism and militarization. These variables often overlap and can be found in most major religious organizations or movements in the country.

The complexity of these discourses spawns multiple disagreements among the organizations, based on how each group perceives its role and defines their sphere. It also provokes differences leading to divisions within each group's ranks.

In 2002, as many as 239 religious organizations were operating in Pakistan, pursuing largely similar agendas.³ Many of them may appear to be divided

along sectarian lines; but are not averse to working together wherever there is a confluence of interest.

This article is an attempt to chart the commonalities and divergences among religious organizations in Pakistan, which determine the discourses of Islamization and religio-socialization. The article does not deal with the impact or influence of religious organizations. It only seeks to highlight their objectives and focuses on their internal mechanisms, which are usually ignored in such discourse analyses. The manifestos, statements of objectives and literature of various religious organizations have been perused in an effort to provide a comparative perspective on these organizations' agendas and highlight the points of divergence. The article is descriptive in its structure and seeks to expand the analytical framework on the subject.

Religious organizations in Pakistan operate in a diverse landscape. It is important to understand them in order to comprehend their discourses. In 1947, only six religious political parties were active in Pakistan:⁴ the Deobandi Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, Jamaat-e-Islami, Tehreek-e-Ahrar, Khaksar Tehreek, Jamat-e-Ahl-e-Hadith of the Salafi sect and the Shia Political Party. In 1948, Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan, representing the Barelvi school of thought, was formed.

The number of religious parties in Pakistan had reached 30 by the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.⁵ These included seven Deobandi and five Barelvi religious parties as well as four each from Shia and Ahl-e-Hadith schools of thought. Three JI groups also surfaced during the same period.⁶ After the 1980s, a sharp increase in the growth of religious parties in Pakistan was observed and the number rose to 239 in 2002. (*See Table 1*) These figures only take into account organizations on the national, regional and provincial levels. The number runs into thousands if all small, local groups are counted.⁷ Among the 239 organizations, 21 participated in electoral politics, 148 worked purely on sectarian agendas, 24 became associated with militant jihad, 12 were striving for the establishment of renewalist/*Khilafat* movement and shunned democratic dispensations, 18 pursued missionary work, mainly preaching their sectarian ideas, and 10 operated as charities.

Table 1: Religious Parties in Pakistan (2002)⁸

Sect/School of Thought	Political	Sectarian	Militant	Educational/Missionary	Total
Deobandi	4	33	5	3	45
Barelvi	6	22	13	2	43
Ahl-e-Hadith	4	10	3	3	20
Shia	3	16	3	1	23
Jl and its factions	3	-	4	7	17
Others	4	1	76	10	91
Total	24	82	104	26	239

It is important to remember, however, that it is often difficult to categorize religious parties since most of them pursue multiple agendas, either on their own or through affiliated groups. However, a closer look reveals that most of these groups orbit around the major organizations that were active in the country in the 1950s, mainly the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP) and Jamiat-e-Ahl-e-Hadith. The All Pakistan Shia Political Parties morphed into Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiq-e-Jafaria in the late 1970s. Most of the other organizations—whether working for missionary, sectarian or educational purposes or engaged in militancy—were either affiliated with or breakaway factions of these five major organizations. Most importantly, all of these groups believe in the agendas set by their parent organizations. However, the parent organization in most cases focuses on Islamization while the affiliated groups or factions work on religio-socialization. The parent parties are part of Pakistan's mainstream politics, believe in the country's constitution and participate in electoral politics and are thus classified as religious-political parties.⁹ The discourse analysis of the so-called parent organization can therefore help understand collective approaches of most of the other groups.

In the last two decades, another breed of religious organizations has surfaced in the country. These too are agents of Islamization and religio-socialization, but they believe that it is impossible to bring about a change while working within the current political system of the country. They deem democracy and democratic processes inadequate for change. Some of them consider democracy a notion opposed to Islamic and want to replace it with their own

version of *Shariah*. Such groups include Jamatud Dawaa, Khilafat movement, Hizbut Tehrir and Al-Muhajiroon, among other. Many of these groups, such as Tanzeemul Akhwan and Tanzeem-e-Islami, believe that complete *Shariah* cannot be enforced through the electoral process and consider the use of force or toppling of the government as justified alternatives. Although these organizations have sectarian and militant tendencies but their dominant approach is renewalist in nature. They want a complete change of system. This is contrary to the approach of the religious-political parties, who tend to focus on gradual change while working within the system.

A Review of the Agendas: Commonalities and Differences

The “enforcement of divine law” is the common agenda in the manifestos of all religious-political organizations. (See Table 2) Their primary objectives also include plans for economic, political, constitutional and foreign policy reforms. But their emphasis is on complete Islamization of the state and society. Many of these parties recommend reforms but remain silent on how those would be translated into policy. Many of their recommendations have tremendous commonalities and at times it would be difficult to tell one organization’s manifesto apart from that of another if the organization’s name was not mentioned in the document.

Mainstream political parties in the country also share many objectives of the religious-political parties.¹⁰ The Pakistan Muslim League promised in its manifesto that it would turn the country into “a modern ideological Islamic State”.¹¹ Tehrik-e-Insaf’s statement of objectives focused on ways of making Pakistan an ideal Islamic state.¹² The Pakistan People’s Party says “Islam is our way”. But if all political parties, excluding those who represent left-wing ideology, share the same vision, where is the point of divergence?

First, religious organizations engage in multipurpose activities, including the religio-socialization process. They believe that political parties are not capable of bringing about the desired change since they only follow political norms and are accommodative towards global, political, strategic and economic trends. On the other hand, religious parties distinguish themselves on the basis of religion and consider themselves to be saviors of Pakistan’s Islamic ideology. They are generally suspicious of the country’s political leadership, and think that it wants to turn Pakistan into a secular state.

Table 2: Objectives of Religious-Political Parties

Religious Party	Objective
Jamaat-e-Islami	Complete enforcement of divine law and making human beings follow the righteous path by creating fear of divine accountability.
Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Fazl)	The basic law of the country will be in agreement with Quran and <i>Sunnah</i> , and will transgress these sources of law through any legislative act or executive order.
Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan	Implementation of <i>Nizam-e-Mustafa</i> in Pakistan that is based on the pattern of Khilafat-e-Rashida.
Markazi Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadith	Dominance of Quran and Hadith.
Tehrik-e-Islami (Tehrik-e-Jafaria)	Divine rule on God's land.
Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA)	To legislate in the light of the recommendations by the Council of Islamic Ideology in order to make Quran and <i>Sunnah</i> the supreme law of the country and to bring every sphere of life under <i>Shariah</i> rule.

The proliferation of religious organizations usually occurs on account of different interpretations of religious ordains along sectarian lines. For instance, when the JUI says that no law could be made against Quran and *Sunnah*, it seeks to confine legislation within the Hanafi framework. The JUI claims that the state must follow the majority's faith in its legislative function.¹³ Other sects want political protection and endorsement of their respective religious ideas. Most of these religious parties believe that parliament should only identify the areas where *Shariah* legislation is required. They do not envisage a role for parliament beyond that nor are they clear on what role it will play after Islamization of constitution and legislation is accomplished.

The commonalities in the agendas of religious-political parties enable them to join hands to strive for their common goals. In 1952, in an early demonstration of joint action to pursue common objectives, religious scholars from all sects developed a consensus on an Islamic constitutional framework consisting of 22 points. The framework later provided the fundamental principles to all religious organizations in Pakistan and their manifestos centered on the same 22 points. The framework emphasized supremacy of 'divine' laws and declared

that the state must not make laws contrary to *Shariah*. Later, many of the clauses from the same framework were included in the Constitution of 1973. The second major consensus among religious-political parties emerged in 1976, when all of them joined hands to form an alliance with the opposition parties in order to topple the government of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and enforce Nizam-e-Mustafa in the country. The movement resulted in martial law in the country and paved the way for Gen Ziaul Haq's Islamization drive. The third major union occurred in 2000 when religious-political parties formed an electoral alliance, called the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA). In 2002, the MMA won 65 seats in the National Assembly, formed its government in the North West Frontier Province (now renamed as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and was part of the ruling coalition in Balochistan.

Religious-political parties set aside their sectarian differences on all of these occasions but their partnership never survived for long. The alliances were short-lived not because of any sectarian difference or disagreements over agenda, but on account of power struggles and varying political strategies of the groups forming the alliance.

There are two major divergences among religious-political organizations: on the ideological and tactical levels.

Ideological Level: The ideological framework of religious organizations not only has a bearing on their worldview, it also defines the boundaries of their political activism. For instance, the JI is connected with the Muslim Brotherhood movements across the world and represents the global Islamist agenda in Pakistan. Sohail Mehmud argues that that is the reason why most JI members are more interested in matters affecting Muslims in other countries than in the affairs of their local communities.¹⁴ This approach has also created greater space for orthodox religious-political organizations, like the JUI and JUP. Results of recent elections in Pakistan demonstrate that.

Similarly, the Movement of Jamat-e-Ahl-e-Hadith (MJAH), Markazi Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadith and Tehreek-e-Jafaria Pakistan (TJP) seek their inspiration from Saudi Arabia and Iran; former two from Saudi Arabia and the latter from Iran. Nevertheless, foreign engagements of Pakistan's religious organizations make little difference to their Islamization discourse in the country and they mainly depend on three major religious organizations cited above. However, their role in religio-socialization is quite important in their sectarian domains.

Tactical Level: This refers to the religious parties' potential to maneuver and to mobilize their support base to gain maximum benefits and defines their political discourse. In the last two decades, the orthodox religious-political organizations, especially the JUI, have gained more from the electoral process and influenced the masses than the JI has. Joshua T White notes that the Deobandi JUI-F has generally taken a less direct approach than the JI in its pursuit of Islamization.¹⁵

The JUI, JUP and MJAHA are conservatives in this regard and focus on local issues. This despite the fact that the JUI had links with the Taliban in Afghanistan and groups affiliated with it engaged in Indian-administered Kashmir. On the national level, these organizations share common agendas, but their distinct worldviews make a huge difference to their approach. After 9/11, for instance, the JI mainly focused on global issues to express solidarity with the Muslim *Ummah*. The party continued to protest against the US even as Pakistan was passing through severe political and economic crises. More importantly, the JI mobilized its supporters among the urban middle class since they were more attracted to such causes, although their strength has rarely helped the party on the national level. This creates the space for the conservative religious parties, which are more connected with the people at the grassroots level through their mosque-madrassa networks. This observation is also substantiated by election results.

Conclusion

Despite the divergences among the stances of religious-political parties, the commonalities play an important role in shaping the religious-political discourse in the country. All religious parties are part of a single discourse and, on the political level, share common objectives. Their discourse encourages Islamization and religiosity in society. However, further inquiries are needed for in-depth exploration of the issue, especially to understand the internal dynamics of various political, militant, sectarian, renewalist, reformist and missionary religious organizations. The impact of their religious discourse on the state-society relations is another dimension which needs to be explored. It is also important to determine how their fundamental objectives are in conflict with the state's own goals and how their increasing sway over the masses has come to impact the state-society relations in Pakistan.

Notes

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- ¹ The term "Islamization" is borrowed from Olivier Roy, who refers to it as political mobilization.
 - ² The term denotes a process of education through which one can learn to see the world as a world of religious significance.
 - ³ Muhammad Amir Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan* (Lahore: Mashal Publications, 2002).
 - ⁴ Ibid.
 - ⁵ Ibid.
 - ⁶ Ibid .
 - ⁷ There is a trend in Pakistan that almost every big mosque or madrassa has its own religious organization. These organizations are mainly set up to gain influence in the area, collect donations and organize religious congregations. These organizations often formally or informally merge in or support the mainstream parties – in line with their schools of thought – on the regional or national level.
 - ⁸ Muhammad Amir Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan*.
 - ⁹ Joshua White, a US scholar, described these parties as 'democratic Islamist', which is a vague term considering the different narratives and understanding of democracy among religious parties. The adjective 'political' fulfills the purpose to distinguish them from other religious parties.
 - ¹⁰ See manifestos of all political and religious parties in Prof. Muhammad Usman and Masood Ash'ar, *Pakistan ki Siyassi Jamatein* (Urdu) (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1986) which compiles the manifestos of all political and religious parties.
 - ¹¹ Prof. Muhammad Usman and Masood Ash'ar, *Pakistan ki Siyassi Jamatein* (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1986), p. 55.
 - ¹² Ibid, p. 711.
 - ¹³ Ibid, p. 418.
 - ¹⁴ Sohail Mehmud, *Islamic Fundamentalism in Pakistan, Egypt and Iran* (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1995).
 - ¹⁵ Joshua T. White, *Pakistan's Islamist Frontier* (Center on Faith & International Affairs, 2008).

Report

Understanding North Punjab in the Context of Pakistani Diaspora in Britain

Pak Institute for Peace Studies

1. Introduction and Background¹

A census report by the Institute for Public Policy Research in London counted that 7.53 percent of Britain's population in 2001 was born overseas.² Among the top non-UK birthplaces of Britain's population, Pakistan was ranked third after Republic of Ireland and India.³ British Pakistanis mainly hail from three parts of Pakistan and Azad Kashmir: Mirpur, which has produced more than 42 percent of their over one million population in Britain,⁴ and North and Central Punjab. Many British Pakistanis also belong to Peshawar, Karachi and interior Sindh.

The large-scale immigration leads to various socio-cultural, religious-political and economic transformations in both the immigrants' native areas and the host society. To understand their behaviors and interaction with the host societies, it is important to map some prevalent socio-cultural and ideological tendencies in their areas of origin, particularly the families they belong to. This exercise becomes even more pertinent where the immigrants have maintained strong links with their native towns and also feel reluctant to be fully assimilated into their host societies for one reason or another.

The primary goal of this study is to measure the key religious, ideological and political trends among Pakistani immigrants hailing from North Punjab, and some adjacent parts of Central Punjab. The research study was conducted in different parts of Rawalpindi, Jhelum, Chakwal, Gujranwala, Gujrat and Mandi Bahauddin districts of Punjab. Although the title of the report only mentions North Punjab, the scope of the study also includes Gujrat, Gujranwala and Mandi Bahauddin districts, which are not part of North Punjab but have been included in the study because a large number of British Pakistanis hail from there, particularly from those parts of Gujrat and Mandi Bahauddin districts which are close to North Punjab's Jhelum district. The

same belt extends to Gujranwala as well, with the number of British Pakistanis decreasing from North to Central Punjab.

Methodology

The study is largely a product of extensive research spanning four months of in-depth field interviews and close-ended surveys. In order to pursue the study in a systematic manner, a mixed method approach was employed. All four qualitative data collection methods—including open-ended interviews, structured surveys, observations during field work and analysis of official texts and documents—have been utilized. The research process commenced with a review of the available literature, PIPS news archives and online sources on the subject. Having reviewed the available literature in the form of books, newspapers, journal articles and online sources, a structured survey form and a questionnaire for open-ended interviews were drafted.

Survey Description

PIPS researchers, who have been involved in similar studies in the past, held extensive discussions to formulate the survey form and the questionnaire. The survey focused on the following key areas: personal information (respondents' age, marital status, education, address in Pakistan and Britain and media interests, etc.); views on religion and ideology (importance of religion in personal life, favorite religious scholar, views on Sufism, madrassas, suicide attacks, etc.); political views (favorite political party, participation in British and Pakistani politics, worldview and opinion on the war on terror, etc.); and views on cultural and economic issues, etc.

- **A Profile of North Punjab**

The region under study stretches from the Potohar Plateau to the plains of Gujranwala. Administratively, the Potohar Plateau is classified as North Punjab, which comprises four districts in an arid zone of the province, namely, Rawalpindi, Chakwal, Jhelum and Attock. Commonly called the Potohar Plateau, North Punjab lies to the south of northern mountains and is flanked in the west by River Indus and in the east by River Jhelum.

The history of North Punjab dates back to the Hindu mythological period of the Mahabharata. The epic represents the Salt Range as the refuge of the five Pandava brothers during the period of their exile.⁵ Similarly, the mention of Katas Raj temple, located in the Salt Range 18 miles south of Chakwal city, is found in the Mahabharata written in 300 BC.

Modern historians have designated Jhelum district of North Punjab as the site of the famous battle between Alexander the Great and Hindu king Poras.⁶ After this battle, we have little information with regard to the condition of the district until the Muslim conquests brought back literature and history to Upper India. The Janjuas and Jats, who now inhabit the Salt Range and its northern plateau, respectively, appear to have been among the earliest inhabitants.⁷

The Ghakkars seem to represent an early wave of conquest from the east, and they still inhabit the whole eastern slope of the district; while the Awans, who now cluster in the western plain, are apparently later invaders from the opposite quarter. The Ghakkars were the dominant race at the time of the first Mughal conquests, and long continued to retain their independence.⁸

During the flourishing period of the Mughal dynasty, the Ghakkar chieftains were prosperous and loyal vassals of the house of Babar; but after the collapse of the Delhi Empire Jhelum fell, like its neighbors, under the sway of the Sikhs. In 1765, Gujjar Singh defeated the last independent Ghakkar prince, and subjugated the wild mountaineers. His son inherited the territory and ruled it until 1810, when he was defeated by Ranjit Singh's army. In 1849, the district passed, with the rest of the Sikh territories, into the hands of the British.⁹

The British, after annexation of Punjab from Sikhs, established administration at the district level. During the British era in the Subcontinent, North Punjab was a religiously diverse area where Sikh, Hindu and Muslim had lived in peace for centuries.


Social Structure

With the exception of Rawalpindi, the districts of North Punjab have the largest rural populations in Pakistan.¹⁰ Hence tribes and castes become very strong in the local context. The population mostly consists of the following tribes, clans


and castes: Awans, Janjuas, Gujjar, Jats, Bhuttas, Mair Minhas Rajputs, Kahuts, Mughal Kassars, Janjua Rajputs, Gujjars, Gondals, Syeds, Arains and Sheikhs.

Education

Decades of sending their sons to European countries in search of better jobs and serving as recruitment ground for the armed forces of Pakistan has led to a boost in the literacy rate of North Punjab. In fact, North Punjab is regarded as the most literate region of Pakistan. Rawalpindi, Chakwal and Jhelum districts are among five districts of Punjab with the highest literacy rate.¹¹ Charts 2 and 3 provide a comparison of literacy rates between North Punjab (the area that produced the largest number of immigrants to the UK and European countries) and South Punjab (the area that produced the largest number of economic immigrants to the Persian Gulf states).



(Source: A report prepared by Punjab Education Department in 2003)



(Source: A report prepared by Punjab Education Department in 2003)

Political Landscape


The four North Punjab districts: Rawalpindi, Attock, Jhelum and Chakwal, with a total population of 6.66 million, comprise 14 National Assembly constituencies and had remained the traditional stronghold of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) from 1988 to 1997. Since the split of the Nawaz Sharif-led PML and the formation of the PML-Quaid-e-Azam (PML-Q) in 2002, the electoral contests in these districts largely remain between the Nawaz-led PML-N, the PML-Q and Pakistan People's Party-Parliamentarians (PPPP). Following is a breakdown of the winning political parties on the 14 seats in the National Assembly from North Punjab in the 2008 elections.¹²

Political party	No of seats
Pakistan Muslim League-N	11
Pakistan People's Party	2
Pakistan Muslim League-Q	1

The PML-N is also the largest political party in Gujranwala, Mandi Bahauddin and Gujrat districts in terms of representation in the National Assembly. The following table depicts the breakdown of the winning political parties on the 11 National Assembly seats from these districts in the 2008 elections.¹³

Political party	No of seats
Pakistan Muslim League-N	5
Pakistan People's Party	4
Pakistan Muslim League-Q	1
Independent	1

Based on this performance in the elections, party representation in the National Assembly from the area of this study is given in Chart 4.



Not surprisingly, religious-political parties such as Jamaat-e-Islami, Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam and Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan have never been able to claim more than 1,000 votes in the entire electoral history of North Punjab. However, in Gujranwala district of Central Punjab, Qazi Hameedullah Khan of Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), an umbrella organization of religious political parties formed in 2002, was able to win from the National Assembly constituency NA-96 in the 2002 elections. But that was the time when for the first time in the history of Pakistan, the MMA and other religious outfits were able to gain political strength due to increasing anti-American sentiments following the Afghan and Iraq wars. However, in the 2008 election Qazi Hameedullah lost, securing only 2,600 votes.¹⁴ In the rest of the Central Punjab districts under discussion, religious parties have always been marginalized on account of popularity of mainstream political forces.

Religious Landscape

Sunni-Barelvis presumably form the largest part of the population of North Punjab followed by Deobandis and Shias. Gujrat, Mandi Bahauddin and Gujranwala maintain a similar pattern of sectarian distribution of the general population. Since there is no official record maintained on the sectarian affiliations of the population, the sectarian classification of North Punjab is

based on the observations of local field researchers and the community leaders engaged and interviewed for the study. The number of mosques and religious seminaries endorsing particular sects are also helpful in understanding the sectarian distribution of the region's population. For instance, investigations revealed that there were 2,827 mosques in Chakwal district, of which 2,056 belonged to Sunni-Barelvis, 507 to Deobandis, 162 to Shias, while 28 mosques were affiliated with the Ahl-e-Hadith sect.¹⁵ The number of mosques subscribing to the Barelvi sect indicated the dominance of this particular sect in terms of numbers in the Chakwal district.

Like any other part of Pakistan, the Sufi tradition is very strong in North Punjab and in the three districts of Central Punjab where this study focused. Prominent spiritual personalities with significant following include Pir Mehr Ali Shah, Barri Imam, Shah Abdul Lateef, Sayyed Muhammad Shah, Hafiz Abdullah Dood Shah, Bawa ji Ghulam, Bawa Afzal, Hazrat Shah Safeer, Shah Chan Charagh, Bikhari Shareef, Bhengali Shareef, Tahli Shahaan, Eidgah Shareef, Mian Muhammad Bakhsh, Shah Daula Wali, Kanwan Wali Sarkar, Hujra Shah Mukeem, Hazrat Abdul Razzaq, Qamar Shah Bukhari, Pir Muzzamil Hussain, Hazrat Hafiz Hayyat, Hazrat Baba Ji Shahsawar and Hazrat Syed Kabeeruddin Shah Wali Daryae.

Economic Landscape

Apart from agriculture, the local economy is largely dependent on three major sources; a significant number of locals settled in Britain and other European countries; a large number of local men enlisted in the armed forces of Pakistan; and local industries that provide employment opportunities to tens of thousands of people in the region. In Gujranwala, Gujrat and Mandi Bahauddin agriculture also provides livelihood to a large number of people.

Large-scale migration of natives of the area to other countries has brought high levels of economical stability, good educational opportunities and better healthcare facilities to the region. This economic boost has attracted a huge numbers of people from impoverished parts of Pakistan, especially from Punjab, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

Communication Avenues

The area under study maintains a vibrant presence in the cyber world. Various web portals present considerable information about different districts under study. Similarly, the print media is also very robust here. In addition to widespread circulation of national newspapers, a number of local newspapers are also published from each district. The total number of local newspapers and magazines published from Rawalpindi, Chakwal, Jhelum, Gujranwala, Gujrat and Mandi Bahauddin exceeds 60.

2. Salient Geographical and Demographic Features

2.1. Composition and Geographical Distribution of Immigrants in Britain

There are around two million Muslim immigrants in Britain, the Pakistani-origin community forming the largest part of that.¹⁶ After Mirpur district in Azad Jammu and Kashmir,¹⁷ the origin of a significant number of British-Pakistanis settled in Britain is spread over the rural and urban areas of the six districts of north and central Punjab which are the focus of this study.

Pakistani immigrants from these areas, as from other parts of Pakistan, and from Mirpur in Azad Kashmir, started to arrive in Britain in the 1950s.¹⁸ The prime pull factor was the sheer demand for workforce in Britain at the time, which prompted the country to attract people mostly from the newly independent Commonwealth countries. Even before the 1950s major shift of Pakistani workers, individuals from the Indian Subcontinent working in ships had settled in Britain in the early 1920s.

A larger number of Pakistanis arrived in Britain in the 1960s.¹⁹ Those who followed them preferred to lodge with other Pakistanis, preferably relatives or friends, to get community support in the new country. By the 1970s, many Pakistanis working in Britain had started thinking that it would be difficult to return home due to a number of factors including better living standards in Britain, the need to maintain their new businesses and works, their children being enrolled in British schools and the political instability in Pakistan.²⁰

The field survey designed to seek responses of British Pakistanis and their relatives from the areas under study asked about the former's length of stay

in Britain. Around 65 percent of the respondents said that the period of stay of their family members or relatives was 20 years or less; while relatives of the remaining 35 percent said that the length of stay in Britain was 21 years or more. (See Table 1)

Table 1: British Pakistanis' Length of Stay in Britain

Duration of Stay	Frequency of Responses
Less than 10 years	29
Between 10 and 20 years	72
21 years and above	50
No reply	3
Total	154

Now when the second and third generations of British Pakistanis have come of age, the basic features of their population and settlements have changed considerably. The composition of their main native towns in the six selected districts of Punjab and their corresponding places of settlement in Britain, as discerned from the field survey and interviews with a range of sources, are given in Table 2.

Table 2: Geographical Correspondence between Immigrants' Native and Host Towns

Native Towns in Six Pakistani Districts	Host Cities in Britain
1. Rawalpindi	
Islampura Jabbar, Gujjar Khan	Bradford, Dewsbury, Birmingham, Manchester
Bhata, Thathi 10, Gujjar Khan	Birmingham, Nottingham, Bradford
Babul village, Gujjar Khan	Bradford
Rattala village, Gujjar Khan	Manchester
Gujjar Khan City	Birmingham, Manchester, Bartley
Dhok Sayyedana, Rawalpindi	Waltham St.
Bewal, Gujjar Khan	London, Bartley

Namble Danna, Murree	Bradford
Abbasiyan, Murree	Bradford, Birmingham
Rawat, Kallar Sayyeddan	Birmingham, Bradford, Blackburn
2. Jhelum	
Jhelum City	Manchester, London, East London, Birmingham, Bradford, Leeds, Oxford
Kermala village, Akwanabad, Sanghoi, Bhaga Sayyeddan,	Manchester, Birmingham, Bradford, London
Dhok Ambh, Pindorin	Bradford
Pehl Bannay Khan, Pehl Mirza Khan, Sohawa	Bradford, Birmingham
Mangla, Dhok Chamala, Deena	Manchester, Birmingham, Nottingham
3. Gujrat	
Lalamusa	Birmingham, London, Yorkshire
Sara-e-Alamgir	Bradford, London, Glasgow, Manchester
Kharian	Manchester, Bradford, London, Birmingham
Gujrat City	Manchester, Bartley, Bradford, London
Chak Kalu, Kotla Arab Ali Khan	London, Birmingham, Bradford
4. Chakwal	
Chakwal City	London, Dewsbury, Birmingham, Sheffield, Nottingham, Manchester
Multan Khund, Tala Gang	Birmingham, Bradford, Manchester
Bahula, Urwal, Chua Sayyeddan, Chakor, Chakral, Dhudiyal	Nottingham, Manchester, London, Bradford, Birmingham
5. Mandi Bahauddin Wassuwal, Malikwal, Bohat, Thathi Murid, Phalia, Mong, Chak Jannu Kallan, Chak 33 Khasa, Chak Basaway, Aidal, Miana Gondal	London, Manchester, Sheffield, Birmingham, Bradford, Dewsbury, Nottingham, Liverpool
6. Gujranwala Sodhra, Wazirabad	Bradford, London, Manchester, Nottingham, Middlebrow, Leeds, Nottingham

2.2. Clan and *Biradri* Relations among Divided Families

The British Pakistanis have maintained a strong link with their native towns. The interviews conducted for this study with the local people from across North Punjab and parts of Central Punjab suggested that joint family system and clan or caste-based relations were very strong in these areas, and also among families divided between Pakistan and Britain. These relations work as a permanent centripetal force attracting the immigrants to their origin, particularly the first and second generations of immigrants. On the other hand, the clan and *biradri* links have not only led to the emergence of a cohesive community of immigrants in Britain but has also 'discouraged' their interaction and assimilation into the host society.²¹ This has strengthened in a way the development of parallel communities of Pakistani immigrants in the host society.

The immigrant families also prefer to invite to Britain and sponsor the people on the basis of *biradri* and blood relations.²² The tradition of intra-family and intra-*biradri* marriages further supports such relations. In some cases, however, a sort of competition also exists between immigrants belonging to the same clan and *biradri* to get better economic and social status in the native and host societies. They strive to be prominent figures of their *biradri*, in a way to represent it at various social and political platforms.²³ Their financial position thus becomes the key to achieve this purpose.

Besides constant financial support for and marriages within their families and relatives, the strong *biradri* and clan relations are also manifested by the frequency of immigrants' visits to their native towns. As many as 96 of family members and relatives of the immigrants revealed that they visited their native towns at least once a year. (See Table 3)

Table 3: Frequency of Visits to Native Towns in Pakistan

Frequency of Visits	Responses
Once a year	96
Twice a year	5
Very rare/after one to three years	53
Total respondents	154

- ***Links of British Pakistanis with Immigrant Community of Mirpur***

Around 62 percent respondents of the survey said their family members and relatives settled in Britain had good relations with immigrants from Mirpur district of Azad Kashmir; the remaining either did not know about the nature of relations (26 percent), or said their family members had no links with the immigrant community from Mirpur (12 percent). Most of the respondents from the last category belonged to Gujranwala and Mandi Bahauddin districts. The interviews with the local sources also strengthened the perception that immigrants from these two districts had least links with the immigrant community from Mirpur. However, the reason for that was not sufficiently elaborated by any of them. Some speculated that Gujranwala and Mandi Bahauddin were much farther from Mirpur, being located in Central Punjab and had a different way of life as well. Interaction of the two districts with the Mirpur community in Pakistan is also not frequent or well established.

Those who stated that their relatives had good relations with the Mirpur immigrant community in Britain described a shared native nationality, i.e., Pakistani, as the reason. Some immigrant families from Jhelum also marry into and have family relations with the Mirpuri community. However, the shared towns, regions, and clan/*biradri* were found to be equally, or even more, important in development of links between British nationals with a Pakistan or Kashmiri origin.

2.3. Immigration Trends: Ethnographical and Geographical

People from all social strata, based on economic background, education, professions and age, etc., and administrative domains (rural and urban) represent North Punjab's immigrant community in Britain. The number of immigrants from rural and urban parts of Jhelum and Rawalpindi, or the Potohari belt close to Mirpur, is higher than that from other parts. Parts of Gujrat close to Jhelum, such as Sara-e-Alamgir, Kharian and even Lalamusa, have a significant number of immigrants settled in Britain. After that, Chakwal, Mandi Bahauddin and Gujranwala represent the descending order with regard to the number of immigrants from these areas.

The number of immigrants from rural areas is higher, who mostly have an agricultural background.²⁴ Gujranwala, Mandi Bahauddin and parts of Gujrat

are typical agricultural areas where land ownership patterns are different from Jhelum, Rawalpindi and Chakwal districts. In case of the former there are small farmers with just a few acres of agricultural holding as well as feudal land owners and Chaudhrys, who have hundreds of acres of land. Urban parts of Gujranwala and Gujrat are rich in industry but the field observations suggested this sector does not provide much employment opportunities any more due to the protracted economic crisis and electricity shortages in Pakistan.

On the other hand, Jhelum, Chakwal, Rawalpindi and parts of Gujrat closer to the Potohari belt have remained military recruitment areas. Economic activities in the form of industry are limited. People own little agricultural land, which is arid and hardly suffices to meet their living expenses. Based on perceptions of the local sources interviewed for this study and survey respondents, it can be assessed that about 10 to 15 percent people from these areas are living abroad, including in Britain.²⁵

People from these areas sell their assets such as agricultural lands, property and jewelry, to go abroad. Some often borrow money to fund their trip abroad. Those who want to go to European countries have to manage much higher finances – ranging from US\$ 5,000 to US\$ 15,000 depending upon their choice of the country and means (legal or illegal) – as compared to those desiring to go to Middle Eastern countries. However, as discerned from field interviews, the possibility of going to Britain illegally is minimal, and that also through other European countries.

Presently, the family members of British Pakistanis and the students who get admission to British educational institutions constitute a large portion of long-stay immigrants to Britain from North Punjab and other areas. Qualified and highly skilled professionals also adopt the legal course. The less affluent and the uneducated nonetheless rely on illegal agents to land in European countries, particularly in Greece, Spain, Italy, France and Germany, but only a few succeed in reaching there. However, most of the people belonging to this category find it easier to go to the Middle East.

In a visible trend, however, most of the youths, educated or uneducated, aspire to go abroad, mainly to European countries. But the actual ratio of Pakistanis going to Europe or the United States is now far less than that of the

people going to Middle Eastern and other countries. Two main factors for this are the very strict visa policies and the scale of money needed to go to the former countries.²⁶ Some relatives of British Pakistanis said that after the war on terror and the global economic downturn, the trend to immigrate to Britain has declined. Some local journalists, who were interviewed for this study, also subscribed to that opinion. The representative of Dawn Group of Publications in Mandi Bahauddin argued that previously they found many reports and news about travel agents illegally sending people abroad but nowadays such reports were rare.²⁷ However, a Deputy Superintendent of Police in Mandi Bahauddin said that more people were trying to go abroad as he received around 10 applications every day, requesting issuance of character certificates which are required to be submitted along with visa applications. He considered that the number of visa applicants was higher compared to the past. At the same time, he believed that only a few of the applicants would have been able to get visa.²⁸

Human traffickers and agents facilitating illegal travel abroad are mainly based in Gujrat, Rawalpindi and Mandi Bahauddin districts. The majority of the people going abroad illegally, particularly to European countries, belong to Gujrat, Gujranwala and Mandi Bahauddin. That means that the thrust of the people immigrating to Britain is on legal means—including student and family members of British Pakistanis—and is more visible in the districts of Jhelum, Chakwal and Rawalpindi. If they need some consultancy regarding the visa process they prefer to go to Rawalpindi and Islamabad for that purpose.²⁹ The second and third generations of Pakistani immigrants in Britain from Mirpur and Jhelum are being brought up there. They follow the legal procedure to invite their relatives or friends to Britain.³⁰ Educated people and government officials apply for different scholarships to go to Britain.

It was also found during field research conducted for this study that some consultants/agents befool the people in the name of study visas. In Mandi Bahauddin, for example, there are some student visa consultancy firms which tell the people they can get admission to colleges and universities in Britain and other European countries even if they have middle class education; one grade less than matriculation or GCSE.³¹ According to a representative of travel agents in Jhelum, there is a misconception among people about travel agents and human traffickers. A travel agent has to provide guarantees of millions of rupees to the government and the International Air Transport


Association (IATA) to get licenses. He said it was highly unlikely he would put his business on stake by getting involved in illegal practices.³² Human traffickers retain a chain of agents in different countries and move the people illegally from country to country through sea or land routes.³³

The federal government's Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment also sends Pakistanis to different countries such as Malaysia, Korea and Taiwan, etc. The main destinations for business visits are mainly China and Taiwan, etc.³⁴ Some people suspect that officials of Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) also play a role in illegal immigrations by providing protection and cover to human traffickers/agents.³⁵

The trends of going abroad legally and illegally also often depend largely on the legal and social status of immigrants inviting or encouraging their relatives or friends to emigrate.


- **Key Pull and Push Factors**

Out of the 154 respondents of the survey, including British Pakistanis and their family members, 83 (54 percent) said better economic opportunities including work, job and business in Britain had attracted their relatives. As many as 19 percent said their relatives had emigrated to get better education. While 14 and 13 percent respondents identified marriages and family visits, respectively, as the major pull factors. (See charts 5 and 6)



Interviews with a range of people from the native towns of British Pakistanis however revealed that whatever the purpose of their visits, the immigrants have some fundamental economic objectives in their minds. Wealth is considered an indicator of social status, power and 'wisdom' in Pakistan. The majority of British Pakistanis' families back in their native areas have wealth which encourages others to follow their example and go abroad.³⁶

On the other hand, poor socio-economic conditions in Pakistan and lack of economic opportunities were described as some of the major factors pushing people to leave Pakistan. Many family members of British Pakistanis described the economic opportunities and wages in Pakistan and Britain in a comparative context; they lamented the poverty, unemployment and lower wages in Pakistan. A sizeable majority, 81 percent, said their family members had left Pakistan due to poverty and unemployment. A civil society representative in Rawalpindi argued that if issues of inflation and low wages were addressed, the number of Pakistanis going abroad would dwindle significantly.³⁷ Some others described absence of industry, particularly in Chakwal and Jhelum areas, and protracted industrial crisis in Gujranwala and Gujarat as the major push factors.




According to a representative of the business community in Gujrat district, youngsters do not see a promising future for themselves in Pakistan and want to go abroad at all costs.³⁸ They perceive Europe, including Britain, as a land where their dreams could come true. The role of the media and the Internet, among others, is very critical in creating such perceptions.³⁹

Land disputes and local rivalries also play a role in forcing people to migrate from some parts of north and central Punjab.⁴⁰ In many cases in Mandi Bahauddin and Gujrat, old enmities, clashes and cases of legal prosecution forced the influential families and farmers, particularly from the Jat *biradri*, to send their youths abroad.⁴¹ Many others do so to compete with their rivals in the area because they think going abroad opens for them doors to affluence, which they need in order to have influence and power, and for legal wrangling in courts.⁴² Even those who do not have rivalries or enmity with anyone join the race to send their family members, mostly youths, abroad.⁴³ In some cases, this competition also arises out of jealousy.⁴⁴

3. Socio-cultural Features


3.1. Native Towns: A Review of Local Perceptions of Immigrants

The field survey included some questions which were meant to explore the prevalent trends in the social and cultural lives of British Pakistanis and their families. As many as 81, or 53 percent, of the survey respondents said they celebrated *Urs*, cultural and religious festivals held in remembrance of one *Sufi* saint or another. This demonstrates that the Sufi tradition of Islam is well entrenched in these regions of Punjab and also among families of British Pakistanis. Meanwhile, responding to another question, as many as 136 respondents said they listened to music; only 18 percent said they did not. With regard to getting information, news and entertainment, most of them relied on TV; compared to 56 percent newspaper readers. As many as 97 percent said they watched television. (See Chart 8)




Among the 150 respondents who said they watched television, 72 percent did not confine themselves to watching a particular TV channel or type of channels, such as news and entertainment; they watched more than one channels. As many as 11 percent of the respondents said their favorites were entertainment channels, 15 percent liked Geo News, one of the main TV news channel in the country, while only 2 percent favored the state-run Pakistan Television (PTV). (See Chart 8-A)

Chart 8-A: Favorite TV Channels of Respondents




Out of the 86 respondents who said they read newspapers, 36 percent liked Urdu daily *Jang* and 17 percent Urdu daily *Nawa-e-Waqt*, while only 1 percent, one respondent indeed, liked Time magazine. (See Chart 8-B)

Chart 8-B: Favorite Newspapers of Respondents



Some other survey questions sought opinions of the respondents about how the British Pakistanis impact the culture and society of their native towns, and how did the government and society treat them when they return for brief visits or permanently. As many as 71 percent of the respondents said that the local culture of their native towns was not influenced or threatened by the visits and stay of British Pakistanis, whereas 29 percent asserted British Pakistanis posed some threats. Less than half of the respondents, 48 percent to be precise, were of the view that British Pakistanis were treated well in Pakistan at the state and society level; 52 percent said the government and society did not treat them well. (See Chart 9)



Nonetheless, British Pakistanis were viewed by the local people interviewed for this study as impacting the culture of their native towns both positively and negatively. Some others argued that they had no such impact. However, one thing that almost all the respondents agreed to was that British Pakistanis had a special place in their family, and among their relatives and community in their native areas. Secondly, most of the people saw culture through religious shades.

Maulana Muhammad Hanif, a cleric in Gujranwala, argued that immigrants spread secular, or non-religious, culture, in their native areas in Pakistan when they return from the UK and other European countries.⁴⁵ Contrary to this, according to Maulana Rafique Salafi, the expatriates from the Middle

Eastern countries such as Saudi Arabia have a very positive impact on the local culture and society.⁴⁶

Those who think British Pakistanis have a negative impact on their native societies criticize British Pakistanis male youths for having different styles of beard, hair, and wearing earrings, bracelets and dress, etc. They consider all those things to be symbols of a luxurious and apathetic way of life in a society where most of the children and youths feel depressed and unhappy.⁴⁷ Some of them think British Pakistanis are arrogant and consider themselves superior to others; that by criticizing each and everything in their native areas in Pakistan they give the impression that they have come to a dirty place.⁴⁸ Many of the proponents of this view say British Pakistanis try to introduce 'British culture' – which, according to them, is not acceptable in Pakistan on religious, traditional social grounds in their native towns.⁴⁹ "The other children and youths try to copy them and this creates economic, religious and cultural problems."⁵⁰

Those who consider British Pakistanis have a positive impact on their native towns' cultural and social life argue that they have a better mindset and approach towards life.⁵¹ Proponents of this view believe that there is a lot to learn from Britain and when immigrants come back to their native towns they try to live a better life. "We feel the impact of their positive behaviors on our social life."⁵² They are civilized, respect rules and laws, and try to pay taxes.⁵³ They create awareness about the need for education and social services.⁵⁴ Some other local people however argue that sometimes they are disillusioned when the reality of the local environment does match their ideals.⁵⁵ British Pakistanis think there should not be deception, lies, and corruption. Instead they aspire for peace, justice, harmony, discipline, etc. But they are helpless to a great extent.⁵⁶ Indeed they, particularly those who come back to settle in Pakistan permanently, want to replicate what they had done or seen in Britain.⁵⁷

A third category of the people interviewed for the study says British Pakistanis have no significant impact on socio-cultural realities of their native towns. They have their own arguments. First, that British Pakistanis come back for a few days or weeks. Those who stay longer or permanently find it easier to live like the locals do.⁵⁸ Secondly, the impact is subjective and varies from person to person. It depends on education, training and family background of British Pakistanis.⁵⁹ Also the impact cannot be analyzed as

being positive or negative in absolute terms. This is how cultures get mixed and new cultures evolve. The print and electronic media and the Internet also play an important role in this regard.⁶⁰ Around three decades ago, the cultural impact of immigrants was much more significant. According to Shahid Khan, a leader of the PML-N in Rawalpindi, people in urban areas of Pakistan, such as Rawalpindi and Islamabad, are well aware of the emerging social and cultural trends in different countries. Immigrants do not have to tell or show them anything new.⁶¹

3.2. Socio-cultural Conflicts in Host Society

- *Cultural Alienation and Identity Crisis*

As discussed earlier in the report, most of British Pakistanis who emigrated to Britain from North Punjab and parts of Central Punjab belonged to rural areas or small urban centers. Their traditional ways of life did not even match those in the big cities or urban areas of Pakistan. According to many of the people interviewed for this study, the first generation of immigrants arriving in Britain would have felt that they were in entirely new and advanced socio-cultural settings. They and their succeeding generations have been struggling since then to adjust in their host society without breaking ties with their tradition and their native lands' socio-cultural and religious norms and values. Besides the structural factors, it was discerned from discussions with family members and relatives of British Pakistanis that the issues of British Pakistanis' cultural alienation and identity construction have remained subject to some instantaneous triggers over time as well, particularly the incidents of 9/11 and 7/7, the war on terror, so-called 'Islamophobia' and role of the media in these respects.

The second and third generations of British Pakistanis are in particular struggling to resolve their identity conflict, which mainly emanates from distinct socio-cultural realities of their ancestral/native and host societies. They are also confused on how to counter 'negative perceptions' of themselves, particularly with regard to Islam, extremism and terrorism. According to a recent opinion poll commissioned by Exploring Islam Foundation, Muslim youths believe that the whole 'identity crisis business' – the view that confusion among new generation of Muslim immigrants about their cultural identity tends to push them towards extremism – has been

exaggerated to fit a stereotype image of Muslims.⁶² The role of political classes and the media are hence very significant in determining the level of success of multicultural and assimilation policies.

Khaleda Khan, mother of two British Pakistanis living in London, says that living in Britain as a Muslim and Pakistani is not an easy task these days. "My son feels unsafe when he goes to mosque."⁶³ She did not, however, describe the reason for this 'insecurity', but the person who interviewed her for this study believes that she was referring to strict monitoring and surveillance of British Muslims by the UK government.


As religious values are placed above the social, cultural, ethnic and other traits by most British Pakistanis, the role of clerics and Muslim schools cannot be ignored in encouraging children and teenagers to isolate themselves from the social mainstream. According to Dr Denis MacEoin, the author of *Music, Chess and other Sins: Segregation, Integration and Muslim Schools in Britain*, although some Muslim schools teach social cohesion, others regard it as a deadly sin. Some schools impart the skills necessary for a fulfilling life alongside non-Muslim friends and co-workers, others try to recreate a Pakistani or Bangladeshi lifestyle and to make it exclusive. Music, chess and cricket are just three things banned in some Muslim schools in Britain. Others are drama, dance, sport, Shakespeare, and, in some cases, any aspect of the Western culture.⁶⁴

There are some other understandable factors for British Pakistanis' alienation and failure to assimilate in the mainstream British society. Britain's urban communities are changing at a more rapid pace than ever, but acute economic and social challenges prevent Muslims in Britain from availing the opportunities. The problems of widening economic and social inequalities also have implications for wider issues of alienation, disenfranchisement, isolation and dislocation that have an impact on how young men, irrespective of their religion, might become vulnerable to the forces of political radicalism and violence.⁶⁵

Another factor regarding this is that most British Pakistanis arrange marriages of their children in their native towns in Pakistan which in a way discourages the youths' integration into the host society and also creates conflicts in their minds as there are numerous examples of such marriages not succeeding. When children of British Pakistanis, particularly girls, reach

adulthood their parents rush back to their native towns in order to seek a suitable match for them. In many cases, however, such marriages cannot be called successful due to socio-cultural gaps.⁶⁶

However, despite some difficulties that they have started to face, particularly after 9/11, on account of sharing the religion of Islamist terrorists, most British Pakistanis feel that they have been successful in maintaining their religious and cultural values in Britain to a great extent. As many as 64 percent of the survey respondents said British Pakistanis did not feel any threat to their religion and culture in Britain; whereas 35 percent said there were some threats. (See Chart 10)



- ***Generation Gap***


The old British Pakistani generations think their children do not conform fully to their ancestors' socio-cultural and religious ways of life. Some are happy that their children are adapting to new realities of the ever changing modern world but others are not. New generations nevertheless are more or less ignorant of the culture of their ancestors' native towns. When they visit Pakistan, many of them find it difficult to understand or adjust to things they have never experienced before.⁶⁷ Unlike their ancestors, they do not consider that they have roots in their parents' areas of origin.

The new generations confront two key social paradigms in Britain, i.e., the British social setup, and pressure, and at least a desire from their parents to conform to

their ancestral religio-cultural norms and values. Some of them see the progress and development among all layers of British society, including locals and immigrants, in a comparative context and trace their own backwardness to the traditional social and religious narratives of their forefathers.⁶⁸ This creates a sort of conflict or generation gap between the old and new generations.

- *Issues of Discrimination*

A general perception among the family members of British Pakistanis is that the latter have started to face more problems after the 9/11 and 7/7 terror attacks; about two-third of the survey respondents confirmed this perception while a third denied it. Meanwhile, a considerable majority, 83 percent, said British Pakistanis had never faced any act of racial discrimination towards them in Britain. As many as 16 percent, however, reported incidents of racial discrimination. When asked if their family members or relatives were satisfied with the British government's efforts to counter racism, more than half of the respondents (53 percent) did not offer any reply, 32 percent replied in the affirmative and 15 percent in the negative. (See Chart 11)



Media campaigns against terrorism also have their impact on public perceptions of Muslims, particularly Pakistani immigrants, in Britain, and encourage the non-Muslim British citizens to distance themselves from Muslims and Pakistanis.⁶⁹ The behavior the British people has indeed changed to varying extent towards Pakistani immigrants.⁷⁰

Describing the nature of the problems British Pakistani had been facing in Britain especially after the 7/7 attacks, some respondents said that they were viewed with suspicion. Some had to face enquiries but were cleared after no ground was found of their support or involvement in any extremist or terrorist plot.⁷¹ They have to face strict security checks at airports, which some family members of British Pakistanis call discriminatory. The terrorism and counter-terrorism phrases and the political and media debate have definitely added to social isolation of British Pakistanis. The number of Muslims stopped and questioned at airports and other points of entry to the UK has doubled in the last four years, raising serious concerns about racial profiling.⁷²

3.3. Economic and Education Status

The education and economic and social status of British Pakistanis from the six districts of Punjab under study is diverse. They include laborers, businessmen or self-employed or salaried individuals (low-grade to highly skilled professionals), and students. Most of the respondents and the people interviewed for this study however claimed their relatives or family members were laborers and low-grade workers in Britain. Professionals such as doctors, engineers and IT experts, etc. were fewer in number but earned a lot. A substantial change is also visible in the lifestyles of families of British Pakistanis in their native towns. Their life standards are better than in the past and compared to other families living in the same localities. It is a generalization, however, to suggest that British Pakistanis and their families have a lot of money. Indeed the situation varies from individual to individual.⁷³

A range of views were found in the field interviews with regard to education of children of British Pakistanis in their native areas. Some said their education was improving, others however said that it was not. Those who advocated the first view asserted that the first generation of the immigrants was not well educated. But once they had the financial means, they ensured good education for their children. They managed to enroll their children in good private schools. Many British Pakistani families' children in Pakistan study in the Cambridge education system—for their O and A levels—after which their parents or elders try to invite them abroad for higher education.⁷⁴ Former District Nazim Chakwal Sardar Ghulam Abbas also argued that children of British Pakistanis from Chakwal and children of their family members were studying in good schools, colleges and universities.⁷⁵

On the other hand, Uzma Khawaja, general manager for National Commission for Human Development (NCHD), said that she had recently visited government and private schools in Jhelum as part of an education campaign. She was surprised to see that few students were enrolled in private schools—about 5 percent of them from families of immigrants in different countries—and the majority was either studying in government schools or was not enrolled in schools at all. She asserted that people were not willing to spend much on education.⁷⁶ In Gujrat district also, students' dropout rate at the secondary and higher secondary education levels was high, particularly in government schools and colleges. One reason was stated to be youths' obsession to go abroad.⁷⁷

The economic and education status of British Pakistanis is also diverse in Britain. Although in general they lag far behind other British citizens, including those from other Asian communities, there are also many examples of British Pakistanis who are very well placed in the host society.


Although exact data is not available in this regard, discussions with British Pakistanis and their relatives suggested that the 9/11 and 7/7 terrorist attacks, and the war on terror had affected employment opportunities for Pakistani Diaspora in Britain.⁷⁸ Those living illegally in Britain find it difficult to find any work. They mostly work in shops, restaurants and homes and are often paid less than minimum wage. Their employers exploit their illegal status.⁷⁹

Most children of British Pakistanis in Britain fail to go to colleges and universities. GCSE is considered basic education in Britain and 78 percent British Pakistani boys and 63 percent girls cannot even complete this first level of education.⁸⁰ Asfandiar Khan, a businessman and political activist in Jhelum, said he saw fewer children of Pakistani immigrants in schools and colleges than in shops and factories during his visits to Britain. He does not believe that immigrants' children are getting any better education in Britain than children in their native areas in Pakistan.⁸¹

- *Immigrants' Role in Socio-economic Uplift of Native Towns*

Around 62 percent of the respondents said that British Pakistanis were playing their due role in socio-economic uplift of their host and native

countries, whereas 38 percent did not consider that they were playing such a role. (See Chart 12)



The various perceptions of the role of British Pakistanis in socio-economic uplift of their families and native towns, discerned from field interviews, are described in the following paragraphs.

Areas of Investment and Spending

1. Most of the investment and spending of British Pakistanis in their native towns is on constructing personal properties, homes, big plazas and markets. A representative of a local NGO in Gujrat said that the construction boom in Gujrat and Jhelum was due to remittances from abroad. He asserted that there is more demand for construction material and labor in the areas which have a higher ratio of people abroad.⁸² This has a positive impact on other related businesses and industries such as ceramics, sanitation, plastic, electric and other home appliances.⁸³ Purchasing activity in local markets circulates money.⁸⁴ In rural areas also most of the big houses and buildings belong to immigrants and their families. They also make a major contribution in development of housing societies in urban areas either by investing their money with builders or purchasing plots and houses.⁸⁵

2. A major chunk of earnings of British Pakistanis is spent on maintaining their status and lavish life. They spend a lot on marriages, including on wedding functions and parties.
3. British Pakistanis provide monthly expenses of their families including parents, spouse and siblings in their native areas. In many cases the entire income of British Pakistanis is spent on supporting their parents and families.⁸⁶ Those who have their children with them in Britain regularly support their parents in Pakistan.
4. Some people interviewed for this study said British Pakistanis had established some businesses in their native towns in collaboration with their family members and other local partners. The businesses included fuel stations, schools or colleges and cottage industry. Many also kept their savings in bank accounts in their native towns.⁸⁷
5. British Pakistanis also donate funds as charity and Zakat. They send donations for victims of floods and other natural disasters in Pakistan. However, after alleged 'misuse' of their funds after the 2005 earthquake, they have become more cautious in who they give donation and charity to in order to ensure that the money is used effectively.⁸⁸ To help the victims of the 2010 floods, they raised and sent money to their relatives in their native towns. They trust the army more for judicious use of their donations.⁸⁹
6. British Pakistanis were found to be very interested in financing the education sector in their native towns. If any of their old school teachers requested them to fund a school or college they readily did so if they had the resources. This trend is more prevalent in rural areas. But former Deputy District Nazim of Rawalpindi Afzal Khokhar claimed he knows some British Pakistanis who had established on their own or had contributed to the establishment of schools and colleges in Rawalpindi, a big urban centre.⁹⁰

Some people interviewed for this study quoted examples where British Pakistanis had contributed money for socio-economic development of their native towns. For instance, in rural areas of Lalamusa in Gujrat some British Pakistanis had contributed finances for construction of roads.⁹¹ Al-Mudassar Education Centre and Al-Mudassar Centre for the Disabled in


Kharian get funding from immigrants in France and Britain.⁹² Hafiz Shabbir, a prayer leader in Madni Masjid in Sara-e-Alamgir, had visited Britain, raised funds from immigrants and established a madrassa in Sara-e-Alamgir.⁹³ A British Pakistani, Anwar Pervez, is funding schools in Gujjar Khan.⁹⁴ Farhat Abbas claimed that his relatives in Britain run an NGO in their native town, Chakwal, and have established a college there where more than 60 teachers are employed.⁹⁵ According to Rizwan Ali Khan, Educational Coordinator of the NCHD, British Pakistanis had provided electricity transformers and electricity generators in the nearby villages of Chakwal.⁹⁶

But most of the people interviewed in the native towns of British Pakistanis lamented that there were a lot of problems for the latter to come and invest their money in Pakistan, including bureaucratic hurdles. British Pakistanis do not invest in establishing industrial units because it is a complicated process in Pakistan and difficult to manage without strong political and administrative connections or support.⁹⁷ In addition, there are issues of insecurity, violence and law and order. They do not want to put their lives and investments at risk amid increasing incidents of robberies and kidnapping for ransom.⁹⁸ Shortage of gas and electricity also repels them.⁹⁹ At the same time, there is no institute or mechanism in Pakistan to motivate and facilitate the immigrants to invest in Pakistan.¹⁰⁰

4. Religious Trends

There is a general perception among people that Pakistan was made in the name of Islam. Being Muslim, an average Pakistani takes religion seriously and wants to see it in the public domain. Nevertheless, most of them do not practice religion in their daily life. To measure the religious trends of the population in focus, the survey respondents were asked about some aspects of their religious life. An overwhelming majority, 96 percent, said religion was an important part of their life. About 53 percent respondents said they were practicing Muslims and offered their prayers regularly; whereas 32 percent said they did not. Significantly, 49 percent of the survey respondents believed that *Shariah*, or Islamic jurisprudence, should be the only source of law; however, a considerable portion of the survey population, 29 percent, asserted that *Shariah* should not be the only source of law. At the same time

over half of the respondents (58 percent), said they were disciple of some *Pir*, religious faith leader or saint. (See Chart 13)



Sectarianism—Muslims’ subscription to various religious sects—is one of the major factors for growing radical tendencies in Pakistan where people devotedly follow the interpretation and beliefs of their own sects and are unwilling to consider alternative views. But as mentioned earlier, the areas under study are presumably dominated by the Sunni-Barelvi sect, followed by the Deobandis, Ahl-e-Hadith and Shias. But the Deobandi school of thought is gradually gaining ground and increasing its strength in the area.¹⁰¹

Nonetheless, the perceptions of the people interviewed for this study suggest that the tradition of Sufism is on the wane in these areas. People openly express their love with and faith in the Sufis and saints of the past who, according to them, served Islam and preached love. But at the same time many people are skeptical of the present breed of ‘*Pirs*’ and fake Sufis, who neither hold the good character of their predecessors nor serve Islam in any manner. Some others however think that with people moving away from this ‘peace loving and tolerant’ tradition in Islam, society has become more conservative and rigid over the past few decades.¹⁰²

4.1. Comparison of Trends in Native and Host Societies

Most British Pakistanis and their family members said they enjoy almost the same religious freedom in Britain as they did in Pakistan. All the sects celebrate religious events in Britain as well. Eight major Pakistani religious parties have their network in Britain and operate a number of affiliated organizations, charities and religious schools. These parties have links with international Islamic groups and charities, which share a common agenda. Deobandi politico-religious parties are very active in Britain and British Pakistanis are a major source of funding for their political, sectarian, Jihadi and charity/welfare activities. Pakistani Salafi movements are also growing rapidly in Britain and have established links with other international groups in Britain, such as Muslim Brotherhood.¹⁰³

The presence of all schools of thought and groups in Britain is the cause of spread of different ideologies in Pakistani Diaspora. Anjum Saleem, a British Pakistani from Jhelum, said that although the young generations of British Pakistanis were less inclined towards religion but some of them had adopted extreme religious beliefs.¹⁰⁴

According to another point of view that emerged during the interviews, the people who had been living a less religious life in Pakistan became more religious and practicing Muslims after they went to Britain, although the environment of their host society was liberal.¹⁰⁵ Perceptions of most of the people interviewed in the six native districts of British Pakistanis suggested that British Pakistanis were more religious than their family members and relatives in Pakistan.

Some people believe that Muslims in the UK are practicing their religion in a better manner which is why Islam is spreading there, while some others consider the 7/7 and 9/11 attacks to be a conspiracy by Jews with the objective of maligning Islam.¹⁰⁶ Dr. Asmat Malik, a social activist and political leader from Jhelum commented that religious inclinations of Muslims have increased in the West and that they are better Muslims than the people of Pakistan, as 80 percent Muslims, including the old and the young, are inclined towards Islam.¹⁰⁷


5. Political and Ideological Outlook

With regard to ideological and political views and beliefs British Pakistanis can be placed into two categories. One is active part of the political process in Britain and has made significant contribution to the state institutions, whereas the other has kept itself politically isolated. The political psychology of the latter category links their identity to the religious-political groups, religious clergy and political parties active in their native towns in Pakistan.

5.1. Political Awareness and Roles

- *Links with Native Politics*

As many as 51 percent of the respondents of the survey said that their relatives settled in Britain were actively participating in politics in their native towns. The remaining 49 percent said their family members did not have any links with politics in their native areas. (See Chart 14)



British Pakistanis from rural and urban parts of Gujrat, Rawalpindi and Jhelum were found to be more active in their native towns' politics compared to those from Gujranwala, Mandi Bahauddin and Chakwal.

Their support for political parties comes in the forms of funds and political campaigns in their native towns. Their money becomes available mostly on or around election day.¹⁰⁸ Representatives of political parties call them and visit them abroad to get their support, which is mainly financial. Some of them even come to their native areas in Pakistan ahead of elections to campaign for the candidates they support.


Many of the political activists interviewed for this study said that family members and relatives of British Pakistanis and immigrants to other countries had strong political lobbies. Chaudhry Arshad, a PML-Q member of the Punjab Assembly from Kharian and brother of a British Pakistani, said that when representatives of political parties go to immigrants' families to ask for votes, they are told that they would first seek the opinion of their family members abroad and then respond.¹⁰⁹

Political parties try to maintain good relations with British Pakistanis because they can influence their families and relatives in their native lands to vote for those parties' candidates. The voters are usually disposed to vote according to their British Pakistanis relatives' advice because of the latter's financial support for them.¹¹⁰

Support on the basis of a common *biradri* (clan or caste) is a powerful element in Pakistani politics. British Pakistanis also have to take this factor into consideration while supporting candidates in elections.¹¹¹ It was learned during field work for this study that the majority of British Pakistanis belongs to rural areas in North Punjab, hence they are more influenced by the caste and clan considerations. In urban areas this trend is not as strong.¹¹²


British Pakistanis cannot win elections as independent candidates.¹¹³ However, with money they can get ticket of one of the leading political party or can use this money to enhance their profile in their area and in the ranks of a main political party. This offers them in return votes from supporters of the party.

Based on perceptions of family members and relatives of British Pakistanis, it can be discerned that the latter mainly support two factions of Pakistan Muslim League—the PML-N and PML-Q—and Pakistan People's Party (PPP). (See Chart 15)



- **Participation in British Politics**

Contrary to British Pakistanis' involvement in politics in their native towns, only 8 percent of the respondents said that their family members or relatives were participating in politics in their host country. (See Chart 16) This is also in contrast to the findings of a study on British Pakistanis from Mirpur district of Azad Kashmir, which found that 56 percent people of the Mirpuri community in Britain were associated with some political party in Britain.¹¹⁴



But there are some British Pakistanis belonging to north and central Punjab who are actively engaged in British politics. For instance, parents of Sayeeda Warsi, the current chairperson of the Conservative Party and a minister without portfolio in David Cameron's cabinet, had migrated from Bewal, Gujjar Khan to Britain.¹¹⁵ Ancestors of British Pakistani Sajjad Karim, who is a member of the European Parliament, belong to Karari Wala village of Mandi Bahauddin.¹¹⁶

With regard to British Pakistanis' active participation in British politics and their political vision as voters, the 2010 elections in the UK manifested two significant trends. First, British foreign policy appealed more to British Pakistani voters rather than domestic issues, and, secondly, more British Pakistanis got elected to British parliament.

The pre-election feedback from British Pakistanis and other members of the Muslim community in the UK was that foreign policy remained of pivotal importance, with issues such as Palestine and Afghanistan heading the list. On the domestic front, 'Islamophobia' headed a long list of issues that also included economy, health, education and taxation. What was also of great interest this time round was that there was an unprecedented numbers of Muslim women and Muslim young people, who were following, campaigning and generally engaged in the election process.¹¹⁷

A number of British Pakistanis contested the 2010 elections in the UK, representing different political parties. Seven of them, including two women, were elected members of parliament. Five of these seven won elections on the ticket of Labour Party while the rest won on Conservative Party tickets. For the first time, two British Pakistani women made their way to the British parliament.¹¹⁸ In the last parliament, there were four Muslim MPs, three of them of Pakistani origin.¹¹⁹


5.2. A Peep into Ideological and Political Viewpoints

The family members and relatives of British Pakistanis from North Punjab were asked a number of questions to seek their political and ideological views on a range of national and global issues. These views do not necessarily represent the political and ideological positions of British Pakistanis but are

helpful in assessing the mindset of their family members and relatives in their native towns.

- **Jihad, Terrorism and Taliban**

Respondents' viewpoints suggest they strongly condemn violence, terrorism and actors of violence in Pakistan such as Taliban. 93 percent of the respondents said nothing justified taking of human lives through terrorist activities, whereas 2 percent said there could be some justification for that. Similarly, 90 percent of the respondents believed that suicide bombings and attacks could not be justified in the name of Islam, while 6 percent held the opposite view. Ninety percent of the respondents also did not see Taliban as serving the cause of Islam; whereas only 5 percent said that the Taliban were serving Islam. (See Chart 17)




On the other hand, when asked if fighting in Kashmir was jihad, 48 percent of the respondents replied in the affirmative, while 23 percent called fighting in Afghanistan jihad. 45 percent and 68 percent of the respondents, respectively, did not believe that fighting in Kashmir and Afghanistan was jihad.

A study on radicalization conducted by Pak Institute for Peace Studies in 2009 had asked the same question regarding fighting in Kashmir and Afghanistan from 1,568 respondents across Pakistan. Findings of the PIPS study reveal almost similar trends. As many as 73 percent of the respondents in the 2009 PIPS study were of the view that fighting in Afghanistan was not jihad; 18 percent considered it jihad, while 9 percent did not respond to the question. As many as 56 percent of the respondents in the 2009 study had called fighting in Kashmir jihad and 21 percent had said that it was not jihad.¹²⁰ More public support for 'jihad' in Kashmir is probably because of the historical link of Pakistan with the Kashmir conflict. Most of the people in Pakistan also see Kashmir as a continuation of the nation's struggle for independence.¹²¹

- *Worldview and War on Terror*

The majority of the respondents (75 percent) said that Pakistan should not support the United States in the war on terror. As many as 20 percent supported Pakistan's alliance with the US while 12 percent chose not to answer the question. When asked about the Pakistani government's use of force against militants in parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA, 75 percent of the respondents supported such tactics; 18 percent opposed military operations in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA and 7 percent did not respond.



This reflects a general perception in Pakistan against the US-led war on terror in Afghanistan and in FATA in Pakistan, and also public sentiments against the US. This notion was further strengthened when the highest number of respondents, 40 (26 percent), said that the US was the biggest threat to Pakistan's security and integrity. (See Table 4) This perception is not confined to the US alone but many British Pakistanis see the US and Britain as very close allies in the ongoing war on terror.¹²²

Table 4: What is the Biggest Threat to Pakistan's Security and Survival?

Options	Al Qaeda	Anti-democratic discourses	India	Taliban	USA
No. of responses	18	27	31	38	40

6. Radicalization Trends

A report on Wilton Park Conference 1021, "Tackling Violent Extremism: The Arc between Pakistan and the UK Diaspora" held on March 25-27, 2010, talks of ambitions of terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda to recruit young British Pakistanis, to encourage them to travel to Pakistan and to return to the UK to carry out attacks. Although it is a serious challenge facing the British government, it must be disturbing for the Pakistani community to hear the British government say that 75 percent of terrorist plots against the UK emanate from Pakistan. No report has elaborated this statistic further.

6.1. Trends in Host Society

Radicalized sentiments emerged in the minds of some British Muslims due to the circumstances that had prevailed during the past few years at the international level and the perceived duality of policies of the western powers as well as the reaction of Muslim leaders against fellow Muslims. This had a particularly adverse impact on young boys and girls who in their frustration could adopt ways and take actions that not only turn out to be a snare for them but also invite blame for the whole Muslim community. Internet and other mediums and channels that are available today to deliver radical ideologies were not there before. Many confused youths, who are against their traditional local Muslim scholars and leaders who have failed to satisfy their religious quests, land themselves in trouble while searching for solutions

to their problems online. Many a times they are guided in an insensitive manner. Hence it is crucial to keep tabs on the sources linked to Al Qaeda, Hizbut Tahrir and other organizations with similar agendas.

6.2. Trends in Native Towns

Religious extremism and terrorism are gradually engulfing Pakistani society and the Potohar region and its adjacent areas including Gujrat, Mandi Bahauddin and Gujranwala are no exception. Poverty, illiteracy and political marginalization may not be the triggers of violent and non-violent radicalization in the region under study as it is politically well-integrated and socio-economically more developed than many other parts of the country. But the physical presence and increasing activities of militant outfits, radical madrassas, heavy concentration of Afghan refugees, especially in Chakwal and Rawalpindi districts, and pervasive confusion over the discourse of jihad and war on terror may contribute in the future to radicalizing individuals and pockets of population in parts of central and north Punjab.

As mentioned earlier, a significant number of respondents denounced Pakistani Taliban and condemned suicide attacks but paradoxically a large number of participants in the survey did not approve of Pakistan's support for the US-led war on terror. Around 50 percent of the respondents also supported armed jihad in Kashmir. (See section 5.2) Meanwhile, patterns of militants' recruitment in Pakistan indicate that such mindsets are more susceptible to recruitment for 'Jihadi' operations in the country and abroad. Another alarming factor is the weakening of the tolerant Sufi tradition in the area. Sufism has always acted as a bulwark against extremist ideologies in Pakistan. For this very reason, terrorists are increasingly intensifying attacks on shrines of Sufis across Pakistan. Attacks on the shrines of Rehman Baba in Peshawar (March 2009), Hazrat Ali Hajveri in Lahore (July 2010), Hazrat Abdullah Shah Ghazi in Karachi (October 2010), and Hazrat Baba Fareed in Pakpattan (October 2010) are some of the recent examples in this regard.

6.3. Conclusion

Based on the findings of the field work and observation of the field researchers, a dominant majority of the survey respondents and the people interviewed for this study seemed to be very moderate in their religious outlook. In political

and ideological perspectives, however, their views were more or less in synch with the general public's perceptions prevalent across Pakistan.

The factors of radicalization are the same in both the native and host societies but a critical factor present in the host society is that the second and third generations of the immigrants to Europe, including Britain, are suffering from an identity crisis and a generation gap. They have a sense of structural or socio-psychological discrimination and are attaching themselves to global Islam at an increasing pace. Saudi Arabia's role in Britain is also highlighted as a critical factor by the media. For decades, Islam has been slowly shifting into an ever more conservative mould, influenced by the huge amounts of cash channeled by the Saudi religious establishment to mosques around Europe.

Although, British citizens of Pakistani origin, their immediate family members and relatives profess great admiration for British society in particular and the West in general, but like any other areas of Pakistan, anti-West and anti-US sentiments are on the rise in the areas studied for the research. Various organizations and platforms consisting of British Pakistanis must be utilized in order to publicize the positive role Britain has played and is still playing in the socio-economic uplift of the areas that have produced a large number of immigrants to Britain.

Notes

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- ¹ The PIPS is grateful to Mujtaba Muhammad Rathor, who managed fieldwork for this study and wrote parts of the report along with Safdar Sial and Khuram Iqbal. Special thanks to Amin Farooqi, Raja Nau Bahar, Zahid Khan, Usman Sarwar, A. Sattar Nadeem and Khalid Gardezi for assisting PIPS field researchers in conducting interviews and survey in their respective cities.
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- ¹⁹ Farhat Abbas (cousin of a Birmingham-based British Pakistani), interview by A. Sattar Nadeem in Chakwal, August 2010.
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- ²¹ Khawaja Asif Javed (a political activist of PPP), interview by Raja Nau Bahar in Jhelum, September 2010.
- ²² Muhammad Ashraf (a businessman), interview by Zahid Khan in Mandi Bahauddin, August 2010.

- ²³ Khawaja Muhammad Anwar (a civil society activist), interview by Zahid Khan in Mandi Bahauddin, August 2010.
- ²⁴ Waseem Shahid (a community leader), interview by Usman Sarwar in Gujranwala, October 2010.
- ²⁵ Dr Zaheer Ahmed (a journalist), interview by A. Sattar Nadeem, August 2010; DPO Chakwal Sabir Ahmed, interview by A. Sattar Nadeem, August 2010; Pir Abdul Sattar (journalist), interview by Mujtaba Muhammad Rathore in Chakwal, August 2010.
- ²⁶ Zahid Saeed (Commissioner Rawalpindi), interview by Khalid Gardezi, September 2010.
- ²⁷ Zahid Shakeel (Correspondent *Dawn News* and daily *Dawn*), interview by Zahid Khan in Mandi Bahauddin, August 2010.
- ²⁸ Saifullah Virk (Deputy Superintendent Police, Mandi Bahauddin), interview by Zahid Khan in Mandi Bahauddin, August 2010.
- ²⁹ Pir Abdul Sattar (a journalist), interview by Mujtaba Muhammad Rathore in Chakwal, August 2010.
- ³⁰ Shahid Nawaz Warraich (Sub-Divisional Officer Police), interview by Raja Nau Bahar in Jhelum, September 2010. S. Nawaz Warraich has also worked in the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA).
- ³¹ Rana Gul Bahar (a local journalist), interview by Zahid Khan in Mandi Bahauddin, August 2010.
- ³² Haji Jawad Ali (a travel agent), interview by Raja Nau Bahar in Jhelum, September 2010.
- ³³ Muhammad Ashraf Ghauri (City President, PPP Mandi Bahauddin), interview by Zahid Khan, August 2010.
- ³⁴ Faiz Piracha (a journalist associated with *Jang* Group), interview by Khalid Gardezi in Rawalpindi, September 2010.
- ³⁵ Farhan Hashim (Bureau Chief of *Nawa-e-Waqt* Group of Publications in Gujranwala), interview by by Usman Sarwar, October 2010.
- ³⁶ Muhammad Ilyas (an NGO worker), interview by Amir Farooqi in Gujrat, August 2010.
- ³⁷ Ejaz Ahmed (representative of Citizen Council, an NGO based in Rawalpindi), interview by by Khalid Gardezi, September 2010.
- ³⁸ Shaikh Muhammad Ikram (a businessman), interview by Amin Farooqi in Sara-e-Alamgir (Gujrat), August 2010.
- ³⁹ Syed Ahmed Ali (a community leader), interview by Khalid Gardezi in Rawalpindi, October 2010.
- ⁴⁰ Dr Muhammad Shoaib (former City Nazim, Gujjar Khan), interview by Khalid Gardezi, October 2010.
- ⁴¹ Rana Gul Bahar, interview by Zahid Khan.
- ⁴² Zahid Shakeel, interview by Zahid Khan.
- ⁴³ Rana Rasheed (Tehsil Municipal Officer, Sara-e-Alamgir), interview by Amin Farooqi, August 2010.
- ⁴⁴ Dr Muhammad Shoaib, interview by Khalid Gardezi.
- ⁴⁵ Interview in Gujranwala by Usman Sarwar, October 2010.
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- ⁴⁷ Ghulam Murtaza (advocate), interview by Zahid Khan in Mandi Bahauddin, August 2010; Dr Saeed Ehsanullah (a political activist of Jamaat-e-Islami), interview by Amin Farooqi in Kharian (Gujrat), September 2010.
- ⁴⁸ Muhammad Ismail (former Nazim, Union Council Thathi, Gujjar Khan), interview by Khalid Gardezi, October 2010.
- ⁴⁹ Chaudhry Azaz Taj (a leader of PML-N), interview by Amin Farooqi in Sara-e-Alamgir (Gujrat), August 2010.
- ⁵⁰ Umar Farooq (a businessman), interview by Amin Farooqi in Lalamusa (Gujrat), August 2010.
- ⁵¹ Pir Sahib (a local religious leader), interview by Mujtaba Muhammad Rathore in Deena (Jhelum), October 2010.
- ⁵² Nigar Khalid (a journalist and analyst), interview by Khalid Gardezi in Rawalpindi, October 2010.
- ⁵³ Chaudhry Muhammad Nazir (Director, Water and Sanitation Authority), interview by Usman Sarwar in Gujranwala, October 2010.
- ⁵⁴ Mirza Mashiatu Rehman (former Naib Nazim, Union Council 117, Sara-e-Alamgir), interview by Amin Farooqi, October 2010.
- ⁵⁵ Mushtaq Ahmed Badal (President, Citizen Committee, Gujranwala Cantt.), interview by Usman Sarwar, October 2010.
- ⁵⁶ Muhammad Azam (a political leader, PML-Chattha group), interview by Usman Sarwar in Gujranwala, October 2010.
- ⁵⁷ Mian Azhar Hassan Dar (General Secretary, People's Lawyers Forum), interview by Usman Sarwar in Gujranwala, October 2010.
- ⁵⁸ Farhan Hashim (a local journalist), interview by Usman Sarwar in Gujranwala, October 2010.
- ⁵⁹ Rana Muneebur Rehman (former Nazim, Union Council, Gujranwala), interview by Usman Sarwar, October 2010.
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- ⁶⁸ Malik Jameel (a British-Pakistani expatriate and Member National Assembly Pakistan), interview by Amin Farooqi in Gujrat, August 2010. Malik Jameel has lived in Britain for about 23 years, mainly in Manchester.
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- ⁷⁷ Ghulam Shabbir (Administrator, Jamia Siddiqia Anwarul Quran, a religious seminary in Kharian), interview by Mujtaba Rathore in Kharian (Gujrat), September 2010.
- ⁷⁸ Muhammad Fareed (cousin of a British Pakistani Muhammad Naeem living in London), interview by Usman Sarwar in Gujranwala, October 2010.
- ⁷⁹ Shabbir Ahmed Butt (former chairman, Municipal Committee, Gujrat), interview by Amin Farooqi in Gujrat, August 2010.
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- ⁸¹ Interview by Raja Nau Bahar in Jhelum, September 2010.
- ⁸² Muhammad Ilyas, interview by Amir Farooqi.
- ⁸³ Sohail Yusuf (Vice President, Gujranwala Chamber of Commerce and Industry), interview by Usman Sarwar in Gujranwala, October 2010.
- ⁸⁴ Muhammad Ilyas, interview by Amir Farooqi.
- ⁸⁵ Zahid Saeed, interview by Khalid Gardezi.
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- ⁸⁷ Shazia Nayyar (Member, District Council Jhelum), interview by Raja Nau Bahar, October 2010.
- ⁸⁸ Nasrullah, interview by Amin Farooqi.
- ⁸⁹ Malik Nadeem Ajmal (a political activist), interview by Amin Farooqi in Sara-e-Alamgir (Gujrat), August 2010.
- ⁹⁰ Afzal Khokhar (former Deputy District Nazim, Rawalpindi), interview by Khalid Gardezi, September 2010.
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- ⁹² Ghulam Shabbir, interview by Mujtaba Rathore.
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- ¹⁰⁹ Chaudhry Arshad (PML-Q's Member Provincial Assembly (Punjab) from Kharian), interview by Amin Farooqi in Kharian, September 2010.
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- ¹¹² Zahid Shakeel, interview by Zahid Khan.
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Notes on Contributors

Nida Naz, a researcher associated with the Conflict and Security Unit of Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) has a Masters degree in International Relations from Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad. Her main area of interest is conflicts in South Asia and political nexus of the regional states.

Safdar Sial is a research analyst at PIPS. After completing his education in marketing research in 1995, he joined English journalism as a reporter and worked with various English daily newspapers in Lahore, Pakistan. In April 2007, he joined PIPS where his specific areas of focus are conflict and security, and media in Pakistan.

Sohail Habib Tajik holds a Masters degree in Criminal Justice Administration/ Criminology from London School of Economics and Political Science, UK, and a diploma in Risk, Crisis and Disaster Management from Leicester University, UK. He has 15 years of experience of law enforcement at the national and international levels. He has worked with United Nations missions in Liberia and Kosovo, and at the International Criminal Tribunal (UNICTR).

Farhat Asif is the editor and co-founder of Pakistan's first English/Arabic bilingual magazine, *The Diplomatic Insight*, which has the theme of peace through informed dialogue. She has earlier worked for Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI). Her area of research is peace, conflict and development studies connected to Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asian Republics.

Muhammad Amir Rana is an expert on terrorism and regional strategic issues. He has authored several books on the phenomenon of Islamic militancy, including *A to Z of Jihadi Organizations in Pakistan*.

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Abstracts

A Progressive Understanding of Pashtun Social Structures amidst Current Conflict in FATA

Brian R. Kerr

The conflict in FATA has global ramifications. Many terrorist attacks in the West have been logistically or ideologically linked to Pakistan's tribal areas. In recent years, there has been a shift in the US and Pakistani policies towards the region, with a greater emphasis on gaining the allegiances of the local population, a strategy crucial for a successful counterinsurgency. Historically, the Pashtun tribes of FATA have largely been left to their local political and administrative structures. However, the institution of jirga as well as the individual positions of power such as maliks, mullahs, and tribal elders have experienced significant consequences as a result of the ongoing wave of violence in FATA. A blend of Pashtun governance and societal structures aided by an influx of infrastructure and development could be a realistic, long-term peace-building mechanism in the region. However, before applying this model, a stable security climate is necessary and militant administrations must be eliminated at the very least.

Understanding FATA

Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi

Islam as a religion of peace is being overshadowed by the Islam of politics. This political variant is the struggle of the small tribal clique of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) against the state, which, they feel, has marginalized them. The society is divided into tribes in FATA; the number is around 400 if all sub-clans are counted. *Pashtunwali* is the pre-Islamic Pashtun code of conduct whose effects on social dynamics in FATA have sometimes been exaggerated. FATA is an extremely poor area by any comparison. Adherence to Islamic ritualism is inbred in the lifestyle of the tribesmen,

regardless of whether they really are religious or not. But before the Taliban, Islamic extremism had never really managed to gain a foothold in the Pak-Afghan tribal belts. FATA is a complicated area to comprehend by any standards, and thus any attempt to win hearts and minds in the area needs to be augmented by intense efforts to understand the ground realities. Barring that, FATA may well continue to be branded as the 'most dangerous area in the world' for a long time to come.

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan: A Global Threat

Khuram Iqbal

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has undergone radical transformation since its inception in December 2007. An entity that was formed to safeguard and strengthen Afghan Taliban's movement against the foreign forces in Afghanistan is gradually enhancing its global profile through its aggressive propaganda against the West in general and the US in particular. This paper seeks to measure the scale of global threat posed by TTP through a close observation and analysis of the post-9/11 shifts in the links between Afghan Taliban, Al Qaeda and Pakistani Taliban. The threat assessment also incorporates the content analysis of randomly selected statements and interviews of TTP's top leadership, which provide important insights into the group's ambitions and capabilities to transform into a global entity. The paper emphasizes enhanced regional and global collaboration to counter Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, which is no longer a challenge for Pakistan alone but a global threat.

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Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) is an independent think-tank committed to provide an in-depth understanding and objective analyses of regional and global issues. PIPS provides international strategic thinkers a forum to play an active role in understanding and researching real and perceived threats to regional and global peace and security. The objective is to engage leading regional and international strategic thinkers, academicians and media persons in pursuance and production of knowledge of national, regional and global security issues and to promote awareness about the importance of peace and democracy. The goal will be achieved through independent policy analysis, and collection, processing, interpretation and dissemination of information and skills/training.

PIPS carries out and disseminates policy analyses and research studies on the regional and global strategic issues such as conflict and development, political violence, religious extremism, ethnic strife, terrorism (including state terrorism), economics, governance and democracy, foreign relations, and cultural learning of policy-making processes. It also conducts dialogues, trainings and other educational programs for strengthening partnerships and resolving inter-state conflicts, and clashes between the government and the public. At the national level, the institute is dedicated to building the knowledge base for peace and enlightenment of the society. PIPS is building one of the largest database on peace and security issues at the regional level.

PIPS has also developed a vast regional and global network for information sharing and research on some of the key security issues facing Pakistan, which also have a profound impact on regional and global security.