

A PIPS Research Journal

Conflict and Peace Studies

VOLUME 3

JAN-MAR 2010

NUMBER 1

1. Militant's Media Package
2. Evolution of Suicide Terrorism in Pakistan and Counter-Strategies
3. Terrorist Attacks and Community Responses
4. Radicals' Influx into Border Areas: Impact on Inter-state Relations in South Asia



Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)

A PIPS Research Journal

Conflict and Peace Studies

VOLUME 3

JAN-MAR 2010

NUMBER 1

Editor

Muhammad Amir Rana

Associate Editor

Najam U Din

Foreign Editor

Ranga Kalansooriya (Sri Lanka)

Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)

A PIPS Research Journal
Conflict and Peace Studies
Copyright © PIPS 2010

All Rights Reserved

No part of this journal may be reproduced in any form by photocopying or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage or retrieval systems, without prior permission in writing from the publisher of this journal.

ISSN 2072-0408
Price: Rs 400.00
US\$ 30.00

The views expressed are the authors' own and do not necessarily reflect any positions held by the institute.

**Pak Institute for Peace Studies
(PIPS)**
Post Box No. 2110
Islamabad, Pakistan
+92-51-2291586
www.san-pips.com
editor@san-pips.com

Editorial Advisory Board

Khaled Ahmed
Consulting Editor
Daily Times and *Friday Times*
Lahore, Pakistan

Dr. Tariq Rahman
Director
National Institute of Pakistan Studies
Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad
Pakistan

Rasul Bakhsh Rais
Professor of Political Science
School of Humanities and Social Sciences
Lahore University of Management Sciences
(LUMS), Lahore
Pakistan

Ishtiaq Ahmed
Professor
Institute of South Asian Studies
And South Asian Studies Program
National University of Singapore
Singapore

Peter Bergen
Senior Fellow
New American Foundation
Washington D.C., USA

Anatol Lieven
Professor
Department of War Studies
King's College
London

Dr. Catarina Kinnvall
Department of Political Science
Lund University
Sweden

Dr. Adam Dolnik
Associate Professor
Director Research Programs
Centre for Transnational Crime Prevention
(CTCP), University of Wollongong
Australia

Tahir Abbas
Director
Center for the Study of Ethnicity & Culture
School of Government & Society
University of Birmingham
United Kingdom (UK)

Shabana Fayyaz
Assistant Professor
Department of Strategic Studies
Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad

Contents

Editor's Note

5

<u>Militants' Media Package</u>	
Comment	
Mainstream Media's Response to Radical Extremism	
	<i>Najam U Din</i>
Reports and Analyses	7
1) Militants' Media in Pakistan: Political Etymology and Professional Craft	
	<i>Wajahat Masood</i>
2) Weapons of Mass Distortion: A Closer Look at the Jihadi Media in Pakistan	13
	<i>Wajahat Ali</i>
3) An External View of the Vernacular Press in Pakistan	21
	<i>Ranga Kalansooriya</i>
Dialogue	35
Media Seminars on Militants' Media in Pakistan and its Impact	45

Abstracts

Papers

Evolution of Suicide Terrorism in Pakistan and Counter-Strategies	55
	<i>Khuram Iqbal</i>
Terrorist Attacks and Community Responses	75
	<i>Amjad Tufail</i>
Radicals' Influx into Border Areas: Impact on Inter-state Relations in South Asia	91
	<i>Muhammad Amir Rana</i>

Note on Contributors 107

Guidelines for Contributors 109

Editor's Note

'Conflict and Peace Studies' has completed two years of its publication. The appreciation, criticism and suggestions from our readers have helped us to continue our efforts and overcome our shortcomings. I hope your cooperation will continue in the future.

In view of the suggestions from our readers and the thematic programs of Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), the Editorial Board has decided to dedicate the next four issues to radicalization and extremism in Pakistan. PIPS specializes in both areas and has initiated a number of major studies on the subjects; the first was a survey to identify the level of radicalization in the country and to measure trends among different segments of the population. The outcome of the survey is 10 comprehensive empirical papers, which would be published in the next two issues. The last issue of the year will focus on the militant landscape of Pakistan. PIPS believes these in-depth studies would help to expand the information base on the issues as well as facilitate an understanding of the phenomena in the religious, political, economic, socio-cultural and physiological perspectives.

The current issue includes a special section on the militants' media in Pakistan. The papers, reports and comments in the section were contributed for two seminars organized by PIPS to understand the characteristics of militants' media. Three other papers included in this issue address various aspects of local and regional conflicts.

Comment

Mainstream Media's Response to Radical Extremism

Najam U Din

There seems to be broad agreement among analysts that Pakistan has never witnessed worse manifestations of violence fuelled by radical extremism than it does today.

Against this backdrop I want to focus on the mainstream media's role instead of talking about the fringe jihadi media.

It is obvious that the media cannot remain aloof from the developments taking place in society. We were taught in graduation studies that the media has the power to influence and shape public opinion. That role obviously attains added significance in turbulent times.

The current wave of violence by radical extremists and other terrorists has exposed shortcomings of the media on many levels. I would talk about some of the main ones.

Of course, media organizations lack the capacity to report from the conflict-hit area now with military operations going on in large swathes of the northwest, but when reports of violent extremism in the Tribal Areas and Swat first became known the media largely failed or chose not to give insight into the threat in a timely manner.

Subsequent coverage of the issues by the print and electronic media has for the most part been confined to reporting on the most recent suicide bombings and other terrorist attacks, casualty figures, and the amount of explosives used in each attack. The media's focus has been on breaking news first but there has been little follow-up or objective and in-depth analysis and only superficial comment, at best, about the dynamics of the Taliban-related terrorism. Until recently, most newspapers and TV channels seemed almost at pains not to dwell on the context of the emergence of the Taliban and other extremist elements seemingly out of thin air.

Many media experts would tell you that the newspapers and TV channels in Pakistan did not and perhaps still do not perceive the Taliban as a threat to the country or its people despite butchering thousands of men, women and

children and flouting in the most blatant manner the rights and protection guaranteed by the constitution. Only a few months ago – before the launch of the military operation in Swat – countless newspaper reports and TV talk shows were opposing military action or justifying the illegal and unconstitutional demands of the Taliban when they had effectively ended the writ of the state in Malakand division and were quite literally slaughtering security forces personnel, public representatives and common citizens. At that time, there were many voices in the media either calling for reaching an understanding, or an agreement with the Taliban and ceding more territory to them, or generally writing and airing favourable reports, either out of fear or on the establishment's behest. It is painfully obvious why elements in the establishment would still be interested in a favourable press for the Taliban and other militant extremists.

Generations of Pakistanis have grown up seeing India painted as the enemy and India-bashing is considered fair game by the media. Indian media's portrayal of Pakistan is not substantially different. But when the Taliban were butchering civilians and security personnel they were not being publicised as Pakistan's enemies. There was no Taliban-bashing.

Today everyone talks about how the tide of public sentiment suddenly turned against the Taliban and how the masses rallied behind the military for the operation in Swat. Yet reports in few media organisations would admit that what really turned the tide was the emergence of the now famous video – which showed a young girl, pinned to the ground facedown by three Taliban hooligans, being publicly flogged in Swat. A human rights activist had brought the video to light, and a number of TV channels had declined to air it before one finally agreed. However, the discussion in the mainstream media did not focus as much on the denial of human dignity but on the motives and agenda of those who had brought the video to light. The video was rubbished as fake. "It's an old incident, and it happened before the peace agreement," said NWFP information minister, as if the violation of citizens' rights and dignity was determined by the date of occurrence. "There are some elements who want to sabotage this agreement," the minister said. Thank God for those elements.

Amid unprecedented death and destruction caused by the terrorists, the media, which could have helped shape public opinion, remained far too occupied with terminology. Taliban were referred to as militants, insurgents, and briefly, terrorists.

A leading English language daily newspaper referred to the Taliban as militants in its coverage. Then one day someone asked the editor's wife if her

husband's newspaper did not consider Taliban terrorists and if it did then why would it not say so in its reports. The following day that newspaper started referring to the Taliban as terrorists. The same week, the newspapers' reporters from Malakand and the NWFP pleaded with the main office in Lahore that the Taliban had threatened to kill them if the paper referred to them as terrorists once more. The next day Taliban had got back the tag of militants again.

This wavering coupled with the lack of a clear editorial line exposed the media's failure to give an organized editorial response, at the intra- or inter-organization level, in the face of growing militant extremism.

Doubts were raised about the ability and the willingness of the media to move beyond day-to-day reporting and about the motives for skirting the issue or not looking at the bigger picture in an analytical manner.

Failure of the media to give insight into the Taliban phenomenon also laid bare the media's perennial institutional weakness, both of capacity and priority, in the form of complete absence of organized investigative journalism.

Of course the media had much to fear. After all they were dealing with terrorists and murderers. Even media organizations and journalists far from the conflict zone had to contend with many threats and attacks. In October 2009, a Taliban group sent two letters to the Lahore Press Club – one on October 12 and the other on October 14 – warning that if the media “does not stop portraying us as terrorists ... we will blow up offices of journalists and media organisations”. The list of threats and warnings individually sent to journalists and media organizations is a long one. But reporters working in the conflict zone were the most vulnerable. And media organizations, even those with considerable resources, failed their employees in the conflict zones, by not looking after them when they had been hounded out of the area by the Taliban on account of their profession or displaced during the military operation. Many were forced to quit journalism to escape Taliban wrath or were sacked by the media organizations.

I would cite just one example. In December 2008, an English language daily newspaper referred in its editorial to the head of Lashkar-e-Islam (LI), an outlawed extremist militant organisation in Khyber Agency, as a “thief”. The militants immediately threatened the newspaper through phone, fax and email. They were very specific and said they knew the editor was abroad when the editorial was published and just wanted to know the name of the person who had authored the editorial.

That newspaper had also been banned by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan in Swat – prompting refusal by newsagents in Swat to receive or distribute the newspaper. Readers found in possession of the paper had also threatened with dire consequences.

After the latest threats, the newspaper feared a similar drop in circulation in the NWFP. Meanwhile, the LI spokesman summoned a senior reporter from the newspaper's Peshawar Bureau. The reporter went to the spokesman and fell to his feet as soon as he saw the man. He remained at the militant's feet for over an hour and a half. The spokesman told the reporter that the Lashkar had no issue with him personally and merely wanted the name of the editorial writer. "Lahore is not that far away," the militant said. Sometimes the spokesman would again ask the reporter to give him the writer's name and then ignore him for a long time. All this while, the reporter could see a man sharpening a knife in front of him. Eventually, the spokesman asked the reporter to get up and leave. The newspaper had apparently been forgiven.

After that the staff at the newspaper's Peshawar bureau told the head office that their life would be in serious peril if a similar thing happened again. It was decided that anything "problematic" covering the region would only be printed in the future after getting the approval of the Peshawar bureau.

The reporter whose life was on the line for comments made in his newspaper was sacked a couple of months later in a retrenchment drive.

The civil society in Pakistan does not see the spread of the extremist ideology so much as the success of the militant media as the failure of the mainstream newspapers and TV channels. Irrespective of the reasons, the mainstream media has failed to inform the people about ground realities on the rise of extremism in Pakistan.

There is little doubt that militant elements still retain considerable support of state institutions. This support has also contributed to the shirking of space for the public discourse on the militarisation of Islamic doctrine in Pakistan. While militant propaganda has the field pretty much to itself today, the mainstream media has been scared into silence, to the extent that it now steers clear of any discussion which would present even a remote possibility of critically analyzing extremist tendencies. Views of objective experts are seldom sought if such issues are ever debated.

Freedom of expression, especially for the media, has historically been a tall order in Pakistan even at the best of times. Journalists say that commenting on militant extremism in the present circumstances is akin to venturing into a

minefield and no one is quite sure what would set off an explosion. Such a course is best avoided, they hold.

As a consequence, the media has imposed a very strict self-censorship regime on itself. The mainstream media does not allow the counter-argument, which journalists voice in private conversations.

In a country with a low literacy rate, regional and national language TV channels obviously enjoy exceptional access to the population. The channels have either chosen not to use that reach to counter extremist tendencies and propaganda, either to appease extremists or because they subscribe to the same extremist ideology themselves. Even those that do not have been scared into silence for fear of personnel safety.

Militant extremists are probably the only elements in Pakistan today to enjoy absolute freedom of expression, with no prohibition of hate speech or the like. In April 2009, Sufi Muhammad, chief of an outlawed militant organization who was acting as an intermediary for Taliban's talks with the government, called the constitution and the judiciary, and even democracy itself, un-Islamic without any consequence. Any such utterance by journalists, or pretty much everyone else for that matter, would have invited instant charges of treason.

A senior reporter working for a leading Urdu news channel defended the flogging of the girl in Swat in a live programme and said the "punishment" conformed to Islamic injunctions. He slammed those who referred to the incident as barbaric.

The anchor of a religious programme on the same channel incited viewers to murder Ahmedis. Though two Ahmedis were shot dead the following day, no action was taken against the anchor, who did not express any remorse on his anti-Ahmedi tirade that led to the assassination of two human beings.

Many journalists point to the futility of government efforts to ban extremist media publication in Pakistan and say that the mainstream media had now become so sympathetic and compliant as to be jihadi media itself.

However, we, the audience of the media organizations, cannot heap the blame on the media without sharing part of the responsibility ourselves. It's a common enough phrase that in democracy you get the leaders you deserve. Does one also get the media one deserves? Mustn't we as readers blame ourselves for putting up with the choices the media makes?

The media could clearly have done more in the face of the Taliban onslaught. It failed use the little space available to form or lead public opinion. It only followed public opinion and that too in a cautious and belated manner.

One would not advocate imprudence or suicide, for Pakistan certainly does not need more media curbs or more journalists' assassinations. It already has plenty of both. One can see that there were hoards of reasons why the media would have feared speaking out against the Taliban and other terrorists. But that is why it was all the more important to speak out and assert the hard-won freedom of the media.

I am sure most people here have heard of 20th century German theologian Martin Niemoller, who is best remembered for his famous poem in which he criticised the inactivity and apathy of German intellectuals and society to the growing menace of Nazism. The poem concludes with the line: *"Then they came for me -- and there was no one left to speak for me."*

I agree with my colleagues in the media about the risks. I agree that speaking has consequences. But keeping quiet also has consequences.

Analysis

Militants' Media in Pakistan: Political Etymology and Professional Craft

Wajahat Masood

I have refrained from using the term radical media, as was suggested by our worthy hosts and have chosen the nomenclature "militant media". Why I do not use the word "radical" to describe the dominant trends of the current media in Pakistan needs some explanation.

Radicalism, as we have come to know it throughout history, stands for the marginalized, vulnerable and numerically challenged segments of society. Radicalism denotes unpopular socio-political causes. It supports new philosophical positions. It embraces a forward-looking approach to pull society out of its bottlenecks. Radicalism stands for egalitarianism. Radicalism promotes the civil right to tap avenues that have hitherto fore been untapped.

Ironically, what is being dubbed as radicalism in Pakistan of today is a doomed attempt at revival of what is socially dead, economically untenable and politically destructive. A radical journalist in Pakistan today is one who espouses the so-called Muslim causes. With 97% Muslim population (which is semi-literate and highly indoctrinated) in Pakistan, what is radical about protesting against the invasion of Iraq while we turn a deaf ear to the cries coming from our own cities and towns like those of Christians in Gojra, Shia Muslims in Parachinar and Dera Ismail Khan and Ahmadi citizens in Rabwah. What kind of radicalism is it that fails to see the flagrant discrimination in laws against women of this country while we blacken page after page for the Muslim women in France being barred from wearing Hijab. Is it radical journalism that we brazenly deny the veracity of a young girl publicly flogged in Swat while referring to a certain lady named Dr Aafia Siddiqui, detained and being arraigned in the US? Do we consider our respectable journalist a radical who went on to quote verses from the holy Quran while the point in contention was that a group of citizens had taken the law into their own hands and committed a heinous crime against a young lady? Our home-spun version of radicalism is politically conservative, undemocratic, irrational when it come to scientific methodology, negates the basic civic rights like the right of expression and academic freedom. Instead of promoting engagement with human fraternity, it propagates antagonism and alienation. It accentuates differences in the name of identity rather than highlighting cultural diversity. While trumpeting the cause of the poor, it

protects the worst forms of vested interests. In fact, the people of this country have seen scores of journalists turn into tycoons, power-brokers and become a part of the dilapidated socio-political structures that they condemn day in and day out.

In Pakistan, the advent of religious militancy and the mushroom growth of media (especially electronic media) with accompanying crescendo for the freedom of press coincide not only chronologically but also in a structured political framework. It is important to understand the broader spectrum and the dominant mindset of the current media personnel and establishments in Pakistan.

In order to comprehend the features of the phenomenon called "militant media", I have divided this write-up into two broader parts:

1. Political etymology of militant press
2. Methodology of militant press

Political Etymology of Militant Press

The tradition of press, in this country, has largely been a populist approach instead of responsible education of the public opinion. However, with the advent of independence and the emergence of a country with a hugely homogenous religious profile, the scope for populist journalism increased exponentially. Whatever restraints observed during the foreign rule went out the window and a two-pronged policy was adopted for self-aggrandizement:

- (a) Narrow nationalism with a heightened emphasis upon differences with India.
- (b) As the partition had arguably been won through the plank of religious identity, the nascent nationalism in Pakistan bore a heavy, though somewhat ambiguous, religious character.

With the arrival of the John Foster Dulles doctrine (national security state) and the failure of democratic experience in the new country, the extreme right-wing forces crept into the power equation. Media was not far behind. The famous Munir Inquiry Commission Report into the anti-Ahmadi disturbances in Punjab in 1953 delves into the role of press at length. It was clear that the press was more than willing to play ball with the undemocratic forces. The journalist was hardly loath to lend a hand in whipping up religious frenzy. Further, it was evident that the undemocratic establishment was out to offer financial rewards to those who followed the prescribed tune

and the journalists (individuals as well as media establishments) were only too keen to gulp down the bait.

History (recent and remote) was re-written with retrospective effect. A culture was invented that suited the establishment though it hardly existed anywhere in the country. The Mullah was offered a set of appeasements through legislation, policies, monetary perks and a virtual impunity to tamper with the social structure and the private lives of citizens. Hate speech from the pulpit was overlooked. Incitement to crimes, against individual or groups, was condoned.

Whether it was the campaign for birth control or Family Laws Ordinance (1962), the Mullah was allowed to flout the writ of the state. As early as 1950, the clerical crowd had the temerity to hold a rally in front of Prime Minister's House in Karachi and mouth the worst possible indecencies against the first lady. The Mullah not only enjoyed the liberty to re-write the history of the freedom movement, they were encouraged to meddle with matters that were strictly constitutional (separate electorate) and statecraft (women's right to vote or education.)

During all this, the progressive, liberal and democratic forces were being hauled on coals. The progressive elements were pilloried under the garb of communist threat. The liberals were denounced in the name of so-called oriental traditions and a non-existent conservative culture. The democrats were targeted for demanding democracy which had been the bane of both the civilian and military rulers. The newspaper editorials scribbled to welcome the military coup of 1958 have survived and can be a good curriculum in sycophancy and self-destruction of press freedom. A famous Director General of Radio Pakistan, the virtual steward of the national culture, for decades went as far as to reject the traditional music in favor of what he believed was truly Muslim and Pakistani music. A territorial conflict with a neighboring country was turned into such a sanctified subject that six newspapers wrote the same editorial verbatim, demanding the banning of the Civil and Military Gazette for publishing a rather innocuous news item about Kashmir. This was the making of the militant press that would jump to kill every vestige of dissent and rationalism. There were voices of dissent such as publications of the Progressive Papers Ltd. but they were largely marginalized and muzzled at first opportunity.

Low intensity warfare (ostensibly by non-state actors) was introduced in 1962 and inevitably culminated in Operation Gibraltar of 1965. This was a war entirely fought and "won" through newspapers and radio, a classic example of hoodwinking a zealot, frenzied, ill-informed and indoctrinated populace.

The 1965 war denotes the point when the press realized that it could enjoy inordinate power (and accompanying financial benefits) in the country if only it espoused a conservative collective narrative.

The soldier may wield the gun but it is for a civilian community to furnish a political and social narrative. The framework considered suitable for Pakistan only pointed towards the Mullah to outline the socio-political features of the set of governing rules. The Mullah, with his centuries old dream of wielding political power and unfathomable hatred for all that signified modernity, pounced upon the opportunity. The Mullah's preferred tool was propaganda and press was the vehicle for this propaganda. Hence, there emerged a bond between the press and the Mullah, each with an eye to his own pound of flesh. The rules of the game, set by the Mullah and accepted by the press, lock, stock and barrel, were as follows.

- a) To turn the majority religious faith into a political ideology and term any disagreement with that political ideology as a travesty of faith. Conflate faith and politics to the point that religion gets precedence over purely political issues. When outwitted politically, hide behind the sandbag of faith and accuse your opponents of insulting the faith. Take the whole nation (state institutions, civil bodies and citizens) hostage in the name of a faith turned ideology. Either permeate all civic, social and state organs or paralyze them through relentless denigration.
- b) To support the establishment (read all those who usurp power through gun and disregard the people's mandate) against democratic forces, especially those whom the people entrust with their mandate.
- c) To undermine the dictates of statecraft and democratic discourse by crafty use of modern resources. Contest for legislative assemblies even if you do not believe in the fundamentals of democracy, namely equality of citizens, will of the people and legislation through public reason. Stack gunpowder of faith in the laws, policies and institution to undermine the very fundamental framework of parliamentary legislation and democratic working.
- d) To employ state of the art technology like printing press, microphone, camera, video, expensive vehicles, modern weapons even if you do not believe in the basic postulates of scientific methodology.
- e) To promote a non-liberal ethos at home and an aggressive militancy abroad. Sexually frustrated people lose the will to fight for a better

life. They fight for tracts of land, articles of faith and the redemption of a non-existent honor. Mendacity in personal life leads to aggression in public. Eulogize militancy, war and the assumed peculiarity of your collective self. That presumed peculiarity bestows a false sense of superiority that offsets the drabness of unproductive, non-creative and incompatible existence at the bare-minimum of living standards.

The bond between the Mullah and the journalist had been established by the early 1960s and the military – the arbiter of all political power – was a partner by default. The press and the Mullah were solidly behind Ayub Khan when he went for an ill-considered adventure in Kashmir in 1965. The press and the Mullah were the best support for Yahya Khan outside his own garrison constituency when he decided to conduct a bloodbath in East Pakistan. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto might not have been without some glaring shortcomings in his mode of governance, but his actual crime was to garner votes from the people. The vote was supposed to be an irrelevant factor in governance. Mr Bhutto did a lot that could be considered a continuity of the previous civilian rulers but his rule was essentially an interregnum after which the military had to re-assume the reins and steer the nation like a legitimate heir to the throne.

Under the self-righteous rule of General Zia-ul-Haq, the single-most prominent development was the Afghan issue. The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan allowed the Western powers to avenge Vietnam and they did it skillfully. The matrix of the Afghan campaign brought in several extraneous actors to this theatre but the most significant development at home was the solemnization of the nexus among the military, Mullah and the media. This Greek tragic-comedy had a double-tier stage, both planes intrinsically intertwined: Islamisation at home (forcible conversion of society into a primitive model of quasi-theocracy) and Jihad abroad (a covert military operation couched in religious diction). The Mullah and the press were protagonists in both scenes with the men in uniform calling the shots. When this drama drew to a close in the late 1980s, the global scenario had undergone a qualitative change. The Cold War paradigm was over. In Pakistan, the military, Mullah and the media refused to change costume. They were so well synchronized and the benefits were as attractive as the uncontested hegemony over the sixth largest populace of the world. They decided on the sequel even when the original script writers had withdrawn. For ten years, the next theatre was Indian-administered Kashmir and a proxy prize fight between Saudi Arabia and Iran in the form of sectarian killing at home. A vast edifice of non-state actors with the not-so-covert official patronage was being built. During the years of mock democracy, the press was an effective instrument in the make

and break of governments while the Mullah, heavily engaged in the exercise of militancy on the eastern and western fronts, was a convenient expedient to swell a scene or two when the political drama so required.

During the Zia era, the shrinking ranks of the liberal, progressive and democratic journalists, writers and intellectuals took a heavy drubbing. Many left the country and the remaining few were forced into oblivion. Hundreds of eminent journalists and writers were banned on state-run media. Heavy censorship was in place and the private newspapers were too afraid to hire those who had incurred the wrath of the soldier-turned Mullah as well as the Mullah-turned-soldier. So liberal and democrat writers were forcibly kept out of the business while their political, ideological and professional competitors were furnished with a walkover. Pakistan, from 1977 onward, has been a classic example of a security state where invisible characters rule the roost.

It is difficult to distinguish a soldier from a Mullah and a Mullah from a journalist; their roles are so deceptively overlapped. More often than not, one person is all three. In the morning, he is a soldier, dispensing with his professional duties. In the afternoon, he holds consultations with the bearded characters and fine-tunes the nuances of the policy to steer the world towards godly ways. Later in the evening, the same person carouses with the journalists and delves in nitpicking about civilian leaders with animated zeal. As Pasternak would have us believe, such situations are ideal for characters like Chamrovsky, the wily politico in 'Doctor Zhivago', who believed that every government found him useful since he had no compunctions at all.

Pakistan, in the wake of 9/11, has two paramount realities: one, the long-standing establishment has no desire or intention to relinquish its hold on power and let the elected representatives formulate the policies. Two, in order to accomplish the first goal, the omnipotent rulers do not afford to shed either the Mullah or the pliant pen-wielders. In the 1960s and 70s, students held the key to political wheeling and dealing. For a brief period, lawyers came in handy. Lawyers' role was critical but short-lived and due to their rather limited approach, could not be relied upon for long.

Media (especially electronic media) has the outreach, the permanence and the sway required to mould the public opinion in accordance with the need of the hour. In Pakistan's indoctrinated ambience, nothing works better than a journalist with a belated awakening of the holy truths. There are dozens of religious and Jihadi publications but their influence, taken together, cannot match a single mid-level daily or a mediocre anchorperson, especially if he can wail and fulminate alternately. Most senior journalists today learned the tricks of the trade in the late 1970s or 80s. Apart from their religious

persuasion under de trop indoctrination, they understand only too well who the real decision-makers are. They are averse to let go of prized tracts of land, coveted professional assignments, clandestine privileges and of course direct access to information that turns them into a sought-after media person overnight.

Methodology of Militant Press

It is incorrect to place all militant media men in the same basket. There are diehard zealots who act to establish a godly system as a divine mission. There are opportunists who act as horses for courses and will stick to their present colors till they see the end of the tunnel. And there are so-called Jihadis who may agree with some points of the imposed narrative but may diverge at certain points if they meet a persuasive argument. However, in today's Pakistan, media is predominantly militant, anti-west, Islamist and anti-democracy. They support the covert game being played in the mountains of Hindukush and plains of the Indus valley. Pakistan's garrisoned legions and the Mullah have a stark possibility of divergence, though at the moment remote. Men in uniform have a nationalist agenda, at the most a regional one. However, the pedigree Mullah has a global, rather cosmic agenda and will not lose time in ditching the soldier if he believes that the moment to move forward has arrived. Here, the militant media, too, may experience internal fissures. However, the force of faith may hold the sway because a mind immersed in dogma is prone to disregard nationalist considerations.

The tools, employed by the militant media, are classic propaganda tools of a group with an ideological mission, i.e. denial, deception, diversion and variations of emphasis. The projection or suppression of a certain piece of information is of primary significance. The placement and the use of a peculiar diction also carry subtle messages, especially for a readership or audience that is already converted to a standpoint. Indirect indoctrination can be very effective, especially when repeated in different contexts.

It is interesting that the legions of militant media men drill one point at a time and thus create a sense of urgency about the issue at hand. For example, when they speak of the Kerry-Lugar legislation, dozens of pieces appear in the media in a day or two. Naturally, it becomes the talk of the town. Then they pick Article 6 of the Constitution (high treason) and all media is abuzz with Article 6 and the dangers of ignoring it. The militant media has a convenience that they need to drill in just the doctrinal part and cannot care less about facts and figures. Figures and data can be refuted by counter arguments with sources of data and figures. Doctrine is invincible. It is just to drum what is already accepted by the recipient populace. The lack of facts

and figures is compensated with an anecdotal style. Anecdote, verifiable or not, can be catchy and also relieves the writer of the burden of analysis. For the sake of brevity, given below is a set of values promoted by militant media as against normal democratic values:

Preferred value framework of militant media as against desirable values		
1.	Global expansionism	Nation State
2.	Territorial revisionism	Peace
3.	Theocracy	Democracy
4.	Moral policing	Human rights and freedoms
5.	Uniformity / regimentation	Pluralism / diversity
6.	Disregard for global norms	International order
7.	Rule by fiat	Public discourse
8.	Opposition to education and healthcare	Quality of life / human capital
9.	Exploitation and extortion	Production and trade
10.	Prejudice / violence	Tolerance
11.	Hierarchy / discrimination	Equality
12.	Submission / conformism / tradition	Dissent / innovation
13.	Hawkish nationalism	Patriotism
14.	Revolution (read eruption)	Evolution
15.	Physical power	Knowledge
16.	Hatred / polarization	Harmony
17.	Fear / intimidation	Security
18.	Morality	Ethics
19.	Deception	Transparency
20.	Authority	Participatory debate

Analysis

Weapons of Mass Distortion: A Closer Look at the Jihadi Media in Pakistan

Wajahat Ali

In the days leading up to the storming of Lal Masjid in 2007, Rageh Omaar, a popular British broadcast journalist, visited the controversial mosque-madrassa complex in Islamabad and was surprised to see a well-stocked pharmacy and a small general store at Jamia Hafsa, an adjacent seminary for female students.

Talking to a female seminary administrator, he asked if there were any trained pharmacists at the medical facility.

"They have all done medical courses and are well trained," said the woman in full-body veil. She told the visiting journalist that the medical facility was free for the students at the seminary.

Omaar mentioned this incident in his documentary, observing that "this willingness to help anyone in need is one of the reasons the Red Mosque is respected by the poor who don't have a state health service to depend on."¹

Writing in a British magazine, he maintained that the mosque wanted to "create a model for Pakistan's estimated 20,000 madrassas to follow."

He noted: "It was the simple but tested and highly effective Islamist model of setting up parallel social and welfare institutions, aimed at highlighting how the state had failed the majority of ordinary people. It has worked for Hamas in Palestine, Hezbollah in Lebanon and many others."²

Most analysts believe that Islamists across the Muslim world are thriving in the absence of responsive state structures. An evidence of that can be found in jihadi publications produced in Pakistan that, among other things, focus on the lack of good governance in the country.

An article published in daily *Islam* contends: "It is the responsibility of the government to address the law and order situation, create employment opportunities, provide shelter to people, educate the masses, and give quality health service and social security to its citizens. But the question is: have our rulers tried to address these issues or even taken a step in this direction?"³

Another write-up on the same page mentions the drainage problem in a small township. It claims that residents of the area are suffering from water-borne diseases, and states that "they are not very happy with their elected representatives". The article says that the government had launched a mega project in 1990 to fix the problem. But it had not produced the desired results even after 18 years – mainly because of the corrupt practices of public servants.

Now compare these accounts to a video released by the Taliban in 2006. It showed the footage of hangings ordered by influential clerics in Miranshah, in North Waziristan tribal region. According to a news report, the people who were hanged were described as "criminals and bandits" and their bodies were "dragged through the streets by pick-up trucks, in a grisly demonstration of rough justice in an area where the civil administration has, according to tribesmen, collapsed."⁴

According to Zahid Hussain, author of *Frontline Pakistan*, "Whenever a state fails to provide security to its people, someone will fill the gap. The Taliban began to release such videos when the army went into the tribal areas and the political administration collapsed."

"Surely," he added, "the group was trying to present itself as an alternative to the government."⁵

According to a special report prepared by a United States think tank, the militant groups in Pakistan "seek to transform politics through religion and religion through politics."⁶

"Unlike the old Islamists, who were willing to enjoy, at a minimum, peaceful existence with secular politics, the new Islamists are unwilling to brook such an option. Often learning the art of politics from secular modernists, especially the use of print and visual media, the new Islamists wish to transform both the state and civil society in the image of what they believe can be a truly Islamic order."⁷

Most jihadi outfits produce their own newspapers, magazines or videos to push their respective political agendas. This is despite the fact that they have found considerable support among the country's mainstream media. Yet, they do not completely rely on the conservative segments of the press and bring out their own publications.

Muhammad Amir Rana explains the reason for that in a write-up on jihadi media in Pakistan. He points out that these publications not only help

militant groups “attract financial and human resources” but also propagate “their concept of jihad.”⁸

“In August 1990,” he recalls, “Institute of Policy Studies, a JI [Jamaat-e-Islami] think tank, organized a seminar in Islamabad on the ‘Role of Islamic Media in the Afghan Jihad’. Editors of jihad publications attended the seminar and agreed to form a union of Islamic media. They also decided to form a religious committee to guide the media and to draft principles of Islamic journalism.”⁹

Amir Rana reports that “various organizations have now started short courses in Islamic journalism” and at least one pro-Taliban religious seminary in Karachi “offers a master’s degree” in the subject.¹⁰

As the United States Institute of Peace report points out, “New Islamists often are well-versed in the technical and scientific infrastructure of modernity and embrace modern technology but reject cultural modernity. Moreover, unlike the old Islamists, the new Islamists rely heavily on the mass media rather than on traditional political institutions to mobilize support.”¹¹

A small booklet, available in open market, explains why jihadi organizations are trying to set up a parallel media industry.

Written in Urdu, the publication maintains that the Jewish community controls media outlets across the world. It laments that “even the Muslim states have to depend on them” to acquire a better understanding of the world. The author describes “Reuters, CNN, AFP and BBC” as “weapons that our enemy uses against us.” He claims that these media networks neither want Muslims to understand each other nor Islamist movements to learn about each other since that will help them integrate and coordinate better.¹²

The booklet criticizes the Pakistani media, accusing it of “playing right into the western and Indian hands.” The media in Pakistan is “working against national interests” and most newspapers “cannot distinguish between harmful and harmless material.”

“Certain Pakistani newspapers only print those statements that run against our religious discourse. They also print suggestive photographs.”¹³

The author concludes: “It is true that journalistic ethics require these publications to accommodate the opposing view; but it is not right for them to give priority to such opinions.”¹⁴

Media Manipulation

It is fascinating to study the media strategy of different militant organizations. Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), which was banned in the wake of the November 2008 terror attacks in Mumbai, distanced itself from Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT) soon after the incident.

“Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and Jamaat-ud-Dawa are not the same organizations,” Abdullah Muntazar, a JuD spokesman, told CNN-IBN. “We have nothing to do with any kind of armed activities in Kashmir or anywhere else. We are only operating inside Pakistan. We are only focusing on humanitarian work, education and preaching.”¹⁵

Jamaat-ud-Dawa's parent organization, Markaz Dawatul Irshad, was co-founded by Hafiz Muhammad Saeed and Abdullah Azzam, a Palestinian scholar who became an ideologue for Hamas and molded Osama bin Laden's political career. A few years down the road, the organization set up its armed wing, Lashkar-e-Tayyaba.

The LeT launched several attacks in Indian-held Kashmir. The group's former leader, Hafiz Saeed, declared in February 2000 that “Kashmir was a ‘gateway to capture India’ and that it was the aim of the Markaz and its military wing, the LeT, to engineer India's disintegration”.¹⁶

But in January 2009, the LeT issued the following statement from Srinagar: “Our struggle is only confined to Kashmir and we have no relations or association with armed groups operating at the international level. We have no global agenda. We just want the freedom of Kashmir and if it comes through peaceful means, we will welcome it.”¹⁷

Interestingly, some of the images in Jamaat-ud-Dawa's 2001 diary belie this claim. One of them says: “We have seen the Soviet meltdown. Now India will crumble and, in the future, the raging flames of jihad will also consume the United States and Israel.”

Shortly after the Mumbai attacks, *Ghazva*, a Jamaat-ud-Dawa publication, eulogized the terrorists, pointing out in its headline that they had “made military history”.

It also printed a lengthy editorial on the issue, saying: “On the very first day of the Mumbai attacks, the Indian media and government officials launched their tirade against Pakistan, Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and Hafiz Muhammad

Saeed. They did not have any substantial evidence against them. But the Indian news outlets were seemingly asked to launch their propaganda campaign as soon as the onslaught began.”¹⁸

The editorial criticized the administration of Pakistan’s former military ruler General (r) Pervez Musharraf for “not showing spine” to the Americans after September 11, 2001, adding that the Indians were encouraged by Pakistan’s “cowardice” and started beating the war drums in the wake of the Mumbai attacks.

It claimed that New Delhi was trying to quell “over 39 separatist movements”, adding: “If there is an open war between India and Pakistan today, a large number of Indians will side with the Pakistan Army and rebel against the brutal and manipulative political system of their country.”

The editorial claimed that “Muslims are treated like slaves in India”. It also added: “The Deccan Mujahideen have brought the plight of Muslims before the international community. India must understand that it needs to set its own house in order.”

Mocking the Indian security forces, the write-up concluded: “If India cannot fight a handful of attackers, how will it take on Pakistan?”

Jamaat-ud-Dawa stopped printing *Ghazva* soon after it was banned by the government. But it launched a new periodical from Lahore to run a campaign against the UN-imposed restrictions against it.

Promoting the concept of jihad, the new publication, *Jarrar*, maintained: “Protest demonstrations will not work. The infidels must be put to the sword since that is what they fear the most.”¹⁹

The paper kept a meticulous record of pro-Jamaat-ud-Dawa rallies across Pakistan. Quoting a leader of the Kashmir freedom movement, it maintained that “unarmed Muslims are dying in Palestine and Kashmir. Yet, the UN Security Council remains silent.” It added: “We must not succumb to the Indians. This will not bring peace to the region. We will have to deal with our archenemy, the Hindu, in a different way.”²⁰

The LeT has always tried to promote jihad. According to Amir Mir, its international magazine, *Voice of Islam*, even taught its readers “how to use swords, spears and daggers” and “how to set up an ambush and lay siege to camps and cantonments.”²¹

But Jamaat-ud-Dawa acquired a human face in the wake of the October 2005 earthquake. The organization did extensive relief work, winning hearts and minds in the quake-affected areas.

Jarrar frequently claimed that Hafiz Muhammad Saeed was punished for doing relief work. But Saeed's conversation with Dr Ayesha Jalal in 2006 revealed that he fancied jihad more than anything else.

"Working to alleviate human suffering might be construed as *jihad-o-jihad*, a derivate of jihad used in speaking of everyday struggle," Dr Jalal writes. "Saeed allowed as much, but in his view the results could not compare with the benefits of the military struggle he and his men were waging in Afghanistan and Kashmir."²²

Militant Groups and the 9/11 U-turn

It is widely believed that the post-9/11 jihadi literature has acquired an anti-state dimension. But Zafarullah Khan, an independent political analyst who has written extensively about militant outfits and their publications, has a different observation. He points out that these magazines and newspapers frequently criticize official policies. Yet, they take immense pride in the fact that Pakistan was created in the name of Islam and that it is the only Muslim country that possesses nuclear weapons.

"They have a negative opinion of the government," Khan says. "But their discourse about the state of Pakistan is affirmative in nature. Only a few jihadi organizations have the trans-boundary mission of establishing the caliphate. But the Pakistani militant outfits do not want to expand the frontiers of the state."²³

Be that as it may, Washington's response to the September 11 terror attacks jolted the militant groups in Pakistan. Most jihadi publications described the US military campaign against the Taliban as a "crusade against Islam." Some of them claimed that it was a "battle of Cross and Crescent."²⁴

In this context, Pakistan's then military ruler, Pervez Musharraf, appeared on the state-run television and made his famous speech, declaring that "Pakistan will not allow its territory to be used for any terrorist activity." He imposed a ban on five militant outfits, pointing to the fact that "we are not the custodians of taking jihad all over the world."²⁵

Musharraf later explained: "India had already tried to step in by offering its bases to the United States. If we did not join the United States, it would

accept India's offer. What would happen then? India would gain a golden opportunity with regard to Kashmir. The Indians might be tempted to undertake a limited offensive there; or, more likely, they would work with the United States and the United Nations to turn the present situation into a permanent status quo. The United States would certainly have obliged."²⁶

None of this satisfied the jihadi outfits that had painstakingly nurtured their relations with the Taliban.

In January 2001, these groups had held an important meeting at Darul Uloom Haqqania, the famous seminary in Akora Khattak, condemning the UN resolutions against the Taliban. The meeting was attended by Maulana Masood Azhar of Jaish-e-Muhammad (JM), Maulana Khalilullah Ferozi of Taliban, Sufi Muhammad of Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM) and a high-ranking former military officer, General (r) Hameed Gul.

The conference urged Islamabad to disregard the UN resolutions and to express solidarity with the Taliban. It resulted in the creation of the Council for Afghan Affairs that was headed by Maulana Samiul Haq.²⁷

Given their close ties with and sympathy for the Taliban, it was difficult for these groups to reconcile with the changing orientation of Pakistan's foreign policy in the wake of the September 11 terror attacks in the United States.

In February 2007, Hafiz Muhammad Saeed said "jihad has been ordained by Allah. It is not an order of a general that can be started one day and stopped the other."²⁸

While some militant outfits only condemned the reorientation of Pakistan's foreign policy in their publications, others, like the TNSM, decided to fight alongside the Taliban. According to Amir Mir, Sufi Muhammad led a large number of his followers to Afghanistan. "Thousand of the youngsters he had taken to Afghanistan in the aftermath of the US invasion were killed by the Northern Alliance troops and hundreds of others were trapped by various Afghan warlords, who literally sold them back to their relatives in Pakistan for huge sums of money."²⁹

Another person who reportedly went against the state after its 9/11 U-turn was Maulana Masood Azhar who, according to Muhammad Amir Rana and Rohan Gunaratna, sent a message to the Taliban that "they should carry out militant activities in Pakistan to press the Pakistan

government to withdraw its support for the US-led war on terror against the Taliban." The proposal came up for discussion in a Kandahar meeting but was shot down by the Taliban leadership. Jaish-e-Muhammad activists were subsequently accused of launching attacks on churches and foreign interests in Pakistan.³⁰

It is important to remember, however, that the top Jaish leader was also suspected of going against the state much before New York and Washington came under terrorist attacks. According to a report in the *Los Angeles Times*, during his detention in India, Masood Azhar "admitted to aiding the 1993 street war against US forces in Somalia."

The Jaish leader, who was then working with Harkatul Mujahideen, was dispatched to Kenya by his boss, Maulana Fazlur Rehman Khalil, in 1993 to meet with leaders of the Somali group Al-Ittihad al-Islamiya. The foreign militants complained that Pakistan "is working in favor of America and America is trying to establish its rule in Somalia."³¹

It may be recalled, however, that the 24 Pakistani soldiers who were ambushed in Somalia were working under the United Nations auspices. But the top Jaish leader was also against Islamabad's policy of assigning troops to UN missions and wrote a book against it.³²

It is also reported about Masood Azhar that at the time of his visit to India on a fake Portuguese passport, he was in close contact with Osama bin Laden. In his book, *A to Z of Jihadi Organizations*, Amir Rana has quoted one of his sources as saying: "I think Osama wanted to bring the mujahideen of Harkatul Ansar directly under Al Qaeda network and felt that Maulana Azhar was just the man to lead them."³³

Militant Groups and Military Operation in the Northwest

Different militant groups have different ways of looking at the war in Pakistan's northwestern territories. Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which has been fighting a bruising battle against the country's security forces, has released several videos to demean the government and the Pakistan Army.

One of them shows the images of General (r) Pervez Musharraf and the former US president, George W. Bush, as the following message is read out in Urdu: "Patriotic Pakistanis! I want to draw your attention to the fact that the Jewish lobby and the American CIA want to seize the assets of Muslims worldwide. They need agents in the Muslim countries to

accomplish this goal. These agents do everything for their self-interest ... Just look at the condition of the Muslim states. Our leaders, who are working for the United States, are left with no moral sense. They are not independent enough to make peace agreements. They only do what they are asked to do. They spill the blood of their Muslim brothers to please their western masters."³⁴

In an apparent bid to break the will of their enemy, these videos show the corpses of TTP victims. They sometimes parade captured soldiers in front of the camera and make them say that they "are happy in the Taliban captivity."

Another video, prepared by the Ummat Studio describes the Pakistani soldiers as "agents of Jews and Christians," adding that "they have done in North Waziristan what Israel does in the Occupied Palestinian Territory."

It shows militants using automatic rifles and sophisticated battlefield equipment and maintains that the jihadi groups are fighting a "defensive war." The video says that "the conflict between good and evil will not end."

It claims that "this government has always dispatched its soldiers to the battlefield with an elaborate plan. Yet, they have always failed against the mujahideen groups."

However, *Jarrar*, which has become a mouthpiece for groups fighting in Kashmir, remains soft on the army. Discussing the situation in Swat in one of its editorials, it says: "The military operation has been intensified in the valley since the establishment of Islamic courts and the destruction of girls' schools in the area. As in Bajaur, a large number of people have been displaced and ordinary citizens are suffering more than anyone else. For a very long time, a conspiracy was being hatched against the Pakistan Army and it has now been made to fight its own people."³⁵

Jihadi publications, without an exception, support the imposition of Shariah in the country. They believe that Pakistan should distance itself from the US-led alliance, stop the war on terror and return to its pre-9/11 policies.

However, militant groups who were previously fighting in Kashmir view Pakistan's military involvement in its restive tribal belt and volatile settled areas of the NWFP slightly dispassionately.

Al Qaeda Influence

Hattin is an Al Qaeda magazine that is also available in Urdu. Unlike the local jihadi publications, it is not available at newsstands across the country. But it is definitely read by members of militant groups that produce their own books, magazines, newspapers and journals.

The magazine is named after a town where Saladin fought the decisive battle against the 'Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem' and captured or killed the vast majority of the 'Crusader forces'.

A short write-up in the beginning of the magazine says: "We are once again fighting against the Crusaders. In the past, Muslims were only trying to get back the Al-Aqsa Mosque. This time round, even the holy land of Ka'aba is under the Jewish and Christian influence."

"Let's not forget that we will have to fight this battle just like we fought the previous war. In fact, we will have to put in greater effort and sacrifice more. Previously, the Crusaders were only targeting Muslims. Now, they want to destroy Islam. This, in short, is the message of *Hattin*."³⁶

The magazine printed several articles on Lal Masjid after the military operation in Islamabad. It contained a message from Al Qaeda deputy chief Ayman Al-Zawahiri and the will of Maulana Abdul Rashid Ghazi, deputy administrator of Lal Masjid, who was killed in the security forces' operation at the mosque.

It also printed an advertisement, asking "experts and university students" to prepare atomic, bio-chemical and other weapons for "the mujahideen". Pointing to the fact that "the Crusaders" were using "destructive technology" against Muslims, it asked the potential candidates to contact those "mujahideen groups" in their area "who are not rendering their services to 'agencies'."

Hattin is not the only Al Qaeda publication available in Urdu. Several other books, pamphlets and periodicals are also rendered in the local language for greater understanding and outreach. These publications heavily quote from the Quran and the Hadith to substantiate their pro-jihad rhetoric. Some believe that they also provide a broader guideline to the local militant groups. But some of the material produced by Al Qaeda is even too hot for Pakistani radical outfits to handle. Osama bin Laden's opposition to the Saudi state, for instance, rarely echoes in these magazines since most of the local militant

groups look up to the royal family and greatly admire the Islamic nature of the Saudi state.

But when it comes to general issues, Osama bin Laden and his militant group exercise tremendous influence over the jihadi media in Pakistan. According to *The Al Qaeda Reader*, a compilation of essays, articles and recorded statements of global militant leaders, Bin Laden considers "moderate Islam" as "a prostration to the West."³⁷

Most local publications agree with Al Qaeda on this issue, criticizing the government for indulging in religious reforms.

Jamaat-ud-Dawa launched a campaign against the previous administration when it decided to repeal the Haddood laws. Its monthly publication, *Al-Dawa*, focused on the issue, trying to oppose the development as strongly as possible.³⁸

Just like Al Qaeda, the local publications also maintain that western states – particularly the United States – are losing their battle against "the mujahideen." A news report in *Jarrar* says "the US is crumbling in the wake of its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan." It maintains that "the growing economic turmoil in America has forced its people to queue up for unemployment allowance."³⁹

A report in *Al-Dawa* claims that "democracy and communism have failed" and "riots and martial law are expected in the United States." The write-up argues that in the present circumstances, the Islamic system of "caliphate" is around the corner.⁴⁰

Conclusion

Pakistan's security forces are fighting a bruising battle against militant outfits in the troubled northwest. Yet, its government has not managed to devise an effective strategy against the growing threat of radicalism.

The Musharraf administration imposed a ban on some militant outfits and tried to restrict their media activities. However, these extremist groups continued to bring out their publications under different names.⁴¹

Today, the real challenge before the government is not to impose sanctions against these groups or to stop them from printing their own magazines, newspapers and journals: It is to make these militant outfits socially irrelevant and counter their vicious propaganda campaign.

This will only become possible, however, if the content of these publications is closely examined. The government needs to determine how the jihadi media products are fueling radicalism in the country. It also needs to figure out the factors behind their market success.

The country's political administration will not be able to stem the rising tide of religious extremism without reducing the social acceptability of militant ideas. Most jihadi organizations will be forced to shut down their media wings if the demand for their publications is reduced.

Notes

- ¹ Witness Special, "Inside the Red Mosque," Al Jazeera, July 27, 2007.
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5s8vn9mKZs&NR=1>
- ² Rageh Omaar, "Battle for Pakistan's Soul," The New Statesman, July 12, 2007.
<http://www.newstatesman.com/international-politics/2007/07/red-mosque-pakistan-state>
- ³ Daily Islam, Islamabad, February 16, 2009.
- ⁴ Arshad Sharif, "Pakistani jihadi videos thrive on execution scenes," Reuters (Posted on May 1, 2006).
http://www.redorbit.com/news/international/487271/pakistani_jihadi_videos_thrive_on_execution_scenes/index.html
- ⁵ Zahid Hussain, an interview with the author, Islamabad, February 2009.
- ⁶ Judy Barsalou, *Islamic Extremists: How do they Mobilize Support?*, United States Institute of Peace (Special Report 89, July 2002).
<http://www.usip.org/files/resources/sr89.pdf>
- ⁷ Ibid.
- ⁸ Muhammad Amir Rana, "Jihadi Print Media in Pakistan: An Overview," *PIPS Research Journal Conflict and Peace Studies*, Vol. 1 (2008), Number 1.
- ⁹ Ibid.
- ¹⁰ Ibid.
- ¹¹ Judy Barsalou, *Islamic Extremists: How do they Mobilize Support?*
- ¹² Attaur Rehman Manglori, *Media ki Yalghar: Aik Barhta Huwa Challenge* (or Media Onslaught: A Rising Challenge), (Rawalpindi: Zilal Al Quran Foundation, 2004), p.29.
- ¹³ Ibid, p.57.
- ¹⁴ Ibid, pp.57-58.
- ¹⁵ <http://ibnlive.in.com/videos/82851/banned-jamaat-speaks-cribs-against-the-world.html>
- ¹⁶ Amir Mir, *The Fluttering Flag of Jihad*, (Lahore: Mashal Books, 2008), p.153.
- ¹⁷ Iftikhar Gilani, "LT to support democratic struggle to liberate Indian-held Kashmir," Daily Times, January 19, 2009.
http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009\01\19\story_19-1-2009_pg1_10
- ¹⁸ Ghazva, Lahore, December 5-18, 2008.
- ¹⁹ Jarrar, Lahore, February 16, 2009.
- ²⁰ Ibid.
- ²¹ Amir Mir, *The Fluttering Flag of Jihad*, pp.153-154.
- ²² Ayesha Jalal, *Partisans of Allah: Jihad in South Asia*, (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2008), p.3.
- ²³ Zafarullah Khan, an interview with the author, Islamabad, February 2009.
- ²⁴ The October 2001 issue of Jaish-e-Muhammad is the case in point.
- ²⁵ Ahmed Rashid, *Descent into Chaos*, (London: Penguin Books, 2008), p.117.
- ²⁶ Pervez Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire*, (New York: Free Press, 2006), p.202.
- ²⁷ Imtiaz Gul and Sadaqat Jan, "From Akora Khattak with love," The Friday Times, January 19-25, 2001, Vol. XII, No. 47.
- ²⁸ Amir Mir, *The Fluttering Flag of Jihad*, p.152.

²⁹ Ibid, p.92.

³⁰ Muhammad Amir Rana and Rohan Gunaratna, *Al Qaeda Fights Back: Inside Pakistani Tribal Areas*, (Islamabad: PIPS, 2008).

³¹ Paul Watson and Sidhartha Barua, "Somalian Link Seen to Al Qaeda," The Los Angeles Times, February 25, 2002, <http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-022502hawk.story>

³² Khaled Ahmed, "Our jihadi militias in Somalia?," The Friday Times, January 12-18, 2007.

³³ Muhammad Amir Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan*, (Lahore: Mashal Books, 2007), p. 220.

³⁴ TTP videos are usually not available in open market. But the author has seen the movie clips mentioned in this section.

³⁵ Jarrar, Lahore.

³⁶ Wajahat Ali, "The Word of Jihad," Herald, June 2009.

³⁷ Edited and translated by Raymond Ibrahim, *The Al Qaeda Reader*, (New York: Broadway Books, 2007), p.22.

³⁸ Al Dawa, January 2007.

³⁹ Jarrar, Lahore, February 16, 2009.

⁴⁰ Al Dawa, Lahore, November 2008.

⁴¹ Muhammad Amir Rana, *Jihadi Print Media in Pakistan: An Overview*.

Report

An External View of the Vernacular Press in Pakistan

Ranga Kalansooriya

Hailing from a conflict ridden socio-political background in another neighbouring country - Sri Lanka, it was not much difficult for me to understand the trends and styles of Pakistani media fabric since both countries share many social, cultural and political dynamics. But in an honest note I must admit the fact that my attempt here is not to be a 'pundit' or a 'master' on Pakistani media and its present challenges. My 'fact finding mission' was just confined to mere two weeks in Islamabad, Peshawar and Karachi, apart from my frequent visits to Pakistan.

The main objective of my short research was to look into the professional standards of the vernacular print media in Pakistan. With logistical assistance of the Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) I monitored some vernacular daily publications in Islamabad and Peshawar, interviewed journalists, editors, publishers and some civil society activists. Thus, this short report would shed a light on the present status and challenges to the vernacular press in Pakistan along with some recommendations.

Background

Radicalised media has become an unshaken - if not growing - challenge within the highly militarised and volatile Pakistani society. Though relatively independent compared to some neighbouring countries in the South Asian region, Pakistani media - especially the regional vernacular press - is under influence and pressure from the militant groups, security forces as well as some political and economic interest groups. Experts cite numerous reasons for this phenomenon which would be discussed in the following paragraphs.

Pakistan's 176 million people have access to a gamut of media products with 142 proper newspapers¹ (over 1000 a day if regional, religious and other forms of publications were also counted)², some 125 radio channels³ and more than 80 television (satellite) channels.⁴ Though half the society is illiterate (Even the official figure on literacy is 54%, this rate goes drastically low in the regions, mainly in the conflict areas), print media still believed to play in shaping the mindset of the society. Nevertheless, radio is the most practical and accessible mode of media in the less developed and illiterate regions.

Most interestingly, a survey by the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies found that 69% of 16 journalists and editors thought that radicalisation was crippling freedom of expression. 50% found that the radical media had an impact on mainstream media, and 57 % thought that the media was concealing facts about radicalisation.⁵

The history of radicalisation of Pakistani media goes back to its era of independence where the pro-partition political movements commenced agenda driven newspapers in spreading their 'radical messages' across to the masses at large. Newspapers like Dawn (English) and Nawa-i-Waqt (Urdu) were established with specific agenda of supporting the concept of a Pakistan carved out from the Indian subcontinent. Since then Pakistani media, especially the vernacular press was a victim of many religio-political interest groups with different formations and agendas. According to Nawa-i-Waqt Resident Editor Javed Siddiq⁶ the objective of the establishment of his newspaper was an Islamic Republic of Pakistan. "So we have to be pro-Islamic and against any separatist movement in Pakistan. We are against any damage to the Islamic ideology, as well," he said.

One of the major perpetrators in radicalising the country's media has been the Pakistani government itself after the birth of new Pakistani nation. According to a revealing of an inquiry committee the Directorate of Information of the Government of Punjab has channelled funds to several newspapers that had an anti-ideological view on Ahmadis with a view to counter and campaign against the latter with radical ideological approach.⁷

Thus, different actors from different theatres infiltrated media - especially the print media - in Pakistan, in different forms. This trend, according to Muhammad Azzam⁸, went to an extent where radical groups 'planted' their members within media systems.

However, the influence of interested parties or groups was not the only contributing factor for media to be radicalised. Several other factors were unearthed during a recent study carried out by this writer in Pakistan - especially in Islamabad, Peshawar and Karachi.

These contributing factors either directly result in radicalisation of media or directly affect professional standards which indirectly pave the way for media to be radicalised. A short research study on the news reporting standards and styles in the Urdu press was conducted by the author in July 2009 where these factors were analysed through monitoring several selected national and regional Urdu newspapers for a period of one week, interviews and a short literature survey. The monitoring of the leading news items in the Urdu

language newspapers included a critical analysis on their reporting styles, adhering to basic principles of media ethics, language and diction used and the manner in which leading stories were treated in the report.

Thus, the following contributing factors were identified:

1. Influence by the Interest Parties

It was clear that either militant/extremist groups or the State entities directly or indirectly influence the media, especially the vernacular press. Since the ruling period of Gen Zia-ul-Haq penetration of militants or extremist activists into media has been taking place and – sometimes under State patronage. Senior journalist Mubashir Bokhari explains⁹ how Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) activists entered into media field for the purpose of propaganda during the Afghan War. This situation has developed to an extent where some radical/extremist groups are ‘planting their own members’ within the media system.

The other side of the situation is the direct influence by the security forces and the militants on media – mainly on the vernacular press. Also most of the regional Urdu newspapers are under influence/threat by extremist groups or the security forces, says Qasim Nawaz, a senior Urdu language journalist. “Mainly the Taliban groups victimize regional newspapers, especially in Peshawar and Swat. No anti-Taliban content could be published in this context,” Nawaz says adding that the security forces are no different but not as bad as Taliban.

Muhammad Amir Rana views the new version of the militant media as a major influencing factor to the mainstream – especially to the Urdu media. “It (the new version of militant media) not only damaged the former’s (the old version of religious media) image of ‘serious religious publications’ by playing a critical role in propagating militant ideologies in Pakistan but also induced a fatal blow to the professional ethics of Urdu mainstream media to a greater extent,”¹⁰ he says.

2. Competition

The extent of competition could be imaginable considering the number of media products available both in print and broadcast market in Pakistan. Thus, competition within each media (between television/ radio channels or newspapers) is greater compared to the competition between different media – i.e. between print and broadcast.

Though the Pakistani media market has experienced a reduction in number of print media products within the past decade, this has not largely affected the competition between major vernacular press companies. However, the trend in the broadcast media is totally the opposite. The boom (or the burst) in the broadcast media has paved the way for an intensive competition within the broadcasting stations or channels. This phenomenon has led to a tough 'fight' not only to be 'the first to report' but also to retain the captured audience for a longer period. Thus, sensitization, glorification and exaggeration are rampant especially in the Urdu and other vernacular media.

3. Lack of Educational and Professional Standards

Poor educational standards were sighted by many experts as one of the major reasons for the low standards in Urdu journalism. "Never mind the national or English language, the regional mother-tongue is not being taught in many of our rural schools," says Adnan Rehmat,¹¹ the Country Head of Internews.

"Improving standards in the media should commence with education," said Qasim Nawaz. "We are in a country where Urdu journalists are just confined to a world of Urdu without any exposure to the international world. In this context we cannot think of a better future for Urdu journalism. Education system must be changed," he stressed. This situation leads to poor understanding of sensitive subject matters resulting in the absence of a proper media platform for healthy public discourse on crucial issues with national importance.

Another key element is the slow development of professional journalism training systems in the country which could not match to the rapid growth of the media industry. Until 2007 entire Pakistan had only 12 journalism schools or departments in universities. However, the media boom demanded expansion in media education system, and the number has been increased to 32 in the present context where journalism departments in universities such as the Peshawar University has been developed to the state-of-the-art standards with international support.

Emergence / boom of broadcast media also crippled the print media to a greater extent by attracting senior journalists for better salaries and perks. Expansion of broadcast media attracted many senior journalists from the print media, due to which the print media is suffering badly from, says Adnan. "More than 80% of present print news desks are with youngsters who have less than three-year experience and they are between the ages of 20 to 22 years. Their academic and exposure background is in a pathetic condition in

understanding complex issues. Thus, their own perception or bias creeps into their own stories," he says.

Poor working condition and safety issues have also affected the standards of journalism, mainly the Urdu press. Low salaries, absence of incentives and other benefits, no insurance schemes do not attract qualified youngsters to the profession. Perks and privileges for journalists vary from their working language to geographical areas. The gap between a Islamabad/Karachi based English language journalist and NWFP based vernacular language journalist is drastic. Peshawar based Urdu journalist Ghani-ur-Rehman¹² says his monthly income is less than USD 120 (Pak Rs10,000) even after 14 years of experience in journalism. "Sometimes, it takes months to get our salaries. I have three kids and life is extremely tough for us," he said.

However, this situation is gradually getting better, according to some vernacular journalists. "Before 2007, my salary was less than Pak Rs 5000," commented Ghani. The average monthly income of an Urdu journalist has been doubled during the past three to five years. This development has prompted a visible increase in the standards of Urdu media, according to Qasim Nawaz. "We have seen a development in the quality of Urdu media given the competition and the development of perks and privileges to journalists. Especially the present standard of Urdu media is better than what it was five years ago. But that does not mean we have rich standards – not at all," Nawaz said.

It was noticed during the one-week Urdu press monitoring period that the print media news desks have become extensively dependent on the broadcast media. This could even be seen in the English press also but to a lesser extent. Many newspaper stories mention their source to 'Monitoring Desk' which is highly depending on mainly broadcast media reports. In fact this has become a syndrome where, it was noticed, that lethargic approach of news journalist to sensitive issues has come to an alarming level. The danger is the print media's dependency on a highly competitive and glorified reporting in broadcast media without practicing its own journalistic norms and procedures.

In fact some media organizations have their own print and broadcast media and the stories are frequently exchanged between the two media. Perhaps, the absence of a converged news-desk provides the average reader with a view that the particular story in the newspaper has been 'hijacked' from a television channel.

4. Exploitation by the Corporate Ownership / Advertising Market

Less qualified journalists with low professional standards are an indirect blessing in disguise for the ownership for many media institutions in many parts of the world – kind of a global phenomenon. It provides the ownership with immense economic and ideological benefits in manipulating the content according to his/her political, economic, religious or other forms of agendas.

“Urdu journalists are under exploitation by the owners. In English journalism, you need to be qualified, at least up to the Masters level and also these qualified individuals would challenge the owner’s ideology and authority, at least to some extent. In contrast, the low standard in Urdu journalism is due to poor salaries and poor educational standards. This is something under the total discretion of the owner to get his message across through his own publication without professional confrontations and conflicts. Therefore, there exists huge gap between English and Urdu journalism.” Nawaz says.

The other most important element is the advertising among which most prominent for regional press is the State’s 25% stake. The regional newspapers have become an innocent victim of this state advertising monopoly which has some USD 20 million budget per annum making the government the largest source of advertiser for the print media in the country, according to Adnan. The untold factor of this phenomenon is that the government is using this mammoth advertising budget to dictate terms to the regional newspapers. “Government uses its advertising quota as a pressure point on regional newspapers so that no newspaper can stand against the government,” says Adnan.

5. Conservative Market

Many experts believe that Pakistan experienced a remarkable economic growth during the past decade – especially during the Musharaff regime – creating an extensive consumer market which has also positively affected the media including the vernacular press. Despite this expansion of the highly commercially valuable market, the ideological environment of the conservative Pakistani media consumer market has not changed - in contrast, it would have deteriorated into radicalism. Therefore, the Urdu media intends to win and retain its market through catering to this ideologically radicalised market.¹³

This ‘catering to the radicalised readership’ concept is more applicable to the regional vernacular media comparing to the national newspapers which

cannot take side with one school of thought or ideology due to the vulnerable national level market. "We should be aware of our national market which consists of every district of Pakistan irrespective of their ethnicity or other allegiances," says Javed Siddiq, the Resident Editor of pro-Islamic newspaper Nawa-i-Waqt. "As mainstream Urdu media we should not resort to ethnicity or any other divisions. Therefore, we cannot afford to antagonize our own regional markets. If we do not keep these sensitivities in mind, we lose our circulation," he stressed.

Urdu media by comparison has been less liberal, more conservative and has tended more often to veer towards radicalization because such a policy sells, says Bilal Lakhani¹⁴ of the Express Media Group. According to its Executive Editor Muhammad Ziauddin¹⁵ that policy sells because the Urdu media consumers have a typical mindset--- a mindset born out of prevalent socio-political environment reinforced by what can be described as the 'officially certified truth' about the country's history, the reasons for its coming into being and a fictional interpretation of Islam's glorious past.

Recommendations and Conclusion

Being one of the most influential and reached-out media, the vernacular press needs urgent attention of the concerned parties to uplift its standards to professional status. One must be mindful of the fact that improving the standards of vernacular media means improving the social – political standards of its own population. Thus, this remains the most crucial element in media development as well as stabilization of democracy through creating an informed public.

The first initiative should be from the corporate ownership of the media houses commencing with recruitment. Presently those who are being attracted to the profession (mainly vernacular press) at the entry level are with poor educational qualifications and low standards mainly due to the low salary structures. This chicken-egg cycle must be changed with immediate effect. The employers should look at high educational standards in higher skills in its endeavours in improving the social standards in the profession.

The existing vernacular media community must be provided with continuous professional training in two fronts. Their skills in the second language (preferably English) must be drastically enhanced while exposing them to international best practices and standards. The ownership tends to invest heavy on the technology and machinery but not on the human resources. This phenomenon needs to be changed and more attention is required in investing on enhancing the professional and social standards of the existing human

resources at the vernacular news desks that should necessarily include the senior level – especially the editors. This would pave the way for much needed change of attitude, aptitude and perception at large.

A change in the perception of the culture of vernacular press is direly needed. More perks, recognition and working standards are diverted to the English press in any media house (where both vernacular and English press exist) depriving the vernacular journalist. This culture of 'imbalanced treatment' or rather discrimination must end while introducing equal treatment to all journalists irrespective of their working language. I would not object if one needs to pay more attention to the vernacular press against the English press given the present context of working conditions. These professional incentives should include social security initiatives such as insurance schemes and other safety covers, especially for those who are working in vulnerable areas.

These measures would certainly attract skilled, educated youth to the profession which is totally opposite to the present dynamics in the media field.

The donor-funded media development projects should pay more thrust on the development of the vernacular press in the country. The donors should understand the fact that the desired outputs or outcomes in good governance or other democratic goals could not be achieved without improving the standards of the vernacular press in the country. Media is not limited to urban centric elites, but its total opposite.

If one accuses the media of being corrupt, and put the main blame on the vernacular press, it's the responsibility of those same accusers to find answers to the next immediate question – 'why is it corrupt?' The answers to this simple question rely on a less-complex social research.

The most important factor in this entire process is the unity among different players in the media theatre. It is totally unfair to put the blame on corporate ownership if the journalist community is not prepared to the desired professional change. Thus, it is a collective effort of the owners, editors and journalists at large without excluding those of the government. The most cardinal responsibility of the state is to create the necessary socio-political environment for the professional enhancement of media.

The last component is the market. It is learnt that the vernacular press in Pakistan has long been a follower of the market, but not a leader or a guide. This situation needs a drastic change. The reader should be well informed

and be educated, enabling him/her to question the media. This is a common vacuum in many parts in South Asia, not confined only to Pakistan. However, it is the responsibility of the same media in doing so – informing and educating the reader. Thus, we are still stuck in another chicken – egg cycle which could only be broken by the collective of owners, editors and journalists.

Notes

-
- ¹ *Understanding the Militants' Media in Pakistan*, (Islamabad: PIPS, 2010).
 - ² Qasim Nawaz, an Urdu media journalist, an interview with the author, Islamabad, July 26, 2009.
 - ³ http://www.pemra.gov.pk/pdf/List_of_Licences_Operational.pdf
 - ⁴ http://www.pemra.gov.pk/pdf/LIST_OF_SATELLITE_TV_LICENCE_ISSUED.pdf
 - ⁵ *Between radicalization and democratization in an unfolding conflict: Media in Pakistan*, (Denmark: IMS, 2009).
 - ⁶ Javed Siddiq, Editor daily Nawa-i-Waqt (Urdu), an interview with the author, Islamabad, July 28, 2009.
 - ⁷ Muhammad Azam, "Radicalization and Media," *PIPS Research Journal Conflict and Peace Studies*, Vol. 1 (2008), Number 1, p. 22.
 - ⁸ Ibid.
 - ⁹ Ibid.
 - ¹⁰ *Understanding the Militants' Media in Pakistan*, (Islamabad: PIPS, 2010).
 - ¹¹ An interview with the author, Islamabad, July 27, 2009.
 - ¹² An interview with the author, Peshawar, July 29, 2009.
 - ¹³ Muhammad Azam, "Radicalization and Media," p. 25.
 - ¹⁴ Author's email interview (August 2009) and follow up meeting with Bilal Lakhani, Karachi, December 2009.
 - ¹⁵ Email conversation with the author, August 2009.

Dialogue

Media Seminars on Militants' Media in Pakistan and its Impact

The Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) organized a series of policy dialogues to seek expert opinion on a PIPS research report titled 'Understanding Militants' Print Media in Pakistan and its Impact'. The report maps the militants' media, its genesis and evolution, and impact on the Pakistani state and society. The report also profiles publications of the militants' media, colloquially known as 'jihad media', along with publications of madrassas, sectarian groups and/or associated individuals, and mainstream media groups which support the narrative of the militants' media. Besides content analysis of the four types of publications, the report also discusses at length the parallel propaganda campaign by militants in the form of leaflets and *Shabnamas* (night letters). The report finds that the militants' media is gradually expanding its influence and outreach, having frustrated government efforts to close it down by continuously resurfacing under new names.

The sessions brought together a large number of media representatives, scholars and academics to discuss the militants' media in Pakistan. There was near consensus during the sessions that the mainstream media also shared responsibility for the current spate of militancy and radicalization in Pakistan as it had failed to put in enough efforts to counter, or at least not side with, the militants' media. Details of three sessions organized by PIPS are given below:

Session 1

First event of the series entitled "Jihad Through Media" was organized in Islamabad on October 20, 2009.

Zafarullah Khan (Executive Director, Centre for Civic Education)

Religious journalism is not a new phenomenon in Pakistan. However, we need to differentiate between religious journalism and militants' journalism. Government-endorsed bodies such as the Council of Islamic Ideology have been giving recommendations to regulate the media and tune it according to Islamic values. But I was amazed at the significant change that came about in the tone and tenor of the recommendations after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. I would like to quote one recommendation that emerged in a

meeting in 1978, suggesting that Pakistan should include *Kalima-e-Tayyaba* and inscribe Allah-o-Akbar on the national flag as these symbols would be a source of inspiration for the majority of the people in Pakistan, instigating in them the desires of martyrdom and jihad. Quite surprisingly, the flag of the Taliban bears these symbols.

Academic discourse has also remained supportive of this kind of media narrative. Some of the leading scholars in journalism in Lahore and Karachi have been asserting that if we want to reform Pakistani society, we need Islamic journalism whose sole source of inspiration should be "*Amr bil Ma'roof wa Nahi Anil Munkir*", enjoining the good and forbidding the evil, a methodology which was later internalized by almost all jihadi publications. Some academics have even argued that it is a false notion that the media's sole responsibility is to provide accurate and up-to-date information. They insist that the media is also bound to interpret developments from an Islamic perspective and strive to promote the Islamic way of life through its discourses.

Despite their huge circulation, militants' publications may have little impact. You can find commonalities between the militants' media and some segments of the mainstream media. To be honest, the vocabulary, the argument, the construction of the argument, especially in *Zarb-e-Momin* and a few Urdu newspapers, has startling similarities. I have tried to decipher 10 to 12 columns, which had amazing similarities but I do not have any empirical evidence. May be it was just a simple case of plagiarism.

Amir Zia (Director News, Samaa TV)

The PIPS study on the militants' media is unique, phenomenal and groundbreaking. But I have a few observations and reservations. First, we should not call the militants' media 'jihadi media'. The term jihad is sacred to Muslims. Jihad is one of the basic tenants of Islam. So calling such publications jihadi is akin to providing them much needed religious legitimacy. My second reservation is regarding the use of the term Islamic journalism. A journalist is a journalist. IN its essence, journalism means being objective, fair and neutral. The militants' media does not meet the basic standards of journalism. Hence, it may be called propaganda literature. The effective manner in which it changes the minds of innocent people through half-baked and faulty information and discourses should be looked into seriously.

Then there is the question of freedom of expression in the media, which is also important. I remember when daily *Islam* was banned a few years ago, the

Pakistan Federal Union of Journalists and the Karachi Union of Journalists organized protests to oppose the government's decision in the name of freedom of press. But I think propaganda and journalism should be separated. The state has every right to ban hate material, or any literature or writing that may incite violence or terrorism.

Afzal Khan (South Asia Free Media Association)

The concepts of freedom of expression and freedom of press come with certain social, political and cultural responsibilities. Everyone should have the right to raise one's viewpoint but using the media as a tool and instrument of propaganda to incite and mislead people and distort facts amounts to abusing the freedom of expression.

The jihadi organizations and their literature particularly mushroomed during General Zia-ul-Haq's martial law and the Soviet-Afghan war. The state also encouraged the mainstream media to highlight the jihad in Afghanistan.

Taufeeq Asif (President Rawalpindi Bar Association)

The media needs to be unbiased and impartial in reporting militancy. It is the best tool for freedom of expression but it may not be used to disseminate hate messages and advocate violence.

Javed Siddique (Resident Editor, daily *Nawa-i-Waqt*, Islamabad)

The publications of religious political parties in the Subcontinent including those of the Jamaat-e-Islami, Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam and Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan were there even before Pakistan gained independence. However, before independence, such publications were not necessarily advocating jihad as vigorously as is being done now. I agree with the other speakers that the Afghan jihad, endorsed by the CIA, ISI and other forces, led to a mushroom growth of militancy and the militants' media in Pakistan. Jihad publications have supported Al Qaeda, Taliban and other jihad groups in Pakistan. In fact, the Kashmir dispute, the occupation of Palestine and the presence of international forces in Afghanistan have provided jihadi publications a cause to promote violence and incite participation in jihad in Kashmir, Afghanistan and Palestine. As long as the issue of Kashmir, Palestine and Afghanistan are unresolved, jihadi organizations and their publications will continue to flourish and it will be difficult to curtail them.

Dr. Tariq Rehman (Director, National Institute of Pakistan Studies)

The militants' worldview, that is to dominate the world through any means, precedes the 9/11 tragedy. It is promoted by international hooliganism, by trade powers, but also by the fact that most of the rulers in the Muslim world are from exploitative elites. These authoritarian regimes have not allowed the liberties which normally prevent grievances from becoming extremism. The publication of reports on such topics by PIPS will help understand the different dimensions of militancy in Pakistan, of which the media front is the most important. Some of the speakers raised very important points regarding the terminology used to describe such media. There is a case for rethinking the terminology we use because language is a powerful tool that influences the mind. There is a worldview, emotions and attitude which grow with the language. It is, therefore, important to pay attention to the terms we use.

Session 2

The second event of the series, entitled 'Assessing the Reporting, Approach and Impact of Militants' Print Media in Pakistan', was organized in Lahore on November 18, 2009.

Hussain Naqi (Journalist and human rights activists)

An analysis of the militants' media in Pakistan that fails to discuss the role of the mainstream media will not be a true description of the narrative being pursued and promoted by the former. It is hard to ignore the opinion expressed throughout this seminar that part of Pakistan's mainstream media has been manifesting an approach that is very close to the militants' media's, and media barons of Pakistan cannot be absolved of the responsibility of creating and promoting an extreme religious or ideological view in the country.

Qazi Javed (Intellectual)

The jihad media blossomed during the Afghan jihad and has been consistently demonizing 'others' – anyone other than militants – until now. In the 1990s, around 100 jihad publications were disseminating radical and extremist ideas among Pakistani youth. A big segment of the mainstream media tacitly endorses the jihad media narrative.

The basic objective of the militants' media is to publicize their cause in an emotional tone. The difference between the free and jihad media is that the free media presents the facts before the masses but the jihad media interprets

the facts according to their own agenda, which is not regional but international. Therefore, the war against these jihadi outfits is not only for the survival of a country but for humanity and civilization. It is a true world war and the failure to recognize its importance would be disastrous.

Hameed Akhter (Columnist)

Pakistan's mainstream media has miserably failed to counter the militants' media. Unfortunately, the mainstream media also subscribes, intentionally or unintentionally, to the ideology being disseminated by the militants' media. Its effectiveness and outreach and its sphere of influence is greater than that of the militants' media.

Dr. Rubina Saigol (Human rights activist)

The textbooks being taught in schools contain content that incites against non-Muslims and the space for alternative thought is shrinking. Even in the mainstream media, anyone speaking about the rights of Ahmadis and Christians is considered a heretic.

Khaled Ahmed (Member PIPS Advisory Board)

The Pakistani media is under immense pressure and threat from militant outfits. Militant and extremist outfits do not tolerate criticism. The Pakistani media is quite vocal in criticizing the government for the sake of criticism but we see that it is reluctant to raise a powerful and clear voice against terrorist outfits.

Session 3

The third and final event of the series entitled "Radical Media and its Trends in Pakistan" was organized at the Islamabad Press Club on December 17, 2009.

Tariq Parvez (Chairman National Counter Terrorism Authority)

The terrorists believe that half of their battle is being fought in the media. Therefore, the mainstream media needs to play its role to create popular support for government's counter-terrorism strategy. The media can be used as the best tool to defeat terrorist ideologies.

Abdul Majeed Mughal (Editor monthly *Nawa-e-Ahl-e-Sunnat*)

The militants' media is a propaganda campaign that need not to be included in a serious discourse on journalism. The government is equally responsible for the mushroom growth of such publications in Pakistan, which promote hatred and violence in the name of religion and jihad.

Wajahat Ali (Journalist)

Youth is the prime target of the militants' media. Such media tries to disparage the political and democratic process in Pakistan and presents religious extremists as an alternative to corrupt state elements. The conservative segment of the mainstream media also reflects the opinion of militants.

Abdul Latif Bhat (Kashmir Media Watch)

The militants' media in Pakistan has been instrumental in advocating global jihad.

Arif Bahar (Expert on Kashmir affairs)

The gap between religious and liberal journalism is widening, which is being exploited by the militants' media. In order to counter the narrative being disseminated by the militants' media, it is imperative to bridge this gap.

Abdullah Muntazir (Editor weekly *Jarrar* of banned *Jamat-ud-Daawa*)

The ban on legally published jihad publications during Gen Pervez Musharraf's regime paved the way for radical media, which is disseminating hatred and preaching violence in Pakistan.

Sajawal Khan Ranjha (Editor of monthly *Baidar-e-Millat*)

The Pakistani media still has to go a long way to its destination. It relies mainly on information and has not yet touched the education and training aspects. The reform and transformation of the media will come after that.

Shabana Fayyaz (Assistant Professor, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad)

Myopic policies of successive governments have contributed to the growth of the militants' media. We should not confuse religious journalism with militants' journalism.

Ammar Khan Nasir (Editor monthly *Al-Shariah*)

The militants' media is only one part of a bigger problem of militancy in the country. Pakistan needs to re-evaluate the discourse of jihad at the state level. It is also debatable if waging jihad in Kashmir and India is in accordance with *Shariah* law.

Salim Safi (TV anchor)

The mainstream media alone should not be blamed for supporting radicalism or militancy in Pakistan. The jihad ideology had influenced a large number of journalists during the Afghan jihad, which was endorsed by the international community.

Neelofar Bakhtiar (Senator, Pakistan Muslim League-Q leader)

The mainstream media need not create confusions among the masses but should create consensus on such issues. It is the moral and social responsibility of the mainstream media to counter the narrative being developed by the militants' media.

Zahid Khan (Senator, Awami National Party leader)

The role of the media has become very important in the face of organized propaganda by so-called 'jihadi' elements. The mainstream media could educate the general public on the issue of terrorism in a much more effective way.

Dr. Ayesha Siddiqi (Defense and political analyst)

I dispute the notion that the media enjoys freedom in Pakistan. Many writers with alternative points of view still find it difficult to reach out to the masses through the media.

Lt Gen (r) Talat Masood (Defense and political analyst)

The positive role of Pakistan's mainstream media to turn public opinion against radical and extremist forces is commendable. The people associated with jihadi publications feel that if they do not continue to propagate their ideology, other forces would dominate them at the local and international level. Extremist views being disseminated by the militants' media must be challenged intellectually and with concrete arguments.

Abstracts

Evolution of Suicide Terrorism in Pakistan and Counter-Strategies

Khuram Iqbal

In the wake of the US-led war on terror, Pakistan became one of the prime victims of suicide terrorism. It is described as world's third worst-hit country in terms of suicide attacks, after Iraq and Afghanistan. In the first quarter of 2008, Pakistan even surpassed war-torn Iraq and insurgency-hit Afghanistan in term of the number of suicide bombings. Anecdotal evidence suggests that suicide attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq have primarily been motivated by the presence of foreign forces in the two countries. But the phenomenon has emerged in Pakistan though the country is not under foreign occupation. This paper seeks to develop an understanding of the complex phenomenon of suicide terrorism in Pakistan.

Terrorist Attacks and Community Responses

Amjad Tufail

One of the main objectives of terrorists worldwide is to create panic and shake people's confidence in the state. The psychological effects of terrorism go beyond the immediate victims of an attack and can cause complex and diverse post-traumatic stress disorders. This study—based on public perspective ascertained through a survey conducted in three Pakistani cities—assesses the psychological effects of terrorism on people's attitudes. It reveals alarming impact of terrorism on children, as well as on adults' behaviour, and underlines the significance of the psychological impact of terrorist attacks on a population. The findings also underscore the need for the news media to reflect on the pattern of its coverage of terrorist attacks. The study also analyzes the social discourse on anti-terrorism efforts and advocates that it should inform the state's counter-terrorism strategies.

Radicals' Influx into Border Areas: Impact on Inter-state Relations in South Asia

Muhammad Amir Rana

South Asia is in the grip of an assortment of conflicts, ranging from territorial claims and other inter-state conflicts to internal insurgencies and separatist movements. The main conflicts in South Asia have centered on the states' borders and have led to the emergence of cross-border networks of separatist and insurgent movements. Initially seen as a reaction to political, social, and economic deprivations, most of these movements have absorbed radical and extremist ideologies—both Islamist and leftist—mainly on account of the states' internal weaknesses and the protracted nature of border disputes. Radicalization is now also spreading to the border regions where such movements were earlier absent, which could have grave implications for the ties between bordering states. The states in South Asia generally lack confidence in each other to form joint mechanisms to counter common threats. This paper suggests that a regional approach is indispensable to deal with the growing threat of radicalization along the international borders in South Asia.

Evolution of Suicide Terrorism in Pakistan and Counter-Strategies

Khuram Iqbal


Introduction

Following the launch of the US-led war on terror, Pakistani society witnessed the most brutal social, political and religiously-motivated violence in the form of escalated suicide terrorism.¹ The “death squads” of various inter-linked terrorist outfits pushed the country towards mayhem. Suicide bombers indiscriminately targeted the security forces, political leaders and activists and civilians. In the year 2007, Pakistan was described as the world’s third worst-hit country by suicide attacks after Iraq and Afghanistan.² In addition to ambushes, roadside bomb blasts and target killings of political leaders, nearly 60 suicide attacks were reported during the year 2007, which killed at least 770 people and injured another 1,574.³ This was a sharp rise from six suicide bombings recorded in Pakistan in 2006. Out of the 60 suicide attacks in 2007, 37 specifically targeted security installations and personnel. In the first quarter of 2008, Pakistan even surpassed war-torn Iraq and insurgency-hit Afghanistan in terms of suicide bombings. The number has been on the rise since. At least 18 suicide attacks rocked the country between January 1st and March 1st that year.⁴ Most of the suicide attacks occurred in Pakistan’s volatile Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and North Western Frontier Province (NWFP).

Chronology of Suicide Attacks in Pakistan

Year	Number of Attacks
1995	1
2002	1
2003	1
2004	5
2005	2
2006	6
2007	60
2008	63
2009	86
Total	225

Mapping Suicide Attacks in Pakistan during 2007



Anecdotal evidence suggests that the phenomenon of suicide attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq has been primarily motivated by the presence of foreign troops in the two predominantly Muslim countries. In September 2007, a report by the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) confirmed that the perception of occupation of Afghanistan by foreign forces is a primary motivating factor behind suicide attacks. The report noted that suicide assailants in Afghanistan and their supporters seemed to be mobilized by a range of grievances.⁵ These include a sense of occupation, anger over civilian casualties in military operations against the Taliban, and perceived affronts to their national, family, and personal sense of honor and dignity arising from the conduct of counterinsurgency operations by allied forces.⁶ These motivations are all linked to the presence of foreign forces. In Iraq, many suicide bombers were reported to be foreigners themselves. Yet the wills and martyrdom videos and statements left by the bombers indicate that they felt a strong bond with Iraq as a Muslim land, and believed that their act was a powerful tool for liberation. Until the 2003 US invasion, there had never been a suicide attack in Iraq. Since the invasion, suicide terrorism has escalated rapidly.⁷

But suicide bombings have shot up in Pakistan even though the country is not under foreign occupation and—barring missile strikes by US drones in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan—only Pakistani security forces have been acting against the militants. Is this really a manifestation of rising Islamic

extremism in Pakistan, or an expression of revenge against the government's counter-measures that are perceived to be excessively heavy-handed, disproportionate and indiscriminate? Is suicide bombing a strategy used by desperate militant groups against a stronger enemy, or a phenomenon motivated by extreme poverty and a sense of deprivation? Is the presence of international forces in Afghanistan a factor fueling suicide attacks in Pakistan? Why are such attacks becoming the most dominant tactic among terrorist organizations in Pakistan? This paper seeks to answer these questions.

It is primarily focused on exploring the actors and the motivating forces behind suicide terrorism in Pakistan. It concludes that the phenomenon of suicide terrorism in Pakistan is complicated and multi-dimensional. Diverse elements contribute to shape the destructive trend which poses a security threat to the entire world. A multi-pronged strategy, involving efficient intelligence, precise military operations, public awareness campaigns and a comprehensive de-radicalization program would be required to counter suicide terrorism in Pakistan.

Suicide Attacks in Pakistan (1995-2009)

Area	Number of Attacks
NWFP	114
FATA	30
Punjab	34
Sindh	7
Islamabad	14
Balochistan	7
Azad Kashmir	2
Total	208

Methodology

There is a dearth of primary sources on the subject. Only limited research work has been done on suicide terrorism so far, particularly in the context of South Asia. Some research papers have been written, but their focus on Pakistan is nominal at best. Abundant information is available in secondary source with regard to suicide attacks. However, most of it is statistical in nature and does not discuss the drivers of suicide terrorism in Pakistan. Moreover, unlike Iraqi suicide bombers who record video statements before conducting an attack, the use of such technology is not rampant among Pakistani suicide bombers. It is partly for this reason that most investigations

into suicide attacks in Pakistan remain inconclusive, as the law enforcement agencies fail to identify the perpetrators, motives, masterminds and the source of material used in suicide attacks in Pakistan. Nevertheless, law enforcement officers involved in investigating suicide bombers, agreed to share their views and findings on the subject. Requests to interview detained would-be suicide bombers held in Pakistani prisons were denied due to security concerns and the issue's sensitivity. The study is largely based on secondary sources—newspapers, books, research reports, socio-political studies and other relevant material—on the subject.

Actors behind Suicide Terrorism in Pakistan

i. Al Qaeda: the Trendsetter

Tactics such as suicide bombings, beheadings and systematic killing of tribal elders have never been a norm in Pakistani and Afghan societies. The arrival of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan in 1996 during the Taliban regime and the dissemination of its violent and militant ideology led to radicalization of the predominantly Pashtun Taliban militants on both sides of the Pak-Afghan border. The first suicide attack in the history of Afghanistan was carried out by Al Qaeda when it assassinated veteran military commander Ahmad Shah Masood—an ethnic Tajik, and moderate anti-Soviet resistance leader—on September 9, 2001, eliminating the last stumbling block in the way of Taliban's rule over the entire country.⁸

Al Qaeda was also involved in the first ever suicide attack in Pakistan. On November 19, 1995, an explosive-laden pickup truck rammed into the gates of the Egyptian Embassy in Islamabad, killing 15 people and injuring 59.⁹ Though the direct responsibility for the attack was not claimed by Al Qaeda but by Egypt-based Islamic Jihad,¹⁰ however, circumstances pointed to Al Qaeda's involvement.

For instance, the funds for the attack were raised by Al Qaeda's deputy chief Ayman Al-Zawahiri, when he was visiting the US in 1993 to raise funds for a charity working for Afghan refugees.¹¹ Furthermore, soon after the bombing, Pakistani authorities arrested Ahmed Said Khadr, suspected to be involved in the terrorist attack. Khadr is thought to be among the founders of Al Qaeda and a key financier of its operations.¹²

Since the November 19, 1995 suicide attack, the global terrorist outfit, in collaboration with Pakistani jihadi groups, has frequently used the lethal modus operandi to achieve its strategic goals and strike targets in Pakistan. Al Qaeda and associated groups in Pakistan resorted to suicide bombings on a

massive scale after the Pakistan government decided to side with the international community in the war on terror. The second suicide attack in Pakistan in which Al Qaeda was directly involved took place in the garrison city of Rawalpindi in December 2003. The target was the then military ruler president Pervez Musharraf. Reports claimed that Abu Faraj al-Libbi, the chief operational commander of Al Qaeda masterminded and financed the assassination attempt on Musharraf. Al-Libbi was closely associated with Al Qaeda's North African cells before becoming involved in Pakistan. According to Amir Mir, a journalist and expert on Al Qaeda, the attack on Musharraf was the first field operation for al-Libbi.¹³

Pakistan suffered 224 suicide attacks between 2002 and 2009. The wave of suicide attacks in Pakistan also signified the revival of Al Qaeda and its associates after they were forced to flee their bases of power to the area along the Pak-Afghan border area as a result of the war on terror launched by the US-led coalition forces in October 2001. Most of the attacks were attributed to Al Qaeda and its affiliated groups in Pakistan. Al Qaeda has specifically targeted the army, paramilitary forces and police personnel and, occasionally, politicians. Since it has been able to find sanctuaries and vital training facilities in FATA, Al Qaeda is likely to remain a key driver behind suicide terrorism in Pakistan in the near future.

Though the international terror network Al Qaeda is regarded as the trendsetter, the phenomenon of suicide terrorism largely remains indigenous. In a statement issued in the aftermath of deadly twin suicide attacks at Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF), at Wah, in September 2008, Federal Interior Minister Rehman Malik revealed that the suicide bombers, their handlers and financiers were all Pakistanis.¹⁴ However, there are some exceptions. For instance, Al Qaeda used a bomber of Saudi origin to target the Danish Embassy in Islamabad in June 2008.¹⁵ Similarly, Pakistani law enforcement agencies believe that Uzbek militants hiding in FATA are also involved in various suicide attacks across Pakistan.¹⁶ Local suicide bombers affiliated with various terrorist outfits have been able to attack high-value targets, such as the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) complex and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) interrogation center in Lahore. The use of local human resources has an added value also because it would not be as easy for foreigners, with a different complexion and features, to get in crowd, approach targets in high-security areas unnoticed and then blow themselves up.

ii. Al Qaeda-Affiliated Groups

The statistics on suicide attacks in Pakistan confirm that erstwhile jihadi organizations now fighting alongside Al Qaeda have been involved in most

of the suicide attacks in Pakistan in recent years. Investigations by government agencies also indicate that suicide bombings are the work of multiple militant and terrorist outfits linked to Al Qaeda, including Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), local Taliban groups active in FATA and splinters of various jihadi outfits.

Lashkar-e-Jhangvi tops the list in terms of sophistication and lethal nature of suicide attacks carried out by its operatives. In fact, the LeJ is the first sectarian terrorist group in the world to resort to suicide bombings. The group carried out its first suicide attack in Quetta in July 2003, targeting a Shia procession. The LeJ was launched in 1996 as a splinter group of the SSP, a Sunni Deobandi offshoot of the Jamait Ulema-e-Islam. Initially, the group was focused on killing members of the rival Shia sect. However, over the course of time, the LeJ underwent a radical transformation from just another sectarian group to an Al Qaeda-affiliated anti-West terrorist outfit.

The group has also used suicide bombings as a tool for sectarian strife in Pakistan. Almost all of the suicide attacks against the Shias in Pakistan have been attributed to the LeJ. It started using the lethal *modus operandi* against the Shia sect in the July 2003 Quetta bombing when a suicide attacker killed more than 45 Shias gathered for a Muharram procession. That was the first time that the LeJ chose Quetta as the battleground in its sectarian war. The city might have been chosen because of two reasons. Firstly, Pakistani security and law enforcement agencies had decimated the LeJ by 2003, capturing or killing its key leadership. Riaz Basra, the founder and operational head of the LeJ was killed in a shootout in Vehari district of Punjab in May 2002, while his lieutenant and right-hand man Akram Lahori was arrested by the police in June 2002. Subsequently, the group was reorganized by a member who belonged to Quetta.¹⁷ Security experts believe that he chose to launch the first suicide attack by the revived outfit against the rival sect in Quetta because of his knowledge of his native city. Secondly, in 2003, many Taliban militants, who were released from detention centers in Afghanistan, joined the LeJ. Most of them were detained and tortured by members of the Shia-dominated Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. Possibly driven by the desire to avenge their humiliation at the hands of Northern Alliance, they decided to target Shias in Quetta, located close to the Afghan border.¹⁸ The terrorist outfit had launched 13 suicide attacks by June 2009, specifically targeting the Shia community in Pakistan.

Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, infamous for the secrecy of its operations, lethal attacks and unrelenting pursuit of its targets, is also believed to train female suicide bombers. In June 2005, law enforcement agencies arrested two female would-be suicide bombers of the LeJ from Swat after an extensive search operation.

The information about two sisters, 20-year-old Arifa and 22-year-old Saba, came to the limelight in October 2004 when intelligence agencies arrested a key LeJ member, Gul Hasan, who was involved in the planning and execution of suicide attacks at two Shia mosques in Karachi. During investigation, he disclosed that the group's new strategy was to launch suicide attacks using female bombers and that many female members of the group had been trained for the purpose.¹⁹ Investigators learned that Hasan had trained two of his nieces, Arifa and Saba, to carry out suicide attacks without the consent of their parents. According to reports, both women left their house on June 29, 2003 without informing their parents. Hasan's wife, also a member of the LeJ facilitated them to flee from Karachi and get training as suicide bombers.²⁰ Following the information provided by Hasan, the two sisters were arrested from Swat in June 2005 after an extensive search operation.

The second category of groups involved in suicide attacks are Taliban groups who are also linked to the Al Qaeda network based in the FATA region. Pakistani intelligence agencies claim that the suicide bombers being trained and launched by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan mainly target the security agencies.²¹ Until December 2007, at least 10 suicide bombings were traced to the tribal areas.²² Since the formation of the TTP, an umbrella organization of various Taliban factions in FATA, Al Qaeda-linked Taliban have been vocal to claim responsibility for various deadly suicide attacks targeting the security forces, politicians, mosques, Jirgas and funerals. The TTP is believed to have trained several hundred suicide bombers to conduct attacks in Pakistan.

The suicide bombers recruited and trained by the TTP and other Taliban factions in Pakistan are also sent to Afghanistan to target US and NATO forces stationed in that country. In January 2008, a Taliban commander told BBC Urdu that Pakistani Taliban sent more than 140 trained suicide bombers to Afghanistan between 2006 and 2008.²³ He said that the majority of the suicide bombers were Pashtuns and belonged to the rural areas of FATA and the NWFP. More than 40 bombers were from the Punjab province of Pakistan and belonged to various banned jihadi outfits.²⁴ The 2007 United Nations report on suicide bombings in Afghanistan also cites the tribal areas of Pakistan as an important source of human and material assistance for suicide attacks in Afghanistan.²⁵ Many would-be suicide bombers, hailing from the tribal belt of Pakistan, have been arrested in Afghanistan in the last few years. Shakir, 14, was one of the Pakistani bombers who went to Afghanistan for a "noble cause" and was apprehended by personnel of an Afghan intelligence agency on March 20, 2008. Shakir, a minor who belonged to Barwand village in North Waziristan, was recruited and trained by a cleric of the local madrassa he had joined to learn the Quran.²⁶ His recruiters on the Pakistani side of the border handed him over to his Afghan handlers to train him

further and take him to the actual target. Shakir was arrested when he was headed for his target in an explosives-laden car. The episode highlights the link between the Taliban insurgents on the both sides of the Pak-Afghan border. Most of the suicide bombers who carry out attacks in Afghanistan are mainly Afghan nationals and some of them had spent time in Pakistan as refugees after the Soviet-Afghan war.²⁷

Pakistani intelligence agencies hold head of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan Swat chapter Mullah Fazlullah responsible for involvement in suicide bombings targeting the security forces.²⁸ Before 2007, rolling hills, gushing streams and scenic vistas were the picturesque Swat valley's main claim to fame. The region, in the NWFP, was a magnet for international and Pakistani tourists. But suicide bombings and steady erosion of state authority over the last two years made Swat—widely known as Pakistan's Switzerland—a conflict zone where radical Islamists are pitted against Pakistan Army. Since the military launched an operation in Swat on October 22, 2007, over 300 Pakistani soldiers have been killed—over 100 in suicide attacks alone—at the hands of Fazlullah's well-equipped Taliban militia. In 2008, Swat was the worst-hit area by suicide attacks as 11 suicide bombings claimed 101 lives and injured 294 people.²⁹ Initially, Fazlullah claimed to be fighting to enforce Shariah law in Swat but later aligned himself with the Taliban movement of FATA, which was basically formed to wage jihad against the “occupying forces” in Afghanistan. Fazlullah has already vowed to extend his hold over a larger part of the NWFP, getting closer to Islamabad in the process which is 160 kilometers from Swat.

Investigations also revealed the involvement of radical madrassas in suicide attacks. All the suicide bombers identified so far studied at various radical Deobandi seminaries in Pakistan. Abid Hunzala—the suicide attacker from Rahimyar Khan who targeted a Pakistan Air Force bus in Sargodha on November 1, 2007—studied in Islamabad's infamous Jamia Faridia, a seminary affiliated with Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) that was besieged by the security forces in July 2007 over its alleged links with global jihadi outfits. Hunzala had been arrested from Lal Masjid during the operation that ended on July 12, 2007. He was later released with other individuals detained from the mosque complex. Hunzala had already been identified by the Sindh Crimes Investigation Department as a potential bomber on September 23, 2007, almost a month before he blew himself up in Sargodha.³⁰ The 16-year-old suicide bomber who killed renowned Shia scholar Allama Hasan Turabi was a student of Jamia Khalilia, located in Musa Colony in Karachi. Hafiz Younis, who blew himself up during an unsuccessful attempt to target the Islamabad airport on February 6, 2007, studied at a madrassa in Southern Punjab. Imran alias Mansoor, a would-be suicide bomber arrested from

Mohmand Agency in October 2008, was a student at Karachi's Jamia Binoria seminary,³¹ infamous for its links with the LeJ, JeM and other militant outfits. Qari Shahid Ali, a would-be suicide bomber, who was planning to target former federal minister Azam Khan Hoti, was a student at a madrassa in Tarangzai, Charsadda.³²

Motivating Factors behind Suicide Terrorism in Pakistan

Suicide terrorism in Pakistan is motivated by a range of reasons, however flawed they may be. It is commonly perceived that suicide bombers are driven solely by the desire for the rewards the religion promises in the hereafter for pursuing what they consider jihad. However, in the context of Pakistan, the religion command for jihad is not the single or primary motivating factor behind suicide terrorism. The suicide bombers in Pakistan are not just motivated by the desire for 72 virgins and other fruits of paradise. The main factors that play a role are cultural (revenge), religious (desire for a higher place in paradise), social (glorification of a suicide bomber), political ("foreign occupation" of Afghanistan and Pakistan's pro-west policies), and economic (there have been incidents in Pakistan when a suicide bomber was apparently solely motivated by monetary consideration).

The element of revenge can be described as the primary motivating factor behind suicide terrorism in Pakistan. Investigations by the law enforcement agencies indicate that suicide bombers are not frantic individuals but make conscious choices about their violent actions. They are carefully recruited by their minders who spread around the country looking for potential bombers. They usually target teenagers and individuals in their early twenties. The conflict zones of FATA, NWFP and radical seminaries in those and other parts of the country provide ideal ground for recruiting potential suicide bombers. The recruits are usually local boys, who are outraged over the deaths of their loved ones during military operations. According to the data obtained for this study, most of the suicide bombers in Pakistan are believed to come from the Pashtun-dominated FATA and the NWFP. Since 2003, massive military operations launched in FATA by the Pakistani military to evict foreign militants have resulted in death of civilians and destruction of property. In addition to the role played by indoctrination, large-scale killings of both militants and civilians during military operations have also inflated the ranks of suicide bombers across FATA and the NWFP.

In Pashtun society, religion has traditionally been subservient to culture and the concept of revenge dominates the common behavior. The Pashtun code of honor, or Pashtunwali, requires family members to exact revenge for murdered relatives.³³ The concept of Badal, or revenge, means that a Pashtun

whose family member is killed is obsessed with revenge. Revenge may take time—a Pashtun proverb goes: *Badal badal we, ko agha saal kala pas humvi* “I took my revenge after a hundred years, and I only regret that I acted in haste.”³⁴ It may take generations to avenge the wrong, but retribution will be the focus of the family’s life until such time and will be seen as the family regaining its honor.³⁵ In this context the fact that most of the suicide bombers in Pakistan are ethnic Pashtuns—many of who seeks revenge for family members killed in operations by Pakistan Army or US drone strikes inside Pakistani territory—cannot be overlooked. A discussion with a senior Pakistani intelligence officer, who offered his thoughts on condition of anonymity, is worth mentioning. He said: “Almost all suicide bombers we have arrested or identified so far refer to two particular incidents as motivating factors: the US missile strike in Bajaur Agency in October 2006 in which over 80 people were killed, and Operation Silence launched by the security forces in Lal Masjid in July 2007, which claimed more than 100 lives.”³⁶

A Taliban militant once stated: “Our recruiters usually spend over three months to find a potential suicide bomber. But a single US drone strike makes the task very easy for our recruiters. After each US strike in the tribal areas, a number of youth seeking revenge for the loss of their relatives’ lives approach our local commanders and register as suicide bombers.”³⁷

The spate of suicide bombings unleashed after the Musharraf government’s Lal Masjid operation in July 2007—which many believe was poorly handled and resulted in the deaths of over 100 women and children—demonstrates that a regime’s heavy-handedness can lead to increased suicide terrorism. Though there was widespread support for the Lal Masjid security operation, the manner in which it was conducted was deemed heavy-handed and critics slammed excessive use of force.³⁸ In fact the matter could have been resolved without resorting to use of force. The effects of the security forces’ operation at Lal Masjid were felt throughout the remainder of 2007, as the country suffered 47 suicide bombings in the last six months of the year. Before Lal Masjid, only 14 suicide attacks had been recorded in the 60 years of Pakistan’s history. In February 2008, a leading Al Qaeda-linked terrorist, Qasim Toori, claimed that over 600 would-be suicide bombers were present in Karachi and most of them were former students of a madrassa adjacent to Lal Masjid.³⁹ On March 20, 2009, Pakistani Taliban released a video in which they vowed to avenge every individual killed in the Lal Masjid operation.⁴⁰ In the 50-minute video, the Taliban claimed responsibility for various suicide attacks after the launch of Operation Silence at Lal Masjid. The video showed suicide bombers say in their “martyrdom statements”: “This is our revenge for Lal Masjid.”⁴¹

There is further evidence to suggest that revenge plays an important role in motivating Pakistani suicide bombers. The suicide bombers who targeted the POF in Wah in August 2008 were also sent to target the “Englishmen” who were supposedly manufacturing arms at the facility to be used by Pakistan Army to carry out military operations in FATA. However, one of the three suicide bombers opted not to blow up his explosives after realizing that the victims would be Pakistanis, almost all poor workers, and not the “Englishmen” he had been sent to kill.⁴² The bomber was arrested when he was trying to escape from the scene.

The use of force without meaningful efforts to address social and political issues alienates people and the perceived “tyranny” provides terrorist masterminds with fodder for their propaganda against the government, motivating potential suicide attackers.

Secondly, religion is also distorted by the recruiters to motivate a disgruntled and revenge-seeking youth to become suicide bombers. Recruiters are said to encourage the aspiring bombers by emphasizing the higher place a *shaheed*, or martyr, enjoys in heaven. The religious content in the testament tapes and martyrdom videos refers extensively to scripture in citing the many rewards for a martyr in the hereafter and in particular to a Quranic verse that asserts that martyrs remain physically alive even after death. For many impoverished teenagers, this may seem as an attractive option compared to a life of constant deprivation with little hope of change in a system where they do not consider themselves stakeholders. There have been reports of former TTP chief Baitullah Mehsud—who was killed in a CIA-operated drone strike in South Waziristan in August 2009—issuing “tickets to paradise” to would-be suicide bombers. One such letter was recovered from Mir Janan, 14, a would-be suicide bomber arrested in September 2008 from Nowshera in the NWFP. The letter promised the young boy that, “angels will carry you to heaven immediately after pressing the button of the suicide jacket.”⁴³ Another would-be suicide bomber, 19, was arrested by police in March 2007, and disclosed details about the religious motivation of the boys and young men being trained to carry out suicide attacks.⁴⁴ He said that an Uzbek trainer used to remind them that they must not forget to bow their head before setting off their explosives. “You cannot enter paradise if your head remains intact with your body,” the boy quoted the trainer as saying.⁴⁵ The 19-year-old was a member of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and a cousin of infamous Taliban commander Abdullah Mehsud. He was subsequently released in a prisoner swap with the Taliban.⁴⁶

Thirdly, the social prestige enjoyed in FATA by the individuals training to be suicide bombers is another important motivating factor. Most of the suicide

bombers are teenagers, and are fascinated by the social esteem and admiration commanded by a *Mujahid* (holy warrior) or martyr in the tribal areas. According to some reports, after the accomplishment of a suicide mission, the TTP issues “martyrdom certificates” to the family of a suicide bomber.⁴⁷ These certificates are locally considered to be a great honor for the family of the suicide bomber. Suicide bombers in FATA are glorified as saviors of Islam against the tyrant regimes of the United States, Israel and the Pakistani government and security forces, which are painted as Western pawns.⁴⁸

Fourthly, political grievances are also exploited by the trainers to mislead the youth being trained as suicide bombers in Pakistan. The written or video-taped “wills” of suicide bombers, which are readily available in FATA, invariably highlight political grievances, including perceptions of Pakistan being under the influence of “anti-Islam forces”. Most suicide attacks in Pakistan have been claimed by organizations that have clearly made a tactical decision to use suicide bombings against an unpopular government that is perceived as pro-US. These organizations, such as Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, Jamiat al-Furqan and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, have been vocal in calling the Pakistani government “an American puppet”. In July 2007, a group calling itself the Mujahideen-e-Islam published a pamphlet threatening more suicide attacks against Pakistani security forces if they did not stop “doing the bidding of the United States.”⁴⁹ The pamphlet entitled “Until Islam Lives in Islamabad” urged Pakistani soldiers to “go to your homes and earn *halal* (pure) income for your families... instead of serving the Americans.”

Fifthly, extreme poverty is also a factor in suicide terrorism in Pakistan. While suicide attackers elsewhere in the world are generally not poor and illiterate, such attackers in Pakistan tend to be uneducated and often from poor families. According to Pakistani law enforcement officers, more than 95 percent of suicide bombers in Pakistan have been from very poor and relatively less educated families. A significant number of suicide bombers hailed from Southern Punjab, the traditional stronghold of the banned militant organization Jaish-e-Muhammad.⁵⁰ Due to extreme poverty in that region, parents prefer to send their children to madrassas, instead of expensive modern schools.⁵¹ Terrorist outfits are also believed to buy children from poor parents in Bahawalnagar, Bahawalpur and other districts of Southern Punjab to use them as human bombs. Families in these districts are also known to have sold children as young as four to human traffickers for use as jockeys in the Persian Gulf states' camel racing industry.

Similarly, investigations into a suicide attack targeting the outhouse of Rashid Akbar Niwani, a member of National Assembly, in Bhakkar, on August 6,

2008 revealed the bomber was paid to target a person who had sought Niwani's help to settle a financial dispute. According to the reports, the Crimes Investigation Department arrested five people involved in the suicide attack. According to police, suspect Waqas Hussain, and his accomplices Dr Nazar Hussain, Arif Khan, Muhammad Amjad and Saeed Amjad Abbas had "hired" a suicide bomber and explosives expert from Wana to kill Ejaz Hussain, with whom Waqas allegedly had a monetary dispute.⁵²

According to a police handout:⁵³

Waqas Hussain and Ejaz Hussain, both residents of Bhakkar district, were fast friends. Waqas started a used car business after borrowing Rs 2.1 million from Ejaz, but could not establish himself and began to suffer losses. He handed over seven vehicles to Ejaz at different times to return the borrowed money, but Ejaz demanded another Rs 5.4 million. A dispute developed and both men had cases registered against each other. Ejaz finally took the dispute to Niwani and asked him to settle it. Niwani called both parties to his outhouse in the presence of local notables, listened to them and announced another sitting for August 6. Waqas and his father Nazar Hussain went to their relative Arif Khan in Dera Ismail Khan and informed him about the situation. They decided to kill Ejaz in a suicide attack and Arif asked them to arrange money for the purpose. Waqas, Nazar and Arif went to Tank where they met Jaan Muhammad Wazeer, a resident of Wana, and agreed to pay him Rs 1.2 million for the purpose. A day before the suicide attack on August 6, Jaan handed over the suicide bomber and an explosives expert to Arif. The bomber and explosives expert were later handed over to Waqas at Adda Dajal in Bhakkar district. On the day of incident, Waqas confirmed through a dispenser, Amjad Abbas Shah, that Ejaz was present at Niwani's house and took the suicide bomber there. The bomber blew himself up near Ejaz, killing him and 25 others.

Such incidents demonstrate that in some cases financial benefits have also provoked suicide killings in Pakistan.

What Needs to be Done?

The drivers and motivating factors behind suicide terrorism in Pakistan are multi-dimensional. It is only appropriate then that the phenomenon is tackled through a multi-dimensional strategy, involving political, social and economic reforms as well as proportionate use of force, which must avoid collateral damage.

Mobilizing support of the general populace through public awareness campaigns would also be crucial. In the last eight years, the electronic and print media in Pakistan have grown significantly. From one state-run

television network in the year 2000, Pakistan today has around 60 private television channels and hundreds of newspapers. The increasing power of the print and electronic media in Pakistan could be used to create a hostile environment for aspiring suicide bombers. In the aftermath of deadly suicide attacks in Pakistan in 2007-08, private media outlets produced very effective and appealing footage to challenge the use of suicide attacks on human, national and religious grounds. On account of the media's constructive role, support for suicide attacks has dropped sharply in Pakistan. A survey released in July 2009 showed that 13 percent Pakistanis supported suicide bombers in 2002. In 2009, the support dropped to 5 percent.⁵⁴ The government of Pakistan must actively and consistently engage the media in its drive against suicide terrorism.

Operational measures must be taken to prevent suicide attacks. Collateral damage during military operations must be minimized. Civilian casualties in air strikes and other operations have played into the hands of terrorists and proven disastrous for the government's overall counter-terrorism campaign. Many scholars whose work has been reviewed here stress the importance of resisting "over-reaction" to a threat. The anti-government elements often benefit from excessive use of force by the security forces—and the concomitant oppression of the community in which the militants are based or from whom they garner support—because such use of force generates and sustains support for them and their cause.⁵⁵ Data from Palestine also emphasizes the link between the humiliation and loss suffered by a population and its support for suicide attacks and the actual supply of activists. Some scholars have found that desecration of sacred places and perceived humiliation move people to embrace violence even more than death and destruction do.⁵⁶ In order to enhance Pakistan Army's counter-insurgency operations and enable it to strike precisely—in a manner that avoid civilian casualties and through means that distinguish between militants and civilians—the US and the international community's assistance would be instrumental.

Intelligence is the key to precise and effective elimination of the physical infrastructure of suicide bombers. Israel is reported to have prevented over 80 percent suicide operations through counter-intelligence operations.⁵⁷ Pakistani law enforcement agencies need to allocate more resources to enhance their human intelligence capabilities in conflict zones. These agencies lack modern equipment to investigate suicide attacks. Police forensic laboratories are not equipped with facilities for DNA testing and the mechanism to identify the attackers is also patchy. Investigators lack permanent mortuaries, where they could preserve body parts of suspected suicide bombers.⁵⁸ A considerable investment would be required to equip

Pakistani law enforcement agencies with modern technologies to probe suicide attacks.

Security measures can stop suicide attacks from physically happening, but they do not remove the ideology and motivation that drive suicide bombers.⁵⁹ Strategic measures must be carried out to discourage and de-radicalize the individuals. Turning a human being into a walking bomb and convincing him to kill human beings is not an easy task. It requires a change of the bomber's mindset through conditioning, training and brainwashing. Trainers of most militant organizations are adept at distorting the teachings of Islam to convince individuals that suicide bombing would earn them Allah's favor and paradise. As the individuals training to be suicide bombers are unaware of the true teachings of Islam and most do not learn Quran with translation or interpretation, they are easy prey for the trainers. Disseminating the message of Quran in local languages would take away the cloak of legitimacy for suicide bombings that trainers present to would-be bombers. Religious justifications for such attacks by the terrorists must be countered theologically by religious scholars, who must be persuaded by the government to play a proactive role in the face of suicide terrorism. Some efforts have been made in this regard, with religious scholars in Pakistan issuing *fatwas* (religious decrees) against suicide attacks and calling them un-Islamic. However, they have not been coordinated, or properly publicized by the government and have therefore failed to create a public response against suicide terrorism. Initially, the response from the clergy was not unanimous. While scholars from the Barelvi school of thought were vocal in condemning suicide bombings as un-Islamic, Deobandi scholars chose to stay silent over the issue. The decrees issued by Barelvi scholars had little impact as most terrorist outfits in Pakistan follow the Deobandi school of thought. It was only in October 2008 that the suicide bombings were unanimously declared un-Islamic by religious scholars.⁶⁰ The conference that issued the statement was attended by scholars from all important schools of thought in the country, including Jamaat Ahle Sunnat (Barelvi), Ahle Tashee (Shia), Ahle-Hadith, Jamaat-e Islami, Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Deobandi), and the banned Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (Deobandi). Therefore, on the face of it at least, the factions that endorsed the call comprised all sects of Islam in Pakistan. Previously such *fatwas* had only been issued by "moderate" clerics, who were seen as pro-government. Such a Deobandi-Ahle Hadith consensus to issue a decree rejecting suicide bombings as un-Islamic was unprecedented.⁶¹ The venue for the conference was Jamia Naeemia in Lahore, headed by its leader Maulana Sarfaraz Naeemi. A joint religious decree against suicide attacks by the leading religious scholars of Pakistan understandably irked Pakistani Taliban and other terrorist outfits. On June 12, 2009, Maulana Naeemi was assassinated by a suicide bomber dispatched by the Tehrik-e-Taliban

Pakistan. This was a major blow to the efforts by the clergy to challenge the religious justification for suicide bombings. The *fatwa* by top religious scholars and the subsequent assassination of Maulana Naeemi helped turn public opinion against Taliban and their terrorist activities.

Suicide bombers have a particular mindset, which needs to be changed through proper de-radicalization and reintegration measures. The onus lies on governments of Muslim-majority countries to allocate the resources to spread literacy and true understanding of Islam, especially in areas known to breed suicide bombers.⁶² Anti-terrorism literature should be included in the syllabus of elementary classes so that the new generation learns to despise the idea of bloodshed and chaos. The ready acceptance of extremists' views by poor and illiterate Muslims necessitates basic changes in the madrassa system and the appointment of educated Islamic scholars to places of religious learning.

The terrorist outfits in Pakistan maintain hundreds of individuals trained as suicide bombers on their beck and call. These bombers would not vanish overnight and a long-term strategy is required to counter suicide terrorism in Pakistan on the operational and ideological levels. But efforts to ensure an end to suicide bombings in the future need to start now. Otherwise, Pakistan will remain vulnerable to suicide terrorism as more brainwashed killers emerge from the conflict zones of FATA, NWFP and the seminaries across Pakistan.

Notes

-
- ¹ Suicide terrorism is defined as a mode of operation that requires the death of its executor to ensure its success.
 - ² Khuram Iqbal, "Drivers of Suicide Terrorism in Pakistan", RSIS Commentaries, February 27, 2008, www.pvtr.org/pdf/commentaries/RSIS0212008.pdf, last visited December 24, 2008.
 - ³ *Pakistan Security Report 2007*, Pak Institute for Peace Studies, Islamabad, January 2008.
 - ⁴ Raza Hamdani, "Khudkush hamlay: Pakistan sar-e-fehrist", (or suicide attacks: Pakistan tops the list), BBC Urdu.com, March 23, 2008, www.bbc.co.uk/urdu/pakistan/story/2008/03/080323_suicide_attacks_sen.shtml, last visited January 25, 2010.
 - ⁵ UNAMA's report on suicide attacks in Afghanistan, September 2007, http://www.unama-afg.org/docs/_UN-Docs/UNAMA%20-%20SUICIDE%20ATTACKS%20STUDY%20-%20SEPT%209th%202007.pdf, last visited January 25, 2010.
 - ⁶ Ibid.
 - ⁷ Scott McConnell interviewed Robert Pape, "The Logic of Suicide Terrorism: It's the occupation, not the fundamentalism," *The American Conservative*, July 18, 2005.
 - ⁸ Paul Wolf, "The Assassination of Ahmad Shah Massoud," September 14, 2003, <http://www.ratical.org/ratville/CAH/ASMassoud.html>, last visited January 25, 2010.
 - ⁹ McGirk, Tim, "Bomb kills 14 at Egypt's embassy," *The Independent*, November 20, 1995.
 - ¹⁰ Steve Macko, "Terrorist bomb attack on Egyptian Embassy in Pakistan", www.emergency.com/egyptbom.htm, last visited June 29, 2008.
 - ¹¹ "Context of November 19, 1995: Islamic Jihad Attacks Egyptian Embassy in Pakistan," <http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/context.jsp?item=a111995embassybombing#a111995embassybombing>, last visited January 23, 2010.
 - ¹² "Al Qaeda Family: A family divided", CBC News Online, March 3, 2004, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/khadr/alqaedafamily2.html>, last visited January 24, 2010.
 - ¹³ Amir Mir, "Abu Faraj Al-Libbi's Arrest A Decisive Blow To Al Qaeda," *Cobra Post*, <http://www.cobrapost.com/documents/Abufaraj.htm>, last visited April 6, 2009.
 - ¹⁴ Tariq Butt, "Suicide bombers, handlers & financiers are all Pakistani: Malik," *The News*, September 9, 2008.
 - ¹⁵ "Danish embassy bomber 'from Mecca'-Al Qaeda leader," *Reuters*, July 22, 2008, www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSSP66665, last visited January 24, 2010.
 - ¹⁶ Author's interview with an official of an intelligence agency who spoke on condition of anonymity, Islamabad, January 6, 2008.
 - ¹⁷ Saifullah Khalid, Urdu daily Ummat, Karachi, February 4, 2008.
 - ¹⁸ Ibid.
 - ¹⁹ Maqbool Arshad, Urdu monthly Fact, Lahore, November 2004, Volume 13.
 - ²⁰ Ibid.

- ²¹ "Charsadda and the cult of suicide-bombing," editorial Daily Times, Lahore, December 25, 2007.
- ²² Ibid.
- ²³ Abdul Hai Kakar, BBC Urdu, January 10, 2008, www.bbc.co.uk/urdu/story/2008/01/printable/080110_bombers_suicide_rza, last visited February 26, 2009.
- ²⁴ Ibid.
- ²⁵ UNAMA's report on suicide attacks in Afghanistan.
- ²⁶ "If you carry out a suicide attack, you will not die," Daily Times, Lahore, May 28, 2008.
- ²⁷ UNAMA's report on suicide attacks in Afghanistan.
- ²⁸ Amir Mir, "Surge in suicide bombings," The Post, Lahore, January 25, 2008.
- ²⁹ *Pakistan Security Report 2008*, Pak Institute for Peace Studies, January 2009, Islamabad.
- ³⁰ Azaz Syed, "Suicide bomber in Sargodha blast identified," Daily Times, Lahore, January 25, 2008.
- ³¹ "Suicide bomber presented before media," Daily Times, Lahore, November 4, 2008.
- ³² Sabz Ali Tareen, "Would-be bomber held in Charsadda," The News, Lahore, March 18, 2009.
- ³³ "Curses & Revenge Spells", <http://easterncampaign.wordpress.com/2007/06/27/pashtuns-must-have-their-revenge-sometimes/>, June 27, 2007, last visited April 5, 2009.
- ³⁴ Aftab Ahmad Khan, a native Pashtun of Charsadda district, an interview with the author, April 5, 2009.
- ³⁵ "Pashtuns" <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/pakistan/pashtun.htm>, last visited April 5, 2009.
- ³⁶ Author's conversation with a senior intelligence official who investigated a number of arrested would-be suicide bombers in Pakistan, Islamabad, December 2008.
- ³⁷ Aqeel Yousafzai, a Peshawar-based journalist, an interview with the author, Peshawar, July 2008.
- ³⁸ "Thousands protest against Pakistan mosque operation," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, July 13, 2007.
- ³⁹ "Jundullah claims 600 suicide bombers present in Karachi," Daily Times, Lahore, February 4, 2008.
- ⁴⁰ Dilawar Khan Wazir, "Fidayeen Muslamano ka aitmi plant hein," (or fidayeen are atomic plant of Muslims), *BBC Urdu*, March 22, 2009, www.bbc.co.uk/urdu/pakistan/2009/03/090322_taliban_video_na.shtml?s, last visited April 5, 2009.
- ⁴¹ Ibid.
- ⁴² Author's interview with an official of an intelligence agency, Islamabad, January 6, 2008.
- ⁴³ "Held would-be bomber reveals target," The News, Karachi, September 13, 2008.
- ⁴⁴ Shumaila Arif, Urdu monthly Fact, Lahore, May 2007.
- ⁴⁵ Ibid.
- ⁴⁶ Ibid.
- ⁴⁷ Aqeel Yousafzai, interview.

-
- ⁴⁸ Dilawar Khan Wazir, "Fidayeen Muslamano ka aitmi plant hein".
- ⁴⁹ "Militants vow 'gift of death,'" *The Post*, July 24, 2007.
- ⁵⁰ Urdu daily Jang, Karachi, September 15, 2007.
- ⁵¹ Most of the madrassas in Pakistan offer free religious education along with free boarding to the children enrolled there.
- ⁵² "Bhakkar Blast: suicide bombers for sale?" *Dawn*, Karachi, December 24, 2008.
- ⁵³ Ibid.
- ⁵⁴ Anwar Iqbal, "Decline in support for suicide attacks in Pakistan," *Dawn*, June 24, 2009.
- ⁵⁵ UNAMA's report on Afghanistan.
- ⁵⁶ Atran, Scott, "The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism," *The Washington Quarterly*, Volume 29, Number 2, Spring 2006, pp. 127-147.
- ⁵⁷ Sara De Silva, "Preventing Suicide Terrorism," *Terrorism Risk Briefing*, June 2009, www.pvtr.org/pdf/commentaries/PreventingSuicideTerrorism.pdf, last visited 15 November 2009.
- ⁵⁸ Imran Asghar, "Bottom line: Police lack modern equipment to probe suicide attacks," *Daily Times*, Lahore, April 20, 2009.
- ⁵⁹ Ibid.
- ⁶⁰ "Suicide bombing un-Islamic, only state can declare jihad: fatwa," *Daily Times*, October 15, 2008.
- ⁶¹ "Editorial: Fatwa against suicide bombings," *Daily Times*, October 16, 2008.
- ⁶² Nazia Nazar, "The menace of suicide bombing," *The Post*, June 10, 2009.

Bibliography

Books:

- Amir Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan*, (Lahore: Mashal Publication, 2006).
- Sohail Abbas, *Probing the Jihadi Mindset*, (Islamabad: National Book Foundation, 2007).
- Mia Bloom, *Dying to Kill: the Allure of Suicide Terror*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005).
- Robert Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*, (University of Chicago Press, 2005).

Journals/ Reports

- Tom Koenigs, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Afghanistan, "Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan (2001-2007)," United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), September 9, 2009.
- Yoram Schweitzer, "Suicide Bombings: The Ultimate Weapon?," International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, August 7, 2001. Assessed at www.ict.org.il
- Scott Atran, "The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism," *The Washington Quarterly*, Volume 29, Number 2, Spring 2006, pp. 127-147.
- Scott Atran, "Mishandling Suicide Terrorism," *The Washington Quarterly*, Summer 2004, 27:3 pp. 67-90.

-
- Assaf Moghadam, "The Roots of Suicide Terrorism: A Multi-Causal Approach," Paper presented for the Harrington Workshop on the Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism, University of Texas, Austin, May 12-13, 2005.
- Hekmat Karzai, "Strategic and Operational Measures to Curb the Growing Threat of Suicide Terrorism in Afghanistan," Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, Kabul, 2007.

Terrorist Attacks and Community Responses

Amjad Tufail

Introduction

Terrorism has occurred throughout the history, but today the world is experiencing its global spread. Pakistan has also faced wave upon wave of terrorist attacks in its major cities, most of them in Islamabad, the federal capital, Peshawar and Lahore, capital cities of the NWFP and Punjab provinces, respectively.

Terrorism—the use of "violence and intimidation in the pursuit of political aims"¹—involves some form of violence or the threat of violence. The perpetrators are usually individuals or organized non-state actors. Terrorists not only want to create panic but also to shake people's confidence in the government and the political leadership. Terrorism, therefore, is violence and aggression designed to have psychological effects that go beyond the immediate victims of an attack. Psychologists are of the view that aggression can both be innate as well as learned subsequently. In this regard, the works of Freud,² Lorenz,³ Frost and Howells,⁴ Dollard, Miller, Doob, Mower and Sears⁵ may be reviewed.

The main causes of terrorism can be historical, cultural, religious, economic, social or psychological. Societal pathology can also be responsible for terrorist acts. An absence of social norms, compliance, unequal opportunities of social and economic development, discriminatory laws, ineffective administrative structure and promotion of negative role models by the media may enhance the gravity of terrorism in any society. Psychologists hold that most of the cases of violence can be attributed to childhood neglect, maladjustment, as well as sexual and emotional abuse. Another characteristic leading to violence is rage. Unresolved rage leads to a number of psychosomatic illnesses, masochism, sadism and depression. International disputes—such as the occupation of Palestine, Kashmir, Iraq and Afghanistan—have also played an important role in terrorist attacks in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Pakistan has become the main target of terrorist attacks by different groups, particularly after 9/11.

The most common forms of terrorism in Pakistan in recent years have been suicide attacks and bomb blasts. Suicide attacks have ancient origins. In the Middle Ages the Jewish Sicairis and Islamic Hashishiyun sects were infamous for such attacks.⁶ In the 18th century, suicide tactics were used along the

Malabar Coast of Southwestern India, in Atjeh in Northern Sumatra and in Mindanao and Sulu in the Southern Philippines. At all these places, Muslims carried out suicide attacks in their fight against Western hegemony and colonial rule.⁷ The biggest suicide assault in recent years has been the 9/11 attacks in the US. Incidents of terrorism have since mushroomed worldwide.

Psychological Effects of Post-9/11

Initial empirical information on the psychological effects of the September 11 attacks became available soon after the incident. Based on a random-digit-dialing survey of 560 US adults conducted three to five days after September 11, Schuster et al reported that 44% of Americans surveyed were bothered "quite a bit" or "extremely" by at least one of five selected symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Results varied based on sex, race/ethnicity, and distance from the World Trade Center (WTC). Around 35% of the adults surveyed said their children had one or more stress symptoms. Galea et al⁸ studied the prevalence of symptoms consistent with PTSD and depression among 1,008 adults living south of 110th Street in Manhattan using random-digit-dialing techniques with telephone interviews conducted five to nine weeks after the WTC attacks. The findings indicated that 7.5% of the adults living south of 110th Street reported symptoms consistent with current PTSD, and 9.7% reported symptoms consistent with current major depression. Those living closest to the WTC site were found to be nearly three times as likely to have PTSD as those living farther away.

The studies reported to date have either focused on providing a broad overview of the reactions in the US, using survey assessments whose relationship to clinical diagnosis is unknown, or documenting clinically significant distress among those most directly exposed to the events. The National Study of Americans' Reactions to September 11 (N-SARS), a Web-based descriptive epidemiological study of a national cross-sectional sample of adults, was designed:

- (1) to estimate the prevalence of symptoms of PTSD and clinically significant, non-specific psychological distress in the second month after the attacks, both nationwide and in the areas most proximal to the attack sites, using screening instruments whose relationship to clinical diagnosis is well-documented; and
- (2) to examine the association of both direct and indirect exposures to the September 11 events with symptoms of PTSD and of clinically significant psychological distress. The study also reported on adults' perceptions of the reactions of children in their households.

In another study, based on responses of a national sample of adults to a survey conducted in the second month following the terrorist attacks, the prevalence of probable PTSD related to the September 11 attacks was significantly higher in the New York City metropolitan area than in Washington, DC, other major metropolitan areas, or elsewhere in the US. Given that the population of the NYC metropolitan area exceeds 10 million adults, the 5.1-percentage-point difference in the prevalence of probable PTSD between the NYC metropolitan area and the rest of the US, adjusted for age, sex, race/ethnicity, and education differences, translates into an estimated 532,240 excess cases of probable PTSD among adults in the NYC metropolitan area following the terrorist attacks.

The N-SARS estimate of the prevalence of probable PTSD in the NYC metropolitan area (11.2%) is somewhat higher than the estimate for the portion of Manhattan that lies south of 110th Street (7.5%) reported by Galea et al.⁹ The studies differed in the scope and socio-demographic composition of the samples studied and in the ways in which self-reports of PTSD symptoms were translated into "diagnoses," either of which could account in part for the differences in prevalence estimates. Despite these differences in methods, however, the 7.5% PTSD prevalence reported by Galea et al falls within the 95% confidence interval of the N-SARS probable PTSD prevalence rate for the NYC metropolitan area.

The low prevalence of probable PTSD in the Washington, DC, metropolitan area, the other population center that was attacked, is somewhat surprising. Clearly, there are differences in the actual events in the two cities that could account for the difference. Pentagon is more geographically isolated from Washington than the WTC towers were from NYC; it was a military rather than a civilian target, possibly reducing the perception of personal vulnerability, or identification with the victims; and the crash into the Pentagon was much less devastating than the crashes into and collapse of the WTC towers, which produced spectacular visual images and caused considerably more deaths and injuries. The N-SARS estimates are, however, the only estimates published to date for the Washington, DC, area.¹⁰

Although there is limited evidence linking indirect exposures to traumatic events via TV to PTSD symptoms in children and adolescents, there is little empirical information about the association in adults. In a community sample in which there was opportunity for direct or indirect exposure or both, a statistically significant association was found between PTSD symptom levels and the number of hours per day of TV coverage of the attacks that were watched, even after controlling for indices of direct exposure to the attacks, the content of the TV coverage seen, and socio-demographic characteristics.

Similar models fit to our measure of non-specific clinically significant psychological distress symptoms indicate that no direct exposure measures were associated with non-specific distress symptom levels, but both hours of TV watched and the TV content index were.¹¹

Documentation of these adjusted associations in a community sample of adults raises a number of important questions. The associations could be an indication that exposure via TV contributed to the development of the symptoms—that those who were already distressed by other September 11 exposures watched TV coverage as a coping mechanism; or that psychologically vulnerable persons are more likely to seek out such exposures via TV. Although the N-SARS findings do not speak definitively to the direction of causality, our findings suggest that the N-SARS measures of TV watching—both hours of coverage watched and the specific content—may be better conceived of as correlates of distress, e.g., a coping mechanism, than as indices of exposure. However, the issue requires additional research in designs that support more definitive causal inference.

Although the research for this paper did not find a statistically significant association between proximity to the attacks and adults' reports of distress among children in their households, the fact that about 61% of adults in NYC and 49.4% in the rest of the US perceived one or more children in their households to be upset by the attacks suggests a need for further study. Studies of children in Oklahoma City after the April 1995 bombing of the Murrah Federal Building found significant levels of psychological problems related to direct and indirect exposure and to TV viewing.¹²

Although children's distress perceived by adults may be biased by the adults' own reactions, or otherwise without clinical significance, further examination of the reactions is clearly indicated. A follow-up should involve direct assessments of children themselves as well as more detailed reports by their parents and teachers.

To measure the psychological and emotional effects of 9/11 terrorist attacks on the WTC, the states of Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York added a terrorism module to their ongoing Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS). This report summarizes the results of the survey, which suggests widespread psychological and emotional effects in all segments of the three states' populations. The BRFSS is a random-digit-dialed telephone survey of the non-institutionalized US population aged 18 years and above. The terrorism module consisted of 17 questions which asked respondents whether they were victims of the terrorist attacks, attended a memorial or funeral service after the attacks, were employed or missed work after the attacks,

increased their consumption of tobacco and/or alcohol following the attacks, or watched more media coverage following the attacks. The survey was conducted between October 11 and December 31.

A total of 3,512 respondents completed the module in the three states (1,774 in Connecticut, 638 in New Jersey, and 1,100 in New York). Approximately 50% of the respondents participated in religious or community memorial services, and 13% attended a funeral or a memorial service for an acquaintance, relative, or community member. Nearly half (48%) the respondents reported experiencing anger after the attacks. Around 75% reported having problems attributed to the attacks and 12% reported getting help. Family members (36%) and friends or neighbors (31%) were the main source for help. Approximately 3% of alcohol drinkers reported increased alcohol consumption, 21% of smokers reported an increase in smoking, and 1% of non-smokers reported that they started to smoke after the attacks.

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks and in the presence of the threat of new attacks, many experts expect a radical increase in the number of people experiencing serious problems with prescription drugs, mental health problems, and stress-related medical problems. This could result in higher than expected costs for addiction, mental health, and healthcare services that can further strain an ailing economy.

The people directly involved in tragedies are most at risk of developing traumatic stress reactions, PTSD, and related anxiety and panic disorders. This includes victims who were physically injured or exposed to life-threatening danger, those who watched the events unfold from a nearby vantage point, and those who lost a loved one, friend or co-worker in the attacks. Experts estimate that between 70,000 to 100,000 people in New York City had such exposure to the terrorist attacks that puts them at risk for developing PTSD.

Countless other Americans have been plagued by chronically high stress accompanied by a variety of stress-related problems such as irritability, sleeping disorders, difficulty in concentration and heightened and chronic anxiety. The rates of PTSD and stress-related problems are greater following events caused by deliberate violence than after natural disasters. Individuals with previously diagnosed addiction and mental health issues are most likely to suffer from more severe PTSD marked by both more frequent episodes and more severe symptoms during each episode.

There are two types of traumatic experiences which result in different types of traumatic stress responses: a single time limited episode of traumatic violence

that ends with no serious threat of recurring episodes of traumatic violence; and, prolonged ongoing experiences marked by continuous threat of or actual recurrence of episodes of traumatic violence. The latter tends to produce comparatively more damage. The fact that someone experiences or witnesses an act of violence does not mean that he or she will inevitably develop psychiatric morbidity. The available evidence seems to suggest that it takes more than the agent, e.g., threat to life, to provoke psychopathology. Indeed, the role of the environment is of importance, a component of the epidemiological triangle that has been neglected by a greater focus on host-related factors, e.g., gender or age of the victim.

Pakistani Context

Pakistan has played a key role in the global war on terror, but despite being a US ally in the war, it is often accused of supporting Taliban and Al Qaeda in its northern provinces. The present study is intended to understand community attitudes and practices in their cities. In this regard three cities—Rawalpindi, Lahore and Peshawar—were selected because of the intensity of terrorist attacks they faced. The main objective of the study is to measure people's response to observing a terrorist attack, watching media converge of the event, people's perception about the effect of the situation on children and the activities in which people participate after such incidents.

Findings of this study may help to:

- 1- Assess the psychological effects on people's attitudes, so remedial measures can be suggested for mental and emotional health of adults and children.
- 2- Guide media persons about the sensitivity level of the community, so they adopt proper ways to cover such events.
- 3- Make comparisons with studies conducted in other countries.
- 4- Facilitate further research in this area.

Methodology

The present study is descriptive in nature and survey technique was used to collect data from Rawalpindi, Lahore and Peshawar. Data was collected on a structured questionnaire between July 16 and September 25, 2009 by three data collectors associated with Pak Institute for Peace Studies.

Data Collection and Sample

The data was collected through personal contact on a questionnaire designed specifically for the present study with a random sample of residents of the three cities, Lahore, Peshawar and Rawalpindi. A total of 187 respondents (including 59 females) were included in the research. As many as 78 respondents belonged to Lahore, 57 were residents of Peshawar and 37 lived in Rawalpindi; remaining 15 respondents were permanent residents of some other districts but were staying in any one of the aforementioned three cities at the time of survey.

Majority of participants had a matriculation or intermediate level degree. Only one respondent had Ph.D level education. The ratios are very proximate to the urban population statistics.

Study Instrument

Respondents were asked questions from the structured questionnaire in Urdu about demographic characteristics, the location of a respondent's residence, and the respondent's location during the attacks. Further queried whether they had directly witnessed the attacks, had been personally involved in the rescue effort or had friends or relatives who were killed or injured during the attacks.

Procedure

Data was collected independently by three data collectors in three cities. They personally contacted people in their vicinities and requested them to participate in the research. The respondents completed the questionnaires on their own. The data collectors marked answers according to the choices of illiterate respondents.

Statistical Analysis

Descriptive statistics was used to analyze the data.

Summary of responses

Q 1: Have you ever heard an explosion?

Almost half (47 percent) of respondents had this experience. As many as 89 respondents (61 males and 28 females) said they had heard the sound of at least one explosion.

Q 2: Presence close to site of incident?

Some 48 male and 24 female respondents stated that they had been present close to at least one place where a terrorist incident occurred. Such proximity creates among individuals the apprehension that they too could fall victim to the incident. This perception may have a strong influence on people's attitudes and practices.

Q 3: Any relatives affected by terrorism?

At least one relative of 26 male and nine female respondents were affected by terrorist attacks. This shows that almost 20% of the participants received emotional injuries due to the present situation.

Q 4: Any relative/acquaintance injured?

Some 51 respondents (27.3%) reported injuries to at least one person—a relative or acquaintance—in a terrorist attack. This is more than a quarter of the sample.

Q 5: Any relative/acquaintance killed?

38 respondents (20.3%) stated that they know at least one person who died in a terrorist attack. The above two immediate responses indicate the ratio of a personal sense of loss and vulnerability in Pakistan today.

Q 6: Participation in rescue activities.

At least 23.5% of the respondents have participated in rescue activities, indicating active participation of the community in giving care and comfort to the affected persons.

Q 7: Level of fear among respondents.

An alarming 85% of the respondents feel a high degree of fear and 11.8% moderate fear on account of acts of terrorism. Only 2.2% stated that they are not scared.

Q 8: People's urge to rush towards home after an explosion.

Well more than half (60.8%) the respondents stated that they urge to rush home to the comfort of their family. Some 26.2 % had moderate response while 12.9 % said they don't know what to do.

Q 9: Changes in daily routine.

Degree	Frequency	Percent
High	83	44.4
Moderate	74	39.6
Don't know	22	11.8
No opinion	7	3.7
Not mentioned	1	0.5
Total	187	100

As many as 44.4% respondents stated that they change their daily routine to a considerable degree after a terrorist attack.

Q 10: People become suspicious of others.

Degree	Frequency	Percent
High	91	48.7
Moderate	48	25.7
Don't know	40	21.4
No opinion	7	3.7
Not mentioned	1	0.5
Total	187	100

Some 74.4% respondents reported becoming suspicious, to varying degrees, of other people after a terrorist attack.

Q 11: People continuously feel uneasy.

Amid a wave of terrorist attacks, 61.5% of the respondents stated feeling a high degree of uneasiness, while 30.5% of moderate uneasiness. This shows a high level of stress and anxiety among the respondents and has implications for the general state of mental health of the people exposed to daily terrorist attacks in Pakistan.

Q 12: People are becoming aggressive.

In a crucial finding, 59.4% of the respondents feel people are becoming more aggressive and 28.3% feel moderate aggression among people on account of terrorist attacks. This finding also suggests a link between anxiety and aggressive behavior.

Q 13: Intolerance is growing among people.

At least 61% of the respondents believe that people are becoming highly intolerant amid increasing terrorist attacks and 30% think they are becoming moderately intolerant.

Q 14: Table 16: People's indifference to law enforcement agencies.

Some 67.4% of the respondents said that they are highly indifferent and almost 20% moderately indifferent. This finding points to the community's lack of trust in law enforcement agencies. This should also inform the authorities to bring suitable changes in the behavior of law enforcement personnel so that the people have a more positive relationship with them.

Q 15: People feel unsafe.

An alarming rate of 75% of the respondents feel highly unsafe on account of the ever-present threat of terrorism and 20% have a feeling of personal vulnerability to a moderate degree.

Q 16 : People experience sleep disorders

Degree	Frequency	Percent
High	60	32.1
Moderate	90	48.1
Low	19	10.2
No opinion	18	9.6
Total	187	100

The above table shows that 32% of the respondents perceive that people have developed a high degree of sleep disorders on account of the threat of acts of terrorism, while 48% think people have moderate sleep disorders. This reflects adversely on the mental health of the people.

Q 17: Children are becoming restless

Degree	Frequency	Percent
High	60	32.1
Moderate	90	48.1
Low	19	10.2
No opinion	18	9.6
Total	187	100

These alarming figures of the above table indicates that 32% of the respondents hold that children are highly restless due to the present situation and 48% feel that they are moderately restless. The findings of the present study confirm assumption about changes in child behavior on account of acts of terrorism.

Q 18: Children fear going outside their homes.

According to 37.4% of the respondents, children are highly fearful of going outside their homes, while 45.5% say they are moderately afraid. This perception seems slightly exaggerated.

Q 19: Children experience nightmares

Degree	Frequency	Percent
High	43	23.0
Moderate	79	42.2
Low	29	15.5
No opinion	35	18.7
Not mentioned	1	0.5
Total	187	100

The above table indicates that 23% of the respondents perceive that children experience a high degree of nightmares and 42% that they have moderate nightmares.

Q 20: Children are becoming irritated.

According to 23.5% respondents, children are becoming highly irritated, while 45% feel they are moderately irritated due to the present situation. This indicates that children feel a high degree of stress and anxiety due to negative social experiences.

Q 21: Children are more violent nowadays

Degree	Frequency	Percent
High	39	20.9
Moderate	91	48.7
Low	27	14.4
No opinion	30	16.0
Total	187	100

This table shows that 21% of the respondents feel that children are more violent now, and 49% feel the phenomenon exists among children to a moderate degree. This also confirms the assumption cited earlier that stress and anxiety lead to aggressive behavior.

Q 22: Children take less interest in play

Around 22% of the respondents feel that children's interest in sports and recreation is affected to a high degree on account of acts of terrorism, while 49% of the respondents feel it has affected children to a moderate degree.

Q 23: Children take less interest in studies

Degree	Frequency	Percent
High	43	23.0
Moderate	92	49.2
Low	25	13.4
No opinion	26	13.9
Not mentioned	1	0.5
Total	187	100

Amid acts of terrorism, children's interest in studies dips to a high degree, according to 23% of the respondents. Around 49% of the respondents feel only moderate effects on children's study behavior.

Q 24: Children talk more about death.

Of the respondents, 33% perceive that children talk a lot about death these days while 38% think they do so to a moderate degree. This finding is consistent with other findings that indicate a high level of stress and anxiety among children living under adverse conditions.

Q 25: TV coverage has negative effect on attention

Some 35% of the respondents believe that TV coverage of terrorist attacks has a highly negative impact on viewers, and 45% think the impact is moderately negative.

Q 26: Domestic violence has increased due to TV coverage

Degree	Frequency	Percent
High	51	27.3
Moderate	63	33.7
Low	24	12.8
No opinion	49	26.2
Total	187	100

This table reflects that 27% of the respondents perceive that TV coverage of terrorist attacks has increased domestic violence to a high degree, while 34% think it has hiked such violence to a moderate extent.

Q 27: People feel confused due to TV coverage.

The survey found that 30.5% of the respondents think TV coverage of terrorist attacks creates immense confusion among viewers and 48% perceive that such coverage creates moderate confusion.

Q 28 : People feel depressed due to TV coverage.

There is a high likelihood of depression among viewers due to TV coverage of terrorist attacks, according to 29% of the respondents. Around 48% perceive that there are moderate chances of that.

Q 29: People talk to each other on how to combat terrorism.

The survey found that according to 29% of the respondents, people talk a lot with each other, especially with friends and family on how to combat terrorism, whereas 35% think such discourse only goes to a moderate degree.

Q 30: Prospects of a political solution.

Around 40% of the respondents believe that there are slim chances of a political solution to the terrorism problem, while 29% think such a solution has a high chance of success.

Q 31: Prospects of a military solution.

A little over 41% of the respondents argue that a military solution has slim chances of success, while 26% believe such a solution holds a high likelihood of success.

Q 32 : Prospects of a combined political-militarily solution

Degree	Frequency	Percent
High	55	29.4
Moderate	36	19.2
Low	65	34.8
No opinion	28	15.0
Not mentioned	3	1.6
Total	187	100

Around 35% of the respondents state that a combination of the political and military strategies has a chance of success, while 29% rate the prospects for the success of such a combination as high. Results for the last three tables reflect the confusion among the people about possible solution to the menace of terrorism.

Q 33: Active participation of community in anti- terrorism fight.

Nearly 45% of the respondents believe that there are low chances of practical participation of the community in combating on terrorism, 26% predict moderate chances and only 20% think there are high chances of people actively participating in the anti-terrorism efforts.

Conclusion

This study was intended to understand community attitudes and practices regarding terrorist attacks and their following impacts in three cities, Lahore, Rawalpindi and Peshawar. Research findings on different statements show internal consistency and internal validity. Since the sample for this study was selected at random, the chances to granulize research findings are reduced. This research, therefore, has low external validity.

The research reveals the psychological effects of terrorism on all age groups and highlights the need to take measures for the mental and emotional health of the people. Most importantly it reveals some alarming impact on children which requires urgent attention of the relevant authorities. It also suggests the significance of properly educating people about terrorism-related issues to diminish the confusion about government efforts to combat terrorism. The news media also need to reflect on the impact of the coverage of terrorist attacks and review the manner in which it operates.

It also indicates that the social discourse on combating terrorism has now crept into the grassroots of the population where they believe in politico-military solution to the menace. The counter-terrorism strategies should take this development in a serious note in winning the hearts and minds of the public.

Notes

-
- ¹ Compact Oxford English Dictionary.
- ² S. Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents*, (Harmondsworth, 1930 and Penguin, 1985); S. Freud, *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*, (Harmondsworth, 1917 and Penguin, 1974).
- ³ K. Lorenz, *On Aggression*, (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966).
- ⁴ J. M. Howell & P. J. Frost, *A Laboratory Study of Charismatic Leadership: Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, (1989).
- ⁵ J. Dollard, et al., *Frustration and Aggression*, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1939).
- ⁶ Y. Schweitzer, *Suicide Terrorism: Development and Characteristics*, a lecture presented at the International Conference on Countering Suicide Terrorism at ICT, Herzeliya, Israel on 21st February, 2000.
- ⁷ Ibid.
- ⁸ S. Galea, J. Ahern, H. Resnick, et al., "Psychological Sequelae of September 11," *New England Journal of Medicine*, 2002.
- ⁹ Ibid.
- ¹⁰ W.E. Schlenger, et.al., "Psychological Reactions to Terrorist Attacks: Findings From the National Study of American Reactions to September 11," *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 2002.
- ¹¹ Ibid.
- ¹² A.Y. Shalev, S. Freedman, "PTSD Following Terrorist Attacks: A prospective Evaluation," *American Journal of Psychiatry*, 2005.

Radicals' Influx into Border Areas: Impact on Inter-state Relations in South Asia

Muhammad Amir Rana

Numerous insurgencies and separatist movements have erupted in South Asia since the end of British rule in 1947. These conflicts have taken a heavy toll on infrastructure and human lives, fuelled humanitarian and economic crises and increased mistrust among South Asian states. As many as 23,098 people lost their lives in conflicts in South Asia in 2008 alone.¹

Besides inter-state disputes, conflicts have had their roots in religious, ethnic, communal and caste issues. The major conflicts in South Asia have centered on the states' borders. The Taliban movement in Afghanistan and Pakistan; the Assam, Tripura, Bodoland and Naxalite movements in India; the Rohingya liberation movement in Myanmar;² Kashmir liberation movement across the Line of Control (LoC);³ the Baloch separatist movement in Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan; and, the Uighur separatist movement in China⁴ were all born and flourished along border areas. These movements have cross-border networks and structures, and with the South Asian states entangled in border disputes with their neighbors, these conflicts have bred inter-movements ties as well.

As the South Asian states engage in border disputes with their neighbors, inter-movement ties have emerged with cross-border networks and structures. Most of the separatist and insurgent movements have come under the influence of radical ideologies and some have been transformed into radical movements.

Initially, most of the insurgent movements in South Asia were born as a reaction to political, social, and economic deprivations. Wrong decisions by the leaders of these states reinforced the movements. Rob Johnson considers four factors responsible for fueling conflicts: absence of any tradition of democracy, corruption at the local level, poverty, and lack of education. He emphasizes that these factors are common in all South Asian conflicts despite the great diversity in the region.⁵ Religion remained a potent source of conflict and along with ethnic and cultural identities provided the initial base for insurgent movements, before radical ideologies took over many of these movements.⁶ Separatist or insurgent movements have a tendency to absorb extremist ideologies. It helps to justify their objectives, including violence and sabotage activities, and makes their agenda appealing. In this context, the primary objective of this paper is to explore:

1. General features of separatist and insurgent movements in border regions of South Asia.
2. The motivation of extremist forces' concentration in the border areas.
3. Extremist groups' focus on the undisputed borders and the threats this emerging phenomenon poses.
4. Impact of radicalization and movements on inter-state relations.

A comprehensive review of the historical, political, ethnic, social, and cultural backgrounds of the separatist and insurgent movements is not possible in a brief paper. However, the current border disputes and violent movements are briefly discussed to explain the influx of separatists and insurgents into border areas.

Some of the terms used in this paper need to be explained first.

A separatist movement usually means a group within a country which wants to separate its 'rights and land' from the rest of the country to form an independent state.⁷ In this paper, this term has been used in the same context for all the movements striving for independence on religious, ethnic, social or cultural basis, including the movements in Kashmir, Assam and Tripura and those of the Rohingyas, Bodos, Uighurs and Tamils.

Insurgency, in the general sense, is a struggle between a non-ruling group and the ruling authorities, in which the former consciously applies political resources—organizational skills, holding demonstrations and propaganda—and instruments of violence, or both, to get their social, political and economic rights or to establish legitimacy for their own political system, which the ruling authorities consider illegitimate.⁸ In South Asia, Taliban, Naxalites, the Islamist jihad movements in Pakistan and Bangladesh, and the Maoist rebel movement in Nepal can be categorized as such.

The term extremism denotes rigidity in one's stand on religious, political or social grounds.⁹ The term radicalization is used to refer to expansion of the ideological support base along border regions, in order to force governments to adopt the movements' agendas through violent activities, demonstrations or activism. The Sangh Parivar in India, and the Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan are radical movements, which emphasize on reversion of society to the ancient pattern of Hinduvata and Islam, respectively. Extremism and radicalization are tendencies that can be found among insurgent and separatist groups.

At present, South Asia is beset with multiple border disputes, which are widely seen as acting as a magnet for separatist and insurgent movements (See *Annex*). Inter-state conflicts in South Asia, based on border disputes, have a crucial connection with the emergence of radical and extremist movements in these areas. The situation in the Kashmir region is a direct outcome of the boundary dispute between India and Pakistan. Both countries had agreed in the United Nations to hold parts of Kashmir under their respective control until the dispute is resolved. Unfortunately, the two countries have failed to reach any consensus on the issue, which has been an instrumental factor in the separatist movement in Kashmir.

The separatist movements in the Indian states of Assam and Tripura have their roots in the massive influx of different ethnic populations into bordering towns from East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) following the 1971 partition from West Pakistan. Bangladesh, which has the longest land border with India, has no major boundary dispute except regarding 140 acres of a river island, where the two countries have agreed to maintain status quo for now.¹⁰

Conflicting claims on the resource-rich waters of Bangladesh could cause confrontation with Myanmar and India. A survey by an Indian ship for exploration of gas and oil in January 2009 and a similar attempt by Myanmar in November 2008 indicate potential flashpoints.¹¹

The main irritant between Bangladesh and India is border management, principally regarding a mechanism to control the influx of immigrants. These immigrants mainly belong to the same ethnic groups settled on both side of the border. The easy cross-border flow of immigrants has allowed the Assam, Tripura, Bodoland, and Meghyla separatists in India to maintain their structures and networks across the border in Bangladesh. Moreover, rising discontentment in the Chittagong Hills Tracts (CHT) in Bangladesh, where an accord in 1997 had sought to end a violent movement by the native tribal people, has once again become a matter of concern. The Rohingya Muslim separatists in Myanmar, operating from Bangladesh, are a major irritant in Bangladesh-Myanmar ties.¹²

China, India, and Pakistan have some of the major land-boundary disputes in the world. These disputes have already triggered several wars.¹³ China and India both have long-standing claims over the province of Arunachal Pradesh, in the east, and Aksai Chin, in northern Kashmir.¹⁴ But these borders areas are not facing any violent separatist or insurgent movements.¹⁵

India and Nepal have a dispute over a 75 square kilometer territory called Kalapani, but the main problem between the two countries is poor border

control systems. Nepal, a land-locked country, is dependent on India for trade and business but poor border controls have provided opportunities to left-wing and Hindu radical movements to export their ideologies and to maintain considerable inter-structural relationship.¹⁶

India and Bhutan have a soft border and poor border control is an issue there as well. India has repeatedly accused Bhutan of aiding separatists by allowing them to establish training camps on Bhutanese soil for launching operations into India.¹⁷ The Ngolops, armed Nepalese dissidents, also pose a serious threat to the security of this Himalayan kingdom. India has the same complaint against Myanmar, with which it shares a 334-kilometer border.

Pakistan has a boundary dispute with Afghanistan over the controversial Durand Line, the 2,250-kilometer border between the two countries. The boundary line with Afghanistan was drawn in 1893 by Sir Mortimer Durand, then foreign secretary of British India, and was acceded to by the Emir of Afghanistan the same year. Afghanistan claims that Durand Line had been imposed by a stronger power upon a weaker one, and favors the establishment of a cross-boundary Pashtun state, to be called Pashtunistan or Pakhtunistan. On the other hand, Pakistan, as the legatee of the British in the region, insists on the legality and permanence of the boundary. The tribes living on either side of the border largely do not recognize Durand Line as international boundary.

The two countries did not have any major armed conflict over the border dispute and did not deploy regular army units there until after 9/11. Pakistan deployed its regular forces at the border for the first time—to stop infiltration of Al Qaeda and Taliban remnants—when US-led coalition forces invaded Afghanistan to oust the Taliban regime from power.

Afghanistan has also deployed its troops on the border and small-scale armed clashes have now become the norm. The presence of Taliban and Al Qaeda on both sides of the border has thrust the area into international limelight. The influx of Taliban has strained bilateral relations and the Durand Line dispute remains an issue of concern in an unstable region.

Although Pakistan does not have any boundary dispute with China and Iran, Baloch and Uighur separatist movements have remained matters of concern for Iran and China, respectively. The Baloch separatist movement is equally worrying for Iran and Pakistan, while China is worried about the Uighurs' links with Pakistani jihad groups.

These separatist and insurgent movements have had a direct bearing on increased tensions on borders in the region. India has continuously blamed Bangladesh,¹⁸ Bhutan, Pakistan and Myanmar for insurgency on its borders. Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka have leveled the same charge against India.

Pakistan has faced similar attempts at an insurgency by the Pashtun nationalist movement on its western border with Afghanistan. However, such efforts have failed to create any serious problems for Islamabad despite strong backing by Kabul for its greater Pashtunistan agenda. Until 9/11, there was no serious dispute on the Pak-Afghan border and neither country felt the need to deploy regular forces along Durand Line. This 'soft border' had provided great strategic support to the Afghan Mujahideen during the Soviet-Afghan war. The Mujahideen used Pakistani tribal territory along the border for recruiting and training fighters and getting logistic support from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the US and other Western countries.¹⁹

But the situation changed after 9/11 when US-led coalition forces attacked Afghanistan to eliminate Al Qaeda and their Taliban supporters, prompting the militants to return to their old hideouts in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).²⁰ They re-established their structures and networks in these areas and, for the first time since gaining independence in 1947, Pakistan deployed regular forces to stop their infiltration and activities. The same ethnic Pashtun tribes are settled across Durand Line. It is not uncommon for some houses to have some rooms on the Pakistani side and others in Afghan territory. A similar situation prevails on the Bangladesh-India border where people on both sides of the border are tied in social, religious, cultural, economic, and familial relations. Other examples could be found on the Bangladesh-Myanmar, Bhutan-India and the Pak-Afghan border region, in Balochistan, as well.

The division of the same ethnic and religious population across the borders has created problems on international borders in the region. It has not only made border security difficult but also forced states to give concession to these ethnic groups to keep their relations intact. It may help to boost trade and cultural ties between states, but at the same time provides occasion for flourishing illegal trade, as well as human and drug trafficking. On the Pak-Afghan border, drug lords and weapon smugglers have created a safe haven for their activities.²¹ The same scenario is on display along the Bangladesh-India border where human trafficking has become a major problem.²²

Tensions on these borders also have serious implications for nuclear proliferation. In the Indian state of Jharkhand, near Nepal's border,

smugglers' networks are known to be involved in trafficking of uranium.²³ In February 2008, Indian police foiled an attempt to smuggle four kilograms of uranium to Nepal.²⁴

During the Taliban regime, Pakistani tribal areas were massively influenced by the Taliban. Local tribesmen were inspired by the system in force across the border in Afghanistan, and some groups also emerged in the tribal areas to enforce a similar system there. Initially, these groups could not gain much strength but after the Taliban regime fell in Afghanistan, Al Qaeda and the Taliban started supporting them financially, ideologically, and in terms of expertise in terrorist activities. Now, the Taliban have partly enforced their version of *Shariah* in North and South Waziristan, Bajaur, Khyber, and Mohmand agencies of Pakistan's tribal areas. Now they are marching towards the settled areas and the local administration seems helpless in the face of advancing religious extremism.²⁵

Separatist movements have also been radicalized on the borders of Bangladesh, India and Myanmar. Because of the Rohingya liberation movement's link to the Afghan jihad, radicalization penetrated its ideology. It has now become a wholly radical movement with an agenda for the creation of an Islamic state. The movements mentioned above have generally emerged out of historical, political, social and economic factors, and later come under the influence of radical religious ideologies.

The Indian ethno-political separatist movements of Assam and Tripura are also in the phase of transformation after the emergence of parallel Islamic separatist movements. These Islamic movements have the same separatist agenda, with the condition that the new states would be Islamic. Seven separatist groups were operating in Assam until 1998, all of them with a nationalist agenda, but now six Muslim separatist groups have also been established there.²⁶ These movements are influenced by Bangladesh-based jihad groups like Jamiatul Mujahideen and Harkatul Jihad-e-Islami.²⁷ The same outfits have influence over the Rohingyas liberation movement and have links with Afghan jihad groups.

Despite common agendas, parallel movements are relatively less tolerant of each other than separatist nationalist movements. This factor usually plays an important role in the emergence of sectarian and communal divisions and provokes clashes among different groups. Two major riots, where the separatist groups played a major role, have occurred on the India-Bangladesh border in West Garo Hills district of the Indian state of Meghalaya since 1992.²⁸

Similar trends and crises are visible in the Kashmir liberation movement. Before the second phase of the insurgency started there in the late 1980s, the command of the insurgent movement was in the hand of the nationalists, mainly the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF). The group had moderate religious views. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, radical jihadi organizations took over. These groups started radicalization in Indian-held Kashmir, and have now developed their own support bases in the disputed region. Their leaders claim that they are capable of continuing their activities for long without any external support.²⁹

The trend of parallel movements can also be seen in Balochistan province of Pakistan and Xinjiang, the Muslim majority province of China. In Balochistan, the command of the insurgent and separatist movement remained in the hands of nationalist groups, which had a leftist ideology. But in the last two years, a parallel Islamist separatist movement, called Jundullah,³⁰ came into existence. This indicates a major shift in the region. Jandollah has the same nationalist agenda, creation of independent greater Balochistan, with an ideological difference. The group has links with Pakistan-based Sunni sectarian organization Sipah-e-Sahaba, the Taliban, and probably Al Qaeda.

The Iranian border province of Sistan-Balochestan is a major target of Baloch separatist movement, where the radicals, including Jundullah, seem to have successfully planted the seed of sectarianism. That may reduce the influence of the leftist separatist groups in Balochistan, besides triggering a full-scale insurgency and sectarian rift on both sides of the border.

The separatist movement in Xinjiang also faces a similar fate, where Islamist radical groups backed by Al Qaeda seem to be gaining control of the movement.

Islamic radical trends have not only influenced the insurgent and separatist movements in South Asia but also affected left-wing radical ideologies. Almost all insurgent and separatist movements in South Asia are dominated by two major radical ideologies, Islamist and leftist.

Maoist and communist organizations in Nepal and India had developed strong ties, and their influence remained strong in border towns.

Apparently, the Tamil separatist movements in Sri Lanka and India do not have any religious or leftist agenda; in fact, the movements are working under nationalist ideologies. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) killed hundreds of Muslims and Buddhists in eastern Sri Lanka in the late

1990s to achieve domination. They also forced the closure of Buddhist temples and mosques.

These radical movements are increasing their influence in those border areas across the region where conflicts have existed for a long time. The process of radicalization is also gripping the peaceful border regions where such movements were earlier non-existent. For example, radical groups are concentrating on both sides of the southern Pak-India borders;³¹ jihadi groups are trying to establish their networks in Pakistani border towns of Omer Kot and Metthi, which are Hindu-dominated areas. A similar situation prevails on the other side of the border, where Sangh Parivar—an association of Hindu nationalist and extremist organizations—is gaining influence.³² The concentration of right-wing radical organizations on the border can create a security problem and lead to communal violence as Muslims and Hindus settled on either sides of the border can cross over to the other side. This and any consequent violence could have serious implications for Pakistan-India relations, which have not fully recovered since the November 2008 Mumbai attacks.

The South Asian states have used all options to curb these movements, employing political means as well as the use of military force. India, in its northeast, and Pakistan, along its western borders, are trying to resolve the issues but so far neither country has succeeded. One hurdle is the fact that these insurgent and separatist movements find havens among the minority ethnic and religious communities, which are present on both sides of the border. This aspect makes it difficult for either state to address the issue solely, without support from the other bordering state. The states' failure to address the economic and social grievances of the populations in the border regions have also contributed to the aggravation in the border regions.

Countries in South Asia also lack confidence in each other, which makes it difficult to form any joint mechanism to counter common threats. India and Pakistan are yet to reach any solution on the Kashmir issue, and chances of any immediate headway seem remote after the suspension of composite dialogue process between the two countries after the Mumbai attacks. The delay in forging a joint mechanism allows the opportunity to radical groups to function and even enhance their capabilities.

Countries in the region must understand that radicalization is a force that makes stances inflexible on all sides and can become the main hurdle to resolving issues through political means.

Radicalization of the region's separatist movements can add to the complexity of border disputes. Radicalization also eventually starts to travel inside the country from the borders. Talibanization in Pakistan, Islamization in Bangladesh, the Maoist and Naxalite nexus in India, Hindu radicalism in Nepal and the sectarian and separatist threat in Iran cannot be countered without effective internal strategies and mechanisms, and, most importantly, inter-state cooperation.

South Asian states mainly have post-colonial border disputes. They have not only failed to resolve those disputes but have also been unable to improve the socio-political and economic conditions of those living in border regions. This has increased a sense of alienation among the ethnic communities living in border areas, and forced them to look inwards, cementing their bonds and support structures with their ethnic kinsmen across the border. The chronic deprivations are making room for radicalization among them. An early solution of the boundary disputes could help counter radicalization in the border regions. At the same time, states also need to effectively address the grievances of the ethnic minorities and bring them into the political and social mainstream.

South Asian states are mainly opting for the use of force to combat the separatist, insurgent and radical movements in border areas. These measures alone have not produced the desired result until now. The most recent example is the failure of a joint effort by US, NATO and Pakistani troops to eliminate Taliban and Al Qaeda militants from along the Pak-Afghan border areas. Sri Lanka seems to be the only success story in the region so far where security forces have captured almost all the territory earlier held by the LTTE. But the future of the ethnic Tamil community is still at stake in absence of any rehabilitation plan to bring them back into the mainstream of the political discourse.

The disputed, and even settled, borders cannot be left for the militants to establish their parallel systems there, merely because the states sharing the border lack mutual trust needed to come up with a joint strategy. Countries in the region need to look beyond their own strategies to counter growing radical threats on borders. The radical movements stand to gain if the states offer lax, indifferent and myopic responses to them apparently on account of border disputes. Well-coordinated, inclusive and proactive inter-state approaches on the regional level are imperative to deal with the issue of militancy, violence and radicalization in bordering areas across South Asia. These approaches should be supplemented at home by local initiatives involving the people.

If the US can plan to pursue the regional approach in Afghanistan and Pakistan's tribal areas in an effort to defuse the Taliban insurgency, there is no reason why the South Asian countries cannot opt for it, especially when they already have a joint regional forum, South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC).³³ This forum can be used to develop common strategies to counter radicalization and deal with the insurgent and separatist movements at the regional and local levels.

Notes

-
- ¹ *Pakistan Security Report 2008*, Pak Institute for Peace Studies, Islamabad, January 2009, p. 23.
 - ² Rohingyas are descendents of Arab and Persian traders who arrived in Myanmar between the 9th and 15th centuries.
 - ³ The temporary demarcation line between the Indian- and Pakistani-administered Kashmir, arranged with UN assistance at the end of the Pakistan-India war of 1947-48.
 - ⁴ Uighurs are a Turkic Muslim ethnic community concentrated in China's Xinjiang province.
 - ⁵ Rob Johnson, *A Region in Turmoil*, (New Delhi: Viva Books, 2006), p. 15.
 - ⁶ Rob Johnson, p. 16.
 - ⁷ Oxford English Dictionary, Ninth edition, 2002.
 - ⁸ John Richard Thackrah, *Dictionary of Terrorism*, (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 127.
 - ⁹ Iain McLean and Alistair McMillan, *Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics*, 2003.
 - ¹⁰ "South Asia Border commanders declare truce," BBC News, August 25, 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/430087.stm, last accessed on January 27, 2010.
 - ¹¹ "Bangladesh to protest over India survey in its waters," Dawn, Islamabad, December 27, 2008.
 - ¹² Julie Clothier, "Myanmar Muslims stay put in Bangladesh despite hardships," AFP, August 2, 2008.
 - ¹³ India and China fought a brief but bloody war in 1962 over their disputed Himalayan border, while Pakistan and India have fought two major wars, in 1965 and 1971, and a limited war over Kargil in 1999.
 - ¹⁴ Arunachal Pradesh is the eastern-most state on India's northeast frontier. Although entirely administered by India, it is claimed by China. Aksai Chin is administered by China and claimed by India. Aksai Chin was historically part of the Himalayan kingdom of Ladakh until Ladakh was annexed by Kashmir in the 19th century. One of the main causes of the 1962 Sino-India war was India's discovery of a road China had built through the region, which India considers its territory.
 - ¹⁵ China again spurned India's claim over Arunachal Pradesh during the visit to China by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in January 2008 but both sides agreed to enhance trade and economic ties.
 - ¹⁶ Most of the Maoist groups in India have links with Maoists in Nepal, similarly Hindu radicals in Nepal have ties with groups in India. For more details see reports on Nepal and South Asia at: http://www.san-pips.com/new/index.php?action=san&id=sa_1
 - ¹⁷ South Asia Assessment 2003, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/southasia/index.html>, last accessed on January 27, 2010.
 - ¹⁸ Manak Sarkar, chief minister of the Indian state of Tripura claimed that 26 militant camps were operating in Bangladesh and facilitating infiltrations into India. Daily *Nawa-e-Waqt*, Lahore, September 23, 2006.

-
- ¹⁹ For details see Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden*, (Penguin Press, 2004).
- ²⁰ Muhammad Amir Rana and Rohan Gunaratna, *Al-Qaeda Fights Back: Inside Pakistani Tribal Areas*, (Islamabad: PIPS, 2008).
- ²¹ Daily *Mashriq*, Peshawar, November 7, 2005.
- ²² Kanchan Lakshman & Sanjay K. Jha, "India-Bangladesh: Restoring Sovereignty on Neglected Borders," <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/faultlines/volume14/articele7.htm>, last accessed on June 14, 2007.
- ²³ *Vijay Times* reports that smugglers are sending highly radioactive "yellowcake", or partially processed, uranium, used in making nuclear weapons, to Nepal through the clandestine narcotic route via the Jharkhand-Bihar-West Bengal conduit, and it is suspected that the destination might be Al Qaeda. http://www.wmdinsights.com/I6/I6_SA2_SmugglingOfUranium.htm, last accessed on August 2, 2007.
- ²⁴ Associated Press of Pakistan, February 28, 2008.
- ²⁵ Muhammad Amir Rana and Rohan Gunaratna, *Al-Qaeda Fights Back: Inside Pakistani Tribal Areas*.
- ²⁶ Jaideep Saikia, *Anatomy of Conspiracy, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 25, (Taylor & Francis, 2002), pp. 185-197.
- ²⁷ Both groups have their ideological base in Pakistan.
- ²⁸ Bangladeshis Sneak into India, *Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, March 11, 2002.
- ²⁹ Daily *Ummat*, Karachi, April 23, 2007. A statement by Syed Salahuddin, head of United Jihad Council, Kashmir.
- ³⁰ Also known as Jundallah, headed by Abdel Malik Regi, who was exiled from Iran.
- ³¹ The northern land border begins in the Thar desert in the province of Sindh and is separated in the south from the salt flats of the Rann of Kutch by a boundary that was first delineated in 1923-24.
- ³² "Hindu extremism reach near Pakistani borders," daily *Nawa-i-Waqt*, Lahore, February 9, 2005.
- ³³ The eight SAARC members are: Afghanistan Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, India and Sri Lanka. China and Iran have been granted status of observer with the organization.

Annex

Major insurgent and separatist movements in South Asia

No	Movement	Country	Nature	Border
1	Arakan liberation movement ¹	Myanmar	Politico-religious/separatist	Bangladesh-Myanmar border
2	Assam liberation movement ²	India	Ethno-nationalist/separatist	India's borders with Bangladesh and Bhutan
3	Bodoland liberation movement ³	India	Ethno-nationalist/separatist	India's borders with Myanmar and Bhutan
4	Balochistan separatist movement	Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran	Ethno-nationalist/separatist	Afghanistan-Iran-Pakistan borders
5	Chittagong Hills Tracts ⁴	Bangladesh	Nationalist/separatist	Bangladesh-Myanmar border
6	Jihadi movements	Bangladesh	Insurgents	Bangladesh's borders with India and Myanmar
7	Jihadi movements	Pakistan	Insurgents	Line of Control (LoC), Pakistan's borders with Afghanistan and India
8	Khalistan movement ⁵	India	Politico-religious nationalist/separatist	The border region between the Indian and Pakistan Punjab
10	Kashmir liberation movement ⁶	India, Pakistan	Politico-religious nationalist/separatists	LoC
11	Left wing extremism ⁷	Bangladesh	Left wing radical	Bangladesh-India border
12	Maoists movement ⁸	Nepal, India	Left wing radical	India-Nepal border
13	Manipur liberation movement ⁹	India	Ethno-nationalist/separatist	India-Myanmar border
14	Mizoram liberation movement ¹⁰	India	Ethno-nationalist/separatist	India-Bangladesh border
15	Meghalaya insurgent movement ¹¹	India	Ethno-nationalist	India-Bangladesh border
16	Nagaland liberation movement ¹²	India	Ethno-nationalist/separatist	India-Myanmar border

Radicals' Influx into Border Areas: Impact on Inter-state Relations in South Asia

17	Naxalites ¹³	India	Left Wing radical	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inside India • India's borders with Bangladesh and Nepal
18	Sangh Parivar ¹⁴	India	Hindu religious fundamentalist	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inside India • India's borders with Pakistan and Nepal
19	Taliban	Afghanistan, Pakistan	Politico-religious insurgents	Pak-Afghan border
20	Tamil liberation movement ¹⁵	Sri Lanka	Ethno-nationalist/separatist	Maritime boundary between Sri Lanka and India
21	Tamil Nadu liberation movement ¹⁶	India	Ethno-nationalist separatist	Maritime boundary between Sri Lanka and India
22	Tripura liberation movement ¹⁷	India	Politico-religious separatist	India-Bangladesh border
23	Tripura-Bengali liberation movement ¹⁸	India	Ethno-nationalist separatist	India-Bangladesh border
24	Turkistan liberation movement ¹⁹	China	Politico-religious Separatist	China-Pakistan border
25	Pashtun nationalist movement ²⁰	Afghanistan, Pakistan	Ethno-political nationalist	Afghanistan-Pakistan border

Notes

-
- ¹ Arakan liberation movement began in 1948, but gathered momentum in March 1978 when the Burmese government launched a campaign in Arakan to check illegal immigrants. The action was seen as an attempt to expel Muslims from the territory.
 - ² New Delhi has cited migration from Bangladesh as the source of militancy in the Indian state of Assam. Dhaka denies the charge. The movement that started with the demand to deport illegal migrants also witnessed the birth, in 1979, of the militant outfit, the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA).
 - ³ The Bodos, an ethnic group in India's northeast, demand a separate Bodo state in Assam.
 - ⁴ The Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), a southeastern mountainous region of Bangladesh, spreads over 13,295 square kilometers. When the Bangladeshi government started to take over tribal land with large-scale settlement of landless Bengalis, the native Jumma people reacted by launching an armed resistance.
 - ⁵ The Khalistan movement was launched in Indian Punjab in the 1970s and '80s to create "The Land of the Pure" in all Punjabi-speaking areas contiguous to the borders of Indian and Pakistani Punjab. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh conceded in March 2008 that Sikh extremists were still active, *Dawn*, March 6, 2008.
 - ⁶ Kashmiri separatist groups are divided into two categories, one support the Indian- and Pakistani-administered Kashmir to become an independent state, while the other is striving for the merger of Indian-held Kashmir into Pakistan.
 - ⁷ Bangladesh is also a victim of left-wing extremism in small pockets of the country's western districts. The main objective of these elements is to form a socialist republic of Bangladesh.
 - ⁸ The Maoists won the April 10, 2008 elections and formed the government after the monarchy was thrown out.
 - ⁹ In the Indian state of Manipur, militancy originated in protest against the forcible merger of the former Manipur kingdom with India. In 1964, the United National Liberation Front was formed with the objective of ending discrimination against Manipur, which was designated as a state only in 1972, nearly 23 years after its merger with India.
 - ¹⁰ Mizoram, which was part of the state of Assam before it was made a separate state in 1987, experienced militancy after the Union government of India failed to respond positively to its demand for assistance during the massive 1958-59 Mautam Famine. The Mizo National Front (MNF), led by its legendary leader Laldenga, launched the movement on February 28, 1966 and demanded independence for Mizoram.
 - ¹¹ Militant groups in India's northeastern state of Meghalaya are struggling to transform Meghalaya into a state exclusively for the Khasi tribe and free it from the domination of the Garo tribe. Another objective is to fight against the presence of 'outsiders', as they feel that Khasi youth are deprived of the fruits of development in the state.
 - ¹² Long before the British left India, Nagas considered themselves to be an independent people and petitioned the British to declare an independent country for them. After being snubbed by both the British and the new regime in New Delhi,

Nagas, under the leadership of the Naga National Council (NNC), started to fight for independence in 1956.

- ¹³ The Naxalites is a loose term used to define groups waging a violent struggle on behalf of landless laborers and tribal people against landlords. Many groups operate under different names. The Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) is the political outfit that propagates the Naxalite ideology. Specific groups have front organizations, such as the Indian People's Front.
- ¹⁴ 'Sangh Parivar' is the collective name used to describe a family of powerful Hindu nationalist organizations. The most influential groups in the Parivar are the Rashtriya Swamsevak Sangh (RSS), Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), Bajrang Dal, and the Bharatiya Janta Party.
- ¹⁵ The Tamils in Sri Lanka have been subjected to oppression by successive Sinhala-dominated governments. The resettlement of a large numbers of Sinhalese in the eastern province also offended the Tamils.
- ¹⁶ The objective of the movement is to achieve liberation of Tamil Nadu from what several groups united under the banner of Tamil National Liberation Army see as Hindu Brahminist tyranny.
- ¹⁷ Migration of Hindus from the British-ruled East Bengal—which subsequently became East Pakistan and then Bangladesh—to the Indian state of Tripura is believed to be responsible for pushing the once dominant indigenous tribal people in the state to the minority status. This development sparked a violent backlash among the indigenous people. Starting in 1970, militant groups emerged in the state, demanding the indigenous people's rights in the presence of the Bengali population, which is accused of dominating the political and economic affairs of Tripura.
- ¹⁸ The United Bengali Liberation Movement was formed in October 1999. The objective of the movement is protection of the Bengali population in Tripura from attacks by terrorist outfits such as the National Liberation Front of Tripura.
- ¹⁹ Uighur militants have been striving for decades to establish an independent East Turkestan in the Chinese province of Xinjiang.
- ²⁰ The Pashtun nationalist movement remained active during the 1960s and 70s, struggling for a greater Pashtun state. One of its objectives was the merger of the Pashtun majority areas in Pakistan with Afghanistan.

Notes on Contributors

Najam U Din is associate editor of *Conflict and Peace Studies*. He has done his LLM in international human rights law from Lunds University in Sweden. He has worked with the English print media in various capacities since 1998. He also works for the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan as a research officer.

Wajahat Masood has done his LLM in International and European Human Rights Law from University of Leeds in UK. He is one of the founding members of the Democratic Commission for Human Development (DCHD) Pakistan. He has remained associated with many local and international media groups. Currently he works with an Urdu daily *Aaj Kal* as Editorial Editor.

Wajahat Ali has worked with some of the leading English language news outlets in Pakistan. His areas of interest include inter-state politics, conflict resolution and religious militancy. Mr. Ali also anchored his own weekly television show on Pakistan's foreign policy at *DawnNews*.

Ranga Kalansooriya is the foreign editor of *Conflict and Peace Studies*. He is former Director General of Sri Lanka Press Institute. He is the author of *LTTE and IRA: Combating Terrorism and Discussing Peace* and has reported on terrorism for over 15 years.

Khuram Iqbal works with Pak Institute for Peace Studies as a researcher. A graduate in Strategic Studies from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore, he has worked as senior analyst at International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, Singapore for three years.

Amjad Tufail teaches psychology at Post-graduate Psychology Department at Government M.A.O. College, Lahore. He has 20 years of experience in research, teaching and development. He is also a well known Urdu short story writer and critic and has 10 books to his credit. Currently he pursues his PhD on “development and validation of stress management programme for students”.

Muhammad Amir Rana is the founder of Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), established in January 2006, and has since been working as Director at the institute. Besides presenting numerous research papers at international fora, he has also authored a number of books including *A to Z of Jihad Organizations in Pakistan* and *Al-Qaeda Fights Back: Inside Pakistani Tribal Areas*.

Guidelines for Contributors

Conflict and Peace Studies is a quarterly journal published by the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies. The journal is aimed at dissemination of research by the Institute in its key mandated areas. It also provides a forum for those around the world undertaking research in the areas of:

- Conflict and peace (Inter-state and intra-state conflicts in South Asia)
- Security and development
- Radicalization
- Media for peace and democracy
- Political violence and terrorism
- Counter-terrorism
- Economic strategic issues
- International relations and foreign policy

Only previously unpublished submissions will be accepted and copyright will be assigned to the publisher. Permission to use copyright material submitted to the journal will be the responsibility of the author.

Submissions must be typed, single-spaced, should not exceed 6,000 words including references, and should be accompanied by an abstract (200-300 words) and a brief introduction of the author (100-150 words). Contact details should also be provided. Before publication, proofs will be sent to authors for correction and must be returned to the editor by the given deadline.

Guidelines regarding endnotes/footnotes, headings, subheadings etc. may be followed as given in the *Chicago Manual of Style*.

The title of the submission may be center-aligned and all headings and sub-headings left-aligned. All headings and sub-headings, as well as the title, may be in lower case but first letter of the first word and of all other words except prepositions, articles, and coordinating conjunctions may be capitalized. Titles and subheads may not be underlined or italicized.

Citations for books may include full name of the book, city of its publication, publishing company or organization, year of publication, and the page number/s referred to. Citations for articles may include full name of the article, name of the journal it was published in along with its volume

and issue numbers, and, the page number/s referred to. Names of the books and journals cited may be italicized but may not be in quotation marks. Names of the articles cited may be in quotation marks but may not be italicized.

Manuscripts may be submitted to the editor electronically at editor@san-pips.com.

Last	Issue	Title
------	-------	-------

LAST ISSUE

Abstracts

Financial Sources of Pakistani Militant and Religious Organizations

Muhammad Amir Rana

Developments after 9/11 have forced the militant groups in Pakistan to adopt new ways to generate funds. In the face of growing domestic restrictions and international curbs on funding, many of these groups have established public welfare wings as fronts for their activities or resurfaced as charity organizations, to boost their image among the masses and avoid government restrictions. Despite proscribing scores of militant organizations and imposing curbs on fund-raising, Pakistan has not been able to stop these organizations' access to funding and their financial networks remain intact. After being barred from raising fund, the militant groups have ventured into legitimate businesses such as school chains, housing projects and the media. Funds from individuals and organizations based abroad also continue to fill the coffers of the militant organizations in Pakistan. Some organizations raise finances through money laundering, smuggling of weapons, kidnappings for ransom and other criminal activities. The government needs to think outside the box to come up with effective strategies, denying the militant networks new avenues for generating funds.

Taliban on the March: Threat Assessment and Security Implications for the Region

Safdar Sial

Since 1996, the Taliban militancy has been proliferating on both sides of Pakistan-Afghanistan border at strategic, operational and tactical levels. The Taliban are not only propagating their own version of Islam through diversified tactics but also expanding and consolidating their areas of influence. At the same time they are maneuvering small local militant groups and individuals in pursuit of their agenda. They have not been defeated in Afghanistan so far, nor has the Pakistani government managed to stem their growth and consolidation in its tribal areas and the North West Frontier Province (NWFP). Meanwhile, Taliban groups have multiplied, expanded and set trends for other militant groups to follow, inflating the risk matrix for

the entire region. Having links with jihadist groups and Al-Qaeda, on ideological and operational levels, the Taliban present a bleak security scenario for the entire region, particularly Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, China, India and Central Asian States.

Radicalization and De-Radicalization in Singapore and Pakistan: A Comparison

Ishtiaq Ahmed

The term radicalism began to be used for rightwing ideas and movements after the Iranian Revolution of 1979 presented a model of mass uprising against dictatorship that was laced with a medieval ideology. After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, leftwing radicalism greatly weakened as a world force. Thereafter, Islamism in its different sectarian garbs and regional manifestations became synonymous with radicalism. While discussing the root causes and ideologies of Islamism, this paper attempts to compare the historical context and different approaches to radicalization and de-radicalization in two countries—Singapore and Pakistan. The tiny city state in Southeast Asia and the second largest country in South Asia have many parallels and differences in their respective manifestations and approaches towards radicalization and de-radicalization. The comparison provides candid examples on how a nation-state could be guided by short-sighted political forces into chaos. Pakistan, a country that had a visionary beginning under the leadership of Jinnah, could learn from Singapore in balancing the freedom of religion with restraints on the misuse of religion to sow discord among different religious and cultural communities.

VOLUME 2, NUMBER 2

Contents

Abstracts

Papers

Taliban Insurgency: A Counterinsurgency
Perspective

Muhammad Amir Rana

Inequality and the Militant Threat in Pakistan

Muhammad Azam and Safiya Aftab

Deradicalization: Approaches and Models

Saba Noor and Shagufta Hayat

Crisis of Political Development and Human Rights
Violations

Dr. Mansoor Akbar Kundi

Tablighi Jamaat: Discourse and Challenges

Muhammad Amir Rana

VOLUME 2, NUMBER 1

Contents

Debate

Defining the Phenomenon of Radicalization
in Pakistan: A Report

Abstracts

Papers

Mapping the Madrasa Mindset: Political
Attitudes of Pakistani Madaris

_____ *Muhammad Amir Rana*

Radicalization in Pakistan: Sociocultural
Realities

_____ *Muhammad Azam*

Post-9/11 Peace Narrative in Pakistan

_____ *Shabana Fayyaz*

Radicalization in Sri Lanka

_____ *Ranga Kalansooriya*

Human Rights Reporting in Pakistani Media

_____ *Safdar Sial*

Case Study

Radicalization among Educated Pakistani Youth

_____ *Saba Noor*

VOLUME 1

Contents

Editor's Note

Comments

New Approaches to the War on Terror in Afghanistan and
Pakistani Tribal Areas

What has culture to do with the economy?

Abstracts

Papers

Radicalization & Media

_____ *Muhammad Azam*

Jihadi Print Media in Pakistan: An Overview

_____ *Muhammad Amir Rana*

Poverty & Militancy


_____ *Safiya Aftab*

Evolution of Counter-Terrorism Legislation in Pakistan

_____ *Saba Noor*

Exploring the Mindset of the British-Pakistani Community:
The Socio-cultural and Religious Context

_____ *Safdar Sial*



Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) is an independent think-tank committed to provide an in-depth understanding and objective analyses of regional and global issues. PIPS provides international strategic thinkers a forum to play an active role in understanding and researching real and perceived threats to regional and global peace and security. The objective is to engage leading regional and international strategic thinkers, academicians and media persons in pursuance and production of knowledge of national, regional and global security issues and to promote awareness about the importance of peace and democracy. The goal will be achieved through independent policy analysis, and collection, processing, interpretation and dissemination of information and skills/training.

PIPS carries out and disseminates policy analyses and research studies on the regional and global strategic issues such as conflict and development, political violence, religious extremism, ethnic strife, terrorism (including state terrorism), economics, governance and democracy, foreign relations, and cultural learning of policy-making processes. It also conducts dialogues, trainings and other educational programs for strengthening partnerships and resolving inter-state conflicts, and clashes between the government and the public. At the national level, the institute is dedicated to build a knowledge base for peace and enlightenment of the society. PIPS is building one of the largest database on peace and security issues at the regional level.

PIPS has also developed a vast regional and global network for information sharing and research on some of the key security issues facing Pakistan, which also have a profound impact on regional and global security.