Table of contents
- Introduction 28
- Production of narcotics 30
Poppy cultivation 30
Production of heroin 33
Diversification into methamphetamine 34
Smuggling of precursors 35
- Pakistan – The counter narcotics regime and drug use 35
Policy and institutional regime 36
Seizures 37
Pakistan as a transit country 38
Drug use in Pakistan 39
- Successes and challenges in countering narcotics 40
Successes 40
Challenges 41
- Conclusion 42
Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank Ms. Irmgard Zeiler, of the Research and Trend Analysis Branch, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) for her help in identifying some very useful reference material.
Acronyms
| AML | Anti Money Laundering |
| ANF | Anti Narcotics Force |
| ANDSF | Afghan National Defense and Security Forces |
| APG | Asia Pacific Group |
| CFT | Combating the Financing of Terrorism |
| CNS | Control of Narcotics Substances |
| FATA | Federally Administrated Tribal Area |
| FATF | Financial Action Task Force |
| FIA | Federal Investigation Agency |
| FMU | Financial Monitoring Unit |
| INCB | International Narcotics Control Board |
| KP | Khyber Pakhtunkhwa |
| LEA | Law Enforcement Agency |
| MSA | Maritime Security Agency |
| NMD | Newly Merged District |
| PCG | Pakistan Coast Guard |
| PWID | People Who Inject Drugs |
| UNDCP | United Nations Drug Control Program |
| UNODC | United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime |
Executive summary
The narcotics trade is thought to have yielded significant revenue for dealers and political elites in Afghanistan, but its impacts are very much apparent in Pakistan as well; the latter being both a transit and destination country for opiates. This paper focuses on the following questions.
- How has opium and heroin production developed (or otherwise) in Afghanistan over the last decade? Further, what does research say about the production of methamphetamine?
- What is the evidence from Pakistan regarding drug trafficking through the country (transit traffic) and as an end use destination? And lastly:
- What has Pakistan done recently to counter the narcotics trade as well as the flow of funds from the trade?
Production
As of now, about 75 percent of the estimated global cultivated area for opium poppy lies in Afghanistan. Opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan already covered more than 120,000 hectares of land in 2009, but the cultivated area began to increase significantly after 2013 (when it almost doubled) and peaked in 2017. In the very first press conference held by the new Taliban administration on August 18, 2021, the government’s spokesman announced curbs on the narcotics trade. However, there was no announcement of an immediate ban on the cultivation of opium poppy. Based on estimates of acreage, the UNODC assessed global potential heroin manufacture at a maximum of about 694 tons in 2020.
Afghanistan’s role as a leading producer of opiates has been well established for some time, but more recent research links the country to the production of ephedrine and methamphetamine (more commonly known as meth). Over the last two or three years, meth production has commenced in Afghanistan, using ephedrine extracted from the ephedra plant which grows wild in the highlands.
Drug use and trade in Pakistan
The most recent comprehensive study on drug use in Pakistan took place eight years ago in 2013. The study found that 6.7 million people in Pakistan were using illicit substances, and of these, just over 4 million could be considered drug dependent. The most commonly used drug was cannabis, with about 4 million users. Heroin had about 860,000 regular users, while about 320,000 persons were found to be regular users of opium. The 2013 survey was also the first to find meth users in the population, although numbers were very small at only about 19,000.
Opium seizures in Pakistan represented 4 percent of global opium seizures, and 9 percent of global heroin seizures. Although the ANF has not published data post 2019, evidence from Iran suggests that meth trafficking has increased significantly in the region in the last two or three years.
About a decade ago, the UNODC estimated that 40 percent of the Afghan opiate trade transits through Pakistan. A recent UNODC study, based on information from a small sample of traffickers in Afghanistan, also confirms that Pakistan is a major transit/destination, along with Iran. With the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan now having been fenced from the Pakistan side, it is unclear whether unofficial crossings are still widely used. More than a third of the traffickers reported traveling to other countries, including Pakistan, to sell drugs or to negotiate deals. Many traffickers use legitimate business visas, as they run documented enterprises alongside the narcotics deals.
Pakistan is also used as a transit country for precursors. The INCB estimated, based on data from the Government of Afghanistan, that about 15 percent of the precursors used in heroin manufacture in Afghanistan entered through Pakistan in the period from 2011 to 2014. Law enforcement officials in Pakistan believe that a large part of the chemical is sent to Afghanistan through mislabeled containers which form part of the cargo of Afghan Transit Trade. Pakistan’s legitimate import of acetic anhydride and other similar products has been falling over the years, and diversion from legitimate use in Pakistan is likely to be rare.
Successes and challenges
Pakistan was declared a poppy free country by the UNDCP in 2001 and has since maintained its status. This is due, in no small measure, to the extensive law enforcement operations that have taken place in the border districts of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. There is also little to no evidence of heroin manufacture in Pakistan.
In June 2018, Pakistan made a commitment to work with the FATF and the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering to strengthen its anti-money laundering (AML) and combating the financing of terrorism (CFT) regimes. Over the past three years, the country has enacted significant primary and secondary legislation (passage of, and amendments to more than 15 laws, and more than 30 rules and regulations). As of June 2021, Pakistan had addressed 26 out of 27 actions that it agreed to three years earlier.
In terms of challenges, it is important for policymakers in Pakistan to have reliable data on drug abuse, and types of narcotics in use, to formulate a policy to counter the use of narcotics. The existing data is outdated. With an evidence-based policy in place, the country will be in a better position to request assistance and resources from international agencies experienced in counter narcotics operations.
Pakistan has worked closely with FATF to control money laundering and terrorist financing. However, if the narcotics trade continues to grow or diversify, the country’s financial monitoring systems will continue to face pressure, and legitimate trade and commerce can be negatively affected. Similarly, the performance of law enforcement agencies can potentially come under increased scrutiny from the international community. The growth of the illegal economy in general, and the narcotics trade, in particular, have implications for Pakistan’s internal security and political stability, given the links between the trade and organized crime, as well as terrorism.
Introduction
As of end August 2021, the Taliban have taken power in Afghanistan, after a lightning offensive of just over one week. It is too early to comment on the form that the Taliban’s ‘Islamic emirate’ will take this time around, 24 years after its first manifestation. What is clear though is that Pakistan once again finds itself dealing with turmoil on its western border. As efforts continue to forge a consensus on the governance structure in Afghanistan, Pakistan is trying to position itself as a mediator across different groups and is also trying to convince the international community to work with all stakeholders to establish an inclusive government in the country.
However, it is a rocky road ahead, and peace in Afghanistan still seems somewhat elusive in the short to medium term. Recent signs of the re-emergence of the Islamic State, this time in the form of IS-Khorasan, render the situation even more complex and dangerous.
The Taliban began to re-emerge as a force to be reckoned with in 2005-06, and had, within a few years, established control over much of rural Afghanistan. By 2019, the group had gained in strength to the extent that the US had started high level talks with their representatives in Doha. The re-emergence of the Taliban after a decisive loss, and the group’s ability to sustain a long-term insurgency has raised many questions, particularly about how they managed and financed their operations over more than a decade. Their recent offensive, (beginning in May 2021, and gaining momentum in August), has been characterised by the capture of arms and ammunition as well as sophisticated equipment from the retreating Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). But the long struggle before that also required significant monetary resources. Available evidence suggests that most of these were acquired through local taxation (in districts where the group had established control), mainly taxes on goods transport, on commerce, and on local land and agricultural production. In some districts, the Taliban derived additional income from taxation of mining operations as well as trade in minerals. But another possible source of funding that has been extensively mentioned in the literature, is taxation of the narcotics trade, specifically trade in opium, heroin, and cannabis.
The narcotics trade is thought to have yielded significant revenue for growers and dealers, as well as the Taliban, and other political elites in Afghanistan. However, this is a regional issue, and its impacts are very much apparent in Pakistan as well; the latter being both a transit and destination country for opiates in particular. The effects of the trade have manifested themselves in different ways in Pakistan, from an increase in addiction levels (mainly cannabis, but also heroin, and lately, synthetic drugs), to the rise of organized crime, and the proliferation of informal money transfer mechanisms. Attempts to launder the proceeds of the trade may have compromised the banking system, before more stringent controls were enacted recently. Funds are also thought to have made their way into key sectors such as the real estate market, and even the stock exchange, essentially distorting these markets. One reason why Pakistan faced significant pressure from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) was its perceived inability to control the flow of funds from illicit trade into formal sectors of the economy.
This paper will build upon an earlier analysis completed in 2014 (Aftab, 2014), and focus on the following questions.
- How has opium and heroin production developed (or otherwise) in Afghanistan over the last decade? Further, what does research say about the production of methamphetamine in that country – a new trend that appears to be picking up pace?
- What is the evidence from Pakistan regarding drug trafficking through the country (transit traffic) and as an end use destination? And lastly:
- What has Pakistan done recently to counter the narcotics trade as well as the flow of funds from the trade?
This paper is largely based on secondary sources besides relying on firsthand information collected from some experts, and provides an overview of the state of the regional narcotics trade as of August 2021.
Production of narcotics
Poppy cultivation
There is a perception in Pakistan that the Taliban had banned poppy cultivation throughout their years in power. In fact, the group came to power in 1996, and opium poppy cultivation was not banned till July 2000 (UNDCP, 2001). The 2001 opium poppy season was the one year where cultivation decreased dramatically. In 2000, the opium poppy crop covered an estimated 82,172 hectares, but this acreage had fallen to 7,606 hectares in 2001 (Ibid). As such, the ban was not only announced, but was also effectively enforced. However, there is no evidence that dry opium stocks were destroyed during this one year, or at any time before. Once the Taliban were deposed, opium poppy cultivation began again, and gained strength in traditional poppy growing areas like Helmand and Kandahar. Over the years, cultivation of opium poppy gained strength, including in areas where the Taliban insurgency was active, as well as in rural areas which were under the control of the group.
As of 2021, about 75 percent of the estimated global cultivated area for opium poppy lies in Afghanistan, as shown in the figure below. Thus, for the current year, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimated that almost 300,000 hectares of land across mainly west and southeast Asia was under poppy cultivation, and 224,000 hectares of this was in Afghanistan, with the remaining area lying mainly in South-east Asia (UNODC, 2021: Table 6.2.1).[1]
As the figure shows, opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan already covered more than 120,000 hectares of land in 2009, but the cultivated area began to increase significantly after 2013 (when it almost doubled), and peaked in 2017, when the crop covered 328,000 hectares. Afghanistan is primarily a pastoral country and has only about 7.7 million hectares of arable land.[2] In any given year, about half of the arable land is cultivated in actual. This would mean that, as per UNODC estimates, about 8 percent of the available cultivable land was used to grow poppy in 2021. Pakistan, in contrast, was declared “virtually poppy free” by the UN Drug Control Program (UNDCP) in 2001 and has since maintained its status. Although poppy fields have since been identified in Pakistan, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Balochistan, these have typically been destroyed before the crop matures.[3]
Figure 2.1: Illicit cultivation of opium poppy (hectares)
Source: Data from: UNODC. (2021). World Drug Report. Table 6.2.1.
In the very first press conference held by the new Taliban administration on August 18, 2021, the government’s spokesman announced curbs on the narcotics trade. However, there was no announcement of an immediate ban on the cultivation of opium poppy. Instead, the spokesman invited foreign governments to assist the new administration to introduce alternatives to the poppy crop to Afghan farmers.[4] It is, as yet, too early to predict how the situation will evolve.
While the Taliban have previously (during their first term in government) demonstrated the resolve to crack down on poppy farming, they have also allegedly benefitted from taxes on production of and transportation of opiates over the last decade. Recent research suggests that revenues from land tax on poppy fields and transportation of illicit substances are dwarfed by the Taliban’s taxation of the movement of licit goods (Mansfield & Smith, 2021).[5] Nevertheless, an immediate crackdown on poppy cultivation does not seem likely. The Taliban derive considerable support from the rural heartland and are unlikely to jeopardise their relations with key constituents until they have consolidated their hold on power. According to the UNODC, the farmgate value of opium, which is an indicator of the income that farmers derive from the crop, was about $350 million in 2020 (UNODC/NSIA, 2020). Although prices of opium had fallen in 2020, this still represents substantial revenue for poor farmers.
Production of heroin
| Box 2.1: From opium poppy to heroin
The moisture in raw opium has to be removed before the product can be smoked or consumed. Opium is typically dried and packed into “bricks” before further processing. The UNODC has devised a detailed methodology for the estimation of extraction of oven-dry opium from the estimated poppy crop in Afghanistan (UNODC, 2020). They estimated the production of oven-dry opium in Afghanistan in 2020 at 6,300 tons (as a best estimate within a band of 5,400 tons to 7,200 tons) (UNODC, 2021: Table 6.2.2). A part of this is consumed as is, while some is converted into morphine and not processed further. The remaining opium is first converted into morphine, and then processed into heroin using a simple technique. This last step involves the use of precursors – most notably acetic anhydride. Overall, heroin manufacture is a relatively simple and inexpensive process, using basic tools and not much expertise. Further, heroin laboratories are highly portable and can be packed up and relocated at short notice. |
Based on estimates of acreage, the UNODC assessed global potential heroin manufacture at a maximum of about 694 tons in 2020 (UNODC, 2021: Table 6.2.4). Not all of this would have been consumed – some could be stored, some wasted or destroyed, and some seized by drug enforcement officials across the world. Nevertheless, the UNODC estimates that about 340 tons of heroin ends up being consumed globally, and a significant proportion of this is trafficked from Afghanistan.[6] At street prices of about $58 per gram (the average for the US) ((UNODC, 2021: Table 8.4),[7] this translates to an expenditure of approximately $18 billion on heroin consumption in the world in one year.[8] Only a small proportion of this revenue is likely to have found its way back to Afghanistan. But in a country where the total GDP was estimated at about $20 billion in 2020,[9] even small flows would have had an impact on the local economy.
Diversification into methamphetamine
Afghanistan’s role as a leading producer of opiates has been well established for some time, but more recent research links the country also to the production of ephedrine and methamphetamine (more commonly known as meth). Meth is typically a synthetic drug and requires the extraction of ephedrine from medication such as cough syrup. Meth cooking using syrups and medicines requires a level of expertise that is not easily sourced. However, over the last two or three years, meth production has commenced in Afghanistan, using ephedrine extracted from the ephedra plant which grows wild in the highlands. Initial research suggests that ephedra, earlier harvested for sale to pharmacies, or used as household fuel, has, for the last four or five years, been sold to traders who are supplying ephedrine producers and meth cooks in provinces like Farah and Wardak (EMCDDA, 2020).
The same research study found that the wholesale price of meth in Afghanistan was around $286 per kilogram in Afghanistan in 2019, compared with $3,062 per kilogram recorded in Southeast Asia the same year (Ibid). If the growth of meth production remains unchecked, it is only a matter of time before this price differential is exploited by more dealers, and greater quantities of meth and its variants find their way from Afghanistan to overseas markets.
Smuggling of precursors
As mentioned earlier, manufacturing heroin from opium requires the use of precursors, like acetic anhydride, trade in which is internationally regulated. The UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988) requires signatory states to prevent diversion of certain industrial chemicals, like acetic anhydride, to illicit uses. The International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) is responsible for monitoring governments’ control over precursors.
Afghanistan banned the import of acetic anhydride in 2009, given that it has no industry that would require the chemical as an input.[10] As such, all acetic anhydride used in Afghanistan for heroin manufacture would have had to be smuggled in. The price differential makes this illicit trade very attractive – the average price of acetic anhydride is $1 per liter, whereas in Afghanistan, the average price of a liter was estimated at $257 in 2017 (UNODC, 2018). The UNODC estimates that the manufacture of 1 kg of heroin base requires 1 liter of acetic anhydride, and that up to $144 million worth of the chemical was used in Afghanistan in 2019 (UNODC/NSIA, 2019: 16, 74).
Pakistan – The counter narcotics regime and drug use
Pakistan is both a transit and an end use country for opiates from Afghanistan. It is the first stop in the infamous Balkan route for heroin smuggling from Afghanistan to Western Europe.[11] In this section, we briefly explore Pakistan’s policy, legislative, and institutional anti-narcotics regime, and also touch upon drug use in the country.
Policy and institutional regime
Pakistan is party to three UN drug control conventions, including the Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988, and the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 as Amended by the 1972 Protocol. The Conventions place strong focus on fighting organized crime responsible for trafficking and production of narcotics, but the 1988 Convention also mentions the need for governments to prohibit possession of drugs for personal use.[12] Further, the 1988 Convention requires signatories to regulate trade in precursors such as acetic anhydride, which have primarily industrial uses, but are key inputs to the manufacture of narcotics.
The Government of Pakistan formulated a new anti-narcotics policy in 2019, which delineated three priorities: Interdiction; Prevention and Treatment; and Regional and International Cooperation. In terms of actions to be supported, the policy aims to continue enforcement of the ban on cultivation of opium poppy in Pakistan; enhance border management and law enforcement systems including controlling the diversion of licit pharmaceuticals and precursors; and improve international cooperation, particularly in the form of intelligence sharing with neighboring countries to check trafficking. The policy also recognizes the need to control online trafficking management systems. Of late there is increased awareness in Pakistan of drug use in educational institutions and amongst young people in general, and the policy lays out plans for communications campaigns and awareness drives for these groups.
A number of institutions are responsible for enforcing Pakistan’s anti-narcotics policy, including the Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF), which is the lead drug trafficking control agency in Pakistan. The Force was established in 1995, and has the primary responsibility of interdiction, systems for collecting intelligence on drug traffickers (including maintaining a fund for informers) and conducting raids for drug seizures. In addition, Pakistan Customs has specialised drug units located at international seaports and airports. Other institutions such as the Coast Guards, Maritime Security Agency, and all law enforcement agencies are part of the anti-narcotics institutional framework. The federal Ministry of Narcotics Control oversees the operations of the ANF, but it does not have jurisdiction over the other law enforcement agencies. As such, coordination of efforts could be an issue.
The key anti-narcotics legislation in Pakistan is the Control of Narcotic Substances (CNS) Act, 1997. The Act prohibits the cultivation, production, manufacturing, extraction, preparation, transportation, possession, trade, financing and trafficking of narcotics and psychotropic or controlled substances except for scientific, industrial or medical purposes. The Anti Money Laundering Act 2010 has created the institutional structure and provided the legislative basis for monitoring financial systems to detect money laundering, which is integral to tracing narcotics related transactions. The Financial Monitoring Unit (FMU) at the State Bank of Pakistan also helps in implementation of legislation on money laundering by investigating suspicious transactions reported by commercial banks.
Seizures
In 2019, the last year for which data is published on its website, the ANF seized 27,184 kg of opium, 7,682 kg of heroin and 37,897 kg of cannabis, in addition to a 193 kg of meth and a host of other drugs and precursors.[13] In terms of global rankings, opium seizures in Pakistan represented 4 percent of global opium seizures, and 9 percent of global heroin seizures ((UNODC, 2021: 89).[14] The UNODC data shows that in 2019, total global seizures of heroin amounted to 93 tons, of which 12 tons were seized in Pakistan and Afghanistan (8 in Pakistan and 4 in Afghanistan).
Although the ANF has not published data post 2019, evidence from Iran suggests that meth trafficking has increased significantly in the region in the last two or three years. In 2019-20, 17 tons of meth was seized in Iran – a more than 200 percent increase over the previous year’s level (EMCDDA, 2021). Iranian officials allege that the bulk of this comes from Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Figure 2.2: Global seizures of heroin in tons
Source: Data from: UNODC. (2021). World Drug Report. Data from Booklet 3, Figure 71.
The ANF’s prosecution of drug offenders has improved in recent years, and the conviction rate in lower courts is over 80 percent.[15] The proportion of decisions in favor of the state tends to fall as cases move through higher courts, as is only expected. However, the caseload of the so-called CNS courts (which were constituted under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act), is very high, and disposal of cases is slow (Sahoutara, 2019).[16]
Pakistan as a transit country
About a decade ago, the UNODC estimated that 40 percent of the Afghan opiate trade transits through Pakistan (UNODC, 2011). A recent UNODC study, based on information from a small sample of traffickers in Afghanistan, also confirms that Pakistan is a major transit/destination, along with Iran (UNODC, 2020). Traffickers from Afghanistan mentioned using both official and unofficial border crossings for the drug trade, although some clarified that official crossings were only used when requisite “arrangements” had been made (UNODC, 2020: 20). With the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan now having been fenced from the Pakistan side, it is unclear whether unofficial crossings are still widely used. More than a third of the traffickers reported traveling to other countries, including Pakistan, to sell drugs or to negotiate deals. Many traffickers use legitimate business visas, as they run documented enterprises alongside the narcotics deals.
Pakistan is also used as a transit country for precursors, although to a lesser extent. The INCB estimated, based on data from the Government of Afghanistan, that about 15 percent of the precursors used in heroin manufacture in Afghanistan entered through Pakistan in the period from 2011 to 2014 (INCB, 2016).[17] Most of the acetic anhydride smuggled through Pakistan originates in China, which is a key manufacturer of the chemical in the region, along with India. Law enforcement officials in Pakistan believe that a large part of the chemical is sent to Afghanistan through mislabeled containers which form part of the cargo of Afghan Transit Trade (NIOC, 2020). Pakistan’s legitimate import of acetic anhydride and other similar products has been falling over the years, from about 240,000 kg in 2005 to barely 6000 kg in 2020.[18] As such, diversion from legitimate use in Pakistan is likely to be rare.
Drug use in Pakistan
The most recent comprehensive study on drug use in Pakistan took place eight years ago in 2013 (UNODC, 2013). Based on surveys covering all four provinces and Azad Jammu and Kashmir, the study found that 6.7 million people in Pakistan were using illicit substances, and of these, just over 4 million could be considered drug dependent. The commonly used drug was an opiate, cannabis, which was estimated to have about 4 million users. Heroin was relatively less commonly used, with about 860,000 regular users, while about 320,000 persons were found to be regular users of opium. The 2013 survey was also the first to find meth users in the population, although numbers were very small at only about 19,000 (Ibid). Since then, media reports suggest, meth use in Pakistan has increased significantly, and the drug is particularly popular amongst young adults and students. There is, however, no definitive figure of the number of people addicted to crystal meth or ice, as no comprehensive survey has been carried out since 2013.
Successes and challenges in countering narcotics
The narcotics trade can permeate the economy, politics, and society in countries which are points of origin for the trade or are significant transit routes. A failure to control narcotics smuggling, or the financial flows from the trade, can have grave repercussions for a country and its dealings with the international community. Some of the ways in which Pakistan has been affected, and ways in which the issues are being addressed, are discussed in this section.
Successes
Pakistan was declared a poppy free country by the UNDCP in 2001 and has since maintained this status. This is due, in no small measure, to the extensive law enforcement operations that have taken place in the former federally administrated tribal areas (FATA), now the newly merged districts of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. There is also little to no evidence of heroin manufacture in Pakistan. In 2013, the last year when UNODC reported on heroin manufacture by country, Pakistan was estimated to be the site of manufacture of less than one ton of heroin (UNODC, 2013a).
In June 2018, Pakistan made a commitment to work with the FATF and the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering to strengthen its anti-money laundering (AML) and combating the financing of terrorism (CFT) regimes. Over the past three years, the country has enacted significant primary and secondary legislation (passage of, and amendments to more than 15 laws, and more than 30 rules and regulations). As of June 2021, Pakistan has addressed 26 out of 27 actions that it agreed to in June 2018, and it has pledged to make progress towards achievement of the one remaining action, which is related to investigation and prosecution of leaders of UN designated terror groups. As of August 2021, the country has also achieved compliance (or is largely compliant) with 35 out of 40 recommendations in the APG Action Plan (APG, 2021).
Pakistan will remain on the “enhanced follow up” or so called “grey list” till it meets the one remaining requirement of FATF, as well as the five remaining requirements of the APG. Nevertheless, it has made substantial progress.
While many of the FATF/APG requirements relate to terrorist financing, the increased surveillance of financial flows and efforts to combat money laundering are expected to have a significant impact on flows from the narcotics trade in the medium to long term.
Challenges
The data on drug abuse in Pakistan is outdated, and in the last seven years, there has been no comprehensive survey on the drug use in the country. The last survey, conducted in 2013, found an estimated 6.7 million drug users in the country, of which about 4.5 were thought to be addicted (UNODC, 2013). However, that survey predated the rise of the “meth culture” and the proliferation of party drugs. These seem to have made inroads into educational institutions, and amongst urban youth in recent years, and the extent of their use has not been adequately assessed. The production of meth in Afghanistan, which is a recent phenomenon, can potentially exacerbate this issue.
It is important to note here that while the prevalence of use of “soft drugs” such as cannabis, is lower in Pakistan than in many western countries, the prevalence of heroin use is high, with over 1 percent of the population aged 15 to 64 estimated to have used the drug.[19] Similar high rates exist in only a few other countries, notably Russia, the US and Australia. Further, Pakistan has a high proportion of people who inject drugs (PWIDs) – three countries, Russia, China and Pakistan, account for 34 percent of PWIDs worldwide (UNODC, 2021: 41). The implications for the spread of HIV and hepatitis C are obvious. It is important for Pakistan to have reliable data on drug abuse, and types of narcotics in use, to formulate a policy to counter the use of narcotics. With an evidence-based policy in place, the country will be in a better position to request assistance and resources from international agencies experienced in counter narcotics operations.
Pakistan has worked closely with FATF to control money laundering and terrorist financing. However, if the narcotics trade continues or grow or diversify, the country’s financial monitoring systems will continue to face pressure, and legitimate trade and commerce can be negatively affected. Similarly, the performance of law enforcement agencies can potentially come under increased scrutiny from the international community. The growth of the illegal economy in general and the narcotics trade in particular, also has implications for Pakistan’s internal security and political stability, given the links between the trade and organized crime, as well as terrorism.
Conclusion
The future of the regional narcotics trade is closely tied to developments in Afghanistan. If peace prevails and a broad-based government is formed, there can be progress on counter narcotics operations in the short term. If the situation remains unstable, or a civil war erupts, the narcotics trade is likely to flourish as warring factions will rely on the trade to generate financing. The second scenario has grave ramifications for Pakistan. The coming few months or even years could be critical.
References
Aftab, Safiya. 2014. Post 2014: The regional drug economy and implications for Pakistan. Policy Research Paper for the Barcelona Center for International Affairs (CIDOB).
APG (Asia Pacific Group). 2021. Mutual Evaluation of Pakistan – 3rd Follow up Report. July.
EMCDDA (European Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction). 2020. Emerging evidence of Afghanistan’s role as a producer and supplier of ephedrine and methamphetamine. EU4MD Special Report, November.
EMCDDA (European Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction). 2021. Methamphetamine Developments in South Asia: The Situation in Iran and the Implications for the EU and its Neighbors. EU4MD Special Report, April.
INCB (International Narcotics Control Board). 2016. “Precursors and chemicals frequently used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances 2015.” United Nations, March. About 85 percent of precursors were estimated to enter through Iran.
Mansfield, David & Graeme Smith. 2021. “War gains: How the economic benefits of the conflict are distributed in Afghanistan and the implications for peace – a case study on Nimroz province.”. ODI, August. <https://l4p.odi.org/assets/images/L4P-Nimroz-study_main-report-13.08.21.pdf>
NIOC (National Initiative Against Organized Crime, Pakistan). 2020. “Drug trafficking in Pakistan.” Global Initiative, July. < https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Drugs-Trafficking-in-Pakistan.pdf>
Sahoutara, Naeem. 2019. “Two CNS courts in city restrained from trying new drugs cases filed by police.” Dawn, January 21st. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1458878>
UNDCP (UN International Drug Control Programme). 2001. Annual Opium Poppy Survey 2001.
UNODC. 2011. The global Afghan opium trade: A threat assessment. Vienna, July.
UNODC. 2013a. World Drug Report 2013. Data Annex.
UNODC. 2018. “Acetic Anhydride in the Context of Afghan Heroin.” Afghan Opium Trade Project, I: 7.
UNODC. 2020. Voices of Quchaqbar: Understanding opiate trafficking in Afghanistan from the perspective of drug traffickers. Afghan Opium Trade Project (AOTP) update report.
UNODC. 2021. World Drug Report.
UNODC. 2020. World Drug Report 2020 – Methodology Report.
UNODC/Ministry of Interior and Narcotics Control. 2013. Drug Use in Pakistan.
UNODC/Ministry of Interior and Narcotics Control. 2013. Drug Use in Pakistan.
UNODC/NSIA. 2019. Afghanistan Opium Survey 2019.
UNODC/NSIA. 2020. Afghanistan Opium Survey 2020.
[1] Until 2018, the UNODC conducted on the ground surveys on poppy cultivation in the country, but in more recent years, it has relied on estimates based on satellite imagery.
[2] World Bank data for 2018. Downloadable at:<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/AG.LND.ARBL.HA?locations=AF>
[3] In 2016, the last year for which data is available, the Anti-Narcotics Force in Pakistan destroyed 1470 hectares of poppy fields in KP, Sindh and Balochistan. Only 129.5 hectares in KP remained unaccounted for. See http://anf.gov.pk/ns.php
[4] See transcript of the first press conference of Zabiullah Mujahid at: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/17/transcript-of-talibans-first-press-conference-in-kabul>
[5] See David Mansfield’s definitive work on Afghanistan’s illicit economy.
[6] For details, visit: <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/drug-trafficking/index.html>
[7] The UNODC reported a weighted price of $57.8 for 2019.
[8] One ton has 907185 grams. The value of a ton of heroin at $58 would be over $52 million. Thus the value of 340 tons would amount to close to $18 billion.
[9] Details can be seen here: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=AF>
[10] Acetic anhydride is used primarily in manufacture of paints and plastics.
[11] This route encompasses Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and then on to the Balkan states and eventually, Western Europe.
[12] See Article 3 of the 1988 Convention. However, this Article can be interpreted as requiring bans on possession only to the extent that possession relates to trafficking.
[13] See http://anf.gov.pk/ns.php
[14] About 90 percent of total opium seizures worldwide were in Iran, while Turkey and Iran collectively accounted for 39 percent of global heroin seizures.
[15] Data derived from multiple issues of ANF Quarterly Bulletins.
[16] According to the report, there were over 7000 cases pending before two CNS courts in Karachi alone in 2019. The report does, however, point out that conviction rates for the Karachi CNS courts were about 91 percent.
[17] About 85 percent of precursors were estimated to enter through Iran.
[18] See UN Comtrade – Pakistan’s imports of saturated acyclic monocarboxylic acids and acetic anhydride (Code: 291524). Downloadable at: <https://comtrade.un.org/Data>
[19] Calculated using number of heroin users in 2013 and the estimated population in the relevant age cohort.