



COMPARISON OF TERRORIST ATTACKS IN PAKISTAN (2015-2022)

27%

**INCREASE IN
TERRORIST ATTACKS
COMPARED TO
THE PREVIOUS YEAR**

PAKISTAN SECURITY REPORT



PAK INSTITUTE FOR PEACE STUDIES (PIPS)

PAKISTAN SECURITY REPORT 2022

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

| | |
|--|--|
| ANP: Awami National Party | JM: Jaish-e-Muhammad |
| AQIS: Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent | JuD: Jamaatud Dawa |
| Arm: Army | JUI-F: Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam-Fazl |
| ATCs: Anti-Terrorism Courts | Kid: Kidnapping |
| BH: Beheading | KP: Khyber Pakhtunkhwa |
| BLA: Balochistan Liberation Army | LeJ: Lashkar-e-Jhangvi |
| BLF: Balochistan Liberation Front | LI: Lashkar-e-Islam |
| BNA: Baloch Nationalist Army | LM: Landmine Blast |
| BRA: Baloch Republican Army | LoC: Line of Control |
| BRAS: Baloch Raji Aajoi Sangar | Lvs: Levies Force |
| BRG: Baloch Republican Guard | Mil: Militant |
| BT: Bomb Blast | MNA: Member of National Assembly |
| CIA: Central Intelligence Agency | MPA: Member of Provincial Assembly |
| Civ: Civilians | MQM: Muttahida Qaumi Movement |
| CPEC: China-Pakistan Economic Corridor | NACTA: National Counter-Terrorism Authority |
| CT: Counter-Terrorism | NAP: National Action Plan |
| CTDs: Counter-Terrorism Departments | NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| CVE: Counter-Violent Extremism | NGO: Non-Governmental Organization |
| DGMOs: Director Generals of Military Operations | NSA: National Security Advisor |
| DSP: Deputy Superintendent Police | NSC: National Security Committee |
| ETIM: East Turkistan Islamic Party | NSP: National Security Policy |
| FATA: Federally Administered Tribal Areas | OIC: Organization of Islamic Cooperation |
| FATF: Financial Action Task Force | P-mil: Paramilitary Forces |
| FC: Frontier Corps | PCG: Pakistan Coast Guard |
| FIA: Federal Investigative Agency | PIPS: Pak Institute for Peace Studies |
| Fr: Firing | PkMAP: Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party |
| HG: Hand Grenade | PML-N: Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz |
| HRCP: Human Rights Commission of Pakistan | Pol: Police |
| IDP: Internally Displaced Persons | PPL: Pakistan Petroleum Limited |
| IED: Improvised Explosive Device | PPP: Pakistan People's Party |
| IS-K: Islamic State-Khorasan | PTI: Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf |
| ISI: Inter-Services Intelligence | PTM: Pashtun Tahaffuz Movement |
| ISIS: Islamic State in Iraq and Syria | QWP: Qaumi Watan Party |
| ISPR: Inter-Services Public Relations | RA: Rocket Attack |
| JI: Jamaat-e-Islami | RCB: Remote-controlled Bomb |
| JID: Joint Intelligence Directorate | Rng: Rangers |
| | SA: Suicide Attack |
| | Sab: Sabotage |

| | | | |
|--------------|----------------------------|--------------|---------------------------------|
| SECP: | Securities and Exchange | TA: | Terrorist Attack |
| Sect: | Sectarian | TIP: | Turkistan Islamic Party |
| SM: | Sipah-e-Muhammad | TLP: | Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan |
| SP: | Superintendent of Police | TTP: | Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan |
| SPA: | Sindhudesh People's Army | UBA: | United Baloch Army |
| SRA: | Sindhudesh Revolution Army | UN: | United Nations |
| SSP: | Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan | UNSC: | United Nations Security Council |
| ST: | Sunni Tehreek | WB: | Working Boundary |

FOREWORD

What has encouraged and provided space to the banned TTP to regroup and escalate terrorist violence in Pakistan? Two factors stand out; first, the Afghan Taliban's taking power in Kabul, and, secondly, Pakistani state's persistent ambition to engage in peace talks with the group. As the country has witnessed a 27 percent increase in the incidence of terrorist violence in 2022, the TTP was a major actor of violence in the year. In May 2022, annual report of the UNSC-led 1988 Taliban sanctions committee monitoring team noted that the group is focused on a long-term campaign against the Pakistani state and has arguably benefitted the most of all the foreign extremist groups in Afghanistan from the Afghan Taliban takeover. Meanwhile, insecurity and violence at the Pak-Afghan border have been growing gradually since the Taliban took power in Afghanistan. The Taliban have apparently taken a stricter and nationalistic stance in their response to Pakistan's efforts to fence the border.

The Islamic State's Khorasan chapter also stepped up its attacks in Pakistan in 2022. Its members were believed to be active in Bajaur, Peshawar, Mohmand, Orakzai, and Kurram areas of KP; Bolan, Sibi, Awaran, Mastung, and Quetta districts of Balochistan; and Karachi and northern Sindh.

On the other hand, while the Baloch insurgent groups mainly the BLA continued to carry out attacks in 2022, a new group Baloch Nationalist Army also emerged in the year, which claimed one major attack in Lahore, the provincial capital of Punjab province. Similarly, a new Sindhi insurgent group, which calls itself Sindhudesh People's Army (SPA), claimed the heinous attack that targeted a dental clinic run by a Chinese couple in Karachi. Over the past few years, Sindhi insurgent groups have been trying to be more assertive. There were reports that some of them even forged alliance with some Balochi insurgent groups. Still, the operational strength and threat of the Sindhi insurgent remains low to medium. But the emergence of new groups such as SPA is a sign of warning, especially for Pakistan's bilateral and multilateral economic and trade engagements in the province and country.

Against this backdrop, realization is growing among the policymakers and security agencies about the security threats being posed by the TTP and other militants in Pakistan. For one, in October 2022, the senators from both the government and opposition benches sounded alarm over surge in terrorist activities by the outlawed TTP. Earlier in the month, the Ministry of Interior had issued a nationwide alert asking for 'extreme vigilance', instructing (the home and chief secretaries of the four provinces, Azad Jammu and Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan, as well as the Islamabad chief commissioner) that targeted search and strike missions be carried out wherever militant activity is reported. In December, Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari termed the TTP as a red line for Pakistan. Similarly, the National Security Committee (NSC) meeting held on December 30th vowed to respond with full force against the terrorists.

The National Counter-Terrorism Authority (NACTA) also proposed the setting up of National Counter-Terrorism Department (NCTD). The NACTA National Coordinator had reportedly

forwarded the proposal to the Prime Minister Mian Shehbaz Sharif early December. The proposed NCTD would operate under NACTA on the federal level and will be authorised to conduct counter-terrorism operations across the country.

In October 2022, the FATF removed Pakistan from its grey list that warrants increased surveillance for terrorism financing. In recent years, Pakistan has taken multiple legislative, administrative, and operational measures to fulfil the conditions set out by the Financial Action Task Force. The FATF decision to remove Pakistan from its grey list was made by consensus that Pakistan has completed all substantial, technical and procedural requirements of both 2018 and 2021 Action Plans.

However, to counter the rising security and terrorist threats in the country, Pakistan needs a complete reorientation of its policy towards Afghanistan, and needs to bilaterally engage and talk with Afghanistan, i.e., the Taliban, on the issues of countering terrorism, enhancing trade, and evolving mechanism on border security and refugees, etc. Similarly, the country needs to come up with a proper implementation mechanism to implement National Security Policy as well as revised NAP. There is also a need to increase capacity and role of civilian law enforcement agencies, which will prevent the terrorist threat to a significant extent. While observing a zero-tolerance policy on terrorism, Pakistan also needs to take a different, multi-dimensional approach to deal with the factors, dynamics, and actors of Pakistan's growing extremism challenge, which is not confined to fighting the terrorists militarily only.

PIPS hopes that this 17th edition of its annual security report would help the policymakers, academics, media, and civil society understand the gravity of the security situation in Pakistan with a view to moving towards sustainable solutions. This year too, the report includes the comprehensive data on violent incidents, comparative analysis of various security variables, the changing targets and tactics of militants and nature of state responses.

Safdar Sial

January 6, 2023

Chapter 1

OVERVIEW OF SECURITY IN 2022: CRITICAL CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Muhammad Amir Rana and Safdar Sial*

- 1.1 Overview of Security Situation in 2022
- 1.2 Critical Challenges and Recommendations

-
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 - Safdar Hussain, nom de plume Safdar Sial, is Joint Director at PIPS and Associate Editor of *Conflict and Peace Studies* journal. He has also co-authored "Dynamics of Taliban Insurgency in FATA" and "Radicalization in Pakistan".


1.1 Overview of Security Situation in 2022

In 2022, the number of terrorist attacks in Pakistan continued to rise for the second consecutive year. Different nationalist insurgent, religiously inspired militant, and violent sectarian groups perpetrated a total of 262 terrorist attacks in Pakistan in the year – including 14 suicide bombings. – which marked an increase of 27 percent from the year before. These terrorist attacks claimed in all 419 lives – an increase of 25 percent from those killed in such attacks in 2021 – and injured another 734 people.

About half of the total fatalities or deaths caused by terrorist attacks in 2022 concentrated among personnel of security forces and law enforcement agencies including 38 FC men, 108 policemen, 52 army officials, 7 Levies, and one unspecified paramilitary soldier. Another 234 personnel of security and law enforcement agencies were also injured in the reported terrorist attacks. Similarly, 152 civilians lost their lives and another 498 were wounded in these attacks. Meanwhile 61 militants were killed and another two were injured, either in suicide blasts they perpetrated, or in security forces' retaliatory fire following some attacks.

The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), local Taliban groups such as Hafiz Gul Bahadur group, Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K), and other similar religiously inspired groups perpetrated a combined total of 179 terrorist attacks – compared to 128 in previous year – which killed 250 people and injured 262 others. Different Baloch and Sindhi nationalist insurgent groups carried out 79 attacks – as compared to 77 such attacks in 2021 – which claimed 97 lives and wounded another 259 people. Meanwhile, compared to two in 2021, four sectarian-related terrorist attacks were recorded in 2022 claiming 72 lives and inflicting injuries on another 213 people.

Chart 1: Classification of Terrorist Attacks in Pakistan in 2022



Out of the total 262 terrorist attacks recorded in Pakistan in 2022, as many as 180, or about 69 percent, targeted personnel, vehicles, convoys, and posts or facilities of security and law

enforcement agencies. Civilians were apparently hit in 14 attacks, while another 14 attacks targeted pro-government tribal elders and former members of peace committees. Meanwhile terrorists targeted political leaders/workers in eight attacks; polio vaccination workers and their security escorts in seven attacks; power pylons and railway tracks in a combined total of seven attacks; government officials, institutions, and state symbols in four attacks; educational institutions in another four attacks; and non-Baloch workers and settlers in Balochistan in two attacks. CPEC/Chinese workers were also targeted in two major attacks. A combined total of three attacks targeted Shia and Sunni community members, including a major suicide blast at a mosque of Shia Muslims in Koocha Risaldar near Qissa Khwani Bazaar, Peshawar. Other sporadic targets hit by the terrorists in 2022 are given at Table 1.

Table 1: Targets Hit in Terrorist Attacks in 2022

| Targets | Attacks | Killed | Injured |
|---|----------------|---------------|----------------|
| Security/law enforcement agencies (personnel, convoys, posts) | 180 | 268 | 390 |
| Education/institutions/teachers | 4 | 2 | 4 |
| Non-Bloch settlers/workers | 2 | 3 | 7 |
| Gas pipelines | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Govt. officials/institutions/symbols | 4 | 7 | 7 |
| Power pylons/cell phone towers | 4 | 0 | 0 |
| Pro-govt. tribal elders/peace committee members | 14 | 19 | 20 |
| Militants | 1 | 2 | 0 |
| Civilians | 14 | 13 | 54 |
| Shia religious scholars/community | 2 | 68 | 211 |
| Worship places/shrines/madrassas | 1 | 0 | 3 |
| Govt. offices/public property (hospitals, banks etc.) | 3 | 1 | 1 |
| Sunni religious leaders/community | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Political leaders/workers | 8 | 10 | 10 |
| Christian community/Church | 2 | 2 | 4 |
| Sikh community | 1 | 2 | 0 |
| Unknown | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Alleged spy | 4 | 3 | 2 |
| Health/polio workers, security escorts | 7 | 7 | 6 |
| CPEC/workers/Chinese | 2 | 6 | 6 |
| Railway tracks / trains | 3 | 0 | 5 |
| Development, exploration projects, companies, workers | 3 | 5 | 4 |
| Total | 262 | 419 | 734 |

The terrorists mainly used direct fire in most attacks including infantry fire or direct shootout in 129 attacks and tactical fire such as hand grenades in 53 attacks. They also used a total of 67 improvised explosive devices (IEDs) of various types including 14 suicide bombings. The terrorists also used other attack tactics, though less frequently, including 9 coordinated gun-and-bomb attacks, two rocket attacks, one act of abduction, and another terrorist act of sabotage and lynching.

About 95 percent of the total recorded terrorist attacks in Pakistan in 2022 concentrated in in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces.

Out of the total 262 terrorist attacks that took place in the country in 2022, as many as 169, or over 64 percent, concentrated in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. That also represented an increase of 52 percent from such attacks that happened in the province in the year before. The reported attacks from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa claimed 294 lives - as compared to 169 in the previous year - and inflicted injuries on another 393 people. North Waziristan continued to be a major flashpoint of insecurity and militant violence in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa for a third year in a row. Compared to 31 in 2020 and 37 in 2021, as many as 30 terrorist attacks took place in the district in 2022; meanwhile 12 terrorist attacks happened in the neighboring South Waziristan tribal district. Other KP districts where 10 or more attacks took place in the year included Peshawar (17 attacks), Khyber and DI Khan (14 attacks each), Lakki Marwat (13), Bannu (12), and Bajaur (11 attacks). On the whole, terrorist attacks were recorded from 21 districts of the province in 2022. Moreover, about 77 percent of the reported attacks from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa targeted personnel of security and law enforcement agencies, mainly army and police.

Balochistan faced the second highest number of terrorist attacks in 2022, after Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Baloch insurgents as well as religiously inspired militant groups perpetrated a total of 79 attacks in the province, compared to 81 in previous year, which claimed 106 lives and wounded 271 others. Different Baloch insurgent groups, mainly the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), perpetrated 71 attacks in Balochistan killing 86 people and wounding 199 others. The attacks by Baloch insurgent groups spread over 21 districts of the province, mainly targeting security forces. Meanwhile, religiously inspired militant groups such as the TTP and the Islamic State terrorist group (IS-K), etc., were reportedly involved in as many as seven attacks in Balochistan including two suicide blasts. These attacks caused death to 17 people and injuries to another 47 people. One sectarian-related attack killed three and wounded 25 others in Balochistan in 2022.

Same as in the previous year, eight terrorist attacks took place in Sindh province including six in Karachi and two in interior Sindh (one attack each in Naushahro Firoze, and Tando Muhammad Khan). These attacks killed a total of eight people and injured 31 others. Five of the reported attacks from Sindh in 2022 were perpetrated by Sindhi nationalist insurgents – mainly Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army (SRA) and a new group Sindhudesh People's Army; the

latter targeted a clinic in Karachi run by a Chinese dentist couple. Other targets hit by Sindh insurgents included a railway track in Naushahro Firoze, a power pylon in Tando Mohammad Khan, and security forces personnel in Karachi. Two Baloch insurgent groups, the banned BLA and a hitherto new group Baloch Nationalist Army, perpetrated two attacks in Karachi targeting Confucius Institute at the Karachi University, and security forces, respectively. The banned TTP also perpetrated one attack in Karachi injuring a policeman.

A combined total of five (5) terrorist attacks took place in Punjab and Islamabad which claimed 11 lives and injured 39 others. Three (3) terrorist attacks happened in Punjab which claimed six lives and injured 30 more people. Two of these attacks took place in the provincial capital Lahore including a major vehicle-borne blast by Baloch Nationalist Army targeting security and bank officials in Anarkali bazaar. The banned TTP claimed the third attack that target killed a policeman in Kallar Syedan, Rawalpindi. Meanwhile, two reported attacks from Islamabad including a suicide blast, targeted security forces, killing two policemen; three militants were also killed in these attacks including a suicide bomber.

One terrorist attack was also recorded in Gilgit-Baltistan, which did not cause any casualty, but militants torched a girls' school in Darel valley. (See Table 2)

Table 2: Terrorist Attacks in Pakistan in 2022

| Region | Attacks | Killed | Injured |
|---------------------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Khyber Pakhtunkhwa | 169 | 294 | 393 |
| Balochistan | 79 | 106 | 271 |
| Punjab | 3 | 6 | 30 |
| Karachi | 6 | 8 | 31 |
| Sindh (excluding Karachi) | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Islamabad | 2 | 5 | 9 |
| Gilgit-Baltistan | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Total | 262 | 419 | 734 |

1.1.1 Comparison

When counted together, as many as 398 incidents of violence of different types – as listed at Table 3 – were recorded in Pakistan in 2022. Apart from 262 terrorist attacks cited earlier, these violent incidents also included: 87 anti-militant operational or kinetic strikes carried out by security forces and their 11 armed clashes/encounters with militants; a combined total of 15 cross-border attacks from Afghanistan, India and Iran; eight (8) incidents of communal/faith-based violence including mob attacks; five (5) thwarted/failed terror plots; four (4) incidents of ethno-political violence; one sectarian clash; two inter-militant clashes/attacks; two clashes between security forces and protestors; and one targeted attack,


whose motivation was not clear (*See Table 3*). These overall incidents of violence killed a total of 832 people and injured 960 others.

Table 3: Nature of Overall Incidents of Violence

| Nature of Incident | Incidents | Killed | Injured |
|--|------------|------------|------------|
| Terrorist attacks | 262 | 419 | 734 |
| Political/ethnic violence | 4 | 3 | 11 |
| Clashes & encounters between security forces & militants | 11 | 25 | 6 |
| Cross-border clashes/attacks | 15 | 35 | 56 |
| Operational attacks by security forces | 87 | 327 | 51 |
| Sectarian clashes | 1 | 2 | 17 |
| Inter-militant clashes/attacks | 2 | 4 | 0 |
| Communal/faith-based violence | 8 | 5 | 2 |
| Plot/foiled terror attempts | 5 | 3 | 0 |
| Targeted attacks [not clear if by terrorists] | 1 | 5 | 0 |
| Protests/clashes with security forces | 2 | 4 | 83 |
| Total | 398 | 832 | 960 |

The number of overall incidents of violence also posted an increase, from 326 in 2021 to 398 in 2022, or 22 percent. That increase in overall violent incidents was mainly contributed by considerable increase recorded in the number of terrorist attacks as well as counterterrorism operations. The overall number of people killed in these violent incidents increased by about 37 percent; from 609 in 2021 to 832 in 2022. However, the number of people injured in all such incidents of violence decreased from 1,045 in 2021 to 960 in 2022. (*See Chart 2*)

Chart 2: Comparison of Overall Incidents of Violence & Casualties (2015-22)



For a second year in a row, the number of terrorist attacks posted an upsurge in the year 2022. Since 2014-15, when military operations including Zarb-e-Azb, and National Action Plan were launched, there had been a gradual decline in the incidence of terrorist violence and consequent casualties in the country that continued until 2020. But from 2021-onward this declining trend did not sustain, and the incidence of terrorist attacks took an upturn. (See *Chart 3 and Table 4*) This clearly indicates that the militants have once again increased their presence and activities in Pakistan over the past two years.

Chart 3: Comparison of Terrorist Attacks and Fatalities in Pakistan (2015-2022)




Table 4: Comparison of Terrorist Attacks and Fatalities in Pakistan (2009-22)¹

| Year | No. of Terrorist Attacks (%Change) | No. of Killed (% Change) |
|------|------------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| 2009 | Baseline year (2,586 attacks) | Baseline year (3,021 Fatalities) |
| 2010 | 18%↓ | 4% ↓ |
| 2011 | 7%↓ | 18%↓ |
| 2012 | 20%↓ | 14%↓ |
| 2013 | 9%↑ | 19%↑ |
| 2014 | 30%↓ | 30%↓ |
| 2015 | 48%↓ | 38%↓ |

¹ ↑ and ↓ represent increase and decrease, respectively, from previous year.

| Year | No. of Terrorist Attacks (%Change) | No. of Killed (% Change) |
|------|---------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 2016 | 28%↓ | 12%↓ |
| 2017 | 16%↓ | 10%↓ |
| 2018 | 29%↓ | 27%↓ |
| 2019 | 13%↓ | 40%↓ |
| 2020 | 36%↓ | 38%↓ |
| 2021 | 42%↑ | 52%↑ |
| 2022 | 27%↑ | 25%↑ |

As described in the Table 4, in the year 2022 the number of terrorist attacks in Pakistan marked an increase of 27 percent from the previous year. That comparative upsurge in terrorist violence was greatly contributed by a significant increase in the number of attacks reported from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The frequency of terrorist incidents in the province increased by 52 percent, compared to 2021, and the number of those killed in these attacks also increased, by 74 percent. This can be further explained by the fact that about two-third of the total attacks reported from Pakistan in 2022 concentrated in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa alone.

With the exception of KP, the number of terrorist attacks in all other regions of Pakistan either decreased or remained unchanged from previous year. But the decrease was not significant enough to cause an overall decline in the number of attacks. For instance, while the number of terrorist attacks in Balochistan fell by only 2 percent, it remained unchanged in Sindh and Islamabad. While in Punjab, the number of terrorist attacks appears to have posted a significant decline of 40 percent from the year before, but that only reflects a decrease of 2 attacks, i.e., from 5 in 2021 to 3 in 2022.

Compared to five in the year before, as many as 14 suicide attacks happened in 2022 including 10 in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (9 in North Waziristan and one in Peshawar), two in Balochistan's Quetta and Sibi districts, and one each in Karachi (Sindh) and Islamabad. These attacks claimed 108 lives – compared to 30 in 2021 – and injured 287 others. The TTP was involved in six of these attacks, four of which targeted personnel of security and law enforcement agencies in North Waziristan, one hit police in Islamabad, and another attack targeted security escort of polio vaccinators in Quetta. Hafiz Gul Bahadur group and a hitherto unknown group Ittehad Musallah Islami Mujahideen were believed to be involved in one suicide bombing each in North Waziristan, while another three suicide blasts reported from North Waziristan remained unclaimed. Islamic State-Khorasan terrorist group (IS-K) claimed two suicide blasts that took place in Peshawar (KP) and Sibi (Balochistan). These attacks by IS-K claimed a combined total of 71 lives besides wounding another 205 people. Most of these casualties resulted from the suicide blast in a mosque in Peshawar. Similarly, Baloch insurgent group BLA

perpetrated a suicide attack targeting Chinese teachers of the Confucius Institute at the Karachi University.

Table 5: Comparison of Terrorist Attacks & Casualties (2022 vs. 2021)²

| Province / Region | Number of Attacks (%Change) | Killed (% Change) | Injured (% Change) |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| Khyber Pakhtunkhwa | 52%↑ | 74%↑ | 222%↑ |
| Balochistan | 2%↓ | 22%↓ | 21%↓ |
| Punjab | 40%↓ | 57%↓ | 41%↓ |
| Sindh | Unchanged | 38%↓ | 11%↓ |
| Islamabad | 2; unchanged | 5 compared to 2 in 2021 | 9 compared to 2 in 2021 |
| Gilgit- Baltistan | 1 compared to 0 in 2021 | 0 | 0 |
| Total | 27%↑ | 25%↑ | 32%↑ |

Down by 35 percent from the year before, 15 cross-border attacks took place in Pakistan from across its borders. Most of these attacks happened from across the country's border with Afghanistan (13 attacks) in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces. These attacks from Afghanistan killed 34 people and injured 52 others. Meanwhile one attack happened from across the Working Boundary with India in Punjab but did not cause any casualty or damage. Similarly, another attack was reported from across the Iranian border in Panjgur (Balochistan), which claimed the life of one FC man and injured four people. Among those 35 killed in overall cross-border attacks were 15 army soldiers, 12 civilians, six FC officials, and two militants. Indeed, the security situation at the Pak-Afghan border has been deteriorating since the Taliban took power in Kabul in August 2021. Nonetheless, since February 2021, when Pakistan and India recommitted themselves to the 2003 ceasefire arrangement at the Line of Control, there has been a significant decline in Indian violations of the Line of Control (LoC) and Working Boundary ceasefire. Indeed, there have been only three cross-border attacks from Indian side since February 2021, including two in 2021 (post-February), and one in 2022.

Compared to 63 in the year before, security forces and law enforcement agencies conducted 87 anti-militant operational strikes in 2022 in 25 districts and regions of Pakistan. These actions caused a total of 327 fatalities (302 militants, 22 army soldiers, one FC man, one policeman, and one civilian), as compared to 197 in 2021, besides injuring 51 others. Out of the total 87

² ↑ and ↓ represent increase and decrease, respectively, compared with previous year, i.e., 2021.

operational strikes recorded in 2022, as many as 57 happened in KP, 28 in Balochistan, and two in Sindh's provincial capital, i.e., Karachi. There were a dozen districts across Pakistan where two or more anti-militant operations happened in the year including North Waziristan (24 operational strikes), Lakki Marwat (8), DI Khan (7), Peshawar (6), Bannu (5), Khyber (4), and Tank (2 strikes) in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, as well as Kech (7 strikes), Quetta (4) and Kohlu, Mastung and Ziarat (2 strikes each) in Balochistan, and two such strikes in Karachi. The operational strikes in North Waziristan, Bannu, Lakki Marwat and DI Khan in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Kech, Quetta, Ziarat, and Kohlu in Balochistan killed significantly a greater number of militants as compared to other districts.

Security and law enforcement agencies also entered into in a total of 11 armed clashes and encounters with militants – compared to six such incidents in previous year – in six districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. These armed clashes and encounters claimed 25 lives (13 militants and 12 army soldiers) and injured six security personnel. As many as eight of these clashes and encounters (or about 73 percent) took place in the twin Waziristan and DI Khan districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (between the security forces and the TTP militants). Meanwhile one attack happened in each of Bajaur, Peshawar, and Swat districts.

As many as five (5) incidents of communal or faith-based violence as well as three incidents of mob violence against blasphemy accused individuals were also recorded in Pakistan in 2022. These incidents claimed the lives of five people including two persons accused of blasphemy, and three members of Ahmedi community. In one of such incidents, a Hindu temple was also damaged in Karachi. Apart from Karachi, such incidents were recorded in Chiniot, Faisalabad, Khanewal, Muzaffargarh and Okara districts in Punjab, and DI Khan and Peshawar districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Compared to five in 2021, as many as four (4) incidents of ethno-political violence, including election-related, also took place in 2022, which claimed three lives and wounded 11 others. One of these incidents was recorded in each of four provinces of Pakistan. In Sindh and Punjab, respectively, the reported incidents were linked to by-polls in Karachi's Korangi districts, and Lahore's Johar Town. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Awami National Party election nominee for a general council seat Musawir Dawar was shot dead in Mirali Bazaar. Meanwhile, in the reported single incident from Balochistan, Sardar Mohammad Ashraf Kakar, a senior leader of the Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PkMAP), was shot dead by unidentified attackers in Loralai town.

The number of people killed in overall violent incidents in 2022 (832) represented an increase of about 37 percent from those killed in such incidents in the year before (609). The reported increase in fatalities was marked by the death of 264 personnel of security forces and law enforcement agencies in overall violent incidents, compared to 227 in 2021. Fatalities among civilians in 2022 (184) were nonetheless about 13 percent more from the previous year's fatalities among them (163). There was also an increased number of militants killed (384), in

these violent incidents, compared to 2021 when 219 militants were reportedly killed. (See Table 6)

Table 6: Casualties in Overall Violent Incidents in 2022

| Category | Killed | Injured |
|------------------------------|------------|------------|
| FC | 45 | 80 |
| Militants | 384 | 30 |
| Civilian | 184 | 613 |
| Police | 110 | 135 |
| Paramilitaries [unspecified] | 1 | 1 |
| Army | 101 | 93 |
| Levies | 7 | 7 |
| Rangers | 0 | 1 |
| Total | 832 | 960 |

1.2 Critical Challenges and Recommendations

1.2.1 The Fallout of Afghan Situation and Pakistan's Concerns

Most analysts and independent sources seem in agreement that since the August 15th 2021 (when the Taliban took over Kabul), Afghanistan has been, once again, becoming a fertile ground for local and transnational terrorist groups. A United Nations report on terrorism early February 2022 validated that argument when it said: "There are no recent signs that the Taliban ha[ve] taken steps to limit the activities of foreign terrorist fighters in the country. On the contrary, terrorist groups enjoy greater freedom there than at any time in recent history."³ Another report released by the UN in July 2022 noted that while the situation in Afghanistan remained complex, international terrorist organizations based there view the victory of the Taliban as a motivating factor for disseminating their propaganda in the neighboring regions of Central and South Asia, and globally.⁴ Earlier, towards end of May 2022, annual report of the UNSC-led 1988 Taliban sanctions committee monitoring team said, "the group [TTP] is focused on a long-term campaign against the Pakistani state," and that it "has arguably

³ United Nations Security Council's twenty-ninth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, February 3, 2022, <https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=S%2F2022%2F83&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False>

⁴ The report was released around mid-July 2022 and can be downloaded here: <https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2075689/N2239429.pdf>

benefitted the most of all the foreign extremist groups in Afghanistan from the [Afghan] Taliban takeover.”⁵

Similarly, most analysts also appear unconvinced that the Taliban will or could fulfil their promises on foreign militant groups such as Al-Qaeda, Islamic State Movement of Uzbekistan, ETIM or TIP, and TTP, etc.; the Taliban have so far only acted against Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K).

A Pak Institute for Peace Studies report released in September 2022 noted that it was not hard to foresee the dreadful fallout for Pakistan of the ill-fated fall of Kabul last August. In one year, since the Taliban took power in Kabul, there had reportedly happened 250 terrorist attacks in Pakistan which represented an over 51 percent increase from the previous year.⁶ The data and statistics provided in the report indicated that since the Taliban takeover of Kabul last year there has been significant increase in the number of terrorist attacks and consequent killings in the two key conflict and militancy-prone areas of Pakistan, i.e., Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. The incidence of such attacks in Punjab, Islamabad and Sindh has however declined, though only slightly.⁷

Pakistan is concerned about the Taliban not being willing or able to help in countering the TTP threat. However, apparently Pakistan's counterterrorism cooperation with the US is growing. The US State Department has recently said that the United States was committed to employing it all counterterrorism tools to counter the threat posed by terrorist groups operating in Afghanistan. The announcement also identified Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) and the TTP as the two groups that were using the Afghan soil for spreading terror in the region. It identified the TTP deputy emir Qari Amjad, or Mufti Hazrat Deroji, one of the four leaders added to the US list of designated terrorists, as the man who oversees TTP's operations and militants in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. His 15-year campaign of violence against Pakistan has stepped up since the Taliban seized control in Afghanistan last year, the State Department noted. The three AQIS leaders added to the list included the group's emir Osama Mehmood, Atif Yahya Ghouri, the deputy emir of AQIS, and Mohammad Maruf who is responsible for AQIS' recruiting branch.⁸

The TTP is becoming a major irritant in Pakistan's relations with the Taliban government, which many in the beginning saw as a "friendly" regime in Afghanistan. Foreign Minister Bilawal

⁵ Baqir Sajjad Syed, "Prospects of success in ongoing talks with TTP 'bleak'," *Dawn*, May 29, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1692031/prospects-of-success-in-ongoing-talks-with-ttp-bleak>

⁶ Data and statistics have been derived from Pak Institute for Peace Studies' digital database on security incidents.

⁷ Ahmed Ali, "Fallout of Afghan situation and Pakistan's policy responses," PIPS, September 9, 2022, <https://www.pakpips.com/article/7039>

⁸ Anwar Iqbal, "US designated four TTP, AQIS leaders as global terrorists," *Dawn*, December 3, 2022.

Bhutto Zardari recently termed the group as a red line for Pakistan.⁹ Later, the National Security Committee (NSC) meeting held on December 30th (2022) vowed to respond with full force against the terrorists terming them enemies of Pakistan. The statement came after rising terrorist violence in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan and a botched suicide bombing attempt in Islamabad not only set off alarm bells in the power corridors but also left several countries worried about the security of their nationals.¹⁰

Meanwhile, insecurity and violence at the Pak-Afghan border have been growing gradually, since the Taliban took power in Afghanistan. While the situation at the Chaman border (Balochistan) has been tense for several weeks now, some major cross-border attack from Afghanistan also happened in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, such as the one in Kurram tribal district during the month of November. The Taliban have apparently taken a stricter and nationalistic stance in their response to Pakistan's efforts to fence the border. Secondly, the refugee issue as well as illegal cross-border movements have also added to border tensions. As a result, not only the number of cross-border attacks and clashes has increased but intensity of such incidents has also grown resulting in more deaths and injuries. Only in 2022, 34 Pakistani citizens lost their lives (including 20 security officials) in 13 such attacks/clashes along the Durand Line. Importantly, in the past, or during Ghani regime, most of the cross-border attacks from Afghanistan were carried out by the TTP or other militant groups, but now many of such incidents involve Afghan border forces under the Taliban regime.

Pakistan needs to be careful in its dealing with the Afghan situation as well as the Taliban. Some PIPS recommendations, based on expert consultations it held on Pakistan's Afghan policy priorities in the year 2022, are listed below:

- Pakistan needs a complete reorientation of its policy towards Afghanistan in the wake of growing threats of terrorism in the country after the banned Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) called off a ceasefire it had agreed to with the government earlier 2022. Civil-military leadership, political parties, bureaucracy and ulema should be on the same page to tackle the threat, and there should be an inclusive policy on how to deal with Afghanistan and the TTP.
- Pakistan needs to bilaterally engage and talk with Afghanistan, i.e., the Taliban, on the issues of countering terrorism, enhancing trade, and evolving mechanism on border security and refugees, etc. Pakistan can formulate such agreements under the table, and once the Taliban government is recognized, these can be made formal. It seems strange

⁹ *The Express Tribune*, December 22, 2022, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2392314/ttp-red-line-for-pakistan-says-fm-bilawal>

¹⁰ Sanaullah Khan, "Terrorists are enemies of Pakistan: NSC vows to respond to terror with full force," *Dawn*, December 30, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1729017>

that despite their proximity, Afghanistan and Pakistan share no formal agreement regarding refugees, trade, or border.

- Pakistan's Afghan policy has largely remained centred upon the groups, warlords, and politicians, instead of citizens of Afghanistan. Therefore, Pakistan may work on developing a policy that focuses on winning hearts and minds of the Afghan people. Reaching out to different factions of Afghan society and polity will help in removing misperceptions held by many Afghans about Pakistan.
- Pakistan should continue taking lead in ensuring the reach of humanitarian assistance to poverty-ridden Afghanistan. The primary pathway to achieve this is by keeping its humanitarian air and road corridors open, along with the land routes for UN agencies, NGOs and other donors. Moreover, Pakistan shall be on the front foot with regards to implementation of OIC's commitments pertaining to the Afghan situation.
- Pakistan may devise a policy that facilitates trade with Afghanistan include doing so in Pakistan's national currency and enabling barter mechanism until Afghanistan gains financial stability. This will be a practical implementation of Pakistan's National Security Policy that asserts that Pakistan's security-oriented outlook has shifted to economic. An impetus to Pak-Afghan trade can be a game changer for both Pakistan and Afghanistan.

1.2.2 Growing Terrorist Threat from TTP, IS-K and Others

The Taliban government in Afghanistan and Pakistan's negotiation ventures emboldened the banned TTP to regroup and escalate terrorist violence in Pakistan. According to yearly data collected by PIPS, the group carried out 89 terrorist attacks in Pakistan in the year 2022. However, the TTP itself issued an infographic for attacks it carried out in 2022 (for 8 months excluding 4 months of ceasefire) according to which the group perpetrated 367 attacks, compared to 282 in 2021.

Overall, terrorist violence has gradually been picking up and intensifying in parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces. An upsurge was reported after the banned TTP formally announced to call off a ceasefire it had agreed to with the government few months back. A review of geographical spread of terrorist attacks in KP suggests that the twin North Waziristan districts and neighboring Lakki Marwat and Bannu districts extending to DI Khan, besides Peshawar, emerged as flashpoints of insecurity and violence in 2022.

The TTP reportedly also threatened political leaders, elders, and businessmen to extort money from them. For one, after a letter, issued on the TTP Mardan letterhead and addressed to the KP Minister for Science and Information Technology, circulated on the social media, the Minister Muhammad Atif Khan confirmed on October 19th that he had received a ransom note purportedly from the outlawed TTP, demanding Rs8 million in three days or he would be

targeted.¹¹ However, the TTP issued a formal statement denouncing the letter as fabricated. The TTP spokesman said the group will investigate and punish the perpetrators.¹²

August witnessed reported relocation of few small groups of Pakistani Taliban militants into parts of KP from Afghanistan. Defence Minister Khawaja Asif also admitted on the floor of the National Assembly that anti-Taliban feelings were growing in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) as people were holding protest demonstrations in various parts of the province against the Taliban presence in their areas.

Meanwhile the Islamic State's Khorasan chapter stepped up its attacks in 2022. Compared to eight in 2021, the IS-K conducted at least 23 terrorist attacks in Pakistan in 2022 including few major ones such as the suicide blast that killed over 65 people in a mosque in Peshawar in March. In KP, one of the IS-K's main targets has been Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam leaders, mainly in Bajaur. The group also perpetrated one attack in Mastung district of Balochistan targeting members of Christian community there. Similarly, in one of Pashto versions of Ghahg (Voice of Khorasan), the group warned that they will carry out attacks targeting Hindus to avenge the insulting remarks for the Holy Prophet (PBUH) delivered by Indian politician Nupur Sharma.

While the Baloch insurgents continued to carry out attacks, a new Baloch group emerged in 2022 with the name of Baloch Nationalist Army (BNA). The emergence of different factions and alliances of Baloch insurgent groups reflects a major shift in Baloch insurgency. First, traditionally the Baloch nationalist struggle, political and militant, was led by tribal elites or elders, but the BLF, BRAS and now BNA are emerging phenomenon in the way that they are largely led by middle-class educated Baloch youth. Secondly, this phenomenon could also be a reflection of growing dissatisfaction among the insurgent leaders on the ground about the Baloch leaders living abroad in self-exile.

Similarly, a new Sindhi insurgent group, which calls itself Sindhudesh People's Army (SPA) has claimed the heinous attack that targeted a dental clinic run by a Chinese couple in the busy Saddar area of Karachi, near Empress Market.

To effectively deal with internal security situation, PIPS recommends the following:

- Pakistan needs to come up with a proper implementation mechanism to implement National Security Policy as well as revised NAP, which are discussed further in the following section. A yearly review of both NSP and NAP is also needed to improve the responses to rapidly changing security scenarios. A parliamentary oversight committee can be formed to ensure broader transparency and effectiveness.

¹¹ Manzoor Ali, "Militants' threaten KP minister, attempt to extort money," *Dawn*, October 20, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1715959/militants-threaten-kp-minister-attempt-to-extort-money>

¹² <https://twitter.com/khorasandiary/status/1582705017550606337?t=QdxkEIF-I3A9qvrKHSr7Bg&s=08>

- There is a need to increase capacity and role of civilian law enforcement agencies, which will prevent the terrorist threat to a significant extent. Civilian law enforcement structures are rooted in the people and enjoy more freedom to operate due to their frequent interaction and confidence-level with the communities.
- The Baloch and Sindhi nationalist insurgents pose major threat to foreign engagements and workers in Balochistan and parts of Sindh. The terrorist operations by BLA, BLF and BRAS are highly unpredictable and recently they have acquired the resolve and capacity to perpetrate high-impact attacks, also targeting foreign nationals and interests. Therefore, a very high vigilance level is required to counter the threat.
- There should be a zero-tolerance policy towards the terrorist groups, and there should be no negotiations with those who are unwilling to quit violence.
- Pakistan needs to introduce critical shifts in foreign policy pursuits. For one, peace with the immediate neighbors including India would enable the government in Pakistan to invest more in basic social services like health and education and improve governance.
- The government may also ensure that while dealing with suspected insurgents, fundamental rights and legal frameworks are not violated, because otherwise the state tends to lose legitimacy in the eyes of public. For instance, high-handed policies in Balochistan have tended to further aggravate the sense of alienation among the Baloch. The issue of missing persons has become a point of reference in the center-Baloch relations.

1.2.3 National Action Plan & Security Policy

National Action Plan came under discussion a few times during 2022 whenever there was some major terrorist attacks. The previous government had also approved the country's so-called first-ever National Security Policy (2022-26) which is no more heard about.

As in 2021, PIPS recommends the following measures in 2022 to make the frameworks and implementation of revised NAP and national security policy more effective.

- Civilianize NAP and counterterrorism regime giving leading role to the parliament.
- Modernize and reform police, strengthen its investigation branches, reform the Evidence Act and enhance police's operational autonomy.
- Devise well-defined, realistic, and achievable plans/objectives with effective monitoring and evaluation systems against individual NAP goals/clauses. Monitoring and evaluation be done using clearly defined and concrete performance indicators, otherwise NAP would continue to be judged subjectively on the basis of varying perceptions.
- Strengthen NACTA; the prime minister may take ownership of NAP and use the NACTA platform to regularly review the status of and progress on NAP provisions.
 - Inter-Provincial Coordination Ministry (IPCM) be activated to work along with NACTA for better coordination and results.

- Reform the criminal justice system with much greater urgency and focus as this particular NAP action has practically remained a nonstarter so far.
 - The government shall review and refine key definitions in the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 in consultation with relevant stakeholders, which will also contribute to avoiding delays in prosecution.
 - Afford rigorous training and sensitization to the ATC judges in handling terrorism cases.
 - Strengthen ATCs through infrastructural uplift and capacity building.
- Develop and run an effective de-radicalization and rehabilitation program, led by civilians that also engages or partner with civil society organizations.
- Build and promote counter-narratives.
 - The Paigham-e-Pakistan can be a significant ideological response to the extremist ideologies; the message be disseminated widely and transformed into national narrative.
 - Categorization of militants into pro-state and anti-state must end.
 - Curb the access of militant/jihadist and sectarian groups to cyberspace and other means of communications without misuse of related laws, with a view to evade loss of public trust and confidence in state institutions.

1.2.4 The Need for Soft Approaches to Counter Violent Extremism

Since 2014, Pakistan has achieved considerable success in its counterterrorism endeavors leading to an improved overall security environment, which has only recently started to become problematic again. However, Pakistan's counterterrorism campaign, since early 2000s, has been largely kinetic, or muscular, and less soft, or political.

Experts agree that Pakistan needs to take a different, multi-dimensional approach to deal with the factors, dynamics, and actors of Pakistan's growing extremism challenge, which is not confined to fighting the terrorists militarily only. While successful in the short-term, kinetic or hard approaches fail to address the wider issues or causes factoring in violent extremism. For instance, even as hard approaches eliminate terrorists already on the ground, as long as the ideology driving them survives, more will continue to take their place. Therefore, "soft" approaches must be an indispensable component in any CT framework; more so in the case of Pakistan, where not just terrorism but also religious extremism is rampant.

Not only the state but civil society organizations equally need to engage in soft approaches to counter violent extremism. In its Resolution 2354 (adopted in 2017), the Security Council recognized that "efforts to counter terrorist narratives can benefit through engagement with a wide range of actors, including youth, families, women, religious, cultural, and education leaders, and other concerned groups of civil society.

indeed, civil society organizations have been part of CVE and de-radicalization programmes in many Muslim-majority countries mainly including Algeria, Nigeria, Indonesia, Egypt, and Bangladesh, etc. For instance, the role of civil society in Algerian experience is an important source of 'soft power'. Similarly, many appreciate Bangladesh's strategy of involving and exploiting the extensive influence and reach of its civil society organizations in the country's de-radicalization efforts.¹³ Similar lessons regarding the role of civil society are on the offer in the northeast of Nigeria¹⁴ and Somalia.¹⁵ In Indonesia, too, "some civil society organizations are engaged in facilitating the disengagement and eventual reintegration of ex-offenders" including through skills training and employment placing such as "employ[ing] former extremists as chefs and waiters in restaurants."¹⁶ Lessons learned from these initiatives coupled with Pakistan's own needs and context can help in framing CVE responses in the country.

PIPS believes that the following suggestions, if adopted by the state and society, can contribute to undermining the foundations upon which the extremist and terrorist movements are built.

- Despite all challenges, democracy has survived in Pakistan, and this reflects the wishes of the people of Pakistan and their firm belief in the democratic political system. Hence, the first and foremost strategy to counter terrorism in Pakistan comes through a true democratic system with free and fair elections, the supremacy of the parliament and sacrosanctity of the constitution.
- Parliament is the center of collective decision-making, and the Parliament must take a lead role in counterterrorism efforts. It must build a clear stance on terrorism, and extremism.
- This is the right of the people's elected representatives to play lead role in policymaking, especially Pakistan's foreign policy towards its neighbors, and play a pivotal role in defining Pakistan's strategy towards CVE and CT.
- The role of political parties is central in this regard. Political parties must articulate their vision for addressing the challenges facing Pakistan and should present their ideas for countering extremism and terrorism at the parliament. All political parties must also

¹³ For instance, see "The rise of religious-based radicalism and the deradicalisation programme in Bangladesh," and "Transforming terrorists: examining international efforts to address violent extremism."

¹⁴ For instance, one CSO there provides psycho-social and trauma counseling for both the victims of Boko Haram and former perpetrators.

¹⁵ Few organizations there are engaged in enhancing vocational and trade skills of former combatants.

¹⁶ Christina Nemr and Rafia Bhulai, "Civil Society's Role in Rehabilitation and Reintegration Related to Violent Extremism," The Global Observatory, June 25, 2018, <<https://theglobalobservatory.org/2018/06/civil-societys-role-rehabilitation-reintegration-violent-extremism>>

refrain from seeking any sort of assistance from extremist groups for electoral matters or political gains.

- While acknowledging the bulging youth population, all political parties also need to empower the youth by providing them space and platform for free expression and creativity as well as leadership.
- Comprehensive educational reforms are needed, aiming at removal of hateful, discriminatory, and insensitive contents from the textbooks and inclusion of more scientific inquiry, debate, and critical thinking and reasoning. There is also a need to increase in education budget to improve the quality of education.
- For ensuring the sacrosanctity of the constitution, it is pertinent to ensure uniform application of the constitution in all parts of Pakistan. It is equally important to promote the values derived from the constitution, including through enhancing constitutional literacy among the people, particularly among the youth.
- It is the duty of the state of Pakistan, being a republic, to reinstate rule of law across the country and to ward off any perception that the state is weak or fragile.
- Similarly, the role of civil society, as a bridge between people and the state, must be acknowledged and exercised. No effort against extremism or terrorism would be viable without the support of civil society. The state must build partnership with civil society to ensure maximum advantage from all soft measures.
- The state and society need to reaffirm freedom of religious beliefs and that no citizen can be denied his/her fundamental rights on account of their beliefs. Parliament and the government shall take all necessary steps for the protection and equitable development of all religious communities.
- It is utmost essential to include women in all walks of life and protect their social, political, and economic rights; the Parliament needs to rectify laws that discriminate against women in any shape or form. Women should also be included in efforts meant to CVE as the UN resolution 1325 acknowledges the role of women in the promotion of peace and security.
- The state needs to own and celebrate the indigenous cultures and promote cultural identities in Pakistan.
- The state is suggested to approach CVE and de-radicalization in a holistic manner with involvement of multiple stakeholders. The subject must not be an exclusive domain of the security agencies.
- No reintegration, rehabilitation and mainstreaming [of militants] beyond the frameworks of the Constitution shall be accepted.
- The prison system needs a major overhaul as it often serves as breeding grounds for violent extremism and ideological radicalization.

1.2.5 Persisting Conflict and Insecurity in Balochistan

While the frequency of terrorist attacks has been varying, but the most recent phase of the Balochistan conflict that started in 2005-06 continues unabated. There have been some fundamental shifts in the Baloch insurgency, such as emergence of educated, middle class leadership, and emphasis on more lethal, high-impact attacks on what the BLA claims 'political targets' or the ones which brings them into the limelight and international focus.

Meanwhile, as the banned TTP ended ceasefire, Balochistan also started to face the terrorist violence by the group; the TTP claimed a suicide bombing in the provincial capital Quetta targeting a police truck in November. The TTP in the past had remained very active in Balochistan; it had established its Balochistan chapter also, which was known as Tehreek-e-Taliban Balochistan. After the group's relocation to Afghanistan following the 2014 Zarb-e-Azb operation, its presence, and activities in the Balochistan province also decreased significantly. But the group has declared to carry out attacks across Pakistan in its statement that called off the ceasefire. Experts warn that Balochistan and Sindh could be the group's next targets after it has already made its presence felt in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

The banned BLA was the major of violence in 2022 in Balochistan. The BLA's Majeed Brigade also claimed the suicide attack on a van of the Confucius Institute at the Karachi University, saying that the Director and other Chinese teachers were the target, who the group believed were members of the Chinese communist party. The BLA and other Baloch insurgent groups have been vocal against and targeting Chinese engagements in Pakistan and also the China Pakistan Economic Corridor and its lynchpin project of Gwadar Port that lies in southern Balochistan. While the use of a female suicide bomber was perhaps the first incidence by the BLA, the group has been nonetheless carrying out such *fidayeen* attacks in recent years. Its Majeed Brigade, which was established in 2011, is an elite suicide squad, which has been mainly targeting Chinese interests and CPEC.

In March 2022, a report presented by Interior Ministry in the National Assembly said that terrorist groups were regrouping in Balochistan. The report however emphasized the growing threat from Iranian border noting that anti-Pakistan terror outfits were regrouping in Balochistan via Iranian province of Sistan and Baluchistan.¹⁷ The report, which was indeed interior ministry's reply to a query posed by PPP MNA Dr Shazia Sobia Aslam Soomro, also revealed that persistent intelligence-based operations were being undertaken to neutralize terror organizations and operational capabilities of the counterterrorism apparatus were being enhanced. It also recalled recent government initiatives to engage disgruntled Baloch youths for reconciliation, including "special socio-economic development packages for mitigating extremist threats in Balochistan and KP, and addressing the most marginalized segment of

¹⁷ "Terror outfits' regrouping in Balochistan, NA told," *Dawn*, March 29, 2022.

society through the 'Ehsaas Programme' along with engaging the youth in constructive activities.¹⁸

Traditionally the Baloch insurgents had been carrying out low-intensity attacks mainly targeting state infrastructure (such as power pylons and railways tracks), non-Baloch settlers and workers as well as security forces. But in recent years, as cited earlier, some significant transformations have happened in Balch insurgency. First, it has come increasingly under influence of middle-class, educated youth who are not as much connected to tribal chieftain system as those before them. Secondly, those leading the insurgency on the ground have apparently become more focused on adding to destructive edge of their terrorist violence including through high-impact *fidayeen* and coordinated gun-and bomb attacks. Thirdly, in recent years, the targets of Baloch insurgents have become more confined to security forces and Chinese engagements including CPEC. Fourthly, they have started to use sophisticated weapons and assault attacks also as they did in their invasion of FC camps in Nushki and Panjgur early this year, ie 2022. Fifthly, the thrust of the insurgency has been shifting to south and southwest of Balochistan.

The Pakistani state, nonetheless, is largely employing the same traditional methods to counter the insurgent movement. For one, relying merely on kinetic actions, the state does not seem interested in engaging the insurgent leaders and/or Balochistan's legitimate nationalist political leadership in talks or process of reconciliation. The issue of missing persons is adding fuel to fire. Meanwhile, by intensifying their terrorist attacks, the Baloch insurgent groups are not only increasing their prospects of recruitment from disgruntled Baloch youths but also putting pressure on moderate nationalist political forces of Balochistan. Balochistan is not merely a security problem but a political conflict which calls for corresponding efforts at achieving reconciliation as well as security.

These are some Balochistan-specific suggestions that emerged during PIPS conversation with the Baloch people, leaders and experts:

- As the socioeconomic trickledown impact of mega development projects for masses in the Balochistan has been minimum so far, Pakistan needs to make sure that people in the province start reaping the benefits of big projects as soon as possible.
- The people of Balochistan demand free and fair elections so that their 'elected' representatives can decide about their affairs.
- There is a need to increase the socio-cultural engagements between the foreigners working on development or other projects and local populations. Government of Balochistan and development-related departments/authorities need to reach out to

¹⁸ Ibid.

people in the province to address the concerns of general public, educated youth and the civil society.

- The Baloch demand a network of technical institutions to be set up in the urban areas of the province to train youth from the area to be actively becoming part of development projects. Most of the educated youth of the region is unemployed, according to local, as they do not qualify the technical and experience requirements needed for most of the jobs at Gwadar port and industries that will be set up in future.

1.2.6 Reforms in Ex-FATA

The government's failure to speed up the process of introducing reforms in erstwhile FATA region after it was made part of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province has left the people complaining and even questioning the merger. Many local groups have been asserting that the merger is not solving their problems and issues and hence it should be reversed; a demand that the banned TTP also made during peace talks with the government. Some tribesmen even filed the petitions before the court for that. In March, the Supreme Court of Pakistan decided to establish larger bench on petitions against the 25th Amendment that allowed the integration of erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The Amendment had received presidential consent on March 31, 2018.¹⁹

The growing attacks on police once again reminded the need of reforming and capacitating the law enforcement structures of the tribal districts. Apparently, the government is aware of that need. For one, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Inspector General of Police Moazzam Jah Ansari said while briefing journalists in Peshawar on April 28th that they were focusing on better training, equipment and communication system for police in tribal districts. He said that besides several of police arms and other needs were also being met under the Accelerated Implementation Programme. "We are going to make setup of CTD in all merged districts by June 30 this year," he added.²⁰

The establishment of police stations and training of law enforcement agencies also needs to be stepped up. Although the process is underway, but it is quite slow, according to local accounts.

The revised NAP also places emphasis on introducing reforms in merged tribal districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa including ensuring an adequate share in NFC, capacity building of law enforcement agencies and introduction of political-administrative structures like local

¹⁹ "SC decides to form larger bench on FATA integration petitions," *The Express Tribune*, March 9, 2022.

²⁰ "Terrorists infiltrating from Afghanistan: KP IG," *Dawn*, April 29, 2022.

government elections and land reforms. There is a need to rehabilitate the internally displaced persons from ex-FATA and develop educational, road and other infrastructure in these areas.

It is heartening that local body elections were successfully held in ex-FATA in 2021-2022. During first phase of local bodies election held in KP on December 19th, polls were also held for the first time in Khyber, Mohmand and Bajaur tribal districts. In the second phase, voting was held in 65 tehsils in 18 districts of the provinces on March 31st including in tribal districts of Orakzai, North and South Waziristan, and Kurram.

PIPS believes that to heal and rehabilitate the citizens of ex-FATA, there is a need to:

- Enhance the economic and infrastructure development of this strategically critical area.
- Bring back the internally displaced persons and rehabilitate them.
- Speed up the process of political, administrative, and judicial reform in tribal districts.

Chapter 2

SECURITY LANDSCAPE OF PAKISTAN IN 2022

Safdar Sial *

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- 2.1 Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
- 2.2 Balochistan
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2.1 Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

As in past several previous years, the highest number of terrorist attacks in 2022 for any one region of Pakistan took place in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Out of the total 262 terrorist attacks that took place in the country in 2022, as many as 169, or over 64 percent, concentrated in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. That also represented an increase of 52 percent from such attacks that happened in the province in the year before. The reported attacks from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa claimed 294 lives - as compared to 169 in the previous year - and inflicted injuries on another 393 people.

North Waziristan continued to be a major flashpoint of insecurity and militant violence in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa for a third year in a row. Compared to 31 in 2020 and 37 in 2021, as many as 30 terrorist attacks took place in the district in 2022; meanwhile 12 terrorist attacks happened in the neighboring South Waziristan tribal district. Other KP districts where 10 or more attacks took place in the year included Peshawar (17 attacks), Khyber and DI Khan (14 attacks each), Lakki Marwat (13), Bannu (12), and Bajaur (11 attacks). On the whole, terrorist attacks were recorded from 21 districts of the province in 2022. Moreover, about 77 percent of the reported attacks from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa targeted personnel of security and law enforcement agencies, mainly army and police.

Table 1: Terrorist Attacks in KP in 2022

| District | Attacks | Killed | Injured |
|------------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Bajaur | 11 | 18 | 8 |
| Bannu | 12 | 11 | 8 |
| Charsadda | 8 | 5 | 3 |
| D.I Khan | 14 | 16 | 11 |
| Hangu | 2 | 3 | 0 |
| Khyber | 14 | 13 | 11 |
| Kohat | 8 | 1 | 17 |
| Kurram | 3 | 4 | 3 |
| Lakki Marwat | 13 | 22 | 12 |
| Lower Dir | 2 | 6 | 5 |
| Mardan | 5 | 4 | 5 |
| Mohmand | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| North Waziristan | 30 | 64 | 68 |
| Nowshera | 3 | 4 | 3 |
| Orakzai | 2 | 3 | 3 |
| Peshawar | 17 | 74 | 201 |
| Shangla | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| South Waziristan | 12 | 20 | 6 |
| Swabi | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Swat | 3 | 6 | 2 |
| Tank | 7 | 19 | 26 |
| Total | 169 | 294 | 393 |

The militants perpetrated major or high-impact terrorist attacks in the province in 2022 more frequently compared to previous year. Compared to eight in the year before, as many as 13 major attacks happened in the province,²¹ which caused a combined total of 132 deaths. The worst of these attacks happened in Peshawar targeting Shia religious community in March, which alone killed over 65 people and injured 186 others. The IS-K had claimed the attack. Other major attacks happened in North Waziristan, Lakki Marwat, Bajaur, Tank, Lower Dir, and Swat districts.

Meanwhile as many as 10 suicide blast also took place in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa including nine in North Waziristan and one in Peshawar. These suicide blasts claimed 89 lives and wounded 235 others. The TTP perpetrated four of these suicide blasts, while one such attack each was carried out by IS-K, Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group, and Ittehad Musallah Islami Mujahideen; three suicide blasts in KP remained unclaimed.

Besides perpetrating suicide blasts, militants relied more on direct shootout or firing while carrying out attacks in KP, as they used this particular attack tactic in 104 attacks. They also carried out 22 IED blasts, 24 hand grenade blasts, seven gun and bomb attacks, one rocket attack, and one kidnapping.

About 77 percent of the total reported attacks from KP targeted security forces and law enforcement personnel, and another combined total of 15 attacks targeted political leaders and tribal elders. Six attacks hit either polio vaccination teams or their police escorts, and seven attacks were apparently targeted at civilians. A single attack that targeted a mosque in Peshawar caused 65 deaths. (See Table 1a)

Table 1a: Targets Hit by Militants in KP in 2022

| Targets | Attacks | Killed | Injured |
|---|---------|--------|---------|
| Security/law enforcement agencies (personnel, convoys, posts) | 130 | 178 | 174 |
| Education/institutions/teachers | 2 | 2 | 3 |
| Govt. officials/institutions/symbols | 2 | 6 | 2 |
| Power pylons/cell phone towers | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Pro-govt tribal elders/peace committee members | 8 | 12 | 1 |
| Civilians | 7 | 11 | 9 |
| Shia religious scholars/community | 1 | 65 | 186 |
| Worship places/shrines/madrassas | 1 | 0 | 3 |
| Sunni religious leaders/community | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Political leaders/workers | 7 | 9 | 8 |

²¹ Four or more people were killed in each of these attacks.

| Targets | Attacks | Killed | Injured |
|---|----------------|---------------|----------------|
| Christian community/Church | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Sikh community | 1 | 2 | 0 |
| Health/polio workers, security escorts | 6 | 6 | 6 |
| Development, exploration projects, companies, workers | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Total | 169 | 294 | 393 |

Apart from the terrorist attacks cited earlier, as many as 57 anti-militant operational strikes by security forces (causing 193 deaths, most among militants) and 11 armed clashes between security and law enforcement personnel and militants were also recorded in the province during 2022. Meanwhile nine cross-border attacks from Afghanistan also took place in different KP provinces. Other conflict-related violent incidents reported from the province during the year included two inter-militant attacks/clashes; two incidents of faith-based violence; one targeted attack by some unknown perpetrator; one clash between protestors and police; as well as five [foiled or failed] terror plots. On the whole, 258 incidents of violence of different types, as described above, took place in the province in 2022, which claimed 551 lives and inflicted injuries on another 541 people.

Some frequently hit targets in the reported 169 terrorist attacks from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2022 are described below.

2.1.1 Attacks on Security Forces/Law Enforcement Agencies

As cited earlier, 77 percent of the total attacks recorded in KP targeted personnel of security and law enforcement agencies. Indeed, compared to 50 such attacks in 2020 and 79 in 2021, a total of 130 terrorist attacks in 2022 hit personnel, vehicles and posts of security and law enforcement agencies in the province. These attacks claimed 178 lives (including 127 personnel of security and law enforcement agencies) and wounded 174 others. Security forces came under more frequent attacks in North and South Waziristan, Lakki Marwat, Bannu, Peshawar, Khyber and DI Khan districts where a combined total of 90 attacks exclusively hit personnel of army, FC, police and Levies.

The banned TTP perpetrated 112 attacks against security and law enforcement personnel, while the banned IS-K was believed to be involved in 13 such attacks. Hafiz Gul Bahadur group carried out two attacks against security forces, while a hitherto new group Ittehad Musallah Islami Mujahideen also targeted security personnel in two attacks. One such attack was perpetrated by Lashkar-e-Islam.

Some of the attacks against security forces and law enforcers reported from KP in 2022 are narrated below:

- February 20: Security forces averted a serious assault by militants. Daily Mashriq reported militants attacked an army check-post in Spinwam area of Mirali tehsil of North Waziristan with heavy weapons. Security forces repulsed the attack and killed five attackers; one army soldier was also martyred. However, ISPR stated that security forces killed 5 militants in a military operation.²²
- March 21: Militants attempted a major terrorist assault on security forces in Bajaur, which was averted by the latter. Reportedly, TTP militants invaded a post of security forces in the Bloro area of Bajaur tribal district with light and heavy weapons. Two soldiers and three passers-by embraced martyrdom in the attack. Security forces retaliated and killed four attackers.²³
- March 30: The terrorists launched a pre-dawn attack on a military compound in Tank, but security forces foiled their attempt to enter the complex. During an intense exchange of fire, six soldiers embraced martyrdom; 22 FC and army personnel were also injured in the gunfight. TTP claimed the attack.²⁴
- April 11: The TTP terrorists fired a rocket at a police van and later opened fire with automatic weapons in the Kulachi town of DI Khan. Five cops lost lives in the attack, while DSP Fazle Subhan was seriously injured.²⁵
- April 14: Seven soldiers were martyred when terrorists ambushed a vehicle of security forces in Datakhel tehsil of North Waziristan. Terrorists targeted a moving vehicle of security forces using a rocket-propelled grenade launcher and assault guns.²⁶
 - May 14: Three soldiers (Zubair Qadir, Aziz Asghar, and Qasim Maqsood) and three children were martyred and six others, including two children, suffered injuries when a suicide bomber blew himself up near a patrolling vehicle of the army in Eidak area of North Waziristan tribal district.²⁷ No one claimed the attack. Experts asserted that some militants associated with the TTP, who were not happy with the group's talks with the government, could be involved. In the second suicide blast of the month, on May 30, two security officials, Naik Banaras and Sepoy Munsif Khan, were injured in a suicide attack on their vehicle parked at a check-

²² Daily *Mashriq* (Urdu), February 21, 2022, <https://mashriqtv.pk/story/?story=202202210104>; *Dawn*, February 21, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1676169/soldier-martyred-five-terrorists-killed-in-north-waziristan>

²³ Daily *Mashriq* (Urdu), March 21, 2022, <https://mashriqtv.pk/latest/231565>; *Dawn*, March 22, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1681243/four-terrorists-killed-in-bajaur-gun-battle-ispr>

²⁴ *The News*, March 31, 2022, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/946030-8-soldiers-martyred-7-terrorists-killed-in-tank-s-waziristan>; *Dawn*, March 31, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1682628/8-personnel-martyred-in-tank-south-waziristan-clashes>

²⁵ *The News*, April 11, 2022, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/949555-five-cops-martyred-in-di-khan-attack>

²⁶ *Dawn*, April 15, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1685094/eight-soldiers-martyred-in-north-waziristan-attacks>

²⁷ *The Express Tribune*, May 15, 2022, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2356714/3-soldiers-children-martyred-in-suicide-blast-in-north-waziristan>

- post in the Razmak subdivision of North Waziristan tribal district.²⁸ This suicide attack also remained unclaimed.
- July 4: A convoy of security forces was heading from Mirali to Miramshah, the district headquarters of North Waziristan, when a suicide bomber riding a motorcycle blew himself up near one of the vehicles near Khadi market in Mirali seriously injuring 10 army soldiers. Local sources believed Gul Bahadur Group was involved in the attack.²⁹
 - August 8: Four army soldiers were martyred when militants targeted a military convoy with a suicide blast in the Mir Ali area of North Waziristan district. The martyred soldiers were identified as Lance Naik Shahzaib, Lance Naik Sajjad, sepoy Umair, and sepoy Khurram. A hitherto new group Ittehad Musallah Islami Mujahideen claimed the blast.³⁰
 - November 16: Militants on motorcycles opened fire on a police mobile van in Shahabkhel area of Lakki Marwat martyring six police officials including an assistant sub-inspector. The banned TTP claimed the attack.³¹
 - December 18: In a major effort of breaking out of a police detention facility, militants detained inside a Bannu CTD center got out of the lockups and took CTD staff and security officials as hostage. Two security personnel were injured in the standoff. Militants demanded a safe evacuation to Afghanistan, among other things.³² Security forces cleared the facility after 2 days after an operation, which reportedly eliminated most of the militants, and arrested others.
 - December 18: In Lakki Marwat, at least four policemen were martyred, and four others injured as terrorists attacked the district's Baragai police station. There was a fierce exchange of fire between the police and terrorists in which the attackers threw hand grenades and rockets toward the police station.³³ Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group was believed to be involved in the attack.
 - December 20: Around 50 militants stormed a police station in Wana, South Waziristan with rocket launchers and entered the station after blowing up the front gate. One police constable was injured, while an alleged militant was killed when FC rushed to take over the police station and free the policemen taken hostage by attackers. Militants escaped

²⁸ Daily *Jang* (Urdu), May 31, 2022, <https://e.jang.com.pk/detail/140693>

²⁹ *Dawn*, July 5, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1698214/10-soldiers-injured-in-north-waziristan-suicide-attack>

³⁰ Daily *Mashriq* (Urdu), August 9, 2022, <https://mashriqtv.pk/latest/245872/>

³¹ Daily *Mashriq* (Urdu), November 16, 2022, <https://mashriqtv.pk/latest/256967/>

³² *Dawn*, December 19, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1727169/no-breakthrough-in-talks-tense-situation-prevails-in-bannu-after-militants-seize-ctd-centre>

³³ *The Express Tribune*, December 18, 2022, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2391670/four-policemen-martyred-in-lakki-marwat-terrorist-attack>

after looting arms and ammunition including 8 AK-47 rifles. The TTP claimed the attack.³⁴

2.1.2 Sectarian-related Attacks

Among the 169 terrorist attacks recorded in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2022, as many as three were sectarian-related including a major one. On March 4, Shia worshipers were attacked in an *imambargah* in Peshawar. Initially, at least 57 people were killed and over 194 others injured in the suicide blast; a day later the death toll reached 62 while another 3 among those injured died in hospital taking the death toll to 65. The bomber opened fire on the two policemen deployed at the gate before he managed to force his entry into the premises. Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K) claimed the bombing,³⁵ which was worst in terms of casualties since the 2014 attack on Army Public School Peshawar that had claimed over 100 lives

In June, two sectarian-related attacks happened in Kurram. On June 20, a man was killed and another sustained bullet injuries when unidentified persons opened firing on a passenger vehicle near Sadda town of Kurram tribal district. Tension gripped the area following the apparently sectarian attack, from Parachinar to Peshawar.³⁶ The attack was linked to ongoing tensions in the agency that started around mid-June when a car was attacked in Topaki village in Kurram, in which chairman of the local peace council, Momin Khan, along with two others was killed while another person was injured. After the incident, a video went viral on social media in which sacrilegious remarks were passed about some sacred personalities from early Islamic history. It sparked protest in the area and thousands of people took to the streets in Parachinar.

2.1.3 [Declining] Attacks on Civilians

Only seven attacks, or 4 percent of the total attacks in KP, targeted civilians, which claimed 11 lives besides injuring nine others. Indeed, terrorist attacks against civilians in KP have been falling significantly in past several years, indicating militants' changing tactics and targets; militants nonetheless preferred to hit security forces, pro-government tribal elders and political leaders, etc., more frequently, apparently thinking that targeting civilians could earn them

³⁴ *Dawn*, December 21, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1727460/militants-storm-wana-police-station-in-south-waziristan-flee-with-weapons>

³⁵ *The News*, March 5, 2022, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/938658-bloodbath-in-peshawar-mosque>; *Dawn*, March 6, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1678510/officials-claim-breakthrough-as-peshawar-blast-death-toll-rises-to-62>; *Daily Jang* (Urdu), March 8, 2022, <https://e.jang.com.pk/detail/69333>

³⁶ *Dawn*, June 22, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1696065/tension-grips-kurram-as-man-killed-in-attack>

more public wrath. In the year before, too, only four terrorist attacks in KP had targeted civilians.

Militants targeted civilians in DI Khan, Bajaur, Mohmand, Kurrum, North Waziristan, and Peshawar. While the banned TTP claimed none of these attacks, the banned IS-K was believed to be involved in one targeted killing of one civilian, Shattar Khan, in Bajaur on the suspicion of Khan's association with the Taliban. All other attacks against civilians were perpetrated by unknown militants.

2.1.4 Attacks on Tribal Elders and Political Leaders/Workers

Compared to 12 in the year before, a combined total of 15 attacks in KP targeted tribal elders and political leaders and workers, which claimed 21 lives and injured nine others. So-called pro-government tribal elders and members of peace committees came under eight attacks in North and South Waziristan, Bajaur, Swat, and Khyber districts causing 12 fatalities. Political leaders and workers were targeted in seven terrorist attacks including in Bajaur, North Waziristan, Lower Dir, and Shangla districts causing nine deaths. The TTP, Islamic State Khorasan terrorist group and some unknown militants perpetrated these attacks.

Attacks on political leaders:

Out of the seven attacks targeting political leaders in KP, four happened in Bajaur and one attack each in Lower Dir, Shangla and North Waziristan. The IS-K perpetrated three such attacks in Bajaur targeting Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F) leaders, while the rest were carried out by some unknown militants. Some of these attacks that caused at least one or more deaths are described below:

- April 13: A schoolteacher and member of Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam-Fazl, Mufti Shafiullah, lost his life in an IED blast in Bajaur.³⁷
- April 26: The IS-K militants also shot dead JUI-F local leader Mufti Bashir Muhammad Jan in Tani Badan Chowk in Mamond tehsil of Bajaur. The IS-K claimed the killing terming the victim a "preacher of the evil apostates." The TTP nonetheless condemned the killing of "cousin of the group's founding deputy emir Maulvi Faqir Muhammad."³⁸
- July 15: Unknown attackers gunned down a local leader of JUI-F Qari Samiuddin and his colleague, Hafiz Numan Dawar near Mirali town in North Waziristan.³⁹

³⁷ Daily *Mashriq* (Urdu), April 14, 2022, <https://mashriqtv.pk/story/?story=202204141016>

³⁸ *The News*, April 28, 2022, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/953939-slain-juif-leader-laid-to-rest-in-bajaur>

³⁹ *Dawn*, July 16, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1699799/jui-f-leader-gunned-down-in-north-waziristan>

- August 6: A gun attack targeting the vehicle of a Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) MPA Malik Liaqat Khan in Lower Dir claimed four lives, including a police constable and Levies sepoy. The MPA was critically injured along with 3 others.⁴⁰
- October 1: Unknown militants killed a senior JUI-F activist, Maulana Shafiullah, in Mamond tehsil of Bajaur tribal district.⁴¹ No one claimed the attack, but the Islamic State-Khorasan has in the past claimed such attacks targeting JUI leaders.

Attacks on tribal elders and peace committee members:

The TTP and affiliated local Taliban groups perpetrated seven attacks against tribal elders, while IS-K carried out one such attack. A total 12 lives were lost in these attacks including tribal elders Malik Kashmir Khan, Muhammad Wali, Mailk Darya Jan, and Malik Alamgir Khan in separate attacks in North Waziristan; a tribal elder Bakhmali Khan Abdulai in South Waziristan; PML-N Bajaur leader and peace committee activist Malik Fatchi Khan in Bajaur; and a tribesman Rasheed Khan in Khyber.

Separately, in Swat, Idrees Khan, ex-chairman of a peace committee, was on his way when TTP militants hit his vehicle with a remote-controlled device at Bara Bandai Kotkay, Kabal tehsil, Swat district. Five persons, including Mr Khan, two cops, and two passers-by, lost their lives.⁴²

2.1.5 Attacks on Polio/Health Workers & Police Escorts

As many as five policemen and one polio vaccination volunteer lost their lives, and six others were injured in six reported terrorist attacks from KP that targeted polio vaccinators and their security escorts. Two of these attacks were reported from North Waziristan and one attack took place in each of Kohat, Peshawar, Khyber and Tank districts. The TTP and local Taliban groups, as well as a new group Lashkar-e-Khorasan Pakistan were allegedly involved in these attacks.

Those killed in these attacks included police constable Hamid Khan in Kohat; two policemen, Razaullah and Deen Shahid, and a volunteer Rashidullah, in North Waziristan tribal district; and two policemen Nisar and Pir Rehman, who were guarding a polio vaccination team in Tank district.

2.1.6 Other Sporadic Targets Hit in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

⁴⁰ *Dawn*, August 7, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1703682/4-killed-in-gun-attack-on-pti-mpa-in-lower-dir>

⁴¹ *Dawn*, October 1, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1712821/one-soldier-martyred-in-cross-border-attack-in-kurram-ispr>

⁴² *The News*, September 14, 2022, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/991169-two-policemen-among-five-martyred-in-swat-blast>

One attack each targeted members of **Christian and Sikh communities**, respectively. In Peshawar, a Christian priest, William Siraj, was shot dead and another, padre Naeem Patrick, wounded when unidentified attackers fired on their vehicle near Jamil Chowk on the city's Ring Road on January 30th.⁴³ No one so far had claimed the attack. Separately, on May 14th, militants target killed two members of Sikh community, Ranjeet Singh and Guljeet Singh, in Sarband area of Peshawar and managed to escape. The victims owned spice shops in the Battathal bazaar. The Islamic State's Khorasan (IS-K) chapter claimed the attack.⁴⁴

Meanwhile, two attacks targeted **government officials and offices** killing six people. In one of these attacks, on September 9th, four policemen were killed, and two others sustained injuries when a convoy of Tank tehsil chairman Saddam Hussain Khan was ambushed by unidentified gunmen near Pai village of Tank.⁴⁵

Two attacks targeted **educational institutions** in Swat and South Waziristan. In Swat, a school van was taking students to a school at Gulibagh in Charbagh tehsil when militants on a bike opened fire. The driver was killed on the spot, while two students were injured.⁴⁶ In South Waziristan, one man was killed, and a security official injured in an attack on the Army Public School for Girls in the Azam Warsak area of South Waziristan. Attackers opened fire from a nearby mountain during Parents' Day celebrations and fled to the Pak-Afghan border area after security forces retaliated.⁴⁷

Meanwhile, IS-K was believed to be involved in two attacks that targeted an **alleged Taliban affiliate** and an alleged anti-IS-K cleric. Shattar Khan was critically injured in a roadside bomb blast in Mamond tehsil on April 28th afternoon, and succumbed to injuries on April 29. According to some accounts, IS-K perpetrated the attack on the suspicion of the victim's association with the Taliban.⁴⁸ Similarly, militants shot dead a **Salafi religious scholar** Maulana Abdul Aziz in Bara while he was heading to mosque for offering morning prayers. According to local sources, the victim used to articulate anti-Daesh sermons.⁴⁹

⁴³ *Dawn*, January 31, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1672373/priest-gunned-down-after-mass>

⁴⁴ *Daily Jang* (Urdu), May 15, 2022, https://jang.com.pk/news/1086453?_ga=2.89045275.1610735527.1652599372-207031387.1652599372

⁴⁵ *Dawn*, September 10, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1709307/four-police-officials-martyred-in-tank-attack>

⁴⁶ *Dawn*, October 11, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1714402/school-kids-injured-as-militants-destroy-swat-peace>

⁴⁷ *The Express Tribune*, December 3, 2022, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2389297/three-cops-martyred-in-nowshera-terror-attack>

⁴⁸ *Dawn*, May 1, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1687630/man-injured-in-bajaur-blast-dies>

⁴⁹ *Daily Mashriq* (Urdu), October 11, 2022, <https://mashriqtv.pk/story/?story=202210111011>

Separately in Hangu, a security guard was killed, and a supervisor kidnapped in a terrorist attack on the **installation of MOL Pakistan**, an oil exploration company, in Thall Tehsil of the Hangu district. The TTP claimed the attack.⁵⁰

2.2 Balochistan

Balochistan faced the second highest number of terrorist attacks in 2022, after Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Baloch insurgents as well as religiously inspired militant groups perpetrated a total of 79 attacks in the province, compared to 81 in previous year, which claimed 106 lives and wounded 271 others. Among those 106 killed in these attacks were 59 security and law enforcement personnel (33 FC men, 11 policemen, 10 army soldiers, and 5 Levies), 26 civilians as well as 21 militants.

Different Baloch insurgent groups, mainly the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), perpetrated 71 attacks in Balochistan killing 86 people and wounding 199 others. The attacks by Baloch insurgent groups spread over 21 districts of the province, mainly targeting security forces. Meanwhile, religiously inspired militant groups such as the TTP and the Islamic State terrorist group (IS-K), etc., were reportedly involved in as many as seven attacks in Balochistan including two suicide blasts. These attacks caused death to 17 people and injuries to another 47 people. One sectarian-related attack killed three and wounded 25 others in Balochistan in 2022.

The highest number of attacks for any one district of the province was recorded in Quetta (16 attacks), followed by Kalat and Kech with six attacks each. Meanwhile five attacks happened in each of Khuzdar and Panjgur districts, and four attacks each took place in Kohlu, Nasirabad and Sibi districts. A geographical distribution of 79 terrorist attacks reported from Balochistan in 2022 is given at the Table 2.

Table 2: Terrorist Attacks in Balochistan in 2022

| District | Attacks | Killed | Injured |
|------------|---------|--------|---------|
| Awaran | 2 | 2 | 8 |
| Bolan | 2 | 1 | 5 |
| Dera Bugti | 3 | 5 | 8 |
| Gwadar | 2 | 0 | 1 |
| Harnai | 3 | 8 | 4 |
| Jafarabad | 3 | 2 | 23 |
| Kachhi | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Kalat | 6 | 6 | 6 |
| Kech | 6 | 13 | 11 |

⁵⁰ Daily *Mashriq* (Urdu), February 1, 2022, <https://mashriqtv.pk/story/?story=202202010108>

| District | Attacks | Killed | Injured |
|----------------|-----------|------------|------------|
| Kharan | 2 | 2 | 1 |
| Khuzdar | 5 | 3 | 12 |
| Kohlu | 4 | 6 | 25 |
| Lasbela | 3 | 1 | 10 |
| Mastung | 2 | 1 | 4 |
| Nasirabad | 4 | 2 | 3 |
| Nushki | 2 | 13 | 7 |
| Panjgur | 5 | 13 | 9 |
| Pishin | 2 | 2 | 0 |
| Qilla Abdullah | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Quetta | 16 | 14 | 99 |
| Sibi | 4 | 10 | 32 |
| Ziarat | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Total | 79 | 106 | 271 |

As many as 42 of the reported 79 terrorist attacks from Balochistan (or over 53 percent) targeted personnel, vehicles and posts of security forces and law enforcement agencies. Seven attacks apparently targeted civilians, four hit alleged spies, and another six attacks targeted tribal elders. Other targets sporadically hit by terrorists in Balochistan are given at Table 2a.

Table 2a: Targets Hit by Terrorists in Balochistan in 2022

| Targets | Attacks | Killed | Injured |
|---|---------|--------|---------|
| Security/law enforcement agencies (personnel, convoys, posts) | 42 | 79 | 152 |
| Education/institutions/teachers | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Non-Bloch settlers/workers | 2 | 3 | 7 |
| Gas pipelines | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Govt. officials/institutions/symbols | 2 | 1 | 5 |
| Power pylons/cell phone towers | 2 | | |
| Civilians | 7 | 2 | 45 |
| Shia religious scholars/community | 1 | 3 | 25 |
| Govt. offices/public property (hospitals, banks etc.) | 3 | 1 | 1 |
| Political leaders/workers | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Christian community/Church | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| Unknown | 1 | | |
| Alleged spy | 4 | 3 | 2 |
| Health/polio workers, security escorts | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Pro-govt tribal elders/peace committee members | 6 | 7 | 19 |
| Railway tracks / trains | 2 | 0 | 5 |

| Targets | Attacks | Killed | Injured |
|---|----------------|---------------|----------------|
| Development, exploration projects, companies, workers | 2 | 4 | 4 |
| Total | 79 | 106 | 271 |

2.2.1 Attacks by Baloch Insurgents

As cited earlier, different Baloch insurgent groups perpetrated 71 attacks in Balochistan in 2022 killing 86 people and wounding 199 others. They had carried out a same number of attacks in the province in previous year, which spread over 17 districts; however, in 2022, the attacks by Baloch insurgent groups spread over 21 districts of Balochistan including 13 in Quetta alone.

Baloch insurgents employed multiple attack tactics that included 27 hand grenade blasts, 24 IEDs blasts [mainly using remote controlled and vehicle-borne detonation], 17 incidents of firing or targeted killing, two gun and bomb attacks, and one rocket attack.

Baloch insurgents targeted security forces in 38 attacks causing significant fatalities among **security forces and law enforcement personnel** (43 deaths). These attacks (against security forces) were reported from 16 districts of Balochistan with 11 such attacks from Quetta and another five from Panjgur.

- The BLA-led coordinate gun and bomb fedayeen attacks at FC camps in Panjgur and Nushki in early February were the most lethal attacks by the insurgents during the year 2022. These and some other relatively more intense attacks by the Baloch insurgents (mainly the BLA and BLF) against security forces in the year are listed below:
- January 26: A group of militants attacked a check post of security forces in Dasht tehsil of **Kech** district martyring at least 10 security officials and injuring three others. The banned BLF claimed the attack. One terrorist was also killed in the exchange of fire and three others were later apprehended, according to ISPR statement.⁵¹
- February 2: The BLA perpetrated two major attacks on security forces in Nushki and Panjgur. Terrorists tried to enter security forces' camp from two locations in **Panjgur** that initiated armed gunfight. ISPR announced on February 5 that the operation was completed and a total of eight terrorists were killed; Five soldiers, including a JCO, embraced martyrdom and six soldiers were injured during the operation lasting 72

⁵¹ Daily *Intekhab* (Urdu), Quetta, January 27, 2022, <https://epaper.dailyintekhab.pk/today/st/2/1/01-27-22> (Front page); *Dawn*, January 28, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1671869/ten-soldiers-martyred-in-kech-terrorist-attack>

hours.⁵² Separately, terrorists attempted to enter an FC camp in **Nushki** which was promptly responded and followed by armed clashes between security officials and the attackers that continued for 3 days. The ISPR said on February 5 that nine terrorists were killed. Four security personnel, including an officer embraced shahadat during shootout with terrorists while repulsing attack at the FC camp. The BLA's Majeed Brigade had claimed both attacks.⁵³

- March 15: Militants targeted an FC convoy on its way to **Sibi** with roadside IED blast in the Sangam area of the district. Four FC personnel were martyred, and 8 others injured in the blast. The banned BLA claimed the attack.⁵⁴
- July 14: Militants killed Lt Col Laiq Baig Mirza in **Harnai** after having kidnapped him from Ziarat along with his cousin Umer Javed 2 days before. Security forces were searching the area, and seeing the forces closing-in, the militants shot Lt Col Mirza in the head and attempted to flee. In the ensuing exchange of fire, two terrorists were also killed.⁵⁵
- August 14: The BLA militants targeted security forces on the Independence Day, ie 14th of August, in **Harnai and Panjgur districts**. The Inter-Services Public Relations, the army's media affairs wing, said the terrorists assaulted a check post in the Khost area of the Harnai district resulting in the martyrdom of two soldiers and injuries to an officer as a result of heavy firing. The BLA claimed the attack on social media saying its Fateh (Victory) Brigade fighters were involved.⁵⁶ Meanwhile, militants hurled a grenade at the official residence of the deputy commissioner, Abdul Razzaq Saloli, in Chatagan area of Panjgur injuring an official of Levies and damaging 4 vehicles. Deputy commissioner Sasoli and other members in the house remained unhurt. BLA claimed the attack.⁵⁷
- October 22: A search team of Frontier Corps came under attack in the Margat area of **Quetta** which led to heavy exchange of fire. Two soldiers lost their lives in the gun battle while three others sustained injuries. Security sources said armed militants also suffered casualties during the exchange of fire.⁵⁸

⁵² *The Express Tribune*, February 3, 2022, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2341655/four-militants-killed-as-security-forces-foil-major-terror-bid-in-balochistan>; *Dawn*, February 6, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1673592/operation-completed-against-terrorists-in-panjgur-nushki>

⁵³ *The Express Tribune*, February 3, 2022, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2341655/four-militants-killed-as-security-forces-foil-major-terror-bid-in-balochistan>; *Dawn*, February 6, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1673592/operation-completed-against-terrorists-in-panjgur-nushki>

⁵⁴ Daily *Intekhab* (Urdu), Quetta, March 16, 2022, <https://epaper.dailyintekhab.pk/today/st/2/1/03-16-22> (Front page)

⁵⁵ Daily *Jang* (Urdu), Quetta, July 15, 2022, <https://e.jang.com.pk/detail/180871>

⁵⁶ *Dawn*, August 15, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1704983/two-soldiers-martyred-in-harnai-shootout>

⁵⁷ Daily *Jang* (Urdu), August 15, 2022, <https://e.jang.com.pk/detail/209083>

⁵⁸ *Dawn*, October 24, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1716616/two-security-men-martyred-three-injured>

- December 25: An Improvised Explosive Device (IED) went off close to a party of the security forces in Khan area of **Kohlu**. Captain Fahad, Lance Naik Imtiaz and sepoy Asghar, Mehran and Shamoon were martyred in the blast.⁵⁹

As many as seven attacks by Baloch insurgents were apparently targeted against **civilians**, which claimed two lives and wounded 45 others. These were mostly low-scale IED and hand grenade blasts including a landmine blast, which were carried out by BLA, BRG and unspecified national insurgents in Kech, Kohlu, Gwadar, Nushki, Nasirabad, Jafarabad, and Sibi districts. Only two of the reported attacks caused fatalities. On February 8th, A man was killed, and three others were injured in Dera Murad Jamali when militants on a motorcycle hurled a grenade which exploded close to a passenger bus parked inside the bus stand. The Baloch Republican Guard claimed the attack saying policemen patrolling in bazaar were the target.⁶⁰ Later in the year, on September 30th, A bomb planted by unidentified miscreants inside a sweets shop in the main bazaar of Kohlu went off when a large number of people were there for purchasing sweets. One person was killed, and 25 others were injured in the blast.⁶¹

Meanwhile seven attacks by Baloch insurgent groups, mainly BLA and BRA, targeted **tribal elders and peace committees' members**. These attacks claimed seven lives and wounded 19 others in Dera Bugti, Kalat, Lasbela, Kachhi, and Khuzdar districts. In January, at least four people were killed while eight others sustained severe injuries in twin IED blasts in Mat area of Sui in Dera Bugti district. Those killed included three Levies personnel, Khairullah, Fato Khan, Din Mohammad, and peace activist and Senator Mir Sarfaraz Bugti's cousin, Sain Bakhsh.⁶² In another related attack reported from the district in February, BRA militants opened fire on two members of a tribal peace force killing Ali Baksh Nosani Bugti whereas his colleague remained unhurt.⁶³

In November, the banned BLA carried out two attacks in Kachhi and Khuzdar districts targeting pro-government tribal elders. On November 7, A tribal elder, Sardar Muhammad Khan Banglani, was passing through the Pinjara Bridge when armed men opened fire on his car. He was killed on the spot.⁶⁴ Next day, in Khuzdar a bomb exploded when PPP leader Abdul Latif

⁵⁹ *Dawn*, December 26, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1728306/6-security-men-martyred-in-balochistan-terror-incidents>

⁶⁰ *Dawn*, February 9, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1674082/man-killed-in-grenade-attack>

⁶¹ *Dawn*, October 1, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1712822/one-killed-25-injured-in-kohlu-blast>

⁶² *The Nation*, January 28, 2022, <https://nation.com.pk/28-Jan-2022/four-killed-eight-injured-in-sui-attack>; *Dawn*, January 29, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1672025/twin-blasts-in-sui-claim-lives-of-three-levies-men-senator-sarfaraz-bugtis-cousin>

⁶³ *Daily Intekhab* (Urdu), Quetta, February 3, 2022, <https://epaper.dailyintekhab.pk/today/st/2/1/02-03-22> (front page)

⁶⁴ *Dawn*, November 8, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1719638/tribal-elder-gunned-down-in-dera-murad-jamali>

Shahwani was travelling with tribal elder Abdul Ghani Bangulzai, who later died of his wounds in a Karachi hospital.⁶⁵

Baloch insurgent groups also targeted **alleged spies** in four attacks including three in Kech and one in Khuzdar. Three of these attacks were carried out by the BLA and one by BLF. In Turbat town of Kech district, BLF militants shot dead one person, Zafar Muhammad Jan, in July, and claimed the dead was an agent of the state and spying against them (insurgents). The BLA also targeted alleged spies in two attacks in Kech district and one in Khuzdar. On October 6, two motorcyclists shot dead a man in the Star Plus market area in Turbat town. The deceased was identified as Muhammad Javed, hailing from Punjab. The BLA claimed the attack saying the victim spied for security agencies.⁶⁶ Later, on October 11, a person Safiyan Masih, resident of Gujranwala, was injured in a grenade blast in a garage in Salala Bazar, Turbat. The BLA claimed the attack saying the victim spied for security agencies.⁶⁷ In Khuzdar, two persons were seriously injured when militants hurled a hand grenade on their car at Khand link road on August 29th. The banned BLA claimed the attack and said Amir Ghulamani and Mumtaz Ghulamani were the target who allegedly worked for the security forces. Mumtaz succumbed to his injuries 2 days later.⁶⁸

Baloch insurgent groups BLA and BLF targeted **non-Baloch settlers/workers** in two attacks claiming three lives and wounding seven others. In Kalat, two persons Nadir and Asghar, from Sindh province, were killed in a bomb blast targeting their vehicle in Johan area of Kalat. The banned BLA claimed the attack.⁶⁹ In Awaran, on December 10th, a shopkeeper, Nasir Ali, was killed and seven others, including two women, were injured in a bomb blast at a shop in the main bazaar of the city. The BLF claimed the attack.⁷⁰

A total of three attacks by Baloch insurgents hit **railways tracks and gas pipelines** in Bolan, Nasirabad, and Dera Bugti. These attacks injured five persons, besides damaging bogies of Jaffer Express in Bolan, a railway track in Jafarabad, and a section of a gas pipeline in Dera Bugti.

Baloch insurgents targeted **development and exploration companies/workers** in two attacks in Harnai and Kalat killing in all four people and injuring as many others. On June 18th, unknown militants attacked the camp of a construction company on Harnai-Quetta road and put the machinery on fire. As many as three workers were killed and as many others injured in the firing. Seven workers were also missing, which *Jang* reported were kidnapped by

⁶⁵ *Dawn*, November 9, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1719866/tribal-elder-killed-in-khuzdar-blast>

⁶⁶ *Dawn*, October 7, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1713844/man-gunned-down-in-turbat>

⁶⁷ Daily *Jang* (Urdu), October 12, 2022, <https://e.jang.com.pk/detail/260637>

⁶⁸ *Dawn*, August 30, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1707513/two-injured-in-khuzdar-quetta-grenade-attacks>

⁶⁹ Daily *Jang* (Urdu), Quetta, October 11, 2022, <https://e.jang.com.pk/detail/259731>

⁷⁰ Daily *Mashriq* (Urdu), December 11, 2022, <https://mashriqtv.pk/story/?story=202212111006>

attackers.⁷¹ On August 31st, an IED blast took place in the Sheikhri area, on the outskirts of Kalat town, near PPL working site. The blast happened when work was in progress, killing one local employee and inflicting injuries on another.⁷²

2.2.2 Attacks by Religiously Inspired Militants in Balochistan

In an apparently **sectarian-related attack**, a remote-controlled blast at a shoes shop on Fatima Jinnah Road, Quetta, killed three people including a police officer and injured 25 others. According to local accounts, the Hazara shop owner was the target who died in the attack. According to media reports, the police officer was the target who had come at the shop to resolve a dispute among locals.⁷³

Meanwhile, the religiously inspired militant groups, mainly the banned TTP and IS-K, perpetrated seven attacks including two suicide attacks in Balochistan in 2022. Two such attacks happened in each of Pishin and Quetta districts, and one attack each took place in Gwadar, Mastung, and Sibi districts.

The Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K) reportedly carried out two attacks in Balochistan, in Sibi and Mastung, targeting security forces and members of Christian community, respectively. First, on March 8th, at least six Frontier Constabulary (FC) officials were martyred, and 19 others were injured including 13 FC men when a suicide bomber exploded himself near the security officials and people returning from Sibi festival ceremony. The IS-K claimed the attack.⁷⁴ Later, on August 8th, the group targeted Christian community in Mastung. Reportedly, the militants opened fire on four men sitting outside their houses in Christian Colony of Mastung, injuring them all. One of them died a day later in a hospital in Quetta. The deceased Wilson Masih was a brother of former Balochistan Assembly Member Handery Masieh.⁷⁵

Meanwhile the banned TTP carried out four terrorist attacks in Balochistan in 2022 including three against security forces and one hitting policeman guarding polio vaccinators. The TTP conducted these attacks in Quetta and Pishin, whose details are given below:

Similarly, on October 25, militants on a motorcycle shot dead a police constable, Muhammad Hashim, who was providing security to the polio vaccination workers in Pishin.⁷⁶

⁷¹ Daily *Aaj*, June 19, 2022, <https://epaper.dailyaaj.com.pk/>; Daily *Jang*, Quetta, June 19, 2022, <https://e.jang.com.pk/detail/159499>

⁷² *Dawn*, September 1, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1707820/kalat-hit-by-ied-blast-earthquake>

⁷³ Daily *Jang* (Urdu), March 3, 2022, <https://e.jang.com.pk/detail/65127>

⁷⁴ Daily *Azadi* (Urdu), Quetta, March 9, 2022, <https://dailyazadiquetta.com/2022/03/09/sibi-blast-4>

⁷⁵ Samaa News (English), August 9, 2022, <https://www.samaaenglish.tv/news/40014276>

⁷⁶ Daily *Jang* (Urdu), October 26, 2022, <https://e.jang.com.pk/detail/271851%22>

- February 25: Two policemen, ASI Rehmatullah Dharpali and police constable Ali Asghar, were martyred and another was injured after gunmen opened fire at them at a restaurant in the Eastern Bypass area of Quetta. The TTP claimed the attack.⁷⁷
- October 25: Militants on a motorcycle shot dead a police constable, Muhammad Hashim, who was providing security to the polio vaccination workers in Pishin. The TTP claimed the attack in its monthly release of count.⁷⁸
- November 1: A policeman Zainullah, who was posted at Surkhab Police Station in Pishin, was on his way along with his 10-year-old son to Killi Tarate, when two unidentified armed motorcyclists opened fire, killing the cop on the spot.⁷⁹
- November 30: A suicide bomber travelling in a rickshaw targeted the truck carrying police contingent for the security of polio workers who were administering vaccines during an ongoing campaign in Kuchlak and other areas of Quetta district. At least four people were killed, including a policeman, and 24 others injured. The TTP claimed the attack.⁸⁰

Some unknown religiously inspired group carried out an attack in Gwadar. Reportedly, a person was injured in a remote-controlled blast near a girls school in Jiwani, Gwadar on July 21st.⁸¹

2.3 Sindh

Same as in the previous year, eight terrorist attacks took place in Sindh province including six in Karachi and two in interior Sindh (one attack each in Naushahro Firoze, and Tando Muhammad Khan). These attacks killed a total of eight people and injured 31 others.

Five of the reported attacks from Sindh in 2022 were perpetrated by Sindhi nationalist insurgents – mainly Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army (SRA) and a new group Sindhudesh Peoples Army; the latter targeted a clinic in Karachi run by a Chinese dentist couple. Other targets hit by Sindh insurgents included a railway track in Naushahro Firoze, a power pylon in Tando Mohammad Khan, and security forces personnel in Karachi.

Two Baloch insurgent groups, the banned BLA and a hitherto new group Baloch Nationalist Army, perpetrated two attacks in Karachi targeting Confucius Institute at the Karachi University, and security forces, respectively.

The banned TTP also perpetrated one attack in Karachi injuring a policeman.

⁷⁷ *Dawn*, February 26, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1677109/two-cops-martyred-one-hurt-in-quetta-attack>

⁷⁸ *Daily Jang* (Urdu), October 26, 2022, <https://e.jang.com.pk/detail/271851%22>

⁷⁹ *Dawn*, November 2, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1718377/police-constable-shot-dead-in-pishin>

⁸⁰ *Dawn*, December 1, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1724032/four-lives-lost-in-ttp-claimed-suicide-attack>

⁸¹ *Daily Jang* (Urdu), July 22, 2022, <https://e.jang.com.pk/detail/187668>

Table 3: Terrorist Attacks in Sindh in 2022

| Types of Attacks | Attacks | Killed | Injured |
|---|----------|----------|-----------|
| By [Sindhi and Baloch] nationalist insurgents | 7 | 8 | 30 |
| By Taliban and similar militants | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Total | 8 | 8 | 31 |

Regional distribution of terrorist attacks in Sindh in the year 2022 is given at Table 3a.

Table 3a: Regional Distribution of Terrorist Attacks in Sindh

| Location | Attacks | Killed | Injured |
|---------------------|----------|----------|-----------|
| Karachi | 6 | 8 | 31 |
| Naushahro Firoze | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Tando Muhammad Khan | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Total | 8 | 8 | 31 |

2.3.1 Karachi

As noted earlier, *Baloch nationalist insurgents* carried out two attacks in Karachi, including a major one. In April, in one of the worst attacks on Chinese nationals in Pakistan, a female suicide bomber of BLA Majeed Brigade blew herself up near the gate of the *Confucius Institute at the Karachi University* when a van carrying Chinese nationals, who taught at the Chinese language centre, came in her range. Four people – three Chinese nationals and their Pakistani driver – were killed in the blast. Four others were injured including a Rangers official.⁸² The BLA said in its statement that the director of the Confucius Institute at the Karachi University was the target. It also said that the Institute was engaged in Chinese propaganda and that the teachers were members of the Chinese communist party.

In August, three people were injured in a grenade attack at a toll plaza in the Garden area, Karachi, with the police suspecting it was linked with Independence Day celebrations. The

⁸² *The Express Tribune*, April 26, 2022, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2354305/female-suicide-bomber-kills-3-chinese-nationals-at-ku>; *Dawn*, April 27, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1687041/three-chinese-teachers-killed-in-varsity-bombing>

Baloch group Baloch Nationalist Army claimed the attack stating that police check-post at the toll plaza was the target.⁸³

Meanwhile, **Sandhi nationalist insurgent groups** perpetrated three attacks in Karachi. In May, the Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army (SRA) and some unspecified group perpetrated two terrorist attacks in Karachi. The reported attacks caused two deaths and injuries to another 21 people. As reported in media, explosion caused by an IED planted on a bicycle killed a young man and injured seven others at one of Karachi's busiest streets in the Saddar area. The SRA said in its claim of the attack that a vehicle of the **Pakistan Coast Guards** was the target.⁸⁴ Few days later, an IED strapped to a motorcycle exploded at the parking lot of a local cloth market in Karachi, leaving a woman dead, and injuring 14 others, including three policemen. A police mobile of Kharadar Police Station was reportedly the target of the attack that had remained unclaimed so far.⁸⁵

In September, a young Chinese man, Ronald Raimond Chao, was shot dead while **a Chinese dentist couple**, Dr Richad Hu and his wife Margaret Hu, were critically wounded when a man posing as patient entered their clinic Saddar and opened indiscriminate fire on them. A newly formed outfit Sindhudesh People's Army (SPA) claimed the attack warning China to stop supporting Pakistan.⁸⁶ The statement also demanded of China to close its 'exploitative' projects in the province as soon as possible, otherwise the group could perpetrate even more deadly attacks against Chinese in the future.

The banned **TTP** also carried out one attack in Karachi. On January 3rd, militants attacked a policeman with a hand grenade on Mauripur road, Karachi. The targeted cop lost his fingers in the blast, which was claimed by the TTP.⁸⁷

2.3.2 Interior Sindh

Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army perpetrated two attacks in interior Sindh, including one attack in each of Naushahro Firoze and Tando Muhammad Khan districts. These attacks targeted a railway track and a power transmission line. First, on April 5th, SRA militants targeted a railway track with a bomb blast near Pad Eidan in Naushahro Firoze.⁸⁸ Later in the month, on April 27th to be precise, SRA miscreants tried to blow up a pylon of high-tension transmission line

⁸³ Daily *Jang* (Urdu), August 14, 2022, <https://e.jang.com.pk/detail/208211>

⁸⁴ *The News*, May 13, 2022, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/957309-one-killed-seven-hurt-in-karachi-blast>

⁸⁵ *The News*, May 17, 2022, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/958457-woman-killed-14-injured-in-karachi-bombing>

⁸⁶ *The News*, September 29, 2022, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/995582-chinese-national-killed-two-injured-in-karachi-attack>

⁸⁷ Daily *Jang* (Urdu), January 4, 2022, <https://e.jang.com.pk/detail/24907>

⁸⁸ https://twitter.com/sindhudesharmy8/status/1511412992167997440?cxt=HHwWgMCrsfmGz_kpAAAA

on Tando Mohammad Khan road with an improvised device, damaging its foundation. The 220kV transmission line was damaged in the blast.⁸⁹

Separately, *ethnic tensions* flared up in several cities of Sindh after a 35-year-old Sindhi man was killed and five of his colleagues were injured in a scuffle at a hotel in Hyderabad on 12th of July. The incident caused an outcry among nationalist circles who believed the hotel owner was an Afghan national. They quickly linked the incident to the issue of influx of outsiders in Sindh.

Leaders from across the political spectrum unanimously called for calm as several incidents of violence were reported in the province, where shops and hotels owned by Pashtuns were attacked and forcefully closed, allegedly by Sindhi nationalists. Hotels and shops owned by Pashtuns were attacked and forcefully shut in Dadu, Sehwan, Khairpur Nathan Shah, Kotri and Jamshoro. Armed men on motorbikes attacked three hotels in Kotri. In retaliation, the owners pelted stones leaving two men, identified as Uzair Soomro and Sadaqat Ali, injured. A heavy police contingent reached the spot and shifted the injured to Kotri's District Headquarters Hospital.⁹⁰ In a bid to prevent the law-and-order situation from deteriorating further, Sindh Information Minister Sharjeel Memon contacted Qaumi Awami Tehreek President Ayaz Latif Palijo and Sindh ANP President Shahi Syed, urging them to play a positive role to allay the ethnic strife.

2.4 Punjab & Islamabad

A combined total of five (5) terrorist attacks took place in Punjab and Islamabad which claimed 11 lives and injured 39 others.

Three (3) terrorist attacks happened in Punjab which claimed six lives and injured 30 more people. Two of these attacks took place in the provincial capital Lahore including a major vehicle-borne blast by Baloch Nationalist Army targeting security and bank officials in Anarkali bazaar. The banned TTP claimed the third attack that target killed a policeman in Kallar Syedan, Rawalpindi. Meanwhile, two reported attacks from Islamabad including a suicide blast, targeted security forces, killing two policemen; three militants were also killed in these attacks including a suicide bomber.

Table 4: Terrorist Attacks in Punjab in 2022

| District | Attacks | Killed | Injured |
|----------|---------|--------|---------|
| Lahore | 2 | 5 | 30 |

⁸⁹ *Dawn*, April 29, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1687282/blast-damages-electricity-pylon-near-tando-mohammad-khan>

⁹⁰ *Dawn*, July 15, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1699697/calls-for-calm-as-ethnic-strife-threatens-peace-in-sindh>

| | | | |
|-------------------------------------|----------|-----------|-----------|
| Rawalpindi | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Punjab Total | 3 | 6 | 30 |
| Islamabad | 2 | 5 | 9 |
| Total Islamabad & Punjab | 5 | 11 | 39 |

In January, three terrorist attacks happened in Punjab and Islamabad – two in Lahore and Rawalpindi districts of Punjab and one in the federal capital. These attacks claimed seven lives and injured 33 others. Those killed included three civilians, two policemen and two militants. While the attacks in the twin cities of Rawalpindi and Islamabad were perpetrated by the banned TTP, a newly established Baloch insurgent group Baloch Nationalist Army (BNA) claimed the attack that hit the provincial capital of Punjab. In **Lahore**, a powerful blast ripped through the crowded Anarkali market, killing three people and injuring 33 others. Baloch Nationalist Army, while claiming responsibility for the blast said the security and bank officials were the target.⁹¹ As cited earlier, the banned Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan perpetrated two attacks against the police in the twin cities of Rawalpindi and Islamabad. First, on January 17, police officials tried to stop two men on a motorcycle at Jilani Chowk in **G-8 sector of Islamabad** for routine checking. The riders opened fire at the police party, martyring Head Constable Munawar and wounding three other policemen. Two attackers were also killed in the exchange of fire. The TTP claimed the attack.⁹² Later, on January 31, a police constable, Moeen Asif, who was returning home from **Kallar Syedan (Rawalpindi)**, was found shot dead near Chanali village. The banned TTP as well as Islamic State terrorist groups both claimed the attack on social media.⁹³

In June, one attack took place in **Lahore**, the provincial capital, killed two militants. Reportedly, two alleged militants of the Baloch Nationalist Army who were earlier arrested in connection with the Anarkali blast were reportedly killed by unknown militants when they were being taken by police to a place for recovery of weapons and explosives.⁹⁴

Later in the year in December, a policeman was martyred and at least six people were injured in a suicide blast in **Islamabad's I-10/4 sector**. The police stopped a suspicious vehicle, a couple came out, and while being checked by the officers, the man went inside the vehicle on some pretext and then detonated himself.⁹⁵

Clashes between criminal gangs and police in Rajanpur

⁹¹ *Dawn*, January 21, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1670672/bomb-blast-in-lahore-market-leaves-three-dead>; Daily *Jang* (Urdu), January 21, 2022, <https://e.jang.com.pk/detail/35582>

⁹² Daily *Jang* (Urdu), January 18, 2022, <https://e.jang.com.pk/detail/33895>

⁹³ *Dawn*, January 31, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1672352/constable-found-dead>

⁹⁴ *The News*, June 5, 2022, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/963531-two-terrorists-killed>

⁹⁵ *Dawn*, December 23, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1727851/one-policeman-martyred-in-suicide-blast-in-islamabads-i-10-police>

Fierce clashes took place on November 23 between the police and the criminals in Rajanpur with the latter having fired rocket launchers, mortars and other weapons at the poorly equipped police force; the clashes continued for more than five hours. The heavy exchange of fire ended up in the killing of Khuda Bukhsh Lound, ringleader of a notorious group, who also had a head money of Rs1.8 million against him. Several gangs of hardened criminals later united on November 25 under the umbrella of a Baloch banned militant group, BLA, and threatened to attack six police stations in Rojhan tehsil of Rajanpur district. The BLA on the social media declared the killed Lound as 'martyr'. At least 12 others, including 5 policemen, were also injured in the clashes. The heavily armed criminals left several bullet-proof vehicles riddled with bullets. Another most-wanted criminal, identified as Gora Umrani, also a BLA member, had received five bullet injuries and six of his accomplices were also injured. The assailants took away their injured associates and disappeared in the tall bushes and forests.

Over 1,000 police personnel were participating in the large-scale operation launched in the troubled and relatively inaccessible areas of Rajanpur and Rahim Yar Khan districts of south Punjab, which shared boundaries with Sindh and Balochistan. Reportedly, the situation in Rojhan was highly tense as the groups were moving ahead to hit their targets. The south Punjab police have also put their heads together to devise new strategies to fight back.⁹⁶

2.5 Gilgit-Baltistan

In a single reported attack from the region in 2022, three miscreants torched the Girls Middle School, located in Darel valley, and fled the scene. The blaze left the school's furniture completely burnt and part of its corrugated metal roof also collapsed as a result.⁹⁷

An incident of **armed sectarian-clash** was recorded in Gilgit. Two people were killed and 17 others were injured when two religious groups clashed at Yadgar Chowk, near Gilgit deputy commissioner's office. Those killed belonged to Shia community and were identified as Syed Iqbal Hussain, 25, a resident of Nagaral of Gilgit district; and Mohammad Ali, 15, from Hoper valley of Nagar.⁹⁸ According to police, the clash between the two groups began when the top Shia leader of Gilgit-Baltistan, Agha Rahat Hussain Al-Hussaini, was hoisting the Alam (flag) of Hazrat Imam Hussain at Khomar Chowk at the start of Muharram. Home Secretary Iqbal Hussain Khan said 44 suspects allegedly involved in the incident had been arrested and the arrest of more elements would be carried out on intelligence-based information. He said that Section 144 had been imposed in the area for the next two weeks.

⁹⁶ Asif Chaudhry, "Gangs unite under banned group to avenge killing of 'terrorist'," *Dawn*, November 26, 2022.

⁹⁷ *Dawn*, November 9, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1719858/miscreants-torch-girls-school-in-diamer>

⁹⁸ *Dawn*, August 1, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1702608/two-killed-17-wounded-in-gilgit-clash>

2.6 Suicide Attacks

Compared to five in the year before, as many as 14 suicide attacks happened in 2022 including 10 in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (9 in North Waziristan and one in Peshawar), two in Balochistan's Quetta and Sibi districts, and one each in Karachi (Sindh) and Islamabad. These attacks claimed 108 lives – compared to 30 in 2021 – and injured 287 others.

The TTP was involved in six of these attacks, four of which targeted personnel of security and law enforcement agencies in North Waziristan, one hit police in Islamabad, and another attack targeted security escort of polio vaccinators in Quetta. Hafiz Gul Bahadur group and a hitherto unknown group Ittehad Musallah Islami Mujahideen were believed to be involved in one suicide bombing each in North Waziristan, while another three suicide blasts reported from North Waziristan remained unclaimed.

Islamic State-Khorasan terrorist group (IS-K) claimed two suicide blasts that took place in Peshawar (KP) and Sibi (Balochistan). These attacks by IS-K claimed a combined total of 71 lives besides wounding another 205 people. Most of these casualties resulted from the suicide blast in a Shia mosque in Peshawar.

Similarly, Baloch insurgent group BLA perpetrated a suicide attack targeting Chinese teachers of the Confucius Institute at the Karachi University.

Table 5: Suicide Attacks in Pakistan in 2022

| District | Attacks | Killed | Injured |
|--------------------------|-----------|------------|------------|
| Quetta | 1 | 6 | 23 |
| Sibi | 1 | 6 | 19 |
| Balochistan Total | 2 | 12 | 42 |
| North Waziristan | 9 | 24 | 49 |
| Peshawar | 1 | 65 | 186 |
| KP Total | 10 | 89 | 235 |
| Islamabad | 1 | 2 | 6 |
| Karachi | 1 | 5 | 4 |
| Pakistan Total | 14 | 108 | 287 |

These suicide blasts are re-narrated below, despite their description in respective sections on regional security landscapes.

- March 4: Shia worshipers were attacked in an imambargah in Peshawar. Initially, at least 57 people were killed and over 194 others injured in the suicide blast at the Shia mosque in Koocha Risaldar near Qissa Khwani Bazaar; a day later the death toll reached 62 while another 3 among those injured died in hospital taking the death toll to 65. The bomber

- opened fire on the two policemen deployed at the gate before he managed to force his entry into the premises. Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K) claimed the bombing.⁹⁹
- March 8: At least six Frontier Constabulary (FC) officials were martyred, and 19 others were injured including 13 FC men when a suicide bomber exploded himself near the security officials and people returning from Sibi festival ceremony. The IS-K claimed the attack.¹⁰⁰
 - April 25: In one of the worst attacks on Chinese nationals in Pakistan, a female suicide bomber of BLA Majeed Brigade blew herself up near the gate of the Confucius Institute at the Karachi University when a van carrying Chinese nationals, who taught at the Chinese language centre, came in her range. Four people – three Chinese nationals and their Pakistani driver – were killed in the blast. Four others were injured including a Rangers official.¹⁰¹ The BLA said in its statement that the director of the Confucius Institute at the Karachi University was the target. It also said that the Institute was engaged in Chinese propaganda and that the teachers were members of the Chinese communist party.
 - May 14: Three soldiers (Zubair Qadir, Aziz Asghar, and Qasim Maqsood) and three children were martyred and six others, including two children, suffered injuries when a suicide bomber blew himself up near a patrolling vehicle of the army in Eidak area of North Waziristan tribal district.¹⁰² No one claimed the attack. Experts asserted that some militants associated with the TTP, who were not happy with the group's talks with the government, could be involved.
 - May 30: Two security officials, Naik Banaras and Sepoy Munsif Khan, were injured in a suicide attack on their vehicle parked at a check-post in the Razmak subdivision of North Waziristan tribal district.¹⁰³ This suicide attack also remained unclaimed.
 - July 4: A convoy of security forces was heading from Mirali to Miramshah, the district headquarters of North Waziristan, when a suicide bomber riding a motorcycle blew himself up near one of the vehicles near Khadi market in Mirali seriously injuring 10 army soldiers. Local sources believed Gul Bahadur Group was involved in the attack.¹⁰⁴
 - August 8: Four army soldiers were martyred when militants targeted a military convoy with a suicide blast in the Mir Ali area of North Waziristan district. The martyred soldiers were

⁹⁹ *The News*, March 5, 2022, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/938658-bloodbath-in-peshawar-mosque>; *Dawn*, March 6, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1678510/officials-claim-breakthrough-as-peshawar-blast-death-toll-rises-to-62>; *Daily Jang* (Urdu), March 8, 2022, <https://e.jang.com.pk/detail/69333>

¹⁰⁰ *Daily Azadi* (Urdu), Quetta, March 9, 2022, <https://dailyazadiquetta.com/2022/03/09/sibi-blast-4>

¹⁰¹ *The Express Tribune*, April 26, 2022, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2354305/female-suicide-bomber-kills-3-chinese-nationals-at-ku>; *Dawn*, April 27, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1687041/three-chinese-teachers-killed-in-varsity-bombing>

¹⁰² *The Express Tribune*, May 15, 2022, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2356714/3-soldiers-children-martyred-in-suicide-blast-in-north-waziristan>

¹⁰³ *Daily Jang* (Urdu), May 31, 2022, <https://e.jang.com.pk/detail/140693>

¹⁰⁴ *Dawn*, July 5, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1698214/10-soldiers-injured-in-north-waziristan-suicide-attack>

identified as Lance Naik Shahzaib, Lance Naik Sajjad, sepoy Umair, and sepoy Khurram. A hitherto new group Ittehad Musallah Islami Mujahideen claimed the blast.¹⁰⁵

- October 23: Four personnel of Frontier Works Organisation, a subsidiary of the army, were wounded, two among them critically, in a suicide blast in North Waziristan district. A suicide bomber, apparently in his teens, covering himself with a blanket came close to the FWO vehicle and detonated explosives.¹⁰⁶
- November 10: Five security personnel were wounded in a suicide attack in Mirali area of North Waziristan tribal district. Reportedly, a suicide bomber rammed his motorcycle into vehicle of security forces near Nowrek village.¹⁰⁷
- November 30: A suicide bomber travelling in a rickshaw targeted the truck carrying police contingent for the security of polio workers who were administering vaccines during an ongoing campaign in Kuchlak and other areas of Quetta district. At least four people were killed, including a policeman, and 24 others injured. The TTP claimed the attack.¹⁰⁸
- December 14: A Pakistan Army soldier and a citizen were martyred in a suicide attack, by a bomber on a motorcycle, in the Miran Shah area of North Waziristan. As many as 14 others, including nine security personnel, were also wounded the attack.¹⁰⁹
- December 19: One soldier and two civilians lost their lives, and four soldiers were injured as the result of a suicide attack on the convoy of security forces in North Waziristan. The suicide bomber struck his rickshaw in the vehicle of security forces.¹¹⁰
- December 23: A policeman was martyred and at least six people were injured in a suicide blast in Islamabad's I-10/4 sector. The police stopped a suspicious vehicle, a couple came out, and while being checked by the officers, the man went inside the vehicle on some pretext and then detonated himself.¹¹¹
- December 28: Two soldiers were wounded when a suicide bomber rammed his explosive-laden vehicle into a security checkpoint in Mirali area of North Waziristan tribal district.¹¹²

¹⁰⁵ Daily *Mashriq* (Urdu), August 9, 2022, <https://mashriqtv.pk/latest/245872/>

¹⁰⁶ *Dawn*, October 24, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1716599/four-fwo-men-hurt-in-north-waziristan-suicide-bombing>

¹⁰⁷ *Dawn*, November 11, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1720246/five-security-personnel-hurt-in-suicide-attack>

¹⁰⁸ *Dawn*, December 1, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1724032/four-lives-lost-in-ttp-claimed-suicide-attack>

¹⁰⁹ *The News*, December 15, 2022, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/1020242-soldier-citizen-martyred-9-injured-in-suicide-attack-on-army-checkpost-in-north-waziristan>; *Dawn*, December 15, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1726441/3-killed-as-suicide-attacker-rams-bike-into-convoy-in-north-waziristan>

¹¹⁰ Daily *Jang* (Urdu), December 20, 2022, <https://e.jang.com.pk/detail/321780>

¹¹¹ *Dawn*, December 23, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1727851/one-policeman-martyred-in-suicide-blast-in-islamabads-i-10-police>

¹¹² *Dawn*, December 29, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1728762/2-soldiers-wounded-in-waziristan-suicide-attack>

2.7 Faith-based Violence

Compared to seven (7) in 2021, as many as eight (8) incidents of communal or faith-based violence were recorded in Pakistan in 2022. These included (5) incidents of communal or faith-based violence as well as three incidents of mob violence against blasphemy-accused individuals.

These incidents claimed the lives of five people including two persons accused of blasphemy, and three members of Ahmedi community. In one of such incidents, a Hindu temple was also damaged in Karachi. Apart from Karachi, such incidents were recorded in Chiniot, Faisalabad, Khanewal, Muzaffargarh and Okara districts in Punjab, and DI Khan and Peshawar districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Table 6: Incidents of Faith-based Violence in Pakistan in 2022

| District | Attacks | Killed | Injured |
|-----------------------|----------|----------|----------|
| Chiniot | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Faisalabad | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Khanewal | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Muzaffargarh | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Okara | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Punjab Total | 5 | 3 | 1 |
| DI Khan | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Peshawar | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| KP Total | 2 | 2 | 1 |
| Karachi | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Sindh Total | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Total Pakistan | 8 | 5 | 2 |

In February, three incidents of faith-based mob violence were recorded in three Punjab districts including Khanewal, Faisalabad and Muzaffargarh. On February 12th, a middle-aged man was stoned to death by a mob over alleged desecration of the Holy Quran in **a remote village of Khanewal** district.¹¹³ On February 13th, a violent mob attacked and injured a man for allegedly burning the pages of Holy Quran in **Faisalabad's Tandlianwala area**. The police rescued the accused person and shifted him to an undisclosed location.¹¹⁴ On February 14th, police with the help of area notables foiled a lynching attempt in **Alipur tehsil of Muzaffargarh** and rescued a man from a mob over alleged blasphemy and shifted him to

¹¹³ Dawn, February 13, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1674819/lynching-horror-visits-khanewal>

¹¹⁴ Dawn, February 14, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1674960/police-avert-another-possible-lynching-in-faisalabad>

some undisclosed location.¹¹⁵

Again, in March, two incidents of faith-based violence were reported in KP, one each from Peshawar and DI Khan. A man was killed and another wounded when unidentified assailants attacked the clinic of an Ahmadi doctor in the Scheme Chowk area of **Peshawar**. Both the slain and wounded worked at the clinic but were not Ahmedi.¹¹⁶ In **DI Khan**, a woman teacher at a girls' seminary in the city was killed after she was allegedly stabbed in the neck by three female students on the suspicion that the slain had committed blasphemy.¹¹⁷

On May 17th, a 35-year-old man, Abdus Salam, belonging to the minority Ahmadi community was stabbed to death over his faith in **Okara** city of Punjab province. The attacker was reportedly student of a local seminary.¹¹⁸ In **Karachi**, on June 8th, a group of five unidentified people, who came on motorcycles, vandalised a Hindu temple in the Korangi area of Karachi and pelted stones at an idol.¹¹⁹ Meanwhile, on August 12th, another member of minority Ahmadi community, Naseer Ahmad, was stabbed to death in the eastern town of **Rabwah** by a TLP supporter allegedly for refusing to chant Islamist slogans. The attacker also raised slogans eulogising TLP founder, the late Khadim Hussain Rizvi.¹²⁰

Separately, hundreds of people belonging to the **Hindu community marched on the roads of Kalat** town to register their protest against what they said the alleged desecration of the remains of a Hindu woman's body burnt in the Shamshan Ghat the other day. The traders belonging to the community closed all their shops and gathered in the Shahi Bazaar area and joined the march, which was led by Mahraj Ghansham, Dewan Hari Chaand and Dr Nanad Lal. To show solidarity with the Hindu community, religious and political parties also joined the protest. The marchers chanted slogans against the local administration. While speaking at the protest, the community leaders strongly condemned the incident and demanded that police arrest the elements involved in this act that had hurt the sentiments of the entire community.¹²¹

¹¹⁵ *Dawn*, February 15, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1675128/police-rescue-blasphemy-suspect-from-lynch-mob-in-muzaffargarh>

¹¹⁶ *Dawn*, March 6, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1678514/man-killed-in-attack-on-ahmadi-doctors-clinic-in-peshawar>

¹¹⁷ *Dawn*, March 30, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1682482/female-seminary-teacher-killed-by-her-students>

¹¹⁸ IHRC tweet: <https://twitter.com/IHumanRightsC/status/1526610383351562243?cxt=HHwWhoC-ocWDzq8qAAAA>

¹¹⁹ *Dawn*, June 9, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1693939/hindu-temple-vandalised-in-karachi-korangi-area>

¹²⁰ *Reuters*, August 12, 2022, <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/man-ahmadi-minority-stabbed-death-pakistan-2022-08-12/>

¹²¹ Abdul Wahid Shahwani, "Members of Hindu community stage protest in Balochistan's Kalat," *Dawn*, October 3, 2022.

2.8 Border Attacks

Down by 35 percent from the year before, 15 cross-border attacks took place in Pakistan from across its borders with Afghanistan, India and Iran. Most of these attacks happened from across the country's border with Afghanistan (13 attacks) in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces. These attacks from Afghanistan killed 34 people and injured 52 others. Meanwhile one attack happened from across the Working Boundary with India in Punjab but did not cause any casualty or damage. Similarly, another attack was reported from across the Iranian border in Panjgur (Balochistan), which claimed the life of one FC man and injured four people. Among those 35 killed in overall cross-border attacks were 15 army soldiers, 12 civilians, six FC officials, and two militants.

The security situation at the Pak-Afghan border has been deteriorating since the Taliban took power in Kabul in August 2021. The Taliban have apparently taken a stricter and nationalistic stance in their response to Pakistan's efforts to fence the border. Secondly, the refugee issue as well as illegal cross-border movements have also added to border tensions. As a result, not only the number of cross-border attacks and clashes has increased but intensity of such incidents has also grown resulting in more deaths and injuries. Only in 2022, 34 Pakistani citizens lost their lives (including 20 security officials) in 13 such attacks/clashes along the Durand Line. Importantly, in the past, or during Ghani regime, most of the cross-border attacks from Afghanistan were carried out by the TTP or other militant groups, but now many of such incidents involve Afghan border forces under the Taliban regime.

Table 7: Border Attacks/Clashes in 2022

| Nature of Attack | Attacks | Killed | Injured |
|-------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| Pak-Afghan border | 13 | 34 | 52 |
| Pak-India border | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Pak-Iran border | 1 | 1 | 4 |
| Total | 15 | 35 | 56 |

Nonetheless, since February 2021, when Pakistan and India recommitted themselves to the 2003 ceasefire arrangement at the Line of Control, there has been a significant decline in Indian violations of the Line of Control (LoC) and Working Boundary ceasefire. Indeed, there have been only three cross-border attacks from Indian side since February 2021, including two in 2021 (post-February), and one in 2022.

2.8.1 Pak-Afghan

Out of the 13 cross-border attacks from Afghanistan, nine took place in Kurram and North Waziristan districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and another four happened in Qilla Abdullah district or Chaman border in Balochistan.

From the first month of the year, e.g., **January**, insecurity at the country's western border had started to emerge as a new challenge for Pakistan. On January 2nd, a Taliban Defense Ministry spokesman criticized the fencing project, saying Pakistan had "no right to erect barbed wire along the Durand Line and separate the tribes on both sides of the line."¹²² Pakistan said it had conveyed its concerns at the highest level to the Afghan interim government saying it was observing maximum restraint.¹²³ On January 3rd, Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi told a news conference in Islamabad that Pakistan was determined to protect its interests. "We are not silent. We have installed the fence and, God willing, this effort will continue," he reiterated.¹²⁴ Later, on January 5th, the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) spokesman Maj Gen Babar Iftikhar reaffirmed the resolve to complete fencing of the 2,600km-long border with Afghanistan. Speaking at a media conference at the ISPR office, he said: "As far as the issue about the fencing that you are referring to ... these are very localised problems. They have been addressed. The government is in touch with the Afghan interim government," he maintained, emphasising the cordial nature of the relations with Afghanistan's de facto government.¹²⁵

In February, two cross-border attacks from Afghanistan side killed eight persons including five FC personnel and three civilians and wounded another 4 FC men. One of these attacks happened in Kurram district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the other on Chaman border crossing in Balochistan. While the former was perpetrated by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the latter was in incident of armed clash between Afghan Taliban officials and Pakistani security forces. The Chaman border crossing was reopened after three days since the start of the clashes on February 24th. The reopening came after reported "successful talks between Pakistani officials and the governor of Afghanistan's Kandahar province."¹²⁶

In March, a group of TTP terrorists from Afghanistan attempted to infiltrate into Pakistani territory in the Hassan Khel area of North Waziristan, but security forces foiled the infiltration attempt. While trying to cross the border, the terrorists opened fire on the troops martyring four soldiers. The fleeing terrorists suffered heavy losses.¹²⁷

- In April, three soldiers of the Pakistan Army (Havaldar Taimoor, Sepoy Saqib Nawaz, and

¹²² <https://twitter.com/AbdulhaqOmeri/status/1477682063402848257>

¹²³ *The Express Tribune*, January 3, 2022, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2336852/concerns-conveyed-to-afghan-taliban-on-fencing-incidents>

¹²⁴ Ayaz Gul, "Pakistan vows to continue fencing Afghan border, downplays Taliban disruptive acts," VOA, January 3, 2022, <https://www.voanews.com/a/pakistan-vows-to-continue-fencing-afghan-border-downplays-taliban-disruptive-acts-/6379947.html>

¹²⁵ Baqir Sajjad Syed, "Fencing on border with Afghanistan to continue, says ISPR," *Dawn*, January 6, 2020, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1667915/fencing-on-border-with-afghanistan-to-continue-says-ispr>

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*

¹²⁷ *Dawn*, March 25, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1681710/four-soldiers-martyred-in-attack-from-across-afghan-border>

Naik Shoab) embraced martyrdom when terrorists from inside Afghanistan across the international border, opened fire on Pakistani troops in general area Dewagar, North Waziristan district. Four soldiers received injuries.¹²⁸

- This cross-border attack, coupled with some other high-impact TTP attacks during the month of April against security forces, drew a strong reaction from Pakistani security forces. Pakistan demanded of the Afghan government to take strict action against the TTP and other militants attacking Pakistan while being sheltered in Afghanistan. The Foreign Office spokesperson said that elements of banned terrorist groups in the border region, including the TTP [Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan], continued to attack Pakistan's border security posts, resulting into martyrdom of several Pakistani troops. Meanwhile, Afghan media as well as social media platforms were rife with reports on Pakistan's strikes against TTP militants' hideouts inside Afghanistan. Some reports quoted Afghan officials saying the "death toll had risen to 47 following Pakistan military strikes in the eastern Afghanistan provinces of Kunar and Khost."¹²⁹ Pakistan's Foreign Office said the government was looking into the allegations of airstrikes.¹³⁰

In July, a militant was killed during an exchange of fire in North Waziristan when a group of terrorists from Afghanistan attempted to break the border fence near the Kanjeera and Wargar Sar military posts. A security official, Saqib, suffered injuries in the encounter.¹³¹

In September, three cross-border attacks happened from across the Durand Line which martyred five soldiers of Pakistan Army. On September 13th, terrorists from Afghanistan opened fire on Pakistani troops in Kharlachi, Kurram district, killing three soldiers, Naik Muhammad Rehman, Naik Maweez Khan, and Sepoy Irfanullah. The Afghan Taliban later attributed the cross-border firing to attempts by Pakistani forces to build a post close to the Durand Line, which they said led to an exchange of fire between the two sides.¹³² On September 20th, the TTP militants from inside Afghanistan opened fire on the Pakistani security forces in Dwatoi area of North Waziristan. A Pakistan Army soldier, Nazar Muhammad, embraced martyrdom.¹³³ Later, on

¹²⁸ *The News*, April 23, 2022, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/952653-three-soldiers-martyred-in-terrorist-attack-from-across-pak-afghan-border-ispr>; *Dawn*, April 24, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1686528/three-soldiers-martyred-by-firing-from-across-afghan-border>

¹²⁹ Haroon Janjua, "Tensions increase between Taliban and Pakistan over attacks," DW, April 21, 2022, <https://www.dw.com/en/tensions-increase-between-taliban-and-pakistan-over-attacks/a-61535921>

¹³⁰ *Dawn*, April 17, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1685373/fo-looking-into-afghan-allegation-of-air-strikes>

¹³¹ *Dawn*, July 3, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1697941/4-terrorists-killed-in-military-action-in-kp>

¹³² *The News*, September 14, 2022, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/991173-three-soldiers-martyred-in-kurram>; *Dawn*, September 15, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1710198/taliban-see-bid-to-build-border-post-behind-kurram-violence>

¹³³ *Dawn*, September 21, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1711212/one-soldier-martyred-in-cross-border-attack-from-afghanistan>

September 30th, the terrorists from across the Afghan border opened fire on troops at Kharlachi border crossing in Kurram martyring one soldier.¹³⁴

In October, too, a cross-border attack happened from across the Durand Line which martyred one soldier of Pakistan Army.

In November, two cross-border attacks happened from across the Durand Line which martyred two soldiers of Pakistan Army and injured another nine soldiers and four civilians. One of these reported two attacks happened in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and other on Chaman border in Balochistan. Reportedly, a soldier was martyred and 11 others, including seven personnel and four civilians, were injured when clashes erupted between security forces and Afghan Taliban in Kurram tribal district on November 19 and 20 over construction of a road in the Pakistani territory by the latter.¹³⁵

The situation at the Chaman border in Balochistan also remained tense during the November. The border remained close for more than a week after an armed man from the Afghan side opened fire on Pakistani security personnel at Friendship Gate, resulting in the martyrdom of one soldier and leaving two others wounded on November 13. Official sources said that Pakistani and Afghan forces exchanged fire for more than an hour following the incident, with reports that five personnel from the Afghan side were killed and 14 others were injured in the gun battle. Seven of the injured were shifted to Kandahar hospital, according to the reports pouring in from across the Afghan border.¹³⁶ The Afghan border authorities explained that the Taliban forces were not involved in the shooting at Friendship Gate. "They might be terrorists who were involved in firing," the officials said.¹³⁷ About a week later, on November 20, Pakistan agreed conditionally to reopen the Chaman border. The decision to open the border was made during a meeting between Pakistani and Afghan officials.

In December too, two cross-border attacks from Afghanistan happened - both along Chaman border - which claimed nine lives and injured 30 others. First, on December 11th, seven people lost their lives and 16 others suffered injuries in Chaman, which came under heavy firing by Afghan border forces; an injured boy died a day later raising the death toll to 8. According to the military's media wing, the Afghan border forces used artillery and mortars in the attack. A border fencing dispute had earlier caused closure of the border which was followed by heavy exchange of fire from both sides.¹³⁸ Few days later, on December 15th, one person was killed,

¹³⁴ *Dawn*, October 1, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1712821/one-soldier-martyred-in-cross-border-attack-in-kurram-ispr>

¹³⁵ *Dawn*, November 22, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1722161/three-soldiers-hurt-in-firing-from-across-afghan-border>

¹³⁶ "Trade suspended at Chaman border after deadly shooting," *Dawn*, November 14, 2022.

¹³⁷ Gul and Yousafzai, "Pakistan-Afghan border crossing closed after clashes," Reuters, November 14, 2022, <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistan-afghan-border-crossing-closed-after-clashes-2022-11-14>

¹³⁸ *The News*, December 11, 2022, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/1019117-six-pakistanis-martyred-17-injured-in-unprovoked-firing-by-afghan-troops-ispr>; *Dawn*, December 12,

and 15 were injured as Afghan forces attack another team repairing border fence. Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) said indiscriminate fire from inside Afghanistan on the civilian population of Chaman continued intermittently through the day.¹³⁹

2.8.2 Pak-India

In a single ceasefire violation by India, an unarmed Indian supersonic missile intruded into Pakistani territory, endangering several airliners during the course of its flight, and finally hit a private property near Mian Channu in Khanewal district of Punjab.¹⁴⁰ The Indian unarmed missile landed on Pakistani territory on March 9th. According to the statement issued by Pakistan's military a "high-speed flying object" had crashed near the eastern city of Mian Channu and its flight path had endangered passenger flights. Pakistan's well measured and sensible response was appreciated worldwide as it entailed no threat of retaliation. However, India took few days to acknowledge the incident and regretted that the missile was accidentally fired due to some technical malfunction during maintenance.

2.8.3 Pak-Iran

As in the year before, a single cross-border attack was recorded inside Pakistan in 2022 from Iranian side of the Pakistani border. Reportedly, on March 25th, a rocket fired from Iranian side of the border martyred a security official and injured three security personnel and one civilian in Parom tehsil of Panjgur district of Balochistan.¹⁴¹

Earlier in February 14, ***Pakistan and Iran established a joint working group*** to deal with border-related matters during a daylong visit of Iranian Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi to Islamabad in which he met Prime Minister Imran Khan, Interior Minister Sheikh Rashid Ahmed and Chief of the Army Staff Gen Qamar Bajwa in the aftermath of terrorist attacks in Balochistan province of Pakistan. Dawn reported that "Mr Vahidi's visit followed close on the heels of [Pakistani] ISI[s] Chief Lt Gen Nadeem Anjum's unannounced trip to Iran over the past few days."¹⁴² Comprising the interior ministries of Iran and Pakistan, the joint working group is mandated to cover security and non-security matters pertaining to the border with an aim to promote bilateral cooperation. It would "deal with terror-related concerns, cross-border

2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1725912/unprovoked-shelling-by-afghan-forces-kills-seven-at-chaman>

¹³⁹ *Dawn*, December 16, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1726591/border-clashes-erupt-again-days-after-kabul-apology>

¹⁴⁰ *Dawn*, March 11, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1679361/indian-missile-flew-over-100km-inside-pakistan-ispr>

¹⁴¹ *Daily Jang* (Urdu), Quetta, March 26, 2022, <https://e.jang.com.pk/detail/83628>

¹⁴² Baqir Sajjad Syed, "Pakistan, Iran form joint working group on border issues," *Dawn*, February 15, 2022.

crimes, drug trafficking, issues related to border crossings, and construction and operation of border markets.”¹⁴³

Table 8: Regional Distribution of Cross-border Attacks

| Border | District | Attacks | Killed | Injured |
|-----------------------------|------------------------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|
| Pak-Afghan | Kurram (KP) | 4 | 10 | 15 |
| | North Waziristan (KP) | 5 | 11 | 5 |
| | Qilla Abdullah (Balochistan) | 4 | 13 | 32 |
| | Total | 13 | 34 | 52 |
| Pak – India | Khanewal (Working Boundary) | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| | Total | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Pak - Iran | Panjgur (Balochistan) | 1 | 1 | 4 |
| | Total | 1 | 1 | 4 |
| Total from 3 borders | | 15 | 35 | 56 |

Civilians and security officials from Pakistani and Iranian sides deliberated upon mapping the border during a follow-up meeting after the Pakistan’s surveyor general visited Iran early March. The meeting was held on March 27 between an 8-member Pakistani delegation and a 6-member Iranian delegation in Taftan in Chagai district of Balochistan and discussed border fencing and mapping and related issues. Unlike Afghanistan, Iran has been welcoming the border fencing being done by Pakistan, which it says will ensure security on both sides of the border. Both sides agreed in the meeting that aerial and ground mark of border pillars would be carried out to make detailed maps of the border zone. “A four-kilometre strip — two kilometres on each side — would be mapped as per the protocol,” a media report said quoting an official. The officials also agreed that the “909-kilometre Pak-Iran border would be divided into four sections and each side would map two sections, with monitoring from both countries. Problems faced by local residents due to closure of Rahdari Gate from the Iranian side were also discussed.”¹⁴⁴

In **May**, the Frontier Corps inspector general held a grand jirga in Panjgur, adjacent to the Pakistan-Iran border, to listen to the problems the people of the area were facing in border trade. Senior military officials and a large number of political, tribal and social personalities attended the jirga whose purpose was to discuss the situation in the area and find a solution to the problems being faced by the people. The FC inspector general said all responsibilities

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Ali Raza Rind, “Pakistan, Iran discuss border fencing,” *Dawn*, March 28, 2022.

relating to the border had now been transferred to the civil administration and the army's job was just to provide security to the people in the area.

2.9 Ethno-political Violence

Compared to five in 2021, as many as four (4) incidents of ethno-political violence, including election-related, also took place in 2022, which claimed three lives and wounded 11 others. One of these incidents was recorded in each of four provinces of Pakistan. In Sindh and Punjab, respectively, the reported incidents were linked to by-polls in Karachi's Korangi districts, and Lahore's Johar Town. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Awami National Party election nominee for a general council seat Musawir Dawar was shot dead in Mirali Bazaar. Meanwhile, in the reported single incident from Balochistan, Sardar Mohammad Ashraf Kakar, a senior leader of the Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PkMAP), was shot dead by unidentified attackers in Loralai town.

Table 9: Incidents of Ethno-political Violence in 2022

| District | Incidents | Killed | Injured |
|------------------|-----------|----------|-----------|
| Karachi | 1 | 1 | 10 |
| Lahore | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Loralai | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| North Waziristan | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Total | 4 | 3 | 11 |

- March 22: In an apparent incident of political violence, Gunmen killed Awami National Party election nominee for a general council seat Musawir Dawar in Mirali Bazaar (North Waziristan). The deceased was also a social activist and worked for the Youth of Waziristan, a youth organisation.¹⁴⁵
- June 16: An incident of election-related violence was recorded in Karachi, where on the day of byelection for NA-240 seat of Karachi's District Korangi clashes were reported between rival political groups. A man was killed and over 10 others were injured due to firing and brawls among the political workers of MQM-P and TLP.¹⁴⁶
- June 19: An incident of political violence was also recorded in Lahore. An armed clash happened between workers of the PML-N and PTI busy in by-poll campaign in Johar Town which left several people injured.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁵ *Dawn*, March 23, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1681419/anp-poll-nominee-shot-dead-in-north-waziristan>

¹⁴⁶ *The News*, June 17, 2022, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/966881-mqm-p-retains-karachi-s-na-240-with-margin-of-mere-65-votes>

¹⁴⁷ *Daily Jang* (Urdu), June 20, 2022, <https://e.jang.com.pk/detail/160077>

- December 12: Sardar Mohammad Ashraf Kakar, a senior leader of the Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PkMAP), was shot dead by unidentified attackers in Loralai town. The police said it appeared to be a case of targeted killing.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁸ *Dawn*, December 13, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1726075/pkmap-leader-shot-dead-driver-injured-in-loralai>

Chapter 3

MILITANT LANDSCAPE OF PAKISTAN IN 2022

Safdar Sial *

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Following the military operations in North Waziristan, Khyber and other tribal districts in 2014, much of the terrorist infrastructure based in ex-FATA had relocated across the border to Afghanistan. But since August 15th (2021), when the Taliban took power in Kabul, a new shift in the militant landscape and terrorist threat has been observed. Worsening the situation are cross border movements of militants, who cross border and attack Pakistani security personnel. Not only the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Islamic State's Khorasan (IS-K) chapter have intensified their attacks inside Pakistan, but the Balochi and Sindhi nationalist groups have also perpetrated some high-impact attacks in 2022 including on security forces and Chinese nationals and interests in Pakistan.

The July 2022 report of the UN's Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team noted that while the situation in Afghanistan remained complex, international terrorist organizations based there viewed the victory of the Taliban as a motivating factor for disseminating their propaganda in the neighboring regions of Central and South Asia, and globally.¹⁴⁹ It assessed the TTP as the largest among the foreign terrorist fighters in Afghanistan. The report also assessed the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K) threat as 'at hand' that could sustain over short to medium term but underscored that Al-Qaeda posed a long-term threat. Towards end of July (on 31st of July to be precise), the US reportedly killed the leader of Al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, in a drone strike in Afghanistan; later President Joe Biden confirmed that he was killed in a counter-terrorism operation carried out by the CIA in the Afghan capital Kabul.¹⁵⁰

It was in March 2022 that the leadership council of the TTP announced to start operation *Al-Badr* from the first of Ramadan as part of its spring offensive in Pakistan. According to the declaration issued by the TTP, the *Al-Badr* Operation would entail *istishhadi* or suicidal/martyrdom actions, ambushes, mine blasts, targeted attacks, assaults, and laser/sniper attacks with exclusive focus on targeting Pakistani security forces. The operation was announced for one year but only after one month of its launch, the TTP announced ceasefire on Eidul Fitr which the group later extended twice, finally until the end of May 2022, due to its talks with Pakistani government in Afghanistan, which were mediated by the Afghan Taliban. In May, the TTP extended the ceasefire for an indefinite period.¹⁵¹

Separately, the TTP has continued to add more groups in its fold, a process it started in August 2020. In April 2022, there were reports of some Pakistani Taliban commanders joining the TTP and pledging allegiance to Noor Wali Mehsud including commander Ahmed Dawar from Dattakhel, North Waziristan, and commander Eid Marjan (Jannati) from the Spinwam area of North Waziristan. Earlier in March, the TTP spokesman announced that three groups from Lakki

¹⁴⁹ The report can be downloaded here: <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N21/416/14/PDF/N2141614.pdf?OpenElement>

¹⁵⁰ BBC News, August 2, 2022, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-62387167>

¹⁵¹ It continued until November when it was announced null and void by the TTP.

Marwat district, under Malvi Tipu Gul, had merged with the TTP. According to one account, about 22 small militant groups have merge with the TTP since July 2020 including two from Balochistan.¹⁵²

Towards the end of August 2022, there were reports including on social media that the TTP may have ended the ceasefire and again resorted to violence. In the beginning of September, the TTP claimed multiple attacks including in DI Khan, Lakki Marwat, Khyber and Peshawar districts but the TTP spokesman termed these attacks as 'defensive'. These attacks continued, and rather intensified in November when the banned TTP formally announced to call off the ceasefire it had agreed to with the Pakistani government. The development came at a time when Pakistan army just witnessed a change of command at the top, giving to many an impression that the TTP might be trying to put pressure on security establishment for reinitiating the talks. For, the announcement of the end of the ceasefire also entailed a message from the group for its combatants to intensify attacks across the country. The group had cited ongoing military operations against militants in Bannu, Lakki Marwat and other districts as one of the reasons behind their decision to end the ceasefire.

The month of August also witnessed reported relocation of few small groups of Pakistani Taliban militants into parts of KP from Afghanistan. Local tribesmen spotted the movements of such groups in multiple areas. While local accounts stressed there had been visible movement of militants in Swat, Dir and few other areas mainly twin Waziristan districts, there was confusion about what allowed or led them to relocate to these areas.

Multiple protest demonstrations were observed in Swat and other areas against rising terrorism and growing militant activities. For one, on October 18th, the PTI activists, schoolchildren, transporters, lawyers, and traders, held white flags and banners inscribed with slogans of peace.¹⁵³ Earlier in the month, a huge protest demonstration was held in which local residents, and leaders and representation of various parties and bodies participated including Swat Qaumi Jirga, Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party, Pakistan People's Party, Awami National Party, Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz, Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, Qaumi Watan Party, Swat Ulesi Jirga, Pashteen Tahaffuz Movement, and civil society organizations. The participants raised slogans against terrorism and vowed to establish peace and not allow any militant actors to regroup in their area.¹⁵⁴

Meanwhile, in 2022 IS-K members were also believed to be active in Bajaur, Peshawar, Mohmand, Orakzai, and Kurram areas of KP; Bolan, Sibi, Awaran, Mastung, and Quetta districts of Balochistan; and Karachi and northern Sindh. There is a heightened risk of IS-K attacks on

¹⁵² A tweet by Abdul Sayed, a Sweden-based researcher, said so.

¹⁵³ *Dawn*, October 19, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1715772>

¹⁵⁴ For details, see: <https://mashriqtv.pk/story/?story=202210080109>

non-Muslims and Shias in Pakistan, which could also trigger communal and sectarian tensions; in Afghanistan they are already doing that. The March 2022 suicide blast by the group in a Shiite mosque in Peshawar is just one example; the attack caused over 65 deaths. Later in August alone, the Islamic State's Khorasan chapter claimed five attacks in Pakistan including four in KP and one in Balochistan's Mastung district. In KP, one of the IS-K's main targets has been Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam leaders, mainly in Bajaur. The IS-K has indeed carried out several attacks against JUI-F leaders in Bajaur in past few years. The group believes that the religious-political party's ideology resonates with that of the Taliban, their main rival. Bajaur, Mohmand and Orakzai were the tribal regions from where the Pakistani Taliban commanders had first declared allegiance to the Islamic State group in 2014. The IS-K has in recent months also issued statements seeking support from local tribesmen in Bajaur and Orakzai districts. The militant group's other prime targets have been security and law enforcement personnel, tribal elders, religious-political leaders, the TTP supporters and affiliates as well as member of minority communities and Islamic sects.

Islamic-State Khorasan in its propaganda campaign also has increasingly started to focus Pakistan, mainly the KP province bordering on Afghanistan; this campaign also includes anti-TTP ideological and operational propagation. For one, the group's Al-Azaim media in July 2022 released several videos and text outputs declaring the TTP leaders "apostates" and calling on TTP fighters to join the IS-K for "true jihad". The group through its Eid message sent instructions to its cells in Central and South Asia to enlist for lone-wolf and suicide attacks. Similarly, in an 11-page message/pamphlet in Urdu, the IS-K has urged the people of Bajaur tribal district to extend assistance to the group either through manpower or financially.

The banned Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) has been among the main actors of instability and terrorist violence in the province, but in 2022 it simply surpassed other groups in terms of frequency and intensity of terrorist attacks. The group apparently has two factions being led by Harbiyar Marri and Bashir Zeb. The latter, i.e., Bashir Zeb-led BLA, is more active and lethal in its attacks. It operates independently as well as part of BRAS (Baloch Raaji Aajoi Sangar), an alliance of at least four Baloch insurgent groups. Bashir Zeb also leads the BLA's so-called Majeed Brigade, which was established by its predecessor slain Aslam Baloch. While many other Baloch groups also remained active including BLF, BRA, Baloch Republican Guards, United Baloch Army, a new group Baloch Nationalist Army also emerged on militant landscape of Balochistan. Besides claiming few attacks in Balochistan, the group also perpetrated an attack in Lahore, the provincial capital of Punjab.

Meanwhile, while Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army remained more active in Sindh, a new Sindhi insurgent group, which calls itself Sindhudesh People's Army (SPA), claimed an attack that targeted a dental clinic run by a Chinese couple in Karachi. Over the past few years, Sindhi insurgent groups have been trying to be more assertive. There were reports that some of them even forged alliance with some Balochi insurgent groups. Still, the operational strength and threat of the Sindhi insurgent remains low to medium. But the emergence of new groups such

as SPA is a sign of warning, especially for Pakistan's bilateral and multilateral economic and trade engagements in the province and country. Though little information is available about the SPA, but experts argue it could be a faction of either Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army or Jeay Sindh Qaumi Mahaz. Others hold that the use of a new name could be just an operational tactic employed by some old group in a way to get recognition and attention.

3.1 Major Actors of Violence in 2022

3.1.1 Religiously Inspired Militant Groups

- ***Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)***

The TTP remained the major actor of violence in 2022. The group was believed to be involved in 89 terrorist attacks across Pakistan, compared to 87 in the year before. The reported terrorist attacks by the group also included six suicide bombings. The attacks by the TTP claimed 135 lives, compared to 158 in the TTP-orchestrated attacks in the previous year, and left 120 others injured. (See Tables 1 & 2) Out of the total 89 attacks perpetrated by the TTP in Pakistan during the year under observation, as many as 81 concentrated in KP province alone, while four happened in Balochistan, another three in Punjab and Islamabad, and one in Karachi. Apart from these terrorist attacks, many of the cross-border attacks from Afghanistan in 2022 (mainly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) were also perpetrated by the TTP.

However, the TTP itself issued an infographic for attacks it carried out in 2022 (for 8 months excluding 4 months of ceasefire) according to which the group perpetrated 367 attacks, compared to 282 in 2021.

Geographical spread and statistics of the attacks perpetrated by the TTP in 2022 indicate that while the group had carried out most of the attacks in the tribal districts or former FATA, it was also successful in showing its presence in northern Balochistan, and twin cities of Rawalpindi-Islamabad.

Pakistani government also remained engaged in negotiations with the TTP, which were doomed from the outset. From the first month of the year 2022, reports had started to emerge about peace talks with the TTP. A media report in January claimed that the government had started another process of talks and a local tribal jirga of prominent elders that had met with TTP chief Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud in eastern Afghanistan's Paktika province. However, the TTP's central spokesman Muhammad Khurassani downplayed the talks but claimed "the jirga

ha[d] contacted [them] but [they] sent it to the mediator, which is the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. [And] so far, there is no discussion or meeting with the jirga.”¹⁵⁵

With relations to talks, the TTP made a ceasefire announcement early May which it later extended for an indefinite period. On May 31st, it was announced that the government of Pakistan and the TTP have separately met the Acting PM of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) and announced an extension of ceasefire.¹⁵⁶ A few days later, in the first week of June, a 50-member Pakistani delegate arrived in Kabul to hold a Jirga with the TTP leadership.¹⁵⁷ On the 18th of June 2022 the Afghan Taliban confirmed that the Pakistani government and the TTP had reached a mutual agreement regarding an 'indefinite ceasefire' during their ongoing negotiations.¹⁵⁸ However, the banned TTP categorically stated it would not back down from its 'primary' demand for the reversal of the merger of ex-FATA with the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The claim was made by no one else but the TTP chief Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud in an interview with a YouTuber. The interview made rounds on social media and was apparently conducted somewhere in Kabul, according to *Dawn*.¹⁵⁹

Early July, Interior Minister Rana Sanaullah stated that a parliamentary committee had authorized the military leadership to continue talks. But he asserted that the talks would be held only under the Constitution of Pakistan, and nothing over and above the Constitution would be negotiated or agreed upon.¹⁶⁰ In another related development, the Parliamentary Committee on National Security also formally approved the process of negotiations and approved the formation of a 'Parliamentary Oversight Committee'. The PCNS was also told that there could be no compromise on the merger of erstwhile tribal areas, respect for the Constitution, and disarming of the group. These were described as Pakistan government's 'red lines'.¹⁶¹

A delegation of Pakistani religious leaders, led by Mufti Taqi Usmani, visited Kabul on July 25-26 and met with TTP leadership apart from the Taliban government officials. The TTP

¹⁵⁵ Ihsanullah Tipu Mehsud, "Pakistan turns to tribal jirga to restart peace talks with local Taliban," *The Nation*, January 18, 2022, <https://nation.com.pk/18-Jan-2022/pakistan-turns-to-tribal-jirga-to-restart-peace-talks-with-local-taliban>

¹⁵⁶ Ismail Khan, "Islamabad, TTP agree on indefinite ceasefire," *Dawn*, May 31, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1692383>

¹⁵⁷ "پاکستانی طالبان سے مذاکرات کیلئے ۵۰ رکنی جرگہ کابل پہنچ گیا" *Daily Mashriq* [Urdu], June 02, 2022, <https://mashriqtv.pk/story/?story=202206020102>

¹⁵⁸ Anadolu Agency, "Afghan Taliban confirm Pakistan-TTP 'indefinite ceasefire,'" *The Express Tribune*, June 18, 2022, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2362180/afghan-taliban-confirm-pakistan-ttp-indefinite-ceasefire>.

¹⁵⁹ Pazir Gul, "TTP refuses to budge from demand for Fata merger reversal," *Dawn*, June 30, 2022.

¹⁶⁰ Iftikhar A. Khan, "Military given go-ahead for TTP talks, Says Sana," *Dawn*, July 3, 2022.

¹⁶¹ Baqir Sajjad Syed, "Parliamentary body to keep eye on talks with TTP," *Dawn*, July 6, 2022.

reportedly communicated to the delegation the obstacles encountered during their negotiations with Pakistani authorities, and criticized Pakistan, for having been part of US-led war on terror, and also declared the country's Constitution and system as not in line with Islamic tradition. According to one account, the Pakistani scholars' delegation urged the TTP leadership to withdraw their demand for the reversal of FATA merger, but they refused to budge.¹⁶² Earlier, on July 22, a high-level military huddle, chaired by Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee Gen Nadeem Raza, also discussed 'peace talks' with the banned TTP and decided to pursue the matter in accordance with "comprehensive security strategy". "The forum was given a detailed briefing on review of national security situation specific to Western Border, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan," the ISPR said about the meeting.¹⁶³

Early September, there were reports including on social media that the TTP may have ended its months-long ceasefire and again resorted to violence as the group claimed multiple attacks including in DI Khan, Lakki Marwat, Khyber and Peshawar districts. The TTP spokesman however termed these attacks as 'defensive'. The group categorically ended the ceasefire in November 2022.

- **Local Taliban**

These are small groups in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa which may share the ideology with other Pakistani Taliban groups part of the TTP but mostly operate independently as small cells or groups. Compared to 22 in the year before, these local Taliban groups carried out 38 terrorist attacks in 2022, which claimed 30 lives. Most of these attacks are religiously motivated and were targeted against security forces, polio workers, schools, and tribal elders, etc. In 2022, attacks by these local Taliban groups were reported from 15 districts of KP, more frequently in Charsadda, Khyber, Kohat, North Waziristan, Bannu, Swat and Peshawar.

- **Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K)**

Compared to eight in 2021, IS-K perpetrated a total of 23 terrorist attacks during the year under review including 21 in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and two in Balochistan. In all, 92 people lost their lives and another 222 were injured in these attacks. Most of these casualties resulted from the suicide bombing the IS-K carried out in a mosque of Shia Muslims in Peshawar.

In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, IS-K perpetrated eight attacks in Peshawar, nine in Bajaur and one attack each in Khyber, Orakzai, Tank and South Waziristan districts targeting security forces, a mosque of Shia Muslims, members of Sikh community, leaders of political parties mainly including JUI-F, and tribal elders.

¹⁶² *The Express Tribune*, July 27, 2022, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2367953/pakistani-clerics-fail-to-soften-ttp-in-kabul-meetings>

¹⁶³ *Dawn*, July 23, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1701083>

Table 1: Terrorist Attacks Claimed/Perpetrated by Terrorist Groups

| Organization | Balochistan | KP | Punjab & Islamabad | Sindh (Excluding Karachi) | Karachi | GB | Total |
|--------------------------------------|--------------------|------------|-------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------|-----------|--------------|
| Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) | 4 | 81 | 3 | - | 1 | - | 89 |
| Local Taliban | - | 38 | - | - | - | - | 38 |
| Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K) | 2 | 21 | - | - | - | - | 23 |
| Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group | - | 2 | - | - | - | - | 2 |
| Ittehad Musallah Islami Mujahideen | - | 2 | - | - | - | - | 2 |
| Lashkar-e-Islam | - | 1 | - | - | - | - | 1 |
| Lashkar-e-Khorasan Pakistan | - | 1 | - | - | - | - | 1 |
| Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) | 45 | - | - | - | 1 | - | 46 |
| Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) | 7 | - | - | - | - | - | 7 |
| Balochistan Republican Army (BRA) | 4 | - | - | - | - | - | 4 |
| United Baloch Army (UBA) | 1 | - | - | - | - | - | 1 |
| Baloch Republican Guards | 4 | - | - | - | - | - | 4 |
| Baloch Nationalist Army (BNA) | - | - | 1 | - | 1 | - | 2 |
| Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army (SRA) | - | - | - | 2 | 1 | - | 3 |
| Sindhudesh Peoples Army | - | - | - | - | 1 | - | 1 |
| Rival Sectarian group | 1 | 2 | - | - | - | - | 3 |
| Nationalist insurgents [unspecified] | 8 | - | - | - | 1 | - | 9 |
| Unknown militants | 3 | 21 | 1 | - | - | 1 | 26 |
| Total | 79 | 169 | 5 | 2 | 6 | 1 | 262 |

In Balochistan, the group targeted FC personnel in Sibi and members of Christian community in Mastung. In a suicide attack claimed by the group, at least six FC officials were martyred, and 19 others were injured in Sibi.

In its propaganda campaign, the group has increasingly started to focus Pakistan, mainly the KP province bordering on Afghanistan; this campaign also includes anti-TTP ideological and operational propagation. For one, the group's Al-Azaim media in July 2022 released several videos and text outputs declaring the TTP leaders "apostates" and calling on TTP fighters to join the IS-K for "true jihad". The group through its Eid message sent instructions to its cells in Central and South Asia to enlist for lone-wolf and suicide attacks. Similarly, in an 11-page message/pamphlet in Urdu, the IS-K urged the people of Bajaur tribal district to extend assistance to the group either through manpower or financially.

At the same time, continuing media propaganda and statements by IS-K including through their publications suggested they are trying to increase their presence and influence in the region mainly Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia. For instance, one report claimed that the IS-K based in Afghanistan was trying to broaden its appeal among Uzbek, Tajik and Kyrgyz speakers in the region through the production, translation, and dissemination of propaganda literature. Another objective of this campaign could be "to delegitimize Kabul's new Taliban government as a Pashtun ethno-nationalist organization rather than a bona fide Islamic movement."¹⁶⁴

- **Other Religiously Inspired Groups**

As reported in media, **Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group** perpetrated two attacks in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa including a suicide blast in North Waziristan and a direct shoot out in Lakki Marwat. Both the attacks targeted security and law enforcement personnel. However, local accounts stress that the group could be behind many more attacks including suicide blasts in North Waziristan which remained unclaimed.

Ittehad Musallah Islami Mujahideen, a hitherto new group, claimed two attacks, in Lakki Marwat and North Waziristan, which targeted security personnel. In Lakki Marwat the group hit policemen in July, while in North Waziristan it perpetrated a suicide blast in August martyring four army soldiers. According to local accounts, it's not a big group and may comprise only 10 to 15 militants; some say it could be part of Hafiz Gul Bahadur group, but the group has never acknowledged that. It does not have any webpage or media outlet but only a spokesman, Baseer Waziristani, which suggests the group may be based in Waziristan. Some analysts assert that whenever there are some talks going on between the government and the

¹⁶⁴ Lucas Webber, Riccardo Valle, "Perspectives: Islamic State in Afghanistan seeks to recruit Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kyrgyz," Eurasianet, March 17, 2022, https://eurasianet.org/perspectives-islamic-state-in-afghanistan-seeks-to-recruit-uzbeks-tajiks-kyrgyz?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter

militants, such smaller groups appear which apparently either don't approve the talks or want to become part of the talks.

Lashkar-e-Khorasan Pakistan was reportedly behind an attack in Tank that killed two policemen in August. As reported in media, two policemen guarding a polio vaccination team were shot dead by militants in Tank district on the second day of the campaign. The Khorasan Diary tweeted that Asadullah Jhangvi, a spokesman for Lashkar-e-Khorasan Pakistan, had claimed the attack.

A Khyber-based group **Lashkar-e-Islam** was also believed to be involved in one attack in the district which targeted policemen causing death to three people including two policemen.

Table 2: Casualties in Terrorist Attacks by Different Groups

| Group Responsible | Killed | Injured |
|------------------------------------|--|---|
| TTP | Balochistan: 10 KP: 121 Punjab & Islamabad: 6 Sindh (Karachi): 0 Total: 135 | Balochistan: 24 KP: 92 Punjab & Islamabad: 9 Sindh (Karachi): 1 Total: 120 |
| Local Taliban | KP: 30 Total: 30 | KP: 42 Total: 42 |
| Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K) | Balochistan: 7 KP: 85 Total: 92 | Balochistan: 22 KP: 200 Total: 222 |
| Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group | KP: 6 Total: 6 | KP: 13 Total: 13 |
| Ittehad Musallah Islami Mujahideen | KP: 6 Total: 6 | 0 |
| Lashkar-e-Islam | KP: 4 Total: 4 | KP: 2 Total: 2 |
| Lashkar-e-Khorasan Pakistan | KP: 2 Total: 2 | 0 |
| BLA | Balochistan: 60 Karachi: 5 Total: 65 | Balochistan: 105 Karachi: 4 Total: 109 |
| BLF | Balochistan: 14 Total: 14 | Balochistan: 16 Total: 16 |
| BRA | Balochistan: 5 Total: 5 | Balochistan: 8 Total: 8 |
| United Baloch Army (UBA) | 0 | 0 |
| Baloch Republican Guards | Balochistan: 1 Total: 1 | Balochistan: 3 Total: 3 |

| Group Responsible | Killed | Injured |
|--------------------------------------|--|---|
| Baloch Nationalist Army (BNA) | Punjab: 3 Sindh: 0 Total: 3 | Punjab: 30 Sindh: 3 Total: 33 |
| Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army (SRA) | Sindh: 1 Total: 1 | Sindh: 7 Total: 7 |
| Sindhudesh Peoples Army | Sindh: 1 Total: 1 | Sindh: 2 Total: 2 |
| Rival sectarian group | Balochistan: 3 KP: 4 Total: 7 | Balochistan: 25 KP: 2 Total: 27 |
| Nationalist insurgents [unspecified] | Balochistan: 5 Karachi: 1 Total: 6 | Balochistan: 38 Karachi: 14 Total: 52 |
| Unknown militants | Balochistan: 1 KP: 36 Punjab: 2 GB: 0 Total: 39 | Balochistan: 30 KP: 42 Punjab: 0 GB: 0 Total: 72 |
| Total | 419 Killed | 734 Injured |

3.1.2 Nationalist Insurgent Groups

- **Baloch Insurgent Groups**

In recent years, Baloch insurgents have tried to increase the impact of their attacks, mainly to attract the international attention among other reasons, including through the selection of high value targets and employing coordinated *fidayeen* (or gun-and-suicide) attacks.

Secondly, Baloch insurgents are apparently also trying to expand their areas of operations beyond Balochistan, which is apparent from their attacks outside Balochistan such as the BLA attack on Chinese teachers of Confucius Institute in Karachi University in April and a new Baloch group BNA's attack on security forces in Lahore's Anarkali bazaar in January.

Thirdly, they have been placing more focus on south and southwestern Balochistan besides continuing showing presence in the provincial capital Quetta. Indeed, a major part of Baloch separatist insurgency has relocated in recent years around Awaran and Makran coastal belt, which have proximity with the Gwadar Port. Though Gwadar has historically been a peaceful district of Balochistan compared to other parts of the province, but the Baloch insurgents have developed significant presence in districts close to Gwadar mainly Kech, Panjgur and Awaran.

Fourthly, there are some indications that some Baloch insurgent groups have developed a sort of operational nexus with the Sindhi nationalist insurgents mainly in Karachi and northern Sindh, which will add to their operational capability as well as that of Sindhi groups.

Fifthly, the TTP and IS-K are also alluring the Baloch militants as well as disgruntled youths, which could make the Baloch militant landscape even more complex in coming months and years.

Finally, in recent years some significant shifts have happened in Balch insurgency. For one, it has come increasingly under influence of middle-class, educated youth who are not as much connected to tribal chieftain system as those before them. Similarly, those leading the insurgency on the ground have apparently become more focused on adding to destructive edge of their terrorist violence including through high-impact *fidayeen* and coordinated gun-and bomb attacks. And as noted earlier, the targets of Baloch insurgents have become more confined to security forces and foreign engagements. They have also started to use sophisticated weapons and assault attacks as they did in their invasion of FC camps in Nushki and Panjgur early this year.

While multiple Baloch insurgent groups remained active in Balochistan in 2022 (some have presence even in Karachi and parts of southern Punjab), ***Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA)*** was the most active and believed to be involved in most of terrorist attacks. Compared to 38 in the previous year, the BLA carried out 46 terrorist attacks in 2022 – including 45 in Balochistan, and one in Karachi. These attacks killed 65 people – including 30 security and law enforcement personnel and 15 civilians; 20 militants also died in these attacks – and injured 109 people. (*See Table 1 and 2*)

Attacks by BLA spread over 17 districts of Balochistan, with more frequent attacks reported from Quetta (12 attacks), Kalat (6), Khuzdar (5), and Kech and Sibi (3 attacks each). Over 61 percent of attacks perpetrated by BLA targeted security forces and law enforcement agencies; other main targets included government officials/state symbols, alleged spies, and pro-government tribal elders.

Compared to 25 in the year before, the ***Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF)*** carried out seven terrorist attacks in Balochistan in 2022, including two in each of Kech, Panjgur and Awaran districts and one attack in Hub (Lasbela). In these attacks 14 people were killed including 11 security officials, two civilians (one alleged spy and one non-Baloch worker), and one militant, while 16 others got injured. Most of the attacks by BLF (5) targeted security forces; others hit non-Baloch settlers, and an alleged spy.

A new Baloch insurgent group ***Baloch Nationalist Army (BNA)*** claimed two terrorist attacks in 2022 including one in Lahore (Punjab) on security and bank officials, and another in Karachi (Sindh) targeting police. Two Baloch insurgent groups namely United Baloch Army (UBA) and a faction of Baloch Republican Army (BRA) joined hands to form this new group, i.e., BNA. The

spokesperson of the newly established group, Mureed Baloch, has said that the purpose of their unification is to strengthen the Baloch resistance movement. The BNA has also reportedly joined the umbrella organization of Baloch insurgent groups, i.e. BRAS. The parent BRA that is reportedly led by Brahamdagh Bugti had condemned the BNA attack in Lahore, which suggested he wanted to clarify that his BRA is not the part of BNA. Indeed, a faction of BRA led by Gulzar Imam is part of BNA, who had formed his own faction in 2018 after being expelled from the parent BRA.

Baloch Republican Army (BRA), also known as Bugti Militia, perpetrated four terrorist attacks in 2022 comparing to a same number of terrorist attacks in 2021. These attacks targeted security forces and a basic health unit building in Kohlu, and pro-government tribal elders in Dera Bugti. In all, five people lost their lives and eight others were injured in these attacks.

United Baloch Army (UBA) claimed one attack that targeted the office of DG Levies in Quetta in March but caused no casualties. Similarly, another Baloch insurgent group **Baloch Republican Guards (BRG)** claimed four attacks including three in Nasirabad and one in Dera Bugti. These were low-intensity attacks and in all killed one and injured three persons.

Unspecified Baloch insurgents were also believed to be involved in nine terrorist attacks, including eight in Balochistan and one in Karachi.

- **Sindhi Nationalist Insurgent Groups**

Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army (SRA) carried out three attacks in Sindh, including one attack in each of Naushahro Firoze, Tando Muhammad Khan, and Karachi districts targeting a railways track, a power transmission line, and security forces, respectively. In all, one person was killed, and seven others were wounded in these attacks.

The group is emerging as a critical security threat in interior Sindh and Karachi. The group claimed the Karachi attack (on May 12th) near a Coast Guards vehicle and accused Pakistan as well as China of capturing and exploiting lands, ports, and islands of Sindh's coastal line. It also said Sindhis were being turned into minority on their own soil and people from outside were being settled and provided employments. Similar concerns and grievances are expressed by the Baloch nationalist insurgents. The SRA was established as a splinter of SLA after a conflict on leadership emerged. A former leader of a Sindhi nationalist group Jeay Sindh Mutahidda Mahaz (JSMM), Syed Asghar Shah alias Sajjad Shah, who hails from Larkana, leads the group. On May 16, Larkana police claimed to have arrested six suspects in Nasirabad area of the city and seized from them two hand-grenades and four pistols. They allegedly belonged to the Asghar Shah group of the SRA. The SRA is also linked to the Baloch BRAS (nexus was formed in July 2020), which is an alliance of BLF, Bashir Zeb's BLA, Gulzar Imam's BRA and Bukhtiar Domki's BRG. After joining BRAS, SRA increased its attacks, which also hinted at enhanced funding and training for the group.

Meanwhile, a new Sindhi insurgent group, which calls itself ***Sindhudesh People's Army (SPA)***, claimed the heinous attack that targeted a dental clinic run by a Chinese couple in the busy Saddar area of Karachi, near Empress Market. The spokesman of the group, Soreeh Sindhi, released a statement to media claiming his group's fighters had targeted the clinic killing one Chinese national and injuring three others. He stated that his group "claims the responsibility of the attack and harshly warns the Chinese government against supporting and cooperating with Pakistan, who is occupant and possessor of the 'Sindhudesh'." The statement also demanded of China to close its 'exploitative' projects in the province as soon as possible, otherwise the group could perpetrate even intensive attacks against Chinese in the future.

3.1.3 'Unidentified' Militants

The religiously motivated militants, whose group identities and organizational affiliations were not defined or reported by media and law enforcement and security officials, were involved in 26 terrorist attacks in Pakistan in 2022 (21 in KP, 3 in Balochistan, one in Punjab and one in GB), which claimed 39 lives and injured 72 others.

3.2 Targets and Attack Tactics of Militants

The terrorists hit diverse targets of over 23 types in their attacks in 2022. However, they targeted security forces quite frequently. Out of the total 262 terrorist attacks recorded in 2022 across Pakistan, as many as 180, or about 69 percent, targeted personnel, vehicles and posts of security and law enforcement agencies. Civilians were apparently hit in 14 attacks. Meanwhile, the terrorists targeted pro-government tribesmen and peace committees' members in 14 attacks; political leaders/workers in eight attacks; polio vaccination workers and their security escorts in seven attacks; power pylons and railway tracks in a combined total of seven attacks; government officials, institutions, and state symbols in four attacks; educational institutions in another four attacks; and non-Baloch workers and settlers in Balochistan in two attacks. CPEC/Chinese workers were also targeted in two major attacks. A combined total of three attacks targeted Shia and Sunni community members, including a major suicide blast at a mosque in Koocha Risaldar near Qissa Khwani Bazaar, Peshawar.

The terrorists mainly used direct fire in most attacks including infantry fire or direct shootout in 129 attacks and tactical fire such as hand grenades in 53 attacks. They also used a total of 67 improvised explosive devices (IEDs) of various types including 14 suicide bombings. The terrorists also used other attack tactics, though less frequently, including 9 coordinated gun-and-bomb attacks, two rocket attacks, one act of abduction, and another terrorist act of sabotage and lynching.

Chapter 4

STATE RESPONSES

Safdar Sial *

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4.1 Political Front

- **Action against Terror Financing: Pakistan Gets Off FATF Grey List**

On April 8th, Jamaatud Dawa chief Hafiz Saeed was sentenced to 33 years in jail in two cases of terror financing.¹⁶⁵ Just a month before that the international watchdog on terror financing and money laundering, ie FATF, had retained Pakistan on its grey list asking the country to 'do more' to fulfil its promise of prosecuting militant actors involved in terrorist financing. However, the FATF also acknowledged Pakistan's robust progress on its global commitments to fight financial crimes in its hybrid plenary meeting held on March 4th. Pakistan was placed on the FATF grey list in 2018, which made foreign firms more cautious about investing in the country. The plenary meeting noted that Pakistan had completed 26 of the 27 action items in its 2018 action plan of the FATF and of the seven action items of the 2021 action plan of the watchdog's Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) ahead of the deadlines. FATF asked Pakistan to continue to demonstrate that terror financing investigations and prosecutions target senior leaders and commanders of UN-designated terrorist groups.¹⁶⁶

Eventually in October, the FATF removed Pakistan from its grey list that warrants increased surveillance for terrorism financing. In recent years, Pakistan has taken multiple legislative, administrative, and operational measures to fulfil the conditions set out by the Financial Action Task Force. The FATF decision to remove Pakistan from its grey list was made by consensus that Pakistan has completed all substantial, technical and procedural requirements of both 2018 and 2021 Action Plans. As a result, Pakistan has been taken out of the list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring, with immediate effect. This decision was taken during the FATF Plenary meeting held in Paris, France from 20-21 October 2022.

- **'Anti-Extremism Enforcement Cell' Established in Sindh**

A meeting of Apex Committee on National Action Plan, held early this year (on March 7th) under the chairmanship of Prime Minister of Pakistan, had decided to establish a new cell called 'Anti-Extremism Enforcement Cell'. During the month of November, the counterterrorism department (CTD) of Sindh police established a cell to counter extremism under the supervision of SSP Operations, CTD Karachi in compliance of that decision of the Apex Committee. As reported in media, "the cell will function at the defunct Operations-II, CTD office, in Garden Headquarters, Karachi. Meanwhile, the CTD head has also merged the set-ups of Operations-I and Operations-II of the CTD Karachi and renamed it as 'Operations CTD Karachi' including all the logistics staff, etc with immediate effect."¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁵ "Hafiz Saeed sentence," *Dawn*, April 10, 2022.

¹⁶⁶ Khaleeq Kiani, "Pakistan remains on 'grey list' as UAE also joins the club," *Dawn*, March 5, 2022.

¹⁶⁷ *Dawn*, November 25, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1722886/ctd-sets-up-cell-to-counter-extremism>

- **NACTA Proposed Setting Up National Counter-Terrorism Department**

Amidst the rising incidence of terrorist violence in the country, the National Counter-Terrorism Authority (NACTA) proposed the setting up of National Counter-Terrorism Department (NCTD). The NACTA National Coordinator had reportedly forwarded the proposal to the Prime Minister Mian Shehbaz Sharif early December. The proposed NCTD would operate under NACTA on the federal level and will be authorised to conduct counter-terrorism operations across the country.¹⁶⁸

- Budget Allocations for Law Enforcement and Security
 - In the federal budget 2022-23, an allocation of PKR 209,161 million [current expenditures] was made for Public Order and Safety Affairs. Out of it, PKR 190,265 million were set out for Police and Civil Armed Forces, PKR 9,231 million for administration of public order, and PKR 9,256 million for law courts, among other things. In the federal budget, demand-wise expenditures for National Security Division have been budgeted at PKR 143 million, while PKR 269 million have been earmarked for NACTA, or National Counter-Terrorism Authority.¹⁶⁹
 - Sindh government in its 2022-23 budget budgeted expenditures for Police and other Civil Armed Forces at PKR 118,749.338 million, beside an estimate of development expenditure of PKR 11,019.973 million for Public Order and Safety Affairs [law courts, police, prisons, etc.]¹⁷⁰
 - The Punjab government has set current budget (2022-23) for Public Order and Safety Affairs at PKR 208,675 million (law courts, attorneys, police, and Civil Armed Forces, jails/prisons); the development budget for the same is PKR 5,666 million.¹⁷¹
 - KP government's estimated budgetary expenditure (2022-23) for Public Order and Safety Affairs is PKR 110,515.122 million including PKR 92,811.411 million for police or law enforcement.¹⁷²
- Sindh's Initiative to Provide Security for CPEC and Chinese

The Sindh government has set up a foreign security cell at the Central Police Office (CPO), Karachi with its 31 branches in all district headquarters. The cell is tasked to register data of foreigners, mainly Chinese, and provide them security. Already in 2016, the Sindh police had

¹⁶⁸ Daily *Jang* (Urdu), December 3, 2022, <https://e.jang.com.pk/detail/306609>

¹⁶⁹ Government of Pakistan Finance Division's Annual Budget Statement on Federal Budget 2022-23. https://www.finance.gov.pk/budget/Budget_2022_23/Annual_Budget_Statement_English.pdf

¹⁷⁰ https://finance.gos.pk/Home/Download?path=Budget%2FBudgetBooks%2FFY-22-23%2FVOLUME_I%2FVOLUME-I-%202022-23.pdf

¹⁷¹ Centre for Peace and Development Initiative, "Punjab budget bulletin 2022-23," <https://www.cpdipakistan.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Punjab-Budget-Bulletin-2022-23.pdf>

¹⁷² <https://www.finance.gkp.pk/articles/budget/budget-estimates/budget-estimates-2022-23>

created a special protection unit (SPU) to provide security cover to those projects based in Sindh.

The development, ie the establishment of the cell, happened on June 10th at a meeting presided over by Sindh Chief Minister Syed Murad Ali Shah at the CM House, Karachi. The meeting exclusively focussed on the security of Chinese and other nationals working on CPEC and other development projects in the province. Other highlights of the meeting are listed below:¹⁷³

- The home secretary apprised the meeting that "personnel of Sindh police, Pak Army, Rangers, FC and private security firms were providing security cover to the CPEC projects under the umbrella of special security division (SSD)," which works in line with security guidelines issued by NACTA.
- The CM held that "incidents like the Karachi University suicide attack in which Chinese teachers were targeted, would not be allowed to happen again."
- At present, eight CPEC projects are running in six districts of the province where around 4,000 Chinese are working. Meanwhile, as many as 2300 Chinese are also working in Sindh province on 214 non-CPEC projects.
- The provincial police chief informed the meeting that a foreign information desk had also been established by the Special Branch at Karachi airport to register the data of all foreign nationals, including Chinese. Also, the FIA had been requested to provide 40 dashboard terminals for entry/exit data of foreign nationals, but it was yet to be done.

The CM directed the police chief to keep the Chinese consulate in the loop for the proposed security arrangements and compiling of the data.

4.2 Operational Front

Compared to 186 in the previous year, as many as 315 suspected militants were killed in security forces and law enforcement agencies' kinetic actions as well as clashes and encounters between security forces and militants in the year 2022. These operations and clashes/encounters were not confined to a particular area or region but were reported from across all regions of Pakistan, as given at Tables 1 & 2, respectively.

Security and law enforcement agencies also arrested 129 suspected terrorists and members of militant groups in as many as 66 search and combing operations conducted all over the country as part of *Raddul Fasaad*. These arrests did not include those who were detained and then released after preliminary investigations.

¹⁷³ Tahir Siddiqui, "Murad orders foolproof security for Chinese working on CPEC, other projects," *Dawn*, June 11, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1694116/murad-orders-foolproof-security-for-chinese-working-on-cpec-other-projects>

Security forces foiled at least five major terror bids or plots, either independently or in collaboration with Bomb Disposal Squads, mainly by recovering and defusing IEDs planted by militants.

4.2.1 Military/Security Operations

Compared to 63 in the year before, security forces and law enforcement agencies conducted 87 anti-militant operational strikes in 2022 in 25 districts and regions of Pakistan. These actions caused a total of 327 fatalities (302 militants, 22 army soldiers, one FC man, one policeman, and one civilian), as compared to 197 in 2021, besides injuring 51 others.

Out of the total 87 operational strikes recorded in 2022, as many as 57 happened in KP, 28 in Balochistan, and two in Sindh's provincial capital, i.e., Karachi.

There were a dozen districts across Pakistan where two or more anti-militant operations happened in the year including North Waziristan (24 operational strikes), Lakki Marwat (8), DI Khan (7), Peshawar (6), Bannu (5), Khyber (4), and Tank (2 strikes) in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, as well as Kech (7 strikes), Quetta (4) and Kohlu, Mastung and Ziarat (2 strikes each) in Balochistan, and two such strikes in Karachi. The operational strikes in North Waziristan, Bannu, Lakki Marwat and DI Khan in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Kech, Quetta, Ziarat, and Kohlu in Balochistan killed significantly more number of militants as compared to other districts.

In **January**, security forces conducted six intelligence-based operational strikes in Pakistan killing 13 militants and nationalist insurgents. Five of these strikes were recorded in two districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and one from Quetta, the provincial capital of Balochistan. On January 8th, the Counter-Terrorism Department claimed to have killed six suspected terrorists of Islamic State group in a raid in Quetta. Daesh's regional leader Asghar Samalani was also among the killed, who carried head bounty of PKR 2 million. About 5 militants managed to escape.¹⁷⁴

Security forces stepped up anti-terrorism operations in **February** and conducted 11 intelligence-based operational strikes in Pakistan, which killed 33 militants and nationalist insurgents. Six of these strikes were recorded in three districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and five anti-militant operations were reported from parts of Balochistan. On February 4th, security forces killed three terrorists linked to Panjgur and Nushki attacks, including two high-value targets, in the Balgatar area of Kech district.¹⁷⁵ On February 21st, according to a statement issued by military's media wing ISPR, Captain Haider Abbas embraced martyrdom in pursuit of the terrorists during an intelligence-based operation in Kohlu district of Balochistan.¹⁷⁶ Two

¹⁷⁴ Daily *Jang* (Urdu), January 11, 2022, <https://e.jang.com.pk/detail/29369>

¹⁷⁵ *Dawn*, February 6, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1673592/operation-completed-against-terrorists-in-panjgur-nushki>

¹⁷⁶ *Dawn*, February 22, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1676379/army-captain-martyred-in-kohlu-operation>

days later, security forces conducted an operation targeting camps of miscreants in Hoshab area of Kech district. At least 10 suspected Baloch insurgents were killed in heavy exchange of fire, who were reportedly involved in attacks on security forces in Turbat and Pasni.¹⁷⁷

Table 1: Operational Attacks by Security Forces, against Militants and Insurgents

| Region | District | Attacks | Killed | Injured |
|--------------------|------------------|-----------|------------|-----------|
| Balochistan | Awaran | 1 | 4 | 1 |
| | Bolan | 1 | 3 | 0 |
| | Gwadar | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| | Harnai | 1 | 6 | 0 |
| | Kech | 7 | 45 | 1 |
| | Kharan | 1 | 4 | 0 |
| | Khuzdar | 1 | 2 | 0 |
| | Kohlu | 2 | 10 | 3 |
| | Mastung | 2 | 7 | 1 |
| | Nasirabad | 1 | 4 | 0 |
| | Nushki | 1 | 2 | 0 |
| | Panjgur | 1 | 6 | 0 |
| | Quetta | 4 | 14 | 1 |
| | Sibi | 1 | 7 | 1 |
| | Zhob | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| | Ziarat | 2 | 13 | 0 |
| | Total | 28 | 130 | 9 |
| Khyber Pakhtunkhwa | Bannu | 5 | 44 | 14 |
| | D.I Khan | 7 | 19 | 0 |
| | Khyber | 4 | 9 | 6 |
| | Lakki Marwat | 8 | 16 | 0 |
| | North Waziristan | 24 | 85 | 17 |
| | Nowshera | 1 | 4 | 0 |
| | Peshawar | 6 | 11 | 1 |
| | Tank | 2 | 5 | 0 |
| | Total | 57 | 193 | 38 |
| Sindh | Karachi | 2 | 4 | 4 |
| | Total | 2 | 4 | 4 |

¹⁷⁷ Daily *Intekhab* (Urdu), Quetta, February 24, 2022, <https://epaper.dailyintekhab.pk/today/st/2/1/02-24-22>

| Region | District | Attacks | Killed | Injured |
|-----------------------|----------|-----------|--|---|
| Total Pakistan | | 87 | 327 (302 militants) ¹⁷⁸ | 51 (28 militants) ¹⁷⁹ |

In **March**, a total of 29 militants were killed in 7 intelligence-based security operations including five in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and two in Balochistan. On March 7th, security forces conducted an operation in Peshawar and killed three suspects allegedly involved in Kocha Risaldar suicide attack on a mosque of Shia Muslims.¹⁸⁰ One of the killed was reportedly handler of the suicide bomber. On March 26th, security forces conducted a clearance operation in mountaneous region of Sibi after rceiving information about presence of Balochistan Nationalist Army militants there. Six militants were killed in the ensuing exchange of fire while one soldier was martyred and another injured.¹⁸¹

In **April**, security forces and law enforcement agencies conducted eight intelligence-based anti-militant operations killing 17 militants and nationalist insurgents; two army soldiers were also martyred in one of these actions. Six of these strikes were recorded in three districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and two anti-militant operations were reported from parts of Balochistan.

In **May**, three reported anti-militant operations killed six militants. Two of these strikes were recorded in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and one in Sindh. On May 14th, a commander of the militant Islamic State group's Khorasan chapter (IS-K) and mastermind of suicide attack on Koocha Risaldar Shia mosque was killed along with a would-be suicide bomber in an early morning raid in Peshawar.¹⁸² Separately, the CTD and officials of an intelligence agency conducted a joint raid in Mauripur Musharraf Colony area of Karachi and killed two suspected militants, said to be associated with the proscribed Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army and involved in the recent blast in Saddar. Another two militants managed to escape.¹⁸³

Another 28 militants were killed in seven anti-militant actions conducted in **June**; two army soldiers were also martyred. Five of these strikes were recorded in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (including 4 in North Waziristan), and two in Balochistan. On June 19th, security forces conducted an intelligence-based operation against suspected BLF militants in central Makran mountain range near Parome in Panjgur district. At least six militants were reported killed in the action. Arms and ammunition were also recovered from the terrorists' hideout.¹⁸⁴

¹⁷⁸ Others among those killed included 22 army soldiers, 1 FC men, 1 policeman, and one civilian.

¹⁷⁹ Other injured included 13 soldiers, 9 policemen, and 1 FC man.

¹⁸⁰ Daily *Aaj* (Urdu), March 8, 2022, <https://www.dailyaaj.com.pk/news/56790>

¹⁸¹ Daily *Mashriq* (Urdu), March 27, 2022, <https://mashriqtv.pk/story/?story=202203270127>

¹⁸² *Dawn*, May 15, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1689718/is-k-commander-suicide-bomber-killed-in-peshawar-raid>

¹⁸³ Daily *Jang* (Urdu), May 19, 2022, <https://e.jang.com.pk/detail/129660>

¹⁸⁴ Daily *Jang* (Urdu), June 20, 2022, <https://e.jang.com.pk/detail/159716>

In **July**, security forces and law enforcement agencies conducted eight intelligence-based anti-militant operations, which killed 34 militants; three army soldiers and one civilian were also martyred in these actions. Four of these strikes were recorded in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (all in North Waziristan), and as many others happened in Balochistan. On July 15th, nine alleged BLA militants were killed, and a havildar was martyred during an operation against the killers of Lt Col Laiq Baig Mirza, an army officer who was kidnapped earlier while travelling to Quetta from Ziarat. Advisor to Balochistan CM Mir Ziaullah Langove said on July 20 that 5 among those killed were on the list of missing persons and belonged to a terror group.¹⁸⁵ Next day, while continuing their search operation against killers of Lt Col Mirza, security forces swooped down a militant hideout in the mountains near Ziarat killing two more terrorists. They also recovered the body of Umer Javed in Warchoom area, who was kidnapped along with his cousin Lt Col Laiq Baig Mirza from Ziarat four days ago.¹⁸⁶

Security forces conducted three intelligence-based anti-militant operations in **August** (all in KP), which killed five militants; four policemen were also injured.

In September, law enforcers stepped up vigilance as well as kinetic actions against the militants. On the whole, 17 militants were killed in five kinetic actions conducted by security and law enforcement agencies; five soldiers were also martyred. Three of these reported strikes took place in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and two in Balochistan. Separately, security checkpoints were set up at various locations in Matta and Kabal tehsils of Swat. Locals also saw several military vehicles carrying security personnel in both tehsils. As reported in *Dawn*, hundreds of security personnel, including the army and the elite police force accompanied by local cops, launched an operation at dawn to comb Matta's mountainous region.¹⁸⁷ Similarly, security officials in Tirah valley had also ordered residents of Sandana, Dray Naghari and Sanda Pal localities to vacate their houses in anticipation of a small-scale military operation against militants following recent attacks on security forces. Local security commanders held a meeting with residents of Sandana area on September 7th after a late-night attack on the personnel deputed in the area. Sipah tribesmen, who inhabit the area, were given choice to either hand over the suspects involved in the attack or vacate their houses so that a military action could begin to flush out the miscreants.¹⁸⁸

In **October**, another 33 militants were killed in 11 anti-militant operations, six of which were reported from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, four from Balochistan, and one from Karachi (Sindh). on

¹⁸⁵ *Dawn*, July 16, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1699841/nine-terrorists-killed-soldier-martyred-in-balochistan-in-search-for-abducted-man>; *Dawn*, July 21, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1700800/five-killed-in-operation-belonged-to-terrorist-group-langove>

¹⁸⁶ Daily *Jang* (Urdu), Quetta, July 17, 2022, <https://e.jang.com.pk/detail/183451>

¹⁸⁷ Fazal Khaliq, "Security posts set up in Swat's Matta, Kabal tehsils," *Dawn*, September 21, 2022.

¹⁸⁸ "Tirah residents asked to leave ahead of action against militants," *Dawn*, September 8, 2022.

October 1st, the CTD and an intelligence agency officials conducted a joint operation in Gulshan-e-Maymar, Karachi, and killed two alleged IS-K militants, identified as Syed Aimal Khan and Abdullah. Suicide vests were also recovered from the hideout.¹⁸⁹ On October 17th, personnel of CTD and another law enforcement agency conducted intelligence-based operation in the Qabu area of Splinji Mountains in Mastung and cordoned off the hideouts of terrorists. The militants opened fire triggering an exchange of fire, which continued for several hours, and resulted in the death of 5 militants.¹⁹⁰

In **November**, as many as 45 militants were killed in 12 such actions recorded in KP and Balochistan provinces. On November 15th, the CTD and security officials killed a total of seven alleged militants in two different actions in DI Khan. The TTP in a statement, which circulated on social media, claimed the security forces had conducted a drone strike before initiating the ground operation. On November 20th, security forces launched an intelligence-based operation in Shawal area of North Waziristan. The operation squad had the support of gunship helicopters. As many as nine suspected Taliban militants belonging to Akhtar Muhammad Janikhel group (affiliated with Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group) were killed and 13 others injured.¹⁹¹ Separately, on November 29th, security forces launched an intelligence-based operation in Hoshab (Kech district in Balochistan) that led to a heavy exchange of fire between both sides, in which 10 suspected terrorists belonging to a banned militant organization were killed, another was arrested, whereas two others managed to escape.¹⁹²

Another 43 militants were eliminated in seven anti-militant operations reported in **December**, seven policemen were also martyred. With the exception of one from Zhob, all other actions were reported from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Security forces launched an extensive operation to free the hostages and **Bannu CTD facility** seized by militants two days before. According to ISPR, 25 terrorists were killed in the clash, three were arrested and seven surrendered to the forces. Three security officers were martyred in the operation while 10, including three officers, were injured; one of the injured official Haleem Khan died 2 days later.¹⁹³

4.2.2 Security Forces' Clashes and Encounters with Militants

¹⁸⁹ *Dawn*, October 3, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1713225/militants-killed-in-maymar-encounter-belonged-to-is-k-claims-ctd>

¹⁹⁰ *Dawn*, October 17, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1715438/five-terrorists-killed-in-splinji-operation>

¹⁹¹ Daily *Aaj* (Urdu), November 20, 2022 (Front page), <https://epaper.dailyaaj.com.pk/>

¹⁹² *Dawn*, November 30, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1723901/10-militants-killed-in-hoshab-operation>

¹⁹³ *Dawn*, December 21, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1727467/25-militants-killed-as-forces-secure-ctd-compound-in-bannu>; *Dawn*, December 23, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1727748/soldier-injured-in-bannu-embraces-martyrdom>

Security and law enforcement agencies also entered into in a total of 11 armed clashes and encounters with militants – compared to six such incidents in previous year – in six districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. These armed clashes and encounters claimed 25 lives (13 militants and 12 army soldiers) and injured six security personnel.

As many as eight of these clashes and encounters (or about 73 percent) took place in the twin Waziristan and DI Khan districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (between the security forces and the TTP militants). Meanwhile one attack happened in each of Bajaur, Peshawar, and Swat districts.

Table 2: Clashes and Encounters between Security Forces and Militants

| District | Attacks | Killed | Injured |
|------------------|-----------|----------------------------|-------------------------|
| Bajaur | 1 | 3 | 0 |
| D.I Khan | 3 | 5 | 0 |
| North Waziristan | 4 | 6 | 2 |
| Peshawar | 1 | 5 | 0 |
| South Waziristan | 1 | 6 | 0 |
| Swat | 1 | 0 | 4 |
| Total | 11 | 25 (13 Mil; 12 Arm) | 6 (4 Pol; 2 Arm) |

Details on some of the reported clashes and encounters between security, law enforcement agencies and militants are given below.

- March 30: Security forces entered into an armed clash with the militants during the month under review. The armed clashes took place between security forces and terrorists in the Makin area of South Waziristan. During an intense exchange of fire, Captain Saad Bin Amir and Lance Naik Mohammad Irfan were martyred. Security forces also killed four terrorists.¹⁹⁴
- June 18: During a search operation in North Waziristan, security forces challenged the suspected militants and ordered them to surrender, but they opened fire on the security personnel. As a result, Naik Zahid was martyred on the spot, while 2 soldiers were injured. A suspected militant was also killed in retaliatory fire.¹⁹⁵
- June 24: Two suspected militants were killed in an encounter with security forces in DI Khan.¹⁹⁶ Meanwhile, security forces also entered into one armed clash with militants in

¹⁹⁴ *The News*, March 31, 2022, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/946030-8-soldiers-martyred-7-terrorists-killed-in-tank-s-waziristan>

¹⁹⁵ *Dawn*, June 19, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1695600/soldier-martyred-in-n-waziristan-clash>

¹⁹⁶ *Daily Ummat* (Urdu), June 25, 2022, <https://www.ummat.net/2022/06/25/news.php?p=news-58.gif>

the city in which an army soldier Lance Naik Mujeebur Rehman embraced martyrdom in the Draban area.¹⁹⁷

- October 4: An armed clash started after the terrorists attacked a military convoy in Hassan Khel area, on the fringes of the provincial capital Peshawar. Troops responded to the attack, resulting in the killing of the three terrorists. Two security personnel were also martyred.¹⁹⁸
- November 16: The security forces and militants exchanged gunfire in the Hilal Khel area of Bajaur near the Afghan border. During the intense battle, two soldiers were martyred, and a militant was killed.¹⁹⁹

4.2.3 Terrorists Arrested

Security and law enforcement agencies also arrested 129 suspected terrorists and members of militant groups in as many as 66 search and combing operations conducted all over the country as part of *Raddul Fasaad*. These arrests did not include those who were detained and then released after preliminary investigations.

Highest arrests for any one militant group were made of the TTP and local Taliban militants (57). As many as 18 members of different Sindhi nationalist insurgent groups, mainly Sindhudesh Revolution Army, were detained during different operations conducted by law enforcers in Sindh. As many as 33 suspected members of different Baloch insurgent groups were also detained including 18 BLA members.

Similarly, security forces and law enforcement agencies arrested as many as six members and affiliates of Islamic State terrorist group and two operatives of Al-Qaeda from different parts of the country.

As many as six among those detained were reportedly affiliated with Sipah-e-Muhammad and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi.

Table 3 lists organizational association and number of different brands of suspected militants arrested across Pakistan by law enforcers in 2022.

¹⁹⁷ Daily *Dunya* (Urdu), July 25, 2022, https://e.dunya.com.pk/detail.php?date=2022-07-25&edition=ISL&id=6227046_59226821

¹⁹⁸ *Dawn*, October 5, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1713465/seven-terrorists-killed-in-kp-operations-ispr>

¹⁹⁹ *Dawn*, November 17, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1721354/eight-law-enforcers-martyred-in-lakki-bajaur>

Table 3: Suspected Terrorists Arrested in 2022

| Militant Organization | Operations | Suspects Arrested |
|---|------------|-------------------|
| Al-Qaeda | 1 | 1 |
| Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent | 1 | 1 |
| Baloch Republican Guards | 1 | 2 |
| Banned militant outfit (excluding sectarian and tribal) | 1 | 1 |
| BLA | 12 | 18 |
| BLF | 1 | 4 |
| BRA | 2 | 5 |
| BRAS | 1 | 4 |
| Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group | 1 | 3 |
| ISIS | 4 | 6 |
| Jeay Sindh Mahaz | 1 | 1 |
| JSQM | 1 | 3 |
| Lashkar-e-Jhangvi | 1 | 1 |
| Local Taliban / TTP | 26 | 57 |
| Sindhudesh Revolution Army | 7 | 14 |
| Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan | 3 | 5 |
| Sunni Tehrik | 1 | 1 |
| Unknown Militants | 1 | 2 |
| Total | 66 | 129 |

4.2.4 Failed/Foiled Terror Bids

Security forces foiled at least five major terror bids or plots, either independently or in collaboration with Bomb Disposal Squads, mainly by recovering and defusing IEDs planted by militants. (See Table 4)

Table 4: Failed/Foiled Terror Bids in 2022

| District | Attacks | Killed | Injured |
|--------------|----------|----------|----------|
| Bannu | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| DI Khan | 1 | 2 | 0 |
| Khyber | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Total | 5 | 3 | 0 |

On February 13th, the officials of bomb disposal squad defused a 5kg heavy landmine that was planted on a roadside in **Bannu**. The action was taken on the information provided by

some locals.²⁰⁰ Similarly, in Tirah valley of **Khyber** tribal district, security forces recovered a suicide jacket and about 60 kilograms explosive material hidden underground. Security forces defused the explosives and the jacket.²⁰¹

In June, **Bannu** police foiled a terror bid by defusing a homemade bomb that was placed in a plastic bucket in Ameer Hamza area of Bannu. The locals had spotted the bomb and informed the police.²⁰²

Two foiled terror bids were recorded in October. In the first such incident, two suspected suicide bombers, wearing explosive jackets, came in a motorcycle-rickshaw and tried to enter the office of Noor Alam Mehsud on D.I. Khan-Bannu road in **DI Khan**. The police intercepted and killed the bombers after an intense exchange of fire.²⁰³ Later, in **Bannu**, a suicide bomber reportedly fell by accident in the compound of a *tableeghi markaz* and his vest exploded. He wanted to hit the gathering on the Friday night but failed to reach the target. Earlier, media reported it was a gas explosion.²⁰⁴

²⁰⁰ Daily *Jang* (Urdu), February 14, 2022, <https://e.jang.com.pk/detail/53041%22>

²⁰¹ Daily *Dunya* (Urdu), February 16, 2022, https://e.dunya.com.pk/detail.php?date=2022-02-16&edition=ISL&id=5959325_38666579

²⁰² Daily *Mashriq* (Urdu), June 19, 2022, <https://mashriqtv.pk/story/?story=202206190131>

²⁰³ Daily *Jang* (Urdu), October 26, 2022, <https://e.jang.com.pk/detail/271855%22>

²⁰⁴ Daily *Mashriq* (Urdu), October 29, 2022, <https://mashriqtv.pk/story/?story=202210290130>

Chapter 5

THE TTP RESURGENCE IN KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA

Dr. Farhan Zahid*

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After the signing of Doha Peace Accord on February 29th (2020) with the Afghan Taliban, the US forces started to withdraw from Afghanistan per the terms agreed to in the peace agreement. With the US keeping its commitment of withdrawing from Afghanistan, the Afghan Taliban's morale boosted, and they started their quest to conquer Afghanistan after defeating the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). After the fall of most of the provinces in a matter of month, the Afghan Taliban geared up for capturing Kabul in August 2021 which fell to them without any trouble on August 15th.

The return of the Afghan Taliban into power set the stage for the resurgence of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in Pakistan, particularly in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province.

Despite several claims about change in their attitude and general behavior, the Afghan Taliban have, however, turned out to be no different from their version that ruled Afghanistan from 1996-2001. They have adopted all those policies concerning women and minorities which they had adopted in their previous dispensation. Therefore, the assertion of an improved, mature, and well-behaved version of Afghan Taliban i.e., Taliban 2.0, happens to be incorrect, untrue, and deceptive.

The new issue that Afghan Taliban have to deal with is the TTP. The TTP was their Pakistani branch that helped them in those days when they were hard-pressed by the international community. The TTP, however, is not a monolithic entity, but an assemblage of more than 42 terrorist groups from both the settled and the former tribal districts of Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. Moreover, the TTP like its identical twin, the Afghan Taliban, is primarily composed of Pashtuns who dominate the terrorist group.

When the US was in Afghanistan and supporting the Afghan national government in fighting the Afghan Taliban, the latter looked towards the TTP for protection and refuge. Not to disappoint their brethren, the TTP leadership provided the Afghan Taliban leaders and its rank and file shelter and safe haven in its controlled areas in ex-FATA. Moreover, the TTP fought alongside the Afghan Taliban against the US and the Afghan forces. The TTP considers the emir of the Afghan Taliban as their Emir-ul-Momineen, or leader of the faithful.

The TTP brutally punished Pakistan for abandoning the Afghan Taliban and siding with the US in the US-led global war on terror, by launching a terrorism campaign across the country in August 2007. The TTP remains Pakistan's public enemy to this day despite of the fact that numerous terrorist groups operate in Pakistan ranging from nationalist-separatist groups to sectarian and global Islamist terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.

It appeared that the Pakistani policy makers had plenty of hopes from Afghan Taliban that they would endeavor to help Pakistan eliminate TTP and root out its existence from Afghan soil. However, the Afghan Taliban chose to disappoint Pakistan and did nothing against the TTP militants based in the southeastern provinces of Afghanistan. Moreover, they freed all the

militant prisoners, which included high profile commanders like Molvi Faqir Mohammad—the former deputy emir of the TTP—who were incarcerated by previous Afghan government.

According to one estimate, the Afghan Taliban released around 8,000 prisoners;²⁰⁵ many of them were Pakistanis and constituted the rank and file of the TTP. However, the Afghan Taliban tried facilitating the peace talks between the TTP and Pakistani government in December 2021, which failed in the end as TTP ended the ceasefire in November 2022 and intensified its terror campaign in Pakistan. This renewed insurgency has affected Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province the most.

The TTP militants are now safer than ever because of the absence of the American drone strikes and operate freely between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Afghan Taliban have not placed any restrictions on the TTP's terrorist activities inside Pakistan, however, the TTP is taking advantage of Afghan territories. Moreover, the TTP appears to be freer in its cross-border movements as there is no fear of the US forces and Afghan government in neighboring Afghanistan. From its recent activities, it becomes evident that the first intended target of TTP is the erstwhile FATA, now merged with the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. The TTP has created havoc in the seven districts of former FATA, as shown by the precarious condition of the police and local administration amid the on-going TTP offensive. Besides this, the second target of the TTP are the settled districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province which have like the former FATA regions become embroiled in the TTP insurgency.

The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa police is suffering casualties on daily basis because of the unrelenting TTP offensive in the southern and central districts. These attacks are mainly carried out against those police officers who are deployed in the tribal districts of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. Just recently, a hostage situation developed at the Bannu Counter Terrorism Department's (CTD) facility when the prisoners—allegedly the TTP fighters—at the facility overpowered the officers deployed there and took it over. Moreover, the insurgents in control of the facility demanded a safe passage to Afghanistan which meant their lives would be secure in Afghanistan. Consequently, the military operation conducted by the security forces to rescue the hostages and clear the CTD facility of the insurgents resulted in the killing of 33 TTP militants. In addition to this, two military commandos died in the operation and 15 special forces personnel got injured.²⁰⁶

The terrorism figures for the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province are telling about the security situation in the province. In 2022, according to one account, a total of 148 terrorist attacks were carried out only by the TTP against the KP police, which resulted in the killing of 98 police

²⁰⁵ Discussion with Islamabad-based security analyst on December 22, 2022.

²⁰⁶ "Pakistan hostages: 33 militants killed at police station", BBC News, December 20, 2022, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-64041270>

officers. This figure is a sharp increase from what happened to be before the Afghan Taliban came into power in August 2021.²⁰⁷

Conclusion

The security situation in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province appears far from worse. However, the terrorist attacks are on the rise in the districts adjacent to Afghanistan where large-scale terrorist attacks have been observed lately, including attacks on the police stations and military check posts. Moreover, the TTP had endeavored to capture parts of the Malakand Division, and their presence was felt in Swat district in August 2022. The recent hostage situation in CTD complex in Bannu district showcases the prevailing security condition in KP. From these alarming developments, it appears the vicious cycle of violence to stay put. Nevertheless, if the security situation in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province is not instantly improved, it could affect the other provinces.

The need of the hour is to understand the Afghan Taliban's mindset, which the Pakistani security agencies and policymakers have failed to do. The Afghan Taliban work in close tandem with militant groups in Pakistan, especially the TTP and its network of affiliated Islamist terrorist groups. This is not a new phenomenon, as the situation was no different in the previous Taliban regime in Afghanistan (1996-2001) either. Back then, the Afghan Taliban had flatly refused to hand over the most wanted and on-the-run Pakistani terrorists of Lashkar e Jhangvi (LeJ)—a violent sectarian group—who had taken refuge in Afghanistan under the patronage of Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda. The coming of the Afghan Taliban into power is a déjà vu after 25 years when they first took over Kabul in 1996, and their mindset has not changed a bit since then. Moreover, they would continue to pursue their previous policies whether related to Pakistan or domestic matters. Conclusively, the Pakistani security agencies and policymakers have to redraw and reevaluate their current policy measures concerning the Afghan Taliban. Otherwise, it would become very hard for Pakistan to handle the TTP.

²⁰⁷ Ismail Khan, "Amid TTP escalation, Kabul's rulers insist group 'not using Afghan soil'", *Dawn*, December 22, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1727946>

Chapter 6

SECURITY SITUATION OF BALOCHISTAN IN 2022

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The year 2022 didn't differ much from 2021 in respect of the law and order situation in Balochistan. Unfortunately, the year 2022 rather showed a spike of 11% in terrorist attacks on security forces in the province in which hundreds of people including the personnel of security forces and law enforcing agencies were killed and scores injured.

According to a report prepared by the Home and Tribal Affairs Department of government of Balochistan on the basis of DSRs (Daily Situation Reports) gathered by the district administration, in 2022 there were a total 290 violence-related incidents. These included the attacks on camps of Pakistan Army and Frontier Corps, in which over 140 persons were killed and 417 injured. In contrast, in 2021 the total number of reported incidents of terrorist activities was 260—less than the figure for 2022. In these attacks, 138 individuals lost lives and 421 got injured.

However, the brunt of these attacks was borne by the Frontier Corps which remained exposed to the terrorist onslaught. This claim is true as 85 of the total 260 terrorist attacks carried by the terrorists were directed against the FC, in which 46 of its personnel were killed and 113 injured. Moreover, in the 19 attacks aimed against the police, 15 policemen lost their lives while over 65 got injured. In addition to this, 11 attacks on Levies' personnel claimed the lives of 7 and injured 8. However, the report says that five armed attacks were carried out against the Pakistan Army as well, in which one soldier was killed and 8 were injured. Besides this, in the four attacks against the Punjabi/Urdu speaking settlers in the province, two persons were reportedly killed and four injured. Furthermore, there were three sectarian-related violent incidents in Balochistan, in which 5 persons were killed and 26 injured. The report details further that 12 bomb blasts occurred in which 9 people lost their lives and 20 got injured, and 33 IED attacks on security forces in which 5 personnel were killed and 36 injured. Moreover, there were 51 incidents of hand grenade attacks, in which 4 persons were killed and 56 injured. The remaining 10 persons killed and 35 injured were victims of 30 attacks on installations like the electric pylons, gas transmission lines, cellular phone towers etc.

However, in the absence of details provided by the ISPR and Frontier Corps the media had to rely on the report of Provincial Home Department. Moreover, the reach-out to the ISPR and the media cell of Frontier Corps to share with us the total number of incidents, casualties and number of Information Based Operations (IBOs) against terrorists didn't prove fruitful as they didn't respond back. Besides this, with no authentic reports available, rumourmongers start sharing unconfirmed information based on hearsay and the public is left with no option but to believe the rumours. Additionally, as the report of provincial home department is devoid of complete information about the attacks on Pakistan army and Frontier Corps, the details were not included in this report.

At the outset of 2022, Baloch insurgents attacked a Pakistani military check post in Dasht area of Kech district, in which ten soldiers were killed and a military officer injured. This attack was claimed by the Baloch Liberation Front, which is led by Dr. Allah Nazar. The following month,

two armed groups affiliated with the Majeed Brigade of the Baloch Liberation Army attacked the main gates of Frontier Corps' camps in separate attacks, with explosive laden vehicles in Nushki and Panjgur before externing the premises. The attackers, most of them in their 20s and educated, engaged the forces for three days in Panjgur. In the ensuing military operation by Pakistan's military, the attackers—15 in number (6 in Panjgur and 9 in Nushki)—were killed while five soldiers including a captain doctor were said to have been killed in the attacks.

On March 9th, a suicide bomber trying to get access to the route from which President Dr. Arif Alavi had to pass blew himself when the Frontier Corps personnel stopped him at a distance of 100 yards from his target. Six soldiers were killed while 22 injured in the attack. It was known later that the President had participated as a chief guest in the concluding ceremony of annual Sibi festival and was to lunch before taking off for Islamabad. The following week, in an IED explosion—in the same district—4 soldiers of the Frontier Corps were killed and 9 injured. Moreover, in an IED blast the same month, four people including a Deputy Superintendent of Police were killed in the main Bazar in Quetta. In April 2021, a female suicide bomber of BLA blew herself killing three Chinese teachers along with their Pakistani driver in Karachi university. In the same month, 5 army soldiers were killed and 2 injured when their vehicle was blown up in an IED blast in Awaran.

On July 13th, a retired colonel of Pakistan's Army, Laiq Mirza, along with his cousin, Umar Jawaid, were abducted by armed individuals—clad in the Frontier Corps' uniform—belonging to the Baloch Liberation Army. The victims were traveling along with their families from Quetta to Ziarat resort when their escort was ambushed by the insurgents. Both the abductees were executed the next day, with the army later claiming that the security forces hotly pursued the insurgents and killed 9 of them. In another incident, the militants of the Baloch Liberation Army abducted two FC soldiers to exchange for their men in the custody of security forces. However, their demand was rejected outrightly by Pakistan's military.

In September, an army helicopter crashed while taking part in an operation against the Baloch militants in Harnai. In the crash, 6 individuals, which included two pilots—both Majors—and two commandoes died. BLA claimed that it shot down the helicopter which was taking part in an operation against it. However, no independent sources confirmed this claim.

In October, Noor Mohammad Maskanzai, the former Chief Justice of Shariat Court and the ex-Chief Justice of Balochistan High Court was slain in a mosque in his ancestral village of Kharan. BLA later claimed the responsibility and said that they killed him for his alleged hiding of the facts as head of the Judicial commission in 2014 regarding the mass grave discovered in Tootak area of Khuzdar. Elsewhere, 17 decomposed bodies were discovered, with the Voice for Baloch Missing Persons claiming that the number of bodies was far higher—70 decomposed bodies.

In November, a suicide bomber riding an explosive laden car rammed into a police truck, escorting a Polio workers' team—killing three including two police personnel and a woman, and injuring 23 others. On December 25th, which also marks the death anniversary of Aslam Achoo, the commander of Majeed Brigade of Baloch Liberation Army—10 bomb blasts took place in different areas of Balochistan. In these incidents, 6 army personnel including a captain were killed and 17 others injured.

In an important development, Gulzar Imam Baloch, the commander of banned Baloch Nationalist Army, was arrested in Istanbul in April 2022 with help of Pakistan government. He was extradited to Pakistan in September. Reports say that he is being persuaded by his family members, particularly his wife, that if he pledges to work for the state against his erstwhile comrades—the separatists—by dissolving his armed group and forcing his group members lay down their arms, the state might forgive him. However, the military establishment thinks that by executing Gulzar Imam will make him popular and turn into a hero for the Baloch, like Aslam Achoo who was killed in a suicide blast in the Afghan city of Kandahar in 2018.

In another development, the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan's spokesperson, Mohammad Khurasani, announced in December 2022 that "a group of Baloch militants led by Mazar Baloch joined them". However, no statement has been issued by the separatist group yet—either of confirming or contradicting the development. Moreover, it is yet to be seen that how this group which is said to belong to Panjgur district will act along with TTP, since the Baloch separatist groups don't have any religious tendency. However, they can extend a helping hand to each other in their operations against their common enemy—the state of Pakistan.

Since the last two years, Baloch separatist groups, particularly the BLA, BLF and Majeed Brigade have been actively carrying out deadly attacks against the security forces and even Chinese nationals engaged in CPEC activities and present at Gwader port. However, the security forces are only engaged in conducting military operation against them instead of pursuing any reconciliation policy with the rebel groups' leaders sitting abroad. Nonetheless, the strained relations between Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban have provided the Baloch armed groups an hour of respite as Pakistan would be kept distracted by the border skirmishes on its western border. In the given situation, one could expect that the militant activities of Baloch militants may increase in 2023.

Chapter 7

SECURITY SITUATION OF SINDH IN 2022

Zia Ur Rehman*

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Although Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan experienced a significant rise in terror attacks from Islamist militant groups, such as Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K), in 2022, the security situation in Sindh province, particularly Karachi, the provincial capital that has a history of political violence and militancy, did not deteriorate to that extent.

In all, eight terrorist attacks happened in Sindh province – six in Karachi, and one each in Naushahro Firoze and Tando Muhammad Khan districts, which killed a total of 8 people and injured another 17 people, according to the Pak Institute of Peace Studies' statistics. Among those killed included four security/law enforcement personnel and four Chinese nationals.

Sindhi and Baloch separatist groups remained major actors of instability in the province during 2022, which shows that, like 2021, the violence perpetrated by the banned ethnic separatist groups has overtaken the violence committed by Islamist and sectarian outfits in Sindh, particularly in Karachi.

Karachi was for years rife with political, sectarian, and ethnic militancy. A crackdown by security forces started in 2013 has brought a lull in violence in recent years, but scattered attacks still take place.

Attacks on Chinese nationals

The killing of four Chinese nationals in terror attacks in Karachi in 2022 shows that Baloch and Sindhi ethnic separatist groups, which oppose China's Belt and Road Initiative project, have changed their strategy - focusing on the country's major commercial hub and targeting Chinese nationals.

On April 4th, a female suicide bomber targeted a vehicle carrying faculty members of the Confucius Institute, a cultural and educational program that China operates at the University of Karachi, killing three Chinese nationals and their local driver. The Baloch Liberation Front Bashir Zaib faction claimed the responsibility for the attack.

On May 12th, the SRA also claimed credit for an improvised explosive device (IED) attack on a vehicle of the Pakistan Coast Guard (PCG) passing through the Saddar area that killed a passer-by. In another attack on September 28th, an armed attacker posing as a dental patient killed a Chinese-Pakistani dual national and injured two other Chinese nationals in Karachi's Saddar area. Sindhudesh People's Army (SPA), a new Sindhi-separatist outfit, has claimed responsibility for the attack.²⁰⁸

²⁰⁸ Amir Majeed., "New Sindhi-separatist outfit claims responsibility for attack on Chinese dental clinic," Samaa TV, September 29, 2022, <https://www.samaaenglish.tv/news/40018121>

On November 28th, the Sindh Police's Counter-Terrorism Department claimed to have arrested a Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army (SRA) member who was allegedly planning to Saddam-like attack on a Chinese doctor in Hyderabad.²⁰⁹

Although the SRA has developed a nexus with Baloch Raji Ajoi Sangar (BRAS), an alliance of four Baloch separatist groups, in late 2018 with an aim to target Chinese interests in Pakistan, law enforcement officials said that attacks on doctors show that with limited operational capacity, Sindhi separatist outfits have been choosing the softest of targets, such as dentists, as opposed to Chinese nationals associated with the all-important China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

Baloch separatist groups have reportedly provided training to Sindhi separatist groups in order to enhance the latter's operational capacities. In return, Sindhi separatist groups provide logistical support to Baloch separatists for their operations in Karachi. The Sindhi separatist support has allowed the BLA Bashir Zeb faction to expand their operational area to Karachi, where they carried out several attacks on Chinese targets, including attacks on the Chinese consulate in Karachi in November 2018 and Pakistan Stock Exchange compound in June 2020.

Decline in violence from Islamist militant groups

The TTP has claimed to have carried out 367 attacks across the country in 2022, which, according to the group, were mainly conducted in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and its former tribal areas. However, the statistics could not be verified independently because of no access to the bordering areas. Among the attacks, the group said that it had carried out mere two attacks in Karachi.

According to PIPS database, on January 4th, the TTP claimed the responsibility for the single attack it perpetrated in Karachi in 2022 - hurling a hand grenade at a policeman in Maripur Road area, injuring him.

Karachi provides TTP a vital financial lifeline after its militants from Swat, South Waziristan, and other parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and then tribal areas moved to Karachi after the launch of the military operations against them there in 2009.

In the beginning, the TTP in Karachi did not get involved in subversive activities in Karachi. This was in line with the TTP policy to use Karachi only for fundraising and rest and recuperation but in 2011 they changed their strategy. With an adept team of militants, the TTP became active and started extortion, charging protection money from Karachi-based Pashtun traders and transporters, and attacking law enforcement personnel, workers of liberal political

²⁰⁹ "SRA militant' held to foil attack on Chinese doctor: CTD'," *Dawn*, November 4, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1718796>

parties, including Awami National Party, and polio vaccinators.²¹⁰ From 2011 to 2015, the TTP had carried out several high-profile terror attacks, such as attacks on a naval base in 2011 and Karachi airport in 2014.

However, after the launch of the paramilitary Rangers-led operation on violent groups in Karachi in September 2013, law enforcement agencies were largely successful in shattering the network of Taliban militants in the metropolis and the groups could not carry out a significant terror attack in the city during past few years.

Mufti Noor Wali, the TTP's current chief who had also responsibility to head the group in Karachi from 2013 to 2015, in his book 'Inqilab-e-Mehsud', admitted that law enforcement and security agencies had killed most of the key Taliban leaders in an "extrajudicial" manner during the crackdown in the metropolis.²¹¹

A senior CTD official said that the TTP has still an organizational structure in Karachi but as part of its strategy, its militants are not carrying out the terror attacks in the city and using the city for fund-raising to support the groups' terror activities.²¹²

Although the year 2015 saw a surge in ISKP-related developments across Pakistan, a militant group led by Tahir Minhas aka Saeen became active in Karachi in January 2015, shortly after the transnational group announced its Khorasan chapter for the region. In May of that year, a group of ISKP-inspired militants stopped a bus carrying Ismaili Shia Muslims in Karachi's Safoora Goth area and fired indiscriminately at passengers, killing 45 people.

However, the group in the city was weakened after law enforcement and security agencies launched a crackdown on the group.

On October 1st, 2022, the CTD in Karachi killed two IS-K militants in Karachi's Mullah Essa Brohi Goth and recovered arms and ammunition from their possession. The CTD in its press release said that the two militants, who recently joined ISKP after abandoning TTP, were wanted in some terrorism cases in Balochistan province.

²¹⁰ Zia Ur Rehman, "The Pakistani Taliban's Karachi Network," CTC Sentinel, May 2013, <https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-pakistani-talibans-karachi-network/>

²¹¹ Zia Ur Rehman, "TTP's book admits Karachi operation dismantled their network," *The News*, January 17, 2018, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/269287-ttp-s-book-admits-karachi-operation-dismantled-their-network>

²¹² Author's interview with a CTD official in Karachi on December 29, 2022.

ANNEXURES

Hazrat Bilal*

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- Hazrat Bilal works as IT Manager at Pak Institute for Peace Studies

Annex-1: Suicide Attacks in Pakistan in 2022

| Date | District | Target | Injured | Killed | Responsibility |
|--------------|------------------|---|--------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| 04 Mar, 2022 | Peshawar | Shia religious scholars / community | Civ (186) | Pol (2) Civ (63) | IS-K / IS affiliates |
| 08 Mar, 2022 | Sibi | Security or law enforcement agencies | Civ (6) FC (13) | FC (6) | IS-K / IS affiliates |
| 26 Apr, 2022 | Karachi | CPEC / workers / Chinese | Rng (1) Civ (3) | Mil (1) Civ (4) | BLA |
| 14 May, 2022 | North Waziristan | Security or law enforcement agencies | Arm (4) Civ (2) | Arm (3) Civ (3) Mil (1) | Unknown / unknown militants |
| 30 May, 2022 | North Waziristan | Security / law Security or law enforcement agencies | Civ (2) Arm (2) | Mil (1) | Unknown / unknown militants |
| 04 Jul, 2022 | North Waziristan | Security / law Security or law enforcement agencies | Arm (10) | Mil (1) | Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group |
| 08 Aug, 2022 | North Waziristan | Security or law enforcement agencies | | Mil (1) Arm (4) | Ittehad Musallah Islami Mujahideen |
| 23 Oct, 2022 | North Waziristan | Security or law enforcement agencies | Arm (4) | Mil (1) | TTP |
| 10 Nov, 2022 | North Waziristan | Security / law Security or law enforcement agencies | Arm (5) | Mil (1) | TTP |
| 30 Nov, 2022 | Quetta | Security or law enforcement agencies | Civ (23) | Civ (3) Mil (1) Pol (2) | TTP |
| 14 Dec, 2022 | North Waziristan | Security or law enforcement agencies | Civ (5) Arm (9) | Civ (1) Arm (1) Mil (1) | Unknown/ unknown militants |
| 19 Dec, 2022 | North Waziristan | Security or law enforcement agencies | Arm (4) | Civ (2) Mil (1) Arm (1) | TTP |
| 23 Dec, 2022 | Islamabad | Security or law enforcement agencies | Civ (2) Pol (4) | Mil (1) Pol (1) | TTP |
| 28 Dec, 2022 | North Waziristan | Security or law enforcement agencies | Arm (2) | Mil (1) | TTP |
| 14 Attacks | | | 287 Injured | 108 Killed | |

Annex-2: Cross Border Attacks and Clashes in 2022

Pak-Afghan Border

| Date | District | Target | Injured | Killed |
|--------------|------------------|-----------------------------------|---------|---------|
| 06 Feb, 2022 | Kurram | Security/law enforcement agencies | FC (4) | FC (5) |
| 24 Feb, 2022 | Qilla Abdullah | Security/law enforcement agencies | | Civ (3) |
| 24 Mar, 2022 | North Waziristan | Security/law enforcement agencies | | Arm (4) |

| Date | District | Target | Injured | Killed |
|--------------|------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| 23 Apr, 2022 | North Waziristan | Security/law enforcement agencies | Arm (4) | Arm (3) Mil (1) |
| 02 Jul, 2022 | North Waziristan | Security/law enforcement agencies | Arm (1) | Mil (1) |
| 13 Sep, 2022 | Kurram | Security/law enforcement agencies | | Arm (3) |
| 20 Sep, 2022 | North Waziristan | Security/law enforcement agencies | | Arm (1) |
| 30 Sep, 2022 | Kurram | Security/law enforcement agencies | | Arm (1) |
| 23 Oct, 2022 | North Waziristan | Security/law enforcement agencies | | Arm (1) |
| 13 Nov, 2022 | Qilla Abdullah | Security/law enforcement agencies | Arm (2) | Arm (1) |
| 20 Nov, 2022 | Kurram | Security/law enforcement agencies | Arm (7) Civ (4) | Arm (1) |
| 11 Dec, 2022 | Qilla Abdullah | Civilians | Civ (15) | Civ (8) |
| 15 Dec, 2022 | Qilla Abdullah | Civilians | Civ (15) | Civ (1) |
| 13 Attacks | | | 52 Injured | 34 Killed |

Pak-India Border

| Date | District | Target | Injured | Killed |
|--------------|----------|-----------|-----------|----------|
| 10 Mar, 2022 | Khanewal | Civilians | | |
| 1 Attack | | | 0 Injured | 0 Killed |

Pak-Iran Border

| Date | District | Target | Injured | Killed |
|--------------|----------|---|-------------------|----------|
| 25 Mar, 2022 | Panjgur | Security/law enforcement agencies (personnel, convoys, posts) | Civ (1) FC (3) | FC (1) |
| 1 Attack | | | 4 Injured | 1 Killed |

Annex-3: Terrorist Attacks on Security and Law Enforcement Agencies in Pakistan in 2022

| Date | District | Injured | Killed | Responsibility |
|--------------|------------------|---------|---------|----------------|
| 01 Jan, 2022 | Bannu | | Pol (1) | TTP |
| 02 Jan, 2022 | North Waziristan | Arm (2) | | TTP |

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| Date | District | Injured | Killed | Responsibility |
|--------------|------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| 03 Jan, 2022 | Karachi | Pol (1) | | TTP |
| 07 Jan, 2022 | Lakki Marwat | | Pol (1) | TTP |
| 08 Jan, 2022 | North Waziristan | | Pol (1) | TTP |
| 14 Jan, 2022 | Bannu | | Arm (1) | TTP |
| 16 Jan, 2022 | Lakki Marwat | | FC (1) | TTP |
| 17 Jan, 2022 | North Waziristan | Pol (2) | Pol (1) | TTP |
| 17 Jan, 2022 | Islamabad | Pol (3) | Mil (2) Pol (1) | TTP |
| 20 Jan, 2022 | Lahore | Civ (30) | Civ (3) | Baloch Nationalist Army |
| 24 Jan, 2022 | Kohlu | | | BRA |
| 25 Jan, 2022 | D.I Khan | | | TTP |
| 25 Jan, 2022 | Bannu | | | TTP |
| 26 Jan, 2022 | Kech | FC (3) | FC (10) Mil (1) | BLF |
| 30 Jan, 2022 | Jafarabad | Pol (2) Civ (15) | | Unspecified nationalist insurgents |
| 31 Jan, 2022 | Hangu | | Pol (2) | Unknown/unknown militants |
| 31 Jan, 2022 | Rawalpindi | | Pol (1) | TTP |
| 02 Feb, 2022 | Panjgur | FC (6) | Mil (8) FC (5) | BLA |
| 02 Feb, 2022 | Nushki | FC (1) | Mil (9) FC (4) | BLA |
| 07 Feb, 2022 | Quetta | FC (2) Civ (1) | | BLA |
| 08 Feb, 2022 | Tank | | | TTP |
| 09 Feb, 2022 | North Waziristan | Arm (6) Civ (1) | | TTP |
| 14 Feb, 2022 | North Waziristan | | Mil (1) | TTP |
| 19 Feb, 2022 | Peshawar | Pol (3) | | Local Taliban |
| 20 Feb, 2022 | North Waziristan | | Arm (1) Mil (5) | TTP |
| 25 Feb, 2022 | Quetta | Pol (1) | Pol (2) | TTP |
| 28 Feb, 2022 | Sibi | Pol (2) Civ (1) | | BLA |
| 08 Mar, 2022 | Sibi | Civ (6) FC (13) | FC (6) | IS-K/IS affiliates |
| 09 Mar, 2022 | Bannu | Pol (2) | | TTP |
| 10 Mar, 2022 | Khyber | | Pol (1) | TTP |
| 11 Mar, 2022 | Quetta | | | UBA |
| 12 Mar, 2022 | Tank | | Pol (1) | TTP |
| 15 Mar, 2022 | Sibi | FC (8) | FC (4) | BLA |
| 19 Mar, 2022 | Panjgur | FC (1) | | BLF |
| 19 Mar, 2022 | Lakki Marwat | | Pol (1) | TTP |
| 21 Mar, 2022 | Bajaur | | Civ (3) Arm (2) Mil (4) | TTP |
| 23 Mar, 2022 | D.I Khan | Pol (1) | Pol (1) | TTP |

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| Date | District | Injured | Killed | Responsibility |
|--------------|------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| 28 Mar, 2022 | D.I Khan | | Pol (1) | TTP |
| 29 Mar, 2022 | Bannu | | Pol (1) | TTP |
| 30 Mar, 2022 | Tank | FC (22) | Arm (6) Mil (3) | TTP |
| 03 Apr, 2022 | Peshawar | | | TTP |
| 05 Apr, 2022 | D.I Khan | | | TTP |
| 09 Apr, 2022 | Bannu | | Pol (2) | TTP |
| 09 Apr, 2022 | Khyber | | | Local Taliban |
| 09 Apr, 2022 | Bajaur | | Lvs (1) | IS-K/IS affiliates |
| 11 Apr, 2022 | D.I Khan | Pol (1) | Pol (5) | TTP |
| 12 Apr, 2022 | South Waziristan | | Mil (2) Arm (2) | TTP |
| 14 Apr, 2022 | North Waziristan | | Arm (7) | TTP |
| 14 Apr, 2022 | North Waziristan | | Arm (1) | TTP |
| 15 Apr, 2022 | North Waziristan | | Mil (4) | TTP |
| 16 Apr, 2022 | Panjgur | | | BLA |
| 18 Apr, 2022 | Bannu | | Pol (1) | TTP |
| 19 Apr, 2022 | North Waziristan | | FC (2) | TTP |
| 20 Apr, 2022 | Khyber | Pol (2) | Civ (2) Mil (1) Pol (1) | Lashkar-e-Islam |
| 21 Apr, 2022 | Peshawar | | Pol (1) | IS-K/IS affiliates |
| 21 Apr, 2022 | Kohat | Pol (1) | | TTP |
| 22 Apr, 2022 | Awaran | Arm (1) | Arm (1) | BLF |
| 22 Apr, 2022 | Nowshera | | Pol (1) | TTP |
| 23 Apr, 2022 | Kurram | Pol (1) | | Unknown/unknown militants |
| 27 Apr, 2022 | South Waziristan | | Arm (2) | TTP |
| 27 Apr, 2022 | South Waziristan | | Pol (1) | IS-K/IS affiliates |
| 29 Apr, 2022 | Charsadda | Civ (1) | Pol (1) | TTP |
| 12 May, 2022 | Karachi | Civ (7) | Civ (1) | Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army |
| 14 May, 2022 | North Waziristan | Arm (4) Civ (2) | Arm (3) Civ (3) Mil (1) | Unknown/unknown militants |
| 16 May, 2022 | Karachi | Pol (3) Civ (11) | Civ (1) | Unspecified nationalist insurgents |
| 17 May, 2022 | Charsadda | | | Local Taliban |
| 17 May, 2022 | Lakki Marwat | | Pol (2) | Local Taliban |
| 18 May, 2022 | Peshawar | Pol (1) Civ (1) | Pol (1) | Unknown/unknown militants |
| 19 May, 2022 | Peshawar | | Pol (1) | IS-K/IS affiliates |
| 23 May, 2022 | North Waziristan | | Arm (2) | Local Taliban |
| 25 May, 2022 | Peshawar | | Pol (1) | IS-K/IS affiliates |
| 30 May, 2022 | Peshawar | Pol (1) | | IS-K/IS affiliates |
| 30 May, 2022 | North Waziristan | Civ (2) Arm (2) | Mil (1) | Unknown/unknown militants |
| 12 Jun, 2022 | Bajaur | Pol (2) | | IS-K/IS affiliates |

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| Date | District | Injured | Killed | Responsibility |
|--------------|------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------|------------------------------------|
| 16 Jun, 2022 | Tank | Pol (1) Civ (1) | Pol (1) | Unknown/unknown militants |
| 19 Jun, 2022 | Jafarabad | | Pol (2) | Unspecified nationalist insurgents |
| 20 Jun, 2022 | Khyber | | Pol (1) | Local Taliban |
| 25 Jun, 2022 | Charsadda | Pol (1) | | Local Taliban |
| 28 Jun, 2022 | Panjgur | Pol (1) | | BLF |
| 30 Jun, 2022 | Swabi | | Pol (1) | Local Taliban |
| 30 Jun, 2022 | South Waziristan | Mil (1) Pol (1) | Mil (1) Pol (1) | TTP |
| 02 Jul, 2022 | Orakzai | FC (3) | | Local Taliban |
| 04 Jul, 2022 | North Waziristan | Arm (10) | Mil (1) | Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group |
| 04 Jul, 2022 | Peshawar | Pol (1) | | Local Taliban |
| 05 Jul, 2022 | D.I Khan | | Pol (2) | Unknown/unknown militants |
| 05 Jul, 2022 | Ziarat | Arm (2) | Arm (1) | BLA |
| 05 Jul, 2022 | Peshawar | Pol (2) Civ (1) | | IS-K/IS affiliates |
| 05 Jul, 2022 | Tank | | Pol (2) | IS-K/IS affiliates |
| 07 Jul, 2022 | Mardan | Pol (3) Civ (2) | Pol (1) | Local Taliban |
| 13 Jul, 2022 | Bannu | FC (4) | FC (1) | Local Taliban |
| 14 Jul, 2022 | Harnai | | Mil (2) Arm (1) | BLA |
| 15 Jul, 2022 | Kharan | | Pol (1) | BLA |
| 15 Jul, 2022 | Khyber | Civ (2) | Civ (1) | Unknown/unknown militants |
| 15 Jul, 2022 | Kech | Civ (4) | | Unknown/unknown militants |
| 16 Jul, 2022 | Lakki Marwat | | Pol (1) | Ittehad Musallah Islami Mujahideen |
| 16 Jul, 2022 | Khyber | | Pol (1) Civ (1) | Local Taliban |
| 17 Jul, 2022 | Quetta | Civ (2) FC (1) | | BLA |
| 17 Jul, 2022 | Kalat | Lvs (1) | Lvs (1) | BLA |
| 18 Jul, 2022 | Kohat | Pol (3) | | Local Taliban |
| 21 Jul, 2022 | Nowshera | Pol (1) Civ (1) Mil (1) | | Local Taliban |
| 27 Jul, 2022 | Peshawar | Pol (1) | Pol (2) | Local Taliban |
| 05 Aug, 2022 | Kohat | Pol (2) | | Local Taliban |
| 08 Aug, 2022 | North Waziristan | | Mil (1) Arm (4) | Ittehad Musallah Islami Mujahideen |
| 10 Aug, 2022 | D.I Khan | Pol (1) | | Local Taliban |
| 13 Aug, 2022 | Karachi | Civ (3) | | Baloch Nationalist Army |
| 13 Aug, 2022 | Lower Dir | Civ (1) | Arm (2) | Local Taliban |

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| Date | District | Injured | Killed | Responsibility |
|--------------|------------------|--------------------|--------------------|---------------------------|
| 13 Aug, 2022 | South Waziristan | | Pol (1) | Unknown/unknown militants |
| 14 Aug, 2022 | Harnai | Arm (1) | Arm (2) | BLA |
| 14 Aug, 2022 | Panjgur | Lvs (1) | | BLA |
| 19 Aug, 2022 | Bajaur | | Pol (2) | IS-K/IS affiliates |
| 29 Aug, 2022 | Orakzai | | Pol (1) Civ (2) | IS-K/IS affiliates |
| 30 Aug, 2022 | Bajaur | FC (1) | FC (1) | IS-K/IS affiliates |
| 02 Sep, 2022 | D.I Khan | | Pol (1) | TTP |
| 04 Sep, 2022 | Lakki Marwat | Pol (1) | Pol (1) | TTP |
| 05 Sep, 2022 | Khyber | | | TTP |
| 05 Sep, 2022 | Charsadda | | Pol (1) | Local Taliban |
| 07 Sep, 2022 | Quetta | Pol (1) Civ (6) | | BLA |
| 13 Sep, 2022 | Kohat | Pol (5) Civ (2) | | TTP |
| 16 Sep, 2022 | Quetta | Civ (13) | Civ (1) | BLA |
| 16 Sep, 2022 | Kohat | | | Local Taliban |
| 17 Sep, 2022 | Peshawar | Pol (2) | | IS-K/IS affiliates |
| 17 Sep, 2022 | Mardan | | | Local Taliban |
| 18 Sep, 2022 | Swat | | | Local Taliban |
| 19 Sep, 2022 | Quetta | Pol (2) | | BLA |
| 23 Sep, 2022 | North Waziristan | | Arm (2) | Local Taliban |
| 25 Sep, 2022 | Mardan | | Pol (1) | Unknown/unknown militants |
| 26 Sep, 2022 | South Waziristan | | Mil (1) Arm (2) | TTP |
| 28 Sep, 2022 | Mastung | FC (1) | | BLA |
| 03 Oct, 2022 | Bannu | | Pol (1) | Local Taliban |
| 08 Oct, 2022 | Quetta | Civ (4) | | BLA |
| 20 Oct, 2022 | D.I Khan | | Pol (1) | TTP |
| 21 Oct, 2022 | Kalat | FC (3) | FC (2) | BLA |
| 22 Oct, 2022 | Quetta | FC (3) | FC (2) | BLA |
| 22 Oct, 2022 | South Waziristan | | Pol (1) | TTP |
| 22 Oct, 2022 | Charsadda | | Pol (1) | TTP |
| 23 Oct, 2022 | Khyber | Arm (1) | Mil (1) | TTP |
| 23 Oct, 2022 | North Waziristan | Arm (4) | Mil (1) | TTP |
| 24 Oct, 2022 | Lakki Marwat | | Mil (1) | TTP |
| 25 Oct, 2022 | Lakki Marwat | Arm (6) | | TTP |
| 26 Oct, 2022 | Bolan | | Pol (1) | BLA |
| 26 Oct, 2022 | Khyber | Arm (2) | | TTP |
| 26 Oct, 2022 | Charsadda | Pol (1) | | Local Taliban |
| 30 Oct, 2022 | Quetta | Civ (1) | | BLA |
| 01 Nov, 2022 | Pishin | | Pol (1) | TTP |
| 03 Nov, 2022 | Mardan | | Pol (1) | TTP |
| 09 Nov, 2022 | South Waziristan | Pol (2) | Pol (2) | TTP |
| 10 Nov, 2022 | North Waziristan | Arm (5) | Mil (1) | TTP |
| 11 Nov, 2022 | Lakki Marwat | | Pol (1) | TTP |
| 11 Nov, 2022 | Khyber | | Pol (1) | TTP |

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| Date | District | Injured | Killed | Responsibility |
|--------------|------------------|--|-------------------------------|---------------------------|
| 11 Nov, 2022 | Kohat | | | TTP |
| 13 Nov, 2022 | Kohat | Pol (1) Civ (1) Pol (1) Civ (1) | | TTP |
| 16 Nov, 2022 | Lakki Marwat | | Pol (6) | TTP |
| 22 Nov, 2022 | South Waziristan | | Arm (1) | TTP |
| 24 Nov, 2022 | Lakki Marwat | | | Local Taliban |
| 24 Nov, 2022 | North Waziristan | Civ (1) | Civ (1) | Local Taliban |
| 25 Nov, 2022 | Lakki Marwat | Arm (2) | Arm (2) | TTP |
| 30 Nov, 2022 | Quetta | Civ (23) | Civ (3) Mil (1) Pol (2) | TTP |
| 01 Dec, 2022 | Charsadda | | Pol (1) | Local Taliban |
| 02 Dec, 2022 | Mardan | | Pol (1) | TTP |
| 03 Dec, 2022 | Nowshera | | Pol (3) | TTP |
| 06 Dec, 2022 | Bannu | | P-ml (1) Civ (1) | Local Taliban |
| 07 Dec, 2022 | Bannu | | Pol (1) | TTP |
| 08 Dec, 2022 | Peshawar | | | TTP |
| 12 Dec, 2022 | D.I Khan | Pol (1) | | TTP |
| 14 Dec, 2022 | North Waziristan | Civ (5) Arm (9) | Civ (1) Arm (1) Mil (1) | Unknown/unknown militants |
| 18 Dec, 2022 | Lakki Marwat | Pol (3) | Pol (5) | Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group |
| 18 Dec, 2022 | Bannu | Arm (1) Pol (1) | | TTP |
| 19 Dec, 2022 | North Waziristan | Arm (4) | Civ (2) Mil (1) Arm (1) | TTP |
| 20 Dec, 2022 | South Waziristan | Pol (1) | Mil (1) | TTP |
| 20 Dec, 2022 | Kharan | Lvs (1) | Lvs (1) | BLA |
| 21 Dec, 2022 | Khuzdar | P-ml (1) Civ (1) | | BLA |
| 23 Dec, 2022 | Islamabad | Civ (2) Pol (4) | Mil (1) Pol (1) | TTP |
| 25 Dec, 2022 | Kohlu | | Arm (5) | BLA |
| 25 Dec, 2022 | Quetta | Civ (5) | | BLA |
| 25 Dec, 2022 | Quetta | Pol (3) Civ (5) | | BLA |
| 25 Dec, 2022 | Lasbela | Civ (3) | | BLF |
| 25 Dec, 2022 | Khuzdar | | | BLA |
| 28 Dec, 2022 | North Waziristan | Arm (2) | Mil (1) | TTP |
| 30 Dec, 2022 | D.I Khan | Pol (4) | | TTP |
| 31 Dec, 2022 | Charsadda | | Pol (1) | TTP |
| 180 Attacks | | 390 Injured | 268 Killed | |

Annex-4: Attacks on Political leaders

| Date | District | Injured | Killed | Responsibility |
|--------------|------------------|------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------|
| 27 Feb, 2022 | Lasbela | Civ (2) | Civ (1) | BLA |
| 13 Apr, 2022 | Bajaur | | Civ (1) | IS-K/IS affiliates |
| 26 Apr, 2022 | Bajaur | | Civ (1) | IS-K/IS affiliates |
| 15 Jul, 2022 | North Waziristan | | Civ (2) | Unknown/unknown militants |
| 06 Aug, 2022 | Lower Dir | Civ (4) | Lvs (1) Pol (1) Civ (2) | Unknown/unknown militants |
| 15 Aug, 2022 | Bajaur | Civ (4) | | IS-K/IS affiliates |
| 24 Sep, 2022 | Shangla | | | Unknown/unknown militants |
| 01 Oct, 2022 | Bajaur | | Civ (1) | Unknown/unknown militants |
| 8 Attacks | | 10 Injured | 10 Killed | |

Annex-5: Attacks on Tribal Elders/Peace Committee Members

| Date | District | Injured | Killed | Responsibility |
|--------------|------------------|--------------------|--------------------|------------------------------------|
| 02 Jan, 2022 | North Waziristan | | Civ (1) | TTP |
| 28 Jan, 2022 | Dera Bugti | Lvs (4) Civ (4) | Lvs (3) Civ (1) | BRA |
| 31 Jan, 2022 | North Waziristan | | Civ (1) | TTP |
| 02 Feb, 2022 | Dera Bugti | | Civ (1) | BRA |
| 14 Mar, 2022 | North Waziristan | | Civ (1) | Unknown/unknown militants |
| 08 May, 2022 | Kalat | Civ (1) | | BLA |
| 04 Jul, 2022 | Bajaur | | Civ (1) | IS-K/IS affiliates |
| 16 Jul, 2022 | South Waziristan | | Civ (1) | Local Taliban |
| 13 Sep, 2022 | Swat | | Pol (2) Civ (3) | TTP |
| 20 Sep, 2022 | Khyber | Civ (1) | Civ (1) | TTP |
| 04 Oct, 2022 | Lasbela | Civ (5) | | Unspecified nationalist insurgents |
| 07 Nov, 2022 | Kachhi | | Civ (1) | BLA |
| 08 Nov, 2022 | Khuzdar | Civ (5) | Civ (1) | BLA |
| 06 Dec, 2022 | North Waziristan | | Civ (1) | TTP |
| 14 attacks | | 20 Injured | 19 Killed | |

Annex-6: Attacks on Civilians

| Date | District | Injured | Killed | Responsibility |
|--------------|-----------|---------|---------|------------------------------------|
| 08 Feb, 2022 | Nasirabad | Civ (3) | Civ (1) | Baloch Republican Guards |
| 10 Mar, 2022 | Jafarabad | Civ (6) | | Unspecified nationalist insurgents |

| Date | District | Injured | Killed | Responsibility |
|--------------|------------------|------------|-----------|------------------------------------|
| 13 Mar, 2022 | Sibi | Civ (2) | | BLA |
| 05 Apr, 2022 | D.I Khan | | Civ (3) | Unknown/unknown militants |
| 28 Apr, 2022 | Bajaur | Civ (1) | Civ (1) | IS-K/IS affiliates |
| 15 Jun, 2022 | Mohmand | Civ (1) | | Unknown/unknown militants |
| 15 Jun, 2022 | Kurram | Civ (1) | Civ (3) | Rival sectarian group |
| 21 Jun, 2022 | Kurram | Civ (1) | Civ (1) | Rival sectarian group |
| 30 Jul, 2022 | Kech | Civ (3) | | BLA |
| 10 Aug, 2022 | Nushki | Civ (6) | | Unspecified nationalist insurgents |
| 13 Aug, 2022 | North Waziristan | Civ (5) | Civ (3) | Local Taliban |
| 30 Sep, 2022 | Kohlu | Civ (25) | Civ (1) | Unknown/unknown militants |
| 30 Oct, 2022 | Gwadar | | | Unspecified nationalist insurgents |
| 11 Dec, 2022 | Peshawar | | | Local Taliban |
| 14 Attacks | | 54 Injured | 13 Killed | |

Annex-7: Provincial Breakdown of Terrorist Attacks

Balochistan

| Month | Frequency | Killed | Injured |
|-----------|------------|------------|-------------|
| January | 5 | 15 | 33 |
| February | 8 | 31 | 19 |
| March | 9 | 14 | 61 |
| April | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| May | 3 | 0 | 1 |
| June | 3 | 5 | 4 |
| July | 9 | 7 | 14 |
| August | 8 | 6 | 17 |
| September | 7 | 2 | 48 |
| October | 12 | 9 | 18 |
| November | 5 | 9 | 29 |
| December | 8 | 7 | 26 |
| Total | 79 Attacks | 106 Killed | 271 Injured |

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

| Month | Frequency | Killed | Injured |
|----------|-----------|--------|---------|
| January | 15 | 13 | 5 |
| February | 5 | 7 | 10 |

| Month | Frequency | Killed | Injured |
|-----------|-------------|------------|-------------|
| March | 12 | 90 | 212 |
| April | 25 | 45 | 7 |
| May | 10 | 17 | 13 |
| June | 11 | 12 | 11 |
| July | 19 | 17 | 39 |
| August | 12 | 23 | 18 |
| September | 17 | 19 | 16 |
| October | 13 | 10 | 16 |
| November | 12 | 16 | 14 |
| December | 18 | 25 | 32 |
| Total | 169 Attacks | 294 Killed | 393 Injured |

Punjab

| Month | Frequency | Killed | Injured |
|---------|-----------|--------|---------|
| January | 2 | 4 | 30 |
| June | 1 | 2 | 0 |
| Total | 3 attacks | 6 | 30 |

Sindh (Excluding Karachi)

| Month | Frequency | Killed | Injured |
|-------|-----------|----------|-----------|
| April | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Total | 2 Attacks | 0 killed | 0 Injured |

Karachi

| Month | Frequency | Killed | Injured |
|-----------|-----------|--------|---------|
| January | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| April | 1 | 5 | 4 |
| May | 2 | 2 | 21 |
| August | 1 | 0 | 3 |
| September | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Total | 6 Attacks | 8 | 31 |

Annex-8: Incidents of Ethnic and Political Violence

| Region | Location | Attacks | Injured | Killed |
|--------------------|------------------|-----------|------------|----------|
| Khyber Pakhtunkhwa | North Waziristan | 1 | | Civ (1) |
| Sindh | Karachi | 1 | Civ (10) | Civ (1) |
| Punjab | Lahore | 1 | | |
| Balochistan | Loralai | 1 | Civ (1) | Civ (1) |
| Total | | 4 Attacks | 11 Injured | 3 Killed |

Annex-9: Targets of Terrorist attacks

| Targets | Attacks | Killed | Injured |
|---|---------|--------|---------|
| Security/law enforcement agencies (personnel, convoys, posts) | 180 | 268 | 390 |
| Education/institutions/teachers | 4 | 2 | 4 |
| Non-Bloch settlers/workers | 2 | 3 | 7 |
| Gas pipelines | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Govt. officials/institutions/symbols | 4 | 7 | 7 |
| Power pylons/cell phone towers | 4 | 0 | 0 |
| Pro-govt. tribal elders/peace committee members | 14 | 19 | 20 |
| Militants | 1 | 2 | 0 |
| Civilians | 14 | 13 | 54 |
| Shia religious scholars/community | 2 | 68 | 211 |
| Worship places/shrines/madrassas | 1 | 0 | 3 |
| Govt. offices/public property (hospitals, banks etc.) | 3 | 1 | 1 |
| Sunni religious leaders/community | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Political leaders/workers | 8 | 10 | 10 |
| Christian community/Church | 2 | 2 | 4 |
| Sikh community | 1 | 2 | 0 |
| Unknown | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Alleged spy | 4 | 3 | 2 |
| Health/polio workers, security escorts | 7 | 7 | 6 |
| CPEC/workers/Chinese | 2 | 6 | 6 |
| Railway tracks / trains | 3 | 0 | 5 |
| Development, exploration projects, companies, workers | 3 | 5 | 4 |
| Total | 262 | 419 | 734 |

Annex-10: Terrorist Attacks' Tactics

| Tactics | Attacks |
|---------------------|---------|
| Hand Grenade | 53 |
| IEDs | 53 |
| Suicide Attack | 14 |
| Rocket Attack | 2 |
| Gun and bomb attack | 9 |
| Kidnapping | 1 |
| Firing | 129 |
| SAB/Lynching | 1 |
| | 262 |

Annex-11: Operational Attacks by Security Forces

| Region | District | Attacks | Killed | Injured |
|-------------|----------|---------|--------|---------|
| Balochistan | Awaran | 1 | 4 | 1 |
| | Bolan | 1 | 3 | 0 |
| | Gwadar | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| | Harnai | 1 | 6 | 0 |
| | Kech | 7 | 45 | 1 |
| | Kharan | 1 | 4 | 0 |

| Region | District | Attacks | Killed | Injured |
|--------------------|------------------|---------|------------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| | Khuzdar | 1 | 2 | 0 |
| | Kohlu | 2 | 10 | 3 |
| | Mastung | 2 | 7 | 1 |
| | Nasirabad | 1 | 4 | 0 |
| | Nushki | 1 | 2 | 0 |
| | Panjgur | 1 | 6 | 0 |
| | Quetta | 4 | 14 | 1 |
| | Sibi | 1 | 7 | 1 |
| | Zhob | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| | Ziarat | 2 | 13 | 0 |
| | Total | 28 | 130 | 9 |
| Khyber Pakhtunkhwa | Bannu | 5 | 44 | 14 |
| | D.I Khan | 7 | 19 | 0 |
| | Khyber | 4 | 9 | 6 |
| | Lakki Marwat | 8 | 16 | 0 |
| | North Waziristan | 24 | 85 | 17 |
| | Nowshera | 1 | 4 | 0 |
| | Peshawar | 6 | 11 | 1 |
| | Tank | 2 | 5 | 0 |
| | Total | 57 | 193 | 38 |
| Sindh | Karachi | 2 | 4 | 4 |
| | Total | 2 | 4 | 4 |
| Total Pakistan | | 87 | 327 (302 militants) ²¹³ | 51 (28 militants) ²¹⁴ |

Annex-12: Sectarian Related Terrorist Attacks

| Date | District | Injured | Killed |
|--------------|-----------|---------------------|---------------------|
| 02 Mar, 2022 | Quetta | Pol (2) Civ (23) | Pol (1) Civ (2) |
| 04 Mar, 2022 | Peshawar | Civ (186) | Pol (2) Civ (63) |
| 15 Jun, 2022 | Kurram | Civ (1) | Civ (3) |
| 21 Jun, 2022 | Kurram | Civ (1) | Civ (1) |
| Total | 4 Attacks | 213 Injured | 72 Killed |

Annex-13: Clashes and Encounter Between Militants and security Forces in 2022

| Date | District | Injured | Killed |
|--------------|------------------|---------|--------------------|
| 30 Mar, 2022 | South Waziristan | | Mil (4) Arm (2) |
| 19 Apr, 2022 | North Waziristan | | Mil (1) |
| 12 Jun, 2022 | North Waziristan | | Arm (1) |

²¹³ Others among those killed included 22 army soldiers, 1 FC men, 1 policeman, and one civilian.

²¹⁴ Other injured included 13 soldiers, 9 policemen, and 1 FC man.


| Date | District | Injured | Killed |
|--------------|------------------|-----------|--------------------|
| 18 Jun, 2022 | North Waziristan | Arm (2) | Mil (1) Arm (1) |
| 24 Jun, 2022 | D.I Khan | | Mil (2) |
| 24 Jul, 2022 | D.I Khan | | Arm (1) |
| 08 Aug, 2022 | Swat | Pol (4) | |
| 04 Oct, 2022 | Peshawar | | Arm (2) Mil (3) |
| 29 Oct, 2022 | D.I Khan | | Arm (2) |
| 16 Nov, 2022 | Bajaur | | Mil (1) Arm (2) |
| 30 Nov, 2022 | North Waziristan | | Arm (1) Mil (1) |
| | 11 Attacks | 6 Injured | 25 Killed |

Annex-14: Incidents of Faith Based Violence

| Date | District | Injured | Killed |
|--------------|--------------|-----------|----------|
| 12 Feb, 2022 | Khanewal | | Civ (1) |
| 13 Feb, 2022 | Faisalabad | Civ (1) | |
| 14 Feb, 2022 | Muzaffargarh | | |
| 05 Mar, 2022 | Peshawar | Civ (1) | Civ (1) |
| 29 Mar, 2022 | D.I Khan | | Civ (1) |
| 17 May, 2022 | Okara | | Civ (1) |
| 08 Jun, 2022 | Karachi | | |
| 12 Aug, 2022 | Chiniot | | Civ (1) |
| | 8 Attacks | 2 Injured | 5 Killed |

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