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# Pakistan Security Report 2010

By Pak Institute For Peace Studies (PIPS)



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## List of Acronyms

**ADB:** Asian Development Bank  
**AJK:** Azad Jammu and Kashmir  
**ANA:** Afghan National Army  
**ANP:** Awami National Party  
**Arm:** Army  
**ASWJ:** Ahl-e-Sunnat wal Jamat  
**ATC:** Anti-Terrorism Courts  
**ATF:** Anti-Terrorism Force  
**ATKSU:** Anti-Target Killing Special Unit  
**BC:** Balochistan Constabulary  
**BH:** Beheading  
**BLA:** Balochistan Liberation Army  
**BLF:** Baloch Liberation Front  
**BLUF:** Baloch Liberation United Front  
**BNP-M:** Balochistan National Party-Mengal Group  
**BT:** Bomb Blast  
**CCTV:** Close Circuit TV Cameras  
**CIA:** Central Intelligence Agency  
**CID:** Criminal Investigation Department  
**Civ:** Civilians  
**CM:** Chief Minister  
**COAS:** Chief of Army Staff  
**CSF:** Coalition Support Funds  
**DG:** Director General  
**DSP:** Deputy Superintendent Police  
**EU:** European Union  
**ETIM:** East Turkistan Islamic Party  
**FAO:** Food and Agriculture Organization  
**FATA:** Federally Administered Tribal Areas  
**FC:** Frontier Corps  
**FCR:** Frontier Crimes Regulation  
**FDMA:** Fata Disaster Management Authority

**FIA:** Federal Investigative Agency  
**Fr:** Firing  
**FR:** Frontier Region  
**HDP:** Hazara Democratic Party  
**HG:** Hand Grenade  
**HRCP:** Human Rights Commission of Pakistan  
**ICRC:** International Committee of Red Cross  
**ICU:** Islamia College University  
**IDP:** Internally Displaced Persons  
**IED:** Improvised Explosive Device  
**IPPs:** Independent Power Producers  
**ISAF:** International Security Assistance Force  
**ISI:** Inter-Services Intelligence  
**ISO:** Imamia Student Organization  
**Ji:** Jamat-e-Islami  
**JUI-F:** Jamiat-e-Ulama-e-Islam Fazal Group  
**KESC:** Karachi Electric Supply Corporation  
**Kid:** Kidnapping  
**KPK:** Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa  
**LeJ:** Lashkar-e-Jhangvi  
**LI:** Lashkar-e-Islam  
**LM:** Landmine Blast  
**LoC:** Line of Control  
**LTTE:** Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam  
**Lvs:** Levies Force  
**Mil:** Militant  
**MQM:** Muttahida Qaumi Movement  
**NATO:** North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
**NDMA:** National Disaster Management Authority  
**NHD:** Pakistan's National Health Department  
**NI:** Nationalist Insurgents' Attack

**NIH:** National Institute of Health  
**NP:** National Party  
**Oper:** Operational Attack  
**PATA:** Provincially Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan  
**P-ml:** Paramilitary Forces  
**PML-N:** Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz Group  
**Pol:** Police  
**PPP:** Pakistan People's Party  
**RA:** Rocket Attack  
**RCB:** Remote Control Bomb  
**RCD:** Regional Cooperation for Development  
**Rng:** Rangers  
**RPP:** Rental Power Plants  
**SA:** Suicide Attack  
**Sab:** Sabotage  
**Sect:** Sectarian  
**SM:** Sipah-e-Muhammad  
**SP:** Superintendent Police  
**SSP:** Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan  
**ST:** Sunni Tehrik  
**TA:** Terrorist Attack  
**TAPI:** Turkaminstan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India Gas Pipeline  
**TK:** Target Killing  
**TNSM:** Terik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi  
**TTP:** Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan  
**UK:** United Kingdom  
**UN:** United Nations  
**UNHCR:** United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees  
**UNICEF:** United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund  
**US:** United States  
**VC:** Vice Chancellor  
**WAPDA:** Water and Power Development Authority  
**WFP:** United Nations World Food Programm



## Glossary

**Military Operation:** Large-scale operations launched by military and paramilitary troops against Islamist militants and separatist insurgents in Malakand Division, FATA and Balochistan to preserve law and order and writ of the state.

**Operational Attack:** Pre-emptive attacks launched by military and paramilitary troops to purge an area of militants.

**Militant Attack:** Indiscriminate use of violence by militant outfits such as Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Lashkar-e-Islam (LI) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) etc., manifested through suicide attacks, beheadings and destruction of educational institutions, CD/video shops, etc.

**Ethno-political violence:** The threat or use of violence, often against the civilian population, to achieve political or social ends, to intimidate opponents, or to publicize grievances.

**Inter-tribal Clash:** Clashes or feuds reported between tribes, mainly in FATA, KPK, Balochistan, rural areas of Punjab and parts of interior Sindh.

**Nationalist Insurgent Attack:** Attacks by separatists/nationalist insurgents mainly in Balochistan.

**Search and hunt operation:** Launched by law enforcement

agencies on intelligence to hunt or purge a particular locality of suspected militants and their hideouts.

**Sectarian attacks:** Indiscriminate use of violence on differences between the various Islamic schools of thoughts over interpretation of religion's commands. Incidents involving indiscriminate use of violence perpetrated by banned sectarian outfits such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Tehrik-e-Jafria, Imamia Student Organization (ISO), Sipah-e-Muhammad, etc., against rival schools of religious thought.

**Sectarian clashes:** Violent clashes between armed factions of banned sectarian outfit or between followers of rival sects such as Sunni-Shia, Deobandi-Barelvi strife. Sectarian clashes also include tribal feuds between followers of Sunni and Shia schools of thought such as in Kurram Agency, where Sunni Turi tribesmen frequently clash with Shia Bangash tribe.

**Overall number of attacks:** The sum of militant and counter-militant attacks of the security forces besides drone attacks, incidents of ethno-political violence, and attacks with sectarian or by nationalist insurgents.

## 1. Introduction

In 2010, Pakistan witnessed an 11 percent decrease in the number of incidents of violence and terrorism compared to the previous year. An effective military campaign against militants in the tribal areas, increased surveillance by law enforcement agencies and killing of key terrorists in US drone strikes in FATA were among the main factors behind this decrease. But this decrease was not uniform across the country. Violent incidents increased in the provinces of Sindh and Punjab and in Gilgit Baltistan in 2010 compared to the previous year, indicating growing urban terrorism in Pakistan. There was a considerable decrease in the number of violent attacks in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa's (KPK) settled areas. However, although the writ of the state was partially restored in FATA, the security situation remained volatile as militants dislodged from their strongholds constantly managed to relocate to other parts of FATA.<sup>1</sup> Despite the progress on the security front, sustainable peace

has not been achieved in KPK and FATA due to the less than impressive performance of a weak political administration, which is beset by chronic challenges of poor governance and failure to ensure effective political participation for the people.<sup>2</sup>

Rule of law is a critical element of good governance, which is lacking not only in KPK and FATA but across the country. According to World Justice Project (WJP) rule of law index 2010, Pakistan is among the countries where rule of law is sorely lacking.<sup>3</sup> The latest Funds for Peace failed states index ranks Pakistan as the 10<sup>th</sup> most poorly governed state on account of poor governance as well as security indicators.<sup>4</sup>

The internal security situation continues to be a pressing challenge for Pakistan. The security scenario indicates that critical security challenges still remain unaddressed, with the government yet to evolve an effective and comprehensive counter-terrorism policy. The challenges consistently highlighted in the last

few years have not been addressed. Better coordination among intelligence agencies, capacity building of law enforcement agencies, curbs on terrorism financing and, most importantly, adequate measures to prevent banned militant groups from operating across the country remained persistently lacking.

In the absence of a comprehensive long-term strategy, the government continues to rely almost exclusively on military solutions to the militancy in FATA. Failure to address the growing ethno-political and sectarian intolerance and the influence of militants in Karachi as well as the continuing alienation and radicalization of a largely young and poor population in South Punjab have compounded the problem. The military is mainly relying on a 'hit, hold, build and clear' strategy. The holding and rebuilding parts of this strategy cannot succeed without public support and partnership, better coordination among federal and provincial governments and availability of adequate resources. The strategy requires political will to initiate bold action but also judicious implementation. This would be hard to achieve without considerably improved cooperation among the military, the political government and the people. Adequate foreign assistance, in terms of financial resources, equipment and training, is also crucial to meet the challenge and must be ensured because Pakistan's stability is also crucial to regional and international peace.

In this context, Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) hopes the fifth edition of its annual security report will help the policymakers, academics, media and civil society understand the gravity of the situation with a view to move toward sustainable solutions. As usual, the report contains comprehensive data on violent incidents, comparative analysis of the security situation and the regional context, the changing targets and tactics of militants, government strategies and the nature of its response to the security challenges. This year's report also highlights regional perspectives and the usual and non-traditional threats to peace.

PIPS security reports are the only major source on internal security in Pakistan as no official

database is available in the country. Although the government has the resources, it lacks a reliable body that can gather and tabulate data from all offices and present it in an accurate and credible manner. That results in lack of uniformity, inconsistency and contradictions in official data.<sup>5</sup>

The conflict/security database and PIPS archives are the basic resources relied upon for this report. The archives and the database are the outcome of a meticulous monitoring process on every relevant incident in the country on a daily basis. A regular follow up is conducted in liaison with the PIPS correspondents in the regions in order to keep track of daily developments on such incidents. PIPS compiles data from sources including newspapers, magazines, journals, field sources and screening of official records. More than 30 English and Urdu dailies, magazines, and journals, and various television news channels are monitored to update the database and archives. Regional daily newspapers and weeklies from Peshawar, Quetta, Gilgit and Karachi are also monitored for details on incidents reported in the local media. Correspondents in provincial capitals are the primary source for PIPS to verify the media reports. In case of a major incident, PIPS teams consult the local administration and journalists for further details. In cases where PIPS finds it difficult to verify facts of a particular incident, it gives preference to the official statements in that regard.

The credit for this report goes to Abdul Basit and his team: Shagufta Hayat and Nida Naz for their constant dedication to monitoring and recording the security developments in the country throughout the year. Acknowledgements would be incomplete without the mention of Safdar Sial, Mujtaba Rathore and Khuram Iqbal for their valuable input. Credit is also due to Farhan Yousaf and Khuram Shahzad, who managed the records and archives. Special thanks to Shahzad Ahmed, the IT manager who developed comprehensive maps of the conflicts.

**Muhammad Amir Rana**

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## 2. Overview

A total of 2,113 militant, insurgent and sectarian-related terrorist attacks were reported from across the country in 2010, killing 2,913 people and injuring another 5,824. The worst affected region of the country was the insurgency-hit province of Balochistan where the highest number of attacks was reported (737), followed by the militancy-infested Federally Administered Tribal Areas (720). Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) was the third most volatile region of the country with 459 attacks; while 111 attacks were reported in Sindh, 62 in Punjab, 13 in Gilgit Baltistan, six in Islamabad and five in Azad Kashmir. (See Table 1)

**Table 1: Terrorist Attacks in Pakistan in 2010**

Province/Area	No. of Attacks	Killed	Injured
KPK	459	836	1832
Balochistan	737	600	1117
FATA	720	904	1433
Punjab	62	309	897
Karachi	93	233	436
Sindh	18	5	30
Gilgit-Baltistan	13	7	16
Azad Kashmir	5	4	28
Islamabad	6	15	35
<b>Total</b>	<b>2113</b>	<b>2913</b>	<b>5824</b>

### 2.1 Comparison

If casualties in terrorist attacks, operations by the security forces and their clashes with the

militants, inter-tribal clashes and cross-border attacks (including drone strikes and incursions by NATO/ISAF forces in FATA) in Pakistan are counted, the overall figures in 2010 amount to 10,003 people dead and 10,283 injured. (See Table 2)

**Table 2: Nature of Attacks**


Attacks/Clashes	No. of Incidents	Killed	Injured
Terrorist attacks	2,113	2,913	5,824
Clashes between security forces and militants	369	2,007	877
Operational attacks by security forces	260	2,631	1,495
Drone attacks	135	961	383
Border clashes	69	65	53
Ethno-political violence	233	660	966
Inter-tribal clashes	214	766	685
<b>Total</b>	<b>3,393</b>	<b>10,003</b>	<b>10,283</b>

Pakistan witnessed an overall decrease in the number of violent incidents in 2010, the first time that had happened since 2007. (See Chart 1) A total of 3,393 attacks were reported in 2010,<sup>6</sup> compared to 3,816 in 2009, a decrease of 11 percent. Similarly, the overall casualties also went down, from 12,623 fatalities in 2009 to 10,003 in 2010. The number of people injured in these attacks also declined from 12,815 in 2009 to 10,283 in 2010. The number of suicide attacks across the country also fell by 22 percent in comparison with 2009, with 68 suicide attacks in 2010, compared to 87 the previous year. Nearly half the suicide attacks were concentrated in



KPK. Attacks by US drones in FATA registered a 165 percent increase in 2010 compared to the previous year.

**Chart 1: Comparison of Attacks and Casualties**



In 2010, the number of terrorist attacks—including militant attacks, sectarian-related attacks and clashes, incidents of ethno-political violence, inter-tribal clashes and attacks by nationalist insurgents—decreased by 21 percent compared to 2009.

However, despite the ongoing military operations in South Waziristan, Bajaur and Orakzai tribal agencies, the number of attacks by militants in FATA went up by 28 percent. Casualties in such attacks in the tribal areas also increased by 40 percent and injuries by 37 percent.

In Karachi, the number of violent incidents spiked by 288 percent due to a substantial increase in sectarian and ethno-political violence, crime and general lawlessness. In Punjab, sectarian and terrorist attacks increased by 34 percent compared to 2009, although the fatalities in these attacks were 40 percent lower than 2009. Over 70 percent attacks in Punjab were concentrated in Lahore, the provincial capital. All four provincial capitals were among the cities worst affected by terrorist attacks in 2010.<sup>7</sup> (See Table 3)

Militant attacks in KPK registered a decrease of 60 percent—from 1,137 attacks in 2009 to 459 in 2010. Although the number of violent incidents was 7 percent lower in Balochistan in 2010 than the previous year, the number of killings was 43 percent higher than in 2009. Insecurity in the province further intensified in 2010 as such attacks grew in intensity and spread to more districts of Balochistan. While law enforcement agencies' personnel had been targeted in 105 attacks in 2009, 144 such attacks took place in 2010. Similarly, attacks on political leaders went up from seven in 2009 to 34 in 2010.

**Table 3: Comparison of Terrorist Attacks and Casualties (2009 and 2010)**

Province/region	No. of Terrorist Attacks	Killed	Injured
KPK	60% decrease	42% decrease	49% decrease
Balochistan	7% decrease	43% increase	4% increase
FATA	28% increase	40% increase	37% increase
Punjab	34% increase	26% decrease	33% decrease
Karachi	288% increase	258% increase	181% increase
Sindh (excluding Karachi)	200% increase	66% increase	329% increase
Gilgit Baltistan	160% increase	46% decrease	16% decrease
Azad Kashmir	No change	76% decrease	70% decrease
Islamabad	40% decrease	50% decrease	51% decrease
<b>Total</b>	<b>21% decrease</b>	<b>15% decrease</b>	<b>16% decrease</b>

Compared to 2009, militants' casualties declined in 2010 by 27 percent—from 7,945 to 5,792. In 2010, civilians accounted for 36 percent of the people killed and 63 percent of those injured in suicide attacks. The number of civilian killed in 2010 was higher than that in the previous year—from 3,476 in 2009 to 3,570 in 2010. The security forces personnel killed in 2010 lost their lives mainly in terrorist attacks and in clashes with the militants. As many as 1,211 security personnel were killed in 2010, compared to 2,515 the previous year, a decrease of 52 percent. (See Table 4)

**Table 4: Casualties in Pakistan in 2010**

Affected Group	Killed	Injured
Militants	5,792	2,437
Civilians	3,570	6,539
Police	183	293
Paramilitary force	50	57
Army	183	523
Rangers	2	0
Frontier Corps	223	434
<b>Total</b>	<b>10,003</b>	<b>10,283</b>

### 3. Security Landscape in 2010

#### 3.1 Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) was Pakistan's third most affected region in 2010. A total of 459 terrorist attacks, 33 of them suicide attacks, were reported in KPK in 2010. The 836 fatalities in these attacks included 722 civilians, 25 personnel of Frontier Corps, 76 policemen, seven army troops and six paramilitaries. As many as 1,832 others, among them 1,580 civilians, 30 FC personnel, 41 army troops, 164 police and 14 personnel of paramilitary forces were injured as well. In 2009, as many as 1,439 people had been killed and 3,616 injured in 1,137 reported attacks. In 2010, Peshawar was the worst-affected district of KPK with 111 reported attacks; with Kohat the second most volatile district of the province with 71 attacks. (See Table 5)

**Table 5: Terrorist Attacks in KPK in 2010**

Districts	No. of Attacks	Killed	Injured
Hangu	53	73	183
Swat	39	68	213
Bannu	43	36	96
Kohat	71	211	366
Swabi	1	3	13
Peshawar	111	122	297
Shangla	1	2	0
Charsadda	22	8	26
Buner	6	3	3
Mardan	24	12	23
Nowshera	16	20	35
D.I. Khan	24	36	78
Tank	12	18	19
Dir	13	74	267
Lakki Marwat	8	128	161
Battagram	1	1	2
Mansehra	5	13	19
Karak	3	4	27
Chitral	4	3	3
Malakand Agency	2	1	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>459</b>	<b>836</b>	<b>1,832</b>

FATA's security landscape was defined by militants' attacks on security forces' convoys and check posts, targeting of pro-government tribal elders, attacks on educational institutions and NATO supplies, drone strikes and conflict-induced displacement. FATA was the second most affected part of the country after Balochistan in 2010.

In 2010, as many as 720 attacks in FATA left 904 people dead and 1,433 injured. Mohmand Agency suffered the highest number of attacks, where at least 260 people were killed and 396 injured in 219 incidents of terrorism. Khyber Agency was the second most volatile part of



FATA, with 158 attacks claiming 165 lives and leaving 329 people injured. (See Table 6)

**Table 6: Terrorist Attacks in FATA in 2010**

Agencies	No. of Attacks	Killed	Injured
Mohmand Agency	219	260	396
SWA	61	90	136
Khyber Agency	158	165	329
Kurram Agency	47	111	87
Bajaur Agency	103	115	246
NWA	30	53	45
Orakzai Agency	102	110	194
<b>Total</b>	<b>720</b>	<b>904</b>	<b>1,433</b>

### 3.1.1. Prominent Killings

### 3.1.2 Assassinations of Political Leaders and Workers

In 2010, at least 22 political leaders and activists of various political parties were assassinated in incidents of target killings, suicide attacks and bomb blasts across FATA and KPK, compared to 45 assassinations in 2009 and 31 in 2008.<sup>8</sup> Due to support for anti-Taliban military operations by the Awami National Party (ANP), the major ruling partner of KPK government, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) targeted rallies of ANP and attacked its leaders, members and their close relatives throughout the year.<sup>9</sup> In May 2010, the TTP distributed threatening letters in Mardan district of KPK against leaders of the ANP. The letters were distributed in mosques of Mian Gulzara Kali area, which is the constituency of the incumbent KPK Chief Minister Amir Haider Khan Hoti. The hand-written letter on a plain paper stated that Hoti had killed the people of Malakand and Swat and in the same manner “we will kill his fellows and children.”<sup>10</sup>

The high profile assassinations of ANP leaders, workers and their close relatives in 2010 included murder of the only son of ANP leader and KPK Information Minister Mian Iftikhar Hussain in Pabbi area of Nowshera district; of Khogh Badshah, a former district president of ANP who was shot dead in Hangu district; and of Ghani-ur-Rehman, a former KPK irrigation minister who was killed in an improvised explosive device (IED) blast, also in Hangu district.<sup>11</sup>

Religio-political parties Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F) were also on the hit list of the militants in FATA and KPK. Major attacks on leaders and members of the JI included the assassination of JI Hangu district chief Fida Saadi, who was shot dead by militants near Kotgi area of Hangu, while Haji Muhammad Khan, the JI head for Frontier Region (FR) Kohat, was shot dead in Sherakai area of FR Kohat.<sup>12</sup>

In Tank district, militants assassinated former JUI-F law maker Maulana Mirajuddin Mehsud. He was the head of JUI-F’s FATA chapter and also headed the local peace committee. In Wana, the headquarters of South Waziristan Agency, a suicide attack on the seminary of Maulana Noor Muhammad, a former member of the National Assembly from the JUI-F, left the cleric and 24 others dead and 36 people injured. Maulana Noor Muhammad was an influential figure in the tribal region and had brokered several peace deals between militants and the local administration.<sup>13</sup> He was supportive of all forms of jihad in Afghanistan but was strongly opposed to any action against Pakistani security forces. He also opposed suicide attacks in Pakistan.<sup>14</sup>

The political leaders and prominent personalities who survived terrorist bids on their lives in 2010 included Aurangzeb Khan, an ANP member of KPK Assembly. He was injured

in a roadside bomb blast when he was going to attend a program organized to mark the death anniversary of Bacha Khan and Khan Abdul Wali Khan.<sup>15</sup>

In Mardan, two TTP militants shot and killed Swat University Vice Chancellor (VC) and noted religious scholar Dr Farooq Khan along with his assistant outside his clinic. Abdullah Azam Brigade linked to the TTP claimed responsibility, and said they had killed the VC for speaking against the Taliban on every forum and for declaring suicide bombing un-Islamic.<sup>16</sup> A psychiatrist by profession, Dr Khan, had been running a rehabilitation centre for the detained would-be suicide bombers trained by the militants. He had previously been threatened by the militants for his writings and outspoken views against the militants' version of Islam.<sup>17</sup>

### 3.1.3 Attacks on Pro-government Peace Committees

Since the end of military operation *Rah-e-Rast* in Malakand Division (in July 2009) and *Rah-e-Nijat* in South Waziristan Agency (in December 2010); incidents of target killings of pro-government tribal elders and members of peace committees in Swat and other conflict-hit areas have increased.<sup>18</sup> As a part of its counter-terrorism policy in 2008, Pakistan Army began encouraging tribal elders to form anti-Taliban militias and *lashkars* (tribal militias) to assist the security forces in maintaining peace in areas cleared of militants.<sup>19</sup>

Targeting the peace committee volunteers in Ghalanai—the regional headquarters of Mohmand Agency—two suicide bombers blew themselves up at the administrative compound of the agency where anti-Taliban militia volunteers from Khwezai area of Mohmand had come to receive their monthly stipend. As many as 45 people were killed and another 60 injured. Another suicide attack on peace committee members in Hassan Khel village, Lakki Marwat district, at a volleyball ground claimed the lives

of 105 people, including 102 civilians and 3 FC personnel, while 100 civilians were injured. The peace committee members and volleyball fans had gathered in the ground for a volleyball match.<sup>20</sup>

Similarly, in Feroze Khel area of Lower Orakzai Agency, TTP militants torched an entire abandoned village of some 63 houses. According to the local people, the TTP wanted to punish the tribesmen because they had refused to stay in the village and support them in their fight against the security forces.<sup>21</sup>

The pro-government tribal elders assassinated in the year 2010 included Malik Muhammad Hasham Nekzankhel in Tiarza area of Tank district,<sup>22</sup> Swat Peace Committee President Sher Muhammad in Kabal tehsil of Mingora district,<sup>23</sup> Malak Ali Rehman who was assassinated outside his *hujra* (guest house) in a remote-controlled bomb explosion in Said Shah area of Bajaur Agency,<sup>24</sup> and a Malik of FR Peshawar's Hassan Khel area in Matni, while resisting a bid to abduct him while his three companions were critically injured.<sup>25</sup>

### 3.1.4 Abduction for Ransom

In 2010, the trend of abducting notable personalities for ransom gained momentum in FATA and KPK. Militants relied on this tactic to generate finances and at times to use the abducted individuals as bargaining chips to ensure release of their detained associates.<sup>26</sup> The TTP also threatened to abduct US and Afghan diplomats and swap them for detained terrorists.<sup>27</sup> In June, TTP militants demanded the government release militants in exchange for 33 soldiers who had gone missing in Mohmand Agency after a militant attack on a security forces' convoy. They threatened to kill the soldiers if their demand was not met.

The most high profile kidnapping in 2010 was that of Dr Ajmal Khan, pro vice chancellor of

Islamia College University Peshawar and a cousin of ANP chief Asfandiyar Wali. He was abducted by militants from Peshawar as he left his residence for his office.<sup>28</sup> A few days later the Taliban released a video of Dr Ajmal appealing to the government to hold talks with the militants and accept their demands. In the video, the professor said he had been abducted because he was a first cousin of Asfandiyar Wali. He said the militants would wait until November 20 for their demands to be met. Later TTP announced an indefinite extension in the deadline.<sup>29</sup>

In October, renowned medical specialist Dr. Intikhab Alam was abducted from outside Nanakpoora hospital in Hashtnagri locality of Peshawar. The abductors demanded a ransom of 15 million rupees for his release. He was later recovered by police in a raid in Shinwari town Peshawar.<sup>30</sup>

### 3.2 Balochistan

Balochistan was the most volatile region of the country in 2010. As many as 737 attacks—including 614 by nationalist insurgents, 105 militant, 12 sectarian and two communal—were reported across the province in 2010, which claimed the lives of at least 600 people, including 483 civilians, 51 FC personnel, seven army soldiers, 53 policemen and six Levies paramilitary personnel. As many as 1,117 people were injured, among them 903 civilians, 123 FC personnel, 69 policemen, 17 soldiers and five Levies personnel. Quetta was the worst-affected district of the province where 189 attacks left 241 people dead and another 494 injured. Khuzdar district was the second most volatile region where as many as 130 attacks left 63 people dead and 139 injured.

The attacks on power pylons, gas installations, railway tracks and basic health units in Balochistan declined considerably in 2010. Attacks on gas pipelines dropped from 68 in

2009 to nine in 2010, on power pylons from 40 to 16, on railway tracks from 26 to six, and on basic health units from six to one. As targeting of government installations decreased, attacks on security forces personnel and political leaders registered a clear increase. Compared to 105 attacks against security forces personnel in 2009, the number of such attacks rose to 144 in 2010. As many as 34 attacks targeting political leaders, apparently by Baloch militants, took place in 2010, compared to seven such attacks in 2009. (See Table 7)

**Table 7: Attacks in Balochistan in 2010**

Districts	No. of Attacks	Killed	Injured
Quetta	189	241	494
Khuzdar	130	63	139
Kech	46	32	61
Kharan	14	2	19
Lasbela	26	15	53
Sibi	11	4	19
Bolan	22	16	11
Mastung	61	50	39
Dera Bugti	37	37	46
Gwadar	20	16	35
Naseerabad	17	13	24
Pishin	2	2	0
Qila Abdullah	21	4	13
Qalat	41	22	34
Panjgur	18	11	39
Awaran	16	11	9



Loralai	6	3	2
Kohlu	17	21	28
Jaffarabad	16	20	33
Chagai	8	3	6
Zhob	4	3	0
Musakhel	2	1	3
Noshki	6	3	6
Ziarat	3	3	0
Barkhan	2	2	4
Kachhi	2	2	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>737</b>	<b>600</b>	<b>1,117</b>

### 3.2.1 Target Killings

The issue of target killings in the context of the broader Baloch conflict is complicated, involving ethno-political and sectarian killings coupled with assassinations of government employees and personnel of law enforcement agencies. In 2010, an unprecedented increase was witnessed in target killings as 143 people were reported killed in this manner. Currently, three parallel trends of target killings are simultaneously going on in Balochistan, i.e., politically motivated targeted killings of political leadership, killing of non-Baloch settlers and ideologically motivated sectarian killings of Shia Hazara community.

### 3.2.2 Attacks/Target Killings of and Attacks on Political Leaders and Activists

A recent trend that seems to have taken root during 2010 was attacks and assassinations of Baloch political leaders by militants and

insurgents.<sup>31</sup> In 2010, 34 such attacks were reported, compared to 12 recorded in 2009.

Prominent Baloch nationalist political leaders attacked or killed in these attacks include secretary of Balochistan National Party-Mengal (BNP-M) Senator Habib Jalib who was assassinated near Sariab Road in Quetta. A little known organization called Ansarul Islam claimed responsibility for his murder.<sup>32</sup> BNP-M Khuzdar chapter President Haji Liaqut Ali Mengal was shot dead near his house in Qalat.<sup>33</sup> Former Turbat Nazim and central leader of National Party (NP) Maula Baksh Dasti was shot dead by armed men in Turbat.<sup>34</sup> In Tump, Sardar Nadir Jan Gichki of the royal family of Makran was shot and killed outside a mosque. He was maternal uncle of Balochistan National Party (BNP) chief Sardar Akhtar Mengal and a tribal chief of Tump, an area of Pakistan adjacent to the Iranian province of Seistan-Balochistan.<sup>35</sup>

Prominent leaders and activists of mainstream and religio-political parties were also attacked or assassinated. The most high profile attack of the year was the December 7 suicide bombing targeting the convoy of Balochistan Chief Minister Nawab Aslam Raisani at a railway crossing in Quetta. Raisani escaped injury in the attack, but 10 people including five security personnel and five civilians were injured. The banned TTP claimed responsibility for the attack. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Al-Alami had also claimed responsibility for the same attack earlier, but Ali Sher Haideri, a spokesman for Al-Alami, later denied involvement of his group. Interestingly, a spokesperson for Baloch Liberation United Front (BLUF), Sadiq Baloch, also claimed responsibility for the attack.<sup>36</sup> In December 2010, the convoy of Balochistan Governor Nawab Zulfiqar Ali Magsi also escaped a bomb explosion in Mangochar area of Qalat district. Banned group Baloch Republican Army claimed responsibility for that attack.<sup>37</sup> In

September, in a possible reaction to the federal interior minister's decision to ban five separatist organizations<sup>38</sup> in Balochistan and possibility of a military operation in the province, Baloch insurgents claimed responsibility for a powerful bomb blast outside the Quetta residence of Balochistan Finance Minister Asim Kurd, which left three people dead and as many injured.<sup>39</sup>

In Khuzdar district, the provincial president of Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) Sardar Abdul Aziz Imrani was shot dead along with his nephew by nationalist insurgents. Another PML-N leader, Rehmatullah Baloch, was shot dead along with his son in Khuzdar.<sup>40</sup> In Naseerabad district, General Secretary of Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam Fazl (JUI-F) Mir Mitha Khan Jattak was shot dead along with his two bodyguards when his car was attacked in Babakot area.<sup>41</sup>

### 3.2.3 Target Killing of Settlers<sup>42</sup>

Incidents of target killing of Punjabi and other non-Baloch settlers had first begun in Balochistan with the murder of Nawab Akbar Bugti in August 2006 and Mir Balach Marri in November 2007. Such killings have continued ever since. In 2010, however, not only was the number of such killings alarming, but their scope also spread to the districts of Noshki, Khuzdar, Mastung, Gwadar, Turbat and Kech.<sup>43</sup>

Baloch insurgents and certain other groups generally targeted the poorer sections of society—such as barbers and tailors claiming that they were informers for intelligence agencies—or the more well-off Punjabi businessmen. On August 14, militants of Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) assassinated 16 ethnic Punjabis in two incidents of target killings in Bolan and Quetta districts. These incidents created further panic among the Punjabi settler community of Balochistan.<sup>44</sup>

Approximately 100,000 Punjabi settlers have migrated from the province in the last few years due to a growing sense of insecurity, selling their properties at throwaway prices.<sup>45</sup>

### 3.2.4 Enforced Disappearances

Another factor that added to an acute sense of human insecurity in Balochistan was the issue of enforced disappearances. According to many quarters, the number of such disappearances have doubled since the current democratic dispensation assumed control of the government in the province. People have allegedly been picked up and held in illegal and unacknowledged custody ad infinitum without any news of their whereabouts.

The situation of enforced disappearances further worsened as bullet-riddled bodies of people believed to have been victims of enforced disappearance in the province started showing up with increased frequency. The victims were killed with a single shot to the head and their bodies showed signs of torture. The victims were almost all Baloch. Reliable data on the number of missing persons in Balochistan is not available. Figures quoted by different organizations vary greatly.<sup>46</sup> Ironically, most of the missing persons belong to areas where no terrorist activity has been reported.<sup>47</sup>

Baloch nationalist forces claim that the number of the illegally detained is around 9,000.<sup>48</sup> However, these figures have not been independently verified so far.<sup>49</sup> The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) has verified 600 cases of enforced disappearance.<sup>50</sup>

## 3.3 Sindh

In Sindh, a total of 111 attacks were reported in 2010, which claimed lives of 238 people and injured another 466. Excluding Karachi, as many as 18 terrorist attacks occurred in various parts of Sindh. Except for Karachi, the

overall security situation in parts of interior Sindh was peaceful. A new trend of low-intensity explosions was witnessed along railway tracks in parts of interior Sindh. Some pamphlets were also found near the blast sites. A little known group called Sindh Liberation Army claimed responsibility for these attacks.<sup>51</sup> (See Table 8)

**Table 8: Terrorist Attacks in Sindh**

Districts (excluding Karachi)	No. of Attacks	Killed	Injured
Khairpur	4	1	0
Dadu	1	4	20
Hyderabad	7	0	0
Sukkur	1	0	0
Ghotki	3	0	10
Nawabshah	1	0	0
Shikarpur	1	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>30</b>

### 3.3.1 Karachi

Karachi's security landscape was marred by a combination of ethno-political violence, sectarian strife, militancy and gang warfare in 2010. As many as 93 terrorist attacks were reported from Karachi in 2010, which claimed the lives of 233 people. (See Table 9)

**Table 9: Terrorist Attacks in Karachi**

Month	No. of Attacks	Killed	Injured
January	1	0	3
February	2	34	100
March	5	11	10
April	9	8	7
May	0	0	0
June	14	20	9
July	8	20	7
August	15	25	16
September	13	16	10
October	9	55	102
November	9	35	156
December	8	9	16
<b>Total</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>233</b>	<b>436</b>

### 3.3.2 Ethno-Political Violence

At least 233 incidents of ethno-political violence were reported throughout the country in 2010, claiming the lives of 660 people and injuring another 966. Much of the violence emanated from turf wars—for land, control of drug and other rackets, and political influence. An overwhelming majority of such attacks took place in Karachi, among activists and supporters of Pakistan People's Party (PPP), Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) and Awami National Party (ANP), the three main parties in Pakistan's national coalition government. The murder of MQM leaders Dr Imran Farooq, in London, and of Raza Haider, in Karachi, aggravated ethnic tensions in Karachi in 2010.<sup>52</sup> Increased complexity



compared to 2009 was the defining characteristic of Karachi's ethno-political violence in 2010. Intermittent attacks also took place in Punjab, KPK, Balochistan, Azad Jammu and Kashmir, Gilgit Baltistan, as well as parts of interior Sindh. In Punjab, violence erupted between activists of the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and PML-Quaid in Gujrat district, and between supporters of the PPP and the PML-N in Muzaffargarh district during by-elections. In KPK, the main reason of such violence was riots in Abbotabad district during demands for establishment of Hazara province. (See Table 10)

**Table 10: Ethno-Political Violence in 2010**

Areas	No. of Attacks	Killed	Injured
Sindh	205	636	637
KPK	9	11	182
Balochistan	5	2	97
Islamabad	2	1	2
Punjab	8	7	33
Azad Kashmir	2	1	11
Gilgit Baltistan	2	2	4
<b>Total</b>	<b>233</b>	<b>660</b>	<b>966</b>


### 3.4 Punjab

In 2010, the banned extremists and militant outfits intensified their activities in Punjab. Not only did the number of terrorist attacks increase, from 46 in 2009 to 62 in 2010, but the devastating floods also provided an opportunity to some extremist outfits to win popular sympathies through effective relief and rehabilitation efforts where the state response was at times found to be slow or insufficient. (See Table 11)

**Table 11: Terrorist Attacks in Punjab in 2010**

Month	No. of Attacks	Killed	Injured
January	4	0	31
February	3	0	10
March	11	82	211
April	2	4	3
May	13	116	179
June	5	6	19
July	10	47	204
August	1	0	2
September	8	46	208
October	4	8	30
November	2	0	0
December			
<b>Total</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>309</b>	<b>897</b>

In 2010, the Punjab province experienced new trends in militant activity. For instance, instead of attacking security forces and law enforcement agencies, the terrorist organizations opted to launch more attacks against targets that were easy to hit because of less stringent security. These targets included mosques, shrines, CD shops, Internet cafés and hospitals. As many as 39 of the 62 terrorist attacks recorded in Punjab in 2010 struck such 'soft targets'. As a consequence, the highest number of casualties in Punjab in such attacks were among civilians. (See Chart 2)

**Chart 2: Casualties Distribution**

Lahore, the capital of Punjab, was worst hit by terrorism where 44 terrorist attacks took place in 2010, compared to 11 in 2009. Despite a noticeable increase in the number of terrorist attacks in Punjab, the casualties were less than the previous year, which could be due to comparatively fewer suicide attacks at crowded places in 2010.<sup>53</sup>

South Punjab was least affected by the terrorist attacks that had so viciously targeted other parts of Punjab. Seven low-intensity attacks hit the region. It appears that the militant outfits are consciously using South Punjab as a recruitment ground and do not want to attract attention by carrying out terrorist attacks there.<sup>54</sup> (See Table 12)

**Table 12: Comparison of Casualties for 2009 and 2010**

Year	No of Attacks	Casualties
2009	46	17,62
2010	62	1,206

As is evident from the statistics, the number of terrorist attacks in Punjab has significantly increased in the year 2010. There were 46

terrorist attacks in the province in 2009, and 62 in 2010. The geographic distribution of terrorist attacks in Punjab in 2010 depicts that Central Punjab was the area worst-affected by militancy, where 46 out of the total 62 attacks took place.

### 3.5 Azad Kashmir

The suicide attacks that began in Azad Kashmir in June 2009 continued in the year 2010 as well. With three suicide attacks and two bomb blasts in 2010 militants confirmed their presence in the region. The five attacks claimed the lives of four army personnel. Of the 28 people injured in these attacks, 15 were army personnel, three policemen and 10 civilians. The first suicide attack in 2010 was reported on January 6 in Tararkhel in district Sudhnoti when a suicide bomber blew himself up outside a military barrack, killing four soldiers and injuring another 11. The second suicide attack on January 16 injured two army personnel when a teenaged suicide bomber targeted a security forces' convoy near Dothan in Rawalakot district. In the third attack, a suicide bomber struck an army vehicle in Rawalakot district. (See Table 13)

Rawalakot (Poonch) and Sudhnoti districts were the hub of militants' concentrated presence where the security forces also foiled several terrorist bids and seized bombs and explosive in search operations during the year.<sup>55</sup> A local militant organization called Tehrik-e-Taliban, Kashmir chapter, was also active in the two districts and militants affiliated with the group threatened people through a number of posters to 'end vulgarity'. Moreover, the bombing of a private cable TV operator in Palandri district underlined the militants' threat in the area.<sup>56</sup> A little known militant group Lashkar-e-Zil also surfaced in Kashmir, claiming responsibility for suicide attacks in Azad Kashmir.<sup>57</sup>

**Table 13: Terrorist Attacks in Azad Kashmir**

Districts	Attacks	Killed	Injured
Rawalakot (Poonch)	3	-	17
Sudhnoti	2	4	11
<b>Total</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>28</b>

### 3.6 Gilgit Baltistan

Ever since the establishment of a new assembly and the government through the Gilgit Baltistan (Empowerment and Self-Governance) Order 2009, this region formerly known as the Northern Areas has witnessed relative political stability. In 2010, the overall security situation of Gilgit Baltistan improved. However, lingering sectarian tensions remained the main cause for insecurity in the area. In 13 attacks in the region in 2010, all of which were sectarian in nature, seven people were killed and 16 injured. The city of Gilgit was the most affected area, where 10 incidents of target killing—most of them against the Shia community—were reported. One incident took place in a village of Ganchay district where a library of the minority Noor Bakhshi sect of Islam was torched by members of a rival sect after a clash between the two sects. (See Table 14)

A history of religious intolerance and politics on sectarian basis in Gilgit has fuelled constant sectarian tensions. In 2010, a peace committee was established to promote religious harmony in the city. Members of the committee from the Shia and Sunni sects decided to co-operate with each other to stop the sectarian killings but the body has failed to deliver so far.<sup>58</sup>

Talking about sectarian tensions in the area, D.J. Mithal, chief editor of daily Bang-e-Sahar, said, "The clerics of Shia and Sunni schools of thought are equally responsible for the

prevailing religious intolerance and sectarian polarization in the region.<sup>59</sup>

The presence of banned militant groups cannot be ruled out in the area as on January 26 a TTP militant hailing from Peshawar was arrested from Gilgit.<sup>60</sup> However, according to the Gilgit Superintendent of Police (SP), "The local groups, and not Taliban or Al Qaeda, are involved in sectarian attacks."<sup>61</sup> A mastermind of sectarian attacks in Gilgit, Faizan was arrested from Abbotabad in March. He hails from Gilgit. After a wave of target killings in August that erupted after a football match, the security forces launched a search operation in Gilgit and partially succeeded in restoring law and order to the city.

**Table 14: Terrorist Attacks in Gilgit Baltistan**

Month	No. of Attacks	Killed	Injured
February	1	0	5
March	3	1	4
July	1	1	0
August	6	5	4
September	1	0	3
October	1	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>16</b>

### 3.7 Islamabad

In 2010, Islamabad was relatively calm and peaceful compared to the previous year. Six reported attacks claimed lives of 15 people and injured 35 others in the federal capital in 2010. In April, three low-intensity explosives/IED blasts targeted two government colleges and a super market in the city. However, no casualties were reported. Two other attacks targeted NATO supply convoys in Sangjani and Sihala areas in the peripheries of Islamabad, causing death of 14 people and injuries to another 34. The attack at Sangjani on June 9 claimed the lives of eight



people and caused injuries to 25 others. On October 3, militants ambushed a convoy of NATO oil tankers near Sihala, killing six people and injuring nine others. The TTP claimed responsibility for the attack.<sup>62</sup> These were the first such attacks near Islamabad and created an acute sense of insecurity among the residents of the federal capital. (See Table 15)

The stringent measures by the government contributed to improved security in Islamabad during 2010. Security check points coupled with increased surveillance limited the militants' ability to strike in the capital.<sup>63</sup> By expanding the red zone area from Parliament House to Serena and Marriott, the two main hotels in the city, all the routes in the area have been closed for public transport. The installation of two state-of-the-art scanners imported from China at the main entry point into Islamabad at Rawat Toll Plaza and Islamabad Toll Plaza for detecting explosive-laden vehicles was also a crucial security initiative by the government in 2010.<sup>64</sup>

Arrests from Islamabad of militants—including Muhammad Asghar, the mastermind of the 2009 Parade Lane mosque attack in Rawalpindi, a TTP commander Samiullah, and suspects of attacks on NATO supply convoys—throughout the year pointed to pockets of active local support for the militants in the area.<sup>65</sup>


**Table 15: Terrorist Attacks in Islamabad in 2010**

Month	No. of Attacks	Killed	Injured
April	3	0	0
June	2	9	26
October	1	6	9
<b>Total</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>35</b>

#### 4. Suicide Attacks

In 2010, suicide attacks occurred at a rate of about two per month, with a little over half of them occurring in KPK. FATA was the second most severely affected region by suicide bombings, where 14 attacks took place, followed by Punjab with nine suicide attacks. (See Chart 3) Although still very high, the number of suicide attacks in Pakistan in 2010 was lower than the previous year. Compared to 87 such attacks in 2009, 68 suicide bombings were reported in 2010. A gradual and consistent increase has been noticed in the number of suicide attacks and the consequent fatalities in Pakistan since 2005. However, 2010 was the first year since 2005 when both the number of suicide attacks and fatalities in such attacks declined compared to the previous year. (See Chart 2) Law enforcement agencies equally contributed to curtailing the number of suicide bombings. According to data collected by PIPS, at least 52 would-be suicide bombers were apprehended by the police and other law enforcement and security agencies across Pakistan in 2010.<sup>66</sup>

**Chart 3: Area Distribution of Suicide Attacks in 2010**



Out of 1,187 people killed in suicide attacks across Pakistan in 2010, the group with the highest number of the fatalities were the civilians. A total of 1,049 civilians and 138

personnel of armed forces and law enforcement agencies lost their lives in suicide terrorism. Complex suicide attacks involving multiple bombers increased in Pakistan in 2010. Attacks at the shrine of Hazrat Ali Hajveri in Lahore in July, CID centre in Karachi in November and targeting of Shia mourners in Karbala Gamay Shah in Lahore in September are glaring examples of the use of coordinated suicide attacks by the terrorist groups.

Investigators are also probing suicide attacks by women, a phenomenon that emerged in Pakistan in 2010. The first ever suicide attack perpetrated by a female struck an IDP camp in Kohat in April. More than 41 people were killed in the attack, which was attributed to Lashkar-e-Jhangvi al-Almi.<sup>67</sup> The outfit reportedly carried out another attack using a female bomber in Lahore to target a procession of Shia mourners in September. The third suicide attack by a female bomber occurred in Bajaur Agency in December. Female bombers and operatives had been present in militant outfits in the past as well and they had previously been used as carriers to transport suicide jackets to the bombers.<sup>68</sup>

## 5. Sectarian Violence

The number of incidents of sectarian violence in 2010 was exactly the same as in 2009 but the number of casualties, both deaths and injuries, increased significantly. A total of 152 incidents of sectarian violence, including sectarian-related attacks and clashes, killed 663 people, representing a 50 percent hike in fatalities compared to 2009, and injured another 1,569 people, almost three times more than in 2009.

Moreover, more than 50 percent of such casualties in 2009 were due to the sectarian-related clashes between rival tribes in Kurram Agency in FATA, while in 2010 more than 60 percent of the total casualties in sectarian violence were concentrated in Karachi, Lahore

and Quetta. While tracking incidence of sectarian-related acts of terrorism, including suicide attacks, a significant geographical shift can be observed from Dera Ismail Khan in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2009 to Karachi and Lahore—provincial capitals of Sindh and Punjab provinces, respectively—in 2010. Analysts do not consider that surprising and assert that sectarian conflict dates back to the Sipah-e-Sahaba (SSP) campaigns in Punjab in the 1980s when military ruler General Ziaul Haq was in power.<sup>69</sup> Since then Karachi and Punjab have been hubs of violent sectarian groups. On the other hand, although a large number of incidents of sectarian-related clashes were reported in FATA, mainly Kurram Agency, during 2010, more than 30 percent of such clashes were reported from cities across Punjab and from Hyderabad and Karachi in Sindh. (See Table 16)

Besides a geographical shift in sectarian violence, another considerable trend during the year was the change in tactics by perpetrators of sectarian violence. There were almost twice as many sectarian-related suicide attacks and incidents of target killing in 2010 than there had been in 2009.

Out of the 68 suicide attacks in Pakistan during 2010, as many as 14, or more than 20 percent, had either sectarian motives or hit sectarian targets, causing the death of 234 people and injuries to another 833. Six of these suicide attacks were reported in Punjab—five in Lahore and one in Sargodha—four in Karachi, three in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa—one each in Mardan, Kohat and Hangu—and one in Quetta, provincial capital of Balochistan. The targets of these attacks included three Shia processions at Karbala Gamay Shah in Lahore; the shrine of Hazrat Ali Hajveri, also in Lahore; an *Imambargah* in Sargodha; two Shia processions and the shrine of Abdullah Shah Ghazi in Karachi; a passenger van of Shia community in

Kohat; a worship place of Ahmedis in Mardan; a hospital in Hangu; and a rally of Shia community in Quetta.

### 5.1 Sectarian-related Terrorist Attacks

As many as 114 sectarian-related terrorist attacks were reported in Pakistan during 2010, including the 14 suicide attacks cited above, killing 485 people and injuring 1,305. Karachi was the worst-hit city which faced about 45 percent of the total attacks. Of the total 18 sectarian-related terrorist attacks in Punjab, including six suicide attacks, nine occurred in Lahore. As many as 188 people were killed and 528 injured in the nine sectarian-related terrorist attacks in Lahore. Quetta was the third most affected district where 10 such acts of terrorism, including a suicide attack, killed 85 people and injured 231. (See Table 16)

**Table 16: Sectarian-related Terrorist Attacks**

Province /region	District	No. of Attacks	Killed	Injured
Sindh	Karachi	51	121	230
Punjab	Lahore	9	188	528
	Faisalabad	1	0	4
	Rawalpindi	1	0	25
	Sargodha	2	1	23
	Bahawalpur	2	3	8
	Pakpattan	2	7	25
	Khanewal	1	1	2
Balochistan	Quetta	10	85	231
	Kech	1	2	8
	Khuzdar	1	1	0
	Swat	1	0	0

Khyber	D.I. Khan	1	7	32
	Peshawar	6	11	61
Pakhtun-khwa	Mardan	2	2	8
	Kohat	2	19	39
	Hangu	2	26	43
FATA Agencies	Khyber	4	1	6
	Orakzai	1	0	9
	Kurram	1	3	7
Gilgit Baltistan	Gilgit	12	7	16
	Ganchay	1	0	0
<b>Total</b>		<b>114</b>	<b>485</b>	<b>1,305</b>

The targets of sectarian-related attacks across Pakistan in 2010 included religious processions, gatherings and mosques of the Shia sect in Rawalpindi, Sargodha and Lahore; processions on Eid Miladun Nabi by Bareilvis (Sunni) in Faisalabad and Sargodha; a Sunni Ittehad rally in Pakpattan; worship places of Ahmedis in Lahore; shrines and mosques in Lahore, Pakpattan, Mian Channu (Khanewal) and Bahawalpur; target killing of activists of Ahl-e-Hadith sect and banned Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan in Lahore and Bahawalpur, respectively.

Sectarian tensions had started to escalate in Karachi after a bomb blast targeted a Shia procession on *Ashura*, in the Shia mourning month of Muharram, on December 28, 2009. The attack was followed by a series of agitations and acts of sabotage, looting and torching in Karachi in January 2010.<sup>70</sup> Two suicide attacks targeted Shia Muslims' *Chehlum* procession on February 5, 2010; one on a bus carrying mourners and the second in a hospital where injured from the first attack were being treated.<sup>71</sup> Although sectarian violence continued unabated in Karachi throughout 2010, mainly in the form of target



killing, sectarian-related terrorist attacks and sporadic clashes between activists of different sectarian groups, but it intensified in the second half of the year. Most of the incidents of sectarian violence took place in Nazimabad, Saeedabad, Liaquatabad, Mehmoodabad, Jinnah Road, Orangi, Shah Faisal Colony, Shahra-e-Faisal, Malir and Korangi localities of Karachi.

The groups involved in sectarian violence in Karachi in 2010, as suggested by police investigations,<sup>72</sup> media reports and arrests of militants associated with sectarian groups, included Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) which is now operating as Ahl-e-Sunnat wal Jamat (ASWJ), Jundullah, Sipah-e-Muhammad (SM), Imamia Student Organization (ISO), Tehrik-e-Ja'afria and, to some extent, Sunni Tehrik (ST). Shia religious scholars and leaders also highlighted Taliban's presence in Karachi and their alleged involvement in killing of members of the Shia community.

Sectarian violence in Karachi during 2010 can be categorized as Barelvi-Deobandi and Shia-Sunni strife. But experts on sectarianism in Pakistan doubt that Sipah-e-Muhammad will attack or clash with Barelvi groups such as Sunni Tehrik because the former treats them as allies.<sup>73</sup>

Clashes were also reported between two Sunni sects in the months of May and June over control of mosques in Karachi.

The incidents of sectarian target killing in Karachi in 2010 were sometimes confused with incidents of political violence. For instance, target killing of an MQM member of Sindh Assembly triggered a spate of political violence but later on law enforcement agencies' investigation and subsequent arrests suggested that the murder was motivated by sectarian impulses and a faction of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi was found to be involved.<sup>74</sup>

Some of the prominent figures killed in sectarian-related target killings in Karachi in 2010 included Allama Amir Hussain Shirazi (chief of ASWJ, Bin Qasim Town); Mufti Saeed Jalalpuri, (chief of Aalimi Majlis-e-Tahaffuz-e-Khatm-e-Nabuwat Karachi and one of the leading scholars at Jamia Binori Town); Maulana Abdul Ghafoor Nadeem (central leader of ASWJ and deputy of Maulana Azam Tariq); Manzoor Akhtar Khan (vice president ASWJ Karachi Division); Ayub Haider Naqvi, (leading Shia scholar); Mirza Khadim Hussain (son of Shia religious scholar Mirza Yusuf Hussain); Maulana Ehsan Farooqi (ASWJ spokesperson); Maulana Muhammad Ameen (chief of ASWJ, former president of SSP and teacher of Hadith at Jamia Binoria Al-Alamia); Syed Liaquat Hussain Nayyar Zaidi (founding president of Shia religious organization, Pasban-e-Aza).

Lahore, the provincial capital of Punjab, was hit hard by sectarian-related acts of terrorism in the year 2010. In Model Town and Garhi Shahu areas of Lahore, militants attacked two worship places of the Ahmedi community in May, killing 100 people, including 97 civilians and three police personnel and injuring 150 others. The TTP claimed responsibility for the attacks. Three suicide attacks hit the provincial capital in July, targeting the shrine of Hazrat Ali Hajveri, a famous Sunni saint and scholar popularly known as Data Sahib. As many as 45 people were killed and another 175 injured in the attacks on the shrine. Again in September, the city witnessed three near simultaneous suicide attacks on a Shia procession near Karbala Gamay Shah, in which at least 43 people were killed and 200 injured. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi al-Alami claimed responsibility for the attacks.

Balochistan witnessed 50 percent decline in sectarian-related terrorist attacks in 2010 compared to 2009 but the number of people killed and injured in these attacks almost quadrupled. A great majority of the sectarian-

related killings were perpetrated against the Shia Hazara community in and around Quetta invariably by proscribed anti-Shia militant outfit Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. Around half a million Hazaras reside in Quetta and its peripheries.<sup>75</sup>

Prominent members of the Hazara community target killed during the year included Hazara Democratic Party (HDP) Chairman Hussain Ali Yousafi; senior Balochistan High Court lawyer Walayat Hussain; Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP) Hassan Ali; prominent businessman and engineer Ahmed Ali Najfi; Balochistan government's Chief Mining Engineering Ashraf Ali Changezi; a member of District Government Syed Talib Agha; and DSP Ghulam Muhammad. All of them had received death threats prior to their assassination.

In 2010, KPK witnessed a 75 percent decrease in the number of sectarian-related terrorist attacks compared to 2009. However, the number of casualties, 79 people killed and 141 injured, was almost the same as in 2009. Compared to 2009, the overall frequency of incidents of sectarian violence, including attacks and clashes, decreased by 135 percent in KPK and FATA.<sup>76</sup> If the sectarian clashes between rival tribes in Kurram Agency in FATA are excluded then these two areas indeed experienced the lowest sectarian-related casualties throughout Pakistan in 2010.

In Gilgit Baltistan, sectarian violence increased almost threefold during 2010 compared to the previous year.<sup>77</sup>

## 5.2 Sectarian Clashes

As many as 178 people were killed and 264 others injured in 38 sectarian-related clashes reported all over Pakistan in 2010, compared to 48 such clashes the previous year. Of these clashes, 23 were reported from FATA, most of them in Kurram Agency, seven from Sindh, mainly in Karachi, and five from Punjab—one

each in Chakwal, Lahore, D. G. Khan, Faisalabad and Bahawalpur districts. (See Table 17)

**Table 17: Sectarian Clashes**

Province /region	District	No. of Attacks	Killed	Injured
FATA	Khyber	5	9	2
	North Waziristan	1	6	2
	Kurram	17	155	192
Sindh	Hyderabad	1	2	4
	Karachi	6	3	24
Punjab	Chakwal	1	0	3
	Lahore	1	0	0
	D.G. Khan	1	1	1
	Faisalabad	1	0	12
	Bahawalpur	1	0	12
KPK	D.I. Khan	1	2	3
Gilgit-Baltistan	Skardu	1	0	7
	Ganchay	1	0	2
<b>Total</b>		<b>38</b>	<b>178</b>	<b>264</b>

In Kurram Agency in FATA, sectarian clashes continued between rival sectarian groups throughout the year. Such clashes were reported between Mangal and Turi tribes, as well as Mangal and Bangash, and Shalozan and Shalozan Tangi tribes. Militants of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan were also reportedly engaged in sectarian-related clashes in Kurram Agency in June and in Khyber Agency in August. Meanwhile, rival sectarian groups in Khyber Agency, Ansarul Islam and Lashkar-e-Islam, continued to clash sporadically whereas at least one incident of sectarian infighting was also reported between militants of Ansarul Islam.

## 5.3 Attacks on Shrines and Worship Places

Terrorist attacks targeting worship places (including mosques, madrassas, *Imambargahs* and Ahmedis' worship places) and shrines of famous Sufi saints occurred throughout the

year. In 2010, a total of 262 people were killed and another 674 injured in 29 attacks on shrines and worship places across the country.

## 6. Attacks on NATO Supplies

The year 2010 saw Taliban militants attack and torch NATO supply convoys across the country. TTP frequently claimed responsibility for such attacks. In October, TTP spokesperson Azam Tariq said the Taliban were targeting NATO convoys in retaliation for escalating US drone attacks in North Waziristan. “We will intensify attacks with intensification of US drone strikes on us. We will not allow the use of Pakistani soil as a supply route for NATO troops based in Afghanistan,” he added.<sup>78</sup>

In 2010, at least 146 attacks were recorded on terminals of companies and trucks transporting supplies to NATO forces in Afghanistan. These attacks occurred across the country, including 102 in Balochistan, 24 in FATA and 12 in KPK, compared to 35 attacks reported in 2009. (See Table 18)

**Table 18: Attacks on NATO Supplies**

Areas	No. of Attacks
Balochistan	102
Islamabad	2
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	12
Punjab	3
Sindh	3
FATA	24
<b>Total</b>	<b>146</b>

In KPK, these attacks were concentrated along Ring Road in Peshawar, and in Khairabad and

Pabbi in Nowshera district. In Balochistan, such attacks occurred along National Highway, RCD Highway, in Wadh area in Khuzdar district, Chaman, Qalat, Pishin, Western Bypass in Quetta, Mithri in Bolan and in Choto area of Mastung district. In Punjab, these attacks were recorded in Tarnol area in Rawalpindi, on Talagang-Mianwali road in Chakwal and in Attock. NATO supplies also came under attack in Shikarpur and Karachi in Sindh; and in Landi Kotal and Jamrud sub-districts of Khyber Agency in FATA.

There were also reports of local transport contractors torching their own trucks and blaming it on the Taliban in order to claim insurance money or to get away with theft of NATO supplies.<sup>79</sup>

## 7. Attacks on Educational Institutions

Formal education suffered amid two distinct conflicts in Pakistan: a nationalist insurgency in Balochistan<sup>80</sup> and the Islamist militancy in KPK and FATA. In 2010, as many as 163 attacks were reported on educational institutions. As many as 46 of these attacks were in KPK, 104 in FATA, 10 in Balochistan, two in Islamabad and one in Sindh.

In Balochistan nationalist insurgent groups continued to threaten educationalists—most of them ethnic Punjabi and Urdu-speaking settlers—in the districts of Mastung, Noshki, Qalat, Gwadar, Khuzdar and Quetta, mainly demanding that the teachers stop teaching Pakistan history, hoisting of Pakistani flag and singing of national anthem at schools. Schools in Balochistan also received threats from Islamist militant groups.<sup>81</sup> In May 2010, the TTP threatened to attack all private schools in Mastung district if they did not replace the existing ‘Western-style uniform’ with the local dress of *Shalwar Kameez*. Female students were warned to observe full Islamic *Hijab*.<sup>82</sup>



## 8. Border Tensions

The security situation on Pakistan's border with Afghanistan remained volatile and 57 people were killed in Pakistani security forces' skirmishes with NATO/ISAF troops and with the Afghan army. Tensions increased on the border with Iran, mainly on account of Jundullah activists' attacks in the Iranian province of Seistan-Balochistan. Six clashes were reported between the border security forces of the two countries in 2010. Over three dozen incidents of cross-border firing or shelling were reported between the Pakistani and Indian security forces during the year.

**Table 19: Border Clashes in 2010**

Border	No. of Clashes	Killed	Injured
Pak-India	39	8	10
Pak-Iran	6	0	10
Pak-Afghan	24	57	33
<b>Total</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>53</b>

**Table 20: Casualties on Pakistan's Borders in 2010**

Category	Killed	Injured
Frontier Corps	3	3
Militants	40	12
Civilians	19	37
Army	3	1
Frontier Corps	3	3
<b>Total</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>53</b>

### 8.1 Pak-Afghan Border

The border has strategic importance for NATO and US-led allied forces in Afghanistan, not only because of the presence of terrorist networks along the frontier but also to secure the main overland supply routes for the international forces. In 2010, as many as 23 border clashes between the security forces on either side of the border were reported. (See Annex 6) Incursions of US drones into Pakistan's tribal areas and border violations by NATO troops and aircraft were reported.

A NATO/ISAF airstrike targeted an FC check post in Kurram Agency from Afghanistan's Paktia province. Three FC soldiers were killed in that attack and another three injured. Following that attack, the government immediately suspended NATO supplies via Torkhum border. The supplies were only restored more than a week later after the US tendered an official apology.<sup>83</sup>

In February, Pakistan registered its reservations over abandoning of security check posts by Afghan National Army and NATO forces along the Pak-Afghan border. NATO and ISAF assured Pakistan of securing the border but as soon as Operation Mushtarak in the Helmand province of Afghanistan started Afghan and NATO troops vacated their check posts leaving the border vulnerable to unhindered militant crossings into Pakistan.

### 8.2 Pak-Iran Border

Activities of Jundullah, an ethno-sectarian militant group active on the both sides of the border, caused tension on the border, with most of the border gates remaining shut for months. Despite the arrest and execution of Jundullah chief Abdul Malik Reigi in Iran, the group's attacks inside Iran continued.

**Table 21: Security Situation at Pak-Iran Border in 2010**

Months	No. of Clashes	Killed		Injured	
		Security Forces	Civilian	Security Forces	Civilian
Feb	2	0	0	0	2
Mar	1	0	0	0	1
Apr	1	0	0	0	4
May	1	0	0	0	3
Jul	1	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>10</b>

### 8.3. Pak-India Border

In 2010, 39 incidents of cross-border firing or shelling were reported between the Pakistani and Indian security forces, which caused the death of three Pakistani security personnel and five civilians. All these incidents were reported on the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir and the Sialkot Working Boundary. (See Table 22)

**Table 22: Security Situation at Pak-India Border (2010)**

Months	No. of Clashes	Killed		Injured	
		Security Forces	Civilian	Security Forces	Civilian
Jan	4	2	0	0	0
Feb	2	0	0	0	0
Mar	8	0	2	0	2
Apr	2	0	0	0	0
May	5	1	1	0	0
Jun	3	0	1	0	3
Jul	8	0	0	1	3
Aug	1	0	0	0	0
Sep	1	0	0	0	0
Oct	4	0	1	0	1
Dec	1	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>9</b>

Agency	No. of Attacks	Casualties	
		Killed	Injured
SWA	10	100	28
Khyber Agency	5	52	29
Kurram Agency	2	3	0
NWA	118	806	326
<b>Total</b>	<b>135</b>	<b>961</b>	<b>383</b>

### 9. Drone Attacks

2010 was the deadliest year in terms of number of drone attacks and casualties since such attacks began in Pakistan in 2004. As many as 87 percent of the drone attacks in 2010 were carried out in North Waziristan Agency. In 135 attacks, 961 suspected militants were killed and 338 wounded. As many as 118 attacks hit targets in North Waziristan, 10 in South Waziristan, five in Khyber Agency and two in Kurram Agency. (See Table 23)

**Table 23: Casualties in Drone Attacks in 2010**

Key Al Qaeda members killed in drone attacks in 2010 included Hussain Al-Yemeni, Sheikh Abdul Razaq, Attiya Abdul Rehman Muhammad Abbas Al-Harbi, Sheikh Mansoor, Osama bin Ali, Mustafa Abu Yazid aka Shiekh Saeed Al-Misri, Saddam Hussein Al-Hussami aka Ghazwan Al-Yemeni, Sheikh Mansoor, and Qari Abdul Haq Al-Turkistani.

Prominent Afghan and Pakistani Taliban leaders killed in drone strikes in the year 2010 included: Abdul Rehman alias commander, affiliated with Hafiz Gul Bahadur group, commander of Punjabi Taliban Muhammad Shoaib, local Taliban commander Qari Shams-ul-Haq, commander Safiullah Haqqani, a cousin of Sirajuddin Haqqani, commander Sajjad Khan, head of TTP's Karak chapter, Muhammad Haqqani, son of Jalaluddin Haqqani, and Punjabi Taliban leader Qari Zafar.

## 10. State Responses

Amid multiple challenges and threats such as political instability, institutional confrontation, economic volatility and a precarious security situation both internally and externally, the government undertook a host of strategies to cope with the mounting challenges.

### 10.1 FATA and KPK

In the conflict-hit areas of KPK and FATA, the government responded with wide-ranging political and military interventions to counter the militancy. Military campaigns continued in areas where militant networks still held sway. In 2010, the government's strategy to counter the militancy in Swat relied largely on military operations and no negotiations were held or peace agreements reached with militant groups. The 2009 peace agreement with Qari Gul Bahadur in North Waziristan remained intact and the military did not launch any operation in

the territory, although US drones conducted missile strikes there during the year.

#### 10.1.1 Political Front

On the political front, reconstruction of destroyed infrastructure and repatriation of internally displaced persons, to areas where military operations had been completed, was underway as the year ended.

In October, the KPK government approved a peace-building initiative, called the Post Crisis Need Assessment (PCNA), involving political and development initiatives in a move towards a revised anti-militancy strategy. Annex 7 describes some of the main initiatives and measures for KPK and FATA pledged by the government and the international community in 2010.

#### a. Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

In recent years the scale of internal displacement in Pakistan induced by conflict and natural disasters has been the largest in the world. The summer 2010 floods in Pakistan and the ensuing devastation not only increased the number of IDPs in the country but also compounded conflict-induced displacement from areas such as Swat. According to figures by United Nation High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), there were around 2 million IDPs in Pakistan in December 2010 on account of various conflicts and the monsoon floods. The largest IDP population had been uprooted from FATA, specifically from Bajaur (250,000), Mohmand (180,000), Khyber (56,000 - 100,000), Orakzai (200,000), Kurram (128,000) and South Waziristan (428,000) agencies.<sup>84</sup>

The state's responses to internal displacement have been rather slow and inadequate. In June 2010, the FATA Secretariat signed a "return policy framework" with the UN, committing to



voluntary return of conflict IDPs.<sup>85</sup> The international humanitarian response in Pakistan is led by UN Humanitarian Coordination and assisted by a host of other agencies under the inter-agency cluster approach. In October, the federal government constituted a task force to facilitate the return and rehabilitation of thousands of IDPs from FATA. The Director General of FATA Disaster Management Authority (FDMA) was appointed the chairman of the task force that comprised of the representatives of 11<sup>th</sup> Corps, Special Support Group, UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, International Rescue Committee and Provincial Disaster Management Authority. The International Committee of the Red Cross was given the status of observer.<sup>86</sup>

#### **b. Peace Committees and *Jirgas***

Through formation of peace committees and anti-Taliban *lashkars* in FATA and KPK, the government tried to encourage residents of the conflict-hit areas to assist the security forces in ensuring law and order in areas purged of militants.

Some of the main *Jirgas* (councils of tribal elders) facilitated by the political administration and the security forces in 2010, which mainly endorsed anti-militants strategies by the state, included:

1. A *Jirga* in January, attended by elders of Ahmadzai Wazir tribe in South Waziristan Agency, which announced to continue its cooperation with the government for restoration of peace in the area.
2. A *Jirga* of 120 members of Mehsud tribes in Wana, the headquarters of South Waziristan Agency that unanimously decided to keep the 2007 peace agreement with the government intact. The *Jirga* held in May also decided that violators of the peace agreement will be fined up to one million rupees.<sup>87</sup>
3. The Swat Qaumi *Jirga* expressed deep concerns regarding pardoning of militants by the government.
4. A *Jirga* of Mehsud tribal elders and political administration held on April 24 at Tank district unanimously announced the immediate return of conflict-induced IDPs to South Waziristan and vowed to fight the Taliban.<sup>88</sup>
5. In March, a grand *Jirga* of Salarzai Tribes held in Khar sub-district of Bajaur Agency unanimously decided not to provide sanctuary or any support to militants and announced penalties of torching of houses, and expulsion or fine of 2 million rupees for the people aiding or abetting militants in the area.<sup>89</sup>

#### **c. Compensations**

Compensation or assistance to civilian victims of terrorist attacks remained a critical issue. Although the KPK provincial government decided to increase the stipend for households affected by terrorist attacks from Rs 25,000 to Rs 50,000<sup>90</sup> and the federal government exempted the militancy-hit areas of KPK from tax survey for the next 10 years.<sup>91</sup>

In June 2010, reports emerged that damage to totally or partially destroyed houses had been assessed in Buner, Upper Dir and Swat districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and at least estimates of damages calculated in Bajaur and Mohmand regions in FATA. However, the same had not happened in Upper Swat and Lower Dir, Shangla, Hangu and Kohat districts in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and South Waziristan, Kurram and Orakzai agencies in FATA.<sup>92</sup>

#### **d. Sacking of Government Employees having alleged Links with Militants**

In 2010, the KPK administration directed government departments to sack employees found guilty of supporting the militants. A committee headed by the provincial chief secretary was formed to prepare a list of government officials found guilty of aiding the militants.<sup>93</sup> Action against Taliban sympathizers among government servants included suspension of at least 40 personnel of Khasadar force in Orakzai, Bajaur, North Waziristan and South Waziristan agencies in January for alleged links with the militants,<sup>94</sup> and sacking of 165 education department employees on the same ground.<sup>95</sup>

#### **e. Counter Terrorism Ordinance 2010 in PATA**

After promulgation of Counter Terrorism Ordinance 2010 in KPK, Governor Owais Ghani ordered implementation of ordinance in the conflict-hit areas of KPK's Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA).<sup>96</sup>

### **10.2 Operational Front**

#### **a. Military Operations**

Military operation *Rah-e-Nijat*, launched in South Waziristan and Orakzai agencies in 2009, continued in 2010. The security forces claimed dislodging militants from their strongholds in South Waziristan. During a visit to South Waziristan in December, army chief General Ashfaq Kiani maintained, "Undoubtedly 100 percent of South Waziristan has been virtually cleared from militants."<sup>97</sup>

A second military offensive was launched in Orakzai Agency in March and the army declared around 90 percent of Orakzai had been cleared of militants and that the area was safe for the displaced population's return.<sup>98</sup> A

military operation in Kurram Agency was still underway as the year 2010 ended. The military declared in July that militants had been driven out of around 80 percent of Kurram Agency.<sup>99</sup>

Three small-scale military campaigns were launched: in Frontier Region (FR) Kohat in January,<sup>100</sup> in FR Peshawar in September<sup>101</sup> and in Kala Dhaka area in Mansehra district of KPK in April.<sup>102</sup>

#### **b. Trial of Arrested Militants**

The federal government also gave approval for trial of some 3,000 militants arrested from Malakand Division, including chief of the banned Terik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi Sufi Muhammad and former TTP spokesperson in Swat Muslim Khan. The militants were to be tried in Malakand Division.<sup>103</sup> However, their trials had not begun until the end of 2010.

#### **c. Recruitment of Additional FC and Levies Personnel**

The Federal Interior Ministry lifted an official ban on recruitment to make new inductions in the paramilitary Frontier Corps (FC) in KPK and FATA and 4,000 new inductions were planned in 2011. The new recruits were to be given bullet-proof jackets and new vehicles.<sup>104</sup> A decision was also made to recruit 50,000 new police personnel in KPK and to increase the number of police stations from 230 to 450.<sup>105</sup> Recruitment of 48,000 additional personnel in Levies force in FATA, and PATA area of KPK was also approved.<sup>106</sup> The Federal Interior Ministry also planned to recruit women as Levies personnel in FATA to facilitate search of houses.<sup>107</sup>

### **10.2 Balochistan**

Unlike the government's emphasis on reconciliation in Balochistan in 2009, its strategy in the province in 2010 was a combination of

carrot and stick. The government expedited the pace of development projects,<sup>108</sup> extended an olive branch to exiled Baloch separatist leaders for negotiations,<sup>109</sup> recruited over 3,900 candidates in the provincial education department under the Aghaz-e-Huqooq-e-Balochistan Package,<sup>110</sup> and announced a 100 percent increase in the seats reserved for Baloch students in the universities and higher education institutions of Punjab. However, the government also banned five Baloch militant/insurgent organizations, namely Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), Baloch Liberation Front (BLF), Baloch Republican Army (BRA), Lashkar-e-Balochistan and *Baloch Musallah Difai Tanzeem* (Baloch Armed Defence Organization) in September. Their accounts and other assets were also frozen.<sup>111</sup>

The Pakistan army also initiated an eight-week specialized counter-insurgency training for Anti-Terrorism Force (ATF) and Balochistan Constabulary (BC) in order to improve the capabilities of Balochistan's law enforcement agencies.<sup>112</sup> Pakistan Army's Southern Command launched a drive to attract Baloch youth to join the armed forces. After relaxation in rules for recruitment, 8,339 youth from the province joined the army. After completion of training the Baloch were to be posted at duty stations of their choice within or outside the province.<sup>113</sup>

The Balochistan government also restored the traditional Levies force with the same jurisdiction that it had before its merger with the police, within the revenue limits of 23 of the 30 districts of the province.

#### 10.2.1 IDPs from Balochistan

The crisis of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Balochistan remained overshadowed by the insurgency in the province. The government had announced one billion rupees for rehabilitation of Bugti IDPs in the Aghaz-

e-Huqooq-e-Balochistan Package. So far the IDPs have not been resettled in their hometowns. Meanwhile due to ongoing violence some 100,000 non-Baloch settlers were reported to have been forced out of the province.<sup>114</sup>

#### 10.3 Ethno-Political Violence

After extensive ethno-political violence in Karachi in August 2010, Federal Interior Minister Rehman Malik and Sindh Home Minister Zulfikar Mirza held a number of meetings with the political stakeholders in the city. After several round of talks involving the PPP, MQM and ANP, the three political parties agreed on a 12-point code of conduct for restoration of peace to the city.<sup>115</sup>

After a spate of politically motivated targeted killings in Karachi in early 2010, additional policing powers were given to Rangers paramilitary force for 180 days along with temporary deployment of Frontier Constabulary contingents in August when ethno-political violence erupted again.<sup>116</sup>

In November, the Sindh government decided to formulate a 400-strong Anti-Target Killing Special Unit (ATKSU).<sup>117</sup> The decision to formulate an anti-terrorism task force of 10,000 personnel was also made. A comprehensive security model for Karachi along the pattern of a security plan in place in Islamabad was also planned.<sup>118</sup> Temporary measures such as prohibitions on assembly, ban on pillion riding and political gatherings, rallies and processions were also taken from time to time.

#### 10.4 Counter Terrorism Initiatives

##### 10.4.1 Terrorist Arrests

In 2010, law enforcement agencies arrested 10,161 suspected militants across the country, including 8,863 alleged activists of the TTP and



other Taliban groups, 50 Al Qaeda operatives, 288 suspected Afghan Taliban, 18 militants of Jundullah, 147 members of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, 108 people linked to the banned SSP, 112 militants of Baloch insurgent groups and 466 operatives of other banned militant outfits. Many of these suspects were released after preliminary investigations, although precise figures were not made public.<sup>119</sup> (See Annex 9)

Senior Al Qaeda leaders arrested in 2010 included American-born Al Qaeda leader Adam Yahya Ghadan, Umar Al-Misri, Abu Riyan al Zarqawi alias Abu Musa, Yahya Majadin Adams, Abdul Wahabi, Shireen Agha, Muhammad Daod Jalali and Roohullah Uzbek.

Key Afghan Taliban arrested in 2010 included Taliban Commander Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar—a close aide and deputy of Afghan Taliban's supreme commander Mullah Muhammad Omar—and key militant commander of Haqqani Network Amanullah Mehsud.

Arrested TTP members included Ismail Mehsud, commander Abu Waqas, affiliated with Bajaur's Naimatullah Group, Swat Taliban leader Abdullah Bhai, commander Yousaf alias Qari and Ameeruddin Mehsud and TTP leader Assad Amin.

#### 10.4.2 Search Operations

The security forces carried out a total of 435 search operations across the country in 2010, including 217 in KPK, 135 in FATA, 25 in Punjab and 30 in Balochistan and recovered stolen NATO goods, explosives, suicide jackets and weapons.

**Table 24: Search Operations Conducted in Pakistan in 2010**

Areas	No. of Search Operations
KPK	217
Tribal Areas	135
Punjab	25
Sindh	14
Gilgit Baltistan	2
Azad Kashmir	8
Balochistan	30
Islamabad	4
<b>Total</b>	<b>435</b>

#### 10.4.3 Initiatives to Enhance Capacity of Law Enforcement Agencies

Several plans were announced—both nationally and internationally—to enhance capacity of the security forces to overcome the mounting challenges of militancy, nationalist insurgency and ethno-political violence in the country. Closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras were also installed at key places of main cities in KPK to assist the security forces in maintenance of law and order.<sup>120</sup>

In February, President Asif Ali Zardari announced a plan to upgrade the paramilitary Levies force in the tribal areas. The planned measures included higher salaries, creation of new Levies units, improved transport and communication facilities, weapons and training and bringing the service structure at par with that of other paramilitary forces and police in the country.<sup>121</sup>

China announced an assistance package worth \$180 million for enhancing the capacity of Pakistan's law enforcement agencies.<sup>122</sup> The European Union (EU) also announced several training and capacity building programs to assist Pakistani law enforcement agencies in countering terrorism. The EU pledged €15 million as an initial grant to the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) for the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA).<sup>123</sup>

## 11. Challenges

Keeping in view the security landscape of 2010 following challenges of critical importance emerge:

### 11.1 Critical Areas

#### 11.1.1 FATA

There was no major change in the militant landscape of FATA in 2010 and it largely revolved around the same dynamics as it had in the last few years. (See Table 5) Despite the military's claims of clearing Frontier Region (FR) Peshawar, and the tribal agencies of South Waziristan, Bajaur and more than 90 percent of Orakzai Agency of militants, the overall security situation deteriorated. Kurram Agency reverberated with sectarian/tribal clashes between Bangash and Turi tribes. North Waziristan Agency witnessed an unprecedented upsurge in drone strikes amid increasing demands by the US for Pakistan to launch a major military operation in the tribal agency. Mohmand Agency witnessed mixed trends of peace and volatility with intermittent acts of violence.<sup>124</sup>

#### 11.1.2 KPK

Targeted killings of noted political leaders, pro-government tribal elders, anti-Taliban peace committee heads and volunteer members along with kidnappings for ransom, attacks on NATO

supply convoys, destruction of educational institutions and attacks on security forces' convoys and check posts throughout 2010 served as a stark reminder that the threat of militancy in KPK was far from over despite a dip in the number of attacks compared to the previous year. The decrease in the number of attacks can be misleading. KPK's security landscape is still vulnerable to militant onslaught, as is demonstrated by intermittent attacks and sporadic acts of violence by Taliban.

#### 11.1.3 Balochistan

The overall security situation in Balochistan continued to deteriorate in 2010 amid a combination of nationalist insurgency, sectarian-related militancy, Taliban presence in the northern part of the province, politically motivated target killings, attacks on educationists, NATO supplies and enforced disappearances/illegal detentions. Although the number of attacks in Balochistan in 2010 was lower than the previous year, the casualties in fact were 43 percent higher.

Growing attacks on political leaders and security forces personnel by Baloch insurgents signifies not only a tactical shift or a more conscious choice of targets, but also their transformation from rudimentary guerilla outfits to a more organized insurgent movement.

#### 11.1.4 Karachi

Intermittent cycles of violence repeatedly resulted in complete breakdown of law and order in Karachi, causing an acute sense of insecurity among the city's residents and bringing the economic activity in the country's financial nerve centre to a halt.<sup>125</sup> Incidents of ethnic, sectarian and terrorist/militant targeted killings also spiked substantially in 2010 compared to the previous year. A rather worrisome dimension of Karachi's security

landscape is Al Qaeda's slow but growing capability and influence in the city. The activities of Al Qaeda and its affiliates have also contributed to the abysmal security situation in the port city.

Karachi's Lyari town has long been a hub of criminal gangs and has often been plagued by gang warfare. Well-entrenched criminal gangs continue to thrive in absence of effective measures by the security forces.

A comparative analysis of crime statistics in 2010 with those of 2009 depicts a grim picture. Kidnappings, murders, motorcycle snatching and rioting have all gone up alarmingly.<sup>126</sup> The deterioration in law and order in Karachi can be gauged from the fact that on two occasions the provincial government was compelled to reacquisition Rangers paramilitary force under the Anti-Terrorism Act, entrusting it with policing powers for 180 days. (See Table 25)

**Table 25: Crime in Karachi in 2009 and 2010**

Crime Type	2009	2010	Increase in Incidents
Kidnappings	487	693	206
Murder	552	668	116
Rioting	545	673	128
Motorcycle Snatching	691	922	231

Source: Data obtained from Sindh Police website and newspapers

The political and ethnic polarization further grew in 2010 as the blame game between key political stakeholders proved a major stumbling block in arresting the increasing tide of ethno-political violence. Far beyond the question of who controls what in Karachi, political violence and target killings in the city have multiple

other dimensions as well. The dynamics of ethno-political violence in Karachi not only revolve around political 'turf wars' between various political stakeholders of the city, i.e., Muhajir versus Pashtun, Muhajir versus Muhajir and Muhajir versus Sindhi, but they are increasingly getting intermingled with sectarian conflict. The alleged involvement of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi in the murder of MQM leader Raza Haider has added a new dimension to Karachi's ethno-political violence. Although searain groups have long been present in the city, their involvement in Karachi's ethnic politics is a new development.<sup>127</sup>

The changing demographic balance of Karachi is another underlying reason for violence in the city. Pashtuns have migrated in large numbers to Karachi in recent years, following anti-Taliban military operations in Malakand Division and FATA, the summer 2010 floods and generally on account of better economic prospects that the city offers. Similarly, following the floods, some 200,000 Sindhis from Thatta, Kashmore and Jaccobabad districts found shelter in Karachi's relief camps. Many others left their flood-stricken homes to live with relatives in the city. This in turn has caused considerable unease among the ranks of the MQM, which fears that the IDPs will be absorbed by the Pashtun and Sindhi populations of Karachi and will not only never return to their native areas, but will also register as voters in the city and undermine MQM's electoral prospects.

#### 11.1.5 South Punjab

Southern Punjab has a robust presence of extremist and militant groups. The support the banned outfits have gained from their relief work during the summer 2010 floods has further undermined confidence in the government.<sup>128</sup> The provincial government's inability to take swift action to curtail the increasing activities of



banned groups prompted opposition parties to accuse the ruling PML-N party in Punjab of turning a blind eye to the increasing activities of these outfits.

## 11.2 Critical Internal Threats

### 11.2.1 Sectarian Violence

Given the fact that security agencies are already confronted with problems of militancy and extremism, the changing dynamics of sectarian violence from specific Sunni-Shia matrix to Deobandi-Barelvi and Barelvi-Hazara compounds the threat of sectarianism in Pakistan. The deadliest suicide attacks in 2010—suicide attacks in Lahore on Hazrat Ali Hajveri's shrine and on a Shia procession—demonstrate that.

The reincarnation of banned sectarian outfits under new names displays the ineffectiveness of such bans as a ploy to tackle sectarian violence in the country. The fluid nature of sectarian militant outfits makes detecting and cracking down on them all the more difficult.<sup>129</sup>

### 11.2.2 Militant Networks and Nexus

The continuing wave of terrorist attacks in Pakistan demonstrates not only that the terrorists retain the ability to strike across the country despite a major military offensive, but also that they would not suspend their attacks. A nexus of Al Qaeda, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and militant groups on mainland Pakistan is behind the prevailing wave of terrorism. A proliferation of militant groups has made the task of countering the threat more difficult for law enforcement agencies. Splinters of banned militant organizations as well as some emerging groups have been found involved in the recent spike in terror attacks in Punjab, Sindh and KPK.

Another challenge that the state authorities have to grapple with is that in spite of successful military offensive no prominent militant leader has been captured or killed. Despite the physical damage done to the terrorist infrastructure in the tribal areas, the militants' ability to carry out attacks against the security forces and in major urban city centers has not diminished.

### 11.2.3 Changing Tactics and Targets by Terrorists

Terrorists keep changing their targets and tactics. In 2010 terrorists changed their targets and intensified sectarian attacks, mainly on shrines of revered religious figure. Another tactic was to target a particular city through repeated strikes to increase the impact of terror. In 2009, terrorists had targeted Peshawar in that manner and in 2010 they focused on Lahore. In 2011, terrorist may well choose another city for repeated attacks. A major change noticed in the militants' strategy in 2010 has been the use of women for suicide attacks. It remains to be seen if that would become a trend. Law enforcement agencies also fear that terrorists can increase the use of children as suicide bombers.<sup>130</sup>

### 11.2.4 Growing Radicalization

Several surveys by PIPS on the subject have noted that growing radicalization in Pakistan makes a large and unemployed population of youth susceptible to courting by the militants. Since radicalization and terrorism have a cause-and-effect relationship in Pakistan, increased radicalization weakens the factors that can counter the phenomenon at the social level.<sup>131</sup> Radicalization in the country is a challenge that has not received the attention it deserves from the government.

### 11.2.5 Nexus between Terrorists and Criminals

A growing nexus between criminals and militants emerged as a serious concern for the

security agencies in 2010. Intelligence agencies' reports indicate that militants are aiding criminals in their activities, especially in abductions for ransom and robberies, in order to generate funds that would eventually help them carry out terrorist attacks.<sup>132</sup> Drug mafia and weapons smugglers are known to cooperate with Islamist militants and nationalist insurgents in Pakistan.<sup>133</sup> They also benefit from each others' networks and contacts for smuggling and cross-border movement.

### 11.2.6 Foreign Militants

The Al Qaeda network in Pakistan attracts radicals from all over the world for terror training. Already beset by militant terrorism, Pakistan can no longer afford to be merely reactive in countering that supply of potential recruits even without being pressured by the US and European nations to do more. Pakistan must develop better surveillance systems for foreigners to improve security for itself and the world at large.

## 11.3 Critical Policies/ Initiatives

### 11.3.1 Counter-terrorism Strategy

Pakistan is yet to develop a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy amid a systemic lack of ownership, consistency and direction of the overall security and counter-terrorism approach of the state. The law enforcement agencies have failed to keep up with the emerging challenges, not least because ideological narratives have prevented them from expanding their vision. The government has also failed to establish a substantial counter-terrorism narrative or force and as far as the latter is concerned is relying largely on its existing human and logistical resources. The law enforcement agencies can only cope with the new challenges by putting in place improved investigation, intelligence gathering and intelligence-sharing mechanisms, and by developing a quick response system.

Accurate threat perception is the key to effective response to the sort of terrorism threats Pakistan faces. A clear approach based on a distinction between the challenges of tribal insurgency and urban terrorism is required at the policy level.

### 11.3.2 Judicial Reforms

The high ratio of acquittal of suspected terrorists by courts of law in 2010 raised concerns about institutional deficiencies in the prosecution and judicial systems. Those acquitted were accused of involvement in the November 2009 suicide attacks in Rawalpindi, the September 2008 Marriott bombing in Islamabad, Manawan police training academy attacks in Lahore, and an attack on Pakistan Aeronautical Complex in Kamra. Malik Ishaq and Akram Lahori,<sup>134</sup> founders of banned sectarian terrorist group Lashkar-e-Jhangvi were acquitted in 45 cases because of less than impressive prosecution.<sup>135</sup> Both were facing more than 100 cases.

Judiciary and executive are both dissatisfied with the existing anti-terrorism laws and performance of the anti-terrorism courts. Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani has stated in the National Assembly that anti-terrorism laws need to be improved and expressed concern that terrorists apprehended by the law enforcement agencies had been allowed to walk free by the courts and had resumed terrorist activities.<sup>136</sup> Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry had showed his dissatisfaction with the poor functioning of anti-terrorism courts.<sup>137</sup>

Increased cooperation of the government with the judiciary in establishment of adequate number of anti-terrorism courts (ATC) and recruitment of judges and other staff can prove to be a good first step.

## 11.4 Critical Regional Issues

Pakistan's relations with its neighboring states, Afghanistan, India, China and Iran are directly

connected with its internal and regional security. The geo-strategic dynamics and the presence of militant extremists in Pakistan and Afghanistan signify that peace and security are possible only through collaborative regional approaches.

#### **11.4.1 Pak-Afghan**

The Taliban insurgency and border security are two major and interconnected issues that have had their impact on regional security and bilateral relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. In this perspective the following issues were in focus during 2010:

##### **11.4.2 Reconciliation with Taliban**

Afghan President Hamid Karzai visited Pakistan in March to seek Pakistan's support in a reconciliation process with Taliban. He acknowledged that Pakistan had a critical role in dialogue with Taliban.<sup>138</sup> Media reports suggest that Pakistan principally agreed and tried to broker a deal between Kabul and the Haqqani network and presented a roadmap for political settlement.<sup>139</sup> But talks between Kabul and the Haqqanis failed to get Washington's backing. It seems that the Americans are only interested in talks with Mullah Omar. The Haqqanis have also shown little interest in joining the Afghan government, unlike Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's militia, which in 2010 presented a 15-point peace plan to Karzai. Ground realities suggest that it is not possible for any Taliban group, including the Haqqani network, to completely break away from Al Qaeda. They can offer only a guarantee that they will influence Al Qaeda to not attack US or NATO forces, and a guarantee that their soil would not be used for terrorist attacks against the West.

The reconciliation overtures with Taliban in Afghanistan have also inspired debates in academic and policy circles in Pakistan for a similar reconciliation with Pakistani Taliban. But

in 2010 that did not get serious attention of the political and military establishment. The main reason behind that may be the two opposing approaches to tackling the Taliban problem, one endorsed by Washington and the other Kabul. They want talks with Taliban in Afghanistan but demand military action in North Waziristan. Ground realities suggest that issue will remain critical in 2011.

##### **11.4.3 Terrorists' Support**

On January 16, the foreign ministers of Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan issued a joint declaration committing that they will not allow the use of their soil against each other.<sup>140</sup> But mistrust prevailed on both sides, despite the ISI chief's visit to Kabul<sup>141</sup> for enhancing counter-terrorism cooperation. On December 24, Pakistani President Asif Zardari and President Karzai met in Turkey and agreed on consolidating intelligence-sharing mechanism,<sup>142</sup> which holds promise of reducing tension between the two countries.

##### **11.4.4 India's Role in Afghanistan**

India's involvement in Afghanistan is an issue of critical concern for Pakistan. The debate on increasing India's role in Afghanistan remained dominated during 2010. To address Pakistan's concerns, Kabul took a few initiatives including offering assurances that Afghan territory would not be allowed to be used against Pakistan's interest and a positive response to Pakistan Army chief General Ashfaq Kiani's offer to train Afghan military officers.<sup>143</sup>

##### **11.4.5 Transit Trade Agreement**

Pakistan and Afghanistan signed a transit trade agreement on July 18, which was facilitated by the US.<sup>144</sup> Islamabad said the agreement would allow Pakistan to export its goods to Central Asia. But the deal was also criticized amid apprehensions that it could



increase Kabul's dependence on New Delhi and enhance India's clout in Afghanistan. Although Pakistan's federal cabinet has approved the deal but the agreement will take some time to be fully implemented because of the reservations by the political and business community in Pakistan.

An agreement on Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India (TAPI) gas pipeline was also reached among member countries but protection of the pipeline remains a critical issue which would feature in discussions in 2011.

### 11.5 Pak-US

Pak-US relations in 2010 remained far from ideal. The US realizes that the Afghan war cannot be won without Pakistan's support<sup>145</sup> and took various initiatives to win over the Pakistani establishment. The strategic dialogue, humanitarian assistance during floods, military and economic assistance had only had limited impact, because of lingering issues of discord such as an operation in North Waziristan, drone strikes and violation of borders by NATO forces. However, mutual distrust has to be the biggest stumbling block that prevents development of joint strategies in the war on terror. During his 20th visit to Pakistan in October, US Admiral Mike Mullen admitted as much. "We left them in a dark hole from about 1990 to 2002, and they don't trust us," he had said.<sup>146</sup> While acknowledging Pakistan's sacrifices in the war on terrorism, the US keep pressuring Islamabad to do more.<sup>147</sup> On the other hand, US media keeps blaming Pakistan and its intelligence agencies, mainly the ISI, for supporting Taliban. The distrust seems to be rooted in the fact that the Pakistani establishment does not believe that the US understands Pakistan's security concerns in the regional context.

For confidence building, both countries had initiated a strategic dialogue and agreed to enhance coordination along the Pak-Afghan

border to stem the flow of militants across Durand Line. In the aftermath of NATO's incursions into Pakistani territory and the ensuing suspension of NATO supplies through Pakistani territory clearly indicates that more needs to be done in this sphere. An agreement from both sides to work on these areas will help remove suspicions and improve the working relationship.

Regarding the demand for an operation in North Waziristan, both countries need to reach a consensus. The political and military leadership in Pakistan maintains that reconstruction of conflict-hit areas and repatriation of IDPs are the priorities of Islamabad before it starts any new operation.<sup>148</sup> The implication of such an operation for internal security is also a major concern for Pakistani leadership, which fears that that could lead to expansion in militancy across the country. The public backing that had paved the way for military operations in Swat and South Waziristan is absent in the case of North Waziristan.

But the US establishment considers an operation North Waziristan critical in exerting pressure on Taliban in Afghanistan. But strategic options for the US are limited and it is unlikely that its wish for a full-fledged military campaign inside Pakistan's tribal areas would be granted.<sup>149</sup>

Amid a lack of consensus between Pakistan and the US over the military strategy, the US is expanding its tactical options, such as an increase in drone strikes and hot pursuit across the Pak-Afghan border. Civilian casualties in such operations will not only further chip away at US support in the country, but will also bring more pressure for the government Pakistan from its own people. Pakistan seems set to allow US to continue hitting selected target in drone strikes to avert any serious confrontation.

### 11.6 Iran

Iranian revolutionary guards intruded into Pakistan a number of times and fired rockets inside Pakistan, but Pakistan did not launch any formal protest, as it does in case of India and Afghanistan. At the same time, Iranian state officials kept criticizing the Pakistani security establishment for not doing enough against Jundullah, the Iranian separatist militant group, which is believed to have sanctuaries in the Pakistani province of Balochistan. Pakistan had helped Iran in capturing Jundullah chief Abdul Malik Reigi, which led to the arrest of more than two dozen alleged Jundullah militants and the hanging of Reigi in 2010.<sup>150</sup> Despite such collaboration, the Iranian foreign minister has demanded for Tehran's security forces to be allowed to launch operations against Jundullah in Pakistan.<sup>151</sup> The Jundullah issue seems set to continue to strain bilateral relations in 2011. It can also undermine the growing economic cooperation between the two countries. In 2010, both governments had signed a major gas pipeline agreement<sup>152</sup> and Pakistan had decided to import 110 megawatt electricity from Iran.<sup>153</sup>

### 11.7 India

2010 was another year of status quo between Pakistan and India as little progress was made in bilateral relations. The only exception was the water resources issue, as India agreed to allow Pakistan to inspect two under-construction hydropower projects on the Indus river in Indian-held Kashmir<sup>154</sup> and installation of a telemetry system on the river.<sup>155</sup> Another development was emergence of consensus on the reduced water flow in the Chenab river during the initial filling of the Baglihar dam in 2008 and Pakistan decided not to press the issue further.<sup>156</sup>

No breakthrough emerged on the Mumbai attack case, as Ajmal Kasab, the alleged culprit, kept changing his statements and was given the death sentence by court. India continued its

Lashkar-e-Taiba and terrorism mantras against Pakistan but has been unable to satisfy Pakistan regarding Islamabad's claim of Indian support for insurgents in Balochistan.

## 12. Recommendations

### 12.1 Internal Security

1. There is an urgent need to devise coordinated counter-terrorism strategies not only at the level of the law enforcement agencies but also at the policy level, with input from civil society and other stakeholders. The federal and provincial governments need to focus more on providing police with better training, equipment and experience-sharing with their international counterparts in order to effectively counter terrorism. Intelligence sharing and coordination among the various agencies tasked with counter terrorism must be improved.
2. The state's counter-terrorism strategy must not focus on short-term measures alone but must also cultivate long-term strategies to prevent the threat of radicalization from materializing in the first place. An alternative counter-narrative is vital to promoting religious harmony and tolerance.
3. Curbing financing of terrorism from all sources, particularly from abroad, merits considerable attention, as does effective implementation of anti-money laundering laws and UN Security Council resolutions on terrorist financing.
4. A cohesive legislative framework to deal with terrorism, under which anti-terrorism courts (ATCs) can effectively function, is crucial. Legislation alone cannot effectively deal with terrorism, until the capacity of the legal system, including that if the ATC

judges, lawyers and the prosecution department, is enhanced. In addition to merit-based appointment of judges of ATCs in a transparent manner, the Supreme Court and high courts should monitor the functioning of the ATCs in accordance with the Supreme Court judgment in the 1999 Sheikh Liaquat Hussain case. Successful prosecution is impossible without sufficient evidence. Therefore, police must be better trained in investigation and crime-scene examination. An effective witness protection program is also vital and without such a program witnesses crucial to the prosecution's case may prefer against cooperating with the state.

## 12.2 Critical Areas and Initiatives

1. Rapid completion of development initiatives in FATA and Malakand region is crucial. At the same, the international community needs to fulfill its commitments, as most development projects in these areas are dependent on foreign aid.
2. The state must review its policy of raising anti-Taliban *lashkars*, as they have proved ineffective in the absence of adequate official support. Deployment and enhancing the capacity of civilian law enforcement agencies could be an alternative.
3. There are multiple problems in the political, social, economic and administrative set-up of Balochistan and resolving those is at the heart of the conflict in Balochistan. The government should ensure implementation of the 7<sup>th</sup> NFC Award, the Aghaz-e-Huqooq-e-Balochistan package, and the 18<sup>th</sup> Constitutional Amendment to remove reservations of that province. So far Baloch nationalists are skeptical of these political initiatives, and only a visible change on the ground can help reduce the nationalists' separatist and anti-federation sentiments.

4. The security forces and law enforcement agencies including the FC, police, Levies and Balochistan Constabulary should be trained, equipped and resourced to maintain law and order in the province. The Levies system should be strengthened instead of giving policing responsibilities to the FC. Levies and Police departments are ill-equipped and the personnel are poorly trained. There are ambiguities regarding the mandate and jurisdiction of law enforcement agencies. Such confusion should be done away with by assigning each agency a clear role.
5. A lasting solution to Karachi's problems lies in de-weaponisation of armed wings of all political parties, along with smart intelligence through inter-agency coordination to stem the tide of rising sectarianism. Moreover, peace in the city is linked with reconciliation among various stakeholders through negotiations and political adjustments.

## 12.3 Borders and Regional Security

1. **Pak-Afghan Border:** The two countries can take joint initiatives to stop cross-border movement of Islamist militants as well terrorists involved in creating trouble in Balochistan. Pakistan has frequently offered joint monitoring of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and suggested an increase in information sharing between its security forces and NATO-ISAF troops on cross-border movement of terrorists.<sup>157</sup> Although both sides have agreed to set up biometric and electronic data exchange systems along Durand Line under the newly agreed Afghan-Pak Transit Trade Agreement,<sup>158</sup> concrete steps are awaited for that to materialize.
2. Pakistan and its partners in the war on terror need to evolve a consensus and



should consider the pros and cons of an operation in North Waziristan for all stakeholders. It will not have implications only for Pakistan but also for Afghanistan and NATO troops present there, as displaced militants could infiltrate and establish strongholds inside Afghanistan. That would be questionable particularly when a political approach of reconciliation with Taliban is apparent. Any military strategy must be in synch with the political approach. At the same time, Pakistan needs to convince its partners, that the Pakistani Taliban groups, against whom military operation are going on in other parts of FATA regions, are equally a threat to them. Pakistan can launch a precise operation in North Waziristan after considering the pros and cons and reaching a consensus with all its partners. Pakistan will need technologies such as drones and the US must consider Pakistan defense needs.

3. **Pak-Iran:** Pakistan needs to pay more attention to its ties with Iran, as those would be pivotal for economic growth and regional security. Critical bilateral issues, especially Jundullah need to be resolved, which is only possible with enhanced security cooperation between the two countries.

## Introduction

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- <sup>3</sup> Jim Lobe, "Rule of Law Prospers Most in Sweden, Least in Pakistan", Institute of Policy Studies, November 25, 2010.  
<http://www.ipsnews.net/index.asp>
- <sup>4</sup> *The Nation*, June 22, 2010.
- <sup>5</sup> Ammara Durrani, strategic communications specialist, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, interview with PIPS, Islamabad, January 3, 2011.

## Overview

- <sup>6</sup> These attacks included all the categories mentioned in Table 2.
- <sup>7</sup> Karachi suffered 93 attacks, Lahore 44, Peshawar 111 and Quetta 189 attacks in 2010.

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- <sup>9</sup> Aqeel Yousafzai, Peshawar-based Journalist, interview with PIPS, Islamabad, December 27, 2010.
- <sup>10</sup> *The Nation*, Islamabad, May 12, 2010.
- <sup>11</sup> *Dawn*, Islamabad, January 4, 2010; *Daily Aaj*, (Urdu), Peshawar, July 25, 2010; *Daily Times*, Islamabad, October 22, 2010.
- <sup>12</sup> *Dawn*, Islamabad, June 24, 2010
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- <sup>20</sup> *The News*, Islamabad, January 2, 2010.
- <sup>21</sup> *Daily Mashriq*, Peshawar, January 5, 2010.
- <sup>22</sup> *The News*, Islamabad, May 18, 2010.
- <sup>23</sup> *Daily Mashriq*, Islamabad, May 19, 2010.
- <sup>24</sup> *Daily Aaj*, Peshawar, January 9, 2010.
- <sup>25</sup> *Daily Mashriq*, Peshawar, July 6, 2010.
- <sup>26</sup> *Dawn*, Islamabad, October 15, 2010.

<sup>27</sup> *Daily Times*, Islamabad, March 29, 2010.

<sup>28</sup> *Daily Aaj*, Peshawar, September 8, 2010.

<sup>29</sup> *Daily Aaj*, Peshawar, November 8, 2010.

<sup>30</sup> *Daily Aaj*, Peshawar, October 15, 2010.

## Balochistan

- <sup>31</sup> Malik Siraj Akbar, Balochistan based journalist, email interview with PIPS, December 29, 2010.
- <sup>32</sup> *Daily Azadi*, (Urdu), Quetta, July 15, 2010.
- <sup>33</sup> *Dawn*, Islamabad, July 21, 2010.
- <sup>34</sup> *Dawn*, Islamabad, July 12, 2010.
- <sup>35</sup> *Daily Intikhab*, (Urdu), Quetta, August 19, 2010.
- <sup>36</sup> Saleem Shahid, "Raisani escapes suicide attack on convoy," *Dawn*, Islamabad, October 8, 2010.
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- <sup>41</sup> *Daily Intikhab*, (Urdu), Quetta, April 10, 2010.
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<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

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<sup>57</sup> "Lashkar-e-Zil behind Azad Kashmir suicide hits," *The News*, Islamabad, January 11, 2010.

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<sup>59</sup> D.J. Mithal, Chief Editor Daily Bang-e-Sahar Gilgit Baltistan, interview with PIPS, Gilgit, January 3, 2011.

<sup>60</sup> *Daily Bad-e-Shamal*, (Urdu), Gilgit, January 27, 2010.

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<sup>62</sup> *Daily Mashriq*, Peshawar, June 10, 2010.

<sup>63</sup> Safdar Sial, Research Analyst, interview with PIPS, Islamabad, January 4, 2010.

<sup>64</sup> *Dawn*, Islamabad, April 14, 2010.

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## Suicide Attacks

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
## Appendices

### 1. Pakistan and South Asia: A Comparison

Compared to 10,003 people killed in Pakistan in violent incidents during 2010, at least 7,123 were killed in Afghanistan and 4,021 in Iraq. In 2010, suicide attacks in Afghanistan increased by 45 percent as compared with 2009 with an average of three attacks per week.<sup>159</sup> Meanwhile Pakistan and Iraq witnessed 68 and 60 suicide attacks respectively in 2010. Although suicide attacks in Iraq and Pakistan decreased during the year, they still remain one of the most preferred tactics for militant outfits operating in both countries.

The security situation across South Asia in 2010 showed mixed trends of peace and volatility. A significant decline was observed in casualties in incidents of violence across the region—from 61,142 in 2009 to 35,302 in 2010. (See Chart 1) This decrease, however, does not indicate any substantial improvement in the regional security situation on the whole. The intensified reassertion of multiple types of violence induced by Islamist militancy, Maoists and nationalist insurgencies, ethno-political aggression, rioting and intermittent acts of violence constantly hobbled the counter-terrorism endeavors of regional states.

**Chart 1: Comparison of Casualties in Last Three Years**



Various factors account for this decrease in casualties. The most pertinent one is the pacification of the Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka. After the end of the conflict in Sri Lanka, there is little chance of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) regrouping to launch a substantial offensive. Maoists' agitation in India was partially active in 2010 resulting in an overall decline in casualty figure to 1,785 in 2010, compared to 3,364 in 2009. Casualty figures for 2009 show that 312 security personnel were killed to 294 Maoists. In 2010, the figures are grim but there were fewer violent attacks. It would be incorrect to attribute this decrease entirely to improvements on the part of the security forces, as military ground offensives such as Green Hunt Operation launched against Maoist guerrilla had only resulted in dispersing Maoists. Meanwhile, Pakistan—the most volatile country of the region—witnessed decline in terrorist attacks and casualties also declined in 2010 to 20,286 from 25,447 in 2009. The government's writ was substantially restored in two main conflict theaters of Pakistan, Malakand Division and FATA, after completion of military operations there.


Afghanistan remained the second most volatile country in the region where the number of militant attacks increased and the scale of the insurgency and counter-insurgency activities increased. Since the beginning of the war on terror, 2010 was the most lethal year with 10,885 casualties, including 1,753 civilian deaths. The year also took a heavy toll on foreign forces in Afghanistan with 536 ISAF and NATO troops killed.

The mounting instability in the country can be attributed to a number of factors. In 2010, an additional 34,000 US troops were deployed in Afghanistan and massive joint military operations launched by ISAF and Afghan National Army (ANA) against the Taliban. The militants responded by escalating suicide attacks and frequent use of improvised explosive devices. Reliance on use of force to subdue Al-Qaeda and the Taliban is yet to show meaningful results.

In Indian-held Kashmir, a strong struggle led by youth revived the demand of freedom and self-determination amid high civilian casualties at the hands of Indian security forces in 2010. The youths' distress was manifested by over 2,000 protests across Kashmir.

The security landscape of other regional states, including Maldives, Bangladesh and Bhutan, remained stable.


**Chart 2: Annual Casualty Figures in South Asian Countries**



The broadening arch of instability stretching from South Asia to the Middle East has engulfed three main theaters of Islamic militancy, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iraq.

A comparison with the other countries shows that along with full-fledged insurgency and terrorism launched by Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Pakistan, military offensives are on the rise too, resulting in higher civilian casualties. (See Chart 3) Pakistan has been beset by ethno-political violence in Karachi, sectarian attacks in various parts of the country, a serious insurgency in Balochistan, and devastating suicide bombings, and growing drone strikes in FATA. Afghanistan shares the same dimensions of violence as Pakistan, but in Iraq the nature of terrorism is purely indigenous and rooted substantially in the sectarian divide.



**Chart 3: Annual Comparison of Civilian Fatalities in Militant and Terror Attacks**

The most frequently used tactics by militant guerrillas includes IEDs followed by suicide bombings. In 2009, 99 suicide attacks struck Afghanistan, 87 such bombings were recorded in Pakistan and 80 in Iraq.

## 2. Non-Traditional Security Threats

Non-traditional security threats and challenges, both internal and transnational, which can originate from a variety of non-state, human and natural causes, can affect both government institutions and civilian populations. Security analysts emphasize the need to review and broaden the country's security doctrine to also include non-traditional security threats into the state security discourse.<sup>160</sup> They assert that this area has largely remained ignored by the Pakistani government, scholars and security analysts despite the implications it can have for the country's traditional security and stability. The following paragraphs describe how some of the non-traditional security challenges hit Pakistan hard in 2010.

### 2.1 Floods

During the 2010 monsoons, Pakistan experienced the worst flooding in its history. According to statistics by Pakistan's National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), as on 21 December, 1,985 people had been killed and 2,946 injured across Pakistan in the floods.<sup>161</sup> More than 1.7 million household were damaged and 20.18 million people affected. Floods also inundated over 2.2 million hectares of cropped land, affected 78 districts, and destroyed about 13,000 schools and 471 health facilities.<sup>162</sup>

Although the NDMA flood updates on 26 December said that nearly 80 percent of the internally displaced persons had returned to their native towns,<sup>163</sup> but the disaster was still far from over. According to UN's Pakistan Floods Emergency Response Plan 2010, only 50 percent of humanitarian funding for a range of needs for flood affectees had been met by December 16. The UN had requested international partners including UN organizations and NGOs for US \$1.9 billion through a revised response plan in November and had received a funding of US \$975 million by December 16, whereas pledges stood at US \$7.8 million.<sup>164</sup> IDPs' concerns about livelihood opportunities and inadequacy of shelter in areas of their origin have proved to be barriers to repatriation. Flood-displaced persons in Sindh are still moving towards their native towns. The UN had declared the Dadu, Jamshoro and Thatta districts in southern Sindh the priority districts in December, with significant numbers of flood-affected people in each district still dependent upon relief assistance for basic needs.<sup>165</sup>

Flood-affectedees were also still on the move in Balochistan by the end of 2010; over 4,300 families were reported to be in camps. Receding water had, however, allowed the people by then to move out of camps in Quetta, Sibi, Naseerabad and Jhal Magsi districts in Balochistan. Also in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), UNHCR profiled in December approximately 3,000 flood-affected families that remained in camps and spontaneous settlements.<sup>166</sup>

Another natural disaster in 2010 was witnessed in Gilgit Baltistan after landslides in Attabad formed a lake on Hunza river and blocked the Karakoram Highway, causing disruption of land access to Upper Hunza, and stranding almost 25,000 inhabitants living upstream of the blockage area.<sup>167</sup> According to NDMA, a total of 381 families had been displaced due to inundation, and 25,000 people were affected. The affected population from Hunza and Gilgit (2,692 families) were evacuated and housed in camps. The government used helicopter sorties and boat service to sustain the population upstream.<sup>168</sup> The prime minister also announced a special package for affectees of Gilgit Baltistan. But analysts and the displaced residents were quoted as saying that proper measures were not taken before or after the landslide created the lake.

The two natural disasters in 2010 exposed the capacity of the government and the relevant institutions to strategically plan for and manage natural disasters or ensure relief and rehabilitation for the affected population in an effectively manner. Analysts argue that the state response has not measured up to the scale of the devastation or the expectations of the people. Even the flow of international aid has been affected by gaps in the state's disaster management mechanisms.<sup>169</sup> Floods have also revealed that learning from previous disasters did not inform the fresh responses.<sup>170</sup> Moreover, if the state does not deliver in such disasters, other forces, including militant groups, often step in to fill the void. Militant organizations can indeed use their relief efforts as an opportunity to enlist fresh recruits in some areas, where recruitment has been reported previously, especially in South Punjab and parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.<sup>171</sup>

## 2.2 Food Security

Floods in 2010 also severely affected agriculture and food security in Pakistan. The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) warned in September that food security of millions in the flood-hit Pakistan was at risk.<sup>172</sup> Floods had inundated vast areas of fertile farmland and also destroyed over half a million tonnes of wheat seed stocks. Additionally, 1.2 million livestock and 6 million poultry were also lost.<sup>173</sup>

About 70 percent of Pakistan's population is dependent on agriculture. Apart from the recent floods, there are many other reasons for declining agricultural production due to which food production is not keeping pace with Pakistan's steadily growing population. In 2009, Pakistan ranked 11th on the world's Food Security Risk Index which placed it in the category of states at extreme risk. World food prices, while still higher than what they were prior to the global food crisis levels, had stabilized considerably but Pakistan continued to suffer from an acute food shortage and high food prices in 2010.<sup>174</sup>

In February 2010, according to FAO figures, the prices of wheat and rice—Pakistan's two chief staple crops—were 30 to 50 percent higher than before the global food crisis,<sup>175</sup> and were still on the increase. World Food Program (WFP) data from early 2010 showed that the prices of essential staples in Pakistan were nearly 40 percent higher than the five-year cumulative averages.<sup>176</sup> The cost of sugar and cooking oil

also escalated in the early months of 2010. The country remained stuck with the sugar crisis in the second half of the year as the government blamed the hoarders and traders for creating an artificial shortage of sugar to hike prices of their stocks.

Farmers and government authorities blamed drought-like conditions for reduced crop yields in late 2009 and early 2010. Rain-fed wheat-cropping areas were been hit particularly hard, yet even the yields of irrigated areas were at risk. In early 2010, Pakistan's minister for food and agriculture admitted that because of recurrent dry spells, "only prayers can avert low yield of wheat this year."<sup>177</sup>

From small farmers to the urban masses and IDPs, millions of Pakistanis are affected by the scourge of food insecurity—particularly the 77 million going hungry and the 36 percent of the population that Islamabad believes are afflicted by poverty.<sup>178</sup> In February 2010, the FAO said that the country's IDP crisis was causing "severe localized food insecurity."<sup>179</sup> Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are among Pakistan's worst hit regions in terms of food insecurity.

### 2.3 Energy

Pakistan's energy sector faces tremendous challenges which have mainly accumulated over time due to absence of long-term planning and management, and poor utilization of country's natural resources. The country is indeed trapped in a circular debt. For example, Pakistan State Oil (PSO) owes over Rs. 50 billion to oil refineries, which in return demand subsidy from the government. The Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) has failed to pay to the independent power production companies (IPPs) which has hampered capacity of the latter to generate power at full potential. Some of the major government institutions and offices have also been reported as not paying their electricity and gas bills.<sup>180</sup>

The country continued to face electricity shortages and extensive power outages throughout 2010. According to the government estimates in the year, Pakistan needs to add a power generation capacity of about 20,000 megawatts (MW) in 10 years (till 2020) with the focus mainly on indigenous resources, including coal, and by keeping Pakistan's energy needs less dependent on imported fuels. In line with this need, the government prepared a 10-year plan which required about US \$32 billion investment in the sector to bridge the supply-demand gap. The plan envisaged generation of 4,929MW of hydropower and about 3,500MW electricity by using indigenous coal.<sup>181</sup>

The Asian Development Bank carried out a third-party review of rental power for Pakistan which was issued in January 2010. Besides mentioning the weaknesses in technical, legal and financial arrangements, the ADB review also highlighted the Pakistani government's power management flaws such as least emphasis on energy efficiency and loss reduction programs.<sup>182</sup> The rental power arrangement also faces high political opposition where political parties argue that it will increase the cost of electricity by about 25 percent and will put economic burden on the people.

But the government continued to focus on electricity generated by rental plants during 2010, probably because of an immediate demand for electricity. At least three rental power plants (RPPs) were inaugurated in 2010 and one in December 2009. A Turkish rental power plant reached the Karachi port on November 18 under a five-year contract with the government. Docked at the Karachi port, it supplies 250MW of electricity to the Karachi Electric Supply Corporation (KESC) through WAPDA.



The government also announced an energy conservation plan on April 22 with an aim to save at least 500MW of electricity on a daily basis.<sup>183</sup> The plan demands a lot of sacrifices from everyone. Analysts have expressed serious reservations on successful implementation of the plan, and if this is the case then almost all sectors of economy will continue to suffer.

With regard to import of natural gas, Pakistan and Turkmenistan signed an agreement in December for Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline according to which Turkmenistan would pump in around 33 billion cubic meters of gas per annum, through the 1,640-kilometer-long gas pipeline, including 735 km across Afghanistan and another 800 km through Pakistan, before culminating in India.<sup>184</sup>

Meanwhile, the pilot project on Thar Coal is currently being executed under the supervision of Member Planning Commission Dr Samar Mobarakmand and Dr Muhammad Shabbir. It is expected that by April 2011 production of gas and electricity would start simultaneously.<sup>185</sup>

## 2.4 Water

Pakistan remained burdened by devastating water shortages in 2010. This water shortage affected both food security and energy security. The country's per capita water availability ranks among Asia's lowest, and is lower than that of many African nations. At least 90 percent of Pakistan's dwindling water supplies are allocated to agriculture, yet inefficient irrigation and poor drainage have produced epidemics of water logging and soil salinity across the countryside. As a result, vast expanses of farmland fail to produce successful harvests. Additionally, Pakistan is suffering from a chronic energy crisis with frequent electricity outages, which undermine the effectiveness of energy-dependent agricultural technologies.

A Dutch study in 2010 found that melting water from the Himalayas accounts for 60 percent of the water in the Indus river. The study also found that projected temperature, rainfall, and snow projections would likely lead to an 8.4 percent decrease in upstream water flow into the Indus by 2050 which would threaten the food security of those dependant on the river for irrigation.

## 2.5 Epidemics

According to the federal Health Ministry, Pandemic Influenza (H1N1), or *Swine Flu*, is a serious public health problem that has been causing severe illnesses and deaths for higher risk populations in Pakistan. The European Centre for Disease Control had reported Pakistan's first case of Swine Flu (Novel H1N1 – a new influenza virus) on August 3, 2009. National Institute of Health (NIH) confirmed on January 26, 2010 that 24 deaths had been reported from Swine Flu by that time throughout the country. Out of a total of 1,029 suspected cases, 253 were reported H1N1 positive while of the 24 deaths caused by the virus three were in Islamabad, 12 in Punjab, five in Sindh, two in AJK, one in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and one in Gilgit Baltistan.<sup>186</sup> Out of 253 positive cases, 76 were reported from Islamabad, 85 from Punjab, 13 from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 73 from Sindh, four from AJK, one from FATA and one from Gilgit Baltistan. This suggests the spread of this pandemic disease across Pakistan.

According to Pakistan's National Health Department (NHD), the number of confirmed patients of *Dengue Fever* and *Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever* in the country had risen to 5,050 by the end of November.

Moreover, the death toll as a result of the disease also rose to 31. Out of a total of 5,050 patients, 2,350 were in Sindh, 1,885 in Punjab, 158 in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. There were at least 380 patients in Rawalpindi and 230 in Islamabad.<sup>187</sup>

Although the government has launched comprehensive programmes and awareness campaigns to control and prevent pandemic diseases in Pakistan such as HIV/AIDS, influenza, tuberculosis (TB) and Dengue Fever, but the meager budget allocations for health, lack of awareness, poor condition of sanitation, contaminated drinking water, unhygienic food and eating habits, and other deteriorated health indicators suggest that Pakistan is very vulnerable to any transnational pandemic disease.



## Annexures

### Annex 1: Drones Strikes in 2010

Date	Place	Casualties		Tactic
		Killed	Injured	
Jan 1	Hakimkhel village Mir Ali, North Waziristan	2	4	US drones fired two missiles
Jan 3	Mosakai village, Mir Ali tehsil, North Waziristan	5	2	US drones fired two missiles
Jan 6	Sanzalai village, North Waziristan <b>(Two Attacks)</b>	17	7	US drones fired three missiles
Jan 8	Tappai village, North Waziristan	5	1	US drones fired two missiles
Jan 9	Ismail Khel village, North Waziristan	4	2	US drones fired two missiles
Jan 14	Shaktoi area, South Waziristan	12	8	US drones fired four missiles
Jan 15	Zanani village, Mirkhani area Mir Ali tehsil, North Waziristan <b>(Two Attacks)</b>	11	3	US drones fired five missiles
Jan 17	Ladha tehsil Shaktoi, South Waziristan	22	-	US drones fired four missiles
Jan 19	Degan area, North Waziristan	6	4	US drones fired two missiles
Jan 29	Dattakhel area, North Waziristan	15	4	US drones fired four missiles
Feb 2	Dattakhela village, Miran Shah, North Waziristan	31	10	US drones fired 18 missiles
Feb 14	Mir Ali town, North Waziristan	7	4	US drones fire two missiles
Feb 15	Tappi village Mir Ali, North Waziristan	4	1	US drones fired two missiles
Feb 17	Tapi Wazir Borakhel area, Miran Shah North Waziristan	4	2	US drones fired two missiles
Feb 18	Darga Mandi, Miranshah, North Waziristan	4	-	US drones fired two missiles
Feb 24	Dandy Derpakhel area Miran Shah, North Waziristan	14	6	US drones fired three missiles
Mar 8	Miran Shah, North Waziristan	9	6	US drones fired three missiles
Mar 10	Datakhel Tehsil, North Waziristan <b>(Two Attacks)</b>	14	3	US drones fired seven missiles
Mar 16	Dattakhela area, North Waziristan <b>(Two Attacks)</b>	14	2	US drones fired five missiles
Mar 17	Hamzoni village and Maizer Madakhel areas, North Waziristan <b>(Two Attacks)</b>	10	4	US drones fired five missiles
Mar 21	Inzar village, Miran Shah, North Waziristan	5	-	US drones fired two missiles
Mar 23	Miran Shah, North Waziristan	6	3	US drones fired two missiles
27 Mar	Hurmaz village, Mir Ali, North Waziristan	4	-	US drones fired two missiles
Mar 31	Mir Khunkhel area, North Waziristan	6	2	US drones fired two missiles
Apr 5	Miranshah, North Waziristan	3	3	US drones fired two missiles
Apr 12	Land Mohammad khel area, North Waziristan	13	2	US drones fired two missiles
Apr 14	Datakhel tehsil, North Waziristan	5	3	US drones fired two missiles
Apr 16	Toolkhel Village, North Waziristan	6	-	US drones files six missiles
Apr 24	Machi khel area Mir Ali, North Waziristan	9	3	US drones fired three missiles
Apr 26	Khushail village Mir Ali, North Waziristan	8	10	US drones fired three missiles
May 3	Machikhel village, Mir Ali, North Waziristan	5	3	US drones fired four missiles



May 9	Enzer Kass village, Dattakhela area, North Waziristan	10	3	US drones fired two missiles
May 11	Dattakhela area, North Waziristan <b>(Two Attacks)</b>	28	7	US drones fired 18 missiles
May 15	Tirah valley, Khyber Agency	15	9	US drones fired six missiles
May 21	Dattakhela area, North Waziristan	6	7	US drones fired five missiles
May 22	Muhammad Khel area, Miranshah, North Waziristan	10	10	US drones fired four missiles
May 28	Angoor Adda Area, South Waziristan	14	4	US drones fired two missile
June 10	Mir Ali, North Waziristan	3	-	US drones fired two missiles
June 11	Dattakhela area, North Waziristan	16	12	US drones fired two missiles
June 19	Mir Ali area, North Waziristan	17	18	US drones fired one missile
June 26	Mir Ali area, North Waziristan	4	1	US drones fired two missiles
June 27	Tapai Toolkhel area, Miranshah, North Waziristan	6	4	US Drone fired two missiles
June 29	Jaykhel Karez area, South Waziristan	10	2	US drones fired two missiles
July 1	Wana, South Waziristan	3	-	US drone fired two missiles
July 15	Dattakhela area, North Waziristan	14	5	US drones fired three missiles
July 24	Angoor Adda area, South Waziristan	16	4	US drones fired five missiles
July 25	Tabbi Talkhel area, North Waziristan	6	4	US drones fired two missiles
July 25	Shaktoi and Landikhel areas, South Waziristan <b>(Two Attacks)</b>	7	7	US drones fired two missiles
Aug 14	Mir Ali area, North Waziristan	12	4	US drones fired two missiles
Aug 21	Miranshah area, North Waziristan	6	-	US drones fired four missiles
Aug 23	Dandy Derpakhel, Darga Mandi and Miranshah areas, North Waziristan <b>(Two Attacks)</b>	24	15	US drone fired six missiles
Aug 27	Shaheedano Dhand area, Kurram Agency <b>(Two Attacks)</b>	3	-	US drones fired four missiles
Sept 3	Machus and Datakhel villages, Miranshah, North Waziristan	12	8	US drones fired six missiles
Sept 4	Maizer village, Miranshah area, North Waziristan	7	4	US drones fired two missiles
Sept 6	Dattakhel area, Miranshah, North Waziristan	5	5	US drones fired two missiles
Sept 8	Dandy Derpakhel, Degan villages, Miranshah area, North Waziristan <b>(Three Attacks)</b>	18	-	US drones fired six missiles
Sept 9	Machankhel area, North Waziristan	6	5	US drones fired two missiles
Sept 12	Dattakhela village, Miranshah area, North Waziristan	5	2	US drones fired two missiles
Sept 14	Shawal and Qutabkhel areas, North Waziristan <b>(Two Attacks)</b>	17	8	US drone fired six missiles
Sept 15	Dargah Mandi and Qutabkhel villages, North Waziristan <b>(Two Attacks)</b>	14	5	US drones fired twelve missiles
Sept 19	Dattakhela village, Miranshah area, North Waziristan	5	-	US drones fired two missiles
20 Sept	Shawal village, Miranshah area, North Waziristan <b>(Two Attacks)</b>	9	-	US drones fired four missiles

Sept 21	Azam Warsak village, South Waziristan	12	-	US drones fired two missiles
Sept 25	Dattakhel, Miranshah, North Waziristan	5	2	US drones fired two missiles
Sept 26	Lawara Mandi , Dand Kali and Sherani villages, Dattakhela area, North Waziristan <b>(Three Attacks)</b>	12	-	US drones fired three missiles
Sept 27	Mir Ali town, North Waziristan	2	-	US drones fired one missile
Sept 28	Angoor Adda area, South Waziristan	4	3	US drones fired two missile
Oct 2	Dattakhela area, North Waziristan Agency <b>(Three Attacks)</b>	18	10	US drones fired eight missiles
Oct 4	Mir Ali town, North Waziristan Agency	8	3	US drones fired two missiles
Oct 6	Miranshah area, North Waziristan Agency <b>(Two Attacks)</b>	11	2	US drones fired four missiles
Oct 7	Mir Ali area, North Waziristan Agency	4	2	US drones fired two missiles
Oct 8	Charkhel village, North Waziristan Agency	8	-	US drones fired two missiles
Oct 10	Spinwam area, North Waziristan Agency <b>(Two Attacks)</b>	8	3	US drone fired five missiles
Oct 11	Shawal village, Mir Ali town, North Waziristan Agency	7	3	US drones fired four missiles
Oct 13	Inzarkas village, Dattakhela area, North Waziristan Agency	7	4	US drones fired four missiles
Oct 15	Machikhel village, Mir Ali area, North Waziristan Agency <b>(Two Attacks)</b>	9	-	US drone fired five missiles
16 Oct	Azizkhel village, Naurak area, North Waziristan Agency	5	3	US drones fired four missiles
Oct 18	Sunzali area, Dattakhela area, North Waziristan Agency	7	2	US drones fired six missiles
Oct 27	Dattakhela area, North Waziristan Agency <b>(Two Attacks)</b>	9	4	US drone fired six missiles
Oct 28	Ismail Khel village, Datta Khel Tehsil North Waziristan Agency	7	-	US drones fired two missiles
Nov 1	Haider Khel village, Mir Ali area, North Waziristan	6	10	US drones fired three missiles
Nov 3	Mir Ali and Dattakhela areas, North Waziristan Agency <b>(Three Attacks)</b>	15	5	US drones fired nine missiles
7Nov 7	Miranshah and Dattakhela Area, North Waziristan Agency <b>(Two Attacks)</b>	13	5	US drones fired nine missiles
Nov 8	Miranshah, North Waziristan Agency	3	3	US drones fired three missiles
Nov 11	Gulikhel area, Miramshah, North Waziristan	8	5	US drones fired nine missiles
Nov 13	Hamzoni Village, Miran Shah, North Waziristan Agency	4	-	US drones fired four missiles
Nov 16	Gharos village, Hassan Khel area, North Waziristan Agency	20	3	US drones fired four missiles
Nov 19	Marsikhel village, Mir Ali, North Waziristan Agency	4	5	US drones fired four missiles
Nov 21	Khadi Village, Mir Ali, North Waziristan Agency	6	-	US drones fired four missiles
Nov 22	Mir Ali, North Waziristan Agency	6	1	US drones fired two missiles
Nov 26	Pir Kali village, Miranshah area, North Waziristan Agency	4	5	US drone fired two missiles

Nov 28	Speen Wam Area, North Waziristan Agency	4	-	US drones fired two missiles
Dec 5	Dattakhela area, North Waziristan Agency	5 Mil	-	US drones fired two missiles
Dec 6	Mir Ali area, North Waziristan Agency (Two Attacks)	8 Mil	6 Mil	US drones fired three missiles
Dec 10	Khaderkhel area, North Waziristan Agency	4 Mil	-	US drones fired two missiles
Dec 14	Miran Shah area, North Waziristan Agency	4 Mil	-	US drones fired three missiles
Dec 15	Datta Khel area, North Waziristan Agency	4 Mil	-	US drones fired one missile
Dec 16	Spin Drand village, Sipah area and Tirah areas, Khyber Agency	7 Mil	-	US drones fired one missile
Dec 17	Nangrosa village, Khushal Markaz, and Tirah areas, Khyber Agency (Three Attacks)	30 Mil	20 Mil	US drones fired three missile
Dec 27	Mir Ali and Machikhel areas, North Waziristan Agency (Two Attacks)	25 Mil	7 Mil	US drones fired eight missiles
Dec 28	Ghulam Khan Datta Khel villages, Mir Ali area, North Waziristan Agency (Four Attacks)	22 Mil	7 Mil	US drones fired three missiles
Dec 31	Ghulam Khan Area, North Waziristan Agency (Two Attacks)	8 Mil	5 Mil	US drones fired four missiles
<b>Total</b>	<b>135 Strikes</b>	<b>961 Killed</b>	<b>383 Injured</b>	

## Annex 2: Suicide Attacks in Pakistan 2010

### Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa

Date	Place	Target	Casualties		Suspect Org/ Claimant of Responsibility
			Killed	Injured	
Jan 1	Shah Hassankhel area, Laki Marwat	Volunteers of anti-Taliban peace committee	105 include 3 FC 102 Civ	100 Civ	Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
Jan 23	Gomal bazaar area, Tank	Police station	5 include 2 Pol 3 Civ	11 include 5 Pol 6 Civ	TTP
Feb 3	Taimargarah area, Lower Dir	FC Convoy	10 include 4 FC 3 US soldiers 3 Civ	131 Include 2 FC 2 US soldiers 127 Civ	TTP
Feb 11	Police lines area, Bannu (Two Attacks)	A police convoy	16 include 8 Pol 8 Civ	25 include 12 Pol 13 Civ	TTP
Feb 20	Mansehra, Balakot , (Two Attacks)	Police stations	2 Pol	12 5 Pol 7 Civ	TTP
Feb 22	Mingora, Swat	Security forces convoy	15 including 2 Arm	48 Civ	TTP



			13 Civ		
Feb 27	Karak	Police station	4 include 1 Pol 3 Civ	23 include 9 Pol 14 Civ	TTP
Mar 5	Tall area, Hangu	Civilian	14 Civ	35 Civ	TTP
Mar 13	Mingora, Swat	Security forces check post	17 include 2 Pol 2 Arm 13 Civ	64 Civ	TTP
Mar 29	Tank	Office of peace committee members	3 Civ	3 Civ	TTP
Apr 5	Peshawar	US consulate General	11 Civ	18 include 10 Civ 8 Arm	TTP
Apr 5	Taimergarra, Lower Dir	ANP rally	56 Civ	106 include 8 Pol 98 Civ	TTP
Apr 17	Kacha Pakha area, Kohat(Two Attacks)	IDP's Camp	41 Civ	64 Civ	Lashkar-e- Jhangvi (LeJ)
Apr 18	Kohat	Police station	7 Civ	31 include 7 Pol 2 FC 22 Civ	TTP
Apr 19	Qissa Khawani Bazaar, Peshawar	JI rally	27 Include 3 Pol 24 Civ	40 Civ	TTP
Apr 24	Taimergara area, Lower Dir	Police van	-	10 Pol	TTP
Apr 28	Pir Bala area, Peshawar	Police Check Post	4 Pol	14 include 8 Pol 6 Civ	TTP
May 1	A market in Mingora area, Swat	Security forces personnel	3 Civ	13 include 7 FC 6 Civ	TTP
July 5	Lower Dir	Scouts Camp	1 P-ml	12 include 10 P-ml 2 Civ	TTP
July 15	Mingora araa, Swat	Police personnel	6 Civ	58 Civ	TTP
July 26	Pabbi area, Nowshera	KP. Information Minister's house	9 include 4 Pol 5 Civ	25 Civ	TTP
Aug 4	FC Chowk area, Peshawar	FC Commandant Safwat Ghayoor	4 Include 1 FC 3 Civ	25 Civ	TTP
Sept 3	Muslim Abad area, Mardan	Ahmadis worship place	1 Civ	6 Civ	TTP
Sept 6	Lakki Marwat	Police station	19 include 7 Pol 12 Civ	57 Civ	TTP
Sept 7	Police Line Colony	Civilian	24 include	90 Civ	TTP

	area, Kohat		22 Civ 2 Pol		
Nov 1	Swabi	Police lines	3 Pol	13 include 4 Pol 9 Civ	TTP
Nov 5	Darra Adamkhel, Kohat	Mosque	95 Civ	100 Civ	TTP
Nov 30	Bannu	Police Van	7 Include 1 Pol 6 Civ	21 Include 2 Pol 19 Civ	TTP
Dec 8	Teerah Bazaar area, Kohat	Passenger Van	19 Civ	32 Civ	TTP
Dec 10	Passkaly area, Hangu	Private Hospital	17 include 2 Pol 15 Civ	30 Civ	LeJ
<b>Total</b>	<b>33 Attacks</b>		<b>545 Killed</b>	<b>1217 Injured</b>	

## FATA

Date	Place	Target	Casualties		Suspect Org/ Claimant of Responsibility
			Killed	Injured	
Jan 8	Tirah village, Khyber Agency	Bagh Markaz mosque	8 Civ	10 Civ	TTP
Jan 30	Khar sub district, Bajaur Agency	FC Check post	17 include 3 Lvs 14 Civ	47 Civ	TTP
Feb 10	Jamrud area, Khyber Agency	Khassaddar personnel	18 include 11 p-ml 7 Civ	15 include 8 p-ml 7 Civ	TTP
Feb 18	Tirah valley, Khyber Agency	Lashkar-e-Islam (militant group)	30 Civ	100 Civ	TTP
Mar 11	Bara sub district, Khyber Agency	FC Convoy	4 Civ	25 Civ	TTP
Mar 29	Tehsil Mamond Bajaur Agency	Tribal elders	2 Civ	5 Civ	TTP
Mar 31	Bara ara, Khyber Agency	Security Forces Camp	6 FC	20 FC	TTP
July 9	Yakka Ghund area, Mohmand Agency (Two Attacks)	Peace Jirga (Asst. political Agent office)	115 include 109 Civ 6 P-ml	113 Civ	TTP
Aug 23	Wana area, South Waziristan	Seminar of Former MNA of JUI(F)	30 Civ	12 Civ	TTP
Nov 14	Shakai area, South Waziristan Agency	Pro-Government Peace Committee member	1 Civ	9 Civ	TTP
Dec 6	Ghalnai area,	Political Agent	45 Include	60 Civ	TTP

	Mohmand Agency (Two Attacks)	Office	14 FC 31 Civ		
Dec 25	Khar area, Bajaur Agency	WFP Centre at Levis forces check post	47 Include 6 Lvs 41 Civ	100 Civ	TTP
Total	14 Attacks		323 Killed	516 Injured	

### Azad Kashmir

Date	Place	Target	Casualties		Suspect Org/ Claimant of Responsibility
			Killed	Injured	
Jan 6	Sandhoti District, Rawlakot	Military Installation	4 Arm	11 Arm	TTP
Jan 16	Poonch district, Rawlakot	Security Forces	-	2 Arm	TTP
Nov 11	Khaigilla Area Rawlakot district	Army Convoy	-	2 Arm	Banned Militants Outfit
<b>Total</b>	<b>3 Attacks</b>		<b>4 Killed</b>	<b>15 Injured</b>	

### Karachi

Date	Place	Target	Casualties		Suspect Org/ Accept Responsibility
			Killed	Injured	
Feb 5	Jinnah road, Karachi (Two Attacks)	Shia Chehlum procession	34Civ	100 Civ	Banned militant out fit Jandullah group
Oct 7	Karachi (Two Attacks)	Abdullah Shah Ghazi Shrine	8 Civ	77 Civ	TTP
Nov 11	Civil Lines area, Karachi	Crime Investigation Department CID office	21 Including 3 Pol 5 FC 13 Civ	150 Civ	TTP
<b>Total</b>	<b>5 Attacks</b>		<b>63 Killed</b>	<b>327 Injured</b>	

### Punjab

Date	Place	Target	Casualties		Suspect Org/ Accept Responsibility
			Killed	Injured	
Mar 8	Modal town area, Lahore	Special Investigation	15 include 9 Arm	93 Civ	TTP



		Agency (SIA) building	1 Pol 5 Civ		
Mar 12	RA Bazaar area, Allama Iqbal town Samanabad and Shadman area Lahore (Two Attacks)	Security personnel, civilian	66 include 9 Arm 57 Civ	116 Civ	TTP
July 1	Hazrat Ali Haveri's shrine (Two Attacks)	Data Ganj Bakhsh Shrine	45 Civ	175 Civ	Punjabi Taliban
July 18	Sharbat Chowk area Sargodha	Immambargah (Darul Uloom Mohammadia)	1 Civ	18 Civ	Punjabi Taliban
Sept 1	Gamay Shah, Bhati chowk areas Lahore (Three Attacks)	Shia procession	43 Civ	200 Civ	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Al-Alami (LeJ)
<b>Total</b>	<b>9 Attacks</b>		<b>170 Killed</b>	<b>602 injured</b>	

### Balochistan

Date	Place	Target	Casualties		Suspect Org/ Accept Responsibility
			Killed	Injured	
Apr 16	Jinnah Road Quetta	Civil Hospital	11 Include 4 Pol 7 Civ	40 include 7 Pol 33 Civ	LeJ
Sept 3	Meezan Chowk Area Quetta	Religious Procession (Al-Quds rally)	66 Civ	195 Civ	Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LeJ)
Sept 9	Soraab area Quetta	Finance Minister's house	5 Civ	4 Civ	Tribal insurgents
Dec 7	Quetta	Chief Minister's Convoy	-	10 include 5 Arm 5 Civ	TTP
<b>Total</b>	<b>4 Attacks</b>		<b>82 Killed</b>	<b>249 Injured</b>	

KNOWLEDGE FOR PEACE

### Annex 3: Attacks on NATO Supply Cargos in Pakistan in 2010

#### Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa

Date	Place	Target	Casualties		Suspect Org/ Accept Responsibility
			Killed	Injured	
Jan 4	Garhi Qamardin area, Ring Road Peshawar	NATO Trawler	1 Civ	1 Civ	Local Taliban
Jan 23	Ring road area, Peshawar	NATO Oil Tankers	-	-	Local Taliban
Feb 1	Ring road area, Peshawar	NATO Oil Tanker	-	-	Local Taliban
Feb 25	Ring road Peshawar	NATO Oil Tanker	-	-	Local Taliban
Mar 1	Ring road, Peshawar	NATO Oil Tanker	-	1 Civ	Local Taliban
June 24	Peshawar	NATO Oil Tankers	-	-	Local Taliban
July 13	Pabbi area, Nowshera	NATO oil Tankers	-	-	Local Taliban
Oct 6	Khairabad area, Nowshera	NATO Oil Tankers	-	-	TTP
Nov 1	Pabbi area, Nowshera	NATO Tankers	-	4 Civ	Local Taliban
Nov 20	Ring road area, Peshawar	NATO Oil Tankers	-	-	Mujahid-e-Islami Buraq Group (Taliban Group)

#### FATA

Date	Place	Target	Casualties		Suspect Org/ Accept Responsibility
			Killed	Injured	
Jan 29	Landi Kotal sub district, Khyber Agency	NATO Oil Tanker	-	1 Civ	Local Taliban
Mar 17	Landi Kotal district, Khyber Agency	NATO Oil Tanker	-	-	Local Taliban
Apr 5	Bara sub district, Khyber Agency	NATO Oil Tankers	1 Civ	-	Local Taliban
Apr 7	Landi Kotal Khyber Agency	NATO oil Tanker	1Civ	3 Civ	Local Taliban

Apr 1	Jamrud sub district, Khyber Agency	NATO Supply Convoy	-	-	Local Taliban
Apr 19	Jamrud and Landi Kotal sub districts, Khyber Agency	NATO Oil Tankers	1 Civ	2 Civ 1 P-ml	Local Taliban
May 12	Landi Kotal Khyber Agency	NATO Forces Convoy	-	-	Local Taliban
June 28	Landi Kotal sub districts, Khyber Agency	NATO Oil Tanker	-	-	Local Taliban
Aug 23	Landi Kotal sub district, Khyber Agency (Two Attacks)	NATO Oil Tankers	2 Civ	-	Local Taliban
Aug 24	Landi Kotal sub district, Khyber Agency	NATO Oil Tankers	-	-	Local Taliban
Aug 29	Torkham border area, Khyber Agency	NATO Oil Tankers	-	-	Afghan Taliban
Sept 23	Landi Kotal sub district and Torkham border area, Khyber Agency (Two Attacks)	NATO Oil Tankers	3 Civ	-	TTP
Sept 25	Torkham border area, Khyber Agency	NATO Oil Tankers	-	-	TTP
Oct 5	Torkham border area, Khyber Agency	NATO Oil Tanker	-	-	Local Taliban
Oct 9	Bara sub district, Khyber Agency	NATO Tankers	-	-	Local Taliban
Oct 15	Jamrud sub district, Khyber Agency	NATO Container	2 Civ	-	Local Taliban
Nov 5	Landi Kotal sub district, Khyber Agency (Two Attacks)	NATO Oil Tankers	-	-	Local Taliban
Nov 6	Jamrud sub district, Khyber Agency	NATO Oil Tanker	1 Civ	1 Civ	Local Taliban
Nov 8	Landi Kotal sub district, Khyber Agency	NATO Oil Tanker	-	-	Local Taliban
Dec 2	Mardan	NATO Containers	1 Civ	2 Civ	Local Taliban
Dec 6	Chamkani Jogian area, Peshawar	NATO Oil Tankers	-	-	Local Taliban
Dec 19	Jamrud Tehsil Khyber Agency	NATO Oil Tanker	-	2 Civ	Local Taliban
Dec 20	Landi Kotal Khyber Agency	NATO Oil Tanker	-	-	Mujahideen Islam Buraq group
Dec 29	Landi Kotal Khyber Agency	NATO Oil Tanker	1 Civ	2 Civ	Local Taliban



## Balochistan

Date	Place	Target	Casualties		Suspect Org/ Accept Responsibility
			Killed	Injured	
Jan 1	Kachlaak, Qila Abdullah	NATO Oil Tankers	-	-	Unknown militants
Jan 7	Chaman, Qilla Abdullah	NATO Oil Tankers	-	-	Unknown militants
Jan 8	Dagarri area Dasht, Mastung	NATO Oil Tanker	-	1 Civ	Unknown militants
Jan 10	Wadh area, Khuzdar	NATO Oil Tankers	-	2 Civ	Unknown militants
Jan 27	Lakpass area Quetta	NATO Oil Tanker	-	-	BLA
Jan 27	Qila Abdullah	NATO Oil tanker	-	1 Civ	Tribal insurgents
Feb 2	Mastung	NATO Truck	1 Civ	1 Civ	Unknown militants
Feb 4	Mastung	NATO Oil Tanker	-	3 Civ	Unknown militants
Feb 5	Chaman, Qilla Abdullah	NATO Oil Tanker	-	-	Unknown militants
Feb 6	Surab area, Qalat	NATO Oil Tanker	-	-	Unknown militants
Feb 18	Baghbana area, Khuzdar	NATO Oil Tanker	-	1 Civ	Unknown militants
Feb 26	Khuzdar	NATO Oil Tanker	-	-	Unknown militants
Mar 4	Khuzdar	NATO Trawler	-	-	Unknown militants
Mar 9	Khuzdar	NATO Supply Truck	-	1 Civ	Unknown Militants
Mar 14	Chaman, Qila Abdullah	NATO Oil Tanker	-	1 Civ	Unknown militants
Mar 15	Dhadar area, Bolan	NATO Oil Tanker	-	1 Civ	Unknown militants
Mar 16	Dhadar area, Bolan	NATO Oil Tankers	-	-	Unknown militants
Mar 20	Khuzdar	NATO Truck	-	2 Civ	Tribal insurgents
Mar 21	Chaman twon, Qila Abdullah	NATO Oil Tanker	-	-	Unknown militants
Mar 27	Manguchar area, Qalat	NATO Oil Tanker	-	3 Civ	Unknown militants
Apr 5	Khuzdar	NATO Trawler	-	2 Civ	Tribal Insurgents
12 Apr	Manguchar area, Qalat	NATO Oil Tanker	-	2 Civ	Tribal insurgents
Apr 13	Ornach area, Khuzdar	NATO Containers	-	-	Tribal insurgents

May 1	Chaman twon, Qila Abdullah	NATO Tanker	-	-	Tribal insurgents
May 5	Chaman town, Qila Abdullah	NATO Oil Tanker	-	-	Tribal insurgents
May 7	Khuzdar	NATO oil Tanker	-	2 Civ	Tribal insurgents
May 12	Chaman twon Qila Abdullah	NATO Oil Tankers	2Civ	2 Civ	Tribal insurgents
May 19	Chaman twon, Qila Abdullah	NATO Trucks	-	-	Tribal insurgents
June 2	Sibi	NATO Oil Tanker	-	2 Civ	Tribal insurgents
June 10	Wadh area, Khuzdar	NATO oil Tankers	-	3 Civ	Tribal insurgents
June 10	Awaran	NATO Oil Tankers	-	-	Tribal insurgents
June 12	Mach area, Bolan	NATO Oil Tanker	-	-	Tribal insurgents
June 15	Chaman, Qila Abdullah	NATO Oil Tanker	-	-	Tribal Insurgents
July 7	Chaman, Qila Abdullah	NATO Oil Tankers	-	2 Civ	Tribal insurgents
July 13	Mastung	NATO Oil Tanker	-	-	Tribal insurgents
July 16	Wadh area, Khuzdar	NATO Oil Tankers	-	-	Tribal insurgents
July 16	Mach area, Bolan	NATO Oil Tankers	-	1 Civ	Tribal insurgents
July 17	Qalat	NATO Oil Tankers	-	2 Civ	Tribal insurgents
July 22	Chaman, Qila Abdullah	NATO Supply Trawler	-	1 Civ	Tribal insurgents
July 23	Khuzdar	NATO Supply Containers	-	-	Tribal insurgents
July 30	Akhtarabad area, Quetta	NATO Oil Tanker	-	1 Civ	Tribal insurgents
Aug 5	Quetta	NATO Oil Tankers	1 Civ	1 Civ	Tribal insurgents
Aug 6	Quetta	NATO Oil Tankers	-	-	Tribal insurgents
Aug 16	Khuzdar	NATO Supply Trawlers	-	-	Tribal insurgents
Aug 19	Khuzdar	NATO Oil Tankers	-	-	Tribal insurgents
Aug 26	Manguchar area, Qalat	NATO Oil Tanker	-	-	Tribal insurgents
Aug 26	Sor Gaz area, Mastung	NATO Oil Tanker	-	-	Tribal insurgents

27 Aug	Khuzdar	NATO Trailer	-	2 Civ	Tribal insurgents
Aug 28	Mastung	NATO Tanker	-	-	Tribal insurgents
Aug 30	Mastung	NATO Tanker	-	-	Tribal insurgents
Aug 30	Khuzdar	NATO Tanker	-	-	Tribal insurgents
Aug 31	Baghban area, Khuzdar	NATO Oil Tankers	1 Civ	1 Civ	Tribal insurgents
Sept 1	Mastung	NATO Oil Tankers	-	1 Civ	Tribal insurgents
Sept 1	Khuzdar	NATO Oil Tanker	-	-	Tribal insurgents
Sept 4	Manguchar area Qalat	NATO Tankers	-	-	Tribal insurgents
Sept 5	Mastung	NATO Oil Tankers	-	-	Tribal insurgents
Sept 8	Khuzdar	NATO Trailers	-	-	Tribal insurgents
Sept 9	Soraab area Quetta	NATO Tanker	-	-	Tribal insurgents
Sept 18	Mastung	NATO Container	-	-	Tribal insurgents
Sept 20	Qalat	NATO Oil Tanker	-	-	Tribal insurgents
Sept 21	Baghbana area, Khuzdar	NATO Tankers	-	-	Tribal insurgents
Sept 22	Khuzdar	NATO Tankers	-	-	Tribal insurgents
Sept 24	Manguchar area, Qalat	NATO Containers	-	-	Tribal insurgents
Sept 25	Wadh Khuzdar	NATO Supply Trawler	-	1 Civ	Tribal insurgents
Sept 25	Manguchar area, Qalat	NATO Containers	1 Civ	-	Tribal insurgents
Sept 26	Mastung	NATO Tanker	-	-	Tribal insurgents
Sept 27	Khuzdar	NATO Tanker	-	-	Tribal insurgents
Oct 1	Khuzdar	NATO Oil Tankers	-	2 Civ	Tribal Insurgents
Oct 4	Manguchar area Qalat	NATO Oil Tankers	1 Civ	-	Tribal Insurgents
Oct 6	Quetta	NATO Oil Tankers	1 Civ	1 Civ	TTP
Oct 7	Khuzdar	NATO Oil Tankers	-	-	TTP
Oct 9	Sibi	NATO Oil Tankers	-	-	TTP



Oct 18	Quetta	NATO Oil Tankers	-	-	Tribal Insurgents
Oct 18	Manguchar area Qalat	NATO Oil Tankers	-	-	Tribal Insurgents
Oct 19	Dasht Bado area, Qalat	NATO Oil Tankers	-	-	Tribal Insurgents
Oct 24	Baghbana town, Khuzdar	NATO Oil Trucks	-	-	Tribal Insurgents
Oct 25	Khuzdar	NATO Oil Tankers	-	-	Tribal Insurgents
Oct 29	Khuzdar	NATO Oil Tankers	1 Civ	1 Civ	Tribal Insurgents
Nov 5	Zehri area Khuzdar	NATO Oil Tanker	2 Civ	3 Civ	Tribal Insurgents
Nov 7	Manguchar area, Qalat	NATO Oil Tanker	-	-	Tribal Insurgents
Nov 10	Dhadar area, Bolan	NATO Tankers	-	-	Tribal Insurgents
Nov 11	Mastung	NATO Oil Tankers	-	-	Tribal Insurgents
Nov 13	Chaman twon, Qilla Abdullah	NATO Tankers	-	-	Tribal Insurgents
Nov 14	Mach area, Bolan	NATO Tanker	1 Civ	-	Tribal Insurgents
Nov 26	Khuzdar	NATO Trawler	-	-	Tribal Insurgents
Dec 1	Chandni chowk, Khuzdar	NATO Oil Tanker	-	-	Tribal Insurgents
Dec 2	Chandni chowk, Khuzdar	NATO Oil Tanker	1 Civ	1 Civ	Tribal Insurgents
Dec 2	Rakhni area, Barkhan	NATO-Coal-Laden Truck	1 Civ	3 Civ	Tribal Insurgents
Dec 12	Mastung	NATO Supply Container	-	-	Tribal Insurgents
Dec 15	Qalat	NATO Oil Tanker	-	-	Tribal Insurgents
Dec 16	Khuzdar	NATO Oil Tanker	-	-	Tribal Insurgents
18 Dec	Bolan	NATO Oil Tanker	-	2 Civ	Tribal Insurgents
Dec 20	Khuzdar	NATO Trawler	-	-	Tribal Insurgents
Dec 21	Wadh area, Khuzdar	NATO Trawler	-	3 Civ	Tribal Insurgents
Dec 26	Ghadkhua and Dasht areas, Mastung	NATO Container	-	-	Tribal Insurgents
Dec 29	Qalat	NATO Oil Tanker	-	-	Tribal Insurgents
Dec 30	Kachhi	NATO Oil Tanker	1 Civ	-	Tribal Insurgents

## Punjab

Date	Place	Target	Casualties		Suspect Org/ Accept Responsibility
			Killed	Injured	
July 22	Talagang area, Chakwal	NATO Oil Tanker	-	-	Punjabi Taliban
Sep 4	Fateh Jang area, Attock	NATO Oil Tanker	1 Civ	1 Civ	Unknown militants
Nov 7	Talagang area, Chakwal	NATO Oil Tanker	-	-	Unknown Militants

## Islamabad

Date	Place	Target	Casualties		Suspect Org/ Accept Responsibility
			Killed	Injured	
Aug 3	Shahzad town area, Islamabad	NATO Truck	-	-	Unknown armed men
Oct 3	Defense Housaing Authority (DHA) Phase 2 area, Islamabad	NATO Oil Tankers	6 Civ	9 Civ	TTP

## Sindh

Date	Place	Target	Casualties		Suspect Org/ Accept Responsibility
			Killed	Injured	
Jan 28	Dalda Mor, Northern Bypass, Karachi	NATO Trucks	-	3 Civ	Local Taliban
Sept 30	Shikarpur District	NATO Oil Tankers	-	-	TTP
Nov 29	Manghupeer area, Karachi	NATO Trawler	-	-	Unknown armed men

KNOWLEDGE FOR PEACE

## Annex 4: Attacks on Educational Institutes

### FATA

Date	Place	Target	Suspect Org/ Claimant of Responsibility
Jan 1	Landi Kotal sub district, Khyber Agency	Boys Primary School	Local Taliban
Jan 2	Mamond sub district, Bajaur Agency	Two Boys Schools	Local Taliban
Jan 5	Nawagai t sub district, Bajaur Agency	Govt. Girls School	Local Taliban
Jan 6	Salarzai sub district, Bajaur Agency	Govt. Boys Primary School	Local Taliban
Jan 6	Safi sub district, Mohmand Agency	Govt. Girls School	Local Taliban
Jan 6	Landi Kotal sub district, Khyber Agency	Private Girls School	Local Taliban
Jan 18	Landi Kotal sub district, Khyber Agency	Govt. Boys Primary School	Local Taliban
Jan 20	Salarzai sub district, Bajaur agency	Govt. Boys Middle school	Local Taliban
Feb 7	Safi sub district, Mohmand Agency	Govt. Girls Middle Schools	Local Taliban
Feb 13	Safi sub district, Mohmand agency	Boys High School	Local Taliban
Feb 16	Safi sub district, Mohmand agency	Govt. High School For Boys	Local Taliban
Feb 21	Safi sub district, Mohmand Agency (Two Attacks)	Govt. Boys High School and Govt. Middle Schools for Boys	Local Taliban
Feb 21	Kurram Agency	Boys Degree College	Local Taliban
Feb 24	Ambar sub district, Mohmand Agency	Govt. School	Local Taliban
Feb 25	Safi sub district, Mohmand Agency	Boys Primary School	Local Taliban
Feb 26	Safi sub district, Mohmand Agency	Govt. City College for Boys	Local Taliban
Mar 3	Spin Qabar sub district, Khyber agency	A private Boys School	Local Taliban
Mar 17	Nawagai sub district, Bajaur Agency	Govt. Girls Primary School	Local Taliban
Mar 17	WANA, South Waziristan	Govt. School	Local Taliban
Mar 20	Safi sub district, Mohmand agency	Govt. Primary School for Boys	Local Taliban
Mar 21	Nawagai sub district, Bajaur Agency	Govt. Primary Boys School	Local Taliban
Mar 24	Khar sub district, Bajaur Agency	Govt. Girls School	Local Taliban
Mar 25	Nawagai sub district, Bajaur Agency	Govt. Girls School	Local Taliban
Mar 27	Bara sub district, Khyber agency	Govt. Boys Primary School	Local Taliban
Mar 27	Safi sub district, Mohmand agency	Govt. Middle School	Local Taliban
Mar 31	Utmankhel area, Orakzai Agency	School	Local Taliban
Apr 2	Safi sub district, Mohmand Agency	Girls High School	Local Taliban
Apr 2	Bezot and Jhalka Mela area, Orakzai Agency (Two Attacks)	Middle School For Girls and a Tech nical institute for Boys	TTP
Apr 4	Bakhmal area, Mohmand Agency	Govt. Boys Primary School	Local Taliban
Apr 5	Suran Darah area, Mohmand Agency	Boys Primary School	Local Taliban
Apr 6	Bara sub district, Khyber Agency	Govt. Boys Primary School	Local Taliban
Apr 9	Bara sub district, Khyber Agency	Govt. Girls Primary School	Local Taliban
Apr 11	Safi sub district, Mohmand Agency	Govt. Boys Middle School	Local Taliban
Apr 12	Ambar sub district, Mohmand Agency	Govt. Girls School	Local Taliban
Apr 15	Safi sub district, Mohmand Agency (Three Attacks)	Govt. Schools Boys and Girls School	Local Taliban
Apr 18	WANA, South Waziristan	Govt. Middle School	Local Taliban
Apr 19	Bara sub district, Khyber Agency	Govt. Primary School	Local Taliban
Apr 20	Landi Kotal sub district, Khyber Agency	Govt. Girls Primary School	Local Taliban



Apr 23	Mamozai sub district, Orakzai Agency	Govt. Girls School	Local Taliban
Apr 25	Khar sub district, Bajaur Agency	Girl's Primary School	Local Taliban
Apr 29	Mosa Kor area, Mohmand Agency	Girls School	Local Taliban
Apr 29	Mamozai area, Orakzai Agency (Three Attacks)	Three Govt. Schools	Local Taliban
Apr 30	Khar subdistrict, Bajaur Agency	Girls Middle School	Local Taliban
May 2	Khar sub district, Bajaur Agency (Two Attacks)	Govt. Boys Middle and High Schools	Local Taliban
28May	Safi sub district, Mohmand Agency	Primary School	Local Taliban
June 1	Safi sub district, Mohmand Agency	School	Local Taliban
June 12	Orakzai Agency	Girls Primary and Boys High Schools	Local Taliban
June 13	Ambar sub district, Mohmand Agency	School	Local Taliban
June 14	Ashfarabad area, Mohmand Agency	Girls Primary School	Local Taliban
June 21	Yousaf abad area, Bajaur Agency	Primary School	Local Taliban
June 27	Khar sub district, Bajaur Agency	High School	Local Taliban
July 6	Khar sub district, Bajaur Agency (Two Attacks)	Govt. Girls Primary School and Boys Primary School	Local Taliban
July 7	Khar sub district, Bajaur Agency	Post Graduate College	Local Taliban
July 12	Khar sub district, Bajaur Agency	Government Girl's Primary School	Local Taliban
July 13	Mamond subdistrict, Bajaur Agency	Middle School	Local Taliban
July 16	Safi sub district, Mohmand Agency	Govt. Girls Primary School	Local Taliban
Aug 1	South Waziristan	Girls School	Local Taliban
Aug 20	Bara sub district, Khyber Agency	Primary School	Local Taliban
Aug 21	Bara sub district, Khyber Agency	Govt. School	Local Taliban
Aug 25	Bara sub district, Khyber Agency	Govt. Primary School	Local Taliban
Sept 21	Mohmand Agency	Girls Primary School	Local Taliban
Oct 1	Mohmand Agency	Girls School	Local Taliban
Oct 3	Khar sub district, Bajaur Agency	Govt. Primary School for Boys	Local Taliban
Oct 5	Khar sub district, Bajaur Agency	Govt. School	Local Taliban
Oct 10	Safi sub-district, Mohmand Agency (Three Attacks)	Govt. Schools	Local Taliban
Oct 22	Bara sub district, Khyber Agency	Govt. Degree College	Local Taliban
Oct 23	Bara sub district, Khyber Agency	Govt. Inter College	Local Taliban
Oct 24	Bajaur Agency	Govt. Boys Middle School	Local Taliban
Oct 26	Mohmand Agency	Govt. Middle School	Local Taliban
Nov 2	Safi sub district, Mohmand Agency (Two Attack)	Govt. Girls Primary School and Boys Primary School	Local Taliban
Nov 3	Sagi Bala area, Mohmand Agency	Govt. Primary Schools for Boys	Local Taliban
Nov 6	Nawagai sub district, Bajaur Agency (Two Attacks)	Govt. Primary Schools	Local Taliban
Nov 9	Safi sub district, Mohmand Agency (Two Attacks)	2 Girls Primary Schools and Boys Primary School	Local Taliban
Nov 10	Mohmand Agency	Govt. Primary School for Boys	Local Taliban
Nov 15	Mohmand Agency	Boys Primary School	Local Taliban
Nov 20	Bara, Khyber Agency	Girls Primary School	Local Taliban
Nov 25	Mohmand Agency	Girls Primary School	Local Taliban
Nov 26	Landi Kotal sub distrsit, Khyber Agency	Girls Primary School	Local Taliban
Nov 26	Mohmand Agency	Govt. Primary School for Boys	Local Taliban
Nov 28	Sandokhel area, Mohmand Agency	Boys Primary School	Local Taliban

Nov 29	Mohmand Agency	Govt. Primary School	Local Taliban
Dec 3	Mohmand Agency	Boys Primary School	Local Taliban
Dec 5	Safi sub district, Mohmand Agency	Govt. Girls School	Local Taliban
Dec 6	Khar sub district, Bajaur Agency (Three Attacks)	3 Govt. Schools (2 Girls and 1 Boys School)	Local Taliban
Dec 14	Safi sub district and Bazar Zaka Khel areas, Mohmand Agency/Khyber Agencies (Three Attacks)	3 Primary School (2 Boys Primary School, 1 Girls Primary School)	Local Taliban
Dec 29	Bajaur Agency	Boys Primary School	Local Taliban

### Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa

Date	Place	Target	Suspect Org/ Accept Responsibility
Jan 24	Shabqadar, Charsadda	Private Girls High School	Local Taliban
Jan 31	Ghuriwala area, Bannu	Govt. Girls Middle school	Local Taliban
Feb 5	Badarshi area, Nowshera	Girls High School	Local Taliban
Feb 6	Bannu	Govt. Girls Primary School	Local Taliban
Feb 19	Kohat (Two Attacks)	Govt. Girls Middle and Govt. Boys Schools	Local Taliban
Mar 21	Shabqaddar, Charssad	Govt. High School	Local Taliban
Mar 23	Risaal pur area, Nowshera	Govt. Girls High School	Local Taliban
Mar 30	Maidan area, Lower Dir	Boys Primary School and Govt. Girls School	Local Taliban
Apr 3	Busti khel area, Kohat	Govt. School	Local Taliban
Apr 8	Arbab Landi villge, Sufid Dheri and mala Zai Regi areas Peshawar (Three Attacks )	Govt. Girls High School, Govt. Boys Middle School and Govt. Girls Primary School	Local Taliban
Apr 10	Charagali area, Upper Dir	Boys Primary School	Local Taliban
Apr 16	Shabqadar, Charssada	Govt. Girls School	Local Taliban
Apr 17	Sheikhan Kily Risalpur, Nowshera	Primary and Middle Schools	Local Taliban
Apr 19	Shabqaddar, Charsadda	Private School	Local Taliban
May 22	Matani area, Peshawar	Girls School	Local Taliban
July 6	Khattako Pul area, Peshawar	Govt. Primary School for Boys	Local Taliban
July 20	Kohat	Boys Primary School	Local Taliban
July 24	Matani area and Charkha Khel village, Peshawar	Boys primary school,	Local Taliban
Aug 21	Dara Adam Khel, Kohat	Girls Primary School	Local Taliban
Sept 4	Kalam area, Swat	Girls Primary School	TTP
Sept 6	Landi Arbab village, Peshawar	Girls High School	Local Taliban
Sept 7	Pashmal area Bahrain, Swat	Govt. Boys Middle School	TTP
Sept 14	Bannu (Two Attacks)	Govt. Boys Primary Schools	Local Taliban
18 Sept	Charkhakhel area, Charsadda	Private Girls School	Local Taliban
Sept 19	Palosai area, Peshawar	Boys Middle School	Local Taliban
Sept 21	Peshawar	Private School	Local Taliban
Sept 22	Mathra and Pastwana areas, Peshawar	Private School	Local Taliban

Sept 23	Salmankhel and Badhbher area, Peshawar (Two Attacks)	Three schools (2 Girls and a Boys School)	Local Taliban
Oct 8	Suburban villages, Peshawar (Two Attacks)	Govt. Primary Schools for Girls and Boys	Local Taliban
Oct 15	Badbher and Charkhakhel areas, Peshawar	Govt. Primary School	Local Taliban
Oct 16	Mera Balarzai Badbher area, Peshawar	Govt. Primary School for Boys	Local Taliban
Oct 25	Bannu	Govt. Girls Primary School	Local Taliban
Oct 26	Koza Bandai area, Swat	School	Local Taliban
Nov 3	Mardan	Govt. Girls Middle School	Local Taliban
Nov 5	Bannu	Govt. Girls School	Local Taliban
Nov 22	Swat	Camp School	Local Taliban
Nov 23	Bahrain area, Swat	Govt. Primary School	Local Taliban
Dec 6	Chamkani, Jogian area, Peshawar	Govt. Girls Primary School,	Local Taliban
Dec 15	Mawia Kila area, Bannu	Girls School	Local Taliban
Dec 16	Yaadgar Chowk and Adezai Areas Peshawar	Govt. Girls Middle School	Local Taliban
Dec 24	Pelosai area, Peshawar	Boys Primary school	Local Taliban

### Balochistan

Date	Place	Target	Suspect Org/ Accept Responsibility
Feb 2	Art road area, Quetta	Girls High School	Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA)
Mar 7	Dera Bugti	Middle School	Baloch Republican Army (BRA)
Apr 1	Pir Koh Area, Dera Bugti	School	Baloch Republican Army (BRA)
Apr 5	Kohlu	School	Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA)
Apr 13	Mashkay town, Awaran	School	Baloch Republican Army (BRA)
Apr 19	Loralai	Private School	Baloch Republican Army (BRA)
June 1	Mano Jan area, Quetta	Primary school	Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA)
July 24	Besmia, Khuzdar	High School	Baloch Lebration Army (BLA)
Sept 28	Hub area, Lasbela	Govt. Boys School	Baloch Lebration Army (BLA)
Nov 18	Qalat	Boys School	Baloch Republican Army (BRA)

### Karachi

Date	Place	Target	Casualties		Suspect Org/ Accept Responsibility
			Killed	Injured	
Dec 28	Karachi	Karachi University	-	15 Civ	Banned Outfits

### Islamabad

Date	Place	Target	Suspect Org/ Accept Responsibility
Apr 13	H-8/4, G-10/4 areas, Islamabad (Two Attacks)	OPF Boys Colleges	Unknown Militants



### Annex 5: Attacks on Shrines and Worship Places in Pakistan 2005-2010

Sr. No.	Date	Place	Target	Killed	Injured
1	Dec 24, 2010	Muslimabad area, Mardan	Ahmadis Community	1	2
2	Dec 18, 2010	Hangu	Ashura Procession	9	13
3	Dec 14, 2010	Budh Bheer area, Peshawar	Ghazi Baba Shrine	-	-
4	Dec 12, 2010	Shalozaa area, Kurram Agency	Imambargah	3	7
5	Dec 3, 2010	Sipah area, Landi Kotal, Khyber Agency	Seminary	-	-
6	Nov 6, 2010	Mingora sub district, Swat	Mosque	2	1
7	Nov 5, 2010	Badhbher Area, Peshawar	Mosque	7	24
8	October 25, 2010	Pakpattan district, Punjab	Baba Fareeduddin Ganjshakar Shrine	7	25
9	Oct 22, 2010	Peshtakhara area, Peshawar	Mosque	5	30
10	Oct 14, 2010	Landi Kotal subdistrict, Khyber Agency	Shrine	-	-
11	Oct 11, 2010	Swat	Mosque	-	-
12	Oct 7, 2010	Karachi	Hazrat Abdullah Shah Ghazi Shahid shrine	9	75
13	Oct 5, 2010	Mian Channu area, Khanewal district	Mosque	1	2
14	Sept 25, 2010	Bahawalpur	Mosque	2	7
15	Sept 3, 2010	Muslim abad area, Mardan	Ahmadis worship place	1	6
16	Aug 23, 2010	Wana, South Waziristan Agency	Seminary of Former MNA of JUI(F) mosque	30	12
17	Aug 19, 2010	Green town area, Lahore	Shrine	-	2
18	July 18, 2010	Sharbat Chowk area, Sargodha	Immambargah (Darul Uloom Mohammadia)	1	18
19	July 15, 2010	Landi Kotal sub district, Khyber Agency	Shrine	-	-
20	July 4, 2010	Khar sub district, Bajaur Agency	Mosque	-	-
21	July 1, 2010	Lahore	Data Ganj Bakhsh Shrine	45	175
22	June 21, 2010	Chamkani area, Peshawar	Shrine of Mian Umer Baba	-	-
23	May 28, 2010	Model Town and Garhi Shahu Area, Lahore (Two	Ahmadis Worship Places	100	150

		Attacks)			
24	Apr 22, 2010	Landi Kotal sub district, Khyber Agency	Saint's Mausoleum,	1	6
25	Apr 21, 2010	Orakzai Agency	Shrine	-	9
26	Feb 18, 2010	Tirah valley, Khyber Agency	Lashkar-e-Islam (militant group) mosque	30	100
27	Jan 8, 2010	Tirah valley, Khyber Agency	Bagh Markaz mosque	8	10
28	Jan 5, 2010	Satori Khel area, Orakzai Agency	Seven Shrines	-	-
29	March 5, 2009	Hazarkhwani area Peshawar	Rehman Baba's Shrine Attacked, Famous Pashtun Traditional Islamic Poet	-	-
30	May 8, 2009	Peshawar	Sheikh Omar Baba's shrine in Peshawar	-	-
31	March 7, 2009	Nowshera	Shrine of Bahadur Baba in Nowshera	1	-
32	March 3, 2008	Bara sub district, Khyber Agency	the 400-year-old shrine of Abu Saeed Baba in Bara Tehsil Khyber Agency	10	-
33	May 2008	Peshawar	The shrine of Ashaab Baba	-	-
34	December 9, 2008	Buner	The shrine of Hazrat Pir Baba	1	4
35	December 18, 2007	GT Road, Peshawar	Shrine of Abdul Shakoor Malang Baba	4	1
36	May 27, 2005	Islamabad	Bari Imam shrine of the Shia sect located in vicinity of the diplomatic enclave in capital Islamabad.	25	100
37	20 March, 2005	Jhal Magsi, Kachhi district/Balochistan	Urs of Sufi saint Pir Syed Rakheel Shah Jhal Magsi shrine bombing	40	15

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### Annex 6: Security Situation at Pak-Afghan Border in 2010

Months	No. of Clashes	Killed			Injured		
		Security Forces	Civilian	Militants	Security Forces	Civilian	Militants
Jan.	1	0	3	0	0	0	0
Feb.	1	0	7	0	0	0	0
Apr.	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
May.	4	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jun.	4	0	1	0	0	3	0
Sep.	7	3	3	40	3	8	12
Oct.	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nov.	4	0	0	0	0	7	0
Dec.	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>12</b>

### Annex 7: Development Initiatives by Federal and KPK Governments in 2010

Sr. No.	Initiatives	Worth	Areas	Status
1	Economic revival package by the federal government	Approx. \$55 million	FATA/ SWA	Completed
2	Agricultural Development and Extension Programmes by FATA Secretariat	Approx. Rs. 10,115 million	FATA	Ongoing
3	Grass-root Human Security Project by the federal government	Approx. \$92,003	FATA/ Mohmand Agency	Ongoing
4	Reconstruction of affected areas by the federal government	Approx. £20 million	FATA/KPK	Ongoing
5	Humanitarian kits for militancy-affected IDPs by the federal government	1000 kits	FATA/KPK	Completed
6	Reconstruction and Development Fund by the federal government	Approx. Rs. 3.7 million	KPK	Ongoing
7	Three projects by FATA Development Authority: Institution Based Youth Skill Development Programme; Youth Skills Field Internship Programme; and Women Skills Development Centers	Approx. Rs. 559.976 million	FATA	Ongoing
8	The federal government's National Counter Terrorism Authority	Approx. Rs. 400 million		Completed



### Annex 8: Development Initiatives in KPK/FATA by International Community

Sr. No.	Initiatives	Worth	Status
1	169 development projects by the United Nations	Approx. \$53 million	Ongoing
2	Reconstruction of militancy-hit areas by the Japanese government	Approx. \$ 9 million	Ongoing
3	Pledge to enhance capacity of law enforcement agencies by the Chinese government	Approx. \$180 million	Completed
4	Capacity building of National Counter Terrorism Authority by the European Union	Approx. €15 million	Ongoing
5	Relief and rehabilitation of IDPs by Saudi Arabia	Approx. \$110.8 million	Completed
6	Malakand Development Pilot Project by Friends of Democratic Pakistan	Approx. \$100 million	Ongoing
7	Development Assistance (2009-2013) by Britain	Approx. £677 million	Ongoing
8	Support for Swat IDP by France	Approx. €12.3 million	Ongoing
9	Grant for IDPs to UN by Japan	Approx. \$33.5 million	Ongoing
10	Assistance for IDPs by the European Union	Approx. €124 million	Ongoing

### Annex 9: Terrorist Arrested across Pakistan in 2010

Month	Local Taliban /TTP	Lashkar-e-Islam	Baloch Nationalist Insurgents	SSP	LeJ	Jundullah	Al Qaeda	Afghan Taliban	Other Banned Militant Outfits
January	1,504	14	2	6	8	5	11	-	100
February	1,262	-	3	100	5	13	8	208	22
March	1,177	23	34	2	3	-	1	48	31
April	861	43	5	1	-	-	1	4	67
May	526	25	25	-	1	-	-	-	16
June	434	4	10	91	94	-	1	17	82
July	992	-	19	-	-	-	2	-	4
August	242	-	2	-	4	-	-	-	11
September	434	-	2	-	-	-	13	8	46
October	716	-	6	2	11	-	5	3	81
November	409	-	4	-	10	-	2	-	6
December	306	-	-	-	11	-	6	-	-
Total	8,863	109	112	108	147	18	50	288	466

## Notes (Appendices)

- <sup>159</sup> (2010), Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 40 of resolution 1917, June 16, 2010.
- <sup>160</sup> Muhammad Amir Rana, "Natural Disasters and Threat Perceptions," *Daily Express Tribune*, September 15, 2010
- <sup>161</sup> <http://www.pakistanfloods.pk/en/damage/summary-of-damages/damages>, accessed on December 23, 2010.
- <sup>162</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>163</sup> Brief on Pakistan Floods 2010, <http://www.pakistanfloods.pk/>, last visited on December 26, 2010.
- <sup>164</sup> Pakistan Humanitarian Bulletin, Issue 10, December 16, 2010, accessed at <http://pakresponse.info/Default.aspx?tabid=87&ItemId=1640> last visited on 22 December 2010. The cluster of requirements includes food security; agriculture; water, sanitation and hygiene; health; shelter and non-food items; logistics and emergency communications; nutrition; coordination and support services; education; protection; community restoration; camp coordination and camp management.
- <sup>165</sup> Pakistan Humanitarian Bulletin, Issue 10, December 16, 2010, accessed at <http://pakresponse.info/Default.aspx?tabid=87&ItemId=1640> last visited on December 22, 2010
- <sup>166</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>167</sup> Muhammad Amir Rana, "Exaggerated Fears," *Dawn*, Islamabad, September 2, 2010.
- <sup>168</sup> Hunza Landslide Report, <http://www.ndma.gov.pk/AttaHunzaLandslide.html>.
- <sup>169</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>170</sup> *Pakistan at Risk: Challenges and Opportunities After the Flood*, A Jinnah Institute Conference Report, 2010.
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- <sup>173</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>174</sup> *Hunger Pains: Pakistan's Food Insecurity*, Edited by Michael Kugelman and Robert M. Hathaway, (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2010).
- <sup>175</sup> Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), "Crop Prospects and Food Situation," February 2010, No. 1, <http://www.fao.org/docrep/012/ak343e/ak343e00.pdf>.
- <sup>176</sup> World Food Program (WFP), "The Market Monitor: Trends of Staple Food Prices in Vulnerable Countries," January 2010, Issue 6,
- <sup>177</sup> Amin Ahmed, "Reduced Yield of Wheat Crop Feared," *Dawn*, Islamabad, January 9, 2010.
- <sup>178</sup> *Hunger Pains: Pakistan's Food Insecurity*, Edited by Michael Kugelman and Robert M. Hathaway, (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2010).
- <sup>179</sup> Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), "Crop Prospects and Food Situation," February 2010, No. 1, <http://www.fao.org/docrep/012/ak343e/ak343e00.pdf>.
- <sup>180</sup> Interview with Safiya Aftab, Research Fellow at Islamabad-based consulting and research firm Strategic and Economic Policy Research (SEPR), Safdar Sial, Islamabad, January 29, 2010.
- <sup>181</sup> Khaleeq Kiani, "About 20,000MW need to be added in 10 years," *Dawn*, Islamabad, October 4, 2010.
- <sup>182</sup> "Islamic Republic of Pakistan: Rental Power Review," prepared by Asian Development Bank, January 2010, accessible at [http://www.pepco.gov.pk/ABD\\_Report.pdf](http://www.pepco.gov.pk/ABD_Report.pdf), retrieved on February 1, 2010.
- <sup>183</sup> The salient features of the plan are: (1) A five-day working week i.e. two weekly holidays in the public sector (2) Closure of all commercial markets by 8pm (special exemption provided to bakeries and pharmacies) (3) Power to neon signs and billboards to be cut off (4) Air-conditioners not to be used before 11 am in government offices (5) There would be a reduction of 300 MW in power supply to Karachi from Pakistan Electric Power Company (Pepco) (6) Industrial units to close down on alternate days (7) Agricultural tube wells not to be provided electricity at peak hours (8) Rs 116 billion to be provided by the government to retire the circular debt (9) 50 per cent reduction in power usage in the houses of the president, prime minister, chief ministers and other public offices (10) Scheduled load-shedding to be reduced by 33 percent.
- <sup>184</sup> *Daily Times*, Islamabad, December 11, 2010.
- <sup>185</sup> Hanif Khalid, "Thar Coal Power Project expedited," *The News*, Islamabad, December 17, 2010.
- <sup>186</sup> *Dawn*, Islamabad, January 27, 2010.
- <sup>187</sup> *Dawn*, Islamabad, November 4, 2010.

