



NATIONAL STRATEGY OF **INCLUSIVE PAKISTAN**

A policy framework of secure and cohesive Pakistan



PAK INSTITUTE FOR PEACE STUDIES (PIPS)

Secure and Inclusive Pakistan

A policy framework of secure and cohesive Pakistan

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SUMMARY

The road to a secure Pakistan lays in upholding its diversity. To counter against extremist violence, ensure that the “diversity within” acknowledges inclusion in all aspects of lives. With this benchmark in all policies, the space to militants will be greatly reduced.

Extremist wave has gravely threatened Pakistan’s diversity. Non-Muslims and even Muslims of varied sects have not only been attacked by militants from distant parts of the country, but have also been forced into silence by the beliefs of those around them.

Eliminating extremism, therefore, requires efforts at developing a holistic counter-violent extremism (CVE) strategy, covering multiple fronts. That strategy should operate not only in the physical domain, but also intellectual, by annulling extremists’ dogmas. Fighting militants on the ground or in the field is as important as fighting them through strategies that don’t necessarily pick up fight, one of them being condition-based rehabilitation or reintegration of (repentant and ready-to-quit-violence) militants. Similarly, besides ridding madrassas of their sectarian biases, CVE strategy should also prioritize educating young boys and girls with tolerant messages and sensitizing their teachers. Local cultures should be appreciated, but not at the cost of rights and lives of women. All such measures will achieve pluralistic co-existence.

These are some of the findings of the ten (10) national-level expert consultations held by PIPS on countering violent extremism. These consultations were held on a range of entry points, which PIPS believes, if explored in terms of societal and policy response actions, can counter extremism. These themes, of the consultations, were largely driven from the model PIPS proposed in 2016.

These 10 themes or entry points on countering extremism included: approaching religious thought to annul extremism; reintegrating and rehabilitating militants, holding national dialogue and reviewing social contract; implementing National Action Plan; exploring link of extremism to constitution, citizenship and governance; engaging youth; approaching media, exploring cultural diversity and pluralistic voices; reforming education; and responding to internal security challenge.

After deliberating upon the link of each point to violent extremism, the consultations suggested the way forward, in specific, pointing the implementing mechanisms towards the possible solution. There was a consensus among participants that Pakistan's Constitution should be the main source of theoretical and operational guidance for these CVE measures.

The consultations expressed concern at militarization of counter-extremism measures, saying that such measures are short-lived and reactive. Any CVE strategy, the consultations noted, shall rest on empowering civilian responsibility and institutions to take lead on most aspects of countering violent extremism. Parliament can initiate debate on what went wrong, and fix rules and procedures of the policies confronting militancy. Together with federal government, it can urgently call for strengthening criminal justice system.

Key findings on CVE themes

- Success against violent extremism strongly pivots on the seriousness of the state. Without active involvement of all the organs and departments of the state, any measure taken will be seen as expedient. On its own, the state repeatedly claims to be serious this time, pointing towards its counterterrorism National Action Plan, announced in early 2015.
- This provides a rare opportunity of confronting violent extremism. NAP serves as a great tool to judge government on its own performance against terrorism.
- Much of the discussions on countering extremism revolve around countering terrorism or terrorists, leaving unaddressed the persistent factors of violent and non-violent extremism in society, which feeds into terrorism. That is why the state's counterterrorism actions don't have sustainable, long-term effect. The soft approaches to counter extremism are missing. NAP is a prime example, much of which has mostly been military-driven, involving military or paramilitary forces. The "hard approach" is also made by the police's "capture or kill" policy. There is less focus on soft approaches, conceptually as well as operationally. NAP shall be revised, incorporating the measures required to tackle violent extremism.
- Civilian institutions should be put in the lead on shaping and implementing responses on violent extremism. The broader contours of the security policy shall come from the parliament, while civilian law-

enforcement agencies should be the first line of defence against any extremist threat.

- At the same time, a great urge is felt of acknowledging mistakes that created militants in the first place. A national charter of peace can also be achieved from a series of dialogues addressing deep politico-philosophical issues afflicting the country. Parliament too can initiate such debates.
- The Constitution of Pakistan is entrusted as the guiding principle of any dialogue on any tensions within the country. The same contract has helped address grievances of the past; there is no reason why it cannot address grievances of the present, including over the set of clauses that accord second-class status to religious minorities.
- There is no point for the state to superimpose any one identity, be it religious or ethnic, upon the multitude of different people living in Pakistan.
- A more responsive criminal justice system, especially at lower level, will help deter criminals in the first place, many of whom are then radicalized by militants. Similarly, a well-to-do justice system will deny extremists the justification militants often invoke, in their attempts to attract people's support. Specific procedural overhauls should be carried out, especially in collecting evidence.
- Any strategy to counter extremism should also target cyber spaces, where young minds are radicalized too.
- Non-Muslims in Pakistan shall be owned as integral element of Pakistan. Bracketing non-Muslims with India or western countries betrays escape from history and nature; they are indigenous to the soil and their valuable history in this region is a chapter of Pakistan's history.
- Local culture shall not be demeaned, nor shall it be local symbols raise fears of discord. Yet, in no way shall cultural practices justifying violence against women be accepted.

The way forward

- To reduce the appeal of extremists who invoke Islam behind their action, a fresh narrative, grounded in religion, is required. The starting point of this narrative shall be the needs of the extremist-affected society.
- Militants willing to shun violence may also be reintegrated or rehabilitated within the purview of the constitution. Provided, they abide by certain conditions, such as denouncing the practice of declaring each other infidel, among others.
- Baloch separatists shall not be conflated with Islamist militants. The cause of Baloch insurgency is purely economic and political in nature, and solutions should be political too, as also acknowledged by the National Action Plan, the country's counter-terror plan.
- Ideological spaces against militants can be secured by treating all citizens, irrespective of their faith, with equality; extremists are able to get away with their action amid a society where a segment has internalized the exclusion of non-Muslims too.
- Curriculum reform is at the heart of education reform. The education-extremism link does not come out from those who are uneducated. The worldview presented in the curriculum is not dissimilar to that of the extremists'.
- There is a need to adopt a framework or narrative, which treats all citizens, irrespective of their ethnicity, creed and geography, with equality. Introducing courses on citizenship, extracted from the constitution, are greatly needed.
- Media's propensity at broadcasting provocative content is linked to the dynamics of media's commercialism. A regulated media can serve as a strong bulwark against extremist ideas.
- Securing pluralistic openness will mitigate radical avenues. National and provincial cultural policies are required, which shall be reflective of universal human values, extracted from the international statutes Pakistan has signed upon, and shall clearly spell out gender equality as its cardinal principle. A nation-wide Cultural National Action Plan be charted, which lays down the plan of celebrating cultural activities, of all faith and ethnicities.

- Part of the inequality stems from the multi-layered education system, which shall be immediately revisited. Besides bringing curriculum reform, the wide variety of schools, catering to different socio-economic backgrounds (Islamic, private, and public, among others) shall be brought under some regulatory mechanism and their academic audit conducted immediately.
- Young people, who constitute majority of the country, are urged to dream big and nurture idealistic notions. But there is little on the ground to translate those notions into reality. Resultantly, they fall for the fantasylands of militant groups.

The country's youth, shall be provided with inclusive public and private spaces, both in physical and digital realms, where they can frequently interact with each other. Any strategy to counter extremism should target cyber spaces too, where young minds are radicalized too.

- Physically spaces can be secured, by according all regions with uniformity. At the same time, militants are allowed to exploit areas which are excluded from the mainstream, such as the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).
- In militancy-affected areas like tribal areas, urgent attention should be paid to building physical infrastructure of the schools and providing enabling environment to girls education.

CONTEXT

In early 2017, Pak Institute for Peace Studies conducted ten national-level consultations on different “themes” of countering violent extremism, as given at the following table. These themes varied from reviving cultural spaces to implementing National Action Plan. All themes were, in a way, linked to different response actions to shrink the extremist space in the country.

Each consultation was attended by a group of notable experts in the field of the specific theme. A working group on education reforms, for instance, included educationists, teachers, and education activists, among others. Each group, in turn, has members with wide policy experiences so as to provide policy dynamics too.

These themes, of the consultations, were largely driven from the Countering-Violent Extremism (CVE) model PIPS proposed in 2016. The model itself was evolved from the experiences of PIPS in the field of counter extremism, ever since the organization was founded. Those experiences were brought to discussion with a group of scholars, experts, and practitioners, who then brainstormed on what should entail a Pakistan-specific CVE model.

In the next step, PIPS carried forward the recommendations proposed for Pakistan-specific model, by further reviewing them and suggesting their implementation plan. The idea was to move beyond a broad wish list to its do-able action plan. The consultation sessions were meant to achieve plans for each of the different themes.

The consultation started with background to the topic, followed by open discussion on how the topic, say education reform, was linked to counter extremism. In the next sessions, specific recommendations and their implementation mechanism were discussed.

Below are the dates and topics of these consultations:

March 20, 2017	Religious thought and conflict
March 27, 2017	Reintegration of militants
April 3, 2017	National dialogue and social contract
April 10, 2017	Implementing National Action Plan
April 17, 2017	Constitution, citizenship, and governance
April 18, 2017	Youth engagement programs
April 24, 2017	Media engagement programs
April 25, 2017	Cultural diversity and pluralism
May 2, 2017	Education reforms
May 3, 2017	Internal security challenges

KEY FEATURES OF CVE POLICY

Society-oriented narrative

A fresh narrative, grounded in religion, is required, to reduce the appeal of the extremists who justify their violence in the name of Islam.

- “Countering” [both non-violent and violent] extremism shall be a goal of this fresh narrative, but not be its starting point. To propose a narrative that merely refutes the arguments of the extremists is to play on their turf. More than that, a fresh narrative shall have its own ingredients, especially those denied by the extremists, ranging from respecting the sanctity of constitution to appreciating diversity across the country.
- The basic starting point of any narrative shall be the needs of the society as well as the on-going processes of sociocultural changes, which are increasingly getting influenced by extremist tendencies. By putting society at centre-stage, the narrative will also have stronger resistance to external factors of conflict and discord. Middle Eastern geopolitical and ideological influences will not easily sway people towards radicalization.

A fresh narrative has to resonate

with broad segments of society. In Pakistan’s case, the narrative shall uphold the existence of multitude of people, espousing different faiths in the country.

In terms of state-society balance, the narrative should cater more to society’s imperatives of security and peace. Historical attempts to merely cater to the state’s needs saw rise of a religious view that ended up justifying violence against its own fellow citizens.

- Apparently, the prevailing narrative of religion revolves around dominance of one or another faith, or conflict of faiths. That is why extremists find sympathizers from the society. While the violence perpetrated by the Islamist militants to attain a certain goal is condemned, the goal is not readily questioned.

Any attempt to nurture a peaceful narrative should rethink about the “entire purpose of religion” in the lives of the people, questioning the “goal” of the Islamists. Without that, the entire debate over this or that Islamist government is secondary.

Presently, the understanding of religion is closely tied to politics, largely because of the way the history of the Muslim world has been narrated. Many conflicts in the early era of Muslim history were political in nature, revolving around the right to rule, embodied in the persona of caliph; but these disputes have been couched in religious language, especially by latter-day Islamists. This approach requires revision too.

- The narrative shall not necessarily see itself as poles apart to the values of the west. The binary of Islam versus West is simplistic reading of the current and past relations between the two. The involvement of western countries in Muslim world are often political subjects; west's contribution to human knowledge be acknowledged.
- The narrative shall extract its reasoning from the constitution of the country. No religious interpretation be accepted which contradicts the constitution-bound sanctity afforded to different citizens. To espouse diversity, the narrative should be authorized and supported by the parliament.

Condition-based reintegration plan

A Pakistan-specific rehabilitation and

reintegration plan of the militants is required, which helps reduce the physical and ideological spaces for extremists in the society.

- To seriously consider the idea of reintegrating militants, there is need to acknowledge mistakes that led to the creation of militants in the first place. Time and again, the state has been accused of selective fight against the militants.

At this stage, a widespread amnesty for all militants, bypassing trial, will set a wrong precedent.

No strategy of reintegrating or rehabilitating militants shall exceed the purview of the constitution.

While exact criteria of reintegrating militants may be charted out, two pre-conditions are must: one, the militants should shun violence; and two, they should stop the practice of declaring one another infidel (*takfeer*).

A clear-cut criteria be laid for banning groups and, if possible, unbanning them.

- Baloch separatists shall not be conflated with Islamist militants. The cause of Baloch insurgency is purely economic and political in nature, and solutions should be provided thus. The country's counter-

terror plan, National Action Plan, also calls for empowering the provincial government to politically deal with the problem.

- A well-laid rehabilitation strategy is also required to deal with militants or extremists ready to shun violence. Any rehabilitation model for Pakistan should aim at strengthening the democratic ethos of the country, rather than imposing a worldview from above; civilian law-enforcement agencies shall take the lead on the centre.

Any new model should start with filling the gaps of the Swat model, referring to the de-radicalization camps set for Swat-based militants. It was found that those who went through the centres were not readily accepted by the society; the centres also failed to shape any proper ideological response, which could de-radicalize the militants; resultantly, the broader worldview of a militant did not much change, even if he had shunned violence.

Moreover, lessons from other countries shall also incorporate while de-radicalizing individuals: engage scholars, professors, and psychiatrists; interact with imprisoned radicals and/or their families.

The process of de-radicalization should start by prioritizing different layers of radical individuals and groups.

Dialogue for peace

There is a need to hold dialogues in the country addressing politico-philosophical issues, especially those producing and/or supporting extremism, to achieve a national charter of peace.

- The “National Charter of Peace” should lay down mechanism for achieving peace and harmony in the country, after consulting multi-layered dialogues involving a cross-section of society, on issues and policies producing extremism.
- Civil society may also hold multiple other dialogues, with broad range of society including teachers, lawyers, religious hardliners, media, and parliamentarians.
- Any dialogue aimed at resolving key philosophical challenges confronting the country, should take into women too. The outcome of those debates will, in that way, be more sensitive towards women.
- Some of the topics of the dialogue include: relations between state and religion, which will automatically discuss role of minorities in the

country; relation between state and citizen; relation between civil society and power elites of the country, especially civil-military players.

Debate should also be generated on what is “national interest”.

The tensions between those who are known as the modernist Muslims and the traditionalists should also be discussed.

The outcomes of such dialogue forums shall be disseminated widely, engaging a broad range of stakeholders such as media, school teachers, lawyers, and even religious hardliners.

- The Constitution of Pakistan is entrusted as the guiding principle of any dialogue on any tensions within the country. The same contract has helped addressed several of the country's other basic questions, including centre-province relations, via 18th Constitutional Amendment.

The Constitution of Pakistan is also trusted as the social contract among its citizens and should be upheld thus.

Several faith-centric clauses that accord second-class status to minorities can be revisited, but the mechanism to do so should follow the one detailed in the Constitution.

Revised National Action Plan

A great benchmark to evaluate the government on counter terrorism is none other than its own counter-terror plan, National Action Plan (NAP).

- To standardize progress on NAP, a proper implementation mechanism of NAP be charted, including indicators and benchmarks against NAP points, besides adding new points dealing with arresting extremism in the long run.
- Most of the points of NAP come in the fold of counter-terrorism, having more immediate effect. The execution of NAP has also been military-driven, involving military or paramilitary forces. The “hard approach” is also made by the police's “capture or kill” policy. There is less focus on soft approaches, conceptually as well as operationally.
- NAP shall be revised by incorporating the soft approaches, actions that have long-term impact, under the fold of countering violent extremism such as education reforms and programs of youth engagement, etc. Additionally, recommendations by Justice Qazi Faiz Isa Commission in the execution of NAP shall be taken forward.

- When it comes to dealing with NAP, the government has been mostly creating its monitoring bodies. Even then, confusion persists. Who monitors NAP: Interior Ministry, NACTA, National Security Advisor, or the apex committees? This confusion shall be removed, by empowering NACTA to serve as focal point on NAP.
- Civilian institutions shall be empowered to take lead on NAP: Parliament shall oversee NAP, the Prime Minister shall take the lead on its execution, and police be empowered with relevant powers to deal with militancy.

Equality and Inclusion

Ideologically spaces against militants can be secured by treating all citizens, irrespective of their faith, with equality; physically spaces can be secured, by according all regions with uniformity.

- Exclusion is at the heart of violent extremism, one way or the other.

Seem from one way, militants hit at those already excluded from the mainstream, such as non-Muslims. Extremists are able to get away with their action amid a society where a segment has internalized the exclusion of non-Muslims too.

Seem from another area, militants are allowed to exploit

areas which are excluded from the mainstream, such as the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Militants escape to the excluded areas, where normal application of law is missing. The special status designated to areas like FATA, Balochistan's B-Area, and Gilgit-Baltistan, shall be done away with.

Both excluded areas and communities are also on the lower rung of development, and their rights are denied.

- There is a need to adopt a framework or narrative, which treats all citizens, irrespective of their ethnicity, creed and geography, with equality. This framework of citizenship will automatically help in embracing minorities, otherwise pushed to the side-lines.

Non-Muslims in Pakistan are as much Pakistanis as Muslims of the country; bracketing them with India or the west is an outcome of the difficulty to grasp the sense of nationhood in the midst of insecurities.

- Part of the inequality stems from the multi-layered education system, which shall be immediately revisited.
- A responsive criminal justice system, especially at lower level, will help deter criminals in the first place, many of whom

are then radicalized by militants. Similarly, a well-to-do justice system will deny extremists the justification militants often invoke, in their attempts to attract people. Specific procedural overhauls be carried out, especially in collecting evidence.

Youth engagement

The country's youth, who constitute majority of the country as well as its extremist groups, shall be provided with inclusive public and private spaces, both in physical and digital realms, where they can frequently interact with each other.

- Engaging youth is partly an effort at changing across-the-board social behaviour. For one, youth radicalization cuts across different divides: Extremists have attracted young people from rural areas and urban centres, madrassas and even universities, poor and well-off backgrounds, not only men but women too.
- At the same time, multi-dimensional accounts of different sets of youth should be considered in the processes of understanding and preventing radicalization in youths. Engaging them requires consistent work on multiple fronts.
- Young people are called to dream big and nurture idealistic notions. But there is little on the ground to translate those notions into reality, resulting into young people falling for the fantasylands of groups like Islamic State (IS) group.
- The influx of radical or extremist thought in the minds of the youth went parallel to a gradual outflow of inclusive spaces for them, mainly in terms of socio-cultural and physical activities.
- Enabling environment be provided for youth to engage with diversity and/or diverse opinions, by reviving dialogues, student unions, parks, playgrounds, public places, youth clubs, online communities, campus magazines.
- Enhanced interaction and communication with youngsters at homes is imperative to prevent any wayward activity among them.
- The government's youth engagement programs are few and far between. These initiatives shall be advertised wisely, besides increasing their scope, such as engaging more young people especially from far-flung areas.
- While Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have announced their youth policies, Sindh and Balochistan have yet to do so. Other administrative units like

Gilgit-Baltistan, FATA, and Azad Jammu and Kashmir shall also shape youth policies.

- As much as a radicalized teacher can radicalize students, a sensitized teacher can help de-radicalize students. Teachers in the campuses shall be sensitized on how to counter any creeping radicalizing discourse or questions in the classroom.
- Any strategy to counter extremism should target cyber spaces too, where young minds are radicalized too.
- Young people of the marginalized areas shall be uplifted. Besides providing political rights in these areas, universities and colleges shall be established in areas like Balochistan and FATA.

Media regulation

A regulated media can serve as a strong bulwark against extremist ideas.

- Strikingly, the rise of militancy went parallel to proliferation of media. Media shall be engaged in a way that while media continue to flourish, militancy doesn't. At times, even if media doesn't glorify militants, its coverage of political issues tends to radicalize people's behaviour into disillusioning from the democratic system.

- Media's propensity at broadcasting provocative content is linked to the dynamics of media's commercialism: Media is an industry and like any industry it caters to ratings, showing issues in a stereotypical fashion to attract people. Setting the norms of the industry will be big step.
- Certain steps can be taken by straight away implementing certain legal requirements of Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA), electronic-media regulatory body. According to PEMRA's rules, every channel entering into license is bound to dedicate 10% of the content to public sector; such public sector messages shall be shaped against extremism.
- Similarly, channels can be monitored against the veracity of the news they broadcast. Such monitoring is critical; the trend of "fake news", or factually-incorrect news to feed one's bias, is indicative of the trend of rising extremism.
- The regulatory body can also dedicate timeslots to different age groups, especially children and young people.
- While much of the attention is paid to TV news shows, even today, drama is among the most-watched formats and clearly the main source of

entertainment in the country. Dramas too stereotype non-Muslims. Entertainment channels shall be regulated too.

- A law has been passed that bans all sorts of criminal activities on the internet; the bill is hailed by the government, but digital rights activists fear part of the bill can be invoked to infringe civil liberties. Efforts can be made at laying down clear-cut definitions of what constitute hate speech.
- Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA), which regulates internet, shall secure online spaces to curb provocative statements, about which there seems to be nothing in the PTA's priority areas.
- Religious publications, which enjoy dedicated readership, shall also be regulated.
- Professional standards shall be maintained in the field of journalism, at all level, starting from universities all the way to the newsroom. Journalists shall even be sensitized against extremism.
- The rise of faith-based radicalism, or loss of pluralistic spaces, is partly extended out of the state's attempts to impose Islam over the country's varied groups. While these policies failed to achieve their original purpose of gluing society, situation further aggravated with the rise of religious extremists, who, by nature, are antithesis to opposite views. The state shall realize its mistake.
- There is no point superimposing any one identity, be it religious or ethnic, upon the multitude of different people living in Pakistan. Instead, energies shall be put in strengthening federalist structure. Federalism is more than transferring administrative powers; in Pakistan, it is also about empowering varied ethnic groups.
- There is urgent need to approve cultural policies at national and provincial levels. The policy shall be reflective of universal human values, extracted from the international statutes Pakistan has signed upon, and shall clearly spell out gender equality as its cardinal principle.

Widened cultural spaces

Faith-based radicalism has an inverse relation with pluralistic openness. When one widens, the other shrinks. Securing pluralistic openness will mitigate radical avenues.

- Non-Muslims in Pakistan shall be owned as integral element of Pakistan. Without the white colour, the flag of Pakistan is incomplete. Bracketing non-

Muslims with India or western countries betrays escape from history and nature; they are indigenous to the soil and their valuable history in this region is a chapter of Pakistan's history.

- Local culture shall not be demeaned, nor shall it be local symbols raise fears of discord. Yet, in no way shall cultural practices justifying violence against women be accepted.
- A nation-wide Cultural National Action Plan be charted, which lays down the plan of celebrating cultural activities, of all faith and ethnicities. The approach of this plan shall be bottom-up: events shall be identified and celebrated upon the recommendations of stakeholders from the ground all the way up to provinces, followed by the centre. Only then can local diversity be accommodated.

The plan can undertake the following measures: promoting unsung role models, such as activists who struggled for people's rights, such as by bestowing awards to them; engaging culture-friendly professionals in institutions impacting cultural diversity; preserving folk culture and poetry; securing cultural heritage sites and monuments, inclusive of all faiths; providing for inclusive spaces; withhold

the trend of unconditionally changing names of different sites. These measures, of protecting cultural diversity, will also boost tourism for the country.

Reformed education

The foundation of a secure future where people freely accept each other can be achieved with a right set of measures in the education sector, today.

- Any measure aimed at reforming education shall orient at achieving knowledge-based society, where people value knowledge for the sake of knowledge. In this knowledgeable society, militants cannot penetrate their fiction too easily.
- That young men and women could show violent radicalism in varsities reflects on the level of radicalism in the society, on the one hand, and the dearth of intellectual space in the varsities, on the other. The two are indeed connected: radicalism is inversely proportional to intellectualism.
- Educational institutions shall be reclaimed from the extremists and their agenda. The job of a university is to produce research and scholarship and not extremism.
- The job of a university shall not be tied to a guaranteed job. This

chain of education to commercial profit shall be broken.

- Education is a right, and shall be treated thus. Even though the Constitution's Article 25-A ensures free education at lower-level, the clause is far from implemented. To own the right, some sort of accountability mechanism shall be adopted, engaging provincial and national legislatures.
- Education can powerfully instil the values of equal citizenship and cultural acceptance, shrinking space for militants. As a policy principal, fundamental human rights, as enshrined in the constitution shall be made the basis of citizenship education.
- Efforts shall be made at adopting some level of standardization of education, having certain common goals and objectives. The country's multi-directional educational system itself deepens the social divides, the members noted.
- The existence of a wide variety of schools, catering to different socio-economic backgrounds, deserves explanation. They shall be brought under some regulatory mechanism. Academic audit of all types of schools, especially foreign-funded, international, Islamic,

and private schools, be carried out.

- In militancy-affected areas like tribal areas, physical infrastructure of the schools destroyed by militants shall be laid. Girls education shall be prioritized too, especially in areas where militants have threatened girls from attending schools.
- Curriculum reform is at the heart of education reform. The education-extremism link does not come out from those who are uneducated. It also comes from the way the prevailing curriculum have radicalized students. The worldview presented in the curriculum is not dissimilar to that of the extremists'. Introducing courses on citizenship, extracted from the constitution are greatly needed.
- Excluded groups like non-Muslims should be taken on board on revised curriculum. In the history and Pakistan Studies books, the contribution of non-Muslims in Pakistan be acknowledged, besides lauding non-warrior role models, such as poets, activists.
- Madrassas are producing graduates who are already in abundance in the society. But blaming madrassas for being non-serious about reforming themselves is not the whole

truth. Bureaucratic delays and political inaction are to be blamed too.

- Even if curriculum is revised (and it has been in some cases), the issue boils down to teachers. A sensitized teacher can orient students towards positive symbols, even if curriculum is contested; a sensitized teacher can turn out otherwise. Today, Pakistan faces the second state.
- Education doesn't stop with textbooks. It doesn't start with them either. Education incorporates all those aspects that enable anyone to comprehend, ranging from promoting mother tongue to encourage sporting activities.

National Internal Security Policy

- The entire approach and vision of the internal security shall be revised, moving beyond the reactive response to any militant attack. A holistic framework be adopted which deals with all sorts of threat ranging from the one emanating from extremist to those emanating from criminals.
- The approach towards security policy shall adopt some sort of conceptual framework to produce internal security policy, the key ingredients of which shall counter extremism,

militancy, and organized crimes; curb separatist tendencies; warn about the internal fallout of strategic priorities; govern cyber spaces; and secure the country's borders.

- The revised framework shall even incorporate elements from human security.
- The internal security shall also aim at dealing with the ideological sources of militants.
- Civilian institutions shall be put in the lead on shaping and implementing national internal security policy. The broader contours of the security policy shall come from the parliament, while civilian law-enforcement agencies should be the first line of defence against any threat.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the Parliament:

To make the country cohesive:

1. Set outline of fresh national narrative, extracted from the Constitution, upholding diversity and renouncing extremism.
2. Engage, where required, with all the department or institutions of the government, informing them of the consequences of their actions on social diversity.
3. Take lead in nurturing the process of inclusive nation-building, by:
 - (a) Initiating debates on what extent diversity got dissipated by policies of the past.
 - (b) Incorporating the voices of different groups in the country.
 - (c) Giving regional languages the status of “Pakistani languages” or national languages.
 - (d) Discouraging “enforced uniformity” of any singular ethnic or religious group.
4. Endorse launch of a dedicated TV channel streaming parliament’s sessions, espousing diverse thoughts from all over the country.

5. Conduct debates on critical philosophical issues especially state-religion relation, state-society relation, the definition of national interest, tension between modernity and traditionalism.
6. Produce “National Charter of Peace” laying down the mechanism for achieving peace and harmony in the country, based on findings of multi-layered dialogue among a range of stakeholders including religious scholars, civil society, and state.
7. Review faith-based clauses that accord second-class status to religious minorities.
8. Oversee effective implementation of all the provisions about education, especially about Article 25-A, which calls for ensuring education to children; and provide for rules and regulations that establish accountability mechanism to enforce Article 25-A.

To make the country secure:

9. Constitute a high-powered national-level truth and reconciliation commission, to:

- (a) Review the policies that produced militancy in the first place, and if required, acknowledge the wrong committed through those mistaken policies.
 - (b) Mainstream those willing to reintegrate.
10. Constitute expert commission with NACTA as secretariat to review the criteria of banned outfits, to ensure that outfits once banned do not remerge under new names.
11. Empower parliamentary committee on national security, to oversee National Action Plan, by:
- (a) Ensuring that NACTA's Rules are implemented in spirit, making it directly answerable to the Prime Minister.
 - (b) Changing, or suggesting changes in, NACTA's Rules to make it a coordinating body on counter-terrorism, rather than responsible for day-to-day operation.
 - (c) Conducting debate on strengthening criminal justice system.
 - (d) Reviewing the existing anti-terrorism laws *immediately* and after every three years.
12. Assign a parliamentary committee, preferably on national security, to provide input in drafting National Internal Security Policy, by:
- (a) Re-assessing strategic priorities
 - (b) Mainstreaming marginalized groups.
 - (c) Including NAP as of its constituent.
 - (d) Upholding the preservation of human rights.
13. Set the process of reforms within security institutions, by:
- (a) Achieving coordination among the institutions.
 - (b) Introducing accountability mechanisms in case of any avoidable lapse.
 - (c) Reviewing threat perceptions of the security institutions, and the process of deriving those perceptions.
 - (d) Putting civilian law-enforcement agencies at the centre of any drive against militancy.

To the federal and provincial governments:

1. Review the entire approach and vision of the internal security, moving beyond the reactive response to any militant attack, and:
 - (a) Adopt some sort of conceptual framework, the key ingredients of which shall counter extremism, militancy, and organized crimes; curb separatist tendencies; warn about the internal fallout of strategic priorities; govern cyber spaces; and secure the country's borders.
 - (b) Incorporating elements from human security.

- (c) Incorporate key counter-terror initiatives like National Action Plan, though after revising it first.
- 2. Revise National Action Plan by:
 - (a) Updating the plan and dividing the plan into counter-terrorism component, having immediate effect; and counter-violent extremism, having long-term effect.
 - (b) Charting NAP's points along a plan with concrete indicators, goals, and responsible institutions for each point.
- 3. Make NACTA front organization on NAP, by:
 - (a) Changing its rules to provide strategic guidance rather than mere day-to-day implementation.
 - (b) Task NACTA to serve as secretariat on banned outfits, assign it to evolve monitoring mechanism so that they do not operate by changing names.
 - (c) Establish a dedicated centre within NACTA that studies militant ideologies justifying attacks in Pakistan and suggests responses. (Such centres be established in universities, also)
 - (d) Convene its Board of Governors meeting.
- 4. Rest ownership of the NAP in the office of the Prime Minister, who shall hold meetings about the progress on NAP on a regular basis.
- 5. Empower the political government of Balochistan to resolve the issues there as vowed in NAP; reintegrate Baloch separatists and mainstream the area.
- 6. Review the scope and powers of the civilian criminal justice system, especially police, on curbing terrorism.
- 7. Institutionalize the entire de-radicalization process by:
 - (a) Assigning the de-radicalization centres to civilian law-enforcement agencies, preferably police.
 - (b) Engaging professionals and moderate scholars in the centres.
 - (c) Prioritizing different layers of radicals.
- 8. Undertake the process of rehabilitation and reintegration of militants, by:
 - (a) Dismissing the prospect of widespread amnesty for militants, without any trial.
 - (b) Upholding constitution in all acts of rehabilitation and reintegration.
- 9. Hold dialogue with broad range of society including teachers, lawyers, religious hardliners, media, and parliamentarians, on critical philosophical issues facing the country especially state-society and state-religion relation.
- 10. Abolish the special statuses of FATA, Balochistan's B-Area, and Gilgit-Baltistan, replacing

- them with uniform law as prevailing in rest of the country.
11. Launch dedicated TV channels streaming parliament's and provincial assemblies' sessions so that the people are well aware of the diverse nature of debates.
 12. Produce a framework for dealing with urban terrorism.
 13. Ensure that fundamental rights are not violated in any internal security policy or action.

Via education department and organizations working on education:

14. Orient education reform towards achieving knowledge-based society, breaking the nexus between education and market.
15. Purge all aspects of education that sow inequality in the long-term, especially by adopting policies that standardize education, having certain common goals and objectives.
16. Conduct academic audit of 4-year bachelor program introduced in 2000s, exploring the cost and benefits of the changes introduced in the higher education.
17. Establish independent interprovincial expert boards, one to oversee curriculum development, and another to specifically oversee the writing of History books.
18. Shape curriculum at different levels, in light of a narrative upholding diversity and rejecting extremism, by:
 - a. Introducing content on modern concept of citizenship, which stresses commonalities among all people, irrespective of their backgrounds, and which derives its values from the basic fundamental rights enriched in the Constitution.
 - b. Highlighting the contribution of non-Muslims in the history and development of Pakistan.
 - c. Reviewing subjects like History and Pakistan Studies; an interprovincial board be created to review these subjects so as to ascertain any errors in the basic facts of the content and/or their interpretation.
 - d. Reviewing Islamiat (Islamic Studies), shaping it with content on social harmony, justice, and goodwill.
 - e. Adding content on literature like poetry and essays to develop the creative faculties of students.
 - f. Including positive ingredients of cultures in Pakistan, showcasing the diversity within.
 - g. Acknowledging role of non-warrior role models like poets, activists, especially women.
 - h. Removing all kinds of biases whether ethnic, religious, or gender.

19. Teach young people about their constitutional rights.
20. Engage opinion-makers especially at grass-root level.
21. Engage community influencers including parents.
22. Provide career counselling to students.
23. Promote essays and books on sectarian harmony, besides introducing them in education system.
24. Regularly sensitize teachers on social harmony, and equip them with tools that enable them to deal with diversity in the classroom, such as through critical teaching of social sciences; additionally, they can also be trained to identify and respond to students on the path of radicalization.
25. Pay special attention to educational infrastructure in conflict-affect and marginalized areas like FATA and Balochistan, and for girls education in areas infested with militancy, allocating a certain amount of portion from the exchequer.
26. Provide enabling environment for girls education in areas infested with militancy.
27. Sensitize students, teachers, and other segments of the society on the fundamental human rights as enriched in the constitution, teaching about these rights in different layers of education too.
28. Regulate all types of educational institutions and carry out their academic audit, especially of:
 - a) foreign-funded
 - b) international
 - c) Islamic
 - d) Private schools
 - e) Madrassas
 - f) Schools of banned outfits like Jamaatud Da'wa
29. Revive adult-literacy program.
30. Provide spaces where students can perform co-curricular activities.
31. Create student councils where students can participate in a range of debates.
32. Re-structure madrassa education board on non-sectarian lines.
33. In the universities, build awareness about history of the West and evolution of its institutions, such as by establishing centres aimed at understanding relation between Muslim and the west, making functional the existing ones, and introducing courses to this end.
34. In the madrassas, introduce courses on understanding relation between Muslim and the west.
35. In the madrassas, scrutinize the content and teachers for sectarian biases.
36. In the madrassas, divide time between madrassa (religious) and formal education.
37. Widen cooperation with media, especially by reviewing media curriculum, incorporating indigenous literature and training teachers.

***Via tourism ministries,
cultural ministries:***

38. Approve the Cultural Policy, after making it reflective of national, provincial as well as universal values committed under international agreements as well as uphold gender equality.
39. Design and approve Cultural National Action Plan, detailing calendar of cultural and religious festivals celebrated all over the country, by incorporating the suggestions put forward by local tiers all the way to the centre.
40. Celebrate festivals of all linguist, religious, and cultural communities in the country.
41. Discourage negative practices in the name of culture, especially those violating rights of women.
42. Ensure that “gender” is flashed out in any cultural policy or initiative.
43. Restructure departments dealing with culture, such as censor board, by engaging professionals.
44. Promote non-warrior role models such as activists, creators of national symbols; and bestow awards upon them.
45. Secure physical spaces celebrating citizens’ democratic struggles and rights, such as by establishing democracy museum.
46. Boost religious tourism, reducing fears of people to visit shrines, temples.

47. Revive cultural events and preserve folk culture, poetry.
48. Ensure that cultural heritage sites are preserved in all development projects.
49. Stop the trend of changing names of different public sites and places.
50. De-militarize cultural sites from all over the country.

Via ministries of law

51. Elaborate the existing Islamic clauses in the Constitution for simpler understanding, in specific about (a) relations between Islam and state, (b) rights of the non-Muslims, and (c) relations with Muslim and non-Muslim countries.
52. Hold discussion on strengthening criminal justice system by, among other things:
 - (a) Identifying loopholes in the existing counter-terror law, especially Anti-Terrorism Act and its witness protection clauses.
 - (b) Carry procedural overhauls with regards to collecting evidence.
 - (c) Invest in reforming lower police system and lower judiciary.
 - (d) Conduct de-radicalization activities in prison centres, to counter radicalization of criminals or low-profile militants.

Via youth affairs ministries:

53. Make efforts at bridging communication gap with youth, interacting with them regularly.
54. Provide enabling environment for youth to engage with diversity and/or diverse opinions, by reviving dialogues, student unions, parks, playgrounds, public places, youth clubs, online communities, campus magazines.
55. Release provincial youth policy, and achieve a coordinated youth policy.
56. Disseminate widely the youth initiatives, and increase their scope by engaging more youth and from diverse backgrounds.
57. Increase the scope of government initiatives with youth in both numbers and backgrounds.

Via religious affairs ministries:

58. Publicize the fatwas and arguments of the scholars, against extremism.
59. Sensitize religious scholars and clerics on a narrative denouncing extremism and upholding diversity.

Via media regulatory body:

60. Ensure strict adherence to PEMRA's Rules, which every channel is bound to follow, assuring that:

- a) Journalists are provided professional journalistic and safety trainings by the media houses.
 - b) Factual errors are penalized.
 - c) Annual credibility report of all the TV channels be released.
61. Allocate timeslots to different age groups, especially children and young people.
 62. Dedicate the 10% content meant for public messages, to broadcast messages against extremism.
 63. Review the licensing and declaration policy of media outlets.
 64. Regulate the rating mechanism, reviewing whether the rating is scientific or not.
 65. Regulate religious publications, which enjoy limited but dedicated readership.

Via Pakistan

Telecommunications

Authority (PTA):

66. Assign "hate speech" as one of the priority areas to be monitored and expunged.
67. Establish online communities representing diverse opinions.
68. In conjunction with civil society, launch online campaign against intolerance and discrimination.
69. In conjunction with civil society, identify what constitutes hate speech.

To civil society (watchdogs, political parties, organizations):

1. Publicize a new narrative denouncing extremism and upholding diversity, in public gatherings of political parties.
2. Hold dialogue with broad range of society including teachers, lawyers, religious hardliners, media, and parliamentarians, on critical philosophical issues facing the country especially state-society and state-religion relation.
3. Serve as watchdog on the codes of the regulatory bodies; in case of PEMRA, ensuring that its rules are properly implemented; in case of PTA, laying down the specifics of what constitutes "hate speech".
4. Sensitize a broad range of actors like media personnel, script writers, teachers, journalists, educationists, religious scholars, against extremism and for diversity, so that inclusion is reflected in their work
5. Promote the trend of checking facts of political parties and media outlets.
6. Interact frequently with community influencers like parents, relatives, local opinion-makers, forewarning them about trends of radicalization among youth.

To religious scholars:

7. Annul the extremists' arguments and their sources that legitimize violence; answer in detail concepts like *takfeer* (the practice of declaring someone as infidel).
8. Interact on a regular basis with scholars of social sciences, discussing contemporary challenges and their responses in light of modern needs.
9. Discard religious interpretations contradicting with constitution or the sanctity it granted to citizens of people of different faiths.
10. Hold dialogue with broad range of society including teachers, lawyers, religious hardliners, media, and parliamentarians, on critical philosophical issues facing the country especially state-society and state-religion relation.

To media outlets:

11. Uphold diversity in newsrooms.
12. Clarify editorial policy.
13. Promote the trend of fact checking in news.
14. Monitor the progress of editorial committee.
15. Train journalists on a host of issues, including against extremist, by laying down proper criteria and designing manuals.

ENABLING ENVIRONMENT AND OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORKS

Besides direct policy measures, there are several other measures which, if taken by a host of different state institutions, can greatly reduce space for thriving of militancy. Some of these points have been discussed in the recommendations section; there they are presented separately. One, because these stand alone as distinct feature which should be adopted by all; secondly, the points against these came repeatedly in the consultations:

- **Review of strategic priorities**

The state accuses neighbouring countries for stoking militant attacks inside the country, but critics deem the attacks largely as backlash of the state's policy of condoning or nurturing groups attacking in the region. This much is clear: anti-Pakistan militant violence was, in its inception, linked to the strategic setting. Achieving internal security requires resetting strategic worldview too.

Many groups tagged as 'proxies' not only caused diplomatic problems for the country, but gradually they also took control of state narratives to emerge as a new far right that is not only interfering in 'strategic affairs' but also shrinking the space for mainstream politics. Only a few

attempts have been made to understand the complex relationship among the banned militant groups - which once were involved in fighting 'jihad' in Afghanistan and Indian-held Kashmir and global terrorist movement. One such attempt was made by PIPS, which found that the banned militant groups focused on Kashmir and Afghanistan have not only been providing human resources to the anti-Pakistan militant groups but also an ideological support and justification for the use of violence in the name of jihad.

In this backdrop, a holistic review of Pakistan's strategic priorities is must to lessen the chances of any fallout on the country's internal security. This review should propose policy measures that contribute in reducing the risk of violence in the country and improving relations with neighbours, mainly Afghanistan, India and Iran. Some measures that were suggested in these consultations in terms of creating enabling environment for setting up such strategic reconsiderations are listed as under:

- 1) Enhanced people-to-people contacts including through civil

society, media, educational, cultural tourism, business/trade and other exchanges and dialogues;

- 2) Training Pakistani media and journalists in progressive and professional ways of reporting and analyses on terrorism and foreign policy issues mainly ties with neighbours;
- 3) Sensitizing and influencing provincial governments to reform education curriculum;
- 4) Sensitizing and supporting civil society and independent research institutes to conduct extensive research on foreign policy and strategic issues and disseminate it;
- 5) Strengthening track-2 channels and create new ones frequently inviting representatives from neighbouring countries to Pakistan to participate in dialogues and meetings; and
- 6) Enhanced exchanges of parliamentarians and political leaders.

- **Coordination among law-enforcement and security agencies**

Coordination among security agencies is must. Efforts shall be made at ensuring that the coordination is undertaken and violation held accountable.

For one, a National Databank (NDB) of terrorists be developed, synchronized with the police departments of the country, National Database and Registration Authority

(NADRA), NACTA, FIA and State Bank of Pakistan. The Databank should have following features:

- A synchronized National Red Book, containing updated information about the wanted, suspected and arrested terrorists and their groups.
- The national databank could be divided into two categories, one for public consumption, which would include details about terrorists and their activities and second dedicated for the police and law enforcement agencies containing details of bank accounts, financial transactions data, property and other assets of the suspected and active terrorists whose names had been placed under the Fourth Schedule.
- To provide information into it, a common website can be developed under the supervision of NACTA and all police and relevant authorities could be bound to provide updates/information on weekly or monthly bases.

Similarly, there is a need that all provinces have their forensic labs¹linked with National Forensic Laboratory (NFL) in Islamabad.

- **Governance**

A proper governance system can not only prevent people, mainly

¹So far only Punjab province has such facility.

youth, from falling for violent radicalism and extremism but also strengthen the rule of law and [administrative and law enforcement] surveillance. The need for good governance is required in much of the country. Bad governance leaves little trust in the government to be serious about militancy.

In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA), rapid completion of development initiatives is crucial. The government needs swift action to not only provides full facilities to the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) – also called as Temporarily Displaced Persons (TDPs) by the government departments – but also to check undesired practices by such charity organizations in IDPs camps. There is a need for making government aid agencies more effective to enhance trust of the IDPs in the state.

Suggested frameworks

- **Internal security policy**

The entire approach and vision of the internal security shall be revised, moving beyond the reactive response to any militant attack. The new one should adopt some sort of conceptual framework to produce internal security policy, the key ingredients of which shall be countering **extremism, militancy, and organized crimes**; breaking **nexus among different types of militants, extremists and criminals**;

curbing **separatist tendencies**; warning about the **internal fallout of traditional strategic pursuits**; governing **cyber spaces**; and securing the country's **borders**. The revised framework shall even incorporate elements from **human security**. Internal security policy shall incorporate key counter-terror initiatives like **National Action Plan, after revising** it; and shall ensure that **fundamental rights** are upheld.

- **Counter-terrorism framework**

The country's counter-terror and counter-extremism plan, National Action Plan, shall be reviewed afresh, dividing into two broader components, Counter-Terrorism (CT) and Counter-Violent Extremism (CVE).

- The first component, CT, shall deal with the hard approaches of countering militancy, having more immediate effect.
- The second component, CVE, shall deal with the soft approaches of countering militancy and its factors, producing results in the medium to long term.

Counter-Terrorism	Counter-Violent Extremism
Reforming policing	Reforming madrassas
Coordination among security institutions	Banning glorifying militants
Acting against armed groups	Reconciling politically with different militants especially in Balochistan
Curbing hate speech	Rehabilitating and de-radicalizing different brands of militants
Choking terror finance	Reforming education, re-orientating culture
Protecting minorities	Reshaping media strategy
Dismantling militants' communication networks	Countering sectarianism
Countering the [extremists' use of] cyber spaces	Reforming judiciary
Addressing loopholes in the criminal justice system	
Securing borders	

- **Citizenship framework**

A citizenship framework, which accepts all Pakistanis as equal citizens, irrespective of their faiths and ethnicities, shall be promoted. This framework will automatically help in embracing minorities, otherwise pushed to the side-lines. Gestures like acknowledging the contribution of non-Muslims in Pakistan shall be undertaken.

DEBATES

Religious thought and conflict

The first working group, which met on March 20, 2017, deliberated about the mechanism for shaping a religion-based narrative that counters those of extremists’.

The group debated what could be done to reduce the appeal of militants who quote their interpretations of religious texts, traditions and precedents from Islamic history to propagate their violent ideologies and justify their actions. Members discussed the need for holding discussion on the topic. One participant summed it up, “as long as religious representatives reflect extremism, such discussion will be needed.”

But several participants questioned the rationale of focusing on religious factors of conflict alone, arguing militancy also emanates from non-religious factors, ranging from ignorance to international politics. “Extremist organizations are not born out of any fatwa”, one scholar noted.

Some called for looking at religious worldview of the extremists – or ideology – as emanating from social realities, rather than the other way around. Social inequality was cited as one such example. Others hinted

at how religious interpretations are subjected to external geopolitical circumstances too. It was suggested that any alternative or counter response should take into consideration those non-religious factors too.

To some, the rationale of the new narrative as being “counter” to the existing one, be extremists’, was unproductive. Several participants called for shaping a narrative that caters to the needs of the society in a progressive way and does not appear to be a “reaction” to some other narrative. Narratives grounded in society resonate with a wide range of social segments.

When it comes to state-society relations, the narrative should cater more to society’s need. Such a narrative should be bottom-up. The group also called upon scholars to come up with refutations of the extremists, and upon the government to publicize those refutations.

One of the fundamental issues the new narrative should deal with is the extent to which the ultimate goal of the Islamists can be revised. When it comes to revisiting the extremists’ narratives, it merits mentioning that many religious scholars have openly denounced violence for attaining that goal. The goal, however, is hardly questioned.

Participants called for a response, which, while countering extremism, doesn't see itself as poles apart to the western one. Instead of viewing the west as a monolithic entity, the group called for acknowledging contribution of the west in diverse spheres of knowledge.

Reintegration of militants

The second group, which met on March 27, 2017, discussed the mechanism for reintegrating militants willing to shun violence and denounce *takfeer* (the practice of declaring fellow Muslims out of creed of Islam).

There were some concerns if reintegration should even be readily offered, especially for those who have inflicted violence on Pakistanis; others questioned reintegration may turn out to be unproductive, as those disagreeing with laying down arms may splinter off, repeating the same cycle of violence. But largely, the working group agreed that, to tackle militancy in the long run, attempts should be made of adopting soft approaches too, one of them being reintegrating the erstwhile militants.

The group was told that there were more chances of reintegrating conventional militant groups – who are aiming primarily for liberating Kashmir from India and secondarily for Islamizing the country. These groups would not want to lose their strong organizational structures or assets in the country. Alternatively,

left on their own, they can turn against the state.

An observer shared findings of the rehabilitation models of six countries (Bangladesh, Malaysia, Morocco, Jordan, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia), calling upon the members to extract lessons from their experiences: engage scholars, professors, and psychiatrists; interact with imprisoned radicals and/or their families. A member also called for adopting model that represents the democratic ethos of the country.

The working group also partially wondered if those Islamist groups who attack inside the country and those who do not, could be bracketed together. As per one member, these groups may not necessarily be seen by many Pakistanis, as being hostile to the country.

When it came to sectarian groups, the group insinuated that militancy is linked to the process of excommunicating each other. If militants denounce this process (known as *takfeer*), should they be accepted? It was questioned as to what will be the rationale of sectarian parties without that process.

Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ) representative, when asked if the outfit can shed the notion of declaring Shias non-Muslims, responded that while no such slogan has been raised from their

platform since 2003, the issue of *takfeer* rests with *muftis* empowered to issue *fatwas*.

JamaatudDa'wa's representative linked militancy to *takfeer*, saying they are against excommunicating each other and they have been publishing about this trend.

Some members called for looking at Baloch separatist groups from altogether different angle. Their problem, one said, is purely economic and political. And they should not be clubbed with the Islamist militants.

As to fatwa-issuing, while members also understood the importance of ending the war of fatwas, one member thought establishing a state-sanctioned fatwa department, as established in some countries, would be counter-productive, fearing that the state can manipulate it to pursue its own ends.

No	Solution	Probability
1.	General or Conditional Amnesty for reintegration of conventional militant groups	NO A widespread amnesty for all, without trial, was contested.
2.	Judicial commission to review militants' character and behaviour.	NO A parliamentary commission to review pro-jihadist polices, proposed
3.	Monitoring mechanism for proscribed organizations	YES Parliamentary oversight and NACTA role endorsed

No	Solution	Probability
4.	De-radicalization of militant detainees	YES A police-led intervention suggested. Engagement of moderate religious scholars in such programs recommended.

National dialogue and social contract

The third group, meeting on April 3, 2017, pondered upon the need for a national dialogue to address critical politico-philosophical issues in the country, especially those producing extremism, and whether a revised social contract could provide answers.

Pakistan like other Muslim countries faces some deep philosophical/intellectual questions touching upon role of religion and nature of the state. To find answers to them, participants suggested, Pakistan, following the trend of other Muslim countries, can hold national-level dialogues. The mechanism of those dialogues, for sure, should suit the needs of Pakistan.

Most of the participants disapproved of the suggestion of re-writing a new social contract. They reposed their trust in the existing constitution, originally drafted in 1973. The same contract, they said, has even helped resolve several of the country's other basic questions, most recently in the form of the 18th

Constitutional Amendment, delegating powers to the provinces.

Several participants, however, reminded that some of the clauses of the Constitution too end up infringing on the freedom of the minorities.

The group suggested that room for amendments be left open. However, any change, whatsoever, should be brought in through the process already laid out in the Constitution.

Participants also brainstormed over the themes for national dialogues and their potential players.

A key dialogue theme suggested was to discuss relation between state and religion. Such a discussion, it was proposed, would automatically discuss role of minorities in the country, besides others. As discussed, several blamed the state's policies for ending up into intolerant narratives in the country.

Another broader theme evolving out of the discussion was relation between state and citizen. This came as the group, while putting their trust on the constitution, desired of its implementation. To this end, one of the urgent dialogues, some participants said, is required between civil society and power elites of the country. One participant said that civil-military relations should also be discussed as a corollary of this larger dialogue theme. One called for exploring

tensions between those who are known as the modernist Muslims and the traditionalists.

Participants trusted in constitution as the guiding principle of any dialogue. A participant even suggested those who reject the constitution of Pakistan as un-Islamic should rather be first told that it doesn't have anything contrary to Islam. This, it was argued, will pave way for dialogue with them.

Implementing National Action Plan

The fourth group, which met on April 10, 2017, discussed the implementing mechanism of National Action Plan, the country's counter-terror plan announced in January 2015.

Members of the group agreed that the gains made against terrorism are temporary, largely because the efforts made rely mostly on exercising quick force. To move towards more lasting outcome, it was suggested that the implementation mechanism of NAP be reviewed, because it is a counter-terror framework provided by none other than the government itself.

When it comes to NAP, the government has been mostly creating its monitoring bodies.

Members blamed different civilian or military institutions, or both, over

failures on the points of NAP with weak progress. Civilian institutions were blamed for foiling counter-terror operations in Karachi and Punjab and for failing to strengthen the criminal justice system. The military was blamed for still living with the old policy of condemning some groups and condoning others, and for driving away the political reconciliation in Balochistan; the legality of apex committees, driving counter-terror efforts in each province, was also questioned.

Largely, however, the group members agreed that the entire counter-terror approach, involving military or paramilitary forces, has been military-driven.

For all the differences, the group called for wresting authorities in different civilian institutions namely the Parliament, Office of the Prime Minister, and civilian law-enforcement agencies.

Below are the observations of the group on different points of NAP:

	Point	Observations
1	<i>Implementation of death sentence of those convicted in cases of terrorism.</i>	<p>There have been several halts followed by resumption in death sentences.</p> <p>Critics question about any direct relation between the decline in terror attacks and resumption of death penalty, saying such penalties reflect that the entire counter-terror policy is focused on hard approaches.</p>
2	<i>Special trial courts under the supervision of Army. The duration of these courts would be two years.</i>	<p>After their expiry in January 2017, the tenure of the military courts have been re-extended, this time, by inserting some conditions such as of allowing the accused to engage lawyer.</p> <p>Largely, though, the details of the proceeding of the military courts are kept in darkness.</p> <p>A group member argued that by reviewing against their sentences, the military courts have not been allowed to function as they were supposed to, and that if civilian courts are given same powers and scope, they too can deliver sentences against the terrorists.</p>
3	<i>Militant outfits and armed gangs will not be allowed to operate in the country.</i>	<p>Some group members were confident that the state has vowed to confront all shades of militant groups. There was realization on part of the state, some members said, of doing away with the past policy of condemning those who attack inside Pakistan and condoning those who attack outside Pakistan. When asked if that is so, it was suggested the state has its own timeline to take care of.</p> <p>But several contested the notion, saying the government has not been successful in curbing the activities of banned outfits. For one, several groups still operate under different names.</p> <p>This inconsistency was further blatant on groups attacking outside Pakistan. A member suggested if the government has</p>

	Point	Observations
		seriously abandoned the old policy, it should expedite progress in the investigations in Mumbai and Pathankot terror incidents, which were allegedly carried out by groups based in Pakistan.
4	<i>NACTA, the anti-terrorism institution will be strengthened.</i>	<p>NACTA launched its website. The portal provides list of proscribed organizations.</p> <p>NACTA is run as subsidiary of interior ministry, as opposed to being under the PM, as was originally conceived.</p> <p>A member argued NACTA should have been made into providing strategic guidance and serving as central node of all intelligence bodies, rather than carrying out day-to-day implementation. For one, NAP's own implementation can be handed over to NACTA.</p>
5	<i>Strict action against the literature, newspapers and magazines promoting hatred, extremism, sectarianism and intolerance.</i>	<p>The country's existing laws are sufficient in cracking down on hate speech, provided law-enforcement agencies are trained and equipped to do that.</p> <p>On the other hand, there were wide reports of hate material being freely available; on the other hand, there are anecdotes of police cracking down on material thought to be fuelling hate merely because of their title.</p>
6	<i>Choking financing for terrorist and terrorist organizations.</i>	<p>Some accounts of militants have been frozen, but overall, convictions in terror financing are close to none.</p> <p>There seems to be little understanding of terror financing. A task force on terror financing, to be headed by the finance minister, was supposed to be constituted.</p>
7	<i>Ensuring against re-emergence of proscribed organizations.</i>	<p>Banned groups still hold public events; many operate by changing their names merely. Instead of targeting the groups, the government should focus on "banned" individuals, freezing their accounts or denying them weapons or passports, one suggested.</p> <p>Largely, there is no mechanism for monitoring or reviewing banned outfits. The point was discussed in detail in second working group. (See PIPS policy brief, <i>Reintegration of Militants</i>, April 2017).</p>
8	<i>Establishing and deploying a dedicated counter-terrorism force.</i>	Police departments in the four provinces, despite having specialized counter-terror personnel, lack coordination.
9	<i>Taking effective steps against religious persecution.</i>	In what are read as symbolic gestures, the highest offices, especially the Prime Minister, has been speaking positively of religious minorities in the country. But targeted attacks against Ahmedi as well as Shia continue.

	Point	Observations
10	<i>Registration and regulation of religious seminaries.</i>	<p>Besides geo-tagging madrassas, a fresh registration drive also started but has stopped by now. Arguably, political parties, including some ally with the government resisted, failing the entire reform process. At least, a member said, action should be taken against 37 madrassas which the government identified are involved in militancy.</p> <p>The group debated how to progress on madrassa reform and regulation. One argued their students cannot be left on their own, calling for incorporating them somewhere else. Another called for a phased approach of reforms. Abrupt closure, it was said, can be counter-productive.</p>
11	<i>Ban on glorification of terrorists and terrorist organizations through print and electronic media.</i>	<p>The body regulating electronic media has warned media against glorifying militants, including those who attack outside Pakistan. Some channels have been fined too.</p>
12	<i>Administrative and development reforms in FATA with immediate focus on repatriation of IDPs.</i>	<p>The government has announced merging FATA with KP after five years, in line with the recommendation of the government-constituted committee on FATA reforms.</p> <p>Some quarters are concerned that five years down the road, the situation might change; others call for moving the debate beyond the provincial status of FATA, advising to do away with the contested Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR).</p>
13	<i>Communication network of terrorists will be dismantled completely.</i>	<p>Despite government's claim, the networks of terrorists have not been dismantled completely, evident from the continuing major attacks, which certainly require networking and coordination.</p>
14	<i>Measures against abuse of internet and social media for terrorism.</i>	<p>Civil society fears that the vague language of the Pakistan Electronic Crime Act 2016 could be invoked to infringe upon civil liberties.</p> <p>The group was told how social media is used by extremists. Very often, they monitor the messages of people on public posts, and then privately message to those who are more extreme in orientation. Extremists criticize democratic system, post fake messages, and instigate people, on social media.</p>
15	<i>Zero tolerance for militancy in Punjab.</i>	<p>Punjab has been the "heartland" of Pakistan, requiring serious attention. Even though the point about Punjab was inserted in NAP, a member shared it took government two more years to accept that southern Punjab is hub of militancy, as Rangers were allowed to conduct operations.</p>
16	<i>On-going operation in Karachi will be taken to its logical</i>	<p>Members argued that Karachi operation has become victim to politics. There have been many arrests, followed by similar number of releases. Peace in Karachi seems temporary, as root</p>

	Point	Observations
	<i>end.</i>	causes around land, politics, ethnicity, are unaddressed.
17	<i>Balochistan government to be fully empowered for political reconciliation with complete ownership by all stakeholders.</i>	Attempts to reconciliation failed with the exit of Chief Minister Abdul Malik Baloch. As of now, the military is driving force in the province. Civilian government should be strengthened in Balochistan. However, a member said, lower-level fighters are being reconciled, amid fears that they might take arms again.
18	<i>Dealing firmly with sectarian terrorists.</i>	The government's approach in dealing with sectarian terrorists has been oriented around counterterrorism, without addressing the causes promoting sectarian minds.
19	<i>Formulation of a comprehensive policy to deal with the issue of Afghan refugees, beginning with registration of all refugees.</i>	Despite calls for registering and/or evicting Afghan refugees, they hardly had any role in terrorist attacks inside Pakistan. The year 2016 saw one of the highest evictions of Afghans from Pakistan.
20	<i>Revamping and reforming the criminal justice system.</i>	Nothing has been done to reform the system, leaving the option of military courts open. Members called for according this point priority, especially by engaging police and fine-tuning the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, especially its witness protection clauses.

Constitution, Citizenship, and Governance

The fifth working group, meeting on April 17, 2017, brainstormed as to how extremism revolves around lack of equal status and physical services to all citizens. The group observed that on the one hand, areas excluded from the mainstream provide space to violent extremists; on the other hand, they often target religious minorities, an excluded group.

Members of the group debated if the constitution accords equality to all citizens in all fields of life. Even if

concept of equal citizenship is enshrined to some extent in the constitution, it is often missing in many spheres in practices, they noted.

The group discussed how some people like religious minorities are accorded or denied the same constitutional rights as others. Similarly, some areas like the tribal areas are defined as special territories with their own codes to the denial of basic human rights. This denial of normal citizenship was termed as “exclusion” of a group of people or their area.

The group observed that exclusion is at the heart of violent extremism. On the one hand, violent extremists thrive in areas that are excluded from national mainstream; on the other hand, violent extremists hit those who are themselves excluded, or feel excluded and alienated.

It is popularly assumed that extremists raise guns against the state out of their frustration from the state for not taking care of them properly. There is considerable debate over whether ill-governance, poverty, and illiteracy produce extremism, and how.

Members too debated the point. One said it is too simplistic to say lack of governance is responsible for extremism, asking, if that were so, why are extremists not produced in many African countries?

The group, however, understood the indirect relation between governance and extremism. Lack of good governance, several insinuated, means lack of proper machinery to check the rise of militant groups; ill-governance provides enabling environment.

Those regions where militants thrive like tribal areas are excluded from the national mainstream as well as lack services. Denial of basic services and development to these “remote” areas carried legacy of the British rulers, who saw them as their distant strategic outposts.

Members noted robust criminal justice system is key to peel off militant recruitment. Surely, a strengthened justice system will help prosecute militants, a point also highlighted in the National Action Plan.

But more than that, a responsive criminal justice system, especially at lower level, will help deter criminals in the first place, many of whom are then radicalized by militants. Similarly, a well-to-do justice system will deny extremists the justification militants often invoke, in their attempts to attract people.

Youth engagement programs

The sixth working group, meeting on April 18, 2017, exploring the way youth are being radicalized in the country, and what can be done in the first place that they don’t fall for extremist provocations.

With more than 60% of population below the age of 30, Pakistan is a young country. At the same time, extremists are able to resonate with a wide section of the youth, which is brought into believing into the extremist notions. Steering youth away from radicalization will greatly diminish the space for radicalization in general.

Members of the group noted that youth radicalization in Pakistan is a cross-cutting phenomenon. “Extremists have attracted young people from rural areas and urban

centres, madrassas and even universities, poor and well-off backgrounds, not only men but women too”, noted the day-long deliberations.

At the same time, the group noted to better diagnose solutions for different youth groups, better to take into account the multi-dimensional realities of the radicalization, too.

The group debated if one particular set of radicalized youth should be preferred over another.

The group also touched upon the education background of the radical individuals.

Member shared youth of the country has been brought up in a worldview that does not diverge much from the extremists’. They have studied textbooks and watch dramas, which thrive on creating stereotypes of non-Muslims.

Members noted youth are denied spaces and opportunities where they can translate their ideas and dreams into reality.

The influx of radical thought in the minds of the youth went parallel with the outflow of the inclusive spaces for them. Gone are the days when people would sit, walk, eat, or drink with each other, least concerned with the faith of each other.

Interactions at homes themselves enabled members kept checks on any wayward activity. Clearly, parents can be approached in assuring their children do not go the harm’s way.

Other influencers include teachers, who can judge if a student is being “transformed”; a student’s sudden change in behaviour, like the content of question, attendance are good indicators, and can be worked upon.

Members were told of the several government initiatives offering incentives such as internship programs to distributing laptops. The group, after appreciating these efforts, suggested these initiatives be advertised wisely, besides increasing their scope, such as engaging more young people especially from far-flung areas.

Members noted that “proper education” is pivotal, too, to ensure young people are not swayed too easily.

The working group shared that young people of the marginalized areas shall be uplifted. Besides providing political rights in these areas, universities and colleges be established in areas like Balochistan and FATA.

Media engagement programs

The seventh working group, meeting on April 24, 2017, explored

the way in which media can be engaged to counter extremism.

Noticeably, extremist thoughts are often conveyed through print and broadcast media and in recent times, through cyber spaces.

Interestingly, it appeared as if rise of militancy went parallel to proliferation of media in Pakistan. Extremists were the first to use latest technology of their times. In the 1990s, messages of militant groups like Al-Qaeda were sold in audio-cassettes. The influx of private media in 2000s also saw the wider spread of extremist messages.

All in all, they agreed that media-society relation is a two-way street; the two affect each other. Even if the subject being talked about is not militant outfits, still, some media coverage tends to radicalize people's behaviours.

Many members attributed the criticism at media, in relaying controversial content, to the dynamics of media industry. Media is an industry and like any industry it caters to ratings. That is why it tends to show issues in a stereotypical fashion because that attracts the people.

Media personnel also get influenced by the jihadis, another participant said. Those who are banned are invited as guests in evening shows, where they try to strike a chord with audience.

Members stressed upon the need for maintaining professional standards in the field of journalism, at all level, starting from universities all the way to the newsroom. One participant called for inculcating reading habit among journalists. Nothing is stopping them from reading books.

Members noted that the debate on the media regulation to check extremism largely discusses current affairs shows, to the complete denial of entertainment programs. Entertainment industry often stereotypes non-Muslims. State-run entertainment channel was particularly pointed out as brainwashing people with a particular viewpoint.

The group also discussed the media of the militants or the militant media. One member, recalling analysis of the militant media, shared their media have clear editorial policy; their outreach is limited but impactful, some having circulation of 20,000 copies.

When it comes to the electronic media, the group shared the media-regulatory body, or Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA), is bound to follow certain legal requirements, which, if met, can properly, help curb extremism.

As to the radicalizing content on the internet, the group was told that a law has been passed that bans all sorts of criminal activities on the

internet. The bill is hailed by the government, but digital rights activists fear part of the bill can be invoked to infringe civil liberties. Efforts can be made at laying down clear-cut definitions of what constitute hate speech.

Cultural diversity and pluralism

The eighth working group, meeting on April 25, 2017, suggested opening up cultural spaces to curb narrow extremist thoughts.

The group found it true that cultural diversity is anathema to an extremist body. Across the country, militant Islamists have targeted cultural symbols.

Members observed that radicals tried to impose a peculiar understanding of Arabic culture, in the name of Islam. "Talibanization is partly Arabization", one said.

The group debated on the causes of why local cultural spaces got denied while religious-ideological radicalism grew.

The overarching issue has been creating national identity on Islam rather than ethnicities. Many argued radicalization emanated from the policy state pursued to glue the country together against perceived threats. The country's elite saw ethnic diversity as threat to unity, thereby imposing Islam.

One participant argued the real shift towards monolithic identity began in 1971. After Pakistan got dismembered, security institutions thought the problem lay in not following Islam enough; hence the answer was sought in more Islam.

Although Pakistan has been part of South Asia, its elite, in response to tensions with India, escaped to Middle East, thinking of Arabic culture as Islamic enough. The internal diversity was seen as liability. Resultantly, the space for ethnic minorities got shrunk.

Pakistan is a multicultural, multi-ethnic country; to make it functional, the interests and ambitions of all the ethnicities and cultures should be given space. Imposing monolithic identity, be that ethnic, is wrong, the group noted.

A lack of appreciation of diversity is particular detrimental to non-Muslims. Even though non-Muslims in Pakistan are indigenous to the country, living mutually with Muslims for centuries, they are viewed as foreign to the country, the participants aggrieved, saying they are not treated as equal citizens and their culture not appreciated as Pakistan's.

The group observed that culture is often invoked to justify violence especially against women. Cultural relativism in the context of violence is unacceptable. To say "this is our culture" is just an excuse. Only

positive expressions of culture should be absorbed.

Education reforms

The ninth working group, which met on May 2, 2017, explored how education can be reformed to tame extremism.

The group endorsed reforming education sector as a must to counter extremism. The group, after reviewing different approaches towards education, argued that any measure aimed at reforming education should help achieving knowledge-based society.

The group argued that the country's multi-directional educational system itself deepens the social divides. There are public schools, some capable to offer courses in English, others relying on Urdu mostly; private schools, aligning with the financial status of the parents of the students; madrassas, registered with one sect-based board, among other types of schools. A student in one school grows with a worldview completely dissonant with that of another. When they grow up, their interests and fear completely diverge, sometimes, in contestation to each other.

Providing education is state's duty. It is a right duly acknowledged in Article 25-A, but this constitutional obligation, of providing free education to children, is not duly met. The group called for holding the state responsible.

After the passage of the 18th Constitutional Amendment, education is transferred to provinces; the group called for assessing impact of that transfer. Some even reasoned that in reality, there has been no progress in the status of education.

The education-extremism link does not come out from those who are uneducated, that the illiterate ones readily fall for exclusive messages. Far from it. In Pakistan's the link comes from the way the prevailing curriculum have radicalized students. Today, they are uncomfortable with condemning the militant acts, which they were thought are the right acts.

Two subjects repeatedly mentioned in this session (as well as previous consultations) that require complete review are Islamiyat (Islamic Studies) and Pakistan Studies. Several studies have found intellectual and moral flaws in the content of these subjects for a diverse country like Pakistan: non-Muslims are made to read the subjects too; the subjects interpret some historical events in purely religious languages; historical events are selectively presented, without offering the viewpoint of the other side; all the role models are warriors; war itself is eulogized, besides others. It is therefore unsurprising that students from mainstream educational institutions are unable to clearly shield against the incursion of militant ideology.

The group argued the entire curriculum aimed at instilling a conception of Pakistani that discards diversity. A member called for inculcating some sense of Pakistani-hood, which embraces all communities and their cultures. One of the ways out of these debates is to source our nationhood on fundamental rights.

A member was curious to learn about the impact of the four-year bachelor program for all disciplines, introduced in the 2000s. The program is praised by its architects, but it ended up ignoring social science, promoting applied sciences.

Members grappled with resolving the mystery behind madrasa reforms. Every step towards reforming them is meant fresh steps in that direction. As if all the previous steps were useless.

The quantity of education is gravely felt in militant-infested areas like FATA, where Taliban destroyed schools and threatened girls from attending educational institutions.

Internal security challenges

The tenth working group, which met on May 3, 2017, debated how to address internal security challenges including those emanating from extremism.

The group agreed that Pakistan faces a multitude of internal security challenges. Terrorism by Islamist militants is the most serious one.

Within the Islamists, there are those who can be co-opted to reintegrate and those who have to fight till the end. Motivations of these militants often revolve around ideology.

The group argued the responses to these threats have usually been reactive and piecemeal. The state's response overwhelming exercises force. The military, which shall be the "final punch", is used as first line of defence; even if military is not involved, the approach of civilian law-enforcement agencies is "kill or capture."

The group argued that many innocent people have suffered in the name of counter-terror drive. More so, even those have shunned violence are nabbed in fresh drive.

A variety of other responses with the same effect - of neutralizing militants - is missing. These responses are important because there is diversity within the internal security challenges the country face.

The group called for shaping a consolidated internal security policy, which articulates the roadmap towards addressing those challenges. The group called for revisiting the entire approach and vision of the internal security, moving beyond the reactive response to any militant attack.

Image Gallery

Group 1: Religious thought and conflict
March 20, 2017



Group 2: Reintegration of militants
March 27, 2017



Group 3: National dialogue and social contract
April 3, 2017





Group 4: Implementing National Action Plan
April 10, 2017



Group 5: Constitution, citizenship, and governance
April 17, 2017



Group 6: Youth engagement programs

April 18, 2017



Group 7: Media engagement programs

April 24, 2017



Group 8: Cultural diversity and pluralism

April 25, 2017





Group 9: Education reforms
May 2, 2017



Group 10: Internal security challenges
May 3, 2017



Annex 1: Details on structure, participants of meetings of Working Groups on Counter-Violent Extremism (CVE)

Group with Report	Date of Meeting	Group Members (arranged alphabetically by last name)
<p>Group 1: Religious Thought and Conflict</p> <p>The group deliberated about the mechanism for shaping a religion-based narrative that counters those of extremists.</p>	March 20, 2017	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Dr. Syed Jaffar Ahmed, former chairman, Area Study Centre, Karachi University. 2. Saqib Akbar, Al-Baseera Trust, Islamabad. 3. Dr. Husn Al-Ameen, Director Iqbal Research and Dialogue Centre, IIU, Islamabad. 4. Dr. Qibla Ayaz, former vice chancellor, Peshawar University. 5. Allama Syed Ahmed Yusuf Banori, Principal Jamiatul Uloom Islamia, Banori Town, Karachi. 6. Maulana Abdul Haq Hashmi, Jamaat-e-Islami Balochistan. 7. Qazi Javed, Director Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore. 8. Dr. Khalid Masood, former head Council of Islamic Ideology. 9. Khursheed Nadeem, Chairman Organization for Research and Education (ORE). 10. Dr. Raghieb Naeemi, Administrator Jamia Naeemia, Lahore. 11. Ammar Khan Nasir, Director Al-Sharia Academy, Gujranwala. 12. Muhammad Amir Rana, Director Pak Institute for Peace Studies. 13. Sahibzada Amanat Rasool, Idara Fikr-e-Jadeed, Lahore. Qari Yaseen Zafar, Administrator Jamia Salafia, Faisalabad.
<p>Group 2: Reintegration of Militants</p> <p>The group explored the possibility and mechanism of reintegrating and rehabilitating militants or banned groups.</p>	March 27, 2017	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Gen. (R) Masood Aslam, former Corps Commander, Peshawar. 2. Khalid Aziz, former Chief Secretary, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. 3. Brig. (R) Muhammad Fayyaz, expert, University of Management and Technology, Lahore. 4. Afrasiab Khattak, former Senator. 5. Tariq Khosa, former Inspector General of Police, Punjab. 6. Dr. Khalid Masood, former head, Council of Islamic Ideology. 7. Syed Arfeen Mehdi, journalist, Geo News. 8. Khursheed Nadeem, Chairman Organization for Research and Education (ORE). 9. Tariq Parvez, former head National Counter-Terrorism Authority (NACTA). 10. Muhammad Amir Rana, Director Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS). 11. Lt. Gen (R) Amjad Shoaib, defense analyst.

Group with Report	Date of Meeting	Group Members (arranged alphabetically by last name)
		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 12. Muhammad Ziauddin, senior journalist 13. Two representatives of banned organizations presented their views in one session.
<p>Group 3: National Dialogue and Social Contract</p> <p>The group pondered upon the need for a national dialogue to address critical politico-philosophical issues in the country, especially those producing extremism, and whether a revised social contract could provide answers.</p>	April 3, 2017	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Dr. Qibla Ayaz, former VC, Peshawar University. 2. Farzana Bari, gender and rights activist. 3. Romana Bashir, peace activist. 4. Rashad Bukhari, scholar. 5. Dr. Zia-ul-Haq, Director General, Islamic Research Institute, International Islamic University, Islamabad. 6. Harris Khalique, poet and essayist. 7. Afrasiab Khattak, former senator. 8. Rahat Malik, political analyst. 9. Khursheed Nadeem, Chairman Organization for Research and Education (ORE). 10. Dr. Raghieb Naeemi, administrator Jamia Naeemia, Lahore. 11. Niaz Hussain Naqvi, jamia Al-Muntazir, Lahore. 12. Dr. A. H. Nayyar, educationist. 13. Yasir Pirzada, columnist. 14. Muhammad Amir Rana, Director PIPS. 15. Dr. Ejaz Ahmed Samdani, Darul Uloom Karachi. 16. Sabookh Syed, senior journalist.
<p>Group 4: Implementing National Action Plan (NAP)</p> <p>The group discussed how best to implement government's own NAP, so as to eradicate militancy from the country, with full involvement of all stakeholders.</p>	April 10, 2017	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Khalid Aziz, former Chief Secretary, KP. 2. Senator Farhatullah Babar, Senator, PPP. 3. ImtiazGul, security analyst. 4. Raoof Hassan, CEO, Regional Peace Institute. 5. Abdullah Khan, security observer. 6. Afrasiab Khattak, former senator, ANP. 7. Tariq Khosa, former Inspector General of Police. 8. Tariq Parvez, founding head, NACTA. 9. YasirPirzada, columnist. 10. Muhammad Amir Rana, Director, PIPS. 11. Shameem Shahid, journalist, Peshawar. 12. Lt. Gen (R) Amjad Shoaib, defense analyst. 13. Dr. Farhan Zahid, security researcher. 14. Shahzada Zulfiqar, journalist, Balochistan
<p>Group 5: Constitution, Citizenship and Governance</p> <p>The meeting</p>	April 17, 2017	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Barrister Shahzad Akbar, lawyer; Director, Foundation for Fundamental Rights. 2. Khalid Aziz, Chairman, Regional Institute of Policy Research and Training. 3. Dr. Yaqoob Bangash, Director, Centre for Governance and Policy, Information Technology University, Lahore.

Group with Report	Date of Meeting	Group Members (arranged alphabetically by last name)
explored to what extent is extremism linked to the provision of constitutional rights and physical services provided by the state. Also, how citizens absorb the concept of citizenship and how governance is carried out.		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 4. Muhammad Ismail Khan, Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS). 5. Afrasiab Khattak, former Senator, KP. 6. Humera Mufti, Director General, Special Initiative, National Counter-Terrorism Authority (NACTA). 7. Dr. Niaz Murtaza, Executive Director, Inspiring Pakistan 8. Khurshed Nadeem, Chairman Organization for Research and Education (ORE). 9. Ammar Khan Nasir, Deputy Director, Al-Sharia Academy, Gujranwala. 10. Dr. A. H. Nayyar, educationist, Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad. 11. Ghazi Salahuddin, columnist, <i>The News</i>. 12. Dr. Farhan Zahid, security researcher.
<p>Group 6: Youth Engagement Program</p> <p>The meeting explored the ways of preventing radicalization in youth as well as response actions to de-radicalize those who have already fallen for extremist and militant narratives and groups.</p>	April 18, 2017	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Mubashir Akram, development professional. 2. Shaukat Aziz, President, FATA Youth Organization. 3. Ali Baba, poet, writer. 4. Farman Baig, journalist. 5. Farzana Bari, Director, Gender Studies, Quaid-e-Azam University. 6. Romana Bashir, Director, Peace and Development Foundation. 7. Rashad Bukhari, peace-building worker. 8. Abdullah Dayo, Frederick Ebert Stiftung (FES). 9. Saeeda Deip, Chairperson, Institute for Peace and Secular Studies. 10. Ravi Dewani, All Pakistan Hindu Council. 11. Muhammad Ismail Khan, PIPS. 12. Pandit Chana Laal, representative of Hindu community. 13. Krishan Laal, representative of Hindu community. 14. Tasawur Majeed, City College, Multan. 15. Khurshid Nadeem, Chairman Organization for Research and Education (ORE). 16. Usman Pirzada, Chairman, Muzaffarabad Youth Council. 17. Younis Qasmi, IRD, International Islamic University, Islamabad 18. Mujtaba Rathore, Peace and Education Foundation. 19. Zia Ur Rehman, Karachi-based journalist. 20. Maimoona Saeed, Multan-based journalist. 21. Aoun Sahi, Bureau Chief, Channel 24, Islamabad. 22. Hina Saleem, peace worker, Bahawalpur. 23. Kulbeer Singh, representative of Sikh Community,

Group with Report	Date of Meeting	Group Members (arranged alphabetically by last name)
		<p>Lahore.</p> <p>24. Sabookh Syed, Editor, IBCUrdu.com.</p> <p>25. Asmat Wazir, anchorperson, Khyber TV.</p> <p>26. Samreen Wazir, Vice President, FATA Youth Organization.</p> <p>27. Muhammad Zeeshan Zafar, Bargad Organization for Youth Development.</p>
<p>Group 7: Media Engagement Program</p> <p>The group meeting explored how media can be engaged in CVE programs so that it neither glorifies extremists nor propagates radicalizing messages.</p>	April 24, 2017	<p>1. Maham Ali, PEMRA.</p> <p>2. Dr. Qibla Ayaz, former Vice Chancellor, Peshawar University</p> <p>3. Saher Baloch, reporter, Karachi.</p> <p>4. Akhter Baloch, blogger, Karachi.</p> <p>5. Dr. Faizullah Jan, academician, Peshawar University.</p> <p>6. Afrasiab Khattak, former Senator, ANP.</p> <p>7. Shmyla Khan, Digital Rights Foundation.</p> <p>8. Wusutullah Khan, senior journalist, columnist.</p> <p>9. Khurram Mehran, spokesperson, Pakistan Telecommunications Authority (PTA).</p> <p>10. Shahid Mehmood Nadeem, Ajoka Theatre, Lahore.</p> <p>11. Ammar Khan Nasir, Deputy Director, Al-Sharia Academy, Gujranwala.</p> <p>12. Muhammad Amir Rana, Director, PIPS.</p> <p>13. Ghazi Salahuddin, columnist.</p> <p>14. Saleem Shahid, Quetta-based journalist.</p> <p>15. Muhammad Zubair, PEMRA.</p> <p>16. Muhammad Ziauddin, senior journalist.</p>
<p>Group 8: Cultural Diversity & Pluralism</p> <p>The group suggested opening up cultural spaces to curb narrow extremist thoughts.</p>	April 25, 2017	<p>1. Bilal Ahmed, radio journalist.</p> <p>2. Dr. Qibla Ayyaz, former vice chancellor, Peshawar University.</p> <p>3. Farzana Bari, gender activist.</p> <p>4. Rashad Bukhari, peace activist.</p> <p>5. Abdullah Dayo, FES Pakistan.</p> <p>6. Saeeda Deip, peace activist.</p> <p>7. Afrasiab Khattak, former Senator.</p> <p>8. Mukesh Kumar, TV producer.</p> <p>9. Khurshid Nadeem, Chairman Organization for Research and Education (ORE).</p> <p>10. A.H. Nayyer, educationist.</p> <p>11. Akbar Notezai, journalist.</p> <p>12. Muhammad Amir Rana, Director, PIPS.</p> <p>13. Mujtaba Rathore, Peace and Education Foundation.</p> <p>14. Fauzia Saeed, Executive Director, LokVirsa,</p>

Group with Report	Date of Meeting	Group Members (arranged alphabetically by last name)
		Islamabad. 15. Saleem Shahid, senior journalist. 16. Marvi Sirmed, civil society activist. 17. Nadeem Omar Tarrar, Director, National College of Arts. 18. Irfan Ahmed Urfi, writer.
Group 9: Education Reforms The group deliberated upon how education in Pakistan can be reformed to curb extremist tendencies.	May 2, 2017	1. Dr. Aamir Abdullah, Islamic scholar. 2. Dr. Syed Jaffar Ahmed, University of Karachi. 3. Dr. Husn Al-Ameen, Director Iqbal Research and Dialogue Centre, IIU, Islamabad. 4. Zehra Arshad, education activist. 5. Dr. QiblaAyaz, former vice chancellor, University of Peshawar. 6. Yaqoob Bangash, historian. 7. Romana Bashir, peace-building activist. 8. Rashad Bukhari, peace & development worker. 9. AzharHussain, peace and education worker. 10. Afrasiyab Khattak, former Senator, KP. 11. Dr. Khalid Mahmood, teacher, Gilgit-Baltistan. 12. A.H. Nayyer, educationist 13. Umer Orakzai, development professional. 14. Muhammad Amir Rana, Director, PIPS 15. Robina Saigol, educationist.
Group 10: Internal Security and Challenges The group debated how to address internal security challenges including those emanating from violent extremism.	May 3, 2017	1. Syed Arfeen, journalist. 2. Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Masood Aslam, defense analyst. 3. Dr. Qibla Ayaz, former vice chancellor, University of Peshawar. 4. Rashad Bukhari, peace & development worker. 5. Zahid Hussain, political analyst. 6. Afrasiab Khattak, former Senator, KP. 7. Tariq Khosa, former Inspector General of Police. 8. Gen (Retd.) Talat Masood, defense analyst. 9. Dr. Khalid Masood, former chairman of Council of Islamic Ideology. 10. Ammar Khan Nasir, Deputy Director, Sharia Academy, Gujranwala. 11. Muhammad Amir Rana, Director, PIPS. 12. Zia Ur Rehman, journalist and researcher. 13. Marvi Sirmed, civil society activist. 14. Dr. Suhail Habib Tajik, security expert. 15. Fayyaz Toru, former Inspector General Police. 16. Farhan Zahid, security expert. 17. Muhammad Ziauddin, senior journalist.

Inclusion
National narrative
Cohesive
Secure
Religious scholars
Constitution
Diversity
Parliament
National Charter of Peace
Cultural National Action Plan
National Security Policy
truth and reconciliation
Pakistani languages
National Action Plan
West-Muslims dialogue
Criminal justice system
De-radicalization
Rehabilitation
Fundamental human rights
Media regulation
Madrassah regulation
National dialogue
Equal citizenship
Cultural festivals
Reintegration



PAK INSTITUTE FOR PEACE STUDIES (PIPS)