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Radicalization in Pakistan

A Comprehensive Study - I

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Editor's Note

The phenomenon of radicalization in Pakistan has been analyzed in two contexts: one, as part of the larger global phenomenon and exploration of regional and global linkages; and second, as analysis of radicalization's possible connection with religion. Analyses in both contexts have sought to determine the causes of radicalization. The evidence indicates with almost uniform consistently that religion is at the heart of the issue. However, that alone has been of little help in comprehending the phenomenon as a whole in Pakistan's context, largely because only a handful of studies have endeavored to analyze historical, political and psychological aspects vis-à-vis radicalization in Pakistani society.

Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) launched a program in 2008 to fill that void by focusing exclusively on research aimed at a greater understanding of the phenomenon and related aspects. PIPS has produced 24 research studies, both empirical and theoretical, since the launch of the program. The institute has also initiated an exhaustive study to measure and analyze the extent and trends of radicalization across Pakistan by combining both quantitative and qualitative data.

The current issue carries the outcome of the study, including a comprehensive survey and five in-depth papers based on the survey's findings. Abdul Basit and Mujtaba Rathore identify the patterns and trends of radicalization in Pakistan. A paper by Safdar Sial and Tanveer Anjum expands the scope to militant landscape and attempts to understand the people's perspective of the phenomenon. The gender perspective is a critical and largely overlooked aspect of radicalization in Pakistan. Saba Noor and Daniela Hussain have attempted to develop an empirical base regarding the issue for the first time. Intellectual response to radicalization also remains an area neglected by academics and researchers in Pakistan. An effort has been made to shed light upon this important aspect.

It is hoped that these studies will help create a thorough understanding of the phenomenon and lead to an expanded discourse on radicalization. The next issue will cover two other important aspects of the subject: radicalization of youth in Pakistan and the State's response to the phenomenon.

May 20, 2010

Survey

Radicalization in Pakistan: Understanding the Phenomenon

Introduction

Pakistan has adopted a two-pronged strategy to fight the menace of religious militancy: it has tried to undertake development activities in the troubled northwest of the country, hoping to wean its people from militant influence by addressing their economic grievances; and it has launched numerous clear-and-hold military operations in militant-infested areas, trying to prevent terrorist threat from reaching its urban centers.

Militant violence has, however, become endemic in recent years. In 2009, militants killed at least 3000 people in Pakistan.[1] While the top leader of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Baitullah Mehsud, was targeted in a drone strike, the militant outfit managed to regroup and launch audacious attacks against the country's security forces.[2] The group also extended the area of conflict to Azad Kashmir where, for the first time, two suicide attacks were recorded.[3] Apart from that, the local Taliban started targeting civilians with greater impunity, killing hundreds of innocent women, children and university students.[4]

It became amply clear in this context that military prowess and economic incentives, while necessary to win the war, were not enough to prevent religious radicalization in the country. The Pak Institute for Peace Studies conducted the following survey to examine the phenomenon more closely. The target population consisted of all urban and rural territories of the four provinces, Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir (excluding military restricted areas).

General Profile

The survey population was selected through probability/random sampling. Most of the people (53.4 and 14.8 per cent, respectively) belonged to urban areas and small towns. Yet a significant proportion (29.9 per cent) also came from the rural community. A large majority of the respondents were either in intermediate (29.3 per cent) or pursuing a graduation or master's degree (37.5 per cent). Barely 8.3 per cent of the people were illiterate and 2.2 per cent had only received madrassah education.

Most of the respondents were not very affluent: only 21 per cent used private vehicles while 50.1 per cent relied on public transportation. A large number of these people belonged to the salaried class – as many of them were employed in public (19.6 per cent) and private (21.1 per cent) sectors – while only 15.3 per cent ran their own business. Meanwhile, 14.6 per cent of the people were without a job.

Despite the meager resources of these people, they seemed to be well-entrenched in their community, with 77.4 per cent living in their own houses. However, there were signs of family pressure and about 79 per cent people said they were living in a joint family system.

A large proportion of these people displayed their conservative streak when asked about women in the social arena: 67.2 per cent of them thought it was a woman's "religious duty" to veil herself. Similarly, 48.8 per cent believed that she should not get the right to divorce.

Meanwhile, nearly 23 per cent people did not listen to music. Many of them (15.8 per cent) attributed their decision to religious reasons. Interestingly, 51 per cent of the total sample endorsed Junaid Jamshaid's decision to quit singing.

Religious Concerns

The participants of the survey were visibly concerned about religion: 77.7 per cent of them thought that Muslims were lagging behind other nations in the world. Most of them (31.2 per cent) claimed this was because they had deviated from Islam. Only 18.1 per cent maintained that it was due to their scientific and technological backwardness.

It is also important to note that a significantly large number of people (46.8 per cent) said that religio-political parties should get a chance to rule the country. This is despite the fact that these parties only showed an impressive electoral performance in October 2002 when many analysts attributed their success to the strong anti-American sentiment in the country.[5] Interestingly, 63.6 per cent of the respondents believed that Pakistan's decision to join the US-led war on terror was incorrect.

However, a majority of people participating in the survey (46.3 per cent) was also wary of the Taliban. They categorically denied that the militant group was fighting for Islam. Even a large percentage of those who looked sympathetic to the radical outfit either condemned (37.9 per cent) its acts of

violence – such as attacks on CD shops, girls' schools and cinema etc – or did not know (21.9 per cent) how to react to them.

Most of the respondents also expressed interesting views on jihad. Very few (2.7 per cent) maintained that Muslims had failed to progress in the world since they had lost their passion to fight against their enemies. Similarly, about 28 per cent people believed that jihad amounted to fighting against cruelty, not to spread Islam in every corner of the world (5 per cent). Many of them (20.4 per cent) were also concerned about internal religious differences. They maintained that these disagreements had led to sectarianism and religious extremism. However, a bigger proportion of people (21.6 per cent) took them casually, claiming that they were preordained and prophesied.

Conclusion

The question is: what do these findings signify?

The survey clearly captures growing religiosity among the masses. It is not surprising that 65 per cent of the respondents said that a person who did not pray five times a day could not become a better Muslim. Nearly 59 per cent of them contended that the struggle for the implementation of Shariah was also jihad. But despite their conservatism, about 81 per cent of the survey population also considered female education as "extremely necessary". Only a small percentage (12.5) thought it was "not very important". Similarly, 58.7 per cent of the people felt that women should be allowed to work outside their home. However, nearly 40 per cent of them disagreed with the proposition.

All these findings indicate that the average Pakistani takes his religion seriously and wishes to see it in the public domain. But, unlike the Taliban, he does not want to make it claustrophobic for other people. The average Pakistani thus wants to look progressive in a conservative framework. He is caught between two competing narratives: the first one, which is primarily grounded in religion and is now championed by militant groups, makes him want to see his religion triumph; the other, usually trotted out by the government and the media, is mostly based on information and rational analysis, making him realize the significance of progressing in the world.

It seems that both of these narratives are not resonating with him beyond a certain point. The religious discourse developed by militant groups, for instance, emphasizes the significance of the "Afghan jihad". Many of the groups that were previously passionate about fighting in Indian Held Kashmir shifted their focus of attention on Afghanistan to defeat the

"crusading" foreign forces. They almost put their struggle in IHK on the backburner, as the two South Asian nuclear neighbors began the normalization process in the region in 2004.

Interestingly, the general perception about the wars in Afghanistan and Kashmir is at variance with the recent militant discourse. Nearly 55 per cent of the people maintained that the bloodshed on the western side of the Durand Line was a "political war". Yet, 56 per cent of them thought that fighting in Kashmir was the real jihad.

It is also interesting to note that most people (31.2 per cent), despite their passion for religion, were shaken by Benazir Bhutto's assassination instead of the Lal Masjid operation (29.1 per cent) or the military campaigns in the northwestern territories of the country (8.4 per cent).

It is important to remember, however, that militant groups can use the growing religious fervor among the people to their own advantage. The state must, therefore, try to transform the ideological mindset by developing counter narratives and challenging the literal and extremist interpretations of Islam.

Notes

[1] Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), *Pakistan Security Report 2009*, p. 3

[2] In October 2009, the TTP attacked Pakistan's military headquarters in Rawalpindi. The attackers were wearing army uniforms and took a number of hostages in an adjacent building. For details, see "Six soldiers, four assailants killed in attack on GHQ," *Dawn*, October 10, 2009. http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/pakistan/04-firing-outside-ghq-qs-04

[3] *Pakistan Security Report 2009*, p. 14

[4] Ibid, p. 29

[5] There were other factors as well. Some analysts believe that the Musharraf administration had unwittingly created a space for these parties by keeping the top leadership of the two mainstream political parties (the Pakistan Peoples Party and Muslim League-Nawaz) outside the political system. See "The buck stops at General Musharraf" by Najam Sethi in *The Friday Times*, (Oct 18-24, 2002).

Abstracts

Trends and Patterns of Radicalization in Pakistan

Abdul Basit and Mujtaba Muhammad Rathore

The phenomenon of radicalization has played a major part in the ongoing militancy in Pakistan's restive tribal regions along the Pak-Afghan border and elsewhere in the country. Islamabad's obvious strategic importance in the US-led war on terror and the extent of religious radicalization in the country have made Pakistan a special focus of discourses on religious extremism and fundamentalism. The growing trends and patterns of radicalization in Pakistan and the underlying factors are anything but straightforward. The dynamics of such trends and patterns may be different from each other but they are interlinked. The roots of radicalization in Pakistan can be traced back to the beginning of violent sectarian divisions between the Shia and Sunni sects and to General Ziaul Haq's Islamization policies in the 1980s. This paper studies the various manifestations of radicalization across the socio-cultural, ideological and religio-political spectrums, highlighting varying tendencies of this rather complex phenomenon. In the light of an empirical study, it has been argued that religious extremism is the common prevalent factor in all the visible trends and patterns of radicalization in Pakistan.

Jihad, Extremism and Radicalization: The Public Perspective

Safdar Sial and Tanveer Anjum

Pakistani society has been facing multiple threats on account of phenomena such as jihad, extremism and radicalization since 9/11. The people of Pakistan, who largely lack awareness about radicalization and extremism and the threats they pose, are the ultimate victims of such threats. At the societal level, people provide ideological support for radical and extremist forces and facilitate them in waging jihad. In a society like Pakistan, where religiosity is an inborn trait and education and critical thinking have been largely ignored, such ideological initiations can have implications for public opinions and perceptions. This study is an attempt to explore the genesis and evolution of certain public perspectives in their historical settings, particularly across the socio-

cultural, religious, political and educational aspects. It has been disputed that the concepts of radicalization and extremism overlap with the concept of jihad in public perception. Certain state-led ideological patterns along with assertions of religious scholars and clerics have had a great impact on people's perceptions about these issues. Although no religious-political party enjoys popular support in the country, but people's perceptions endorse the need for two things: an increased role of religion in politics, law and society; and the need for social development.

Women Radicalization: An Empirical Study

Saba Noor and Daniela Hussain

Radicalization has emerged as a grave challenge to Pakistan's diverse society. However, research into reasons of radicalization of Pakistani women and their involvement in terrorist activities has received little attention. This study explores trends of radicalization among Pakistani women. The focus on women is crucial in the context of Pakistan where women form 53 percent of the population but have little say in policy and decision making at the local or national level. They are not even free to make vital decisions regarding their own life and do not have equal access to the opportunities available to men. The causes of radicalization among women are varied and complex. Women's involvement in terrorism is motivated by ideological reasons and their role has until recently been confined to providing logistic support and assistance to male militants. The trends of radicalization among Pakistani women can be traced back to the Afghan Jihad when women played an active role by providing logistic help and facilitation as mothers, daughters and wives to male militants fighting on the battlefield. At times women have got involved in terrorist activities by choice and at other times they have been forced to do so. However, an active role of women in Pakistan in terms of radicalization became visible to the world during the Lal Masjid/Jamia Hafsa standoff in Islamabad in 2007. A survey forming the basis of this empirical study found that though evidence of large-scale radicalization among Pakistani women has not been found, but women are vulnerable to both radicalization and exploitation in the name of religion, on account of ignorance at societal, political and religious levels.

Litterateurs' Response to Extremism in Pakistan

Muhammad Amir Rana

Extremism is defined in Pakistan in a number of ways, mainly in political, religious, and social contexts. A lack of consensus even on definitions make it difficult to arrive at a comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon, further complicating efforts aimed at countering extremism. This study by Muhammad Amir Rana is based on a survey that aimed to analyze the opinion of intellectuals, mainly individuals associated with literature and creative arts, in order to assess their opinion about the reasons for the steady rise of extremism in Pakistan. The study finds that Pakistani litterateurs are not only well aware of the extent and the various manifestations of extremist trends—they declare extremism to be "a real problem" for Pakistani society—they also offer comprehensive recommendations to address the rise in extremism. However, a comparison of litterateurs' views with opinions of other segments of society, recorded through surveys conducted by PIPS earlier, reveals considerable differences with regard to the preferred course to counter extremism. The litterateurs emphasize ideological and empirical aspects for countering extremism. However, religious scholars assert that extremism is a political issue, which they insist would resolve itself if Pakistan distances itself from the US-led war on terror. Finding a middle path among such divergent stances would obviously be difficult. However, efforts for convergence of views is indispensable as differences at such an elementary level would weaken efforts aimed at an effective response.

Trends and Patterns of Radicalization in Pakistan

Mujtaba Rathore and Abdul Basit

Introduction

Radicalization is the process by which people adopt extreme views, including beliefs that violent measures need to be taken for political or religious purposes.[1] The phenomenon of radicalization, which has played a major part in the ongoing militancy in Pakistan, is of immense importance in the prevailing volatile security landscape of the country. Researchers, scholars, theoreticians of social sciences, policy makers and practitioners of diplomacy have been studying various aspects of radicalization in order to understand religious extremism and radicalization in different Muslim societies, especially in Pakistan.

Understanding the various trends and patterns of radicalization and their root causes is somewhat complex in the context of Pakistan, a society that is ethnically heterogeneous and divided along ethno-linguistic, ideological, sectarian and political lines. The behaviors and attitudes of radicalization at the sub-national levels differ to varying extents. The radical trends and patterns of some areas at times bear considerable similarities to trends and patterns elsewhere in the country. The main causes of radicalization across the country are political marginalization, poverty, economic deprivation and other inequalities, social injustice, sectarian divisions, illiteracy, the role of madrassas and the indoctrination agendas of militant organizations, which exploit these factors.[2]

Pakistan's critical strategic significance in the US-led war on terror and prevalence of religious radicalization here has made the country a special focus of such discourses. Despite the emergence of a new paradigm with the war on terror, the tendency has been towards studying radicalization in Pakistan with its potential regional and global implications through Western theories and prisms thus leading to reductionism.[3] Such works have at times tended to jump to hasty conclusions through sweeping generalizations. Most of the studies on radicalization are centered on certain areas of Pakistan, most often the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) that border Afghanistan. There is a dearth of studies that examine the issue with its varying trends and patterns at the sub-national levels. Such analysis would

pave the way for identifying the similarities and disparities in trends and dynamics of radicalization in the state at the societal level. This paper explores different trends and patterns of radicalization in Pakistani society based on a survey conducted by Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) with a sample of 1,568 respondents nationwide.

Before discussing the findings of this empirical study, it is relevant to look at the journalistic and academic works of local and foreign authors on the subject. Though there is a plethora of literature available on terrorism and religious extremism in Pakistan, none of the works have dealt with the subject directly in the local context. The exiting body of literature on radicalization in Pakistan has looked at the phenomenon in the context of the 'jihad' culture spawned by military dictator General Ziaul Haq's regime in the 1980s, as well as religious extremism and Islamic militancy, sectarianism and Talibanization.

Most of these works trace the roots of radicalization in Pakistan to the start of violent sectarian divisions between the majority Sunni and minority Shia sects. Muhammad Qasim Zaman's *Sectarianism in Pakistan: The Radicalization of Shi'i and Sunni Identities* explores the pattern of radicalization of the two sects in the backdrop of the Iranian Revolution 1979, implementation of Zakat Ushr Ordinance 1979 in Pakistan and resultant awakening of the Shia sect.[4] *The Islamization of Pakistan, 1979-2009*, a report of the Washington-based Middle East Institute reviews the history of radicalization in Pakistan in the context of the Iranian Revolution, the beginning of the violent Iran-Saudi Arabia proxy sectarian war in Pakistan and its implications for the social fabric of the country.[5] International Crisis Group's Asia Report 2005 is also helpful in understanding the links between sectarianism and the trends of radicalization in Pakistan.[6]

The overwhelming majority of work on religious extremism in Pakistan has held Ziaul Haq's Islamization policies and the 'jihad' culture promoted during the Soviet-Afghan war responsible for the growth of religious extremism in Pakistan. Ayesha Jalal's *Partisans of Allah: Jihad in South Asia*, Oliver Roy's *Islamic Radicalism in Afghanistan and Pakistan* and Hassan Abbas's *Pakistan's Drift into Extremism* have studied the growth of religious extremism and the 'jihad' culture in the backdrop of the anti-Soviet 'jihad'.

The literature also highlights the role of madrassas during the anti-Soviet 'jihad' in promoting religious extremism in Pakistani society. These madrassa networks, which are scattered across the country, have inherent differences along sectarian lines and political attitudes and promotion of the 'jihad' agenda have contributed to the existing wave of radicalization in Pakistan.

Muhammad Amir Rana's *Gateway to Terrorism*, Amir Mir's *The Fluttering Flag of Jihad* and International Crisis Group report, *Pakistan: Madrassa, Extremism and the Military*, have highlighted the role of madrassas in this context.

The rise and fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the impact of their retreat along with Al Qaeda remnants into the restive tribal region of Pakistan in the aftermath of the US invasion of Afghanistan have also led to the rise of different Taliban-like militant movements in Pakistan. Muhammad Amir Rana's *Al Qaeda Fights Back inside Pakistani Tribal Areas,* Aqeel Yousafzai's *Talibanization: From Afghanistan to FATA, Swat and Pakistan*, Naveed Shinwari's *Understanding FATA* and Ahmed Rashid's *Taliban: The Story of Afghan Warlords* have underlined the role of Taliban and Al Qaeda in Pakistan. Movements by different groups such as Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi in Malakand and Lal Masjid clerics and militants in Islamabad, demanding the implementation of their own version of *Shariah*, have also played a critical role in further radicalizing Pakistani society.[7]

Muhammad Amir Rana's *A to Z of Jihad Organizations in Pakistan*, Aqeel Yousafzai's *Talibanization: From Afghanistan to FATA, Swat and Pakistan*, Mujahid Hussain's *Punjabi Taliban*, and International Crisis Group's *Pakistan: The Militant Jihadi Challenge* are among the few works that have discussed the militant landscape and networks in different geographical regions of Pakistan and helped in understanding the dynamics of varying patterns of radicalization in the country.

C. Christine Fair's *Islamic Militancy in Pakistan: A View from the Provinces* is the only empirical study conducted at the social level that assimilates the different views of the Pakistani people in the provinces.[8] She has analyzed the public's beliefs about the militancy, militants' activities, objectives and the views of the Pakistani government and its response to the militancy. The work underscores the fact that the level of support for different Islamist groups and consequent government action against these militant groups have differed widely in form, severity and consequences in different provinces of Pakistan.

A review of the literature also reveals another dimension of the phenomenon of radicalization in Pakistan. The prevailing anti-US and anti-Western sentiments among the people of Pakistan are largely due to the US invasion of Afghanistan, while US drone attacks in the country's FATA region have also contributed to radicalizing the views and attitudes of the people. Pakistan's partnership with the United States as a frontline state in war on terror has also radicalized the views of many in Pakistan.[9]

Methodology

The empirical method of inquiry has been employed in conjunction with the mixed methods approach to ascertain the trends and patterns of radicalization at different sub-national levels. For this purpose a nationwide survey, an extensive literature review and interviews of people from different walks of life have been conducted.

A PIPS survey was conducted in Urdu with a total of 1,568 respondents across the country, with 71 percent urban and 29 percent rural representation. The survey had a margin of error of 2.5 percentage points. The number of respondents from each of the four provinces and other administrative entities reflects the ratio of population of each area vis-à-vis the total population of the country. As many as 34 percent of the respondents were from Punjab, 18 percent from Sindh, 23 percent from NWFP, 11 percent from Balochistan, five percent from Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK), three percent from Gilgit-Baltistan and over two percent each from FATA and federal capital Islamabad. An effort was also made to ensure representation of respondents from different age groups, literacy levels and status of employment. Twenty-nine percent of the respondents were from the 15-20 year age group, 47 percent were between 20-35 years, and 23 percent were 35 years or above. Eight percent of the respondents lacked even basic education, 19 percent were educated to the middle level, 29 percent to the intermediate level, and 37 percent beyond the intermediate level, two percent had received madrassa education and 2.8 percent had received both madrassa and regular education. On the social status, as many as 14 percent of the respondents were unemployed, 28 percent were still students and not working yet and 55 percent were employed by the government or the private sector or had their own businesses.

Provincial differences are an important feature in the context of radicalization in Pakistan. Some behaviors are purely individual and not specific to any province or other administrative entity. An effort has been made to distinguish between the two factors, through a section of the survey where the questions specifically deal with the provinces and other administrative entities.

A sense of alienation and deprivation, disenfranchisement and denial of rights and other variables such as geographical proximity and ethnic links have been considered in determining the trends and patterns of radicalization in each province or other administrative entity. Ethnic linkages of a substantial part of the population of FATA, the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Balochistan with the Pashtun majority in militancy-hit

Afghanistan make these regions more susceptible to radicalization than those that do not share a border with Afghanistan. The mushroom growth of militant organizations in different parts of the country was also observed during the study.

The input of respondents from the four provinces, as well as from AJK, FATA and Gilgit-Baltistan regarding the socio-cultural, ideological and religio-political questions has been analyzed in order to determine the views of the people about radicalization at different sub-national levels.

Socio-Cultural Trends

In the socio-cultural domain no visible features or manifestations of radicalization were witnessed during the study. The respondents generally did not think that there is a conflict between culture and religion. When the respondents were asked if they listened to music or not, an overwhelming majority responded in the affirmative, while the largest section of respondents not listening to music was from FATA. In NWFP, FATA and AJK, 30.6 percent, 40 percent and 27.3 percent respondents, respectively, prefer not listen to music. The absence of enthusiasm for music among the people of FATA and NWFP comes partly due to threats from a specific group of hardliner clerics who have declared music un-Islamic through religious edicts. The ban on music echoes rules enforced by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in the late 1990s. The edicts and sermons broadcast through illegal FM radio stations in Malakand Division by Maulvi Fazlullah, chief of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan Swat chapter, and in Khyber Agency of FATA by Mangal Bagh Afridi, chief of the proscribed Lashkar-e-Islam, have attempted to create an aversion for music among the people of these areas and have at least managed to scare the population of the violent consequences for anyone found selling, or listening to music. The militants have frequently attacked and torched CD shops, music centers, internet cafés, and publicly flogged and beheaded dancers and musicians for defying their ban.[10]

1. Do you listen to music?

Response[11]	Punjab	NWFP	Sindh	Balochistan	FATA	Islamabad	Gilgit-Baltistan	AJK
Yes	79.7%	68.8%	79.0%	75.3%	54.3%	80.0%	92.2%	72.7%
No	18.4%	30.6%	20.0%	23.6%	40.0%	20.0%	7.8%	27.3%

Asked whether their choice of dress was influenced by religion, a clear majority replied in the negative. However, they said they preferred the traditional dress over western clothes.

2. Do you consider that choice of dress is any way linked to religion?

Response	Punjab	NWFP	Sindh	Balochistan	FATA	Islamabad	Gilgit-Baltistan	AJK
Yes	25.3%	22.6%	13.8%	25.8%	14.3%	37.5%	27.5%	29.9%
No	54.8%	59.9%	66.6%	54.5%	71.4%	60.0%	58.8%	55.8%

As is apparent from the findings above, the attitudes of the people are not radicalized per se in the socio-cultural context. Although, people devotedly practice their religion in some areas but religiosity is not a manifestation of radicalization in a country like Pakistan where religion is an innate attribute almost from birth.[12] Traditions and culture in different parts of Pakistan have not been radicalized by actions of religious extremists.[13] Even in the areas where culture or traditions had been subdued by radicalization in the name of imposition of militants' versions of Islam on the local masses, the culture reasserted itself once this militant influence faded.[14]

Religious/Ideological

Before looking into the survey findings about religious or ideological views of the respondents, it is worthwhile to consider the historical context. Whether Pakistan was created in the name of Islam and what should be the place of religion in the affairs of the state are questions that have confused the discourse on national character since the country's independence from British rule. Pakistan has never attained a distinct national identity of its own. The lingering tug-of-war between a Western-oriented liberal bureaucracy and a right-leaning clergy has further confused the discourse on the national character.[15]

Pakistani people are traditionally religious. Asked about the path to receiving their religious education, the largest section of respondents across Pakistan said that they had received their basic religious education from their parents, and not from madrassas.

When the respondents were asked about their preferred mode of understanding or seeking guidance on religious teachings, contrary to the common perception of the clergy's domination in the religious domain, the majority in all the regions surveyed except Gilgit-Baltistan said that they relied on religious books. Among other significant findings, the responses also showed that the people either rely on religious commentaries and books or the local prayer leaders and religious clergy. The mixed responses from NWFP and FATA were due to a higher number of madrassas in those areas and the prominent role the clergy, which is held in high esteem in the Pashtun tribal society, plays there.[16]

3. What was the source of your basic religious education?

Response	Punjab	NWFP	Sindh	Balochistan	FATA	Islamabad	Gilgit-Baltistan	AJK
Parents	27.0%	19.2%	25.5%	28.1%	31.4%	17.5%	37.3%	26.0%
School	6.3%	7.2%	4.5%	10.7%	2.9%	5.0%	13.7%	6.5%
Mosque	3.7%	8.1%	7.2%	7.9%	8.6%	2.5%	2.0%	3.9%
Madrassa	3.5%	1.9%	1.4%	7.9%	2.9%	--	3.9%	3.9%
Reading	1.7%	4.2%	4.1%	6.7%	--	2.5%	2.0%	--

4. What is your preferred mode of understanding Islamic teachings?

Response	Punjab	NWFP	Sindh	Balochistan	FATA	Islamabad	Gilgit-Baltistan	AJK
Parents	15.1%	7.5%	19.3%	23.6%	2.9%	17.5%	15.7%	9.1%
Common course books	4.5%	3.6%	5.9%	10.1%	--	2.5%	3.9%	2.6%
Religious books	38.8%	38.2%	29.3%	25.8%	28.6%	30.0%	25.5%	35.1%
Prayer leaders/ clerics	10.2%	22.6%	8.3%	13.5%	20.0%	10.0%	33.3%	15.6%

Sectarianism

Many scholars believe that sectarianism is a permanent feature of radical trends in Pakistan. The debate on sectarian radicalism propounds that people in the country are divided along sectarian lines at various sub-national levels. The discourse portrays that sectarianism takes people towards radicalization as they are accustomed to devotedly following the interpretations and beliefs of their own sects and are unwilling to consider alternative views. The people in Pakistan are divided into four major Muslim sects—Barelvi, Deobandi, Shia and Ahl-e-Hadees. The four sects have their separate mosques and networks of madrassas. These divisions have further accentuated the sectarian cleavage.

The survey elicited mixed response at various sub-national levels about sectarian divisions and differences among Muslims. The largest section of respondents in Punjab, NWFP, Sindh, Gilgit-Baltistan and AJK considers sectarian divisions are based in subjective interpretations, while the largest group of respondents from Balochistan and Islamabad holds that sectarian divisions are based in differences of approach. In Punjab, 35 percent respondents consider sectarianism to be a matter of interpretation, 21.2 percent consider it a matter of differences of approach and 23.6 percent believe it is based in fundamental religious differences. In Sindh, 39 percent hold that sectarian divisions are based on subjective interpretation, while 20.3 percent believe it is linked to differences of approach. In NWFP, 30 percent consider it a matter of interpretation, 21 percent refer to it as fundamental religious differences while 19 percent call it differences of approach. Respondents from all the areas surveyed also consider sectarianism harmful and think that it promotes radicalization and extremism.

5. What is the real difference among Deobandi, Barelvi, Shia and Ahl-e-Hadees sects?

Response	Punjab	NWFP	Sindh	Balochistan	FATA	Islamabad	Gilgit-Baltistan	AJK
Interpretation	35.5%	30.9%	39.0%	28.1%	22.9%	20.0%	43.1%	37.0%
Fundamental religious differences	23.6%	21.2%	14.8%	12.4%	31.4%	22.5%	17.6%	22.1%
Political differences	8.6%	9.2%	15.2%	13.5%	5.7%	2.5%	9.8%	11.7%
Differences of approach	21.2%	19.8%	20.3%	33.1%	28.6%	35.0%	19.6%	20.8%

The respondents gave mixed reactions when asked about their views on religious divisions. In Sindh, Islamabad and Gilgit-Baltistan, the largest section of respondents considers religious divisions to be the outcome of ignorance, while the respondents from Punjab, NWFP, AJK and FATA mainly consider these divisions as borne out of ignorance or as nothing unexpected. Irrespective of the aforementioned perceptions of sectarian divisions, people strictly adhere to the *Fiqh* (jurisprudence) of their respective sects for interpreting religious commands.

6. How do you look at religious divisions?

Response	Punjab	NWFP	Sindh	Balochistan	FATA	Islamabad	Gilgit-Baltistan	AJK
Expected as it had been predicted that Islam will have 73 sects	30.5%	27.3%	19.7%	3.4%	40.0%	12.5%	17.6%	16.9%
Necessary	7.2%	7.5%	10.3%	13.5%	5.7%	2.5%	11.8%	5.2%
Beneficial	6.5%	7.5%	6.9%	18.0%	5.7%	2.5%	11.8%	3.9%
Harmful, they promote sectarianism and extremism	21.2%	22.8%	13.4%	2.2%	28.6%	20.0%	15.7%	35.1%
Logical/ rational	2.0%	4.2%	4.1%	16.9%	8.6%	7.5%	5.9%	1.3%
Ignorance	27.7%	15.0%	32.8%	3.4%	2.9%	40.0%	23.5%	28.6%

The core reason for violent manifestations of sectarianism is the existence of various sectarian groups within different schools of thought who try to garner support for their agendas among the followers of their respective sect. Deobandi sectarian organizations are in a majority among these sects and have their networks in almost all parts of the country. There are few militant wings associated with Ahl-e-Hadees, Shia and Barelvi organizations. Further research into the linkage between radicalization and sectarianism is required to explore the dynamics of this issue.

Politico-Religious

In the politico-religious domain, the underlying trends and patterns have been studied in the context of the 'jihadi culture' promoted during the Zai regime, Talibanization in Pakistan, especially after 9/11 and different movements demanding the implementation of *Shariah* in the country.

a. 'Jihadi Culture'

The current wave of radicalization in Pakistan is attributed to the support of General Zia's regime to the anti-Soviet 'jihad'.[17] The support extended to militant groups at the time laid the foundation of the 'jihadi culture' in Pakistani society. The continuity of state assistance to Kashmiri jihad groups further molded the views of Pakistanis towards jihad which is why the public largely continues to consider the militancy in Indian-held Kashmir as jihad. Respondents from all parts of Pakistan, with the exception of Gilgit-Baltistan, generally regard the militancy in Kashmir as jihad.

7. Are the militants in Indian-held Kashmir engaged in jihad?

Response	Punjab	NWFP	Sindh	Balochistan	FATA	Islamabad	Gilgit-Baltistan	AJK
Yes	57.1%	64.6%	39.7%	57.3%	60.0%	65.0%	11.8%	89.6%
No	19.5%	14.8%	28.3%	25.3%	8.6%	12.5%	58.8%	3.9%
Don't know	21.2%	17.0%	29.3%	13.5%	25.7%	20.0%	25.5%	3.9%

The public lacks the knowledge of what real jihad is according to Islamic principles. The opinions surveyed indicate that a considerable number of people in NWFP, Sindh, FATA and AJK believe that jihad means striving against cruelty. A substantial number of respondents from Punjab, Islamabad and Balochistan believe that jihad means fighting against adversaries of Islam. The respondents from Gilgit-Baltistan state that jihad is resisting worldly desires. The respondents from AJK, FATA and NWFP consider waging a defensive war as the most preferred jihad. In Balochistan, the respondents' preference was equally divided between defensive and offensive jihad. The findings show that people's views about jihad are confused. Militant organizations such as Jaish-e-Muhammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba exploit this confusion to their own ends and continue to operate openly

even after being banned by the government.[18] All jihad organizations in Pakistan espouse Al Qaeda's ideology of waging jihad against all those powers which they believe have conspired against the Muslim world. Enamored by the religious merit of jihad, or what these militant organizations call jihad, people become prone to radicalization, considering that they are serving the religion by shedding blood and that the promised reward awaits them in the hereafter if they embrace martyrdom.

8. What does jihad mean to you?

Response	Punjab	NWFP	Sindh	Balochistan	FATA	Islamabad	Gilgit-Baltistan	AJK
Fight against cruelty	17.7%	44.0%	30.3%	19.1%	51.4%	17.5%	25.5%	41.6%
Fight against adversaries of Islam	27.3%	20.1%	10.3%	22.5%	14.3%	20.0%	11.8%	18.2%
Spreading Islam to all parts of world	7.1%	5.0%	3.4%	3.9%	8.6%	5.0%	2.0%	--
Fight against one's desires	17.5%	8.4%	12.4%	23.0%	2.9%	7.5%	49.0%	13.0%

9. What is the preferred mode of armed jihad?

Response	Punjab	NWFP	Sindh	Balochistan	FATA	Islamabad	Gilgit-Baltistan	AJK
Defensive	35.5%	54.0%	20.0%	32.0%	54.3%	40.0%	17.6%	62.3%
Offensive	11.5%	12.0%	7.2%	31.5%	5.7%	12.5%	25.5%	7.8%
Don't know	48.1%	25.6%	69.7%	30.9%	37.1%	37.5%	52.9%	26.0%

Militant organizations in Pakistan are currently engaged in trying to influence young Muslims to wage jihad on two fronts—Kashmir and Afghanistan. A clear majority of the respondents considers the war in Afghanistan to be a political war. A substantial number of respondents from NWFP and FATA consider the US invasion of Afghanistan to be an act of aggression, which they think justifies jihad. However, the support shown by the respondents in those two areas could be, at least in part, influenced by a shared ethnicity with the Pashtun majority of Afghanistan, rather than a common religion.[19]

10. How would you describe the unrest in Afghanistan?

Response	Punjab	NWFP	Sindh	Balochistan	FATA	Islamabad	Gilgit-Baltistan	AJK
Jihad	12.6%	29.8%	10.0%	19.1%	37.1%	10.0%	9.8%	23.4%
Tribal conflict	21.0%	11.1%	17.9%	27.0%	5.7%	12.5%	15.7%	15.6%
Political war	59.7%	47.9%	57.9%	48.3%	47.5%	52.5%	68.6%	54.5%

As with the confusion among Muslims regarding the concept of jihad, the notion of struggle for the implementation of *Shariah* is also far from straightforwardness. A clear majority of respondents from all regions surveyed, except Sindh and Gilgit-Baltistan, considers the struggle for implementation of *Shariah* jihad. In Gilgit-Baltistan, 47 percent of the respondents stated that the struggle for the implementation of *Shariah* is not jihad, while in Sindh the opinion was almost equally divided between those who believed it to be jihad and those who did not express their views.

11. Do you consider the struggle for implementation of *Shariah* jihad?

Response	Punjab	NWFP	Sindh	Balochistan	FATA	Islamabad	Gilgit-Baltistan	AJK
Yes	63.0%	70.8%	36.6%	69.7%	65.7%	62.5%	27.5%	59.7%
No	13.4%	9.2%	23.4%	12.4%	14.3%	2.5%	47.1%	15.6%
Don't know	20.8%	16.4%	37.6%	14.0%	20.0%	25.0%	19.6%	23.4%

b. Talibanization[20]

The emergence and spread of Talibanization is considered an indicator of radicalization of Pakistani society. The Taliban movement in Pakistani tribal areas is not a distinct organization but an alliance of different organizations which espouse the ideology of the Afghan Taliban. After the US invasion of Afghanistan, the Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda remnants fled to the tribal areas of Pakistan where they reorganized and encouraged different tribes to form their own Taliban-affiliated militias. The phenomenon of Talibanization started from South Waziristan Agency and within a few years not only engulfed almost the entire tribal belt, but, also spread to some settled districts of NWFP, such as Swat. Different militant and sectarian organizations in Pakistan joined hands with Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, founded in South Waziristan in 2007 under Baitullah Mehsud, and started an insurgency against the state in 2007 that is still raging. The Taliban established a 'state' within the state, with parallel administrative and judicial structures under the garb of implementing their version of *Shariah*.[21]

c. *Shariah* Movements

Movements by other groups for the implementation of *Shariah*, such as Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi in Malakand and Lal Masjid clerics and militants in Islamabad, also joined the Taliban and claimed to be striving for *Shariah* rule. The militant landscape of Pakistan presented an ideal environment for them to flourish. Al Qaeda and other international groups actively supported them. The militants portrayed the military operations against them as an effort to deny the implementation of Islam. The propaganda seemed to work for some time as Taliban and other militant movements managed to persuade the people that their violent actions were necessary to realize *Shariah* rule. There was a time when these groups were even held in high esteem in Pakistan. However, there has been a sea change in the last two years. The increasing number of terrorist attacks, including suicide attacks, against civilians and the security forces has turned public opinion against the militants.[22]

Around half the respondents from Sindh (61.7%), NWFP (42.3%), Islamabad (50%), Gilgit-Baltistan (80.4%) and AJK (49.4%) said that the Taliban were not fighting for Islam. In FATA, nearly half the respondents questioned (45.7%) were not sure if the Taliban were fighting for Islam, while a further 31.4 percent said they were not.

A considerable number of respondents from Punjab (30.1%), NWFP (25.3%), Balochistan (49.4%), FATA (22.9%) and Islamabad (27.5%) consider Taliban soldiers of Islam. However, 33.7 percent respondents in Balochistan, and 31.4 percent in FATA do not think that Taliban are fighting for Islam. The majority

in all the areas surveyed condemns violent acts of Taliban, including attacks on girls' schools, and CD/video shops, etc.[23]

12. Are Taliban fighting for Islam?

Response	Punjab	NWFP	Sindh	Balochistan	FATA	Islamabad	Gilgit-Baltistan	AJK
Yes	30.1%	25.3%	12.1%	49.4%	22.9%	27.5%	3.9%	14.3%
No	41.8%	42.3%	61.7%	33.7%	31.4%	50.0%	80.4%	49.4%
Don't know	25.7%	28.1%	23.4%	15.2%	45.7%	20.0%	15.7%	31.2%

13. How do you see Taliban attacks on girls' schools, cinemas, CD/video and barber shops?

Response	Punjab	NWFP	Sindh	Balochistan	FATA	Islamabad	Gilgit-Baltistan	AJK
Condemn these acts	29.0%	41.8%	42.4%	51.1%	45.7%	32.5%	54.9%	23.4%
Support these acts	9.7%	9.7%	2.8%	10.1%	5.7%	10.0%	5.9%	2.6%
Don't know	22.7%	18.7%	30.3%	24.7%	22.9%	12.5%	2.0%	11.7%

Episodic Tendencies of Radicalization

It is not unusual for public opinion to quickly swing from one end to the other in the face of unprecedented incidents. Such opinion shift can result in short-lived tendencies or patterns of radicalization which decline as quickly as they emerge. The respondents were asked questions regarding the security forces' action against militants holed up in Lal Masjid in 2007, the assassination of former prime minister Benazir Bhutto in 2008 and the crisis triggered by military dictator General Pervez Musharraf sacking superior court judges, in order to gauge which of the three events in as many years had influenced people the most. In Punjab, Balochistan and AJK, almost a similar percentage of respondents cited the Lal Masjid operation and Benazir Bhutto's murder. In Islamabad, NWFP and FATA, the biggest section of

respondents said they had been influenced the most by the Lal Masjid operation. The response from Islamabad was understandable because events surrounding Lal Masjid unfolded in the heart of the capital city, which had never before seen violence of such magnitude.[24] In Sindh and Gilgit-Baltistan, a large number of respondents said that Benazir Bhutto's assassination had affected them the most.

14. Which of the following events influenced you the most?

Response	Punjab	NWFP	Sindh	Balochistan	FATA	Islamabad	Gilgit-Baltistan	AJK
Lal Masjid operation	31.4%	46.2%	8.6%	23.6%	48.6%	30.0%	9.8%	26.0%
Benazir Bhutto's assassination	34.4%	7.2%	68.6%	18.0%	8.6%	10.0%	37.3%	27.3%
Judiciary crisis	5.8%	8.1%	2.8%	6.7%	8.6%	17.5%	13.7%	18.2%

Anti-US/Western Sentiments

Another factor feeding radicalization in Pakistan is the anti-US sentiment, due partly to US drone strikes in FATA. The counter-terrorism operations launched by Pakistani security forces in NWFP and FATA have also radicalized views of the people against the government. The responses of the public about Pakistan's decision to join the United States in the war on terror have been mapped. Clear majorities in all parts of Pakistan consider Islamabad made a mistake in joining hands with the US in the war on terror.

15. Was Pakistan's decision to join US-led alliance in war on terror correct?

Response	Punjab	NWFP	Sindh	Balochistan	FATA	Islamabad	Gilgit-Baltistan	AJK
Yes	20.1%	13.1%	13.8%	18.0%	11.4%	15.0%	31.4%	27.3%
No	59.7%	71.9%	58.6%	70.8%	74.3%	55.0%	52.9%	61.0%
Don't know	17.7%	12.0%	23.4%	8.4%	8.6%	27.5%	13.7%	9.1%

Conclusion

Religious extremism is the common factor in all visible trends and patterns of radicalization in Pakistan. The dynamics of such trends and patterns in various parts of the country are different from each other but are largely interlinked. The fundamental cause of such trends and patterns is people's ignorance of the religion. People either rely on the prayer leaders or religious clergy for religious education or books authored by clerics of their respective sects, and both tend to fan sectarianism. State policies also play a vital role in formulating the views of the people. Except some episodic incidents, the major trends and patterns of radicalization are constants with a consistent history, the phenomenon of sectarianism being a case in point.

Though this study has endeavored to highlight the general trends and patterns of radicalization in the country, further empirical study of each trend and pattern with their underlying dynamics is required for the formulation of de-radicalization policies. A one-size-fits-all approach towards de-radicalization has proven counterproductive in the past wand would do so in the future as well. An informed discourse on each trend and pattern should enable policy makers to formulate trend-specific de-radicalization policies. The hostile attitude of the people to such phenomenon of extremism and radicalization is the biggest hurdle in the way of an objective analysis of such issues.

Notes

[1] See "Defining the Phenomenon of Radicalization in Pakistan: A Report," *Conflict and Peace Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 2, (Islamabad: Pak Institute for Peace Studies, January-March 2009), pp. 5-23.

[2]International Crisis Group Report, "Pakistan's Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants," *Asia Report N°125*, (Brussels/Islamabad: 2006); Muhammad Azam and Safia Aftab, "Inequality and the Militant Threat in Pakistan," *Conflict and Peace Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 2, (Islamabad: Pak Institute for Peace Studies, April-June 2009), pp. 33-46; Safia Aftab, "Poverty and Militancy," *Conflict and Peace Studies*, Vol.1, No.1, (Islamabad: Pak Institute for Peace Studies, 2008), pp. 65-86; "The State of Sectarianism in Pakistan," in Asia Report 2005, International Crisis Group, http://www.crisisgroup. org/home/index.cfm?id=3374&1=1, accessed December 10, 2009; Muhammad Amir Rana, "Mapping the Madrassa Mindset: Political Attitudes of Pakistani Madaaris," *Conflict and Peace Studies,* Vol. 2, No. 2, (Islamabad: Pak Institute for Peace Studies, January-March 2009), pp. 27-42.

[3] Asim Sajjad Akhtar, "Moving Beyond 'Islamic'," *The Middle East Institute Viewpoints: The Islamization of Pakistan, 1979-2009*, (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 2009), pp. 22-24.

[4] Muhammad Qasim Zaman, "Radicalization of Shi'i and Sunni Identities," *Modern Asia Studies*, No. 32, Vol. 3, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 689-716.

[5] The Middle East Institute *Viewpoints: Islamization of Pakistan, 1979-2009*, (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 2009).

[6] The State of Sectarianism in Pakistan," in Asia Report 2005, International Crisis Group, http://www.crisisgroup. org/home/index.cfm?id=3374&1=1, accessed December 10, 2009.

[7] Muhammad Amir Mir, *Talibanization of Pakistan: From 9/11 to 26/11*, (New Delhi: Pentagon Security International, 2009).

[8] C. Christine Fair, *Islamist Militancy in Pakistan: A View from the Provinces*, http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/jul09/PakProvinces_Jul09_rpt.pdf, accessed December 10, 2009.

[9] Jim Garriaon, *America as Empire: Global Leader or Rogue Power?*, (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publisher Inc., 2004), p. 156.

[10] PIPS Annual Security Report 2008, (Islamabad: Pak Institute for Peace Studies, 2009), p. 5.

[11] For the sake of brevity only significant percentages (more than 10%) of responses have been presented in the tables.

[12] Muhammad Azam, "Radicalization in Pakistan: Socio Cultural Realities," *Conflict and Peace Studies*, Vol.2, No. 1, (Islamabad: Pak Institute for Peace Studies, January-March 2009), pp. 43-66.

[13] Interview with Mazhar-ul-Islam, executive director Lok Virsa Islamabad, March 19, 2009.

[14] After successful military operation in Swat, where cultural activities had been suppressed by force, the local traditions and customs resumed once these areas were cleared of the militants.

[15] K. K. Aziz, *The Murder of History in Pakistan*, (Lahore: Vanguard Publishers, 2004), p. 200.
[16] C. Christine Fair, *The Madrassah Challenge: Militancy and Religious Education in Pakistan*, (Lahore: Vanguard Publisher, 2009), p. 69.
[17] Hassan Abbas, *Pakistan's Drift into Extremism*, (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2007), p. 90.
[18] Muhammad Amir Rana, *Seeds of Terrorism*, (London: New Melina Publisher, 2005), p. 67, 77.
[19] Rasul Baksh Raees, *Recovering the Frontier State*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 29.
[20] Talibanization denotes such militant movements which seek to establish Islamic Shariah imitating the rule of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.
[21] Muhammad Amir Rana, "Taliban Insurgency in Pakistan: A Counter Insurgency Perspective," *Conflict and Peace Studies*, Vol. 2, No.2, (Islamabad: Pak Institute for Peace Studies, April-June 2009), pp. 9-31.
[22] . Christine Fair, *Islamist Militancy in Pakistan: A View from the Provinces*, http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/jul09/PakProvinces_Jul09_rpt.pdf, December 10, 2009.
[23] PIPS Annual Security Report 2008, (Islamabad: Pak Institute for Peace Studies, 2009), p. 7.
[24] A wave of terrorism, particularly suicide bombings, swept the country after the Lal Masjid operation in 2007.
See PIPS' Pakistan Annual Security reports, 2007, 2008, 2009, available at http://www.san-pips.com

Jihad, Extremism and Radicalization: A Public Perspective

Safdar Sial and Tanveer Anjum

Introduction

It is important to study what Pakistani people think about religious extremism, radicalization and Jihad and what contributes and/or has contributed over time to make them think so. Among many reasons for the importance two of them are significant. First, Pakistani state and society are facing extensive threats from these 'phenomenon' and knowing people's perceptions, who are the ultimate victims, is fundamental in dealing with these threats and the related emerging challenges. Secondly, it is important to look into convergence and polarization of public views, at societal level on these issues to assess the levels and dynamics of tacit or open public support/approval or rejection to extremist and radical forces.

Most of the Pakistani people may not be familiar with the academic or even literal explanations of the concepts of radicalization and extremism, especially when the commonly accepted definitions are borrowed from the West. These definitions, as believed, by Pakistani scholars and academics, are generally not relevant in Pakistani context.[1] Hence it is useful to understand the public perceptions of extremism and radicalization by employing reductionism; taking violence, militancy and also terrorism as reducible phenomenon for this purpose. Nonetheless, people's understanding of Jihad can be studied and analyzed as it is. Meanwhile an effort could be made to see as to what extent extremism and radicalization are overlapped or confused with the concept of Jihad in the public perceptions.

Academics and scholars make a conscious effort to treat radicalization and radicalism as distinct from extremism and terrorism. The reason is found in the fact that both positive and negative connotations are associated with radicalization. It, however, does not mean that radicals cannot be extremists or terrorists.[2] Radicalization can generate extremism, which is the acceptance or adoption of an irrational and extreme position about an issue.[3] The Communism or Marxism was considered a radical ideology because it questioned the legitimacy and advocacy of existing institutions.[4] The term began to be used for rightwing ideas and movements after the Iranian Revolution of 1979. After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, leftwing

radicalism greatly weakened as a world of force and thereafter Islamism in its different sectarian garbs and regional manifestations became synonymous with radicalism.[5] Islamism simplifies Islam to a set of beliefs and practices which are apparently anti-intellectual, anti-modern, anti-liberal, and anti-democratic. Thus, as a political ideology, Islamism – also known as Islamic fundamentalism, militant Islam, radical Islam etc – generates a mindset that is invariably hostile to non-Muslims, deviant sects, women and liberal Muslims. Such a mindset translated into political actions tends to be violence-prone and can give impetus to terrorism.[6]

There are countless studies available on the issues of Jihad, extremism and radicalization in Pakistan. But a focus on the public perspectives on these issues has rarely become a topic of empirical or theoretical researches, though a significant number of opinion polls is available. Indeed, only a few studies have tried to explore the understanding and viewpoint of the Pakistani people on Jihad, extremism and radicalization, and the public support or denouncement for these phenomenons. Even if it has been done, that is also from a theoretical perspective evading an empirical input, in most of the cases.

It is useful first to review some Pakistani focused key researches on religious extremism, radicalization and terrorism before discussing the available literature on public perspectives on the subject. Studies on the extremism and radicalization in Pakistan tend to discuss the phenomenon in any of these two ways. A considerable group of studies treats these phenomenon in Pakistan as part of a global phenomenon; either to compare the Pakistani radicalization and extremism with radicalization and extremism in other Islamic countries (Mahmood, 1995; Roy, 2002) or to explore the global and regional links of Islamic radicalized movements (Hegghammer, 2006). A second comparatively larger group of studies attempt to understand the phenomenon through religion and radicalized religious groups as the major causative factors. Most of these studies have exclusively explored the role of the radicalized and extremist/militant groups in Pakistan (Rana, 2003, 2005; Chitkara, 2003; Haqqani, 2005; H. Abbas, 2004, Waseem etc.) whereas some have tried to discover the links of religion (Kaul, 2002), sectarianism (ICG, 2008) and religious seminaries (Stern, 2004; Roy, 2002; ICG, 2002) with the said phenomenon.

Books and literature produced on Jihad have two main discourses. The first, the interpretational, ideological and intellectual discourse undertakes exegesis of Quran-o-Sunnah, and debate on legal (with regard to Islamic jurisprudence) and historical explanations to understand divine settings for Jihad and its obligations for Muslims. The second discourse tries to

understand Jihad through the waves of militancy and terrorism where the Muslims are involved in. The first discourse is by exclusively a group of experts on Islamic theology and jurisprudence and evades - perhaps by default - the common Muslim's views and opinions. The second discourse, nonetheless, has also remained evasive of public perspective with few exceptions and falls largely in the second group of studies mentioned above.

These various approaches have been used to (i) explore mostly the causes of extremism and radicalization with less emphasis on empirical studies. (ii) The evidence is almost uniformly consistent in indicating that religion is at the heart of the issue. (iii) Only a handful of studies have endeavored to undertake historical (Rana, 2003), political (Kaul, 2002), educational (Davis, 2007) and psychological (S. Abbas, 2008) aspects as undercurrents of the radicalization and extremism in Pakistani society. (iv) People's perceptions of Jihad, extremism and radicalization and eventual possibility of tacit and/or open sympathy or support for or denouncement of the extremist, radical and 'Jihad' groups have been out of scope of these studies.

Some studies and opinion polls, however, have tried to bridge this last mentioned gap that is to explore the public perspectives of Jihad, extremism and radicalization, and which is the focal point of this paper.

Nasim A. Jawed (1999) interviewed some 163 respondents in 1969 (91 in Lahore and Karachi and 72 in Dhaka) from four occupational categories belonging to two social classes - professionals (practicing lawyers, university teachers and journalists) and the *ulama* from the traditional religious leadership. He used his survey findings viz-a-viz Muslim political ideas reflected in Islamic texts - both traditional and contemporary – in order to explore the public attitudes towards national identity, desirability of an Islamic state, role of religion and religious leaders in politics, Jihad as national defense, and desirability and character of Islamic law etc.[7] The research work is a unique blend of social scientific approach and humanistic perspective but its findings may not be as valid today as they were 40 years before due to much changed geographical, sociocultural, political, ideological and global realities for Pakistan.

C. Fair and B. Shepherd (2006) used the data of the Pew Institute – a survey conducted in 2002 in 14 Muslim countries including Pakistan – to study the demand-side determinants or support patterns of terrorism. They used survey inputs describing public views on threat to Islam, suicide bombing and role of religious leaders in politics.[8] They have provided some useful findings on support to terrorism in Pakistan but the study is neither country-specific nor does it provide an insight into public perspectives on social

phenomenon of radicalization and extremism, which are said to lead to terrorism; it was obviously out of scope.

In another study, C. Fair (2004) has tried to explore the reasons which compel people to join militant organizations. Her discussion on militant recruitments on individual level offers a set of views of militant recruits, but her exclusive focus remains on militant and terrorist landscape wherein she focuses on ideological frameworks, mainly based on religious schools of thoughts in Pakistan, to understand the group dynamics of militant recruitments. An almost similar study, but more empirical in methodology and wider in scope, was conducted by Sohail Abbas (2007). He endeavoured to explore the 'Jihadi' mindset by conducting two case studies of the "Afghan Jihad" militants detained in Haripur and Peshawar jails. Contrary to C. Fair's ideological groupthink framework he focused on individual psychological analyses (psychoanalytic perspective) of detainees to understand their mindset. But the societal narrative, description of views/opinions emanating from different layers of social fabric of Pakistan as a whole in support or denouncement of Jihad, extremism and radicalization is not the subject of these studies.

Shinwari (2008) has nevertheless recorded tribal people's socio-cultural, political and religious perceptions of the issues of Jihad, militancy and Talibanization etc. by surveying 1,050 tribesmen from Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). His study provides deep insight into the subject but from perspective of only one of the seven demographic units of Pakistani federation.

The surveys and opinion polls mainly by the Pew Global Attitude Project, the Gallup and others provide an empirical insight into Pakistani public's perceptions and concerns about issues related to terrorism, war on terror, Pakistan's alliance with US, religious extremism, Taliban, Al-Qaeda, Islamic law, female education and the role of religion in politics and compatibility with democracy etc.

The Pew survey (released on July 14, 2005) titled "Islamic Extremism: Common Concepts for Muslim and Western Public" encompasses 17 countries including Muslim and European with Pakistan. It seeks public opinions, along with other topics, on threat of Islamic extremism, suicide bombings, the role of religion in politics and Osama bin Laden. Another survey by the Pew (released on August 13, 2009) focuses exclusively on Pakistani people's opinions on religious extremism, Pakistan's alliance with the US, Al-Qaeda, Taliban, Islamic laws and girls' education.

The focus of the most of the Gallop surveys in understanding Pakistani public perspective in issues related to religious extremism remains on Pakistan's alliance with the US (Julie Ray, Dec. 29, 2008; Rajesh Srinivasan and Julie Ray, Oct. 3, 2008), war against terrorism (Julie Ray, Dec. 17, 2008), Taliban and Talibanization (Julie Ray, May 12, 2009), religion and democracy and role of Shariah (Dalia Mogahed, Oct. 3, 2007).

The International Republican Institute collected public responses in Pakistan in 2009 on Pakistan's alliance with the US on war against terrorism. Another survey by <WorldPublicOpinion.Org> asked people about their views on Al-Qaeda, Taliban and other militant organizations in Pakistan.[9] The <WorldPublicOpinion.Org> and United States Institute of Peace (USIP) carried out a joint study *Pakistani Public Opinion on Democracy, Islamist Militancy, and Relations with the US,* which was conducted by C. Fair, Clay Ramsay and Steve Kull in 2007. The study surveyed only urban adults in 19 cities to explore their views on the role of Islam, democracy, militant groups, and Pakistan's relations with the US etc. The study lacked a homogenous sample representative of entire Pakistani populations and public perspectives on social, cultural and ideological fronts.

Opinion polls and surveys are extended to assess the public opinions at certain intervals of time. Their credibility in academic and research domains in understanding certain social phenomenon is limited in measuring instant responses of the people sans a qualitative analysis and background investigation.

This paper will try to explore the public perspectives – understanding, perceptions/views and also concerns – to analyze the responses at societal levels to the phenomenon of extremism, radicalization and 'Jihad'. An underlying theme will be to assess the ideological support and accommodation at societal level for radical and extremist forces. The genesis and evolution of certain public perspectives will be explored in historical settings particularly the socio-cultural, religious, political and educational aspects. This diachronic analysis will be then used to explain and elucidate the empirical findings with regard to people's views of the set of phenomenon under study.

Methodology

The character of this study is defined by its two key aspects related to empirical and theoretical explanations. Besides relying on the empirical findings of a survey it analyzes the relevant literature, books, documents and other texts to have, firstly, an insight into previous findings and approaches

on the subject and, secondly, to look into ideological, political and socio-cultural contexts and dynamics of public perspectives in Pakistan over time.

The quantitative part of analysis depends on the Pak Institute for Peace Study (PIPS) survey on radicalization and extremism which interviewed adult respondents from across Pakistan's seven federal units – four provinces, Azad Jammu and Kashmir, Federally Administered Tribal areas (FATA), and Gilgit-Baltistan – and also the capital city of Islamabad, between October 2008 and April 2009. For this purpose a comprehensive survey questionnaire, including both open and closed ended questions, was used. For survey population, PIPS used a cluster random sampling technique keeping in view that it represents the survey population and the target population across Pakistan. Keeping in view the objectives of the survey, the PIPS fixed survey sample size at 1,568 assuming the target population as much as 160 million. At 95 % confidence level, the confidence interval for overall sample size was fixed at 2.50; with margin of error being +/- 2.5%. The further distribution of survey population has been made on the basis of 1998 Census's population characteristics on administrative (rural and urban) domains.



Ideological Sensitivities and Historical Explanations

Without going into detail of how people form or structure their views and beliefs from sociological or psychological perspectives, this part of the paper discusses briefly the ideological – political and religious – sensitivities which have remained associated with Pakistani people's beliefs and views as core elements of social learning and state functioning. With regard to this a retrospective analysis of the processes of ideological inductions and social transformations in Pakistan seems useful.

It is a common notion and general perception among people that Pakistan was made in the name of Islam. While historians differ about the motivation of Pakistan's founder Mohammad Ali Jinnah, regarding the formation of an Islamic state, there is little doubt that contemporary Pakistani identity is anchored in Islam.[10] Along with that notion, a country where majority population (more than 98 percent) is Muslim people's thinking in religious terms or their religiosity seems natural, but it varies from individual to individual. Perhaps the people's desire for Islam playing a greater role in their lives can be taken as their approval of religious extremists. This is not a matter of discussion here. But it is important to see people's vulnerability to the ideological structures, especially when these structures are developed in the religious frameworks, organized at the level of state and society and offered to the people for consumption. In a society like that of Pakistan, where religiosity is inborn while education and critical thinking have remained ignored, such ideological inductions can have implications for public opinions and perceptions.

Some social scientists see Islamism as a force of social change - a distinct phenomenon in Pakistan - and bracket religion with other social institutions of Pakistan such as family and occupation. M. Abdul Qadeer (Pakistan, 2006) identifies that Islamic themes were woven into conception of Pakistan's nationalism. They remained largely on the symbolic plane of Pakistan's public sphere during early periods of Pakistani history, although Islam as a religious and spiritual institution continued to be a critical element of national culture and people's identity. Yet in the period starting from 1977 Islam became an important instrument of inventing traditions and reorganizing social life.[11]

The Islamic foundation of Pakistan ideology was strengthened in the beginning mainly by a state-led discourse pursued by most of the Pakistani historians, religious scholars and educationists. Pakistani historiography has mainly tried to homogenize the culture, traditions, and social and religious life of the people; which suits the political attempts towards centralization.

Any attempt to assert the historical identity of a region has been discouraged and condemned.[12] According to Dr. Mubarak Ali, this framework of historiography was developed under the framework of the 'Pakistan Ideology,' which is based on the idea of a separate Muslim nationhood.[13]

With regard to their concern in promoting Islamic nationalism, the first success of the religious and traditionalists, including *ulama* of the Deoband, the Majlis-e-Ahrar, and the Khaksars,[14] came in the form of Objectives Resolution in 1949. It was the milestone in the political history of Pakistan which ignited the role of religion in politics in Pakistan. The religious circles then started openly debating and asserting that Pakistan was made in the name of Islam and should be directed to Islamic ideology. The anti-*Ahmadi* movement of 1953 was another turning point in this regard.[15] The religious clergy started to assert itself in political arena which became obvious by the following agitations against Ayub's Family Law Reform in 1961 – an ordinance designed to regulate certain aspects of the family life of Muslims like divorce, polygamy, minimum age of marriage, and registration of marriage, and which religious elites thought un-Islamic.

By this time the religious clergy in the East and West Pakistan was convinced over the desire of Pakistan becoming an Islamic state. Nasim Ahmed Jawed says, while describing the findings of a survey conducted in first seven months of 1969 in the East and West Pakistan, that 96 percent *ulama* professed national identity of Pakistan as an Islamic one.[16] When asked about desirability of an Islamic state all the *ulama* in both of the former two wings of Pakistan said, of course, that the state should seek to serve Islamic ends.[17]

Parallel to historians and religious clergy, at another level, this work of strengthening national ideology was undertaken by the educationists and text book writers, supported by the successive governments. A close review of the textbooks particularly "Pakistan Studies" reveals that their writers believe that "Pakistan ideology is indeed Islamic ideology which guides us in every sphere of life".[18] Ideologically imbued materials were not confined to Islamist and Pakistan Studies courses; they pervaded the entire syllabus, including Science, English, Urdu, Geography, Social Studies, etc.

This process of establishing an Islamic ideology for Pakistan was later expanded to a broader theme of Islamization of state and society. It was a multipronged process which targeted mainly public education, politics, legislation, economy, media and social order.

The basic roadmap of public education in Pakistan is provided by the school curriculum. The present curriculum dates back to almost a quarter century,

when in 1981 the regime of General Zia-ul-Haq used the Ministry of Education and its Curriculum Wing to launch an ideological assault on a generation of children. It was transmitted onwards by the successive governments of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif to General Musharraf. Pervez Hoodbhoy enlists some excerpts from the official curriculum, duly authorized by the Curriculum Wing of the Ministry of Education, Government of Pakistan, which say that by the end of Class-V the child should be able to understand Hindu-Muslim differences and the resultant need for a Pakistan, demonstrate by actions and beliefs in the fear of Allah, understand India's evil designs against Pakistan, make speeches on *Jihad* and *Shahdat* (martyrdom), and acknowledge and identify forces that may be working against Pakistan.[19]

While most of the emphasis is put on the institutions of religious education, *madrassas*, especially by the international media when it comes to discuss the causes of intolerance in Pakistani society, many scholars, however, don't rule out the role of Pakistan's public school system:

> …while this [madrassas] may be a partial contributory factor, the real problem lies in the public school system – which subsequently feeds into the higher education system of colleges and universities.[20]

C. Fair also contends in her paper on militancy and *madrasssas* that the public school system in Pakistan works on a basis of a curriculum that is highly likely to engender intolerance and promote the concept of conflict resolution through violence.[21] S. Hafeez has put it in these words: "Any attempt to "Islamize" the social sciences is very likely to engender fanaticism, emotionalism, and post-facto analysis on or interpretation of social realities.[22]

Parallel to public schools the higher education also had the similar trends of Islamization. A directive issued by the University Grants Commission (UGC) in 1983 said that textbook writers were to demonstrate that basis of Pakistan is not to be founded in racial, linguistic, or geographical factors, but rather, in the shared experience of a common religion -To get students to know and appreciate the ideology of Pakistan, and to popularize it with slogans, to guide students towards the ultimate goal of Pakistan – the creation of a compulsory Islamized State.[23]

To inculcate Islamic values among the youth a Shariah Faculty, which later became a fully fledged International Islamic University, was founded at Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. Learning of Arabic was encouraged and Islamic Studies was made a compulsory subject at the high school and

college level along with Pakistan Studies. In order to formulate the basis for "Islamic democracy" and to develop the parameters for an "Islamic Political System", Islamic Ideology Council and Islamic Research Institute were revitalized. In 1978 Islamic Ideology Council proposed a scheme of "Establishment of an Islamic Society." It sought Islamization of educational, economic, legal system etc. of the country.[24]

It was under General Zia that narrow and bigoted religiosity explicitly became a state policy.[25] Zia visualized a social order in which all sectors of life were regulated in accordance with Islamic percepts. Thus began a radicalization in religious terms which was referred to as Islamization.[26] In government offices [and also education institutions], the recital of afternoon prayers was promoted and special spaces were assigned for this activity. Anyone who did not pray was considered an outsider…Ramazan was enforced and the people found that eating and drinking in public was penalized…women were asked by zealous passers-by to cover their heads or to dress modestly.[27] Perhaps as a result of Zia's policies, Pakistani society undoubtedly moved towards becoming more conservative in terms of the public practice of social and cultural mores over the last three decades.[28]

In a bid to create an Islamic social order in the country structural adjustments were made in political, constitutional and legal spheres. Almost all the consecutive governments since Pakistan's establishment have been providing assurances to its people that Pakistan is committed to the establishment of an Islamic democracy and Islamic social justice; the starting point was Objectives Resolution 1949. The Constitution Commission appointed by General Ayub Khan had found that 96.6 percent of the people whose opinion it consulted through questionnaire or interviews were in favour of adopting a preamble with Islamic provisions to the Constitution.[29]

All constitutions in Pakistan from 1954 onward have had almost identical preambles that God is the ultimate sovereign of the universe and this sovereignty is to be exercised by the people but within the limits prescribed by Allah (in Quran and through Sunnah), and that necessary facilities should be created for Muslims of Pakistan to order their lives in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam. But there are sharp and wide differences between the modernist elements and the traditionalist and fundamental (religious) groups with regard to the interpretation and enforcement of the preamble.[30]

General Yahya Khan's (1969-71) Legal Framework also required that the National Assembly of Pakistan preserve the "Islamic Ideology". It was during

Yahya's rule and electoral campaign that the term "Islamic Ideology" was explicitly used for the first time and acquired new meaning.[31]

The religious ideological conflict intensified during and after the Z. A. Bhutto regime (1971-1977). The Constitution of 1973 provided more Islamic injunctions than any previous constitution. However, the Bhutto regime again became the target of religious and traditional forces when Bhutto tried to implement socialism, which the religious forces took as a synonym for secularism which is opposed to the religion. To counter this agitation, Bhutto fell back on such ritualistic aspects of Islam, as inviting the Imam of *Ka'aba* to lead Friday prayers, enforcing prohibition, declaring Friday a holiday, instead of Sunday. These concessions did not appease the agitators, and this gave further impetus to the politics of Islamization in Pakistan.[32] In July 1977, Bhutto's government was overthrown by General Zia ul-Haq in the wake of a rising Islamic movement led by the Jamat-e-Islami and Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam, the main politico-religious parties.

The politics of Islamization helped Zia as well to legitimise his rule and also provided him with the opportunity to develop solidarity with Saudi Arabia and the Islamic world in general. Zia introduced normative and structural changes in the political system, based on religion. For criminal offences, Islamic punishments were announced and enforced. Criminals were publicly flogged. At the structural level, in 1973, *Shariah* benches were introduced to enforce laws according to Islamic jurisprudence. To Islamize the economy, on 10 February 1979, the Zakat and Usher Ordinance was announced making it compulsory for everyone to donate 2.5 percent of one's unused/spare wealth, money and assets etc. (as Zakat), and 10 percent of agricultural produce (as Usher) to Zakat Fund of the government which will distribute it to needy and the deserving. The Interest free banking was introduced and was hailed as a major step towards developing a framework for Islamic economy.[33]

Sectarianism grew in parallel with Islamization process. From occasional local disputes about religious beliefs and customs in the 1960s and the 1970s, sectarian differences have evolved into attacks on individuals and institutions of other sects by the 1990s and 2000s.[34] By the end of Zia era, Pakistan was a cultural wasteland both in social and intellectual terms. The opposition to Zia was essentially a political one and did not touch upon the cultural and social damage that his regime inflicted upon the country.[35]

This transformation is not yet over. Pakistan's socio-cultural structure is changing. T. Rahman describes it as follows: "Complex processes of social transformation are underway. But the problem is the direction of change which is positive only partly, and negative in general. Something has gone

wrong with the process of change. The change tends to be more in favour of the radical forces than peaceful socio-cultural agents".[36]

Some scholars assert that Pakistani mainstream media has been a source of great confusion among populace regarding the issues of terrorism and extremism.[37] Hussain Naqi, a veteran journalist and human rights activist, says that a part of Pakistan's mainstream media has been manifesting an approach that is very close to the militants' media, and media barons of Pakistan can't be excluded from this 'responsibility' of creating and promoting an extreme religious or ideological view in the country.[38]

This above-mentioned feature of media cannot be seen in isolation with the efforts to Islamize Pakistani media which had indeed started soon after establishment of Pakistan. Zafrullah Khan mentions a report on media prepared by the Council of Islamic Ideology, right from 1962 uptil 1993 which contains many recommendations such as on how to include Islamic ethos into media discourses. [39] He also argues that academic discourse has remained supportive to this kind of media narrative where some of the leading scholars of journalism in the country have been asserting that if we want to reform Pakistani society we need Islamic journalism whose sole source of inspiration should be "*Amr bil Ma'roof wa Nahi Anil Munkir*", a methodology which was later on internalized by almost all '*Jihadi'* publications.

During Zia regime media underwent some peculiar changes. Women television announcers had to cover their heads. Classical music and dancing were banned along with Pakistani films and film songs. The media establishment underwent a change and a new guard took over.[40]

Zia's Islamization was coupled with '*Jihadi'* sentiment during anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan. Thousands of recruits from Pakistan, mainly from religious seminaries and refugee camps, were trained and sent to Afghanistan to fight against the Soviet forces. A parallel '*Jihadi'* media was promoted to spread the messages of '*Jihad'* and get human and financial support for the for cause. The Jihad publications were printed in several languages in Pakistan, mainly from Peshawar, Karachi and Quetta. The number of such publications had reached to 91 by 1988.[41] The Pakistani religious groups' publications, including those of Jamat-e-Islami (JI) and Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (JUI), supported their favourite Jihad groups in their news and analysis. Monthly Terjuman ul-Quran, weekly Asia and daily Jasarat of Jamat-e-Islami, monthly Al-Haq of Darul Uloom Haqqania Akora Khattak (JUI), and *Al-Jamiah* of JUI were on the forefront.[42]

Another important trend which has run at societal level, parallel to state-led ideological induction, arises from the role of religious leaders, the *ulama* and religious seminaries which have remained fundamental in imparting religious education to the masses. M. Azam, a researcher at the PIPS, has counted three major problems in people's understanding of Islam: language (owing to Arabic language of Holy Quran), sectarian approaches and political use of religion.[43] But the role of *ulama* and religious clerics has remained much more than mere interpretation of Islam and establishing sect-oriented religious explanations. They have been trying to influence both the state affairs and social order from the very beginning. Their vision on nature of state and society for Pakistan should be seen separately from mere Islamization efforts of different regimes.

Similar is the case with religious seminaries - the madrassas - which are also not confined to a sole purpose of education. More than 60 percent of madrassas in Pakistan are said to have political affiliations. As Rana has stated in his paper on political attitudes of Pakistan madrassas, 59 percent are affiliated with religio-political parties, three percent with other mainstream parties and 18 percent with sectarian or Jihadi groups/organizations. Nonetheless the administration of 60 percent of the madrassas believes that playing their role in politics is a religious duty.[44]

Educationists, nevertheless, believe that despite its disciplinary merits, religious education has an inherent propensity to reduce critical thinking since there is predisposition to ideological beliefs that often discourage questionings of Divine plans. Despite such tendencies have been moderated at times and science has been allowed to flourish under moderate religious rule, the underlying tension between questioning the unquestionable remains.[45]

It is true that the *Ulama* are not powerful or influential in the administrative hierarchy, but they exercise considerable sway over the masses who venerate them. The Muslim League, while waging its campaign for establishment of Pakistan, depended heavily on religious leaders to mobilize mass support for its cause. After the establishment of Pakistan, the Muslim League did not build a strong grass-roots organization, nor did the leaders try to put forward a liberal or modern interpretation of Islam before masses. The people eventually have remained dependent on the *Ulama* and the clerics for understanding Islam owing to low rates of literacy and deserted education. They have remained vulnerable to the religious education which *Ulama* and clerics have been offering. And the intellectual horizons of the orthodox *Ulama* have remained confined within the bounds of the Shariah as found in

the Quran and Sunnah and certain schools of Islamic law developed during the classical period of the Muslim history.[46]

Empirical Findings

This part of the paper discusses the empirical findings of the survey. The survey questionnaire contained more than fifty questions seeking people's responses in political, religious, socio-cultural, economic and global perspectives. There was a coherent set of questions on Jihad, Taliban and militancy which was used to explore the public perceptions, and support level if any, on Jihad and militancy.

1. 'Jihad' and Militancy: Support Determinants

In Islamic teachings Jihad is a vast concept. There are three levels of Jihad: intimate struggle to purify one's soul of evil influences; to strive for justice [or against cruelty] through words and non-violent actions; and use of physical force in defense of Muslims against oppression and transgression by the enemies of Allah, Islam and Muslims.[47]

In order to explore people's understanding and views of Jihad, respondents were asked about what Jihad meant to them. The question, however, did not ask about the level or type of Jihad, such as physical (armed) or verbal etc., which they might have in their minds while answering this question. As many as 28% respondents said that fighting against cruelty was Jihad; the maximum response against the given options. Male respondents were more likely to choose this option (32.4%) than women (18.2%). Among age groups, this option was selected the most (30.8%) by the respondents between 20-35 years of age.



About 21% of the respondents defined Jihad in terms of fight against the adversaries of Muslims. This response was almost uniform within all groups of age, gender and economy. However, 31% of the respondents who chose this option belonged to education level of below middle class. A comparatively less number of respondents, corresponding to 5%, said Jihad meant to spread Islam in every corner of Islam. Some 15 % people viewed Jihad as a fight against personal desires. About 27% were of the view that Jihad encompassed almost all the mentioned options.

Traditionally, the defense of an Islamic state has been seen by the Muslims as Jihad. According to a scholar, Majid M. Khadduri, classic example of *bellum justum* (Just War) in Islamic tradition is defensive in nature. According to him, changes were made in Islamic *bellum justum* theory as time passed by. Often there was the need of the Muslim states to make peace, but not on their own terms. Therefore, Muslim jurists began to reinterpret law and to justify the suspension of Jihad. They agreed on the necessity of the peace.[48]

Some Muslim jurists have the point of view that the wars of Muhammad (PBUH) were defensive and they prove it from Quran-o-Sunnah, tradition and Islamic history.[49] They emphasize that from the beginning to the present context of the life of Muhammad the necessity for Jihad has always been for defensive purpose.[50] But according to some scholars Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) fought offensive Jihad in some wars such as in Khyber or Ghazwa Tabuk.[51] Believers of offensive Jihad claim that those who promote the idea that Islam allows only defensive war reject the Quran and Sunnah and conceal the facts of history. They manifest servility of mind, and their statements are unreliable.[52]



People are aware of the armed or physical Jihad but it is doubtful whether they have clear idea about Islamic law regarding offensive or defensive mode

of it. This was manifested in most respondents' 'don't know' resply when they were asked about which type of Jihad should be armed one; 49% selected this option. Among others more respondents, 38%, were in favour of defensive Jihad as compared with 13.3% favouring the option of offensive Jihad.

Male respondents had almost equal level of support for defensive and offensive Jihad – 40.6% and 40.4% respectively. Among female respondents it was 31% and 12% respectively for defensive and offensive Jihad. Contrary to only 18.5% illiterate respondents picked up the option of defensive Jihad more than 50% respondents having higher education supported this option.

The respondents, however, were much clearer while describing and linking the conflicts in Kashmir and Afghanistan to Jihad. About the unrest and fighting in Afghanistan most of the respondents, corresponding to 73%, were of the view that it is not Jihad; 18% said yes it is Jihad while 9% took evasion. Among those 73% who did not think Afghan war Jihad, 55% respondents said it was a political war and 18% considered it a tribal conflict.



On the other hand when asked about the Kashmir conflict, 56% of the respondents said it was a Jihad and only 21% – quite contrary to 73% in case of Afghanistan – said otherwise. This clear difference of opinion is probably because of the historical link of Pakistan with the Kashmir conflict. Both India and Pakistan link Kashmir with their state identities. India interprets its rule over Kashmir as evidence of its secular credentials. Pakistan describes Kashmir as integral to its Islamic identity and an unrealized aspect of the process that led to Pakistan's independence.[53] Majority people of Pakistan also see Kashmir as a continuity of struggle of independence. According to Nasim A. Jawed in the context of Indo-Pakistan subcontinent, the religiously oriented Muslims have generally considered Pakistan's war against India as

Jihad both on grounds of Muslim self-defense, and – in the case of the first two wars – as the rightful efforts to liberate the Muslims of the disputed Kashmir.[54] But in reality this is not confined to just religiously oriented Muslims, majority people of Pakistan has been approving Pak-India wars on Kashmir as being Jihad. The survey question has indeed asked if the fight in Kashmir is Jihad without mentioning the past Indo-Pakistan wars or the recent armed struggle in Indian held Kashmir but it is more related implicitly to the present situation.

The public perspective disapproving Afghan war as Jihad also resonates with Pakistan's past and current policies towards Afghanistan; Pakistan no more considers the Afghan war a Jihad as it did during the Soviet-Afghan war. The other reason can be the terrific damage which Pakistani state and society have faced due to some militant groups, mainly the Taliban, arising out of Afghan war and now hitting Pakistan. Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Talat Masood, a leading defence analyst, is, however, of the view that as people see Indian presence in Kashmir a continued colonial raj owing to India's permanent occupation, the American presence in Afghanistan is perceived as not permanent. And people think there should be Jihad against this [Indian] colonialism, although it has not worked yet.[55]

In order to ascertain the people's mindset on the ideology and acts of Taliban the respondents were asked (without mentioning any areas or countries) whether the Taliban were fighting for Islam. Some The 46% respondents were of the view that Taliban's fight had nothing to do with Islam; they denounced the ideological basis of Taliban's fight. However, 26% respondents said Taliban's fight was for Islam while 28% people did not reply. A major portion of the respondents, who declared Taliban's fight as an Islamic belonged to those who had got their education from madrassas; 41% of the respondents



having madrasa education and 34% having both madrasa and regular education termed Taliban's fight Islamic.

Given the increasing level of Taliban atrocities in country, the disapproval of Taliban's fight on religious grounds by some 46% respondents is not a satisfactory matter. According to Muhammad Amir Rana, there could be two reasons for this particular public response: "Firstly, state pursued jihad policy for a long time which provided people a rationale to support those who engage in jihad. Secondly, Taliban have been using religion and jihad to achieve their political gains, and the people, who lack understanding of this, however, may suppress or confuse their disapproval of Taliban owing to their religious sensitivities".[56] Especially when the religious scholars and clerics do not guide the people in the correct direction and their religious knowledge is poor such sensitivities can mislead their opinions. Another factor can be the anti-American feelings among the people which translate into supporting Taliban who, to the people, fight against the US.[57]



This confused public perspective became more visible when people were asked how did they see the militant acts of Taliban. Some 38% respondents condemned the acts of Taliban in Pakistan such as attacks on security forces, civilians, CD/video shops, girls' schools and other targets. Only 8% said they supported these Taliban's acts. Along with that most of the people, corresponding to 54% of total respondents, were found confused about Taliban's acts. Supportive responses were relatively high among those who had got madrasa education; Only 12% respondents having madrasa education supported Taliban acts – 4% higher than the overall support figure of 8%. Among females, the support for Taliban's acts was slightly higher than the males; it was 9.2% in female and 7% among male. About 42% male and 29% female condemned Taliban's acts.

The respondents who supported the Taliban's acts were asked further to comment on how did they justify the Taliban's acts. Most of the respondents, corresponding to 73% of those supporting the Taliban acts, did not have any justification to support their view. About 9% respondents said that these acts were to eliminate anti-Islamic activities. According to 7% respondents these acts were to incline people towards Islamic teachings. For 5% respondents these acts were to spread panic and fear among anti-Islamic communities. Another 6% respondents were of the view that these acts were to compel the government to enforce Islamic rules and laws.

Although majority of the people don't approve Taliban's fight in Afghanistan as being Islamic or a Jihad, but they also oppose the decision of the Pakistani government to support the USA in war against terrorism. When asked about if Pakistan's decision to support the US in war against terrorism is correct, 64% said 'no'. Only 17% termed it a correct decision while 19% did not reply.



With regard to the 9/11 attacks a sizeable number of Pakistanis believes that such an intricate operation was well beyond the capability of Osama and his company.[58] Secondly most of the Pakistanis see the US attacks in Afghanistan as an attempt to weaken the Islam and Muslim, a concept mainly put forward and propagated by the religious scholars, leaders and some political analysts. Thirdly, people also believe that the acts of terrorism in Pakistan are a reaction to the US drone attacks in Pakistani tribal areas being carried out in the name of war against terrorism.

People in general, have no clear idea of who is responsible for this decision. They think that America invaded Iraq and Afghanistan. There are conspiracy theories among the people about America and they do not know the realities.[59] With regard to this, the role of religious scholars also influences public opinion who have been staunch oppose of war on terror. A comprehensive charter of demands issued by 30 leading religious scholars,

mostly the Deobandis, had suggested in February 2008 that President Musharraf should step down to save the country from suicide attacks and the then turmoil. They advised Musharraf to be bold enough not to see 'extremists' through American eyes.[60]

2. Public Perceptions of Extremism and Radicalization

This part of the paper endeavours to see as to what extent people's views resonate with those of radical and extremist forces which advocate typical religious, political and socio-cultural manifestations of Pakistan. It will help in a way to evaluate the public perspectives on extremism and radicalization. For this purpose two sets of questions were identified in the survey which sought public opinions on variety of issues in religio-political and socio-cultural settings.

Surprisingly, to start with, most of the respondents neither supported political parties nor any religious party or organization. What does it indicate? Are people not satisfied with the performance of political and religio-political parties in achieving people's aspirations? If this argument is correct, are these ideals built on economic and social welfare or ideological factors? At the same time their responses highlight two arguments: firstly the increased role of religion [and religious scholars/leaders] in politics, law and society; and secondly the need for social development. This is being discussed below.



When asked about their support to some political parties, more than half the respondents – 58% to be precise – replied in negative, 39% said yes and 3%

did not reply. The respondents having private businesses were found more supportive of political parties; about 50% of such respondents supported one or another political party. The largest denouncement for the political parties came from the illiterate people, and 70% of the illiterate respondents said they did not support any political party. About 65% of the unemployed respondents, too, did not support any political party.

A large number of respondents did not support any religious party either. About 65% respondents did not support while 33% supported some religious party or organization. Dr. Tariq Rahman, Director National Institute of Pakistan Studies at Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad sees bad governance as a major reason for people's general mistrust in political leaders and parties.[61] At micro level, however, there is constituencies-confined politics where patron-client relationship exists between the voter and the leader. Thus, public response of mistrust in political leaders and parties is more manifested among the middle class.[62]

Unlike their disliking for religious parties or organizations, the respondents expressed more trust in religious scholars and clerics when they were asked about who is participating actively in serving Islam and Pakistani society. More than half, 55%, respondents acknowledged the services of religious scholars and clerics for Islam and society. Only 6% each supported the role of political leaders and military rulers in serving Islam and society. About 14 % commended the role of political and social scholars.



The respondents were also asked a set of questions on nature of laws and government in Pakistan. This is important in the context of efforts for enforcement of Shariah (Islamic law), sometimes by use of force, by the extremist groups particularly in North Frontier Province (NWFP) and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Historically, demand for enforcement of Islamic law has remained at the heart of revivalist Islamic movements. But legality of its enforcement at personal level – by other than state apparatus – and through armed struggle has also remained questionable. It is, however, visible that certain additional connotations have been attached to Jihad such as efforts to Islamize the political institutions and law by all necessary, including political, and – in the last resort – forceful, or rather revolutionary means.[63]

When asked if struggle for implementation of Shariah was also Jihad, without specifying armed or not, about 60% of the respondents said 'yes' and only 16% replied in negative; 24% did not reply. People from the all age groups and with different occupation had almost a similar distribution of views. Support for implementation of Shariah was, however, more visible in respondents having madrasa education as 71% of such respondents replied in affirmative.

A large number of respondents, 63%, were confused about the Hudood Laws, laws related to Islamic punishments. Among rest of the respondents 25% said these laws should be reformed and 12% replied otherwise. Responding to another question, 47% of the respondents favoured this option that the religious-political parties should be given a chance to rule Pakistan; 35 opposed and 18% said they did not know.



Religion was also one of the important factors, quite contrary to its visibility in outcome of polls, when people were asked about their consideration while casting vote where more number of respondents put it above clan or *biradari.*

About 32% of the respondents said they considered the education and capability of the candidate, 21% gave priority to party, 20% prioritized religion and 15% termed clan/*biradari* as basis of their casting vote. Support for religions as decisive factor for casting one's vote was more prevalent in illiterate respondents, 29%, and respondents having madrasa education, 53%. Overall support, however, remained for candidate's education and capability.



The survey asked the respondents three particular questions to seek their views about what the religious extremists and militants describe an "Islamic code" of social order for women. The ongoing trends of extremism and radicalization are impacting the minds of people and that are also affecting the socio-cultural traditions. In the name of Islamization of society and culture, certain cultural and social values, activities and norms have been discouraged or suppressed.[64] These are mostly related to the women.

In response to a question about how do you explain *pardha* (wearing the veil) for women, 67% respondents said this was purely a religious duty. Some 20% viewed its necessity according to the situation. Only 6% of the respondents said it was a personal matter and 5% termed it as unnecessary.



About the female education, a considerable majority of the respondents, amounting to 81%, said it was important for women to get education. However, 15% of the respondents said it was not important; 4% did not reply. Mostly illiterate respondents said women education was not important; 27% such respondents said 'no' to women education. The maximum number of respondents from occupation group of 'private services', more than 90%, supported the women education. This trend shows that people's views do not resonate with the extremist and radical thinking related to women education and traditional mindset of people on such issues is changing. Another important factor of this vehement public support to women education can be the militants' targeting girls' schools in NWFP and FATA which was regularly highlighted in the media. The timing of this survey coincided with the period when such attacks on girls' school were a routine matter.

Towards the end of the nineteenth and start of the twentieth century the modern western education had got acclamation in the Indian subcontinent but the Muslim reformers despite accepting its importance were not fully ready to extend it to the women. They deemed western education necessary for Muslim men but dangerous for women. Even Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, who was a staunch supporter of western education, opposed opening up new schools for girls and asserted in the beginning that they should only read religious books.[65] Maualan Ashraf Ali Thanvi, one of the leading religious scholars associated with Deoband school of thought, also recommended only religious education for women to 'safeguard their religion and faith'. He opposed girls' going to schools where girls from diverse communities, classes and ideologies could impact negatively their thoughts and moral values. Maulana wrote a special book for women, *Bahishti Zewar,* an 'Islamic code of life for women' which Muslim families used to give their daughters in dowry. The book was in fact an effort to keep traditional mindset of women intact and maintain the deprived status of women on religious grounds which had perpetuated under feudal influence.[66]

Even when Muslim reformers agreed to women's education under the pressures of the colonial government and partly to keep up with those of other religions, they sought to maintain strict control over the environment of women's education and its content and curriculum. So while they allowed them an education, it had to have serious religious aspects to it, home economics was often recommended and the education was to be only by Muslim women teachers and not in co-education environments. Women's education, in other words, was to be tailored to their gender roles as wives and mothers and home-makers rather than as independent economic and political agents. However, among the urban well-to-do classes it was also a symbol of modernity and class and liberalism. Education is seen among the

urban lower middle classes as the road to mobility and by the richer classes as the means of maintaining class privilege and economic independence.[67]

Propagation of this traditional mindset about women education was further strengthened by the social taboos not allowing women to work outside their homes; hence discouraging their education. But now the situation has much changed in Pakistan although poverty and lack of awareness, along with religious and socio-cultural traditions still remain the hindering forces regarding women education.



As in the case of women education most of the respondents were also in favour of women's working. About 59% of the respondents said women should work outside their homes, 34 opposed to it and 7% took evasion to the question. About 50% of the respondents having their education less than middle class and 47% of the respondents having private businesses said 'no' to women's working out of their homes.

According to Rubina Saigol, a leading educationist and human rights activist, the material basis of widespread support for education must not be ignored. The market has something to do with this change where people see women's getting education and working important. Market forces have compelled people to seek more than one source of income to support families as most of them cannot survive with single source. The only way that women can get "respectable" jobs like teaching or medicine is through education and they can thus supplement family income in a socially acceptable way.[68]

Secondly, the consumerist pressures of modern times have led to changes in social mores and beliefs, not necessarily because social attitudes have

changed. There are increasing numbers of female-headed households so the traditional family patterns are also changing in Pakistan due to urbanization and economic migration of men to other countries. There is a plenty of push and pull factors that have ensured acceptance of women's education and employment and often religious arguments are given for this, eg. that Hazrat Aisha and Hazrat Zainab were educated and taught other women of their times.[69]

Conclusion

Religion remains a core element of people's belief system while lack of education and critical thinking guides and confuses the views of most of the people of jihad, extremism and radicalization. Certain state-led ideological patterns along with assertions of religious scholars and clerics have had great impact on people's perceptions of these issues. Most of the people don't like the religious extremists and militants but they look towards the state and religious clergy to transform their disliking into an open rejection of the radicals, extremist and militants. At the same time people's responses validate two things: first the increased role of religion [and religious scholars/leaders] in politics, law and society; and secondly the need for social development.

Notes

[1] See the Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) report "Defining the Phenomenon of Radicalization in Pakistan," based on a yearlong exercise of focus group discussions and interviews with academics, scholars and researchers, published in *Conflict and Peace Studies*, Vol.2, Number 1, (Islamabad: PIPS, 2009).

[2] Muhammad Azam, "Radicalization in Pakistan: Sociocultural Realities," Conflict and Peace Studies, Vol. 2, Number 1, (Islamabad: PIPS, 2009), p. 45.

[3] Hussain Naqi, National Coordinator for HRCP Core Groups, interview with Noureen, quoted in "Defining the Phenomenon of Radicalization in Pakistan," *Conflict and Peace Studies*, Vol.2, Number 1, (Islamabad: PIPS, 2009).

[4] Rasul Bakhsh Rais, Professor of Political Science at Lahore University of Management Sciences, quoted in "Defining the Phenomenon of Radicalization in Pakistan," *Conflict and Peace Studies*, Vol.2, Number 1, (Islamabad: PIPS, 2009).

[5] Ishtiaq Ahmed, "Radicalization and De-Radicalization in Singapore and Pakistan: A Comparison," *Conflict and Peace Studies*, Vol. 2, Number 3, (Islamabad: PIPS, 2009), p. 45.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Nasim Ahmed Jawed, *Islam's Political Culture: Religion and Politics in Pre-divided Pakistan*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999).

[8] C. Fair and b. Shepherd, "Who Supports Terrorism? Evidence from Fourteen Muslim Countries," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Issue 29, (London: Routledge, 2006), p.51-76.

[9] Clay Ramsey, Steven Kull, Stephen Weber, Evan Lewis, "Pakistani Public Opinion on the Swat Conflict, Afghanistan, and the US", WorldPublicOpinion.org, July 1, 2009. Accessed at: http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/jul09/WPO_Pakistan_Jul09_rpt.pdf

[10] Saleem H. Ali, "Islam and Education," (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 17.

[11] Muhammad Abdul Qadeer, "Pakistan," (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 36 and 154.

[12] Mubarak Ali, "History, Ideology and Curriculum," *Continuity and Change: Socio-political and Institutional Dynamics in Pakistan,* edited by S. Akbar Zaidi, (Karachi: City Press, 2003), p. 57.

[13] Mubarak Ali, "History, Ideology and Curriculum," *Continuity and Change: Socio-political and Institutional Dynamics in Pakistan,* edited by S. Akbar Zaidi, (Karachi: City Press, 2003), p. 55.

[14] These religio-political groups had opposed the creation of Pakistan and were highly critical of Mr. Jinnah and his associates.

[15] Ahmadi or Qadiyani sect challenged the finality of the prophethood, a universal belief of the Muslims, and said Prophet Muhammad is not the last prophet and there can be more after him. Mirza Ghulam Muhammad was their supreme leader and his followers had belief that he is a prophet of God.

[16] Nasim Ahmed Jawed, *Islam's Political Culture: Religion and Politics in Predivided Pakistan*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 15.

[17] Ibid, p. 57.

[18] Quarterly *Tareekh* (Urdu), (Lahore: *Thap* Publications, April 2009), p. 79.

[19] Pervez Hoodbhoy, "Education Reform in Pakistan: Challenges and Prospects," *Pakistan: Haunting Shadows of Human Security, edited by Jennifer Bennett*, (Dhaka: BIISS, 2009), p. 64.
[20] Pervez Hoodbhoy, "Education Reform in Pakistan: Challenges and Prospects," *Pakistan: Haunting Shadows of Human Security, edited by Jennifer Bennett*, (Dhaka: BIISS, 2009), p. 58.
[21] Quoted by Safiya Aftab in her paper "Poverty and Militancy," published in *Conflict and Peace Studies*, Vol. 1, Number 1, (Islamabad: PIPS, 2008), p. 75.
[22] Sabeeha Hafeez, "The Changing Pakistani society," (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1991), p. 256.
[23] University Grants Commission directive, (Islamabad: Mutalliyah-i-Pakistan, Allama Open Iqbal University, 1983), p. 11.
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[25] Hamza Alvi, "Social Forces and Ideology in the Making of Pakistan," *Continuity and Change: Socio-political and Institutional Dynamics in Pakistan,* edited by S. Akbar Zaidi, (Karachi: City Press, 2003), p. 37.
[26] Ishtiaq Ahmed, "Radicalization and De-Radicalization in Singapore and Pakistan: A Comparison," *Conflict and Peace Studies*, Vol. 2, Number 3, (Islamabad: PIPS, 2009), p. 54.
[27] Arif Hasan, "The Roots of Elite Alienation," *Continuity and Change: Socio-political and Institutional Dynamics in Pakistan,* edited by S. Akbar Zaidi, (Karachi: City Press, 2003), p. 120-122.
[28] Safiya Aftab, "Poverty and Militancy," *Conflict and Peace Studies*, Vol. 1, Number 1, (Islamabad: PIPS, 2008), p. 65.
[29] Report of the Constitution Commission, Pakistan, 1961 (Karachi: 1962).
[30] Khalid B. Sayeed, *The Political System of Pakistan*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1967). See chapter 7; Islam, Political Culture and National Unity.
[31] Muhammad Munir, *From Jinnah to Zia*, (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1980), p. 84-85
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[33] Manzooruddin Ahmed, *Contemporary Pakistan: Politics, Economy, and Society*, (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1980). P. 27-37.
[34] Muhammad Abdul Qadeer, "Pakistan," (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 179.
[35] Arif Hasan, "The Roots of Elite Alienation," *Continuity and Change: Socio-political and Institutional Dynamics in Pakistan,* edited by S. Akbar Zaidi, (Karachi: City Press, 2003), p. 122.
[36] Tariq Rahman, quoted in Muhammad Azam, "Radicalization in Pakistan: Sociocultural Realities," Conflict and Peace Studies, Vol. 2, Number 1, (Islamabad: PIPS, 2009), p. 47.
[37] Najam U Din, address in a seminar on *Assessing the Reporting, Approach and Impact of Militants' Print Media in Pakistan held by* Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) on 18 November 2009 in Lahore.
[38] Hussain Naqi, address in a seminar on *Assessing the Reporting, Approach and Impact of Militants' Print Media in Pakistan held by* Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) on 18 November 2009 in Lahore. Accessed at http://www.san-pips.com/index.php?action=events&id=58.

[39] Zafrullah Khan, a former journalist and Executive Director Centre for Civic Education, Pakistan, keynote address at a Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) seminar on *Understanding the 'Jihad Print Media' in Pakistan and its Impact held* on 20 October 2009 in Islamabad, accessed at http://www.san-pips.com/index.php?action=events&id=56.

[40] Arif Hasan, "The Roots of Elite Alienation," *Continuity and Change: Socio-political and Institutional Dynamics in Pakistan,* edited by S. Akbar Zaidi, (Karachi: City Press, 2003), p. 120-122.

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[43] Muhammad Azam, "Radicalization in Pakistan: Sociocultural Realities," Conflict and Peace Studies, Vol. 2, Number 1, (Islamabad: PIPS, 2009), p. 58.

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[49] Mulana Charagh Ali, "Tehqeeq Al-Jihad", Allama Shibli Numani, "Seerat-ul-Nabi (PBUH)", Sobedar Farman Ali Chudhari, "Eman-o-Taqua, Jihad fi Sbeel Allah", as quoted in Mujtaba Muhammad Rathor, "Jihad, Jhang aur Dehshat Gardi", Zavia Foundation, Lahore (Sep. 2009). P. 57

[50] Mujtaba Muhammad Rathor, "Jihad, Jhang aur Dehshat Gardi", Zavia Foundation, Lahore (Sep. 2009). P. 58

[51] Hafiz Saed, " Tafseer Sorat Toaba", Masood Azhar, " Fatah-ul-Jawad fi Mauraf Ayat-ul-Jihad, Mullana Fazal Muhammad, "Dawat-e-Jihad", as qouted in Mujtaba Muhammad Rathor, "Jihad, Jhang aur Dehshat Gardi", Zavia Foundation, Lahore (Sep. 2009). P. 57

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[53] Hasan-Askari Rizvi, "Islamabad's New Approach to Kashmir", Kash*mir: New Voices, New Approaches,* Vanguard Books, Lahore (2009). P. 137

[54] Nasim Ahmed Jawed, *Islam's Political Culture: Religion and Politics in Pre-divided Pakistan*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.67.

[55] Telephonic interview by Tanveer Anjum, Islamabad, 8 January 2010.

[56] Interview by Tanveer Anjum, Islamabad, 12 January 2010.

[57] Interview with Abdul Basit, Head Conflict and Security Research at Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), by Tanveer Anjum, Islamabad, 8 January 2010.

[58] Hassan Abbas, *Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror*, (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2007), P. 223.

[59] Interview with Tariq Rahman.

[60] "Clergy holds War on Terror Responsible for Terrorism," available on http://www.san-pips.com/index.php?action=san&id=44, retrieved on 14 December 2009.

[61] Telephonic interview by Tanveer Anjum, Islamabad, 11 January 2010.
[62] Telephonic interview with Zafrullah Khan, Director Centre for Civic Education Pakistan, Islamabad, 8 January 2010.
[63] Nasim Ahmed Jawed, *Islam's Political Culture: Religion and Politics in Pre-divided Pakistan*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 67.
[64] Muhammad Azam, "Radicalization in Pakistan: Socio-cultural Realities", *Conflict and Peace Studies*, PIPS Research Journal, Jan-Mar 2009, Vol.2, No.1. P.59
[65] Dr. Mubarak Ali, *Almiya-e-Tareekh*, (Urdu), (Lahore: Fiction House, 2005), p. 69.
[66] Dr. Mubarak Ali, *Almiya-e-Tareekh*, (Urdu), (Lahore: Fiction House, 2005), pp. 67-68.
[67] Rubina Saigol, email conversation with Tanveer Anjum, 11 January 2010.
[68] Email conversation. 11 January 2010.
[69] Ibid.

Women Radicalization: An Empirical Study

Saba Noor and Daniela Hussain

Introduction

Radicalization has emerged as an immense challenge to Pakistan's diverse society. The phenomenon is generally believed to be triggered by reasons that are directly related to political and religious ignorance, poverty, absence of access to education and livelihood opportunities, deterioration of law and order, a biased social structure, unfair government policies, and psychological, domestic, regional and international factors.[1] The process of radicalization as a factor in terrorism has been the focus of attention of scholars, researchers and academics not just in Pakistan but internationally as well. However, research into reasons of radicalization of Pakistani women and their involvement in terrorist activities has received little attention. This study explores trends of radicalization among Pakistani women and assesses their views about socio-cultural, religious, ideological and political elements which can play a role in radicalization of women and increase their chance of association with terrorist organizations.

The term radicalization[2] is often used in Pakistan interchangeably with terms such as terrorism and extremism. Most definitions of the term are borrowed from the West and may not accurately portray the Pakistani context.[3] There is a general consensus among Pakistani scholars that radicalization is a neutral term, and does not have any inherent negative or positive connotations.[4] Radicals want to bring change in society. Multiple factors, possibly different for men and women, may contribute to radicalization. Therefore, it is essential to explore the main features of radicalization among both genders to anticipate future trends.

The focus on women is crucial in the context of Pakistan where women form 53 percent[5] of the total population, but a male-dominated society imposes restrictions on women in the name of religion and culture, often confining them to their homes.[6] However, trends are gradually changing now as more and more women are working in all spheres of life alongside men. But great differences persist in the lives of women in urban and rural areas. According to United Nations Development Programme, adult literacy rate among women in Pakistan is less than 42 percent[7].

Pakistan is a patriarchal society where social and customary practices and discrimination against women are rife. It is not uncommon for women to be

treated as chattel. They are not only discriminated against in terms of healthcare, education and inheritance but also frequently become victims of domestic violence, inhuman and outlawed customs such as *Karo Kari* (so-called honor killings by relatives of the girl if she is suspected of adultery or even shows desire to marry a man of her choice) and marriage to the Quran to keep the family property within the family.[8] Conservative cultural norms and a culture of keeping men and women segregated fails to protect women from different forms of violence, including forced marriages, rape, and murder in the name of honor, not only in conflict zones in Pakistan but also elsewhere in the country.[9] As many as 46,364 women had become victim of various forms of violence until 2006. In the year 2007 alone, 810 cases of *Karo Kari* , 759 cases of rape and 104 cases of murder of women were reported.[10]

Although a number of women have played a vibrant role in the politics of Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto was twice elected prime minister of the country, the overall level of their participation has remained limited.[11]

Conservative policies enforced by the male-dominated establishment have kept women's role in politics suppressed to a great extent. Until the 1990s, only 10 seats were reserved for women in the National Assembly (NA), the lower house of parliament, and five in each of the four provincial assemblies. Furthermore, women representatives were mainly from politically influential families.[12] The overall number of women in politics has remained so low in any given period that their names can be counted on the fingers of one hand. The number of seats reserved for women was increased under the Conduct of General Elections Order 2002 during General Pervez Musharraf's military dictatorship. Under the law, 60 seats were reserved for women in the National Assembly and 17 in the Senate, the upper house of parliament.[13] According to Dr Sabiha Syed, there are multiple other factors in addition to policies that have contributed to women's exclusion and inability to play an effective role in politics. These factors include lack of support from political parties, lack of contact and cooperation with other women groups, absence of political education and training for women and lack of specific constitutional provisions and financial resources.[14] Along with limited political involvement, the role of women in policy making and decision making is also minimal.[15]

As in many other developing countries, women in Pakistan are not only socially and politically deprived but also lack a credible role as breadwinners for the family. Amid the changing societal trends, women are working along with men in every sphere of life, but the crude activity rate (percentage of labor force in total population) for women is 10.7 percent in rural areas and 6.3 percent in urban areas of Pakistan. The refined activity rate (percentage of labor force in population of persons who are 10 years or older) is 16 percent in

rural areas and 8.8 percent in urban areas.[16] Female-headed businesses are often run from home and financial matters are managed by male family members. But with the gradual change in the circumstances and awareness about female education, the number of women entering fields including education, health, engineering and Information Technology has increased, in addition to their active participation in sports and politics.[17] Around 60 percent of women entrepreneurs in Pakistan have opted for traditional businesses such as parlors, bakeries and boutiques, but the largest number is working in the garments and handicrafts sector.[18] In general, urban businesswomen are better placed in terms of accessing information than those operating from rural areas.[19]

This situation reflects the vulnerabilities of women, who suffer exclusion, marginalization and suppression on account of a conservative mindset towards them and are susceptible to radicalization and may subsequently indulge in violent activities. Explaining the reasons for radicalization among women, Margot Bardan says that, along with several other factors, the largest group of women who become vulnerable to the blandishments of radical extremism in the form of improved economic and social conditions are those who are poor and uneducated or under-educated and the socially marginalized or displaced, as in the case of rural women and girls living in towns or cities.[20] According to Erik Erickson's negative identity theory, the opportunity of achieving personal aspirations dispenses with the inclination for conscious assumption of a negative identity. There are examples in the history of terrorism, of oppressed individuals, who, disappointed by the failure of their own dreams, assumed a negative identity by becoming terrorists.[21] A negative identity involves a vindictive rejection of the role regarded as desirable and proper by an individual's family, community or society. In these situations, people engage in terrorism as a result of feelings of rage and helplessness over the lack of alternatives. The more women are marginalized and deprived of their rights, the higher the likelihood of their indulgence in violent acts. In the absence of a competitive state-run education system—especially in the rural areas—there are considerable chances of women's exploitation. The Lal Masjid/Jamia Hafsa uprising and the subsequent standoff in Islamabad in 2007 is a case in point.

Several reasons are cited for women's radicalization and indulgence in violent acts. According to Cunningham, the motives of women radicalization and terrorism are complex, adding that female involvement in terrorist activity is motivated by ideological, logistical and regional factors.[22] He describes that an individual's resort to terrorism implies both *individual factors* (psychological and biographical) and *social factors* (norms of society, ideologies, defacement [degeneration] of the social system).[23] Many authors

claim that women become terrorists to avenge the death of relatives.[24] Galvin argues that the female terrorist joins terrorism with different motivations and expectations than males, including the promise of a better life for her children and the desire to meet people's needs that are not being met by an intractable establishment.[25] Companionship and feminism are also considered motivating factors for many female terrorists.[26]

The trends of radicalization among Pakistani women can be traced back to the Afghan Jihad when women played an active role by providing logistic and facilitation support as mothers, daughters and wives for the male militants fighting on the battlefield.[27] However, an active role of women in Pakistan in terms of radicalization became visible to the world during the 2007 Lal Masjid/Jamia Hafsa standoff where militant men and women challenged the writ of the state in Islamabad and abducted civilians and policemen. These radicalized women, clad in head-to-toe *Burqas*, occupied a children library adjacent to their seminary, abducted Pakistani nationals and foreigners, and demanded the closure of video shops.[28] The Taliban have used similar tactics in Khyber-Pakhtunkhawa and FATA. They threatened to commit suicide attacks if the authorities did not fulfill their demands or if any military action was taken against them. The Lal Masjid episode brought the spotlight on madrassas, which were already being held responsible for indoctrination and growing radicalization in Pakistan.

Conservatives circles in Pakistan advocate that only religious education is important for girls and deem religious seminaries or madrassas to be ideal for girls' education. Even conservative families that ignore formal education for women also favor sending their daughters to madrassas.[29] Madrassas are considered the best option among educational institutions for poor families, because the students not only get education [free of charge?] but are also provided other facilities such as lodging and meals.[30] These seminaries cater to the educational needs of girls and women all over Pakistan, including areas where formal educational intuitions are not allowed to work, or such institutions are not affordable. Almost every religious sect has its own madrassas for women all over the country.[31] Al-Huda, a network of madrassas for women subscribing to the Deobandi school of thought, and the seminaries run by Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), a religious-political party which subscribes to the Sunni school of thought, are the two main madrassa networks with campuses across the country, both in urban and rural areas.

Sarah and Maliha conclude that students of Al-Huda have more extremist views compared to those who study at the JI madrassas, but that does not mean that Al-Huda students support violence.[32] These madrassas have played a crucial role in shaping the mindset of women. Thousands of women

have graduated from Al-Huda alone in 13 years up to 2009. Around 500 get diplomas every year in Karachi alone.[33] In contrast, the agenda of the JI women's wing is more political and it opposes Western policy and the presence of Western, mainly US forces in the region. Due to its political objectives, the JI women's wing has adopted a neutral approach towards followers of other religions. The JI would not mind joining hands with other political parties and religious groups who share the same political aims.[34] Besides these two main madrassa networks for women, there are many other madrassas who are using religious education for women as the ploy to use them for advancing their own agenda.

Neelum Hussain elaborates on madrassas' spreading radicalization not only among regular students, but also among the average woman through holding of *Daras* (religious gatherings). She says that *Daras* preaches more conservative forms of religious practices and beliefs and is becoming a strong tool for indoctrination of women.[35] She believes that such gatherings influence the thinking of the participants as each follows and promotes the teachings of the madrassa holding the *Daras*. She adds:

> In addition to the teachings of Quran, other subjects are also made part of *Daras* and multiple meanings of words are reduced to a given meaning according to their code.[36]

Various means are used during *Darus* (plural of *Daras*), including special sound effects, multimedia, Arabic words and even smoke emitters, to create a surreal effect and capture women's attention. The remarkable impact of *Darus* organized by Al-Huda on women from prosperous backgrounds was on display in Karachi in 1999 when the halls of five-star hotels where the *Darus* were held were jam-packed. Attending these *Darus* became a fashion among rich women for some time, but the trend later faded. However, that is not to suggest that *Daras* has lost its influence on common women.[37] Madrassas continue to arrange such gatherings for women all over the country. According to Neelum, the reasons for popularity of *Daras* among women include family support or at least freedom from conventions family restrictions to attend *Daras*.[38]

Publications by militant organizations have also served as an effective tool to spread radicalization among women. Militant organizations use their publications to promote their ideology, and their narrow definition of jihad, in order to convince women to persuade male family members to join in.[39] There is a marked difference between the understanding of jihad of the average woman and the militants organizations. While the militants interpret jihad as the fight against infidels to spread the religion to every part of the

world, women largely see jihad as striving against cruelty, something which was corroborated by the findings of a survey conducted for this study. Scores of weekly, monthly and daily publications by militant organizations[40] seek to influence women's opinion in the name of religion, with a view to elicit sympathy and support for the militants. The publications play up news regarding the attitude of Western societies towards religious practices of Muslim women, particularly with reference to banning of the *Hijab*.[41] Because of a lack of access to reliable information, women can easily fall victim to such radical propaganda. Rex Hudson states that women, being more idealistic than men, may be more driven to engage in terrorist activities in response to failure and in order to achieve change.[42]

Male religious extremists, madrassas, and jihad organizations in Pakistan use women in large number as a vibrant tool to maintain their political power. However, compared to other Asian and Muslim countries, militant organizations in Pakistan have not enlisted women as active combatants.[43] Militants in Pakistan rely on women for protection to continue their activities and to hide from the authorities. According to Parveen, women act as "human shields" for male extremists in Pakistan, as they are not exposed to as thorough checking when accompanied by women and those clad in all enveloping head-to-toe *Burqas* can hide their identity and remain safe from checking by male security officers.[44]

In the last few years, however, there has been evidence of a growing role of women in militancy and religious extremism. Although women's large-scale and direct involvement in violent extremist activities has only been reported during the Lal Masjid/Jamia Hafsa episode, several other developments point to women indulging in terrorist activities along with male extremists. In 2005, Gul Hassan, a known leader of sectarian militant organization Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, revealed the militants' plan to use women to hit specific targets. Hassan trained his two nieces, who were students of mainstream schools in Karachi, as suicide bombers. The two girls, Arifa and Saba, were arrested by law enforcement agencies in Swat in 2005.[45]

Women have got involved in terrorist activities sometimes by choice and at other times they have been forced to do so. Arifa and Saba, the two girls from Swat who trained to be suicide bombers, said that they decided to become suicide bombers after listening to radical speeches of Fazlullah, leader of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan in Swat, broadcast through his illegal FM radio. However, the two girls said that later they learned that Fazlullah is a terrorist and felt embarrassed about their earlier decision to train as suicide bombers.[46] An 11-year-old Afghan refugee girl, Meena Gul, who escaped from a suicide bomber training camp in Bajaur Agency along with Farida, a granddaughter

of Swat militant leader Sufi Muhammad, stated that her two brothers and father were involved in torching and bombing of girls' schools in Bajaur and that one of her brothers trained female militants in Afghanistan. She said they were forcing her to commit a suicide attack, but she was reluctant to carry out such an attack and escaped from the camp when she got a chance.[47] Meena Gul's statement indicates a change in terrorist organizations' strategy and the use of women and children for carrying out terrorist activities, as the strategy of law enforcement agencies makes it difficult for male terrorist operating alone. Men accompanied by women are less likely to be checked at security posts. Defining the reasons for the use of women in militant activities, Cunningham states that terrorist leaders seem to recognize and make tactical use of women's appearance, gender stereotypes and assumed social roles. "The *invisibility* of women both within terrorist organizations, and particularly their assumed invisibility within many of the societies that experience terrorism, makes women an attractive actor for these organizations, an advantage that female members also acknowledge."[48]

Female terrorists can also use social norms to provide cover for their operations. "For many reasons, women are the preferred choice of secular groups when it comes to infiltration and strike missions. First, women raise less suspicion. Second, in the conservative societies of the Middle East and South Asia, there is hesitation to search a woman's body. Third, women can wear a suicide belt device beneath clothes and [may not raise suspicion as they] appear pregnant."[49] Another reason for terrorist leaders' use of females as combatants is their strategic role, in addition to the tactical one. Attacks by women draw significantly more attention from the media and public. "The use of women provides a new media dimension, which terrorist group intends for the media to interpret as an indicator of a worsening situation."[50] Additionally, women acting as terrorists can serve to shame men into joining the cause.[51]

However, Beyler contends that the motivation of any suicide bomber, whether male or female, is often open to interpretation, as the motives cannot be established with certainty. Some factors that come into play include *ideological* (religious or nationalist), *socio-economic* (including financial assistance given or promised to suicide bombers' families), and *personal* (specific traumas, desire for revenge, or possible psychological predisposition). Taking into consideration the case of Palestinian female suicide bombers, Beyler talks about two main factors: first, the religious belief in life after death, considered to be reachable through self-sacrifice and martyrdom in the name of jihad.[52] She also talks about bombers' motivation to make statements on behalf of their country, religion and/or terrorist organizations. The opportunity to have a status equal to men's, with equal rights and abilities constitutes a motivation for women's radical actions.

However, various authors (Beyler, 2004; Davis, 2006; Taylor, 2000; Shedd, 2006) consider that male terrorists are not likely to view the situation in that manner and will use females without according them a higher social status.

The increasing number of groups that use women and the number of women in combat roles indicates that for many terrorist organizations females bring tactical, strategic and operational advantages which may empower groups to continue to rely on them in the future. Corresponding counter-terrorism measures need to be adapted at the same pace, both at the intervention and prevention levels.

Very few studies and reports have been conducted so far on the subject of radicalization among Pakistani women and the few that have, emerged after the Lal Masjid standoff. *A Study on Women and Radicalization in Pakistan*,[53] by Sarah Ladbury and Maliha Hussein, is the only study that directly looked at the phenomenon of radicalization among Pakistani women. The study carried out for the United Kingdom's Department for International Development, is a combination of theoretical and empirical work and is structured as a series of hypotheses on women and radicalization. The study found that a vast majority of women are not radicalized, are not combatants, and remain deeply fearful of the possibility that their male relatives will join the ranks of militants. However, the study also found that women who have studied or attended Deobandi-oriented schools or study groups are more likely to hold extreme views, although those may not translate into radicalization. Women were found to be highly vulnerable to extremist violence.

It is in this context that the study of radicalization among Pakistani women becomes significant in the current militant and political milieu of Pakistan. The impact and different levels of radicalization in Pakistan among males is quite visible in the form of the ongoing militancy and extremism in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan (FATA), some settled districts of the Khyber-Pakhtunkhawa province and a few districts of South Punjab. The current empirical study is an effort to explore the views of Pakistani women regarding the key factors (cultural and social upheavals, religious and ideological bindings and political issues along with their personal views on jihad and life of women in Pakistan) that directly or indirectly promote radicalization.[54] However, it is difficult to determine the levels and patterns of radicalization among women in a patriarchal society like Pakistan due to the limited role played by women at societal and national levels.[55]

This background highlights the need to explore the impact of socio-cultural, religious and political factors on radicalization of women, through collecting their perceptions. Despite men being the principal earners, women in

Pakistan have a substantial role in domestic affairs as mothers, daughters, sisters and wives. It is accepted that the mother is the first source of learning for children, moral support for her spouse, and not only provide physical care to her children but also helps formulate their basic ideas.[56] This paper is an attempt to analyze the opinions of the women from both rural and urban areas in all parts of the country to determine trends and patterns of radicalization among women in Pakistan.

Research Methods

The present paper is based on both qualitative and quantitative primary and secondary data collection. Primary data acquisition was achieved through the development and implementation of a comprehensive questionnaire with a total of 57 questions, organized in four categories: personal information; religious and ideological information; social and political information; and cultural and social information. These primary data collection methods were enhanced through a process of secondary data collection in order to understand the context, causes and motives of radicalization at the national and international levels. For this purpose, a wide range of books, articles, websites, reports, journals, and newspapers were perused. The data questionnaires were coded and tabulated and were analyzed under SPSS 16.0 (Statistical Package for Social Sciences) software.

Sample Survey

A total of 446 women answered the questionnaire. A team of 11 field researchers collected data through the survey method between October 2008 and April 2009, under the supervision of a project coordinator. Out of 446 respondents, 357 belonged to urban areas and 89 to rural areas. As many as 385 respondents had received some kind of education, either from a madrassa or a mainstream educational institution, while 60 had no basic education. A more detailed outline of distribution according to these variables is given in the following pages. The field researchers implemented the survey with the support of local contacts in places where women work or study, such as educational institutions and offices. Special care was taken to create a balanced sample by involving women from different educational background, necessitating the support of local contacts in order to approach women at their homes, in marketplaces or on the street.

Constrains

The political and security situation of Pakistan was not stable at the time of the survey. The general elections had been held after a brief delay following

the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in December 2007. Politically, Pakistan was facing a number of crises, including the issue of sacking of superior court judges. A wave of protest that started on August 18, 2008 led to Pervez Musharraf's resignation as president. Protests continued until the restoration of the Chief Justice on March 16, 2009. The protests were a major constraint in the conduct of the survey. Acts of terrorism, including suicide bombings, and a terrorist attack targeting the visiting Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore also affected the security situation. Another reason for general unrest in the country at the political and security levels was the elected government's failure to meet the expectations of the people. During Gen Pervez Musharraf's dictatorship, people had demanded a democratic government to ensure social justice but the democratic government was seen to be failing to deliver on that count. Under the elected government's rule, terrorist activities and a prevailing economic crisis worsened. The government even failed to fulfill the basic needs of the people and this inability bred violence and lack of trust in the government and the political system.

These challenges were in addition to the security situation in Pakistan, dominated by an extremist militancy, a nationalist insurgency and terrorism related to sectarianism. As many as 1,593 people were killed and 3,049 were injured in 1,556 attacks in Pakistan during the survey period.[57] Though all provinces were facing a wave of terrorism, FATA and Khyber-Pakhtunkhawa were the most severely affected areas of the country. There seemed no end in sight to the insurgency in Balochistan. Almost all Baloch insurgent groups including Baloch Republican Army (BRA), Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), Lashkar-e-Balochistan, Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) and Balochistan Liberation United Front (BLUF) continued their activities during this period. The security forces also remained engaged in operations against militants in Swat and Malakand region during this period.

Analysis of Results

Profile of the Sample

The age of the respondents ranged from 15 years to 55 years. The largest age group, which constitutes 47.4 percent of the total sample, was between 20 and 35 years of age. Females younger than 20 years of age constituted 35.5 percent of the sample, while 17.1 percent of the respondents were older than 35. As the demographics of the sample suggest, the survey mainly sought to analyze radical tendencies among young female population of Pakistan. More than half of the respondents (55.3%) were single, 40.4 percent were married, 3.4 percent widowed and 0.9 percent divorced. The study observed a decline in the customary trend of early marriage among women, as a majority of girls

younger than 20 years were single and almost half of the respondents between the age of 20 and 35 years were unmarried.

Along with another positive trend in women's perception regarding the necessity of education and developing a career, girls marrying at an older age suggests a shift towards more flexible views regarding women's role in society. According to Erik Erickson's *negative identity theory*, the opportunity of achieving personal aspirations overrides the conscious assumption of a negative identity by an individual. The history of terrorism is full of examples of oppressed individuals, who, disappointed by the failure of their own dreams, assumed a negative identity by becoming terrorists.[58] Negative identity involves a vindictive rejection of the role regarded as desirable and proper by an individual's family, community or society. In these situations, individuals engage in terrorism as a result of feelings of rage and helplessness over the lack of alternatives. In other words, the chance to access education and through it realize one's potential and aspirations was one of the positive trends recorded.

Taking into consideration the different levels of education of the respondents, ranging from middle (eight grade) to masters level, it was observed that 78.6 percent of the respondents have some degree of education. Those who could neither read nor write represented 13.5 percent of the total sample, while four percent of the respondents were exclusively educated at madrassas and 3.8 percent had received education from both a madrassa and a mainstream institution. The ratio of access to education among the sample may be evidence of lifting of the traditional constraints regarding women's role in society, however it is not yet a result that can sustain a generalised countrywide conclusion on its own. Much work and state efforts need to be invested in order for all girls in the country to be able to access and receive educational services, especially when the issue remains highly problematic at societal level and militants continue to torch and bomb girls' schools on a regular basis.

A large section of the sample (35.9%) consists of students; the second sizable category (25.1%) is unemployed women, mainly housewives; women employed in the private services represent 21.5 percent of the sample; 12.8 percent of the respondents are government employees; and 4.7 percent have their own businesses. A considerable majority of the respondents (61%) is not involved in any income generation activity and has to depend on other family members for support, whereas 39 percent of the respondents have a job that provides them with an income.

Table 1 shows that 43.1 percent of the respondents belong to the province of Punjab. 18.7 percent to Sindh, 12.1 to Balochistan; 8.5 percent to Azad

Kashmir, 8.8 percent to Khyber-Pakhtunkhawa, 4.7 percent to Islamabad and 4 percent to Gilgit-Baltistan.

1: Breakdown of respondents' native areas

Region	Frequency	Percent
Punjab	193	43.1
Sindh	83	8.7
Khyber-Pakhtunkhawa	39	8.8
Balochistan	54	12.1
Islamabad	21	4.7
Azad Kashmir	38	8.5
Gilgit-Baltistan	18	4.0
Total	**446**	**100.0**

The survey also recorded whether the respondents live in the traditional joint family system that is believed to encourage among girls unquestioned adherence to social values and precepts.

2: Structure of respondents' families

Joint family system	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	330	75.7
No	106	24.3
Total	**436***	**100.0****
** Ten respondents chose not to divulge this information.* *** SPSS 16 software distributed the 10 missing values accordingly with the distribution of frequencies of the 436 answers given.*		

While observing the economic situation of the sample, 58.5 percent of the respondents stated that their economic condition has improved over time, 23.1 percent said their situation has remained unchanged and 17.8 percent considered that it had deteriorated. *(See Figure 1)*



Cultural and Social Life of Pakistani Women

The cultural and social context of Pakistan is characterized by a great diversity on the basis of financial backgrounds, regions, rural/urban divisions due to uneven socio-economic development and the impact of tribal, feudal and capitalist influences on people's lives. Patriarchal norms have gradually become stronger, especially in rural and tribal setting where local customs establish male authority and power over women's lives, while women from the upper and middle class, especially in the urban settings, gained relatively greater access to education and employment, thus assuming greater control over their lives.

However, social stereotypes persist and women are mainly seen as mothers and wives who are supposed remain at home, while men are expected to be the breadwinners. The perceived domestic role of women includes looking after children, cleaning the house, cooking, washing, etc, which generally deprives them of opportunities of exposure to enlightening experiences through socio-cultural interaction or accessing sources of entertainment.

Furthermore, women's contribution is taken for granted culturally and socially. Amid these conditions women assume predetermined roles, which keep them unaware of their intrinsic potential and capacities and lead to their developing a feeling of alienation. The cycle of unappreciated domestic work increases the vulnerability of those women to recruitment by militants who wish to remove the constraints placed on them but cannot do so. These factors create a context in which any prospect that breaks the monotonous routine becomes attractive and motivating, particularly when sacrificing one's life is advocated in the name of religion.

In this manner, the socio-cultural restrictions and exclusion of women has the potential to play a major role in their adherence to radical ideologies, which may lead to involvement in terrorist activity. This context makes an analysis of Pakistani women's social life, sources of entertainment, manner of spending leisure time, and relating to and communicating with friends extremely relevant. In the following pages certain essential aspects from the survey will be presented, mapping social habits and cultural behaviors, in order to identify trends of radicalization among the respondents.

Avenues of Entertainment

The respondents were asked which media sources they relied upon for entertainment in their leisure time. The largest section of the respondents, consisting of 243 women identified television as their favorite source of

entertainment. Other sources, albeit to a considerably smaller extent, included radio channels, newspapers, Internet and discussions with learned people. Combinations of two or more sources where preferred by approximately 30 percent of the women who participated in the survey.

3: Sources of entertainment for respondents

Source	Frequency	Percent
Television	243	55.6
Radio	13	3.0
Newspaper	19	4.3
Internet	4	0.9
Discussions with learned people	20	4.6
All of the listed sources	24	5.5
Any two of the listed sources	71	16.3
Three or more of the listed sources	43	9.8
Total	**437**	**100.0**

**9 respondents chose not to answer the question*
***SPSS 16 software distributed the 9 missing values accordingly with the distribution of frequencies of the 420 answers given.*

Asked whether they listen to music, 334 respondents (75.4%) replied in the affirmative and 109 (24.6%) in the negative. Of the women who said they do not listen to music, 40.7 percent cited religious reasons, 22.9 percent mentioned restrictions by parents or other family members, while 30.7 percent said some other reasons and 5.7 percent said that they abstain from listening to music on account of a combination of religious and family restrictions. *(See Figure 2)*

Figure 2: Respondent's reasons for not listening to music



Sources of Information

Determination of the sources the respondents rely on for gaining information is of obvious significance. One of the questions in the survey asked the respondents if they have a television set with or without a cable connection or a dish antenna at home.

The responses were expected to offer a glimpse regarding the extent to which women look for reliable information from different sources in order to form their opinions. The survey results show that 5.5 percent of the sample does not have a television set at home, 64.5 percent have a TV set with a cable connection and 30 percent have a TV set but no cable connection.

In terms of the most viewed television channels, 29.2 percent of the respondents said they prefer to watch entertainment channels, 16 percent prefer religious channels, and 14.5 percent news channels. The respondents who expressed their preference for a combination of two channels from the specified list of categories *(See Table 4)* represent 21.4 percent of the sample, while 12.6 percent said they prefer three or more types of channels.

4: Preference for categories of TV channels

Preferred TV Channel	**Frequency**	**Percent**
News	61	14.5
Entertainment	123	29.2
Religious	67	16
Sports	13	3.1
Any two of the listed categories	90	21.4
Three or more of the listed categories	53	12.6
Any other	14	3.1
Total	**421**	**100.0**
**25 respondents chose not to answer the question* ***SPSS 16 software distributed the 25 missing values accordingly with the distribution of frequencies of the 420 answers given*		

The Internet represents another important source of information. Of the respondents, 70.7 percent said they do not use the Internet, while 29.3 percent said they do. Only in Islamabad do the users outnumber the non-users. The majority of the respondents elsewhere in the country consists of women who have no access to this vital source of communication and information. Of the

respondents who said they use the Internet, 30.6 percent do it exclusively to gain information, 19 percent use it mainly to access entertainment websites and 15 percent to visit religious/Islamic websites. *(See Table 5)*

5: **Preference for Internet websites**

Preferred websites	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Informational	45	30.6
Entertainment	28	19
Religious/Islamic	22	15
Related to respondents' profession	11	7.5
Sports	3	2.0
Any two of the listed categories	27	18.4
Three or more of the listed categories	10	6.8
Any other	1	0.7
Total	**147***	**100.0****
**299 respondents said they had no access to the Internet.* ***SPSS 16 software distributed the missing values accordingly with the distribution of frequencies of the 147 answers given.*		

The Dress Code

Rooted in both cultural tradition and religious imperatives, the dress code of women in Pakistan is a matter worth considering in any study of radical tendencies. The example of provincial minister Zill-e-Huma, who was shot dead by a fanatic in Gujranwala because she had not covered her head, shows the extent to which the dress code, or lack of strict adherence to it, can stoke radical sentiments. Therefore, questions regarding preference for a specific dress code, reasons for that choice, and possible links with religion were asked.

An overwhelming majority of the respondents (87.5%) prefers the traditional Pakistani dress *shalwar kameez*, 3.9 percent women favor Western dress, and 8.6 percent like both types of dresses. Table 6 identifies the reasons for women preferring the traditional dress. As many as 30.4 percent of the respondents cited religious reasons, 28.8 percent culture and 12 percent said that comfort is the only reason for their choice of *shalwar kameez*.

6: Reasons for wearing *shalwar kameez*

Reasons	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Religious reasons	132	30.4
Culture	125	28.8
Comfort	87	20.0
Religious and cultural reasons	14	3.2
Cultural reasons and comfort	11	2.5
Religious reasons and comfort	3	0.7
Religion, culture and comfort	11	2.5
No special reason	51	11.8
Total	**434**	**100.0**
12 respondents did not respond to the question.* * SPSS 16 software distributed the 12 missing values accordingly with the distribution of frequencies of the 434 answers given.*		

Even though the biggest section of the respondents cited religion as their reason for wearing *shalwar kameez*, 54.2 percent of the respondents do not consider that wearing the Western attire has any repercussions vis-à-vis the religion. Nearly half of the respondents (49.5%) do not think that subscribing to the Western dress code amounts to a deviation from religion or creates any link or resemblance with the Western people. However, 34.6 percent of the women believe that such a dress choice can cause deviation from religion. The remaining 15.9 percent chose not to answer the question.

Cross-tabulation of the answers to the question regarding the dress choice and preferred means of information yielded an interesting finding. The largest section of respondents that consider Western clothes a deviation from religion watch religious TV channels (37 out of 142). The respondents who hold the opposite opinion mainly watch entertainment channels (69 out of 207).

The female population of Gilgit-Baltistan registers the lower score on radical tendencies, indicating that the region may be less vulnerable to radicalization. Only 5.6 percent of the respondent women belonging to this area consider that western dress code diverts one from religion. *(See Table 7)* The results of the survey shows that respondents from the province of Sindh present the highest tendency towards radicalization with the moderate answers at 38.8 percent, followed by Punjab, Balochistan, Islamabad and Azad Kashmir.

7: Impact of Western dress code: Geographical analysis of opinions expressed

Q. 26 Does following Western dress code create a link with Western people, and diverts one from religion?*							
	Province						
	Punjab	Sindh	Khyber-Pakhtunkhaw	Balochistan	Islamabad	Azad Kashmir	Gilgit-Baltistan
Yes	36.4	38.8	26.3	34.0	33.3	40.5	5.6
No	47.1	40.0	65.8	47.2	47.6	56.8	77.8
Don't know	16.6	21.2	7.9	18.9	19.0	2.7	16.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

**percentages*

Keeping in mind the emphasis on observing veil, a multiple-choice question was designed to determine the respondents' preferred sources for understanding the nature of veil. The responses show that the majority considers veil to be an important component of women's dress because of religious obligations. As many as 285 respondents described observing veil as a religious duty; 27 respondents did not consider it necessary; 26 described it as a matter of personal preference; 86 said that the choice should be made according to the situation and 12 respondents said they did not have an opinion in the matter.

Religious and Ideological Perception of Pakistani Women

Sources of Basic Religious Education

In Pakistani society, mainly in rural areas, religious education is considered more important for girls than mainstream education. Due to conservative societal norms, which bar women from venturing out of their houses, women in rural areas get their basic religious education at home, with the mothers playing an important role. However, parents prefer to send their daughters to madrassas for significant religious knowledge. This context was the reason for collecting the views of the respondents to discover the main influence on

girls' religious knowledge. As many as 30.1 percent of the respondents identified their parents as the source of their religious knowledge. Mainstream schools, madrassas, mosques or reading did not amount to a lot individually, but when combined they influenced religious education of 149 respondents. *(See Figure 3)*

Figure 3: Sources of religious education



A multiple-choice question was designed to record the respondents' preferred sources for understanding religion. The statistics show that 150 respondents rely on religious books; 94 prefer the teachings of their parents; 37 respondents cite clerics and religious teachers as their main source for understanding Islam; 26 say that common course books give them the necessary information about religion and its teachings; 90 state that their knowledge of Islam has more than two sources; 30 respondents consider that all of the cited sources have formed the basis of their knowledge of Islam; while eight respondents consider that their source for understanding Islam is not listed among the cited sources. *(See Figure 4)*

Figure 4: Sources for understanding Islam's teachings



The majority of the respondents (46.4%) believe that religious scholars, prayer leaders and cleric are the best servants of Islam in Pakistan. *(See Table 8)* These statistics show the influence of religious persons on society. According to Safdar Sial, a research analyst with PIPS, people have more trust in clerics because of traditional religiosity and a lack of trust in political leaders and social scholars.[59] This trust in clerics and religious scholars among women in absence of proper knowledge of religion points to the obvious risk—women may easily be manipulated and radicalized by those using the garb of religion to further their own agenda.

8: Segments actively serving Islam

Segment	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Religious scholars	197	46.4
Clerics/prayer leaders	61	14.4
Political leaders	31	7.3
Political and social scholars	39	9.2
Military rulers	27	6.4
Any other segment	60	14.2
Any two of the listed segments	5	1.2
Three or more of the listed segments	4	0.9
Total	**424**	**100.0**

**22 respondents did not respond to the question.*
*** SPSS 16 software distributed the 22 missing values accordingly with the distribution of frequencies of the 424 answers given.*

Asked whether a person can be a good Muslim even if he or she does not offer prayers five times a day, 64.9 percent of the respondents replied in the negative; 27.1 percent in the affirmative; whereas 8 percent did not have an opinion in the matter. Offering prayers five times a day is compulsory for all healthy Muslims. Prayer is one of the five pillars of Islam and Muslims believe that after death the first question a person would be asked would be about the frequency of his or her prayers. In that context, it is natural if people attach importance to offering of prayers and consider it a vital component of religion.

82.2 percent of the respondents believe that Muslims states are lagging behind other nations of the world. However, most of those who believe that Muslims are lagging are highly educated, whereas most of those who consider that Muslims are not lagging behind other nations are mainly illiterate or have education up to middle level. *(See Figure 5)*

Figure 5: Are Muslims states lagging behind other nations



Asked for the reasons for Muslims states lagging behind other nations, 41.4 percent of the respondents cited deviation from Quran and *Sunnah* as the main reason, rather than scientific and technological backwardness. Five percent of the respondents pointed the finger at Western control over Muslim states' economies, while 4.2 percent attributed the decline to lack of passion for jihad. *(See Table 9)* Fifty percent of the respondents who received their education from madrassas hold that deviation from Quran and *Sunnah* is the only cause for Muslims lagging behind other nations. Illiterate women and those educated up to middle level give the same reason for Muslim nations' lack of development. *(See Figure 6)* Curriculum at mainstream educational institutions and madrassas might be responsible for such opinions. But that cannot be the only reason as other aspects, such as more emphasis on religious education for women and blind faith in clerics' opinions regarding religious issues could also have a role. While explaining the influence of religion on women educated from mainstream educational institutions, Dr Samina Yasmeen argues in her PhD thesis that according to the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan and the Objectives Resolution, which serves as the preamble of the Constitution, "The underlying purpose of the vision of higher education would be guided by the Holy Quran and the *Sunnah* through inculcation of Islamic Ideology and moral values; and preservation of our religious and cultural heritage. The purpose of higher education is also to meet the socio-cultural and educational needs of the country."[60]

9: Reasons for Muslims countries lagging behind other nations

Reasons	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Scientific and technological backwardness	37	9.2
Deviation from Quran and *Sunnah*	167	41.4

Western control over Muslim states' economies	20	5
Lack of passion for jihad	17	4.2
Any two of the listed reasons	54	13.4
Three or more of the listed reasons	12	3
Any other	5	1.2
All of the listed reasons	91	22.6
Total	403	100.0

**43 respondents did not answer this question.*
*** SPSS 16 software distributed the missing values accordingly with the distribution of frequencies of the 403 answers given.*

Figure 6: Muslims states' decline is attributable to deviation from Quran and *Sunnah*



Views on Sectarian Differences

Sectarianism has a violent history in Pakistan. Although the government has taken several steps to curb sectarian violence, including the promulgation of anti-terrorism laws, deployment of security forces at sensitive areas and banning of sectarian organizations,[61] sectarian tensions are seen as a significant reason for the rise in the number of acts of terrorism in the country. As many as 104 sectarian-related terrorist attacks including seven suicide attacks were recorded in the year 2009 alone, which killed 446 people and injured another 587.[62] Assessing women's views about sectarian differences and religious divisions is vital to mapping trends of radicalization among women, as sectarian issues not only have the potential to fuel violence but can also be a significant factor in radicalizing mindsets. On account of a lack of access to firsthand knowledge on the subject, women can also be

manipulated by militants for their agenda in the garb of sectarian differences. The violent standoff at Lal Masjid in Islamabad is one example.

As many as 34.7 percent of the respondents hold that the difference among the various schools of thought in Islam, such as Deobandis, Barelvis, Shias, and Ahl-e-Hadith, is one of interpretation; 29.3 percent call it fundamental religious differences; and 26.4 percent refer to sectarian differences as diversity in approaches or thinking. *(See Table 10)*

10: Basis of differences among various Muslim schools of thought

Basis of sectarian differences	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Difference of interpretation	141	34.7
Fundamental religious differences	119	29.3
Differences of thinking and approach	107	26.4
Political differences	30	7.4
Any other reason	9	2.2
Total	406	100.0
40 respondents did not answer this question.* * SPSS 16 software distributed the 40 missing values accordingly with the distribution of frequencies of the 406 answers given.*		

A multiple-choice question was designed to record women's opinion regarding sectarian divisions among Muslims. As many as 123 respondents believe such difference are the outcome of ignorance, 97 state that such differences are not unexpected as Prophet Muhammad is reported to have said that Muslims would be divided into 73 sects; 90 respondents call the divisions harmful because they promote sectarianism and extremism; 41 women say they are necessary to keep Islam pure; whereas 34 women do not see them as a bad thing, saying that Islam allows difference of opinion. *(See Table 11)* The trends of sectarian radicalization are relatively more visible among the respondents who are illiterate, receive their education from madrassas, or receive part of it from a madrassa and the rest from a mainstream school, as 22.2 percent of the respondents educated at madrassas believe that religious divisions are needed to keep Islam pure. Whereas the percentage is quite low among the respondents educated to the middle, intermediate and higher levels of education, 13.3 percent of illiterate respondents and 11.8 percent of those educated both at madrassas and mainstream educational institutions hold that such divisions are necessary to keep Islam pure. *(See Figure 7)* According to a study by the International Crisis Group:

> Students at more than 10,000 seminaries [in Pakistan] are being trained in theory, for service in the religious sector. But their constrained worldview, lack of modern civic education and poverty make them a destabilizing factor in Pakistani society. For all these reasons, they are also susceptible to romantic notions of sectarian and international jihads, which promise instant salvation.

The curriculum of madrassas is also an important factor leading to sectarian radicalization among their students.

11: Respondents' views about sectarian divisions

Stance on religious divisions	Frequency	Percent
Outcome of ignorance	123	30.2
Expected as Prophet Muhammad is reported to have said that Muslims would be divided into 73 sects.	97	23.8
Harmful, as they promote sectarianism and extremism	90	22.1
Necessary to keep Islam pure	41	10.1
Not a bad thing as Islam gives right to difference of opinion	34	8.4
Logical/rational	20	4.9
Any other	2	0.5
Total	407	100.0

**39 respondents did not answer this question.*
*** SPSS 16 software distributed the 39 missing values accordingly with the distribution of frequencies of the 407 answers given.*

Figure 7: Sectarian divisions are necessary to keep Islam pure: Opinions on basis of respondents' level of education



Perception about Jihad

Jihad in its general sense means "striving or utilizing one's for any pursuit" but in the context of *Shariah* it is defined as "collective struggle by Muslims for the well-being of society and to establish the practice of divine laws, without any hesitation."[63] However, Muslim jurists have increasingly given a narrower definition of jihad, describing it as the fight against the enemies of the religion.[64] Furthermore, because of a lack of knowledge about religion and understanding of the Arabic language, as well as on account of a multitude of sectarian approaches and use of religion for political ends, people often cannot distinguish between right and wrong in matters of religion[65] and hold a wide range of opinions about the concept of jihad. It was in this context that several questions in the survey sought to explore women's opinion about the concept of jihad, as various militant organizations have their own definition of jihad to justify their aims and, much like men, women are also exposed to these various influences and are vulnerable to manipulation by such organizations.

The majority of the respondents considers jihad to be the fight against cruelty. *(See Figure 8)* The reason for that answer may well be the injustices women experience in society. According to Anis Haroon, "The rights of women are being seriously eroded, [and they are] threatened by violence, intimidation and terrorism."[66] Over half the respondents also consider that efforts for the implementation of *Shariah* are a form of jihad. *(Table 12)*

Table 12: Struggle for implementation of *Shariah* is also jihad

Opinion	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Yes	265	61.8
No	58	13.5
Don't know	106	24.7
Total	429	100.0
17 respondents did not answer the question* * SPSS 16 software distributed the 17 missing values accordingly with the distribution of frequencies of the 429 answers given*		

According to Farhat Taj, the Taliban have used the absence of a functioning justice system to further their extremist agenda and won considerable support by resolving people's disputes, purportedly according to the rules of *Sharia*h.[67] According to the survey findings, 81.5 percent of the respondents from Balochistan; 76.3 percent from Azad Kashmir and 76.2 percent from

Islamabad consider the struggle for the implementation of *Shariah* jihad. *(See Figure 8a)*

Figure 8: Views about meanings of jihad



Figure 8a: Is the struggle for implementation of *Shariah* jihad?
(Geographical analysis of opinions expressed)



Comparison among the opinions of respondents on the basis of their education yielded some interesting results. As many as 58.8 percent of the respondents who had received their education from both madrassa and mainstream schools disagree that striving for implementation of *Shariah* is jihad. *(See Figure 8b)* However, the majority of the respondents in all the other levels/modes of education characterizes efforts for implementation of *Shariah* as jihad. While commenting on the results regarding interpretation of efforts for the implementation of *Shariah* as jihad, Mujtaba Rathore said that the

opinion may be influenced by the fact that *Shariah* is directly linked to religion which is perhaps why women do not want to risk rejecting it for fear that that would be a sin.[68]

Figure 8b: Is the struggle for implementation of *Shariah* jihad?
(Opinion on basis of respondents' level of education)



Asked about the appropriate nature of armed jihad, the majority of women (228 respondents) expressed ignorance in this regard, whereas 139 respondents said armed jihad should be defensive and 54 said it should be offensive. Noticeably, the respondents from Balochistan and those with intermediate-level education were found to be more radicalized. As many as 40.7 percent respondents from Balochistan said that armed jihad should be offensive. More than half of the respondents (55.6%) with intermediate-level education stated that armed jihad should be offensive. However, the ratio of women favoring resort to armed jihad in an offensive manner remains small among madrassa-educated respondents. *(Figure 9)* According to Dr Rubina Saigol, the curriculum for mainstream schools prepared under the education policies during the regime of military rulers Gen Ayub Khan and Gen Ziaul Haq promotes militants' ideology and the syllabus of social studies is based substantially on jihad and militancy.[69]

Figure 9: Armed jihad should be offensive: Geographical analysis of opinions expressed



To a question whether the militants engaged in conflict in Indian-held Kashmir are waging jihad, 62.2 percent of the respondents stated that they are, whereas 16.8 percent said they are not. Compared to other provinces and regions, an overwhelming majority (89.5%) of the respondents from Azad Kashmir called militants' actions jihad. Such support in Kashmir does not come as a surprise. The perception that militants in Indian-held Kashmir are engaged in jihad is widespread in other regions as well. But a surprisingly low ratio of respondents from Gilgit-Baltistan (5.6%) considers the militants' actions in Kashmir jihad. *(See Figure 10)* The reason, as explained by Amir Rana and Mujtaba Rathore, may be that the people of Gilgit-Baltistan do not agree to their region's future being bracketed with that of Kashmir and the people of Gilgit-Baltistan are asking for the same constitutional rights as are available to the people of other provinces in Pakistan.[70] The people of Gilgit-Baltistan argue that their region has a history that is distinct from that of the state of Jammu and Kashmir and it was made part of Kashmir by the British through force.

Figure 10: Are militants fighting in Kashmir engaged in jihad?
Geographical analysis of opinions expressed



Although the overall majority of women consider the conflict in Kashmir as jihad, 59.6 percent believe that the unrest in Afghanistan is a war being waged for political aims. *(See Figure 11)* Perception of the Afghan war as a political war may have a couple of reasons. In the first place, the Taliban are fighting a war in the name of religion but for political gains. Secondly Pakistan does not have such historical ties with Afghanistan as it has with Kashmir. Thirdly, Kashmir is a struggle for freedom which has been going on since the independence of Pakistan and Pakistan has fought three wars with India. No such situation exists in Afghanistan.

Figure 11: Views about current unrest in Afghanistan



The Taliban in Swat began their activities in the name of religion and initially won the support of the people on the back of the masses' religious sensitivities. At one stage, women even donated their jewelry to Fazlullah, chief of the Swat Taliban, for what they considered a religious cause,[71] but gradually the Taliban lost support in their area of influence on account of perpetuation of fear among the local residents through *Fatwas* (religious edicts) and horrific violence, including beheadings, and public flogging and shooting of people.[72] A number of questions focused on ascertaining the opinion of women about the role of Taliban and gauging the impact of *Talibanization* on radicalization of women. A little less than half of the respondents (43.9%) said that Taliban are not fighting for Islam, 28.3 percent stated that they are, and the remaining 27.8 percent were said they did not know. A comparison of results across the various regions surveyed showed that 50 percent of the respondents from Balochistan consider Taliban to be fighting for Islam. This high level of support in Balochistan is in clear contrast to the opinion expressed in other provinces. *(See Figure 12)* While commenting on the results, Safdar Sial observed that there can be a number of reasons for the opinion expressed by the respondents in Balochistan, including lack of education, conservative traditional norms and a patriarchal mindset. Sial also stated that the women of Balochistan continue to believe that the Taliban are fighting for Islam mainly because they have never been directly exposed to Talibanization as the women from Khyber-Pakhtunkhawa have been.[73]

The women of Swat had soon rued supporting the Taliban. "The women who had donated cash and jewelry to Fazlullah in Swat were now regretting it, and had become vocal against the Taliban."[74] Although the majority of respondents from Balochistan consider that the Taliban are fighting for Islam, a substantial part (46.3%) of the respondents from the same province condemned Taliban attacks on schools, CD shops, barber shops and cinemas. *(See Figure 13)*

Figure 12: Are Taliban fighting for Islam?
(Geographical analysis of opinions expressed)



Figure 13: Opinion about Taliban attacks on different targets



Perception on Political Issues

A quick glace at Pakistani society indicates that women do not have a major role in making policy or decisions in the country and their views on political affairs are sought neither at the state level nor at the local level. The increasing involvement of women in different spheres of society is increasing women's importance in political affairs. The survey tried to capture women's views about the political system and the factors influencing their voting choice in order to gauge the tendency of radicalization on account of political factors. Asked about the considerations influencing their voting choice, 34.5 percent of the respondents said that they consider a candidate's education

and capabilities, 25.5 percent give importance to religion, 17.4 percent consider party affiliation and 12.7 percent cast their vote for a candidate who is from the same tribe or caste. *(See Table 13)* The results show that women now realize that they need educated and capable individuals to run the government. Religion continues to be an important factor in voting choice, but that is something to be expected after long years of lack of political participation as well as marginalization of women as a result of policies put in place by Gen Ziaul Haq's military regime in the 1980s. The women's desire to bring a change in the system and play a more active role is restrained by barriers of religion, culture, family norms and perception of stereotypical gender roles.

According to Farida Shaheed, during the Zia regime "Overt religiosity became the newly minted political coin for entrance, appointments and promotions. Textbooks rewrote history to project politico-religious groups as the champions instead of the opponents of Pakistani statehood; recitation of Quran [became] a mandatory prelude for all public functions. By the time Zia died in 1988, the forced imposition in the name of Islam had transformed into cultural norms, forever changing the social, political and cultural landscape… true citizens were male, Muslim, and largely Punjabi leaving citizenship of all others, especially women and minorities, somewhat suspect and needing to be proved."[75]

13: Considerations while casting vote

Considerations	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Candidate's education/ capability	149	34.5
Candidate's religion	110	25.5
Candidate's party	75	17.4
Caste/tribe	55	12.7
Three or more aspects	2	0.5
Two of this aspects	26	6
Any other	15	3.5
Total	432	100.0
** 14 respondents did not answer the question.* *** SPSS 16 software distributed the 14 missing values accordingly with the distribution of frequencies of the 432 answers given.*		

Two specific questions were asked about women's support for religious or other political parties. The results indicated that 115 women support any political party and 112 any religious-political party. *(See Figure 14)* As many as

47.7 percent of the respondents believe that religious-political parties should be given a chance to rule the county. *(See Figure 15)* This opinion identifies with the level of faith the respondents showed in clerics and religious leaders when 46.5 percent of the women surveyed stated that religious leaders are serving Islam in the true sense. *(See Table 8)*

Figure 14: Support for any religious or political party



**12 respondents did not answer either question.*

Figure 15: Religious-political parties should be given a chance to rule the country



** 14 respondents did not answer the question.*
*** SPSS 16 software distributed the 14 missing values accordingly with the distribution of frequencies of the 432 answers given.*

In view of the national security and political situation of the country at the time of the survey, it was deemed important to consider the views of women regarding the most important event in the country's recent history to try and understand the women's mindset. The statistics indicate that 37.8 percent of the respondents are influenced most by the assassination of former prime minister Benazir Bhutto, whereas 24.8 percent said that the Lal Masjid standoff and the subsequent security forces' operation was the most influential event for them. *(See Table 14)* It is not unexpected for women to be influenced by either of these events because of their obvious significance. But the choice for the two could also be evidence that, even in comparison with other vibrant issues and crises,

issues related to their own gender might have more appeal for women. Benazir Bhutto was an influential female voice not only in the national sphere but internationally as well, whereas female students had a key role in the Lal Masjid standoff. This emotional attachment for their own gender can be exploited by the militants to fuel feelings of grievances against the West and non-Muslims by citing mistreatment and denial of rights to Muslim women by the West. Various militant publications regularly report incidents of violence and imposition of restrictions against Muslim women in the West, mainly with regard to the use of *Burqa*. Such publications can influence women, constituting an important step in their radicalization.

14: The incident that influenced respondents the most

Incidents	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Benazir Bhutto's assassination	163	37.8
Lal Masjid standoff/operation	107	24.8
Security forces' operation in Tribal Areas	30	7
Security forces' operation in Balochistan	26	6
Sacking of superior court judges and judicial crisis	22	5.1
Any two of the listed events	51	11.8
Three or more of the listed events	25	5.8
Any other	7	1.6
Total	431	100.0
** 15 respondents did not answer the question.* *** SPSS 16 software distributed the 15 missing values accordingly with the distribution of frequencies of the 431 answers given.*		

While talking about the role of Pakistan in the US-led war on terror, 58 percent of the respondents stated that Islamabad's decision to assist Washington in the war on terror was not right.

Women's Perception of their Own Role in Pakistani Society

Even though women make up 53 percent of Pakistan's population, they are excluded from the decision-making process in a male-dominated society. In addition to the many discriminatory practices, they are not free to make vital decisions in their life and do not have equal access to the opportunities available to men. Violence against women, mainly domestic violence, is a big challenge in Pakistani society, claiming the lives of a large number of women every year. According to the findings of Parveen and Maria, Pakistani women

suffer discrimination and domestic violence, physical, mental and emotional abuse, honour killings, spousal abuse including marital rape, acid attacks and being burned by family members. Approximately 70 to 90 percent of Pakistani women are subjected to domestic violence in the garb of religious and societal norms.[76] They also state that domestic violence is considered a private matter in Pakistan, as it occurs in the family, due to which prosecution is often not carried out. However, the situation is starting to change with the increasing level of education among women in urban areas, growing awareness about rights and women starting to work outside their homes. But that change is only visible in the cities and women in rural areas continue to be deprived, not least because of financial discrimination associated with gender, but also as victims of inhuman customs such as *Karo Kari* and marriage to the Quran in order to keep family property within the family.

In this context, recording women's views on how they perceive their own role, position and opportunities in society is crucial. Being forced to live with constant restrictions and denial of any development or prospects can feed desperation and promote radicalization and extremism.

Despite clerics denying the importance of modern education for women and the Taliban bombing and torching girls' schools in Khyber-Pakhtunkhawa and FATA and limited education facilities available to girls in rural areas, 388 respondents accept that education is extremely important for girls, whereas 49 respondents do not consider education very important for girls. Six respondents were undecided and three chose not to respond. However, 33.3 percent of the illiterate respondents do not consider education very important for girls and say that they can survive without it. *(See Table 15)* Despite the influence of Taliban and Talibanization in Khyber-Pakhtunkhawa and conservative values in Balochistan, women of both provinces also favor female education and declare it extremely important. *(See Table 15a)* Commenting on the prevailing extremism in Pakistani society during a conference organized by National Commission on the Status of Women, Mukhtar Bacha stated that the Taliban had been created for neo-Wahabism. "In the history of Islam, it was for the first time that Wahabism had appeared in a militant form, and this had happened with the support of Arab money in order to destroy our liberal culture. The only way to empower women is to educate them.[77]

15: Importance of female education: Opinion on basis of respondents' level of education

Importance	Illiterate	Middle	Intermediate	Higher education	Madrassa	Madrassa and mainstream school
Extremely necessary	55%	86.7%	93.4%	97.6%	72.2%	88.2%
Not very important	33.3%	11.1%	4.4%	1.6%	11.1%	5.9%
Not important	5%	2.2%	0.7%		5.6%	5.9%
Don't know	6.7%				11.1%	
Not answered			1.5%	0.8%		

15a: Importance of female education: Geographical analysis of opinions expressed

Importance	Punjab	Sindh	Khyber Pakhtunkhaw	Balochistan	Islamabad	Azad Kashmir	Gilgit-Baltistan
Extremely necessary	93.8%	71.1%	89.7%	70.4%	100%	94.7%	100%
Not very important	4.7%	20.5%	7.7%	18.5%		5.3%	
Not important	1.5%	3.6%		7.4%			
Don't know		4.8%		3.7%			
Not answered	1%		2.6%				

Social stereotypes have cast women in traditional roles and social norms and clerics disprove of women working outside their home. A well known Urdu proverb holds *Zan, Zar, Zameen* (women, money and land) to be the source of every evil. With the gradually changing trends in urban areas, almost 20 to 30 percent women work outside their home in part- or full-time employment.[78] However, social pressures and clerics' influence have kept any change in check and women's lot has remained unchanged in rural areas and FATA.[79]

As many as 323 respondents said women should be allowed to work outside their home; while 99 opposed such opportunity. However, 51.8 percent respondents from Balochistan observed that women should not be allowed to work outside their home. *(See Table 16)* The results among the respondents from Balochistan can be explained on account of conservative customary norms, influence of clerics and limited opportunities for women. According to Zia Awan, in Pakistani society "male family members do not allow females to work or have a job [outside home] because it is considered a slur and shame for the family."[80]

16: Should women work outside their homes?
Geographical analysis of opinions expressed

Opinion	*Region*						
	Punjab	Sindh	Khyber Pakhtunkhaw	Balochistan	Islamabad	Azad Kashmir	Gilgit-Baltistan
Yes	77.2%	71.1%	59%	46.3%	90.5%	79%	100%
No	18.1%	18.1%	33.3%	51.8%	4.7%	18.4%	
Don't know	3.1%	9.6%		1.9%			
Not answered	1.6%	1.2%	7.7%		4.8%	2.6%	

In addition to the role of clerics and cultural norms, some government policies have also tried to restrict the role of women. Talking about the negative role of customs, Dr Arifa Sayeda Zehra stated that "when women were buried alive in Balochistan, some people from that province tried to defend the crime by saying that it was their 500-year-old tradition."[81] Dr Rubina Saigol has states that women became the main target of Ziaul Haq's policy of so-called Islamization, and along with changes in the banking and economic systems, a series of laws were made to limit the status and position of women. Even though the Hudood Ordinance was promulgated in 1979 to punish the offence of rape but it removed the distinction between rape and adultery. The 1979 Qisas and Diyat law covers all the offenses against human body. But instead of taking such offences as crimes against the state, this law provide the option of compromise as a private matter between the parties by providing for Qisas (retribution) or Diyat (blood money). Such laws suppressed women's voice and increased incidents of violence against them.[82]

In 2006, then president Pervez Musharraf revived the issue of women empowerment and presented a Women Protection Bill in parliament, increasing the number of seats reserved for women in legislature. The proposed law was opposed tooth and nail by the religious-political parties that argue that whereas studying the dictates of Islam in Quran and *Sunnah* is valuable for women, anything else may expose them to ideas that go against the basic canons of Islam.[83]

Women were asked questions to record their views about the Hudood Ordinance and to determine if they were even aware of or satisfied with these laws. According to the replies from the respondents, 63.5 percent said that they knew nothing about the Hudood Ordinance and the subject it deals with. Of the 36.5 percent who said they aware of what the law says, 53.7 percent said they have no opinion whether the law should be reformed or not, whereas 32.1 percent women said that the law should be reformed. *(See Figure 16)*

Figure 16: Views about reform of Hudood Ordinance



**155 respondents did not answer the question.*
*** SPSS 16 software distributed the missing values accordingly with the distribution of frequencies of the 296 answers given.*

Women's right of divorce has remained a very controversial and ambiguous subject of debate in Pakistan. Divorced women are considered to carry a stigma amid conservative cultural norms. Social attitudes in this regard are such that once a girl gets married and leaves her father's house for that of her husbands, she is told that only her coffin should leave her husband's house.[84] Women are therefore saddled with a disproportionate burden to make the marriage work, come what may.

While a man can dissolve his marriage by divorcing their wife any time he pleases, a similar right of divorce for women has been consistently and vehemently opposed by clerics, who argue that women have no such right in Islam. Asadullah Bhutto, chief of Sindh chapter of religious-political party Jamaat-e-Islami, stated in 2008: "Islam has not given women the right to

demand divorce. It is only the right of men to divorce women." He disagreed with recommendations made with respect to divorce by the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII)[85] and called them against the Quran and *Sunnah*.[86] Islam gives the right of divorce to men and right of *Khula* to women, who can, under a prescribed procedure, get a divorce through court after foregoing her claim to recovery of dower from her husband.[87] Amendments in law have allowed *Talaq-e-Tafweez* (assigning the right of divorce) to women. However a woman can only invoke that right, if at the time of marriage, a specific clause in the *Nikahnama* (marriage certificate) is marked off. However, either relatives of the woman or the person solemnizing the marriage usually cancels the clause by drawing a line across it. Women have no say in the matter. In this manner women are still largely denied the assigned right of divorce and are forced to go for *Khula* through court to dissolve their marriages.[88] In that context, it was deemed crucial to record the opinions of women regarding the right of divorce.

To the question, 46 percent of the respondents said it is good for women to have the right of divorce, whereas 37.2 percent considered that such a right for women was bad. The majority of the respondents who considered that a right of divorce for women was bad were largely illiterate, had education up to the middle level or were educated at madrassas. *(See Table 17)*

17: Women's right to divorce: Views on basis of respondents' level of education

Options	Intermediate	Middle	Illiterate	Higher education	Madrassa	Madrassa and mainstream school
Don't know	14.7%	27.8%	13.3%	11.2%	16.7%	23.5%
Good	53.7%	31.1%	40%	51.2%	38.9%	41.2%
Bad	30.1%	40%	46.7%	36%	44.4%	35.3%
Not answered	1.5%	1.1%		1.6%		

In most rural areas of Pakistan, and to some extent in urban areas as well, families are keen to marry in their own castes/tribes. The practice, strictly followed across the Sub-continent, is declining somewhat in the urban centres in Pakistan. But women are still not consulted for their choice before the marriage. Usually male elders of the family select a girl's husband and silence of the bride at the time of the marriage is assumed sufficient to imply consent. Families think that they will lose face if a woman in the family chooses her own spouse.[89] However, in urban areas of Pakistan resistance to marrying

outside one's own caste is on the rise and women are increasingly consulted in a meaningful manner. To a question in this context, 71.2 percent of the respondents that is it necessary that the spouses share the same religion and the same sect, whereas 19.8 percent did not consider that important. *(See Figure 17)* Under Islamic law, a Muslim woman cannot marry a non-Muslim man, whereas a Muslim man is allowed to marry a non-Muslim woman. So it may be that the respondents' views are dictated by religious dictates.

Figure 17: Spouses should have same religion and sect



** 16 respondents did not answer this question.*
*** SPSS 16 software distributed the missing values accordingly with the distribution of frequencies of the 430 answers given.*

Conclusion

Pakistan is a diverse society with deep-rooted religious and traditional norms. An over-zealous "Islamization" policy pursued by General Zia's regime in the 1980s has led to conservative religious aspects wielding considerable influence, particularly over women's lives. The conservative trend is gradually changing as more women get higher education and start working alongside men at every level. But the change is largely absent in rural areas where women continue to remain deprived, marginalized and discriminated against. It would require allocation of sufficient resources to stem the tide there. Pakistani women mostly stay at home and mange domestic responsibilities, such as children's education and household work. Several women played a crucial role in winning independence for Pakistan but were later sidelined or overshadowed by male figures in the name of religion and culture. Women get their basic education from home, where parents and grandparents, mainly mothers and grandmothers teach them basic religious beliefs and traditional norms. Due to veneration for all things associated with religion, people respect clerics, and prayer leaders and consider that they are

serving Islam and society in the true sense. Women believe that Muslim states are lagging behind other nations on account of failure to follow the teachings of Quran and *Sunnah.*

A substantial portion of women consider that the true meaning of jihad is to fight against cruelty and that it should be defensive in nature. The findings of the study indicate that the majority of the respondents educated from mainstream institutions consider the struggle for the implementation of *Shariah* to be jihad as well, whereas the respondents educated at madrassas or at both madrassas and mainstream institutions reject that notion, highlighting the need for a review of curriculum at mainstream institutions to remove ambiguity about issues such as the scope of jihad.

Women consider that the current conflict in Afghanistan is not jihad but a struggle for political ends. Despite women having a very limited role in politics and decision making, they increasingly realize their rights and responsibilities on the political front and the majority of the respondents said that they consider the education and other capabilities of candidates while casting their votes in elections. This trend has the potential to bring important changes in society at the political level, but religion continues to retain its influence over women's voting choices. Women in Pakistan generally lack knowledge about their rights and are susceptible to denial of rights and exploitation. Organizations working for women's development should launch programs to educate women about their rights and highlight the rights given by religion and the state.

From the findings of the survey, it cannot be assumed that there is large-scale radicalization among Pakistani women, but the results indicate that, on account of ignorance on certain societal, political and religious levels, women are vulnerable to both radicalization and exploitation in the name of religion. That vulnerability is extenuated because of lack of access to reliable sources of knowledge about religious issues and can be manipulate by elements with vested interests to further their own agendas. There is a strong desire among women to have their say in matters impacting their own lives and in the larger decision-making process. Persistent frustration born of a denial of opportunities to realize this desire, not being recognized as a stakeholder and continued exposure to prejudiced interpretations of religious dictates presents an explosive combination, where women's radicalization and possibly promotion of extremist ideologies and even involvement in terrorist activities does not seem to be a farfetched prospect.

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Litterateurs' Response to Extremism in Pakistan

Muhammad Amir Rana

Introduction

Extremism is defined in Pakistan in a number of ways, mainly in political, religious, and social contexts.[1] Political scientists consider it a political phenomenon, triggered by inequality, socio-economic injustices, and state policies. Clerics and religious scholars see the phenomenon in socio-political perspective but through religious prisms. They consider Talibanization to be an outcome of state polices, and the state's failure to enforce *Shariah* in the country.[2] They also express concern over Westernization of Pakistani society. These narratives are also reflected in public opinion[3] and policy makers follow the same discourse. Even the debate on the issue in the right-wing media reflects the same approach. The opinions of the segments that are among the first targets of extremism are of obvious significance. In Pakistan's context, these include religious and sectarian minorities, women, people associated with the entertainment industry, cultural expression, creative arts and literature. The Taliban in the Federally Administrative Tribal Areas (FATA), Malakand region and adjacent parts of Khyber-Pakhtunkhawa province first targeted women, confining them to their homes and banning their entry into markets. Girls' schools, shrines of *Sufis* (mystics), cultural heritage sites and music shops were torched and bombed. Violent activities and threats by the Taliban brought cultural activities and creative expressions, such as painting and poetry, to a halt. Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) initiated a number of studies in order to determine the opinion of the specifically targeted groups.[4]

The study under review is based on a survey, which aimed to analyze the opinion of intellectuals, mainly individuals associated with literature and creative arts, in order to assess their opinion about the reasons for the steady rise of extremism in Pakistan and what they consider can be done to counter that. One of the objectives of the study was to explore the potential role of Pakistani intellectuals to counter extremism.

Agreeing on a definition of who is an intellectual for the purpose of this survey was among the first difficulties encountered by the study. It was considered whether religious, political, economic and social thinkers should be included in the category. And if they are included how such diverse

opinions would be accommodated and treated scientifically within the limited scope of this study and what would be the criterion for the analytical process? It was also considered whether the views expressed by individuals associated with literature and philosophy would be representative of the collective intellectual thought.

The ability to understand complicated ideas defines intellect, while reason and analytical thinking are considered hallmarks of an intellectual.[5] Religious scholars, and experts associated with physical and social sciences are as engaged in intellectual activity as the people associated with creative arts. But measuring the opinion of all these segments as a single entity presents difficulties on account of diversity of disciplinary backgrounds. PIPS decided to conduct an open-ended survey to assess the views of creative artists, poets, novelists, literary critics and researchers associated with the philosophical discourse. The results of the survey were compared with the opinions expressed by social scientists and religious scholars on the issue of extremism in similar surveys and focused group discussions conducted previously by PIPS.

Litterateurs from five main urban centers in Pakistan took part in the survey. The surveyors tried to engage three generations of litterateurs in order to determine if age differences influence opinions regarding extremism. For the purposes of this study, litterateurs were divided into three categories or generations: the first generation included litterateurs who started writing prior to the creation of Pakistan or before the 1970s; the second generation comprised those who started writing between 1970 until late 1989; and the third-generation included litterateurs who engaged in literary work from the 1990s onward. The categorization is also important in the context of political history of Pakistan. The new state of Pakistan was in a phase of ideological and political transition until the late 1960s, the 1970s witnessed the breaking away of East Pakistan, the military dictatorship of Ziaul Haq and the Afghan-Soviet war, whereas the post-1990 era was characterized by transition to democracy, emergence of jihadi culture and the impact of the 9/11 attacks in the United States on Pakistan.[6] The classification was aimed at determining if the age factor had an impact on opinions in the political perspective. However, all first-generation litterateurs contacted for the survey declined requests to express their opinion. Therefore, this survey only reflects the views of second- and third-generation litterateurs.

In order to obtain accurate and comprehensive data, the survey forms were handed over to the respondents to allow them to answer the questions at their leisure. Zahid Hasan,[7] a field researcher with PIPS, observed that the majority of first-generation litterateurs questioned the utility of the survey. Reluctance

expressed by first-generation litterateurs is significant in so far as it records their belief that such studies would not add value to the fight against extremism.

The survey sample consisted of 50 litterateurs, 16 and 34 from the second and third generations, respectively. The survey was conducted in Lahore, Rawalpindi, Islamabad, Peshawar and Quetta as the five cities are considered hubs of litterateurs' activities. Litterateurs from other parts of the country frequently opt to settle there because of the opportunities and exposure to new literary trends. The participation of 10 female litterateurs in the survey helped gauge the input from both genders. The respondents unanimously declared extremism to be "a real problem" for Pakistani society. In addition to their literary credentials, the respondents were associated with various walks of life, including teaching, journalism and government service.

The respondents were asked the following five questions in the survey:

1. What is extremism?
2. What are the factors breeding extremism?
3. What is the reaction of litterateurs to extremism?
4. If the reaction is not positive, what could be the reasons?
5. What are your recommendations for eradicating extremism?

The survey findings yielded the following five definitions of extremism.

i. Imbalanced ideological attitudes and practices that lead to intolerance.

ii. A state of mind in which an individual regards himself superior to others.

iii. A constant struggle between a particular ideology being preached by the state and popular belief systems.

iv. A synthetic symptom born of a clash of interests between international powers and their policies of violence.

v. Socio-political and economic inequalities cause unstable behaviors, which at times lead to violence. Such patterns of behavior may be called extremism.

The five definitions largely revolve around two main factors: psychological and physical. Most of the respondents (76%) also talked about the cause and effect relationship between the two factors. The psychological aspect includes beliefs and ideologies, while physical dimensions encompass political, social

and economic disparities, interests of external powers and their pressure that influences individuals, states and collective behavior of a society. (*See Table 1*)

1: What is extremism?

No	Definition	Overall Percentage	2nd Generation	3rd Generation
1	Imbalanced ideological attitudes	48%	50%	47%
2	State of mind	26%	37%	20%
3	Behaviors caused by political, social and economic inequalities	16%	6%	20%
4	Behaviors born of state's oppression	6%	6%	6%
5	A synthetic symptom born of a clash of interests between international powers	6%	6%	6%

As many as 48 percent of the respondents defined extremism as imbalanced ideological attitudes, 26 percent called extremism a state of mind in which an individual regards himself superior to others and acts as an inquisitor. Importantly, 20 percent of third-generation respondents termed extremism as imbalanced behaviors caused by political, social and economic disparities. However, only 6 percent of second-generation respondents agreed to that definition.

More diverse opinions were expressed regarding the causes for the spread of extremism. (*See Table 2*) The largest section of the respondents described sectarianism and misinterpretation of religion as the main causes of extremism. A combination of factors including political oppression, class system, ignorance and sectarianism were considered the second most important factor.

2: Causes of extremism

No	Opinion	Overall Percentage	2nd Generation	3rd Generation
1	Political oppression; class system; ignorance	12%	12%	11%
2	Sectarianism; misinterpretation of religion	22%	38%	14%
3	Irrational behaviors	16%	19%	14%

4	External factors; clash of values between East and West	6%	-	6%
5	State's bid to promote a specific ideological identity	8%	13%	6%
6	Lack of cultural activities	6%	-	6%
7	Combination of opinion #1 & #2	18%	13%	21%
8	Combination of opinion #1 & #3	12%	19%	9%
9	Combination of opinion #2 & #5	3%	-	3%
10	Combination of opinion #1, #4 & #5	12%	-	12%

With regard to litterateurs' overall reaction to extremism, the largest section of the respondents was of the view that they are yet to react positively and in a significant manner to the rising wave of extremism in Pakistani society. As many as 18 percent opined that pro-establishment intellectuals have been supporting and promoting radical and extremist ideologies intentionally or unintentionally. (*See Table 3*) According to 32 percent of the respondents, the litterateurs have reacted positively and raised awareness about the crucial issue through their writings. The respondents believe that the three main factors responsible for lack of intellectuals' response to extremism are fear of oppression by state, which has at times tacitly supported extremists, failure to grasp the gravity of the issue and fear of a backlash from extremists.

3: Litterateurs' overall reaction to extremism

No	Opinion	Overall Percentage	2nd Generation	3rd Generation
1	Have not played a significant role	34%	38%	32%
2	Reacted positively through their writings and verbal communications	32%	31%	32%
3	Supported extremism intentionally or unintentionally	18%	31%	26%
4	Don't know	8%	-	8%

4: What could be the possible reasons for insignificant or no reaction?

No	Opinion	Overall Percentage	2nd Generation	3rd Generation
1	Fear of state's oppression	24%	13%	29%
2	Failure to grasp gravity of the situation	36%	31%	38%
3	Fear of extremists' backlash	6%	13%	3%
4	Don't know	34%	43%	29%

The respondents advocated a range of options to counter extremism. (*See Table 5*) The largest section of the respondents believed that extremism should be countered through promoting enlightened moderation, rationality and the idea of *Ijtihad*.[8] A significant number of respondents also favored eliminating social and economic disparities, strengthening democracy, promoting education and a culture of reading, a balanced role of media and declaring Pakistan a secular state in order to counter the spread of radical ideologies.

5: Recommendations to counter extremism

No	Recommendation	Overall Percentage	2nd Generation	3rd Generation
1	Enlightened moderation; promotion of rationality; *Ijtihad*	24%	25%	23%
2	Eliminating social and economic disparities; strengthening democracy	14%	13%	14%
3	Strengthening a culture of reading and increasing the literacy rate	9%	-	9%
4	Balanced role of media	6%	6%	6%
5	Promoting cultural activities	8%	6%	8%
6	Declaring Pakistan a secular state	8%	13%	6%
7	Launching an organized movement	6%	6%	6%
8	Liberation from external influence	6%	6%	6%
9	Combination of recommendations #1 & #2	12%	18%	6%

10	Combination of recommendations #1 & #3	3%	-	3%
11	Combination of recommendations #1 & #5	3%	-	3%
12	Combination of recommendations #1 & #6	4%	6%	3%
13	Combination of recommendations #2 & #5	6%	-	6%

Findings of the Survey

The survey yielded the following findings:

1. The respondents unanimously declared extremism in Pakistani society a crucial issue.
2. Opinions regarding the causes spawning extremism can be classified under three main categories:
    - Misinterpretation of religion
    - Political, economic and social inequalities
    - Lack of rational and logical behaviors

    It is important to comprehend the cause and effect relationship among these aspects at the policy level.
3. Opinions were almost equally divided on whether intellectuals have responded appropriately to extremism or not, signifying confusion among litteratures about their role on this crucial issue. A considerable segment wants to limit their role as intellectuals to avoid being targeted by extremists, while others are willing to play an active role to counter extremism.
4. Recommendations to counter extremism largely revolve around ideological and empirical efforts, while a very small section of the respondents suggested political initiatives to deal with the threat. Only 6 percent of the respondents supported the idea of launching a mass movement to educate public opinion and a similar number favored freedom from foreign influence.

Comparison with Opinions Expressed by other Segments of Society

In 2008-09, Pak Institute for Peace Studies consulted several experts in the fields of political science, international relations, faith studies, science, media and human rights. Their opinion was sought through detailed discussions and a survey on the issues of terrorism and extremism.[9] Out of 16 experts, 11 agreed that extremism is a political phenomenon; only three looked at extremism as an ideological struggle, whereas two experts linked extremism to misinterpretation of religion. The experts also differed on what they considered to be the reasons that breed extremism. Most of the social experts pointed to political, social and economic disparities as the main causes of extremism.

A similar study[10] conducted among teachers of madrassas by PIPS in 2009 demonstrated that the majority of clerics and madrassa teachers declared extremism a political issue. However, they considered that regional and international political issues were more important. A large number of madrassa teachers were of the view that extremism can only be countered if Pakistan distances itself from the US-led war on terror. Very few discussed the religious and ideological aspects of extremism.

Public opinion is shaped by the media, and religious and political leaders and ultimately influences the political trends of a society. A number of public surveys suggest that most of the Pakistanis disapprove of terrorism. A survey conducted by Gallup Pakistan in April 2009 found that 51 percent Pakistanis supported military operations against the militants in the country's tribal areas bordering Afghanistan, 36 percent did not offer any opinion and only 13 percent opposed the military action.[11] As many as 35 percent of the respondents held the United States responsible for a spike in the number of terrorist attacks in Pakistan and 31 percent blamed the Pakistani government. Such public views can be influenced by the media, and political and religious parties. But signs of confusion are discernable in the public opinion regarding extremist and violent groups. A survey conducted by PIPS[12] in 2008 to map the political behavior of the masses revealed that though more than 56 percent Pakistanis acknowledge the services of religious scholars for Islam, over 53 percent oppose their political role.[13] Public opinion considers the provision of justice and basic necessities as crucial for countering extremism. Table 6 captures the variety of opinion on the issue of extremism—assessed through a number of surveys—among various segments of Pakistani society.

6: Diversity of opinions

No	Segment	Extremism	Causes	Proposed Solutions
1	Litteratures	Imbalanced ideological attitudes	Misinterpretation of religion and lack of rational behaviors	Efforts on the intellectual front
2	Social scientists	Political phenomenon in which internal political, social and economic factors are more important	Political, social and economic disparity	Proper policy making
3	Clerics/ religious leaders	Political phenomenon where external factors are also important	Involvement of state	Close ties with Muslim world (*Ummah*) and disassociation from the West
4	Public opinion	Political phenomenon	Involvement of state and external forces	Justice and provision of basic necessities.

The opinion, particularly with regard to countering extremism, is so diverse that it may not lead to an effective response. Whereas the intellectuals lay more emphasis on ideological and empirical aspects for countering extremism, social experts and religious scholars vehemently assert that that is not an effective solution. More comprehensive studies and analysis may yield a more clear answer.

Notes

[1] For details, see Defining Radicalization in Pakistani Context, A Report, Conflict and Peace Studies, Volume 2, Issue 1, 2009, Pak Institute for Peace Studies, Islamabad, Pakistan.

[2] Muhammad Amir Rana, Mapping the Madrasa Mindset, Conflict and Peace Studies, Volume 2, Number 1, Jan-Mar 2009, Pak Institute for Peace Studies, Islamabad, Pakistan.

[3] A survey conducted by Gallup Pakistan in April 2009 endorsed the fact. http://www.gallup.com.pk/Polls/28-4-09.pdf. Last accessed April 20, 2010.

[4] A study by Saba Noor and Daniela Hussain, assessing radicalization among women, is included in the current issue.

[5] Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary, Second Edition, Cambridge University Press, 2005.

[6] For details, see Class and Politics in the Radicalization of Pakistani State and Society, by Robina Segal(Heirich Boll Stiftung Publication Series on Democracy, Volume 16, 2009)
She analyzes the history of conflict among the religious and political elites and military establishment and the impact on society.

[7] Zahid Hasan is a novelist, columnist and poet. PIPS acknowledges his commitment to conduct this survey in a short period.

[8] According to Encyclopedia Britannica, *Ijtihad* is one of the sources of Islamic jurisprudence, for the independent or original interpretation of problems not precisely covered by the Quran, *Hadith* (traditions concerning the Prophet's life and utterances), and *Ijma* (scholarly consensus). Only adequately qualified jurists are entitled to exercise such original thinking, and those who do are termed *Mujtahids*. http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/282550/ijtihad

[9] Defining Radicalization in Pakistani Context, A Report, Conflict and Peace Studies, Volume 2, Issue 1, 2009, Pak Institute for Peace Studies, Islamabad, Pakistan.

[10] Muhammad Amir Rana, Mapping the Madrasa Mindset, Conflict and Peace Studies, Volume 2, Number 1, Jan-Mar 2009, Pak Institute for Peace Studies, Islamabad, Pakistan.

[11] Gallup survey report, April 2009. http://www.gallup.com.pk/Polls/28-4-09.pdf. Last accessed April 20, 2010.

[12] The survey targeted two groups: registered political party workers and voters. A total of 934 interviews were conducted across the country with a view to identify the key determinants of political behavior in Pakistan. The results can be accessed at http://www.san-pips.com/index.php?action=san&id=43

[13] A PIPS Report, Elections 2008: PIPS Survey Challenges Conventional Wisdom, http://www.san-pips.com/index.php?action=san&id=43

Notes on Contributors

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Muhammad Amir Rana is the founder of Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), established in January 2006, and has since been working as Director at the institute. Besides presenting numerous research papers at international fora, he has also authored a number of books including *A to Z of Jihad Organizations in Pakistan* and *Seeds of Terrorism*.

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Conflict and Peace Studies is a quarterly journal published by the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies. The journal is aimed at dissemination of research by the Institute in its key mandated areas. It also provides a forum for those around the world undertaking research in the areas of:

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The title of the submission may be center-aligned and all headings and sub-headings left-aligned. All headings and sub-headings, as well as the title, may be in lower case but first letter of the first word and of all other words except prepositions, articles, and coordinating conjunctions may be capitalized. Titles and subheads may not be underlined or italicized.

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and issue numbers, and, the page number/s referred to. Names of the books and journals cited may be italicized but may not be in quotation marks. Names of the articles cited may be in quotation marks but may not be italicized.

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LAST ISSUE

Abstracts

Evolution of Suicide Terrorism in Pakistan and Counter-Strategies

Khuram Iqbal

In the wake of the US-led war on terror, Pakistan became one of the prime victims of suicide terrorism. It is described as world's third worst-hit country in terms of suicide attacks, after Iraq and Afghanistan. In the first quarter of 2008, Pakistan even surpassed war-torn Iraq and insurgency-hit Afghanistan in term of the number of suicide bombings. Anecdotal evidence suggests that suicide attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq have primarily been motivated by the presence of foreign forces in the two countries. But the phenomenon has emerged in Pakistan though the country is not under foreign occupation. This paper seeks to develop an understanding of the complex phenomenon of suicide terrorism in Pakistan.

Terrorist Attacks and Community Responses

Amjad Tufail

One of the main objectives of terrorists worldwide is to create panic and shake people's confidence in the state. The psychological effects of terrorism go beyond the immediate victims of an attack and can cause complex and diverse post-traumatic stress disorders. This study—based on public perspective ascertained through a survey conducted in three Pakistani cities—assesses the psychological effects of terrorism on people's attitudes. It reveals alarming impact of terrorism on children, as well as on adults' behaviour, and underlines the significance of the psychological impact of terrorist attacks on a population. The findings also underscore the need for the news media to reflect on the pattern of its coverage of terrorist attacks. The study also analyzes the social discourse on anti-terrorism efforts and advocates that it should inform the state's counter-terrorism strategies.

Radicals' Influx into Border Areas: Impact on Inter-state Relations in South Asia

Muhammad Amir Rana

South Asia is in the grip of an assortment of conflicts, ranging from territorial claims and other inter-state conflicts to internal insurgencies and separatist movements. The main conflicts in South Asia have centered on the states' borders and have led to the emergence of cross-border networks of separatist and insurgent movements. Initially seen as a reaction to political, social, and economic deprivations, most of these movements have absorbed radical and extremist ideologies—both Islamist and leftist—mainly on account of the states' internal weaknesses and the protracted nature of border disputes. Radicalization is now also spreading to the border regions where such movements were earlier absent, which could have grave implications for the ties between bordering states. The states in South Asia generally lack confidence in each other to form joint mechanisms to counter common threats. This paper suggests that a regional approach is indispensable to deal with the growing threat of radicalization along the international borders in South Asia.

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