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*Radicals' Influx into Border Areas: Impact
on Inter-state Relations in South Asia*

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Numerous insurgencies and separatist movements have erupted in South Asia since the end of British rule in 1947. These conflicts have taken a heavy toll on infrastructure and human lives, fuelled humanitarian and economic crises and increased mistrust among South Asian states. As many as 23,098 people lost their lives in conflicts in South Asia in 2008 alone.¹

Besides inter-state disputes, conflicts have had their roots in religious, ethnic, communal and caste issues. The major conflicts in South Asia have centered on the states' borders. The Taliban movement in Afghanistan and Pakistan; the Assam, Tripura, Bodoland and Naxalite movements in India; the Rohingya liberation movement in Myanmar;² Kashmir liberation movement across the Line of Control (LoC);³ the Baloch separatist movement in Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan; and, the Uighur separatist movement in China⁴ were all born and flourished along border areas. These movements have cross-border networks and structures, and with the South Asian states entangled in border disputes with their neighbors, these conflicts have bred inter-movements ties as well.

As the South Asian states engage in border disputes with their neighbors, inter-movement ties have emerged with cross-border networks and structures. Most of the separatist and insurgent movements have come under the influence of radical ideologies and some have been transformed into radical movements.

Initially, most of the insurgent movements in South Asia were born as a reaction to political, social, and economic deprivations. Wrong decisions by the leaders of these states reinforced the movements. Rob Johnson considers four factors responsible for fueling conflicts: absence of any tradition of democracy, corruption at the local level, poverty, and lack of education. He emphasizes that these factors are common in all South Asian conflicts despite the great diversity in the region.⁵ Religion remained a potent source of conflict and along with ethnic and cultural identities provided the initial base for insurgent movements, before radical ideologies took over many of these movements.⁶ Separatist or insurgent movements have a tendency to absorb extremist ideologies. It helps to justify their objectives, including violence and sabotage activities, and makes their agenda appealing. In this context, the primary objective of this paper is to explore:

1. General features of separatist and insurgent movements in border regions of South Asia.
2. The motivation of extremist forces' concentration in the border areas.
3. Extremist groups' focus on the undisputed borders and the threats this emerging phenomenon poses.
4. Impact of radicalization and movements on inter-state relations.

A comprehensive review of the historical, political, ethnic, social, and cultural backgrounds of the separatist and insurgent movements is not possible in a brief paper. However, the current border disputes and violent movements are briefly discussed to explain the influx of separatists and insurgents into border areas.

Some of the terms used in this paper need to be explained first.

A separatist movement usually means a group within a country which wants to separate its 'rights and land' from the rest of the country to form an independent state.⁷ In this paper, this term has been used in the same context for all the movements striving for independence on religious, ethnic, social or cultural

basis, including the movements in Kashmir, Assam and Tripura and those of the Rohingyas, Bodos, Uighurs and Tamils.

Insurgency, in the general sense, is a struggle between a non-ruling group and the ruling authorities, in which the former consciously applies political resources—organizational skills, holding demonstrations and propaganda—and instruments of violence, or both, to get their social, political and economic rights or to establish legitimacy for their own political system, which the ruling authorities consider illegitimate.⁸ In South Asia, Taliban, Naxalites, the Islamist jihad movements in Pakistan and Bangladesh, and the Maoist rebel movement in Nepal can be categorized as such.

The term extremism denotes rigidity in one's stand on religious, political or social grounds.⁹ The term radicalization is used to refer to expansion of the ideological support base along border regions, in order to force governments to adopt the movements' agendas through violent activities, demonstrations or activism. The Sangh Parivar in India, and the Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan are radical movements, which emphasize on reversion of society to the ancient pattern of Hinduvata and Islam, respectively. Extremism and radicalization are tendencies that can be found among insurgent and separatist groups.

At present, South Asia is beset with multiple border disputes, which are widely seen as acting as a magnet for separatist and insurgent movements (*See Annex*). Inter-state conflicts in South Asia, based on border disputes, have a crucial connection with the emergence of radical and extremist movements in these areas. The situation in the Kashmir region is a direct outcome of the boundary dispute between India and Pakistan. Both countries had agreed in the United Nations to hold parts of Kashmir under their respective control until the dispute is resolved. Unfortunately, the two countries have failed to reach any consensus on the issue, which has been an instrumental factor in the separatist movement in Kashmir.

The separatist movements in the Indian states of Assam and Tripura have their roots in the massive influx of different ethnic populations into bordering towns from East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) following the 1971 partition from West Pakistan. Bangladesh, which has the longest land border with India, has no major boundary dispute except regarding 140 acres of a river island, where the two countries have agreed to maintain status quo for now.¹⁰

Conflicting claims on the resource-rich waters of Bangladesh could cause confrontation with Myanmar and India. A survey by an Indian ship for exploration of gas and oil in January 2009 and a similar attempt by Myanmar in November 2008 indicate potential flashpoints.¹¹

The main irritant between Bangladesh and India is border management, principally regarding a mechanism to control the influx of immigrants. These immigrants mainly belong to the same ethnic groups settled on both side of the border. The easy cross-border flow of immigrants has allowed the Assam, Tripura, Bodoland, and Meghyla separatists in India to maintain their structures and networks across the border in Bangladesh. Moreover, rising discontentment in the Chittagong Hills Tracts (CHT) in Bangladesh, where an accord in 1997 had sought to end a violent movement by the native tribal people, has once again become a matter of concern. The Rohingya Muslim separatists in Myanmar, operating from Bangladesh, are a major irritant in Bangladesh-Myanmar ties.¹²

China, India, and Pakistan have some of the major land-boundary disputes in the world. These disputes have already triggered several wars.¹³ China and India both have long-standing claims over the province

of Arunachal Pradesh, in the east, and Aksai Chin, in northern Kashmir.¹⁴ But these borders areas are not facing any violent separatist or insurgent movements.¹⁵

India and Nepal have a dispute over a 75 square kilometer territory called Kalapani, but the main problem between the two countries is poor border control systems. Nepal, a land-locked country, is dependent on India for trade and business but poor border controls have provided opportunities to left-wing and Hindu radical movements to export their ideologies and to maintain considerable inter-structural relationship.¹⁶

India and Bhutan have a soft border and poor border control is an issue there as well. India has repeatedly accused Bhutan of aiding separatists by allowing them to establish training camps on Bhutanese soil for launching operations into India.¹⁷ The Ngolops, armed Nepalese dissidents, also pose a serious threat to the security of this Himalayan kingdom. India has the same complaint against Myanmar, with which it shares a 334-kilometer border.

Pakistan has a boundary dispute with Afghanistan over the controversial Durand Line, the 2,250-kilometer border between the two countries. The boundary line with Afghanistan was drawn in 1893 by Sir Mortimer Durand, then foreign secretary of British India, and was acceded to by the Emir of Afghanistan the same year. Afghanistan claims that Durand Line had been imposed by a stronger power upon a weaker one, and favors the establishment of a cross-boundary Pashtun state, to be called Pashtunistan or Pakhtunistan. On the other hand, Pakistan, as the legatee of the British in the region, insists on the legality and permanence of the boundary. The tribes living on either side of the border largely do not recognize Durand Line as international boundary.

The two countries did not have any major armed conflict over the border dispute and did not deploy regular army units there until after 9/11. Pakistan deployed its regular forces at the border for the first time—to stop infiltration of Al Qaeda and Taliban remnants—when US-led coalition forces invaded Afghanistan to oust the Taliban regime from power.

Afghanistan has also deployed its troops on the border and small-scale armed clashes have now become the norm. The presence of Taliban and Al Qaeda on both sides of the border has thrust the area into international limelight. The influx of Taliban has strained bilateral relations and the Durand Line dispute remains an issue of concern in an unstable region.

Although Pakistan does not have any boundary dispute with China and Iran, Baloch and Uighur separatist movements have remained matters of concern for Iran and China, respectively. The Baloch separatist movement is equally worrying for Iran and Pakistan, while China is worried about the Uighurs' links with Pakistani jihad groups.

These separatist and insurgent movements have had a direct bearing on increased tensions on borders in the region. India has continuously blamed Bangladesh,¹⁸ Bhutan, Pakistan and Myanmar for insurgency on its borders. Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka have leveled the same charge against India.

Pakistan has faced similar attempts at an insurgency by the Pashtun nationalist movement on its western border with Afghanistan. However, such efforts have failed to create any serious problems for Islamabad despite strong backing by Kabul for its greater Pashtunistan agenda. Until 9/11, there was no serious dispute on the Pak-Afghan border and neither country felt the need to deploy regular forces along Durand Line. This 'soft border' had provided great strategic support to the Afghan Mujahideen during

the Soviet-Afghan war. The Mujahideen used Pakistani tribal territory along the border for recruiting and training fighters and getting logistic support from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the US and other Western countries.¹⁹

But the situation changed after 9/11 when US-led coalition forces attacked Afghanistan to eliminate Al Qaeda and their Taliban supporters, prompting the militants to return to their old hideouts in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).²⁰ They re-established their structures and networks in these areas and, for the first time since gaining independence in 1947, Pakistan deployed regular forces to stop their infiltration and activities. The same ethnic Pashtun tribes are settled across Durand Line. It is not uncommon for some houses to have some rooms on the Pakistani side and others in Afghan territory. A similar situation prevails on the Bangladesh-India border where people on both sides of the border are tied in social, religious, cultural, economic, and familial relations. Other examples could be found on the Bangladesh-Myanmar, Bhutan-India and the Pak-Afghan border region, in Balochistan, as well.

The division of the same ethnic and religious population across the borders has created problems on international borders in the region. It has not only made border security difficult but also forced states to give concession to these ethnic groups to keep their relations intact. It may help to boost trade and cultural ties between states, but at the same time provides occasion for flourishing illegal trade, as well as human and drug trafficking. On the Pak-Afghan border, drug lords and weapon smugglers have created a safe haven for their activities.²¹ The same scenario is on display along the Bangladesh-India border where human trafficking has become a major problem.²²

Tensions on these borders also have serious implications for nuclear proliferation. In the Indian state of Jharkhand, near Nepal's border, smugglers' networks are known to be involved in trafficking of uranium.²³ In February 2008, Indian police foiled an attempt to smuggle four kilograms of uranium to Nepal.²⁴

During the Taliban regime, Pakistani tribal areas were massively influenced by the Taliban. Local tribesmen were inspired by the system in force across the border in Afghanistan, and some groups also emerged in the tribal areas to enforce a similar system there. Initially, these groups could not gain much strength but after the Taliban regime fell in Afghanistan, Al Qaeda and the Taliban started supporting them financially, ideologically, and in terms of expertise in terrorist activities. Now, the Taliban have partly enforced their version of *Shariah* in North and South Waziristan, Bajaur, Khyber, and Mohmand agencies of Pakistan's tribal areas. Now they are marching towards the settled areas and the local administration seems helpless in the face of advancing religious extremism.²⁵

Separatist movements have also been radicalized on the borders of Bangladesh, India and Myanmar. Because of the Rohingya liberation movement's link to the Afghan jihad, radicalization penetrated its ideology. It has now become a wholly radical movement with an agenda for the creation of an Islamic state. The movements mentioned above have generally emerged out of historical, political, social and economic factors, and later come under the influence of radical religious ideologies.

The Indian ethno-political separatist movements of Assam and Tripura are also in the phase of transformation after the emergence of parallel Islamic separatist movements. These Islamic movements have the same separatist agenda, with the condition that the new states would be Islamic. Seven separatist groups were operating in Assam until 1998, all of them with a nationalist agenda, but now six Muslim separatist groups have also been established there.²⁶ These movements are influenced by

Bangladesh-based jihad groups like Jamiatul Mujahideen and Harkatul Jihad-e-Islami.²⁷ The same outfits have influence over the Rohingyas liberation movement and have links with Afghan jihad groups.

Despite common agendas, parallel movements are relatively less tolerant of each other than separatist nationalist movements. This factor usually plays an important role in the emergence of sectarian and communal divisions and provokes clashes among different groups. Two major riots, where the separatist groups played a major role, have occurred on the India-Bangladesh border in West Garo Hills district of the Indian state of Meghalaya since 1992.²⁸

Similar trends and crises are visible in the Kashmir liberation movement. Before the second phase of the insurgency started there in the late 1980s, the command of the insurgent movement was in the hand of the nationalists, mainly the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF). The group had moderate religious views. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, radical jihadi organizations took over. These groups started radicalization in Indian-held Kashmir, and have now developed their own support bases in the disputed region. Their leaders claim that they are capable of continuing their activities for long without any external support.²⁹

The trend of parallel movements can also be seen in Balochistan province of Pakistan and Xinjiang, the Muslim majority province of China. In Balochistan, the command of the insurgent and separatist movement remained in the hands of nationalist groups, which had a leftist ideology. But in the last two years, a parallel Islamist separatist movement, called Jundullah,³⁰ came into existence. This indicates a major shift in the region. Jandollah has the same nationalist agenda, creation of independent greater Balochistan, with an ideological difference. The group has links with Pakistan-based Sunni sectarian organization Sipah-e-Sahaba, the Taliban, and probably Al Qaeda.

The Iranian border province of Sistan-Balochestan is a major target of Baloch separatist movement, where the radicals, including Jundullah, seem to have successfully planted the seed of sectarianism. That may reduce the influence of the leftist separatist groups in Balochistan, besides triggering a full-scale insurgency and sectarian rift on both sides of the border.

The separatist movement in Xinjiang also faces a similar fate, where Islamist radical groups backed by Al Qaeda seem to be gaining control of the movement.

Islamic radical trends have not only influenced the insurgent and separatist movements in South Asia but also affected left-wing radical ideologies. Almost all insurgent and separatist movements in South Asia are dominated by two major radical ideologies, Islamist and leftist.

Maoist and communist organizations in Nepal and India had developed strong ties, and their influence remained strong in border towns.

Apparently, the Tamil separatist movements in Sri Lanka and India do not have any religious or leftist agenda; in fact, the movements are working under nationalist ideologies. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) killed hundreds of Muslims and Buddhists in eastern Sri Lanka in the late 1990s to achieve domination. They also forced the closure of Buddhist temples and mosques.

These radical movements are increasing their influence in those border areas across the region where conflicts have existed for a long time. The process of radicalization is also gripping the peaceful border regions where such movements were earlier non-existent. For example, radical groups are concentrating

on both sides of the southern Pak-India borders;³¹ jihadi groups are trying to establish their networks in Pakistani border towns of Omer Kot and Metthi, which are Hindu-dominated areas. A similar situation prevails on the other side of the border, where Sangh Parivar—an association of Hindu nationalist and extremist organizations—is gaining influence.³² The concentration of right-wing radical organizations on the border can create a security problem and lead to communal violence as Muslims and Hindus settled on either sides of the border can cross over to the other side. This and any consequent violence could have serious implications for Pakistan-India relations, which have not fully recovered since the November 2008 Mumbai attacks.

The South Asian states have used all options to curb these movements, employing political means as well as the use of military force. India, in its northeast, and Pakistan, along its western borders, are trying to resolve the issues but so far neither country has succeeded. One hurdle is the fact that these insurgent and separatist movements find havens among the minority ethnic and religious communities, which are present on both sides of the border. This aspect makes it difficult for either state to address the issue solely, without support from the other bordering state. The states' failure to address the economic and social grievances of the populations in the border regions have also contributed to the aggravation in the border regions.

Countries in South Asia also lack confidence in each other, which makes it difficult to form any joint mechanism to counter common threats. India and Pakistan are yet to reach any solution on the Kashmir issue, and chances of any immediate headway seem remote after the suspension of composite dialogue process between the two countries after the Mumbai attacks. The delay in forging a joint mechanism allows the opportunity to radical groups to function and even enhance their capabilities.

Countries in the region must understand that radicalization is a force that makes stances inflexible on all sides and can become the main hurdle to resolving issues through political means.

Radicalization of the region's separatist movements can add to the complexity of border disputes. Radicalization also eventually starts to travel inside the country from the borders. Talibanization in Pakistan, Islamization in Bangladesh, the Maoist and Naxalite nexus in India, Hindu radicalism in Nepal and the sectarian and separatist threat in Iran cannot be countered without effective internal strategies and mechanisms, and, most importantly, inter-state cooperation.


South Asian states mainly have post-colonial border disputes. They have not only failed to resolve those disputes but have also been unable to improve the socio-political and economic conditions of those living in border regions. This has increased a sense of alienation among the ethnic communities living in border areas, and forced them to look inwards, cementing their bonds and support structures with their ethnic kinsmen across the border. The chronic deprivations are making room for radicalization among them. An early solution of the boundary disputes could help counter radicalization in the border regions. At the same time, states also need to effectively address the grievances of the ethnic minorities and bring them into the political and social mainstream.

South Asian states are mainly opting for the use of force to combat the separatist, insurgent and radical movements in border areas. These measures alone have not produced the desired result until now. The most recent example is the failure of a joint effort by US, NATO and Pakistani troops to eliminate Taliban and Al Qaeda militants from along the Pak-Afghan border areas. Sri Lanka seems to be the only success story in the region so far where security forces have captured almost all the territory earlier held by the

LTTE. But the future of the ethnic Tamil community is still at stake in absence of any rehabilitation plan to bring them back into the mainstream of the political discourse.

The disputed, and even settled, borders cannot be left for the militants to establish their parallel systems there, merely because the states sharing the border lack mutual trust needed to come up with a joint strategy. Countries in the region need to look beyond their own strategies to counter growing radical threats on borders. The radical movements stand to gain if the states offer lax, indifferent and myopic responses to them apparently on account of border disputes. Well-coordinated, inclusive and proactive inter-state approaches on the regional level are imperative to deal with the issue of militancy, violence and radicalization in bordering areas across South Asia. These approaches should be supplemented at home by local initiatives involving the people.

If the US can plan to pursue the regional approach in Afghanistan and Pakistan's tribal areas in an effort to defuse the Taliban insurgency, there is no reason why the South Asian countries cannot opt for it, especially when they already have a joint regional forum, South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC).³³ This forum can be used to develop common strategies to counter radicalization and deal with the insurgent and separatist movements at the regional and local levels.



Annex**Major insurgent and separatist movements in South Asia**

No	Movement	Country	Nature	Border
1	Arakan liberation movement ³⁴	Myanmar	Politico-religious/ separatist	Bangladesh-Myanmar border
2	Assam liberation movement ³⁵	India	Ethno-nationalist/ separatist	India's borders with Bangladesh and Bhutan
3	Bodoland liberation movement ³⁶	India	Ethno-nationalist/ separatist	India's borders with Myanmar and Bhutan
4	Balochistan separatist movement	Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran	Ethno-nationalist/ separatist	Afghanistan-Iran-Pakistan borders
5	Chittagong Hills Tracts ³⁷	Bangladesh	Nationalist/separatist	Bangladesh-Myanmar border
6	Jihadi movements	Bangladesh	Insurgents	Bangladesh's borders with India and Myanmar
7	Jihadi movements	Pakistan	Insurgents	Line of Control (LoC), Pakistan's borders with Afghanistan and India
8	Khalistan movement ³⁸	India	Politico-religious nationalist/separatist	The border region between the Indian and Pakistan Punjab
10	Kashmir liberation movement ³⁹	India, Pakistan	Politico-religious nationalist/separatists	LoC
11	Left wing extremism ⁴⁰	Bangladesh	Left wing radical	Bangladesh-India border
12	Maoists movement ⁴¹	Nepal, India	Left wing radical	India-Nepal border
13	Manipur liberation movement ⁴²	India	Ethno-nationalist/ separatist	India-Myanmar border

14	Mizoram liberation movement ⁴³	India	Ethno-nationalist/separatist	India-Bangladesh border
15	Meghalaya insurgent movement ⁴⁴	India	Ethno-nationalist	India-Bangladesh border
16	Nagaland liberation movement ⁴⁵	India	Ethno-nationalist/separatist	India-Myanmar border
17	Naxalites ⁴⁶	India	Left Wing radical	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inside India • India's borders with Bangladesh and Nepal
18	Sangh Parivar ⁴⁷	India	Hindu religious fundamentalist	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inside India • India's borders with Pakistan and Nepal
19	Taliban	Afghanistan, Pakistan	Politico-religious insurgents	Pak-Afghan border
20	Tamil liberation movement ⁴⁸	Sri Lanka	Ethno-nationalist/separatist	Maritime boundary between Sri Lanka and India
21	Tamil Nadu liberation movement ⁴⁹	India	Ethno-nationalist separatist	Maritime boundary between Sri Lanka and India
22	Tripura liberation movement ⁵⁰	India	Politico-religious separatist	India-Bangladesh border
23	Tripura-Bengali liberation movement ⁵¹	India	Ethno-nationalist separatist	India-Bangladesh border
24	Turkistan liberation movement ⁵²	China	Politico-religious Separatist	China-Pakistan border
25	Pashtun nationalist movement ⁵³	Afghanistan, Pakistan	Ethno-political nationalist	Afghanistan-Pakistan border

Notes

- ¹ *Pakistan Security Report 2008*, Pak Institute for Peace Studies, Islamabad, January 2009, p. 23.
- ² Rohingyas are descendants of Arab and Persian traders who arrived in Myanmar between the 9th and 15th centuries.
- ³ The temporary demarcation line between the Indian- and Pakistani-administered Kashmir, arranged with UN assistance at the end of the Pakistan-India war of 1947-48.
- ⁴ Uighurs are a Turkic Muslim ethnic community concentrated in China's Xinjiang province.
- ⁵ Rob Johnson, *A Region in Turmoil*, (New Delhi: Viva Books, 2006), p. 15.
- ⁶ Rob Johnson, p. 16.
- ⁷ Oxford English Dictionary, Ninth edition, 2002.
- ⁸ John Richard Thackrah, *Dictionary of Terrorism*, (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 127.
- ⁹ Iain McLean and Alistair McMillan, *Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics*, 2003.
- ¹⁰ "South Asia Border commanders declare truce," BBC News, August 25, 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/430087.stm, last accessed on January 27, 2010.
- ¹¹ "Bangladesh to protest over India survey in its waters," Dawn, Islamabad, December 27, 2008.
- ¹² Julie Clothier, "Myanmar Muslims stay put in Bangladesh despite hardships," AFP, August 2, 2008.
- ¹³ India and China fought a brief but bloody war in 1962 over their disputed Himalayan border, while Pakistan and India have fought two major wars, in 1965 and 1971, and a limited war over Kargil in 1999.
- ¹⁴ Arunachal Pradesh is the eastern-most state on India's northeast frontier. Although entirely administered by India, it is claimed by China. Aksai Chin is administered by China and claimed by India. Aksai Chin was historically part of the Himalayan kingdom of Ladakh until Ladakh was annexed by Kashmir in the 19th century. One of the main causes of the 1962 Sino-India war was India's discovery of a road China had built through the region, which India considers its territory.
- ¹⁵ China again spurned India's claim over Arunachal Pradesh during the visit to China by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in January 2008 but both sides agreed to enhance trade and economic ties.
- ¹⁶ Most of the Maoist groups in India have links with Maoists in Nepal, similarly Hindu radicals in Nepal have ties with groups in India. For more details see reports on Nepal and South Asia at: http://www.san-pips.com/new/index.php?action=san&id=sa_1
- ¹⁷ South Asia Assessment 2003, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/southasia/index.html>, last accessed on January 27, 2010.
- ¹⁸ Manak Sarkar, chief minister of the Indian state of Tripura claimed that 26 militant camps were operating in Bangladesh and facilitating infiltrations into India. Daily *Nawa-e-Waqt*, Lahore, September 23, 2006.
- ¹⁹ For details see Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden*, (Penguin Press, 2004).
- ²⁰ Muhammad Amir Rana and Rohan Gunaratna, *Al-Qaeda Fights Back: Inside Pakistani Tribal Areas*, (Islamabad: PIPS, 2008).
- ²¹ Daily *Mashriq*, Peshawar, November 7, 2005.
- ²² Kanchan Lakshman & Sanjay K. Jha, "India-Bangladesh: Restoring Sovereignty on Neglected Borders," <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/faultlines/volume14/articele7.htm>, last accessed on June 14, 2007.
- ²³ *Vijay Times* reports that smugglers are sending highly radioactive "yellowcake", or partially processed, uranium, used in making nuclear weapons, to Nepal through the clandestine narcotic route via the Jharkhand-Bihar-West Bengal conduit, and it is suspected that the destination might be Al Qaeda. http://www.wmdinsights.com/I6/I6_SA2_SmugglingOfUranium.htm, last accessed on August 2, 2007.
- ²⁴ Associated Press of Pakistan, February 28, 2008.
- ²⁵ Muhammad Amir Rana and Rohan Gunaratna, *Al-Qaeda Fights Back: Inside Pakistani Tribal Areas*.
- ²⁶ Jaideep Saikia, *Anatomy of Conspiracy, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 25, (Taylor & Francis, 2002), pp. 185-197.
- ²⁷ Both groups have their ideological base in Pakistan.
- ²⁸ Bangladeshis Sneak into India, *Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, March 11, 2002.
- ²⁹ Daily *Ummat*, Karachi, April 23, 2007. A statement by Syed Salahuddin, head of United Jihad Council, Kashmir.
- ³⁰ Also known as Jundallah, headed by Abdel Malik Regi, who was exiled from Iran.
- ³¹ The northern land border begins in the Thar desert in the province of Sindh and is separated in the south from the salt flats of the Rann of Kutch by a boundary that was first delineated in 1923-24.
- ³² "Hindu extremism reach near Pakistani borders," daily *Nawa-i-Waqt*, Lahore, February 9, 2005.
- ³³ The eight SAARC members are: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, India and Sri Lanka. China and Iran have been granted status of observer with the organization.
- ³⁴ Arakan liberation movement began in 1948, but gathered momentum in March 1978 when the Burmese government launched a campaign in Arakan to check illegal immigrants. The action was seen as an attempt to expel Muslims from the territory.

- ³⁵ New Delhi has cited migration from Bangladesh as the source of militancy in the Indian state of Assam. Dhaka denies the charge. The movement that started with the demand to deport illegal migrants also witnessed the birth, in 1979, of the militant outfit, the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA).
- ³⁶ The Bodos, an ethnic group in India's northeast, demand a separate Bodo state in Assam.
- ³⁷ The Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), a southeastern mountainous region of Bangladesh, spreads over 13,295 square kilometers. When the Bangladeshi government started to take over tribal land with large-scale settlement of landless Bengalis, the native Jumma people reacted by launching an armed resistance.
- ³⁸ The Khalistan movement was launched in Indian Punjab in the 1970s and '80s to create "The Land of the Pure" in all Punjabi-speaking areas contiguous to the borders of Indian and Pakistani Punjab. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh conceded in March 2008 that Sikh extremists were still active, *Dawn*, March 6, 2008.
- ³⁹ Kashmiri separatist groups are divided into two categories, one support the Indian- and Pakistani-administered Kashmir to become an independent state, while the other is striving for the merger of Indian-held Kashmir into Pakistan.
- ⁴⁰ Bangladesh is also a victim of left-wing extremism in small pockets of the country's western districts. The main objective of these elements is to form a socialist republic of Bangladesh.
- ⁴¹ The Maoists won the April 10, 2008 elections and formed the government after the monarchy was thrown out.
- ⁴² In the Indian state of Manipur, militancy originated in protest against the forcible merger of the former Manipur kingdom with India. In 1964, the United National Liberation Front was formed with the objective of ending discrimination against Manipur, which was designated as a state only in 1972, nearly 23 years after its merger with India.
- ⁴³ Mizoram, which was part of the state of Assam before it was made a separate state in 1987, experienced militancy after the Union government of India failed to respond positively to its demand for assistance during the massive 1958-59 Mautam Famine. The Mizo National Front (MNF), led by its legendary leader Laldenga, launched the movement on February 28, 1966 and demanded independence for Mizoram.
- ⁴⁴ Militant groups in India's northeastern state of Meghalaya are struggling to transform Meghalaya into a state exclusively for the Khasi tribe and free it from the domination of the Garo tribe. Another objective is to fight against the presence of 'outsiders', as they feel that Khasi youth are deprived of the fruits of development in the state.
- ⁴⁵ Long before the British left India, Nagas considered themselves to be an independent people and petitioned the British to declare an independent country for them. After being snubbed by both the British and the new regime in New Delhi, Nagas, under the leadership of the Naga National Council (NNC), started to fight for independence in 1956.
- ⁴⁶ The Naxalites is a loose term used to define groups waging a violent struggle on behalf of landless laborers and tribal people against landlords. Many groups operate under different names. The Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) is the political outfit that propagates the Naxalite ideology. Specific groups have front organizations, such as the Indian People's Front.
- ⁴⁷ 'Sangh Parivar' is the collective name used to describe a family of powerful Hindu nationalist organizations. The most influential groups in the Parivar are the Rashtriya Swamsevak Sangh (RSS), Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), Bajrang Dal, and the Bharatiya Janta Party.
- ⁴⁸ The Tamils in Sri Lanka have been subjected to oppression by successive Sinhala-dominated governments. The resettlement of a large numbers of Sinhalese in the eastern province also offended the Tamils.
- ⁴⁹ The objective of the movement is to achieve liberation of Tamil Nadu from what several groups united under the banner of Tamil National Liberation Army see as Hindu Brahminist tyranny.
- ⁵⁰ Migration of Hindus from the British-ruled East Bengal—which subsequently became East Pakistan and then Bangladesh—to the Indian state of Tripura is believed to be responsible for pushing the once dominant indigenous tribal people in the state to the minority status. This development sparked a violent backlash among the indigenous people. Starting in 1970, militant groups emerged in the state, demanding the indigenous people's rights in the presence of the Bengali population, which is accused of dominating the political and economic affairs of Tripura.
- ⁵¹ The United Bengali Liberation Movement was formed in October 1999. The objective of the movement is protection of the Bengali population in Tripura from attacks by terrorist outfits such as the National Liberation Front of Tripura.
- ⁵² Uighur militants have been striving for decades to establish an independent East Turkestan in the Chinese province of Xinjiang.
- ⁵³ The Pashtun nationalist movement remained active during the 1960s and 70s, struggling for a greater Pashtun state. One of its objectives was the merger of the Pashtun majority areas in Pakistan with Afghanistan.

About Institute

The Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) is an independent, not-for-profit non governmental research and advocacy think-tank. An initiative of leading Pakistani scholars, researchers and journalists, PIPS conducts wide-ranging research and analysis of political, social and religious conflicts that have a direct bearing on both national and international security. The PIPS approach is grounded in field research. Our surveys and policy analyses are informed by the work of a team of researchers, reporters and political analysts located in different areas of conflict in Pakistan. Based on information and assessments from the field, PIPS produces analytical reports, weekly security updates and policy briefings containing practical recommendations targeted at key national and international decision-makers. We also publish survey-based reports and books, providing in-depth analysis of various conflicts or potential conflicts.



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